No More Learning

This brings us back to the Sadean revolutionary who deploys all the resources of reason in service of the most par- ticular, evanescent and selfish interests and, what is more, clothes those selfish interests in the guise of universal principles, this being a part of the titillation his perversions provide--here is the will to power gone mad, the possibility of the universal as something that is inherently egalitarian fades away, and all that can remain is the im- position of the universal by force as a proton pseudos, the more or less arbitrary basis for the ascent of the particular to universal heg- emony or, as Wirth says, for "the propensity of the creaturely, as the child of the super-creaturely, to shun the abyss of its origin and the abyss of its future and move towards itself and affirm the presence only of itself. "33
Now, one may interject that Schelling's thinking as described here really does not seem to differ all that significantly from the no- tion of radical evil Kant develops. Schopenhauer certainly saw it
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this way and, in his typically vituperative manner, criticized Schell- ing for merely rehashing what Kant had already said more clearly and consequentially. But here Schopenhauer is surely wrong be- cause he fails to acknowledge--or tacitly rejects--the way that Schelling returns evil to its status as a fundamental aspect of being and not only of one being. In other words, by transposing the divine structure onto human beings, Schelling immediately ties the whole to the part, whether in harmony or conflict and, in so doing, avoids the division of the concept of evil into metaphysical and moral spheres--here the moral is the metaphysical and vice versa. Schell- ing thereby returns the question of evil to its wider ontological con- text while incorporating the stronger concept of moral evil he found in Kant. 34 This combination lays the foundations for reviving the problem of theodicy by combining a palliative normativity that le- gitimates the whole with a force that threatens actively to under- mine all normativity.
The End of Theodicy?
What concept of theodicy does this combination create? Commenta- tors may be divided as to its exact nature, but almost all agree that Schelling is working within the traditional confines of theodicy. They note that the transposition of an apparently stable structure in God to human beings as an unstable structure absolves God of respon- sibility for evil and, thus, fulfills one of the primary conditions of theodicy. 35 But they also note that the transfer of the locus of evil to human beings as a positive concept still leaves the question open of why God should permit this evil in his creation, a sort of evil that, by its very nature, presents a challenge to God--as a positively nega- tive concept, evil now seems to have a far greater power because it always threatens to undermine God. Evil is no longer an obedient servant but a surly and dangerous one who seeks to rid himself of his master.
The commentators' difficulty stems from nagging doubts about whether the attempt to combine traditional theodicy with a much more aggressive concept of evil, one that seems to make a mockery of theodicy, is in fact possible. From this standpoint, it seems that Schelling's daring combination of incompatibles in fact fails. Even
Heidegger, one of Schelling's most formidable (and, at least initially, sympathetic) readers, sees Schelling's failure precisely in his attempt to remain within the tradition of theodicy, and for Heidegger that means systematic thought, while asserting a much more generous ac- count of freedom and the reality of evil that is inseparable from it:
That is the difficulty which emerges more and more clearly in Schelling's later efforts with the whole of philosophy, the difficulty which proves to be an impasse (Scheitern). And this impasse is evident since the factors of the jointure of Being, ground and existence and their unity not only become less and less compatible, but are even driven so far apart that Schelling falls back into the rigidified tradition of Western thought without creatively transforming it. But what makes this failure so significant is that Schelling thus only brings out difficul- ties which were already posited in the beginning of Western philoso- phy, and because of the direction which this beginning took were pos- ited by it as insurmountable. For us this means that a second beginning becomes necessary through the first, but is possible only in the complete transformation of the first beginning, never by just let- ting it stand. 36
Heidegger suggests that the very dissonance Schelling discovers in the Philosophical Investigations simply cannot admit of reconcilia- tion with the notion of system, that it leads to the final destruction of this notion since it shows with unparalleled acuity that which system must ignore or sacrifice in order to maintain its own legiti- macy. This fundamental freedom, a freedom that cannot be possible other than as an affront to system, refuses to obey, for this refusal is its very essence, an essence that is expressed by the ground and the anarchic impulse it "contains"; hence, any system must also seem to be merely a fiction, a "ruling by fiat" whose authority can never be absolute, can never achieve the apparent calm of Leibnizian reason or Hegelian reconciliation.
? Zi? zek comes to a view that is not that much different but strikes more directly at the key problem of contingency. As we noted be- fore, the apparent contingency lingering in the emergence of the word must cast a long shadow on any attempt to assert even God's necessity; indeed, this is the most sensitive point of the entire anal- ysis. How can God's emergence into existence be both necessary
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and contingent: In other words, can a coherent concept of God suc- cessfully, that is, harmoniously, combine necessity and freedom? And if, indeed, God's emergence into existence is somehow neces- sary and free, does this necessity not in a very significant way undermine the homology between God and human beings that Schelling is otherwise careful to preserve? One might argue with some justice that this difference is so immense that it vitiates the en- tire comparison and points to what seems to be an indelicately forced aspect of Schelling's thought, a purely dogmatic and, as such, seemingly arbitrary desire to preserve the most important elements in the tradition of theodicy against an analysis of human being that cannot but destroy them. 37
From this point of view (and perhaps this point of view only) one is hard pressed to distinguish ? Zi? zek from Heidegger in regard to the es- sential thrust of argument, since both identify the basic frailty of Schelling's attempt at reconciliation in the problematic nature of his assertion of a homology between God and human beings that seems to admit of its own impossibility and, in doing so, tends to undermine the identity between God and human beings that must be the crucial foundation for any form of theodicy. If God is simply not like human beings, and the question of necessity and contingency raises the specter of this difference like none other, there may be no way to rec- oncile the two, and no way to explain how all the qualities that are in- timately connected with God could in any way be connected with human beings other than as useful fictions or projections that are in- distinguishable from fictions.
Coda
But a different view may be argued if one risks the conjecture that Schelling in effect redefines theodicy as a way of preserving it within the context of his much more adventurous concept of evil. To explore this conjecture, we have to look at the purpose of theodicy, the ends to which theodicy is put, once again.
We have already suggested that theodicy arises as the bulwark of the modern scientific revolution; its purpose is to make the broadest claims for the intelligibility and accessibility of the world to human rationality and, thus, to human domination. The dream of mastering
nature and thereby overcoming the meanness of our mortal estate is underwritten by theodicy--absolute knowledge is possible, the human mind can accede to complete understanding because thought and being are one. This is the boldest claim of theodicy, and it is also a very controversial claim about theodicy itself because it assumes that God becomes the tool of the philosophers, of an eros to domi- nate that has nothing of piety about it;38 that the notion of mastering nature is merely a coded way of expressing the ascent of human be- ings from their mortal estate to that of a god.
Kant scuppers this exuberance, and it has been argued that Kant in fact sees nothing more pernicious than the elevation of human beings to the status of gods. 39 But this may not be a fair statement. It seems to us much better to claim that Kant is terribly ambiguous, that his thinking shows the greatest tension between the desire to elevate and to level human beings, as noted previously, the desire to save the true nature of enlightenment aggression by curbing its most danger- ous excesses. In this Schelling is very much Kant's disciple and his philosophical journey reveals the intolerable nature of the tensions in Kant, their inherent instability. 40
In our opinion, the Philosophical Investigations is one of Schelling's most daring attempts to make sense of the tensions in Kant by re- interpreting their instability as the very essence of a theodicy of life, as the living surface of a whole justified by its vital dynamism. Here a central point for Schelling is precisely that a homology between God and man must not be possible; to the contrary, such a homology would be the highest expression of evil itself, a sort of cosmic suicide, because its achievement would mean not only the disappearance of God but that of man as well. What we suggest here, then, is that theo- dicy understood in the modern sense as ultimately demanding (and also despairing of) such a homology, whether openly or covertly, is indeed a most terrible form of evil, a leap into madness that seeks to close the universe at the cost of life itself; the search to become a god leaves human beings in the tatters of aging Oedipus, strangers to themselves and the world--this surely is the essence of evil as Schell- ing sees it. Hence, the corrosive irony is that the modern theodicy of life is indistinguishable from an evil condemnation of life (and, ulti- mately, of itself as an untenable and unfortunate fiction).
