Therefore
it seems that it is not a sin to hate one's I enemy.
Summa Theologica
5:1,2: "Be ye followers of God, as most dear
children, and walk in love. " Now God sometimes punishes a man for a
sin, without previously warning him in secret. Therefore it seems that
there is no need for a private admonition to precede denunciation.
Objection 2: Further, according to Augustine (De Mendacio xv), we learn
from the deeds of holy men how we ought to understand the commandments
of Holy Writ. Now among the deeds of holy men we find that a hidden sin
is publicly denounced, without any previous admonition in private. Thus
we read (Gn. 37:2) that "Joseph accused his brethren to his father of a
most wicked crime": and (Acts 5:4, 9) that Peter publicly denounced
Ananias and Saphira who had secretly "by fraud kept back the price of
the land," without beforehand admonishing them in private: nor do we
read that Our Lord admonished Judas in secret before denouncing him.
Therefore the precept does not require that secret admonition should
precede public denunciation.
Objection 3: Further, it is a graver matter to accuse than to denounce.
Now one may go to the length of accusing a person publicly, without
previously admonishing him in secret: for it is decided in the Decretal
(Cap. Qualiter, xiv, De Accusationibus) that "nothing else need precede
accusation except inscription. " [*The accuser was bound by Roman Law to
endorse (se inscribere) the writ of accusation. The effect of this
endorsement or inscription was that the accuser bound himself, if he
failed to prove the accusation, to suffer the same punishment as the
accused would have to suffer if proved guilty. ] Therefore it seems that
the precept does not require that a secret admonition should precede
public denunciation.
Objection 4: Further, it does not seem probable that the customs
observed by religious in general are contrary to the precepts of
Christ. Now it is customary among religious orders to proclaim this or
that one for a fault, without any previous secret admonition. Therefore
it seems that this admonition is not required by the precept.
Objection 5: Further, religious are bound to obey their prelates. Now a
prelate sometimes commands either all in general, or someone in
particular, to tell him if they know of anything that requires
correction. Therefore it would seem that they are bound to tell them
this, even before any secret admonition. Therefore the precept does not
require secret admonition before public denunciation.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Verb. Dom. xvi, 4) on the words,
"Rebuke him between thee and him alone" (Mat. 18:15): "Aiming at his
amendment, while avoiding his disgrace: since perhaps from shame he
might begin to defend his sin; and him whom you thought to make a
better man, you make worse. " Now we are bound by the precept of charity
to beware lest our brother become worse. Therefore the order of
fraternal correction comes under the precept.
I answer that, With regard to the public denunciation of sins it is
necessary to make a distinction: because sins may be either public or
secret. In the case of public sins, a remedy is required not only for
the sinner, that he may become better, but also for others, who know of
his sin, lest they be scandalized. Wherefore such like sins should be
denounced in public, according to the saying of the Apostle (1 Tim.
5:20): "Them that sin reprove before all, that the rest also may have
fear," which is to be understood as referring to public sins, as
Augustine states (De Verb. Dom. xvi, 7).
On the other hand, in the case of secret sins, the words of Our Lord
seem to apply (Mat. 18:15): "If thy brother shall offend against thee,"
etc. For if he offend thee publicly in the presence of others, he no
longer sins against thee alone, but also against others whom he
'disturbs. Since, however, a man's neighbor may take offense even at
his secret sins, it seems that we must make yet a further distinction.
For certain secret sins are hurtful to our neighbor either in his body
or in his soul, as, for instance, when a man plots secretly to betray
his country to its enemies, or when a heretic secretly turns other men
away from the faith. And since he that sins thus in secret, sins not
only against you in particular, but also against others, it is
necessary to take steps to denounce him at once, in order to prevent
him doing such harm, unless by chance you were firmly persuaded that
this evil result would be prevented by admonishing him secretly. On the
other hand there are other sins which injure none but the sinner, and
the person sinned against, either because he alone is hurt by the
sinner, or at least because he alone knows about his sin, and then our
one purpose should be to succor our sinning brother: and just as the
physician of the body restores the sick man to health, if possible,
without cutting off a limb, but, if this be unavoidable, cuts off a
limb which is least indispensable, in order to preserve the life of the
whole body, so too he who desires his brother's amendment should, if
possible, so amend him as regards his conscience, that he keep his good
name.
For a good name is useful, first of all to the sinner himself, not only
in temporal matters wherein a man suffers many losses, if he lose his
good name, but also in spiritual matters, because many are restrained
from sinning, through fear of dishonor, so that when a man finds his
honor lost, he puts no curb on his sinning. Hence Jerome says on Mat.
18:15: "If he sin against thee, thou shouldst rebuke him in private,
lest he persist in his sin if he should once become shameless or
unabashed. " Secondly, we ought to safeguard our sinning brother's good
name, both because the dishonor of one leads to the dishonor of others,
according to the saying of Augustine (Ep. ad pleb. Hipponens. lxxviii):
"When a few of those who bear a name for holiness are reported falsely
or proved in truth to have done anything wrong, people will seek by
busily repeating it to make it believed of all": and also because when
one man's sin is made public others are incited to sin likewise.
Since, however, one's conscience should be preferred to a good name,
Our Lord wished that we should publicly denounce our brother and so
deliver his conscience from sin, even though he should forfeit his good
name. Therefore it is evident that the precept requires a secret
admonition to precede public denunciation.
Reply to Objection 1: Whatever is hidden, is known to God, wherefore
hidden sins are to the judgment of God, just what public sins are to
the judgment of man. Nevertheless God does rebuke sinners sometimes by
secretly admonishing them, so to speak, with an inward inspiration,
either while they wake or while they sleep, according to Job 33:15-17:
"By a dream in a vision by night, when deep sleep falleth upon men . .
. then He openeth the ears of men, and teaching instructeth them in
what they are to learn, that He may withdraw a man from the things he
is doing. "
Reply to Objection 2: Our Lord as God knew the sin of Judas as though
it were public, wherefore He could have made it known at once. Yet He
did not, but warned Judas of his sin in words that were obscure. The
sin of Ananias and Saphira was denounced by Peter acting as God's
executor, by Whose revelation he knew of their sin. With regard to
Joseph it is probable that he warned his brethren, though Scripture
does not say so. Or we may say that the sin was public with regard to
his brethren, wherefore it is stated in the plural that he accused "his
brethren. "
Reply to Objection 3: When there is danger to a great number of people,
those words of Our Lord do not apply, because then thy brother does not
sin against thee alone.
Reply to Objection 4: Proclamations made in the chapter of religious
are about little faults which do not affect a man's good name,
wherefore they are reminders of forgotten faults rather than
accusations or denunciations. If, however, they should be of such a
nature as to injure our brother's good name, it would be contrary to
Our Lord's precept, to denounce a brother's fault in this manner.
Reply to Objection 5: A prelate is not to be obeyed contrary to a
Divine precept, according to Acts 5:29: "We ought to obey God rather
then men. " Therefore when a prelate commands anyone to tell him
anything that he knows to need correction, the command rightly
understood supports the safeguarding of the order of fraternal
correction, whether the command be addressed to all in general, or to
some particular individual. If, on the other hand, a prelate were to
issue a command in express opposition to this order instituted by Our
Lord, both would sin, the one commanding, and the one obeying him, as
disobeying Our Lord's command. Consequently he ought not to be obeyed,
because a prelate is not the judge of secret things, but God alone is,
wherefore he has no power to command anything in respect of hidden
matters, except in so far as they are made known through certain signs,
as by ill-repute or suspicion; in which cases a prelate can command
just as a judge, whether secular or ecclesiastical, can bind a man
under oath to tell the truth.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether before the public denunciation witnesses ought to be brought
forward?
Objection 1: It would seem that before the public denunciation
witnesses ought not to be brought forward. For secret sins ought not to
be made known to others, because by so doing "a man would betray his
brother's sins instead of correcting them," as Augustine says (De Verb.
Dom. xvi, 7). Now by bringing forward witnesses one makes known a
brother's sin to others. Therefore in the case of secret sins one ought
not to bring witnesses forward before the public denunciation.
Objection 2: Further, man should love his neighbor as himself. Now no
man brings in witnesses to prove his own secret sin. Neither therefore
ought one to bring forward witnesses to prove the secret sin of our
brother.
Objection 3: Further, witnesses are brought forward to prove something.
But witnesses afford no proof in secret matters. Therefore it is
useless to bring witnesses forward in such cases.
Objection 4: Further, Augustine says in his Rule that "before bringing
it to the notice of witnesses . . . it should be put before the
superior. " Now to bring a matter before a superior or a prelate is to
tell the Church. Therefore witnesses should not be brought forward
before the public denunciation.
On the contrary, Our Lord said (Mat. 18:16): "Take with thee one or two
more, that in the mouth of two," etc.
