Objection
2: Further, all things are in God as their first model.
Summa Theologica
On the contrary, It is said in De Anima iii, 21,[22] that "where there
is composition of objects understood, there is truth and falsehood. "
But such composition is in the intellect. Therefore truth and falsehood
exist in the intellect.
I answer that, Just as a thing has being by its proper form, so the
knowing faculty has knowledge by the likeness of the thing known.
Hence, as natural things cannot fall short of the being that belongs to
them by their form, but may fall short of accidental or consequent
qualities, even as a man may fail to possess two feet, but not fail to
be a man; so the faculty of knowing cannot fail in knowledge of the
thing with the likeness of which it is informed; but may fail with
regard to something consequent upon that form, or accidental thereto.
For it has been said [120](A[2]) that sight is not deceived in its
proper sensible, but about common sensibles that are consequent to that
object; or about accidental objects of sense. Now as the sense is
directly informed by the likeness of its proper object, so is the
intellect by the likeness of the essence of a thing. Hence the
intellect is not deceived about the essence of a thing, as neither the
sense about its proper object. But in affirming and denying, the
intellect may be deceived, by attributing to the thing of which it
understands the essence, something which is not consequent upon it, or
is opposed to it. For the intellect is in the same position as regards
judging of such things, as sense is as to judging of common, or
accidental, sensible objects. There is, however, this difference, as
before mentioned regarding truth ([121]Q[16], A[2]), that falsity can
exist in the intellect not only because the intellect is conscious of
that knowledge, as it is conscious of truth; whereas in sense falsity
does not exist as known, as stated above [122](A[2]).
But because falsity of the intellect is concerned essentially only with
the composition of the intellect, falsity occurs also accidentally in
that operation of the intellect whereby it knows the essence of a
thing, in so far as composition of the intellect is mixed up in it.
This can take place in two ways. In one way, by the intellect applying
to one thing the definition proper to another; as that of a circle to a
man. Wherefore the definition of one thing is false of another. In
another way, by composing a definition of parts which are mutually
exclusive. For thus the definition is not only false of the thing, but
false in itself. A definition such as " a reasonable four-footed
animal" would be of this kind, and the intellect false in making it;
for such a statement as "some reasonable animals are four-footed" is
false in itself. For this reason the intellect cannot be false in its
knowledge of simple essences; but it is either true, or it understands
nothing at all.
Reply to Objection 1: Because the essence of a thing is the proper
object of the intellect, we are properly said to understand a thing
when we reduce it to its essence, and judge of it thereby; as takes
place in demonstrations, in which there is no falsity. In this sense
Augustine's words must be understood, "that he who is deceived,
understands not that wherein he is deceived;" and not in the sense that
no one is ever deceived in any operation of the intellect.
Reply to Objection 2: The intellect is always right as regards first
principles; since it is not deceived about them for the same reason
that it is not deceived about what a thing is. For self-known
principles are such as are known as soon as the terms are understood,
from the fact that the predicate is contained in the definition of the
subject.
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Whether true and false are contraries?
Objection 1: It seems that true and false are not contraries. For true
and false are opposed, as that which is to that which is not; for
"truth," as Augustine says (Soliloq. ii, 5), "is that which is. " But
that which is and that which is not are not opposed as contraries.
Therefore true and false are not contrary things.
Objection 2: Further, one of two contraries is not in the other. But
falsity is in truth, because, as Augustine says, (Soliloq. ii, 10), "A
tragedian would not be a false Hector, if he were not a true
tragedian. " Therefore true and false are not contraries.
Objection 3: Further, in God there is no contrariety, for "nothing is
contrary to the Divine Substance," as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xii,
2). But falsity is opposed to God, for an idol is called in Scripture a
lie, "They have laid hold on lying" (Jer. 8:5), that is to say, "an
idol," as a gloss says. Therefore false and true are not contraries.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Peri Herm. ii), that a false
opinion is contrary to a true one.
I answer that, True and false are opposed as contraries, and not, as
some have said, as affirmation and negation. In proof of which it must
be considered that negation neither asserts anything nor determines any
subject, and can therefore be said of being as of not-being, for
instance not-seeing or not-sitting. But privation asserts nothing,
whereas it determines its subject, for it is "negation in a subject,"
as stated in Metaph. iv, 4: v. 27; for blindness is not said except of
one whose nature it is to see. Contraries, however, both assert
something and determine the subject, for blackness is a species of
color. Falsity asserts something, for a thing is false, as the
Philosopher says (Metaph. iv, 27), inasmuch as something is said or
seems to be something that it is not, or not to be what it really is.