Schelling's daring reformulation of theodicy reflects a unique oscil- lation between this madness and a sobriety of reconciliation,
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between the desire to be a god and the desire to live as a human being, between the tragic and comic sides of human striving; Schelling's theodicy is one that sees struggle as the end of creation and the very wellspring of life. Imbalance and dissonance are of the essence and, without them, all turns into meaningless indifference, the Ungrund, a rejection of the constant interestedness that is life, its tirelessly changing fusion of contraction and expansion. As Schelling writes in the 1815 draft of the Ages of the World:
All life must pass through the fire of contradiction. Contradiction is the engine of life and its innermost essence. From this it follows that, as an old book says, all deeds under the sun are full of trouble and every- thing languishes in toil, yet does not become tired, and all forces inces- santly struggle against each other. Were there only unity and every- thing were in peace, then, truly nothing would want to stir itself and everything would sink into listlessness. 41
One might well accuse Schelling of being rather naive. But he is in fact showing a deeply Goethian respect for the integrity of struggle, for the recognition that evil emerges from the unquenchable desire to overcome the ambiguous terms of human life in a brutal pursuit of quietude, a quietude that can only be a form of self-destruction, whether it emerges in monastic self-immolation or in the more brutal pursuits of domination that haunt the history of the twentieth- century as well as our ceaseless striving for control over our bodies and the earth.
Hence, the reformulation of theodicy Schelling advances is one that respects the whole as a necessarily free and unstable interplay of essentially tragic and comic forms of striving; it is a dynamic struc- ture which reflects Schelling's point that the absence of a complete homology between God and human being, expressed through the in- stability in the human synthesis of ground and existence, is the grave dissonance that works life, the evil that works good.
But Heidegger and ? Zi? zek cannot be so easily dismissed. For has Schelling merely renewed the traditional view of evil as servant of the good in a remarkably circuitous way, has he merely engaged in a complex subterfuge that has not managed to conceal itself all that well? One might respond in typically Schellingian fashion by sug- gesting that he both does and does not. While Schelling invokes this
traditional view, he also seems to undermine it by suggesting that evil is not a loyal systemic servant but rather one who always threatens to become master and may (and rather ambiguously must not) have the power to do so. For Schelling, fundamental instability is of the essence of theodicy; the ineradicable possibility of collapse creates the manifold tensions from which the whole emerges as a vi- brant plenitude. Indeed, these manifold tensions--the tensions of restless life itself--must be present at every moment; since instabil- ity endows the moment with an alluring promise of being that is the foremost gift of theodicy, a theodicy always threatened and ever re- stored, at once ending and beginning anew.
INTRODUCTION | xxix
Translators' Note
The clumsiest literal translation is a thousand times more useful than the prettiest paraphrase. --Vladimir Nabokov
It has become customary to preface translations with a statement of impossibility, that the translation simply cannot capture the original, that translation is a traitor to the work translated (traduttore tradi- tore) or that all translation is "merely" an interpretation tainted by limited knowledge, time, and so forth. All three statements, and the great number of variations on them that may be found in any sam- pling of contemporary translations, constitute a modern variant of humility topos; as such they allude to an act of veneration that inevi- tably corrupts to the extent the ever mysterious "grace," by which the blessed tongue may speak the truth freely across the barriers of alien customs and grammar, falters or is unexpectedly withdrawn. While we have no wish to quarrel with these well-worn conventions of the translator's art, we do wish to make a claim that heads in the opposite direction, that suggests the vitality of translation as a means of discovering a text, of bringing the original alive in a new and unac- customed form; every worthy translation is in this sense a restora- tion of an original that may never have existed as such but appears refreshed and refurbished through the translator's efforts if, indeed, they meet with success.
Now, Schelling's celebrated essay on freedom is a notoriously difficult work, and we have tried to hold a fine line between not tainting or masking its difficulty and making it sufficiently access- ible to an audience perhaps only slightly familiar with the conven- tions and habits of writing prevalent in German philosophical dis- course at the beginning of the nineteenth century (and, even for those with more than passing familiarity, Schelling's style can be quite opaque). But, as a practical matter, we have generally pre- ferred to retain the genuine flavor of the original. In particular, we
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have sought to preserve its syntactic structure and idiosyncrasy as generously as possible on all levels, from the simple phrase to the exceedingly complex agglomerations that emerge and transform themselves in the course of Schelling's argument. And this move- ment from the simple phrase to a broader series of echoes of that phrase, both in sound and syntax, is one of the more remarkable features of the treatise's linguistic texture; here we have a carefully wrought structure in which internal echoes and changes in tone play a significant role, one that is indeed extremely hard to capture effectively but that merits the attempt.
To that end, we have thus erred in many ways on the side of the ostensibly more literalist attitude to translation that marks the re- cent Cambridge edition of Kant's works as well as some of the more distinguished translations produced by those following what one might call the "Straussian" imperative to capture the strangeness of the original text and not to efface its linguistic peculiarity (or, for that matter, clumsiness) through palliative simplification or con- descending colloquialism. In this respect, we have sought to avoid the undoubted excesses of hermeneutic approaches derived from Heidegger while not dismissing the virtue of enhancing strange- ness through explanatory paraphrase; yet, we usually have thought it best to keep paraphrase of this nature to the notes or certain combinations (like, e. g. , "beings in the world" for Weltwe- sen) that may in turn be considered deliberatively provocative or overly Heideggerian or, indeed, "mock-Heideggerian. " The upshot is that our translation tends in general toward a painstaking mim ? e- sis of the German text that makes as many sacrifices to English as seemed necessary to avoid loss of the translation's greatest ally, a reasonably idiomatic English prose; in other words, our translation presents Schelling "warts and all" but in what we hope is a suffi- ciently English manner that the warts are not simply all or do not overwhelm the whole.
This approach has led us to several difficult translation choices that merit some discussion in advance, either because the words at issue are ones that have been traditional sources of perplexity to translators or because our way of using them departs from the previ- ous reception of the text or indicates philosophical choices that must be made explicit.
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Anarchy, Anarchical
We have used "anarchy" and "anarchical" to translate, respectively, das Regellose and regellos. This may prove to be a very controversial choice since James Gutmann's rendering of these terms as "unruliness" or "un- ruly" has been widely accepted in discussions of the text. 1 Gutmann's rendering has the virtue of translating the German into cognate English and thereby also preserving Schelling's contrast between "rule" and "unruliness" where an equivalent contrast between "arche ? " and "an- archy" is not possible. Yet, the problem with "unruliness" is twofold. The word seems to us to sound increasingly archaic in modern Ameri- can English and, where it does not, to have largely more benign associa- tions than the German may be said to have since, for example, unruli- ness can refer to children (or, for that matter, mischievous spirits) and, then, in a gently ironic way, one suggesting perhaps some degree of be- mused approval. We chose instead to emphasize what we consider the more striking ambivalence suggested by the word "anarchy," its range of reference both to a terrifying and liberating absence of order. In our view, this ambivalence captures more powerfully the tension between ground and existence, between contraction and expansion, that is such a central aspect of Schelling's thought in a way that "unruliness" or "un- ruly" cannot. Moreover, the broad application of the word "anarchy" to a number of contexts (political, historical, philosophical) enhanced its appeal for us, since it emphasizes the great sweep of Schelling's trea- tise, that the latter is neither so hermetic nor so divorced from immedi- ate reality that it must remain on dusty shelves as just another aban- doned metaphysics or shipwreck of thought appropriate primarily for the historian of philosophy.