I answer that, The right way to go from one extreme to another is to
pass through the middle space. Now Our Lord wished the beginning of
fraternal correction to be hidden, when one brother corrects another
between this one and himself alone, while He wished the end to be
public, when such a one would be denounced to the Church. Consequently
it is befitting that a citation of witnesses should be placed between
the two extremes, so that at first the brother's sin be indicated to a
few, who will be of use without being a hindrance, and thus his sin be
amended without dishonoring him before the public.
Reply to Objection 1: Some have understood the order of fraternal
correction to demand that we should first of all rebuke our brother
secretly, and that if he listens, it is well; but if he listen not, and
his sin be altogether hidden, they say that we should go no further in
the matter, whereas if it has already begun to reach the ears of
several by various signs, we ought to prosecute the matter, according
to Our Lord's command. But this is contrary to what Augustine says in
his Rule that "we are bound to reveal" a brother's sin, if it "will
cause a worse corruption in the heart. " Wherefore we must say otherwise
that when the secret admonition has been given once or several times,
as long as there is probable hope of his amendment, we must continue to
admonish him in private, but as soon as we are able to judge with any
probability that the secret admonition is of no avail, we must take
further steps, however secret the sin may be, and call witnesses,
unless perhaps it were thought probable that this would not conduce to
our brother's amendment, and that he would become worse: because on
that account one ought to abstain altogether from correcting him, as
stated above [2618](A[6]).
Reply to Objection 2: A man needs no witnesses that he may amend his
own sin: yet they may be necessary that we may amend a brother's sin.
Hence the comparison fails.
Reply to Objection 3: There may be three reasons for citing witnesses.
First, to show that the deed in question is a sin, as Jerome says:
secondly, to prove that the deed was done, if repeated, as Augustine
says (in his Rule): thirdly, "to prove that the man who rebuked his
brother, has done what he could," as Chrysostom says (Hom. in Matth.
lx).
Reply to Objection 4: Augustine means that the matter ought to be made
known to the prelate before it is stated to the witnesses, in so far as
the prelate is a private individual who is able to be of more use than
others, but not that it is to be told him as to the Church, i. e. as
holding the position of judge.
__________________________________________________________________
OF HATRED (SIX ARTICLES)
We must how consider the vices opposed to charity: (1) hatred, which is
opposed to love; (2) sloth and envy, which are opposed to the joy of
charity; (3) discord and schism, which are contrary to peace; (4)
offense and scandal, which are contrary to beneficence and fraternal
correction.
Under the first head there are six points of inquiry:
(1) Whether it is possible to hate God?
(2) Whether hatred of God is the greatest of sins?
(3) Whether hatred of one's neighbor is always a sin?
(4) Whether it is the greatest of all sins against our neighbor?
(5) Whether it is a capital sin?
(6) From what capital sin does it arise?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether it is possible for anyone to hate God?
Objection 1: It would seem that no man can hate God. For Dionysius says
(Div. Nom. iv) that "the first good and beautiful is an object of love
and dilection to all. " But God is goodness and beauty itself. Therefore
He is hated by none.
Objection 2: Further, in the Apocryphal books of 3 Esdras 4:36, 39 it
is written that "all things call upon truth . . . and (all men) do well
like of her works. " Now God is the very truth according to Jn. 14:6.
Therefore all love God, and none can hate Him.
Objection 3: Further, hatred is a kind of aversion. But according to
Dionysius (Div. Nom. i) God draws all things to Himself. Therefore none
can hate Him.
On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 73:23): "The pride of them that
hate Thee ascendeth continually," and (Jn. 15:24): "But now they have
both seen and hated both Me and My Father. "
I answer that, As shown above ([2619]FS, Q[29], A[1]), hatred is a
movement of the appetitive power, which power is not set in motion save
by something apprehended. Now God can be apprehended by man in two
ways; first, in Himself, as when He is seen in His Essence; secondly,
in His effects, when, to wit, "the invisible things" of God . . . "are
clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made" (Rom.
1:20). Now God in His Essence is goodness itself, which no man can
hate---for it is natural to good to be loved. Hence it is impossible
for one who sees God in His Essence, to hate Him.
Moreover some of His effects are such that they can nowise be contrary
to the human will, since "to be, to live, to understand," which are
effects of God, are desirable and lovable to all. Wherefore again God
cannot be an object of hatred if we consider Him as the Author of such
like effects. Some of God's effects, however, are contrary to an
inordinate will, such as the infliction of punishment, and the
prohibition of sin by the Divine Law. Such like effects are repugnant
to a will debased by sin, and as regards the consideration of them, God
may be an object of hatred to some, in so far as they look upon Him as
forbidding sin, and inflicting punishment.
Reply to Objection 1: This argument is true of those who see God's
Essence, which is the very essence of goodness.
Reply to Objection 2: This argument is true in so far as God is
apprehended as the cause of such effects as are naturally beloved of
all, among which are the works of Truth who reveals herself to men.
Reply to Objection 3: God draws all things to Himself, in so far as He
is the source of being, since all things, in as much as they are, tend
to be like God, Who is Being itself.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether hatred of God is the greatest of sins?
Objection 1: It would seem that hatred of God is not the greatest of
sins. For the most grievous sin is the sin against the Holy Ghost,
since it cannot be forgiven, according to Mat. 12:32. Now hatred of God
is not reckoned among the various kinds of sin against the Holy Ghost,
as may be seen from what has been said above ([2620]Q[14], A[2]).
Therefore hatred of God is not the most grievous sin.
Objection 2: Further, sin consists in withdrawing oneself from God. Now
an unbeliever who has not even knowledge of God seems to be further
away from Him than a believer, who though he hate God, nevertheless
knows Him. Therefore it seems that the sin of unbelief is graver than
the sin of hatred against God.
Objection 3: Further, God is an object of hatred, only by reason of
those of His effects that are contrary to the will: the chief of which
is punishment. But hatred of punishment is not the most grievous sin.
Therefore hatred of God is not the most grievous sin.
On the contrary, The best is opposite to the worst, according to the
Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 10). But hatred of God is contrary to the
love of God, wherein man's best consists. Therefore hatred of God is
man's worst sin.
I answer that, The defect in sin consists in its aversion from God, as
stated above ([2621]Q[10], A[3]): and this aversion would not have the
character of guilt, were it not voluntary. Hence the nature of guilt
consists in a voluntary aversion from God.
Now this voluntary aversion from God is directly implied in the hatred
of God, but in other sins, by participation and indirectly. For just as
the will cleaves directly to what it loves, so does it directly shun
what it hates. Hence when a man hates God, his will is directly averted
from God, whereas in other sins, fornication for instance, a man turns
away from God, not directly, but indirectly, in so far, namely, as he
desires an inordinate pleasure, to which aversion from God is
connected. Now that which is so by itself, always takes precedence of
that which is so by another. Wherefore hatred of God is more grievous
than other sins.
Reply to Objection 1: According to Gregory (Moral. xxv, 11), "it is one
thing not to do good things, end another to hate the giver of good
things, even as it is one thing to sin indeliberately, and another to
sin deliberately. " This implies that to hate God, the giver of all good
things, is to sin deliberately, and this is a sin against the Holy
Ghost. Hence it is evident that hatred of God is chiefly a sin against
the Holy Ghost, in so far as the sin against the Holy Ghost denotes a
special kind of sin: and yet it is not reckoned among the kinds of sin
against the Holy Ghost, because it is universally found in every kind
of that sin.
Reply to Objection 2: Even unbelief is not sinful unless it be
voluntary: wherefore the more voluntary it is, the more it is sinful.
Now it becomes voluntary by the fact that a man hates the truth that is
proposed to him. Wherefore it is evident that unbelief derives its
sinfulness from hatred of God, Whose truth is the object of faith; and
hence just as a cause is greater than its effect, so hatred of God is a
greater sin than unbelief.
Reply to Objection 3: Not everyone who hates his punishment, hates God
the author of punishments. For many hate the punishments inflicted on
them, and yet they bear them patiently out of reverence for the Divine
justice. Wherefore Augustine says (Confess. x) that God commands us to
bear with penal evils, not to love them. On the other hand, to break
out into hatred of God when He inflicts those punishments, is to hate
God's very justice, and that is a most grievous sin. Hence Gregory says
(Moral. xxv, 11): "Even as sometimes it is more grievous to love sin
than to do it, so is it more wicked to hate justice than, not to have
done it. "
__________________________________________________________________
Whether hatred of one's neighbor is always a sin?
Objection 1: It would seem that hatred of one's neighbor is not always
a sin. For no sin is commanded or counselled by God, according to Prov.
8:8: "All My words are just, there is nothing wicked nor perverse in
them. " Now, it is written (Lk. 14:26): "If any man come to Me, and hate
not his father and mother . . . he cannot be My disciple. " Therefore
hatred of one's neighbor is not always a sin.