For as truth implies an adequate apprehension of a thing, so falsity
implies the contrary. Hence it is clear that true and false are
contraries.
Reply to Objection 1: What is in things is the truth of the thing; but
what is apprehended, is the truth of the intellect, wherein truth
primarily resides. Hence the false is that which is not as apprehended.
To apprehend being, and not-being, implies contrariety; for, as the
Philosopher proves (Peri Herm. ii), the contrary of this statement "God
is good," is, "God is not good. "
Reply to Objection 2: Falsity is not founded in the truth which is
contrary to it, just as evil is not founded in the good which is
contrary to it, but in that which is its proper subject. This happens
in either, because true and good are universals, and convertible with
being. Hence, as every privation is founded in a subject, that is a
being, so every evil is founded in some good, and every falsity in some
truth.
Reply to Objection 3: Because contraries, and opposites by way of
privation, are by nature about one and the same thing, therefore there
is nothing contrary to God, considered in Himself, either with respect
to His goodness or His truth, for in His intellect there can be nothing
false. But in our apprehension of Him contraries exist, for the false
opinion concerning Him is contrary to the true. So idols are called
lies, opposed to the divine truth, inasmuch as the false opinion
concerning them is contrary to the true opinion of the divine unity.
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THE LIFE OF GOD (FOUR ARTICLES)
Since to understand belongs to living beings, after considering the
divine knowledge and intellect, we must consider the divine life. About
this, four points of inquiry arise:
(1) To whom does it belong to live?
(2) What is life?
(3) Whether life is properly attributed to God?
(4) Whether all things in God are life?
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Whether to live belongs to all natural things?
Objection 1: It seems that to live belongs to all natural things. For
the Philosopher says (Phys. viii, 1) that "Movement is like a kind of
life possessed by all things existing in nature. " But all natural
things participate in movement. Therefore all natural things partake of
life.
Objection 2: Further, plants are said to live, inasmuch as they in
themselves a principle of movement of growth and decay. But local
movement is naturally more perfect than, and prior to, movement of
growth and decay, as the Philosopher shows (Phys. viii, 56,57). Since
then, all natural bodies have in themselves some principle of local
movement, it seems that all natural bodies live.
Objection 3: Further, amongst natural bodies the elements are the less
perfect. Yet life is attributed to them, for we speak of "living
waters. " Much more, therefore, have other natural bodies life.
On the contrary, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. vi, 1) that "The last echo
of life is heard in the plants," whereby it is inferred that their life
is life in its lowest degree. But inanimate bodies are inferior to
plants. Therefore they have not life.
I answer that, We can gather to what things life belongs, and to what
it does not, from such things as manifestly possess life. Now life
manifestly belongs to animals, for it said in De Vegetab. i [*De
Plantis i, 1] that in animals life is manifest. We must, therefore,
distinguish living from lifeless things, by comparing them to that by
reason of which animals are said to live: and this it is in which life
is manifested first and remains last. We say then that an animal begins
to live when it begins to move of itself: and as long as such movement
appears in it, so long as it is considered to be alive. When it no
longer has any movement of itself, but is only moved by another power,
then its life is said to fail, and the animal to be dead. Whereby it is
clear that those things are properly called living that move themselves
by some kind of movement, whether it be movement properly so called, as
the act of an imperfect being, i. e. of a thing in potentiality, is
called movement; or movement in a more general sense, as when said of
the act of a perfect thing, as understanding and feeling are called
movement. Accordingly all things are said to be alive that determine
themselves to movement or operation of any kind: whereas those things
that cannot by their nature do so, cannot be called living, unless by a
similitude.
Reply to Objection 1: These words of the Philosopher may be understood
either of the first movement, namely, that of the celestial bodies, or
of the movement in its general sense. In either way is movement called
the life, as it were, of natural bodies, speaking by a similitude, and
not attributing it to them as their property. The movement of the
heavens is in the universe of corporeal natures as the movement of the
heart, whereby life is preserved, is in animals. Similarly also every
natural movement in respect to natural things has a certain similitude
to the operations of life. Hence, if the whole corporeal universe were
one animal, so that its movement came from an "intrinsic moving force,"
as some in fact have held, in that case movement would really be the
life of all natural bodies.