Essence, being, and Being
Jason Wirth has recently pointed out that Schelling's use of the Ger- man Wesen is a great source of difficulty for the translator, and we could not agree with him more. Wesen in German philosophical writ- ing has had strong associations with the Latin essentia and, as dem- onstrated by Bonitz's celebrated translation of Aristotle's Metaphys- ics, the Greek ousia as well. Both essentia and ousia may be (and have
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been) translated into English as "essence," as that "what-ness" of a thing that distinguishes it as the thing it is, as that definition which gives the thing the general identity it has. Hence, Wesen translated as "essence" refers to an abstract universal, something that describes things in time, where they are subject to the cycle of generation and decay, but which, as a condition of its being able to do so, must be freed from that cycle. Now, Wirth has suggested that to translate Schelling's use of Wesen as "essence" is inevitably to distort because Schelling does not associate Wesen with an abstract universal; in- deed, according to Wirth, Wesen for Schelling is fundamentally dy- namic, naming "the tension between present being (existence) and the simultaneous intimation of that which is as no longer being (the past) and that which is as not yet being (the future). " Wirth's solution to this problem--one he freely admits is problematic--is to avoid use of the word "essence" to translate Wesen in favor of "being" with the definite or indefinite article as required. 2
While we appreciate the validity of the problem Wirth identifies and have followed him in practice to a significant degree, we have nonetheless chosen a somewhat different guiding principle in our translation; namely, we have translated Wesen either by "essence" or by "being" depending on the particular shade of meaning Schelling seems to emphasize in a given instance. We freely admit, however, that this shade of meaning has not at all been easy to isolate with as- surance in many of these instances. For example, we have chosen to retain the conventional translation of the title of the essay as a trea- tise regarding the "essence of human freedom" rather than the "being of human freedom. " We have done so because it seems to us that in this instance Schelling is indeed seeking to express a sort of "abstract universal" to the extent the essay is intended to set out the what-ness of human freedom, a definition that is not subject to time but, indeed, in a sense determines what time is or may be. In other cases, where Schelling refers to what is quite evidently a form of being originating or existing within a narrative horizon, that is, within some interpreta- tion of time, we have used the term "being. " In this latter respect, one of the most difficult decisions we made involves reference to the Wesen of the ground as a form of being. But we chose this usage pre- cisely to avoid the assimilation of Schelling's characterization of the relation between ground and existence to that between essence and existence, an assimilation inimical to the polysemy inherent in this
LOVE AND SCHMIDT | TRANSLATORS' NOTE | xxxv
characterization which both suggests a similarity to the tradition (present here as a sort of conceptual "shadow") and a departure from it, since God's essence has traditionally been equivalent to his exis- tence and not (in a carefully qualified manner) prior to it.
Finally, where Schelling uses the substantive Sein, we have trans- lated it with the capitalized "Being" to avoid confusion between Wesen and Sein. In the case of the participial Seiendes, we have em- ployed a circumlocution, "that which has being. " Regarding both these choices, we have followed Wirth's practice in his translation of The Ages of the World.
Man, Mankind
Schelling very frequently uses the word Mensch to describe the whole species. We have translated this word throughout by "man" and its variants where necessary. Not only is this translation somewhat inac- curate--because Mensch does not refer to one of the sexes only, but, like the Greek anthro ? pos, to the species without regard to the sexes-- it also involves a degree of gender bias that is repugnant. And yet the demands of English have presented us with somewhat of a dilemma both grammatically and in regard to well-worn phrases like the rela- tion of "man to God. " Moreover, the strongest alternative we consid- ered, "human beings," is in many cases both unusual and cumber- some. While these may seem like exculpatory reasons themselves, we also want to point out that, as Judith Norman mentions in her translation of The Ages of the World, Mensch in the German philosoph- ical tradition was associated with a masculine subject, and this too seems to be present in the Philosophical Investigations. 3
In closing, we note that our translation follows Thomas Buchheim's excellent recent critical edition of the Philosophical Investigations, although we have not hesitated to check other editions where nec- essary. 4 We should also like to express our appreciation to the pre- vious translators of the Philosophical Investigations, from whose work we have learned a great deal, even if we have not infrequently made different choices, and, in this regard, we hope our choices prove worthy of their work.
PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS INTO THE ESSENCE OF HUMAN FREEDOM AND MATTERS CONNECTED THEREWITH
Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling
PREFACE
This collection will contain individual philosophical treatises by the author that have already been published in various places together with others, as yet unpublished. 1
Those already published in this volume are mostly idealist in con- tent. The first, Of the I as Principle of Philosophy or on the Uncondi- tioned in Human Knowledge, shows idealism in its most youthful guise and, perhaps, in a sense that it subsequently lost. At least the I is still taken everywhere as absolute or as identity of the subjective and objective and not as subjective.
The Letters on Dogmatism and Criticism (No. II), which appeared first in Niethammer's philosophical journal in 1796, contain a lively polemic against the then almost generally accepted and variously misused, so- called moral, proof of the existence of God from the point of view of the then no less generally prevailing opposition of subject and object. 2 For the author this polemic seems still to have its full force in regard to the way of thinking to which it refers. Not one of those who has re- mained at the same standpoint to this day has refuted it. However, the observations contained in the ninth letter at p. 178, et passim, concern- ing the disappearance of all oppositions of conflicting principles in the absolute, are the clear seeds of later and more positive views.
These show themselves in a more definite way in the Treatises in Ex- planation of the Idealism of the Doctrine of Science [Wissenschaftslehre] (No. III) which first appeared in the philosophical journal of Fichte and Niethammer, and which indisputably contribute much to the gen- eral understanding of this system, especially in the third treatise.
The following treatise, On the Relation of the Fine Arts to Nature (No. IV), is an academic speech of which only a small number of cop- ies were made on the first occasion of its appearance, so that it likely first will come into the hands of most more distant readers through this second printing. Incidentally, some new comments have been added at the end of the treatise. 3
OA V-VII
4 OA VIII-XII
The fifth treatise of this volume, Philosophical Investigations into the Essence of Human Freedom and Matters Connected Therewith, is new and appears in print here for the first time.
| The author finds but little to remark about this same treatise.
Since reason, thinking and knowing are accounted to the essence of the spiritual [geistig] nature first of all, the opposition of nature and spirit was properly considered first from this perspective. This way of considering the matter is adequately justified by the firm belief in a purely human reason, the conviction that all thinking and knowing are completely subjective and that nature is utterly without reason and thought, as well as the mechanistic kind of representation [Vor- stellungsart] prevalent everywhere in so far as even the dynamism that was revived by Kant changed again only into a higher mecha- nism and was in no way recognized in its identity with the spiritual. 4 This root of opposition has now been torn out, and securing of a more correct view can be calmly given over to general advancement toward better knowledge.