Objection 2: Further, nothing wherein we imitate God can be a sin. But
it is in imitation of God that we hate certain people: for it is
written (Rom. 1:30): "Detractors, hateful to God. " Therefore it is
possible to hate certain people without committing a sin.
Objection 3: Further, nothing that is natural is a sin, for sin is a
"wandering away from what is according to nature," according to
Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 4,30; iv, 20). Now it is natural to a
thing to hate whatever is contrary to it, and to aim at its undoing.
Therefore it seems that it is not a sin to hate one's I enemy.
On the contrary, It is written (1 Jn. 2:9): "He that . . . hateth his
brother, is in darkness. " Now spiritual darkness is sin. Therefore
there cannot be hatred of one's neighbor without sin.
I answer that, Hatred is opposed to love, as stated above ([2622]FS,
Q[29], A[2]); so that hatred of a thing is evil according as the love
of that thing is good. Now love is due to our neighbor in respect of
what he holds from God, i. e. in respect of nature and grace, but not in
respect of what he has of himself and from the devil, i. e. in respect
of sin and lack of justice.
Consequently it is lawful to hate the sin in one's brother, and
whatever pertains to the defect of Divine justice, but we cannot hate
our brother's nature and grace without sin. Now it is part of our love
for our brother that we hate the fault and the lack of good in him,
since desire for another's good is equivalent to hatred of his evil.
Consequently the hatred of one's brother, if we consider it simply, is
always sinful.
Reply to Objection 1: By the commandment of God (Ex. 20:12) we must
honor our parents---as united to us in nature and kinship. But we must
hate them in so far as they prove an obstacle to our attaining the
perfection of Divine justice.
Reply to Objection 2: God hates the sin which is in the detractor, not
his nature: so that we can hate detractors without committing a sin.
Reply to Objection 3: Men are not opposed to us in respect of the goods
which they have received from God: wherefore, in this respect, we
should love them. But they are opposed to us, in so far as they show
hostility towards us, and this is sinful in them. In this respect we
should hate them, for we should hate in them the fact that they are
hostile to us.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether hatred of our neighbor is the most grievous sin against our
neighbor?
Objection 1: It would seem that hatred of our neighbor is the most
grievous sin against our neighbor. For it is written (1 Jn. 3:15):
"Whosoever hateth his brother is a murderer. " Now murder is the most
grievous of sins against our neighbor. Therefore hatred is also.
Objection 2: Further, worst is opposed to best. Now the best thing we
give our neighbor is love, since all other things are referable to
love. Therefore hatred is the worst.
On the contrary, A thing is said to be evil, because it hurts, as
Augustine observes (Enchiridion xii). Now there are sins by which a man
hurts his neighbor more than by hatred, e. g. theft, murder and
adultery. Therefore hatred is not the most grievous sin.
Moreover, Chrysostom [*Hom. x in the Opus Imperfectum, falsely ascribed
to St. John Chrysostom] commenting on Mat. 5:19, "He that shall break
one of these least commandments," says: "The commandments of Moses,
Thou shalt not kill, Thou shalt not commit adultery, count for little
in their reward, but they count for much if they be disobeyed. On the
other hand the commandments of Christ such as, Thou shalt not be angry,
Thou shalt not desire, are reckoned great in their reward, but little
in the transgression. " Now hatred is an internal movement like anger
and desire. Therefore hatred of one's brother is a less grievous sin
than murder.
I answer that, Sins committed against our neighbor are evil on two
counts; first by reason of the disorder in the person who sins,
secondly by reason of the hurt inflicted on the person sinned against.
On the first count, hatred is a more grievous sin than external actions
that hurt our neighbor, because hatred is a disorder of man's will,
which is the chief part of man, and wherein is the root of sin, so that
if a man's outward actions were to be inordinate, without any disorder
in his will, they would not be sinful, for instance, if he were to kill
a man, through ignorance or out of zeal for justice: and if there be
anything sinful in a man's outward sins against his neighbor, it is all
to be traced to his inward hatred.
On the other hand, as regards the hurt inflicted on his neighbor, a
man's outward sins are worse than his inward hatred. This suffices for
the Replies to the Objections.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether hatred is a capital sin?
Objection 1: It would seem that hatred is a capital sin. For hatred is
directly opposed to charity. Now charity is the foremost among the
virtues, and the mother of all others. Therefore hatred is the chief of
the capital sins, and the origin of all others.
Objection 2: Further, sins arise in us on account of the inclinations
of our passions, according to Rom. 7:5: "The passions of sins . . . did
work in our members to bring forth fruit unto death. " Now all other
passions of the soul seem to arise from love and hatred, as was shown
above ([2623]FS, Q[25], AA[1],2). Therefore hatred should be reckoned
one of the capital sins.
Objection 3: Further, vice is a moral evil. Now hatred regards evil
more than any other passion does. Therefore it seems that hatred should
be reckoned a capital sin.
On the contrary, Gregory (Moral. xxxi) does not reckon hatred among the
seven capital sins.
I answer that, As stated above ([2624]FS, Q[84], AA[3],4), a capital
vice is one from which other vices arise most frequently. Now vice is
contrary to man's nature, in as much as he is a rational animal: and
when a thing acts contrary to its nature, that which is natural to it
is corrupted little by little. Consequently it must first of all fail
in that which is less in accordance with its nature, and last of all in
that which is most in accordance with its nature, since what is first
in construction is last in destruction. Now that which, first and
foremost, is most natural to man, is the love of what is good, and
especially love of the Divine good, and of his neighbor's good.
Wherefore hatred, which is opposed to this love, is not the first but
the last thing in the downfall of virtue resulting from vice: and
therefore it is not a capital vice.
Reply to Objection 1: As stated in Phys. vii, text. 18, "the virtue of
a thing consists in its being well disposed in accordance with its
nature. " Hence what is first and foremost in the virtues must be first
and foremost in the natural order. Hence charity is reckoned the
foremost of the virtues, and for the same reason hatred cannot be first
among the vices, as stated above.
Reply to Objection 2: Hatred of the evil that is contrary to one's
natural good, is the first of the soul's passions, even as love of
one's natural good is. But hatred of one's connatural good cannot be
first, but is something last, because such like hatred is a proof of an
already corrupted nature, even as love of an extraneous good.
Reply to Objection 3: Evil is twofold. One is a true evil, for the
reason that it is incompatible with one's natural good, and the hatred
of such an evil may have priority over the other passions. There is,
however, another which is not a true, but an apparent evil, which,
namely, is a true and connatural good, and yet is reckoned evil on
account of the corruption of nature: and the hatred of such an evil
must needs come last. This hatred is vicious, but the former is not.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether hatred arises from envy?
Objection 1: It seems that hatred does not arise from envy. For envy is
sorrow for another's good. Now hatred does not arise from sorrow, for,
on the contrary, we grieve for the presence of the evil we hate.
Therefore hatred does not arise from envy.
Objection 2: Further, hatred is opposed to love. Now love of our
neighbor is referred to our love of God, as stated above ([2625]Q[25],
A[1];[2626] Q[26], A[2]). Therefore hatred of our neighbor is referred
to our hatred of God. But hatred of God does not arise from envy, for
we do not envy those who are very far removed from us, but rather those
who seem to be near us, as the Philosopher states (Rhet. ii). Therefore
hatred does not arise from envy.
Objection 3: Further, to one effect there is one cause. Now hatred is
caused by anger, for Augustine says in his Rule that "anger grows into
hatred. " Therefore hatred does not arise from envy.
On the contrary, Gregory says (Moral. xxxi, 45) that "out of envy
cometh hatred. "
I answer that, As stated above [2627](A[5]), hatred of his neighbor is
a man's last step in the path of sin, because it is opposed to the love
which he naturally has for his neighbor. Now if a man declines from
that which is natural, it is because he intends to avoid that which is
naturally an object to be shunned. Now every animal naturally avoids
sorrow, just as it desires pleasure, as the Philosopher states (Ethic.
vii, x). Accordingly just as love arises from pleasure, so does hatred
arise from sorrow. For just as we are moved to love whatever gives us
pleasure, in as much as for that very reason it assumes the aspect of
good; so we are moved to hate whatever displeases us, in so far as for
this very reason it assumes the aspect of evil. Wherefore, since envy
is sorrow for our neighbor's good, it follows that our neighbor's good
becomes hateful to us, so that "out of envy cometh hatred. "
Reply to Objection 1: Since the appetitive power, like the apprehensive
power, reflects on its own acts, it follows that there is a kind of
circular movement in the actions of the appetitive power. And so
according to the first forward course of the appetitive movement, love
gives rise to desire, whence follows pleasure when one has obtained
what one desired. And since the very fact of taking pleasure in the
good one loves is a kind of good, it follows that pleasure causes love.
And in the same way sorrow causes hatred.