Reply to Objection 2: To bodies, whether heavy or light, movement does
not belong, except in so far as they are displaced from their natural
conditions, and are out of their proper place; for when they are in the
place that is proper and natural to them, then they are at rest. Plants
and other living things move with vital movement, in accordance with
the disposition of their nature, but not by approaching thereto, or by
receding from it, for in so far as they recede from such movement, so
far do they recede from their natural disposition. Heavy and light
bodies are moved by an extrinsic force, either generating them and
giving them form, or removing obstacles from their way. They do not
therefore move themselves, as do living bodies.
Reply to Objection 3: Waters are called living that have a continuous
current: for standing waters, that are not connected with a continually
flowing source, are called dead, as in cisterns and ponds. This is
merely a similitude, inasmuch as the movement they are seen to possess
makes them look as if they were alive. Yet this is not life in them in
its real sense, since this movement of theirs is not from themselves
but from the cause that generates them. The same is the case with the
movement of other heavy and light bodies.
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Whether life is an operation?
Objection 1: It seems that life is an operation. For nothing is divided
except into parts of the same genus. But life is divided by certain
operations, as is clear from the Philosopher (De Anima ii, 13), who
distinguishes four kinds of life, namely, nourishment, sensation, local
movement and understanding. Therefore life is an operation.
Objection 2: Further, the active life is said to be different from the
contemplative. But the contemplative is only distinguished from the
active by certain operations. Therefore life is an operation.
Objection 3: Further, to know God is an operation. But this is life, as
is clear from the words of Jn. 18:3, "Now this is eternal life, that
they may know Thee, the only true God. " Therefore life is an operation.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (De Anima ii, 37), "In living
things, to live is to be. "
I answer that, As is clear from what has been said ([123]Q[17], A[3]),
our intellect, which takes cognizance of the essence of a thing as its
proper object, gains knowledge from sense, of which the proper objects
are external accidents. Hence from external appearances we come to the
knowledge of the essence of things. And because we name a thing in
accordance with our knowledge of it, as is clear from what has already
been said ([124]Q[13], A[1]), so from external properties names are
often imposed to signify essences. Hence such names are sometimes taken
strictly to denote the essence itself, the signification of which is
their principal object; but sometimes, and less strictly, to denote the
properties by reason of which they are imposed. And so we see that the
word "body" is used to denote a genus of substances from the fact of
their possessing three dimensions: and is sometimes taken to denote the
dimensions themselves; in which sense body is said to be a species of
quantity. The same must be said of life. The name is given from a
certain external appearance, namely, self-movement, yet not precisely
to signify this, but rather a substance to which self-movement and the
application of itself to any kind of operation, belong naturally. To
live, accordingly, is nothing else than to exist in this or that
nature; and life signifies this, though in the abstract, just as the
word "running" denotes "to run" in the abstract.
Hence "living" is not an accidental but an essential predicate.
Sometimes, however, life is used less properly for the operations from
which its name is taken, and thus the Philosopher says (Ethic. ix, 9)
that to live is principally to sense or to understand.
Reply to Objection 1: The Philosopher here takes "to live" to mean an
operation of life. Or it would be better to say that sensation and
intelligence and the like, are sometimes taken for the operations,
sometimes for the existence itself of the operator. For he says (Ethic.
ix, 9) that to live is to sense or to understand---in other words, to
have a nature capable of sensation or understanding. Thus, then, he
distinguishes life by the four operations mentioned. For in this lower
world there are four kinds of living things. It is the nature of some
to be capable of nothing more than taking nourishment, and, as a
consequence, of growing and generating. Others are able, in addition,
to sense, as we see in the case of shellfish and other animals without
movement. Others have the further power of moving from place to place,
as perfect animals, such as quadrupeds, and birds, and so on. Others,
as man, have the still higher faculty of understanding.
Reply to Objection 2: By vital operations are meant those whose
principles are within the operator, and in virtue of which the operator
produces such operations of itself. It happens that there exist in men
not merely such natural principles of certain operations as are their
natural powers, but something over and above these, such as habits
inclining them like a second nature to particular kinds of operations,
so that the operations become sources of pleasure. Thus, as by a
similitude, any kind of work in which a man takes delight, so that his
bent is towards it, his time spent in it, and his whole life ordered
with a view to it, is said to be the life of that man. Hence some are
said to lead to life of self-indulgence, others a life of virtue. In
this way the contemplative life is distinguished from the active, and
thus to know God is said to be life eternal.