It is time that the higher or, rather, the genuine opposition emerge, that of necessity and freedom, with which the innermost centerpoint of philosophy first comes into consideration.
Since the author has confined himself wholly to investigations in the philosophy of nature | after the first general presentation of his system (in the Journal for Speculative Physics), the continuation of which was unfortunately interrupted by external circumstances, and after the beginning made in the work, Philosophy and Religion-- which, admittedly, remained unclear due to faulty presentation--the current treatise is the first in which the author puts forth his concept of the ideal part of philosophy with complete determinateness. 5 Hence, if that first presentation should possess any importance, he must first place alongside it this treatise, which, according to the na- ture of its topic, must already contain deeper disclosures about the entire system than all more partial presentations.
Although up to now the author had nowhere expressed himself re- garding the main points that come to be spoken of in this treatise, the freedom of the will, good and evil, personality, and so on (excepting the one work, Philosophy and Religion), this has not prevented the at- tribution to him of definite opinions regarding these matters by oth- ers as they saw fit, even when wholly inappropriate to the content of
that--as it seems utterly ignored--work. Unsolicited, so-called fol- lowers may have brought forth many distortions as well, as in other so also in these matters, apparently in accordance with the basic principles of the author.
Indeed, only a complete, finished system should have, so it seems, adherents in the genuine sense. Until now the author has never estab- lished anything of the like, but rather has shown only individual fac- ets of such a system (and these often only in a particular, e. g. , polem- ical, connection as well). Hence, he has declared his works fragments of a whole, to perceive the interconnection of which required a finer gift of observation among intrusive followers and a better will among opponents than is commonly found in either. The only scientific pres- entation of his system, since it was not completed, was in its genuine intent understood by no one or by very few. Immediately after the ap- pearance of this fragment, there began slander and falsification on the one hand, and, on the other hand, clarification, adaptation and translation, of which that into a supposedly more brilliant language (since at the same time an entirely unrestrained poetic frenzy had taken hold of minds) was | the worst sort. Now it seems that a healthier time is again upon us. The unwavering, the diligent and the inner are again being sought. One is beginning in general to recognize for what it is the emptiness of those who have gamboled about with the phrases of the new philosophy like French stage heroes or who have gestured like tightrope walkers. At the same time, others have sung to death in all the market squares the new that has been seized upon, as if to the accompaniment of a barrel organ, and have finally aroused such a general disgust that they will soon find no audience remaining; especially if critics, who are, in passing, not ill-disposed, did not say that every unintelligible rhapsody in which some turns of phrase of a well-known writer have been brought together is com- posed in accordance with his fundamental principles. Let them rather treat each such writer as an original, which each fundamen- tally wishes to be, and which, in a certain sense, quite a few also are.
May this treatise thus serve to strike down, on the one hand, many prejudices and, on the other hand, much loose and shallow chatter.
Finally, we wish that those who have openly or furtively attacked the author from prejudice should now also present their points of view just as candidly as has happened here. If complete mastery of one's
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6 OA XIII,7
topic makes possible its free and technically rich [Kunstreich] develop- ment, then the artificial tergiversations [ku? nstliche Schraubenga? nge] of polemic indeed cannot be the form of philosophy. But we wish still more that the spirit of general endeavor secure itself ever more and that the sectarian spirit, which only too often prevails among Ger- mans, not impede achievement of a knowledge and point of view whose development always seemed destined for Germans and that was perhaps never nearer to them than now.
Munich, March 31, 1809 |
F. W. J. Schelling
Philosophical investigations into the essence of human freedom can in part address the correct concept of freedom in so far as the fact of freedom, no matter how immediately the feeling of which is im- printed in every individual, lies in no way so fully on the surface that, in order merely to express it in words, an uncommon clarity and depth of mind would not be required; in part, they can deal with the connection of this concept with the whole of a scientific worldview. 6 Since no concept can be defined in isolation, however, and only proof of its connection with the whole also confers on it final scientific com- pleteness, this must be preeminently the case with the concept of freedom, which, if it has reality at all, must not be simply a subordi- nate or subsidiary concept, but one of the system's ruling center- points: thus both these sides of the investigation coincide here, as everywhere. According to an old but in no way forgotten legend, the concept of freedom is in fact said to be completely incompatible with system, and every philosophy making claim to unity and wholeness should end up with the denial of freedom. 7 It is not easy to dispute general assurances of this kind; for who knows which limiting no- tions have already been linked to the word system, so that the claim asserts something which is of course very true, but also very trivial. Or, if opinion is this, that the concept of system opposes the concept of freedom generally and in itself, then it is curious that, since | indi- vidual freedom is surely connected in some way with the world as a whole (regardless of whether it be thought in a realist or idealist man- ner), some kind of system must be present, at least in the divine understanding, with which freedom coexists. To claim generally that this system can never be brought to clarity in human understanding is again to claim nothing, in so far as, according to how it is under- stood, the statement can be either true or false. It depends on deter- mination of the principle by which man comes to have knowledge of
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any kind; and what Sextus says in regard to Empedocles should be applied to this assumption: the learned and the ignorant can con- ceive of such an assumption as emerging from boastfulness and arro- gance, qualities which must be foreign to anyone having even meager practice in philosophy; yet one who starts out from the theory of na- ture and knows that it is a very ancient doctrine that like is recog- nized by like (which supposedly comes from Pythagoras but is also encountered in Plato, and was declared by Empedocles a good deal earlier) will understand that the philosopher claims such a (divine) understanding because, holding his understanding clear and un- dimmed by malice, he alone grasps the god outside through the god in himself. *,8 However, it is customary among those who are ill- disposed to science to understand thereby a kind of knowledge that is utterly abstract and inanimate like common geometry. It would be more succinct and decisive to deny system even in the will or under- standing of the primal being [Urwesen], to say that there are only in- dividual wills of which each determines its own center for itself and is, according to Fichte's expression, the absolute substance of each and every "I. "9 Reason, which strives for unity, like feeling, which in- sists on freedom and personality, is, however, always dismissed only by a fiat [Machtspruch] that lasts for a while and finally comes to ruin. Thus Fichte's doctrine had to attest to its recognition of | unity, if only in the paltry form of a moral ordering of the world, in which it nonetheless immediately fell into contradictions and unacceptable propositions. Therefore it seems that no matter how much may be brought to support this claim from a merely historical standpoint, namely, from previous systems--(we have not found anywhere argu- ments [Gru? nde] that were drawn from the essence of reason and knowledge themselves)--connection of the concept of freedom with the whole of a worldview will likely always remain the object of a nec- essary task without whose resolution the concept of freedom would teeter while philosophy would be fully without value. For this great task alone is the unconscious and invisible driving force [Trieb- feder] of all striving for knowledge, from the lowest to the highest; without the contradiction of necessity and freedom not only philoso- phy but each higher willing of the spirit would sink into the death that is proper to those sciences in which this contradiction has no
* Sext. Empir. adv. Grammaticos L. I, c. 13, p. 283, ed. Fabric.
application. To pull oneself out of the conflict by renouncing reason seems closer to flight than to victory. With the same justification, an- other could turn his back on freedom in order to throw himself into the arms of reason and necessity without there being cause for tri- umph on either the one or the other side.