Reply to Objection 2: Love and hatred are essentially different, for
the object of love is good, which flows from God to creatures,
wherefore love is due to God in the first place, and to our neighbor
afterwards. On the other hand, hatred is of evil, which has no place in
God Himself, but only in His effects, for which reason it has been
stated above [2628](A[1]), that God is not an object of hatred, except
in so far as He is considered in relation to His effects, and
consequently hatred is directed to our neighbor before being directed
to God. Therefore, since envy of our neighbor is the mother of hatred
of our neighbor, it becomes, in consequence, the cause of hatred
towards God.
Reply to Objection 3: Nothing prevents a thing arising from various
causes in various respects, and accordingly hatred may arise both from
anger and from envy. However it arises more directly from envy, which
looks upon the very good of our neighbor as displeasing and therefore
hateful, whereas hatred arises from anger by way of increase. For at
first, through anger, we desire our neighbor's evil according to a
certain measure, that is in so far as that evil has the aspect of
vengeance: but afterwards, through the continuance of anger, man goes
so far as absolutely to desire his neighbor's evil, which desire is
part of hatred. Wherefore it is evident that hatred is caused by envy
formally as regards the aspect of the object, but dispositively by
anger.
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OF SLOTH (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider the vices opposed to the joy of charity. This joy
is either about the Divine good, and then its contrary is sloth, or
about our neighbor's good, and then its contrary is envy. Wherefore we
must consider (1) Sloth and (2) Envy.
Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether sloth is a sin?
(2) Whether it is a special vice?
(3) Whether it is a mortal sin?
(4) Whether it is a capital sin?
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Whether sloth is a sin?
Objection 1: It would seem that sloth is not a sin. For we are neither
praised nor blamed for our passions, according to the Philosopher
(Ethic. ii, 5). Now sloth is a passion, since it is a kind of sorrow,
according to Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 14), and as we stated above
([2629]FS, Q[35], A[8] ). Therefore sloth is not a sin.
Objection 2: Further, no bodily failing that occurs at fixed times is a
sin. But sloth is like this, for Cassian says (De Instit. Monast. x,
[*De Institutione Caeobiorum]): "The monk is troubled with sloth
chiefly about the sixth hour: it is like an intermittent fever, and
inflicts the soul of the one it lays low with burning fires at regular
and fixed intervals. " Therefore sloth is not a sin.
Objection 3: Further, that which proceeds from a good root is,
seemingly, no sin. Now sloth proceeds from a good root, for Cassian
says (De Instit. Monast. x) that "sloth arises from the fact that we
sigh at being deprived of spiritual fruit, and think that other
monasteries and those which are a long way off are much better than the
one we dwell in": all of which seems to point to humility. Therefore
sloth is not a sin.
Objection 4: Further, all sin is to be avoided, according to Ecclus.
21:2: "Flee from sins as from the face of a serpent. " Now Cassian says
(De Instit. Monast. x): "Experience shows that the onslaught of sloth
is not to be evaded by flight but to be conquered by resistance. "
Therefore sloth is not a sin.
On the contrary, Whatever is forbidden in Holy Writ is a sin. Now such
is sloth [acedia]: for it is written (Ecclus. 6:26): "Bow down thy
shoulder, and bear her," namely spiritual wisdom, "and be not grieved
[acedieris] with her bands. " Therefore sloth is a sin.
I answer that, Sloth, according to Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 14) is
an oppressive sorrow, which, to wit, so weighs upon man's mind, that he
wants to do nothing; thus acid things are also cold. Hence sloth
implies a certain weariness of work, as appears from a gloss on Ps.
106:18, "Their soul abhorred all manner of meat," and from the
definition of some who say that sloth is a "sluggishness of the mind
which neglects to begin good. "
Now this sorrow is always evil, sometimes in itself, sometimes in its
effect. For sorrow is evil in itself when it is about that which is
apparently evil but good in reality, even as, on the other hand,
pleasure is evil if it is about that which seems to be good but is, in
truth, evil. Since, then, spiritual good is a good in very truth,
sorrow about spiritual good is evil in itself. And yet that sorrow also
which is about a real evil, is evil in its effect, if it so oppresses
man as to draw him away entirely from good deeds. Hence the Apostle (2
Cor. 2:7) did not wish those who repented to be "swallowed up with
overmuch sorrow. "
Accordingly, since sloth, as we understand it here, denotes sorrow for
spiritual good, it is evil on two counts, both in itself and in point
of its effect. Consequently it is a sin, for by sin we mean an evil
movement of the appetite, as appears from what has been said above
(Q[10], A[2]; [2630]FS, Q[74], A[4]).
Reply to Objection 1: Passions are not sinful in themselves; but they
are blameworthy in so far as they are applied to something evil, just
as they deserve praise in so far as they are applied to something good.
Wherefore sorrow, in itself, calls neither for praise nor for blame:
whereas moderate sorrow for evil calls for praise, while sorrow for
good, and again immoderate sorrow for evil, call for blame. It is in
this sense that sloth is said to be a sin.
Reply to Objection 2: The passions of the sensitive appetite may either
be venial sins in themselves, or incline the soul to mortal sin. And
since the sensitive appetite has a bodily organ, it follows that on
account of some bodily transmutation a man becomes apt to commit some
particular sin. Hence it may happen that certain sins may become more
insistent, through certain bodily transmutations occurring at certain
fixed times. Now all bodily effects, of themselves, dispose one to
sorrow; and thus it is that those who fast are harassed by sloth
towards mid-day, when they begin to feel the want of food, and to be
parched by the sun's heat.
Reply to Objection 3: It is a sign of humility if a man does not think
too much of himself, through observing his own faults; but if a man
contemns the good things he has received from God, this, far from being
a proof of humility, shows him to be ungrateful: and from such like
contempt results sloth, because we sorrow for things that we reckon
evil and worthless. Accordingly we ought to think much of the goods of
others, in such a way as not to disparage those we have received
ourselves, because if we did they would give us sorrow.
Reply to Objection 4: Sin is ever to be shunned, but the assaults of
sin should be overcome, sometimes by flight, sometimes by resistance;
by flight when a continued thought increases the incentive to sin, as
in lust; for which reason it is written (1 Cor. 6:18): "Fly
fornication"; by resistance, when perseverance in the thought
diminishes the incentive to sin, which incentive arises from some
trivial consideration. This is the case with sloth, because the more we
think about spiritual goods, the more pleasing they become to us, and
forthwith sloth dies away.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether sloth is a special vice?
Objection 1: It would seem that sloth is not a special vice. For that
which is common to all vices does not constitute a special kind of
vice. But every vice makes a man sorrowful about the opposite spiritual
good: for the lustful man is sorrowful about the good of continence,
and the glutton about the good of abstinence. Since then sloth is
sorrow for spiritual good, as stated above [2631](A[1]), it seems that
sloth is not a special sin.
Objection 2: Further, sloth, through being a kind of sorrow, is opposed
to joy. Now joy is not accounted one special virtue. Therefore sloth
should not be reckoned a special vice.
Objection 3: Further, since spiritual good is a general kind of object,
which virtue seeks, and vice shuns, it does not constitute a special
virtue or vice, unless it be determined by some addition. Now nothing,
seemingly, except toil, can determine it to sloth, if this be a special
vice; because the reason why a man shuns spiritual goods, is that they
are toilsome, wherefore sloth is a kind of weariness: while dislike of
toil, and love of bodily repose seem to be due to the same cause, viz.
idleness. Hence sloth would be nothing but laziness, which seems
untrue, for idleness is opposed to carefulness, whereas sloth is
opposed to joy. Therefore sloth is not a special vice.
On the contrary, Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45) distinguishes sloth from the
other vices. Therefore it is a special vice.
I answer that, Since sloth is sorrow for spiritual good, if we take
spiritual good in a general way, sloth will not be a special vice,
because, as stated above ([2632]FS, Q[71], A[1]), every vice shuns the
spiritual good of its opposite virtue. Again it cannot be said that
sloth is a special vice, in so far as it shuns spiritual good, as
toilsome, or troublesome to the body, or as a hindrance to the body's
pleasure, for this again would not sever sloth from carnal vices,
whereby a man seeks bodily comfort and pleasure.
Wherefore we must say that a certain order exists among spiritual
goods, since all the spiritual goods that are in the acts of each
virtue are directed to one spiritual good, which is the Divine good,
about which there is a special virtue, viz. charity. Hence it is proper
to each virtue to rejoice in its own spiritual good, which consists in
its own act, while it belongs specially to charity to have that
spiritual joy whereby one rejoices in the Divine good. In like manner
the sorrow whereby one is displeased at the spiritual good which is in
each act of virtue, belongs, not to any special vice, but to every
vice, but sorrow in the Divine good about which charity rejoices,
belongs to a special vice, which is called sloth. This suffices for the
Replies to the Objections.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether sloth is a mortal sin?