Wherefore the Reply to the Third Objection is clear.
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Whether life is properly attributed to God?
Objection 1: It seems that life is not properly attributed to God. For
things are said to live inasmuch as they move themselves, as previously
stated [125](A[2]). But movement does not belong to God. Neither
therefore does life.
Objection 2: Further, in all living things we must needs suppose some
principle of life. Hence it is said by the Philosopher (De Anima ii, 4)
that "the soul is the cause and principle of the living body. " But God
has no principle. Therefore life cannot be attributed to Him.
Objection 3: Further, the principle of life in the living things that
exist among us is the vegetative soul. But this exists only in
corporeal things. Therefore life cannot be attributed to incorporeal
things.
On the contrary, It is said (Ps. 83:3): "My heart and my flesh have
rejoiced in the living God. "
I answer that, Life is in the highest degree properly in God. In proof
of which it must be considered that since a thing is said to live in so
far as it operates of itself and not as moved by another, the more
perfectly this power is found in anything, the more perfect is the life
of that thing. In things that move and are moved, a threefold order is
found. In the first place, the end moves the agent: and the principal
agent is that which acts through its form, and sometimes it does so
through some instrument that acts by virtue not of its own form, but of
the principal agent, and does no more than execute the action.
Accordingly there are things that move themselves, not in respect of
any form or end naturally inherent in them, but only in respect of the
executing of the movement; the form by which they act, and the end of
the action being alike determined for them by their nature. Of this
kind are plants, which move themselves according to their inherent
nature, with regard only to executing the movements of growth and
decay.
Other things have self-movement in a higher degree, that is, not only
with regard to executing the movement, but even as regards to the form,
the principle of movement, which form they acquire of themselves. Of
this kind are animals, in which the principle of movement is not a
naturally implanted form; but one received through sense. Hence the
more perfect is their sense, the more perfect is their power of
self-movement. Such as have only the sense of touch, as shellfish, move
only with the motion of expansion and contraction; and thus their
movement hardly exceeds that of plants. Whereas such as have the
sensitive power in perfection, so as to recognize not only connection
and touch, but also objects apart from themselves, can move themselves
to a distance by progressive movement. Yet although animals of the
latter kind receive through sense the form that is the principle of
their movement, nevertheless they cannot of themselves propose to
themselves the end of their operation, or movement; for this has been
implanted in them by nature; and by natural instinct they are moved to
any action through the form apprehended by sense. Hence such animals as
move themselves in respect to an end they themselves propose are
superior to these. This can only be done by reason and intellect; whose
province it is to know the proportion between the end and the means to
that end, and duly coordinate them. Hence a more perfect degree of life
is that of intelligible beings; for their power of self-movement is
more perfect. This is shown by the fact that in one and the same man
the intellectual faculty moves the sensitive powers; and these by their
command move the organs of movement. Thus in the arts we see that the
art of using a ship, i. e. the art of navigation, rules the art of
ship-designing; and this in its turn rules the art that is only
concerned with preparing the material for the ship.
But although our intellect moves itself to some things, yet others are
supplied by nature, as are first principles, which it cannot doubt; and
the last end, which it cannot but will. Hence, although with respect to
some things it moves itself, yet with regard to other things it must be
moved by another. Wherefore that being whose act of understanding is
its very nature, and which, in what it naturally possesses, is not
determined by another, must have life in the most perfect degree. Such
is God; and hence in Him principally is life. From this the Philosopher
concludes (Metaph. xii, 51), after showing God to be intelligent, that
God has life most perfect and eternal, since His intellect is most
perfect and always in act.
Reply to Objection 1: As stated in Metaph. ix, 16, action is twofold.
Actions of one kind pass out to external matter, as to heat or to cut;
whilst actions of the other kind remain in the agent, as to understand,
to sense and to will. The difference between them is this, that the
former action is the perfection not of the agent that moves, but of the
thing moved; whereas the latter action is the perfection of the agent.