The same opinion has been more decisively expressed in the phrase: the only possible system of reason is pantheism, but this is inevitably fatalism. * It is an undeniably excellent invention that with such labels entire viewpoints are described all at once. If one has found the right label for a system, the rest falls into place of itself, and one is spared the effort of examining what is characteristic about it more meticulously. As soon as such labels are given, with their | help even one who is ignorant can pass judgment on the most thought- through matters. Nevertheless, with such an extraordinary claim, all
depends on the closer determination of the concept. For thus it should likely not be denied that, if pantheism denotes nothing more than the doctrine of the immanence of things in God, every rational viewpoint in some sense must be drawn to this doctrine. 10 But pre- cisely the sense here makes the difference. That the fatalistic sense may be connected with pantheism is undeniable; but that this sense is not essentially connected with it is elucidated by the fact that so many are brought to this viewpoint through the most lively feeling of freedom. Most, if they were honest, would confess that, given how their ideas have been formed, individual freedom would seem to them to be inconsistent with almost all properties of a highest being, for example, with omnipotence. Through freedom a fundamentally unlimited power is asserted next to and outside of divine power, which is unthinkable according to these concepts. As the sun in the firmament extinguishes all the lights in the sky, even more so does in- finite extinguish every finite power. Absolute causality in One Being leaves only unconditional passivity to all others. This entails the de- pendence of all beings in the world on God, and that even their con- tinued existence is only an ever-renewed creation in which the finite being is produced not as an undefined generality but rather as this
* Earlier claims of this kind are well known. We leave open the question of whether Fr. Schlegel's statement in his work, On the Language and Wisdom of the Indian People, p. 141, "Pantheism is the system of pure reason," has perhaps another meaning.
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definite, individual being with such and such thoughts, strivings, ac- tions and no others. It explains nothing to say that God holds his om- nipotence in reserve so that man can act or that he permits freedom: if God were to withhold his omnipotence for a moment, man would cease to be. Is there any other way out of this argument than to save personal freedom within the divine being itself, since it is unthinkable in opposition to omnipotence; to say that man is not outside of, but rather in, God and that his activity itself belongs to the life of God?
It is exactly from this standpoint that mystics and religious natures of all times have attained to the belief in the unity of man with God, a be- lief that seems to accord with the deepest feeling as much as, | if not more than, with reason and speculation. Indeed, scripture itself finds exactly in the consciousness of freedom the seal and pledge of the be- lief that we are and live in God. Now, how can the doctrine necessarily be at odds with freedom, which so many have asserted in regard to man precisely in order to save freedom? 11
But another and, as commonly believed, more accurate explana- tion of pantheism is that it consists in a complete identification of God with things; a blending of creator and created being [Gescho? pf]12 from which yet another set of difficult and unbearable assertions is derived. However, a more total differentiation of things from God than that found in Spinoza, the presumed classic for this doctrine, is hardly conceivable. God is what is in itself and is understood only from itself; what is finite, however, is necessarily in another and can only be understood from this other. According to this differentiation, things are obviously not different from God simply in degree or through their limitedness, as it may appear, however, on a superfi- cial consideration of the doctrine of modifications, but toto genere. Whatever for that matter their relation to God may be, they are abso- lutely separate from God due to the fact that they can only exist in and according to another (namely, to Him), that their concept is a de- rived one that would not be possible at all without the concept of God; since, to the contrary, the latter concept alone is what is inde- pendent and original, alone what affirms itself, that to which every- thing else can be related only as affirmed, only as consequence to ground. Other properties of things, for example, their eternality, are valid solely on this assumption. God is eternal according to his na- ture, things only with him and as a result of his existence, that is, only in a derivative way. Precisely because of this difference, all individual
things together cannot amount to God, as commonly maintained, in so far as no sort of combination can transform what is by nature de- rivative into what is by nature original, just as little as the individual points on a circumference | when taken together can amount to that circumference, since as a whole, and according to its concept, it must necessarily precede them. Still more fatuous is the conclusion that in Spinoza even the individual thing is equivalent to God. Then, if even the strong expression that every thing is a modified God is to be found in Spinoza, the elements of the concept are so contradictory that, once they are combined together, the concept falls apart again. A modified, that is, derivative, God is not God in the genuine and emi- nent sense; due to this one addition, things return to their place whereby they are forever divided from God. The reason [Grund] for such misinterpretations, which in large measure other systems have also experienced, lies in the general misunderstanding of the law of identity or the meaning of the copula in judgment. It can at once be made comprehensible to a child that in no possible proposition (which according to the assumed explanation states the identity of the subject with the predicate) is stated a sameness [Einerleiheit] or even only an unmediated connection of these two--in so far as, for example, the proposition, "This body is blue," does not have the meaning that the body is, in and through that in and through which it is a body, also blue, but rather only the meaning that the same thing which is this body is also blue, although not in the same respect: and yet this assumption, which indicates complete ignorance regarding the nature [Wesen] of the copula, has constantly been made in rela- tion to the higher application of the law of identity in our time. For ex- ample, if one puts forward the proposition: "The perfect is the imper- fect," the meaning is this: the imperfect is not due to that through which it is imperfect, but rather through the perfect that is in it; how- ever, in our time it has this meaning: the perfect and the imperfect are the same [einerlei], all is the same [gleich] in itself, the worst and the best, foolishness and wisdom. Or: good is evil, which means to say roughly that evil does not have the power to exist through itself; that within evil which has being is (considered in and for itself) the good. This is interpreted in the following manner: the eternal difference between justice and injustice, virtue and vice is denied; both are logi- cally the same. | Or, if in a different turn of phrase, necessary and free things are explained as One, the meaning of which is that the
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same thing (in the final judgment) which is the essence of the moral world is also the essence of nature, then this is understood as follows: free things are nothing but forces of nature, coil springs [Springfeder], which, like any other, are subject to mechanism. The same thing oc- curs in the proposition that the soul is one with the body, which is interpreted as suggesting that the soul is material, air, ether, nerve fluid, and the like; for the reverse, that the body is the soul, or, in the preceding proposition, that the seemingly necessary is in itself free, though it is at once just as valid to infer from the proposition, is in a well-considered way set aside. Such misunderstandings, which, if they are not deliberate, presuppose a level of dialectical immaturity that Greek philosophy surpasses almost in its first steps, make recom- mending the thorough study of logic into a pressing duty. The ancients' profoundly meaningful [tiefsinnig] logic differentiated subject and predicate as what precedes and what follows (antecedens et conse- quens) and thereby expressed the real meaning of the law of identity. 13 This relation persists even in tautological propositions, if they are not to be utterly without meaning. Whoever says, "The body is body," surely thinks something different with respect to the subject of the sen- tence than with respect to the predicate; with respect to the former namely, unity, with respect to the latter, the individual properties con- tained within the concept of body that relate to it as antecedens to con- sequens. Just this is the meaning of another ancient explanation ac- cording to which subject and predicate are set against each other as what is enfolded to what is unfolded (implicitum et explicitum). * |
* Mr. Reinhold, too, who wanted to re-create all of philosophy through logic, does not, however, seem to recognize what Leibniz, in whose footsteps he claims to walk, said about the meaning of the copula in regard to the objec- tions of Wissowatius (Opp. T. I ed. Dutens, p. 11) and still toils away in this labyrinth, where he confuses identity with sameness. In a paper before us is the following passage from him: "According to the demands of Plato and Leibniz, the duty of philosophy consists in showing the subordination of the finite to the infinite, according to the demands of Xenophanes, Bruno, Spinoza, and Schelling, in showing the unconditional unity of both. " To the extent that unity in the sense of opposition is obviously supposed to de- note sameness here, I assure Mr. Reinhold that he is mistaken at least in re- gard to both of the last named. Where is there a more incisive expression for the subordination of the finite to | the infinite to be found than the one