Objection 1: It would seem that sloth is not a mortal sin. For every
mortal sin is contrary to a precept of the Divine Law. But sloth seems
contrary to no precept, as one may see by going through the precepts of
the Decalogue.
children, and walk in love. " Now God sometimes punishes a man for a
sin, without previously warning him in secret. Therefore it seems that
there is no need for a private admonition to precede denunciation.
Objection 2: Further, according to Augustine (De Mendacio xv), we learn
from the deeds of holy men how we ought to understand the commandments
of Holy Writ. Now among the deeds of holy men we find that a hidden sin
is publicly denounced, without any previous admonition in private. Thus
we read (Gn. 37:2) that "Joseph accused his brethren to his father of a
most wicked crime": and (Acts 5:4, 9) that Peter publicly denounced
Ananias and Saphira who had secretly "by fraud kept back the price of
the land," without beforehand admonishing them in private: nor do we
read that Our Lord admonished Judas in secret before denouncing him.
Therefore the precept does not require that secret admonition should
precede public denunciation.
Objection 3: Further, it is a graver matter to accuse than to denounce.
Now one may go to the length of accusing a person publicly, without
previously admonishing him in secret: for it is decided in the Decretal
(Cap. Qualiter, xiv, De Accusationibus) that "nothing else need precede
accusation except inscription. " [*The accuser was bound by Roman Law to
endorse (se inscribere) the writ of accusation. The effect of this
endorsement or inscription was that the accuser bound himself, if he
failed to prove the accusation, to suffer the same punishment as the
accused would have to suffer if proved guilty. ] Therefore it seems that
the precept does not require that a secret admonition should precede
public denunciation.
Objection 4: Further, it does not seem probable that the customs
observed by religious in general are contrary to the precepts of
Christ. Now it is customary among religious orders to proclaim this or
that one for a fault, without any previous secret admonition. Therefore
it seems that this admonition is not required by the precept.
Objection 5: Further, religious are bound to obey their prelates. Now a
prelate sometimes commands either all in general, or someone in
particular, to tell him if they know of anything that requires
correction. Therefore it would seem that they are bound to tell them
this, even before any secret admonition. Therefore the precept does not
require secret admonition before public denunciation.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Verb. Dom. xvi, 4) on the words,
"Rebuke him between thee and him alone" (Mat. 18:15): "Aiming at his
amendment, while avoiding his disgrace: since perhaps from shame he
might begin to defend his sin; and him whom you thought to make a
better man, you make worse. " Now we are bound by the precept of charity
to beware lest our brother become worse. Therefore the order of
fraternal correction comes under the precept.
I answer that, With regard to the public denunciation of sins it is
necessary to make a distinction: because sins may be either public or
secret. In the case of public sins, a remedy is required not only for
the sinner, that he may become better, but also for others, who know of
his sin, lest they be scandalized. Wherefore such like sins should be
denounced in public, according to the saying of the Apostle (1 Tim.
5:20): "Them that sin reprove before all, that the rest also may have
fear," which is to be understood as referring to public sins, as
Augustine states (De Verb. Dom. xvi, 7).
On the other hand, in the case of secret sins, the words of Our Lord
seem to apply (Mat. 18:15): "If thy brother shall offend against thee,"
etc. For if he offend thee publicly in the presence of others, he no
longer sins against thee alone, but also against others whom he
'disturbs. Since, however, a man's neighbor may take offense even at
his secret sins, it seems that we must make yet a further distinction.
For certain secret sins are hurtful to our neighbor either in his body
or in his soul, as, for instance, when a man plots secretly to betray
his country to its enemies, or when a heretic secretly turns other men
away from the faith. And since he that sins thus in secret, sins not
only against you in particular, but also against others, it is
necessary to take steps to denounce him at once, in order to prevent
him doing such harm, unless by chance you were firmly persuaded that
this evil result would be prevented by admonishing him secretly. On the
other hand there are other sins which injure none but the sinner, and
the person sinned against, either because he alone is hurt by the
sinner, or at least because he alone knows about his sin, and then our
one purpose should be to succor our sinning brother: and just as the
physician of the body restores the sick man to health, if possible,
without cutting off a limb, but, if this be unavoidable, cuts off a
limb which is least indispensable, in order to preserve the life of the
whole body, so too he who desires his brother's amendment should, if
possible, so amend him as regards his conscience, that he keep his good
name.
For a good name is useful, first of all to the sinner himself, not only
in temporal matters wherein a man suffers many losses, if he lose his
good name, but also in spiritual matters, because many are restrained
from sinning, through fear of dishonor, so that when a man finds his
honor lost, he puts no curb on his sinning. Hence Jerome says on Mat.
18:15: "If he sin against thee, thou shouldst rebuke him in private,
lest he persist in his sin if he should once become shameless or
unabashed. " Secondly, we ought to safeguard our sinning brother's good
name, both because the dishonor of one leads to the dishonor of others,
according to the saying of Augustine (Ep. ad pleb. Hipponens. lxxviii):
"When a few of those who bear a name for holiness are reported falsely
or proved in truth to have done anything wrong, people will seek by
busily repeating it to make it believed of all": and also because when
one man's sin is made public others are incited to sin likewise.
Since, however, one's conscience should be preferred to a good name,
Our Lord wished that we should publicly denounce our brother and so
deliver his conscience from sin, even though he should forfeit his good
name. Therefore it is evident that the precept requires a secret
admonition to precede public denunciation.
Reply to Objection 1: Whatever is hidden, is known to God, wherefore
hidden sins are to the judgment of God, just what public sins are to
the judgment of man. Nevertheless God does rebuke sinners sometimes by
secretly admonishing them, so to speak, with an inward inspiration,
either while they wake or while they sleep, according to Job 33:15-17:
"By a dream in a vision by night, when deep sleep falleth upon men . .
. then He openeth the ears of men, and teaching instructeth them in
what they are to learn, that He may withdraw a man from the things he
is doing. "
Reply to Objection 2: Our Lord as God knew the sin of Judas as though
it were public, wherefore He could have made it known at once. Yet He
did not, but warned Judas of his sin in words that were obscure. The
sin of Ananias and Saphira was denounced by Peter acting as God's
executor, by Whose revelation he knew of their sin. With regard to
Joseph it is probable that he warned his brethren, though Scripture
does not say so. Or we may say that the sin was public with regard to
his brethren, wherefore it is stated in the plural that he accused "his
brethren. "
Reply to Objection 3: When there is danger to a great number of people,
those words of Our Lord do not apply, because then thy brother does not
sin against thee alone.
Reply to Objection 4: Proclamations made in the chapter of religious
are about little faults which do not affect a man's good name,
wherefore they are reminders of forgotten faults rather than
accusations or denunciations. If, however, they should be of such a
nature as to injure our brother's good name, it would be contrary to
Our Lord's precept, to denounce a brother's fault in this manner.
Reply to Objection 5: A prelate is not to be obeyed contrary to a
Divine precept, according to Acts 5:29: "We ought to obey God rather
then men. " Therefore when a prelate commands anyone to tell him
anything that he knows to need correction, the command rightly
understood supports the safeguarding of the order of fraternal
correction, whether the command be addressed to all in general, or to
some particular individual. If, on the other hand, a prelate were to
issue a command in express opposition to this order instituted by Our
Lord, both would sin, the one commanding, and the one obeying him, as
disobeying Our Lord's command. Consequently he ought not to be obeyed,
because a prelate is not the judge of secret things, but God alone is,
wherefore he has no power to command anything in respect of hidden
matters, except in so far as they are made known through certain signs,
as by ill-repute or suspicion; in which cases a prelate can command
just as a judge, whether secular or ecclesiastical, can bind a man
under oath to tell the truth.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether before the public denunciation witnesses ought to be brought
forward?
Objection 1: It would seem that before the public denunciation
witnesses ought not to be brought forward. For secret sins ought not to
be made known to others, because by so doing "a man would betray his
brother's sins instead of correcting them," as Augustine says (De Verb.
Dom. xvi, 7). Now by bringing forward witnesses one makes known a
brother's sin to others. Therefore in the case of secret sins one ought
not to bring witnesses forward before the public denunciation.
Objection 2: Further, man should love his neighbor as himself. Now no
man brings in witnesses to prove his own secret sin. Neither therefore
ought one to bring forward witnesses to prove the secret sin of our
brother.
Objection 3: Further, witnesses are brought forward to prove something.
But witnesses afford no proof in secret matters. Therefore it is
useless to bring witnesses forward in such cases.
Objection 4: Further, Augustine says in his Rule that "before bringing
it to the notice of witnesses . . . it should be put before the
superior. " Now to bring a matter before a superior or a prelate is to
tell the Church. Therefore witnesses should not be brought forward
before the public denunciation.
On the contrary, Our Lord said (Mat. 18:16): "Take with thee one or two
more, that in the mouth of two," etc.