Hence, because movement is an act of the thing in movement, the latter
action, in so far as it is the act of the operator, is called its
movement, by this similitude, that as movement is an act of the thing
moved, so an act of this kind is the act of the agent, although
movement is an act of the imperfect, that is, of what is in
potentiality; while this kind of act is an act of the perfect, that is
to say, of what is in act as stated in De Anima iii, 28. In the sense,
therefore, in which understanding is movement, that which understands
itself is said to move itself. It is in this sense that Plato also
taught that God moves Himself; not in the sense in which movement is an
act of the imperfect.
Reply to Objection 2: As God is His own very existence and
understanding, so is He His own life; and therefore He so lives that He
has not principle of life.
Reply to Objection 3: Life in this lower world is bestowed on a
corruptible nature, that needs generation to preserve the species, and
nourishment to preserve the individual. For this reason life is not
found here below apart from a vegetative soul: but this does not hold
good with incorruptible natures.
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Whether all things are life in God?
Objection 1: It seems that not all things are life in God. For it is
said (Acts 17:28), "In Him we live, and move, and be. " But not all
things in God are movement. Therefore not all things are life in Him.
Objection 2: Further, all things are in God as their first model. But
things modelled ought to conform to the model. Since, then, not all
things have life in themselves, it seems that not all things are life
in God.
Objection 3: Further, as Augustine says (De Vera Relig. 29), a living
substance is better than a substance that does not live. If, therefore,
things which in themselves have not life, are life in God, it seems
that things exist more truly in God than themselves. But this appears
to be false; since in themselves they exist actually, but in God
potentially.
Objection 4: Further, just as good things and things made in time are
known by God, so are bad things, and things that God can make, but
never will be made. If, therefore, all things are life in God, inasmuch
as known by Him, it seems that even bad things and things that will
never be made are life in God, as known by Him, and this appears
inadmissible.
On the contrary, (Jn. 1:3,4), it is said, "What was made, in Him was
life. " But all things were made, except God. Therefore all things are
life in God.
I answer that, In God to live is to understand, as before stated
[126](A[3]). In God intellect, the thing understood, and the act of
understanding, are one and the same. Hence whatever is in God as
understood is the very living or life of God. Now, wherefore, since all
things that have been made by God are in Him as things understood, it
follows that all things in Him are the divine life itself.
Reply to Objection 1: Creatures are said to be in God in a twofold
sense. In one way, so far are they are held together and preserved by
the divine power; even as we say that things that are in our power are
in us. And creatures are thus said to be in God, even as they exist in
their own natures. In this sense we must understand the words of the
Apostle when he says, "In Him we live, move, and be"; since our being,
living, and moving are themselves caused by God. In another sense
things are said to be in God, as in Him who knows them, in which sense
they are in God through their proper ideas, which in God are not
distinct from the divine essence. Hence things as they are in God are
the divine essence. And since the divine essence is life and not
movement, it follows that things existing in God in this manner are not
movement, but life.
Reply to Objection 2: The thing modelled must be like the model
according to the form, not the mode of being. For sometimes the form
has being of another kind in the model from that which it has in the
thing modelled. Thus the form of a house has in the mind of the
architect immaterial and intelligible being; but in the house that
exists outside his mind, material and sensible being. Hence the ideas
of things, though not existing in themselves, are life in the divine
mind, as having a divine existence in that mind.
Reply to Objection 3: If form only, and not matter, belonged to natural
things, then in all respects natural things would exist more truly in
the divine mind, by the ideas of them, than in themselves. For which
reason, in fact, Plato held that the "separate" man was the true man;
and that man as he exists in matter, is man only by participation. But
since matter enters into the being of natural things, we must say that
those things have simply being in the divine mind more truly than in
themselves, because in that mind they have an uncreated being, but in
themselves a created being: whereas this particular being, a man, or
horse, for example, has this being more truly in its own nature than in
the divine mind, because it belongs to human nature to be material,
which, as existing in the divine mind, it is not. Even so a house has
nobler being in the architect's mind than in matter; yet a material
house is called a house more truly than the one which exists in the
mind; since the former is actual, the latter only potential.
Reply to Objection 4: Although bad things are in God's knowledge, as
being comprised under that knowledge, yet they are not in God as
created by Him, or preserved by Him, or as having their type in Him.
They are known by God through the types of good things. Hence it cannot
be said that bad things are life in God. Those things that are not in
time may be called life in God in so far as life means understanding
only, and inasmuch as they are understood by God; but not in so far as
life implies a principle of operation.