However, defenders of the foregoing claim will now say that pantheism does not speak at all about the fact that God is everything (which is not easy to avoid according to the common notion of his properties), but rather about the fact that things are nothing, that this system abolishes all individuality. Yet it seems that this new de- termination contradicts the preceding one, for, if things are nothing, how is it possible to blend | God with them? Then there is nothing anywhere but pure unblemished divinity. Or, if there is nothing besides God (not simply extra, but rather also praeter Deum), how can he be all things, other than merely in words, so that the whole
by Spinoza referred to above? The living must take issue with calumnies against those who are no longer present--just as we expect that, in a simi- lar case, those living after us will in regard to us. I speak only of Spinoza and ask what should one call this practice of asserting fecklessly what one finds good about systems without being thoroughly acquainted with them, as if it were a trifle to read into them this or that creation of one's fancy? In ordinary, moral society it would be called unconscionable. According to another passage in the same paper, the fundamental mistake of all more re- cent philosophy, just as of earlier philosophy, lies for Mr. R. in the non- differentiation (in confusing, mixing up) of unity (identity) and connection (nexus), as well as of variety (diversity) and difference. This is not the first example where Mr. R. finds in his opponents exactly those errors that he has brought to them. This seems to be the way that he takes the necessary medicina mentis for himself; just as one wants to have examples that peo- ple with excitable imaginations can be cured by means of remedies that they have had others take for them. For who makes the error of confusing what one calls unity--but which really is sameness--with connection in re- gard to earlier and more recent philosophy more decidedly than precisely Mr. R. himself who interprets the inclusion of things in God as Spinoza's as- sertion of their alikeness [Gleichheit] and who generally holds non- diversity (according to substance or essence) for non-difference (accord- ing to form or logical concept). If Spinoza is actually to be understood in this manner, as Mr. R. interprets him, then the well-known proposition, that the thing and the concept of the thing are one, would have to be under- stood as if, for example, one could defeat the enemy with the concept of an army rather than with the army, and so forth, consequences which the se- rious and thoughtful man certainly finds himself to be too good for.
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concept seems therefore to dissolve and vanish into nothingness? In any event, the question arises as to whether much is gained by rais- ing such labels from the dead that, though they may indeed be ones to hold in honor in the history of heresy, yet appear to be much too crude a way of handling products of the mind in which, as in the most delicate natural phenomena, fine [leise] determinations cause essen- tial changes. It might still be open to doubt whether the last-noted de- termination should even be applicable to Spinoza. For, if besides (praeter) substance, he recognizes nothing but its mere affections, which he declares things to be, then this concept is admittedly a purely negative one that expresses nothing essential or positive. In- itially, however, it serves merely to determine the relationship of things to God but not what they may be, considered for themselves. Yet, from the absence of this determination, it cannot be concluded that things contain nothing positive whatsoever (even if always in a derived manner). Spinoza's most astringent expression is likely this here: The individual being is substance itself considered as one of its modifications, that is, consequences. 14 Let's posit now that infinite substance = A, and the same considered in one of its consequences = A/a: thus the positive in A/a is still A; but on this basis it does not follow that A/a = A, that is, that infinite substance considered in its conse- quences is the same [einerlei] as infinite substance considered as such; or, in other words, it does not follow that A/a is not a particular in- dividual substance (even though a consequence of A). This is of course not set out in Spinoza; but here we are speaking first about pantheism in general; hence, the question is only whether the view presented is inconsistent with Spinozism itself. This will be asserted with difficulty, since it has been admitted that Leibniz's monads, which are entirely what | is in the preceding expression A/a, are not a decisive aid against Spinozism. Many statements by Spinoza remain enigmatic without a supplement of this sort, for example, that the essence of the human soul is a living concept of God that is declared to be eternal (not transitory). Therefore, even if substance dwelt only momentarily in its other consequences A/ b, A/c . . . it would surely dwell in that consequence, in the human soul = a, eternally and, therefore, A/a would be divided from itself as A in an eternal and irreversible manner.
If, proceeding further, one wished now to explain the genuine character of pantheism as the denial not of individuality but of free- dom, then many systems otherwise essentially distinguished from
pantheism would be included in the concept of it. For, until the dis- covery of idealism, a genuine concept of freedom was lacking in all the more recent systems, in that of Leibniz as well as in that of Spi- noza;15 and a freedom--as it has been thought by many among us who also pride ourselves on having the liveliest feeling of it according to which it consists precisely in the mere rule of the intelligent princi- ple over sensuality and the desires--such a freedom might still be de- rived even from Spinoza, not in a forced way [nicht zur Not], but rather easily and even more decisively. Hence, it appears that the de- nial or assertion of freedom in general is based on something com- pletely other than the assumption or non-assumption of pantheism (the immanence of things in God). For, if, admittedly, it seems at first glance as if freedom, which was unable to maintain itself in opposi- tion to God, had perished in identity here, then one can say that this appearance is only the result of an imperfect and empty notion of the law of identity. This principle does not express a unity which, turning itself in the circle of seamless sameness [Einerleiheit], would not be progressive and, thus, insensate or lifeless. The unity of this law is an immediately creative one. In the relation of | subject and predicate we have already shown that of ground and consequence, and the law of the ground [Gesetz des Grundes] is for that reason just as original as the law of identity. 16 Therefore, the eternal must also be a ground immediately and as it is in itself. That of which the eternal is a ground through its being is in this respect dependent and, from the point of view of immanence, also something contained within the eternal. But dependence does not abolish independence, it does not even abolish freedom. Dependence does not determine its being and says only that the dependent, whatever it also may be, can be a con- sequence only of that of which it is a dependent; dependence does not say what the dependent is or is not. Every organic individual ex- ists, as something that has become, only through another, and in this respect is dependent according to its becoming but by no means ac- cording to its Being. It is not inconsistent, says Leibniz, that he who is God is at the same time begotten or vice versa; just as little is it a contradiction that he who is the son of a man is also himself a man. On the contrary, it would be far more contradictory, if the dependent or consequent were not independent. That would be a dependency with- out a dependent, a consequence without a consequent (consequentia absque consequente) and, thus, no real consequence, that is, the whole
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concept would abolish itself. The same is valid for the containment [Begriffensein] of one thing within another. An individual body part, like the eye, is only possible within the whole of an organism; none- theless, it has its own life for itself, indeed, its own kind of freedom, which it obviously proves through the disease of which it is capable. Were that which is contained in another not itself alive, then there would be containment without some thing being contained, that is, nothing would be contained. 17 A much higher standpoint is granted by consideration of the divine being itself, the idea of which would be fully contradicted by a consequence which is not the begetting, that is, the positing of, something independent. God is not a god of the dead but of the living. It is not comprehensible how the most perfect being could find pleasure even in the most perfect machine possible. However one may conceive of the way in which beings proceed from God, the way can never be mechanical, not mere production or instal- lation | whereby the product is nothing for itself; just as little can it be emanation where what flows out remains the same as that from which it flows, therefore nothing individual, nothing independent. The procession [Folge] of things from God is a self-revelation of God. But God can only reveal himself to himself in what is like him, in free beings acting on their own, for whose Being there is no ground other than God but who are as God is. He speaks, and they are there. Were all beings in the world but thoughts in the divine mind, they would have to be living already for that very reason. Thoughts are thus probably generated by the soul; but the thought generated is an inde- pendent power, continuing to act on its own, indeed, growing within the human soul in such a way that it restrains and subjugates its own mother. 18 Yet, the divine imagination, which is the cause of differen- tiation [Spezifikation] of beings in the world, is not like its human counterpart in that the latter grants merely ideal reality to created beings [Scho? pfungen]. The representations [Repra? sentationen] of the divinity can be independent beings only; for what is the limiting ele- ment in our representations [Vorstellungen] other than exactly that we see what is not independent? God looks at the things in them- selves. 19 Only the eternal is in itself as based in itself, will, freedom. The concept of a derived absoluteness or divinity is so little contra- dictory that it is rather the central concept of philosophy as a whole. Such a divinity befits nature. So little does immanence in God contradict freedom that precisely only what is free is in God to the
extent it is free, and what is not free is necessarily outside of [ausser] God to the extent that it is not free.