I answer that, The right way to go from one extreme to another is to
pass through the middle space. Now Our Lord wished the beginning of
fraternal correction to be hidden, when one brother corrects another
between this one and himself alone, while He wished the end to be
public, when such a one would be denounced to the Church. Consequently
it is befitting that a citation of witnesses should be placed between
the two extremes, so that at first the brother's sin be indicated to a
few, who will be of use without being a hindrance, and thus his sin be
amended without dishonoring him before the public.
Reply to Objection 1: Some have understood the order of fraternal
correction to demand that we should first of all rebuke our brother
secretly, and that if he listens, it is well; but if he listen not, and
his sin be altogether hidden, they say that we should go no further in
the matter, whereas if it has already begun to reach the ears of
several by various signs, we ought to prosecute the matter, according
to Our Lord's command. But this is contrary to what Augustine says in
his Rule that "we are bound to reveal" a brother's sin, if it "will
cause a worse corruption in the heart. " Wherefore we must say otherwise
that when the secret admonition has been given once or several times,
as long as there is probable hope of his amendment, we must continue to
admonish him in private, but as soon as we are able to judge with any
probability that the secret admonition is of no avail, we must take
further steps, however secret the sin may be, and call witnesses,
unless perhaps it were thought probable that this would not conduce to
our brother's amendment, and that he would become worse: because on
that account one ought to abstain altogether from correcting him, as
stated above [2618](A[6]).
Reply to Objection 2: A man needs no witnesses that he may amend his
own sin: yet they may be necessary that we may amend a brother's sin.
Hence the comparison fails.
Reply to Objection 3: There may be three reasons for citing witnesses.
First, to show that the deed in question is a sin, as Jerome says:
secondly, to prove that the deed was done, if repeated, as Augustine
says (in his Rule): thirdly, "to prove that the man who rebuked his
brother, has done what he could," as Chrysostom says (Hom. in Matth.
lx).
Reply to Objection 4: Augustine means that the matter ought to be made
known to the prelate before it is stated to the witnesses, in so far as
the prelate is a private individual who is able to be of more use than
others, but not that it is to be told him as to the Church, i. e. as
holding the position of judge.
__________________________________________________________________
OF HATRED (SIX ARTICLES)
We must how consider the vices opposed to charity: (1) hatred, which is
opposed to love; (2) sloth and envy, which are opposed to the joy of
charity; (3) discord and schism, which are contrary to peace; (4)
offense and scandal, which are contrary to beneficence and fraternal
correction.
Under the first head there are six points of inquiry:
(1) Whether it is possible to hate God?
(2) Whether hatred of God is the greatest of sins?
(3) Whether hatred of one's neighbor is always a sin?
(4) Whether it is the greatest of all sins against our neighbor?
(5) Whether it is a capital sin?
(6) From what capital sin does it arise?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether it is possible for anyone to hate God?
Objection 1: It would seem that no man can hate God. For Dionysius says
(Div. Nom. iv) that "the first good and beautiful is an object of love
and dilection to all. " But God is goodness and beauty itself. Therefore
He is hated by none.
Objection 2: Further, in the Apocryphal books of 3 Esdras 4:36, 39 it
is written that "all things call upon truth . . . and (all men) do well
like of her works. " Now God is the very truth according to Jn. 14:6.
Therefore all love God, and none can hate Him.
Objection 3: Further, hatred is a kind of aversion. But according to
Dionysius (Div. Nom. i) God draws all things to Himself. Therefore none
can hate Him.
On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 73:23): "The pride of them that
hate Thee ascendeth continually," and (Jn. 15:24): "But now they have
both seen and hated both Me and My Father. "
I answer that, As shown above ([2619]FS, Q[29], A[1]), hatred is a
movement of the appetitive power, which power is not set in motion save
by something apprehended. Now God can be apprehended by man in two
ways; first, in Himself, as when He is seen in His Essence; secondly,
in His effects, when, to wit, "the invisible things" of God . . . "are
clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made" (Rom.
1:20). Now God in His Essence is goodness itself, which no man can
hate---for it is natural to good to be loved. Hence it is impossible
for one who sees God in His Essence, to hate Him.
Moreover some of His effects are such that they can nowise be contrary
to the human will, since "to be, to live, to understand," which are
effects of God, are desirable and lovable to all. Wherefore again God
cannot be an object of hatred if we consider Him as the Author of such
like effects. Some of God's effects, however, are contrary to an
inordinate will, such as the infliction of punishment, and the
prohibition of sin by the Divine Law. Such like effects are repugnant
to a will debased by sin, and as regards the consideration of them, God
may be an object of hatred to some, in so far as they look upon Him as
forbidding sin, and inflicting punishment.
Reply to Objection 1: This argument is true of those who see God's
Essence, which is the very essence of goodness.
Reply to Objection 2: This argument is true in so far as God is
apprehended as the cause of such effects as are naturally beloved of
all, among which are the works of Truth who reveals herself to men.
Reply to Objection 3: God draws all things to Himself, in so far as He
is the source of being, since all things, in as much as they are, tend
to be like God, Who is Being itself.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether hatred of God is the greatest of sins?
Objection 1: It would seem that hatred of God is not the greatest of
sins. For the most grievous sin is the sin against the Holy Ghost,
since it cannot be forgiven, according to Mat. 12:32. Now hatred of God
is not reckoned among the various kinds of sin against the Holy Ghost,
as may be seen from what has been said above ([2620]Q[14], A[2]).
Therefore hatred of God is not the most grievous sin.
Objection 2: Further, sin consists in withdrawing oneself from God. Now
an unbeliever who has not even knowledge of God seems to be further
away from Him than a believer, who though he hate God, nevertheless
knows Him. Therefore it seems that the sin of unbelief is graver than
the sin of hatred against God.
Objection 3: Further, God is an object of hatred, only by reason of
those of His effects that are contrary to the will: the chief of which
is punishment. But hatred of punishment is not the most grievous sin.
Therefore hatred of God is not the most grievous sin.
On the contrary, The best is opposite to the worst, according to the
Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 10). But hatred of God is contrary to the
love of God, wherein man's best consists. Therefore hatred of God is
man's worst sin.
I answer that, The defect in sin consists in its aversion from God, as
stated above ([2621]Q[10], A[3]): and this aversion would not have the
character of guilt, were it not voluntary. Hence the nature of guilt
consists in a voluntary aversion from God.
Now this voluntary aversion from God is directly implied in the hatred
of God, but in other sins, by participation and indirectly. For just as
the will cleaves directly to what it loves, so does it directly shun
what it hates. Hence when a man hates God, his will is directly averted
from God, whereas in other sins, fornication for instance, a man turns
away from God, not directly, but indirectly, in so far, namely, as he
desires an inordinate pleasure, to which aversion from God is
connected. Now that which is so by itself, always takes precedence of
that which is so by another. Wherefore hatred of God is more grievous
than other sins.
Reply to Objection 1: According to Gregory (Moral. xxv, 11), "it is one
thing not to do good things, end another to hate the giver of good
things, even as it is one thing to sin indeliberately, and another to
sin deliberately. " This implies that to hate God, the giver of all good
things, is to sin deliberately, and this is a sin against the Holy
Ghost. Hence it is evident that hatred of God is chiefly a sin against
the Holy Ghost, in so far as the sin against the Holy Ghost denotes a
special kind of sin: and yet it is not reckoned among the kinds of sin
against the Holy Ghost, because it is universally found in every kind
of that sin.
Reply to Objection 2: Even unbelief is not sinful unless it be
voluntary: wherefore the more voluntary it is, the more it is sinful.
Now it becomes voluntary by the fact that a man hates the truth that is
proposed to him. Wherefore it is evident that unbelief derives its
sinfulness from hatred of God, Whose truth is the object of faith; and
hence just as a cause is greater than its effect, so hatred of God is a
greater sin than unbelief.
Reply to Objection 3: Not everyone who hates his punishment, hates God
the author of punishments. For many hate the punishments inflicted on
them, and yet they bear them patiently out of reverence for the Divine
justice. Wherefore Augustine says (Confess. x) that God commands us to
bear with penal evils, not to love them. On the other hand, to break
out into hatred of God when He inflicts those punishments, is to hate
God's very justice, and that is a most grievous sin. Hence Gregory says
(Moral. xxv, 11): "Even as sometimes it is more grievous to love sin
than to do it, so is it more wicked to hate justice than, not to have
done it. "
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Whether hatred of one's neighbor is always a sin?
Objection 1: It would seem that hatred of one's neighbor is not always
a sin. For no sin is commanded or counselled by God, according to Prov.
8:8: "All My words are just, there is nothing wicked nor perverse in
them. " Now, it is written (Lk. 14:26): "If any man come to Me, and hate
not his father and mother . . . he cannot be My disciple. " Therefore
hatred of one's neighbor is not always a sin.
Objection 2: Further, nothing wherein we imitate God can be a sin. But
it is in imitation of God that we hate certain people: for it is
written (Rom. 1:30): "Detractors, hateful to God. " Therefore it is
possible to hate certain people without committing a sin.