However inadequate such a general deduction is in itself for one who sees deeper, it surely makes it sufficiently clear that the denial of formal freedom is not necessarily connected with pantheism. We do not expect that one will oppose Spinozism to us. No small daring be- longs to the claim that system, as it is brought together in the head of any one individual, is the system of reason kat' eksoch ? en, the for- ever unchangeable. What, then, does one understand by Spinozism? Perhaps his entire doctrine as it is presented in the man's writings, therefore, for example, | in his mechanistic physics as well? Or, in ac- cordance with which principle does one wish to distinguish and di- vide up things where everything is supposed to be full of extraordi- nary and singular consistency? It will always remain a striking phenomenon in the history of the development of the German spirit that at any time the claim could have been made: the system, which heaps God together with things, the created being together with the creator (as it was understood), and which subjugates all under a blind, thoughtless necessity, is the only one rationally possible--the only one to be developed from pure reason! To understand the claim one has to recall the prevailing spirit of an earlier era. Then the me- chanistic way of thinking, which reached the summit of its infamy in French atheism, had captured almost all minds; in Germany as well one began to take this manner of seeing and explaining for the genu- ine and sole philosophy. 20 Since, however, the native German disposi- tion [Gemu? t] could never assimilate these consequences to itself, for that reason there first emerged the discord [Zwiespalt] of head and heart that was characteristic of more recent philosophical literature: one abhorred the consequences without freeing oneself from the basis [Grund] of this way of thinking or rising to a better one. One wanted to declare these consequences, and since the German mind could only take hold of the mechanistic philosophy from its (suppos- edly) highest expression, the terrible truth was declared in this way: all philosophy--absolutely all--that is purely rational is or becomes Spinozism! Everyone now was warned about the abyss; it was laid bare before all; the only remedy which still seemed possible was seized; that bold word only could bring on the crisis and frighten Ger- mans away from the corrupting philosophy and lead them back to the heart, to inner feeling and belief. 21 Nowadays, since this way of
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thinking is long gone, and the higher light of idealism shines for us, the same claim would be neither comprehensible to an equal degree nor would it also promise the same consequences. * |
And here then, once and for all, our definite opinion about Spinoz- ism! This system is not fatalism because it allows things to be con- tained in God; for, as we have shown, pantheism at least makes for- mal freedom not impossible. Spinoza therefore must be a fatalist for a completely different reason, one independent of pantheism. The error of his system lies by no means in his placing things in God but in the fact that they are things--in the abstract concept of beings in the world, indeed of infinite substance itself, which for him is exactly also a thing. Hence his arguments against freedom are entirely determinis- tic, in no way pantheistic. He treats the will also as a thing and then proves very naturally that it would have to be determined in all its ac- tivity through another thing that is in turn determined by another, and so on ad infinitum. Hence the lifelessness of his system, the ster- ility of its form, the poverty of concepts and expressions, the unre- lenting severity of definitions that goes together excellently with the abstract means of presentation; hence his mechanistic view of nature follows quite naturally as well. Or does one doubt that the basic views of Spinozism must already be essentially changed by a dy- namic notion of nature? If the doctrine that all things are contained in God is the ground of the whole system, then, at the very least, it must first be brought to life and torn from abstraction before it can become the principle of a system of reason. How general are the expressions that finite beings are modifications or consequences | of God; what a
* In a review of the recent writings by | Fichte in the Heidelberg Annuals of Literature (vol. 1, No. 6, p. 139), the advice that Mr. Fr. Schlegel gives to the latter is to stick exclusively to Spinoza in his polemical efforts because in Spinoza alone the utterly complete system of pantheism in form and con- sequence is encountered--one which, according to the statement cited above, would be at the same time the system of pure reason. Incidentally, this advice may indeed offer certain advantages, yet it strikes one as strange that Mr. Fichte is without doubt of the opinion that Spinozism (as Spinozism) has already been refuted through the Doctrine of Knowledge [Wissenschaftslehre] in which he is entirely correct--or is idealism perhaps not the work of reason, and the supposedly sad honor of being a system of reason remains only for pantheism and Spinozism?
gulf there is to fill here, what questions there are to answer! One could look at the rigidity of Spinozism as at Pygmalion's statue that had to be made animate [beseelt] through the warm breath of love;22 but this comparison is incomplete since Spinozism is more like a work sketched out only in barest outline in which many still missing or un- finished features would first become noticeable if it were made ani- mate. It would be preferable to compare Spinozism to the most an- cient images of divinities which appeared that much more mysterious the less their features bespoke individuality and liveliness. In a word, it is a one-sidedly realist system, which expression indeed sounds less damning than pantheism, yet indicates what is characteristic of the system far more correctly and is also not employed here for the first time. It would be irksome to repeat the many explanations that have been made concerning this point in the author's early writings. A mu- tual saturation of realism and idealism in each other was the declared intent of his efforts. Spinoza's basic concept, when infused by spirit (and, in one essential point, changed) by the principle of idealism, re- ceived a living basis in the higher forms of investigation of nature and the recognized unity of the dynamic with the emotional and spiritual; out of this grew the philosophy of nature, which as pure physics was indeed able to stand for itself, yet at any time in regard to the whole of philosophy was only considered as a part, namely the real part that would be capable of rising up into the genuine system of reason only through completion by the ideal part in which freedom rules. It was claimed that in this rising up (of freedom) the final empowering [po- tenzierende] act was found through which all of nature transfigured it- self in feeling, intelligence and, finally, in will. 23 In the final and highest judgment, there is no other Being than will. Will is primal Being [Ur- sein] to which alone all predicates of Being apply: groundlessness, eternality, independence from time, self-affirmation. All of philosophy strives only to find this highest expression. 24
In our times philosophy has been raised up to this point by | ideal- ism, and only at this point are we really able to begin the investiga- tion of our topic in so far as it by no means could have been our in- tention to take into account all those difficulties that can be raised and were raised long ago against the concept of freedom from the one-sidedly realistic or dogmatic system. Still, idealism itself, no mat- ter how high it has taken us in this respect, and as certain as it is that we have it to thank for the first complete concept of formal freedom,
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is yet nothing less than a completed system for itself, and it leaves us no guidance in the doctrine of freedom as soon as we wish to enter into what is more exact and decisive. In the first connection we note that, for idealism which has been constructed into a system, it is by no means adequate to claim that "activity, life and freedom only are the truly real" with which even Fichte's subjective idealism (which misunderstands itself) can coexist; rather, it is required that the re- verse also be shown, that everything real (nature, the world of things) has activity, life and freedom as its ground or, in Fichte's ex- pression, that not only is I-hood all, but also the reverse, that all is I- hood. 25 The thought of making freedom the one and all of philosophy has set the human mind free in general, not merely with respect to it- self, and brought about a more forceful change in all divisions of knowledge than any prior revolution. The idealist concept is the true consecration for the higher philosophy of our time and, especially, for its higher realism. Were those who would judge or appropriate this realism to ponder that freedom is its innermost presupposition, in what a totally different light would they consider and grasp it! Only one who has tasted freedom can feel the longing to make everything analogous to it, to spread it throughout the whole universe. One who does not come to philosophy by this path follows and merely imi- tates what others do without any feeling for why they do it. It will al- ways remain odd, however, that Kant, after having first distinguished things-in-themselves from appearances | only negatively through their independence from time and later treating independence from time and freedom as correlate concepts in the metaphysical discus- sions of his Critique of Practical Reason, did not go further toward the thought of transferring this only possible positive concept of the in- itself also to things; thereby he would immediately have raised him- self to a higher standpoint of reflection and above the negativity that is the character of his theoretical philosophy. 26 From another per- spective, however, if freedom really is the positive concept of the in- itself, the investigation concerning human freedom is thrown back again into the general, in so far as the intelligible on which it was alone grounded is also the essence of things-in-themselves. Mere idealism does not reach far enough, therefore, in order to show the specific difference [Differenz], that is, precisely what is the distinc- tiveness, of human freedom. Likewise, it would be an error to think that pantheism has been abolished and destroyed by idealism, a view
that could only arise from the confusion of pantheism with one- sided realism. For it is entirely the same for pantheism as such whether individual things are in an absolute substance or just as many individual wills are included in a primal will [Urwille]. In the first case, pantheism would be realist, in the other, idealist, but its grounding concept remains the same. Precisely here it is evident for the time being that the most profound difficulties inherent in the con- cept of freedom will be just as little resolvable through idealism, taken by itself, than through any other partial system. Idealism pro- vides namely, on the one hand, only the most general concept of free- dom and, on the other hand, a merely formal one. But the real and vital concept is that freedom is the capacity for good and evil.