Objection 3: Further, nothing that is natural is a sin, for sin is a
"wandering away from what is according to nature," according to
Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 4,30; iv, 20). Now it is natural to a
thing to hate whatever is contrary to it, and to aim at its undoing.
Therefore it seems that it is not a sin to hate one's I enemy.
On the contrary, It is written (1 Jn. 2:9): "He that . . . hateth his
brother, is in darkness. " Now spiritual darkness is sin. Therefore
there cannot be hatred of one's neighbor without sin.
I answer that, Hatred is opposed to love, as stated above ([2622]FS,
Q[29], A[2]); so that hatred of a thing is evil according as the love
of that thing is good. Now love is due to our neighbor in respect of
what he holds from God, i. e. in respect of nature and grace, but not in
respect of what he has of himself and from the devil, i. e. in respect
of sin and lack of justice.
Consequently it is lawful to hate the sin in one's brother, and
whatever pertains to the defect of Divine justice, but we cannot hate
our brother's nature and grace without sin. Now it is part of our love
for our brother that we hate the fault and the lack of good in him,
since desire for another's good is equivalent to hatred of his evil.
Consequently the hatred of one's brother, if we consider it simply, is
always sinful.
Reply to Objection 1: By the commandment of God (Ex. 20:12) we must
honor our parents---as united to us in nature and kinship. But we must
hate them in so far as they prove an obstacle to our attaining the
perfection of Divine justice.
Reply to Objection 2: God hates the sin which is in the detractor, not
his nature: so that we can hate detractors without committing a sin.
Reply to Objection 3: Men are not opposed to us in respect of the goods
which they have received from God: wherefore, in this respect, we
should love them. But they are opposed to us, in so far as they show
hostility towards us, and this is sinful in them. In this respect we
should hate them, for we should hate in them the fact that they are
hostile to us.
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Whether hatred of our neighbor is the most grievous sin against our
neighbor?
Objection 1: It would seem that hatred of our neighbor is the most
grievous sin against our neighbor. For it is written (1 Jn. 3:15):
"Whosoever hateth his brother is a murderer. " Now murder is the most
grievous of sins against our neighbor. Therefore hatred is also.
Objection 2: Further, worst is opposed to best. Now the best thing we
give our neighbor is love, since all other things are referable to
love. Therefore hatred is the worst.
On the contrary, A thing is said to be evil, because it hurts, as
Augustine observes (Enchiridion xii). Now there are sins by which a man
hurts his neighbor more than by hatred, e. g. theft, murder and
adultery. Therefore hatred is not the most grievous sin.
Moreover, Chrysostom [*Hom. x in the Opus Imperfectum, falsely ascribed
to St. John Chrysostom] commenting on Mat. 5:19, "He that shall break
one of these least commandments," says: "The commandments of Moses,
Thou shalt not kill, Thou shalt not commit adultery, count for little
in their reward, but they count for much if they be disobeyed. On the
other hand the commandments of Christ such as, Thou shalt not be angry,
Thou shalt not desire, are reckoned great in their reward, but little
in the transgression. " Now hatred is an internal movement like anger
and desire. Therefore hatred of one's brother is a less grievous sin
than murder.
I answer that, Sins committed against our neighbor are evil on two
counts; first by reason of the disorder in the person who sins,
secondly by reason of the hurt inflicted on the person sinned against.
On the first count, hatred is a more grievous sin than external actions
that hurt our neighbor, because hatred is a disorder of man's will,
which is the chief part of man, and wherein is the root of sin, so that
if a man's outward actions were to be inordinate, without any disorder
in his will, they would not be sinful, for instance, if he were to kill
a man, through ignorance or out of zeal for justice: and if there be
anything sinful in a man's outward sins against his neighbor, it is all
to be traced to his inward hatred.
On the other hand, as regards the hurt inflicted on his neighbor, a
man's outward sins are worse than his inward hatred. This suffices for
the Replies to the Objections.
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Whether hatred is a capital sin?
Objection 1: It would seem that hatred is a capital sin. For hatred is
directly opposed to charity. Now charity is the foremost among the
virtues, and the mother of all others. Therefore hatred is the chief of
the capital sins, and the origin of all others.
Objection 2: Further, sins arise in us on account of the inclinations
of our passions, according to Rom. 7:5: "The passions of sins . . . did
work in our members to bring forth fruit unto death. " Now all other
passions of the soul seem to arise from love and hatred, as was shown
above ([2623]FS, Q[25], AA[1],2). Therefore hatred should be reckoned
one of the capital sins.
Objection 3: Further, vice is a moral evil. Now hatred regards evil
more than any other passion does. Therefore it seems that hatred should
be reckoned a capital sin.
On the contrary, Gregory (Moral. xxxi) does not reckon hatred among the
seven capital sins.
I answer that, As stated above ([2624]FS, Q[84], AA[3],4), a capital
vice is one from which other vices arise most frequently. Now vice is
contrary to man's nature, in as much as he is a rational animal: and
when a thing acts contrary to its nature, that which is natural to it
is corrupted little by little. Consequently it must first of all fail
in that which is less in accordance with its nature, and last of all in
that which is most in accordance with its nature, since what is first
in construction is last in destruction. Now that which, first and
foremost, is most natural to man, is the love of what is good, and
especially love of the Divine good, and of his neighbor's good.
Wherefore hatred, which is opposed to this love, is not the first but
the last thing in the downfall of virtue resulting from vice: and
therefore it is not a capital vice.
Reply to Objection 1: As stated in Phys. vii, text. 18, "the virtue of
a thing consists in its being well disposed in accordance with its
nature. " Hence what is first and foremost in the virtues must be first
and foremost in the natural order. Hence charity is reckoned the
foremost of the virtues, and for the same reason hatred cannot be first
among the vices, as stated above.
Reply to Objection 2: Hatred of the evil that is contrary to one's
natural good, is the first of the soul's passions, even as love of
one's natural good is. But hatred of one's connatural good cannot be
first, but is something last, because such like hatred is a proof of an
already corrupted nature, even as love of an extraneous good.
Reply to Objection 3: Evil is twofold. One is a true evil, for the
reason that it is incompatible with one's natural good, and the hatred
of such an evil may have priority over the other passions. There is,
however, another which is not a true, but an apparent evil, which,
namely, is a true and connatural good, and yet is reckoned evil on
account of the corruption of nature: and the hatred of such an evil
must needs come last. This hatred is vicious, but the former is not.
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Whether hatred arises from envy?
Objection 1: It seems that hatred does not arise from envy. For envy is
sorrow for another's good. Now hatred does not arise from sorrow, for,
on the contrary, we grieve for the presence of the evil we hate.
Therefore hatred does not arise from envy.
Objection 2: Further, hatred is opposed to love. Now love of our
neighbor is referred to our love of God, as stated above ([2625]Q[25],
A[1];[2626] Q[26], A[2]). Therefore hatred of our neighbor is referred
to our hatred of God. But hatred of God does not arise from envy, for
we do not envy those who are very far removed from us, but rather those
who seem to be near us, as the Philosopher states (Rhet. ii). Therefore
hatred does not arise from envy.
Objection 3: Further, to one effect there is one cause. Now hatred is
caused by anger, for Augustine says in his Rule that "anger grows into
hatred. " Therefore hatred does not arise from envy.
On the contrary, Gregory says (Moral. xxxi, 45) that "out of envy
cometh hatred. "
I answer that, As stated above [2627](A[5]), hatred of his neighbor is
a man's last step in the path of sin, because it is opposed to the love
which he naturally has for his neighbor. Now if a man declines from
that which is natural, it is because he intends to avoid that which is
naturally an object to be shunned. Now every animal naturally avoids
sorrow, just as it desires pleasure, as the Philosopher states (Ethic.
vii, x). Accordingly just as love arises from pleasure, so does hatred
arise from sorrow. For just as we are moved to love whatever gives us
pleasure, in as much as for that very reason it assumes the aspect of
good; so we are moved to hate whatever displeases us, in so far as for
this very reason it assumes the aspect of evil. Wherefore, since envy
is sorrow for our neighbor's good, it follows that our neighbor's good
becomes hateful to us, so that "out of envy cometh hatred. "
Reply to Objection 1: Since the appetitive power, like the apprehensive
power, reflects on its own acts, it follows that there is a kind of
circular movement in the actions of the appetitive power. And so
according to the first forward course of the appetitive movement, love
gives rise to desire, whence follows pleasure when one has obtained
what one desired. And since the very fact of taking pleasure in the
good one loves is a kind of good, it follows that pleasure causes love.
And in the same way sorrow causes hatred.