This is the point of most profound difficulty in the entire doctrine of freedom, one which has been perceived in all times and which does not affect merely this or that system but, more or less, all. * | Yet, it affects most noticeably the concept of immanence; for either real evil is admitted and, hence, it is inevitable that evil be posited within infinite substance or the primal will itself, whereby the con- cept of a most perfect being is utterly destroyed, or the reality of evil must in some way be denied, whereby, however, at the same time the real concept of freedom vanishes. 27 The difficulty is no slighter though, if even the most distant connection between God and beings in the world is assumed; for even this connection is limited to a so- called mere concursus [coming-together, coincidence] or to that nec- essary participation [Mitwirkung] of God in his creatures' actions, which must be assumed due to the essential dependence of the lat- ter on God, incidentally, even when freedom is asserted. Thus God appears undeniably to share responsibility for evil in so far as per- mitting an entirely dependent being to do evil is surely not much bet- ter than to cause it to do so. Or, likewise, the reality of evil must be denied in one way or another. The proposition that everything posi- tive in creatures comes from God must also be asserted in this system. If it is now assumed that there is something positive in evil, then this positive comes also from God. Against this can be objected:
* Mr. Fr. Schlegel has the merit of asserting this difficulty especially against pantheism in his book on India and in several other places, | where it is only to be regretted that this astute scholar did not see fit to communicate his own point of view on the origin of evil and its relation to the good.
SW | 352-353 23
24 OA 424-426
the positive element of evil is good in so far as it is positive. Evil does not thereby disappear, although it is also not explained. For, if what has being in evil is good, whence that in which this being is, the basis that actually constitutes evil? Completely distinct from this assertion (though frequently, even recently, confused with it) is the assertion that in evil there is nowhere anything positive or, differently ex- pressed, that evil does not exist at all (not even with, or connected to, another positive) but rather that all actions are more or less posi- tive, and the distinction among them is merely a plus or minus of com- pleteness, whereby no opposition is established and, therefore, evil utterly | disappears. This would be the second possible assumption in regard to the proposition that everything positive comes from God. Then the force that appears in evil, though it would indeed be compar- atively less complete than that appearing in the good, yet considered in itself or aside from the comparison would surely be a complete whole itself which, thus, like any other, must be derived from God. What we call evil in this is only the lower degree of perfection, which appears merely for our comparison as a deficiency; in nature there is none. It is not to be denied that this is the true view of Spinoza. Some- one could attempt to bypass this dilemma through the answer: the positive that comes from God is freedom that in itself is indifferent to- ward good and evil; yet, if he but thinks of this indifference not merely negatively yet rather as a vital, positive capacity for good and evil, it is not comprehensible how a capacity for evil can result from God who is regarded as pure goodness. It is evident from this, to note in passing, that, if freedom really is what it must be according to this concept (and it unmistakably is), the derivation of freedom from God at- tempted above is then likely also not correct; for, if freedom is a capac- ity for evil, then it must have a root independent of God. Driven by this argument, one can be tempted to throw oneself into the arms of dualism. This system, however, if it is really thought as the doctrine of two absolutely different and mutually independent principles, is only a system of the self-destruction and despair of reason. But if the funda- mental being [Grundwesen] of evil is thought in some sense as depen- dent on that of the good, then the whole difficulty of the descent [Ab- kunft] of evil from good, though concentrated on One Being, is, however, thereby increased rather than diminished. Even if it is as- sumed that this second being was originally created good and
through its own fault fell away from the primal being, then the first ca- pacity for an act striving against God always remains inexplicable in all the previous systems. Hence, even if one | wished at last to abolish not only the identity, but every connection of beings in the world with God and wished to regard their entire current existence and, thus, that of the world, as an estrangement [Entfernung] from God, the difficulty would be removed only one point further but it would not be abol- ished. For, in order to be able to flow out from God, they had to exist already in some manner, and, thus, the emanation doctrine would be the least able to be opposed to pantheism since it presupposes an original existence of things in God and obviously, therefore, panthe- ism. To clarify this estrangement, however, only the following could be assumed: it is either an involuntary estrangement on the part of things but not on the part of God in which case they are cast out by God into a condition of disaffection and malice, and, therefore, God is the originator of this condition. Or it is involuntary on both sides, having been caused, for instance, by an overflow [U? berfluss] of being as some say, an utterly untenable idea. Or it is voluntary on the part of things, a tearing oneself away from God, therefore the consequence of a culpability from which ever deeper abasement [Herabsinken] re- sults; this first culpability is, then, precisely already evil itself, and hence reason provides no explanation of its origin. Without this auxil- iary thought, however, which, if it explains evil in the world, on the other hand entirely obliterates the good and introduces instead of pantheism a pandemonism, every genuine opposition of good and evil just vanishes in the system of emanation; what is first loses itself in in- finitely many intermediary levels through a gradual weakening into that which no longer has any appearance of the good, roughly as Ploti- nus* subtly, but unsatisfactorily, describes the transition from the original good into matter and evil. Accordingly, through a constant subordination and estrangement, something final emerges beyond which nothing more can come into being, and precisely this (which is incapable of further production) is evil. Or: if there is something after what is first, then there must also be something final that has nothing more in itself from that which is first, and this is matter and the neces- sity of evil. 28 |
* Ennead.