Reply to Objection 2: Love and hatred are essentially different, for
the object of love is good, which flows from God to creatures,
wherefore love is due to God in the first place, and to our neighbor
afterwards. On the other hand, hatred is of evil, which has no place in
God Himself, but only in His effects, for which reason it has been
stated above [2628](A[1]), that God is not an object of hatred, except
in so far as He is considered in relation to His effects, and
consequently hatred is directed to our neighbor before being directed
to God. Therefore, since envy of our neighbor is the mother of hatred
of our neighbor, it becomes, in consequence, the cause of hatred
towards God.
Reply to Objection 3: Nothing prevents a thing arising from various
causes in various respects, and accordingly hatred may arise both from
anger and from envy. However it arises more directly from envy, which
looks upon the very good of our neighbor as displeasing and therefore
hateful, whereas hatred arises from anger by way of increase. For at
first, through anger, we desire our neighbor's evil according to a
certain measure, that is in so far as that evil has the aspect of
vengeance: but afterwards, through the continuance of anger, man goes
so far as absolutely to desire his neighbor's evil, which desire is
part of hatred. Wherefore it is evident that hatred is caused by envy
formally as regards the aspect of the object, but dispositively by
anger.
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OF SLOTH (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider the vices opposed to the joy of charity. This joy
is either about the Divine good, and then its contrary is sloth, or
about our neighbor's good, and then its contrary is envy. Wherefore we
must consider (1) Sloth and (2) Envy.
Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether sloth is a sin?
(2) Whether it is a special vice?
(3) Whether it is a mortal sin?
(4) Whether it is a capital sin?
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Whether sloth is a sin?
Objection 1: It would seem that sloth is not a sin. For we are neither
praised nor blamed for our passions, according to the Philosopher
(Ethic. ii, 5). Now sloth is a passion, since it is a kind of sorrow,
according to Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 14), and as we stated above
([2629]FS, Q[35], A[8] ). Therefore sloth is not a sin.
Objection 2: Further, no bodily failing that occurs at fixed times is a
sin. But sloth is like this, for Cassian says (De Instit. Monast. x,
[*De Institutione Caeobiorum]): "The monk is troubled with sloth
chiefly about the sixth hour: it is like an intermittent fever, and
inflicts the soul of the one it lays low with burning fires at regular
and fixed intervals. " Therefore sloth is not a sin.
Objection 3: Further, that which proceeds from a good root is,
seemingly, no sin. Now sloth proceeds from a good root, for Cassian
says (De Instit. Monast. x) that "sloth arises from the fact that we
sigh at being deprived of spiritual fruit, and think that other
monasteries and those which are a long way off are much better than the
one we dwell in": all of which seems to point to humility. Therefore
sloth is not a sin.
Objection 4: Further, all sin is to be avoided, according to Ecclus.
21:2: "Flee from sins as from the face of a serpent. " Now Cassian says
(De Instit. Monast. x): "Experience shows that the onslaught of sloth
is not to be evaded by flight but to be conquered by resistance. "
Therefore sloth is not a sin.
On the contrary, Whatever is forbidden in Holy Writ is a sin. Now such
is sloth [acedia]: for it is written (Ecclus. 6:26): "Bow down thy
shoulder, and bear her," namely spiritual wisdom, "and be not grieved
[acedieris] with her bands. " Therefore sloth is a sin.
I answer that, Sloth, according to Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 14) is
an oppressive sorrow, which, to wit, so weighs upon man's mind, that he
wants to do nothing; thus acid things are also cold. Hence sloth
implies a certain weariness of work, as appears from a gloss on Ps.
106:18, "Their soul abhorred all manner of meat," and from the
definition of some who say that sloth is a "sluggishness of the mind
which neglects to begin good. "
Now this sorrow is always evil, sometimes in itself, sometimes in its
effect. For sorrow is evil in itself when it is about that which is
apparently evil but good in reality, even as, on the other hand,
pleasure is evil if it is about that which seems to be good but is, in
truth, evil. Since, then, spiritual good is a good in very truth,
sorrow about spiritual good is evil in itself. And yet that sorrow also
which is about a real evil, is evil in its effect, if it so oppresses
man as to draw him away entirely from good deeds. Hence the Apostle (2
Cor. 2:7) did not wish those who repented to be "swallowed up with
overmuch sorrow. "
Accordingly, since sloth, as we understand it here, denotes sorrow for
spiritual good, it is evil on two counts, both in itself and in point
of its effect. Consequently it is a sin, for by sin we mean an evil
movement of the appetite, as appears from what has been said above
(Q[10], A[2]; [2630]FS, Q[74], A[4]).
Reply to Objection 1: Passions are not sinful in themselves; but they
are blameworthy in so far as they are applied to something evil, just
as they deserve praise in so far as they are applied to something good.
Wherefore sorrow, in itself, calls neither for praise nor for blame:
whereas moderate sorrow for evil calls for praise, while sorrow for
good, and again immoderate sorrow for evil, call for blame. It is in
this sense that sloth is said to be a sin.
Reply to Objection 2: The passions of the sensitive appetite may either
be venial sins in themselves, or incline the soul to mortal sin. And
since the sensitive appetite has a bodily organ, it follows that on
account of some bodily transmutation a man becomes apt to commit some
particular sin. Hence it may happen that certain sins may become more
insistent, through certain bodily transmutations occurring at certain
fixed times. Now all bodily effects, of themselves, dispose one to
sorrow; and thus it is that those who fast are harassed by sloth
towards mid-day, when they begin to feel the want of food, and to be
parched by the sun's heat.
Reply to Objection 3: It is a sign of humility if a man does not think
too much of himself, through observing his own faults; but if a man
contemns the good things he has received from God, this, far from being
a proof of humility, shows him to be ungrateful: and from such like
contempt results sloth, because we sorrow for things that we reckon
evil and worthless. Accordingly we ought to think much of the goods of
others, in such a way as not to disparage those we have received
ourselves, because if we did they would give us sorrow.
Reply to Objection 4: Sin is ever to be shunned, but the assaults of
sin should be overcome, sometimes by flight, sometimes by resistance;
by flight when a continued thought increases the incentive to sin, as
in lust; for which reason it is written (1 Cor. 6:18): "Fly
fornication"; by resistance, when perseverance in the thought
diminishes the incentive to sin, which incentive arises from some
trivial consideration. This is the case with sloth, because the more we
think about spiritual goods, the more pleasing they become to us, and
forthwith sloth dies away.
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Whether sloth is a special vice?
Objection 1: It would seem that sloth is not a special vice. For that
which is common to all vices does not constitute a special kind of
vice. But every vice makes a man sorrowful about the opposite spiritual
good: for the lustful man is sorrowful about the good of continence,
and the glutton about the good of abstinence. Since then sloth is
sorrow for spiritual good, as stated above [2631](A[1]), it seems that
sloth is not a special sin.
Objection 2: Further, sloth, through being a kind of sorrow, is opposed
to joy. Now joy is not accounted one special virtue. Therefore sloth
should not be reckoned a special vice.
Objection 3: Further, since spiritual good is a general kind of object,
which virtue seeks, and vice shuns, it does not constitute a special
virtue or vice, unless it be determined by some addition. Now nothing,
seemingly, except toil, can determine it to sloth, if this be a special
vice; because the reason why a man shuns spiritual goods, is that they
are toilsome, wherefore sloth is a kind of weariness: while dislike of
toil, and love of bodily repose seem to be due to the same cause, viz.
idleness. Hence sloth would be nothing but laziness, which seems
untrue, for idleness is opposed to carefulness, whereas sloth is
opposed to joy. Therefore sloth is not a special vice.
On the contrary, Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45) distinguishes sloth from the
other vices. Therefore it is a special vice.
I answer that, Since sloth is sorrow for spiritual good, if we take
spiritual good in a general way, sloth will not be a special vice,
because, as stated above ([2632]FS, Q[71], A[1]), every vice shuns the
spiritual good of its opposite virtue. Again it cannot be said that
sloth is a special vice, in so far as it shuns spiritual good, as
toilsome, or troublesome to the body, or as a hindrance to the body's
pleasure, for this again would not sever sloth from carnal vices,
whereby a man seeks bodily comfort and pleasure.
Wherefore we must say that a certain order exists among spiritual
goods, since all the spiritual goods that are in the acts of each
virtue are directed to one spiritual good, which is the Divine good,
about which there is a special virtue, viz. charity. Hence it is proper
to each virtue to rejoice in its own spiritual good, which consists in
its own act, while it belongs specially to charity to have that
spiritual joy whereby one rejoices in the Divine good. In like manner
the sorrow whereby one is displeased at the spiritual good which is in
each act of virtue, belongs, not to any special vice, but to every
vice, but sorrow in the Divine good about which charity rejoices,
belongs to a special vice, which is called sloth. This suffices for the
Replies to the Objections.
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Whether sloth is a mortal sin?
Objection 1: It would seem that sloth is not a mortal sin. For every
mortal sin is contrary to a precept of the Divine Law. But sloth seems
contrary to no precept, as one may see by going through the precepts of
the Decalogue.