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THE WILL OF GOD (TWELVE ARTICLES)
After considering the things belonging to the divine knowledge, we
consider what belongs to the divine will. The first consideration is
about the divine will itself; the second about what belongs strictly to
His will; the third about what belongs to the intellect in relation to
His will. About His will itself there are twelve points of inquiry:
(1) Whether there is will in God?
(2) Whether God wills things apart from Himself?
(3) Whether whatever God wills, He wills necessarily?
(4) Whether the will of God is the cause of things?
(5) Whether any cause can be assigned to the divine will?
(6) Whether the divine will is always fulfilled?
(7) Whether the will of God is mutable?
(8) Whether the will of God imposes necessity on the things willed?
(9) Whether there is in God the will of evil?
(10) Whether God has free will?
(11) Whether the will of expression is distinguished in God?
(12) Whether five expressions of will are rightly assigned to the
divine will?
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Whether there is will in God?
Objection 1: It seems that there is not will in God. For the object of
will is the end and the good. But we cannot assign to God any end.
Therefore there is not will in God.
Objection 2: Further, will is a kind of appetite. But appetite, as it
is directed to things not possessed, implies imperfection, which cannot
be imputed to God. Therefore there is not will in God.
Objection 3: Further, according to the Philosopher (De Anima iii, 54),
the will moves, and is moved. But God is the first cause of movement,
and Himself is unmoved, as proved in Phys. viii, 49. Therefore there is
not will in God.
On the contrary, The Apostle says (Rom. 12:2): "That you may prove what
is the will of God. "
I answer that, There is will in God, as there is intellect: since will
follows upon intellect. For as natural things have actual existence by
their form, so the intellect is actually intelligent by its
intelligible form. Now everything has this aptitude towards its natural
form, that when it has it not, it tends towards it; and when it has it,
it is at rest therein. It is the same with every natural perfection,
which is a natural good. This aptitude to good in things without
knowledge is called natural appetite. Whence also intellectual natures
have a like aptitude as apprehended through its intelligible form; so
as to rest therein when possessed, and when not possessed to seek to
possess it, both of which pertain to the will. Hence in every
intellectual being there is will, just as in every sensible being there
is animal appetite. And so there must be will in God, since there is
intellect in Him. And as His intellect is His own existence, so is His
will.
Reply to Objection 1: Although nothing apart from God is His end, yet
He Himself is the end with respect to all things made by Him. And this
by His essence, for by His essence He is good, as shown above
([127]Q[6], A[3]): for the end has the aspect of good.
Reply to Objection 2: Will in us belongs to the appetitive part, which,
although named from appetite, has not for its only act the seeking what
it does not possess; but also the loving and the delighting in what it
does possess. In this respect will is said to be in God, as having
always good which is its object, since, as already said, it is not
distinct from His essence.
Reply to Objection 3: A will of which the principal object is a good
outside itself, must be moved by another; but the object of the divine
will is His goodness, which is His essence. Hence, since the will of
God is His essence, it is not moved by another than itself, but by
itself alone, in the same sense as understanding and willing are said
to be movement. This is what Plato meant when he said that the first
mover moves itself.
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Whether God wills things apart from Himself?
Objection 1: It seems that God does not will things apart from Himself.
For the divine will is the divine existence. But God is not other than
Himself. Therefore He does not will things other than Himself.
Objection 2: Further, the willed moves the willer, as the appetible the
appetite, as stated in De Anima iii, 54. If, therefore, God wills
anything apart from Himself, His will must be moved by another; which
is impossible.
Objection 3: Further, if what is willed suffices the willer, he seeks
nothing beyond it. But His own goodness suffices God, and completely
satisfies His will. Therefore God does not will anything apart from
Himself.
Objection 4: Further, acts of will are multiplied in proportion to the
number of their objects. If, therefore, God wills Himself and things
apart from Himself, it follows that the act of His will is manifold,
and consequently His existence, which is His will. But this is
impossible. Therefore God does not will things apart from Himself.
On the contrary, The Apostle says (1 Thess. 4:3): "This is the will of
God, your sanctification. "
I answer that, God wills not only Himself, but other things apart from
Himself. This is clear from the comparison which we made above
[128](A[1]). For natural things have a natural inclination not only
towards their own proper good, to acquire it if not possessed, and, if
possessed, to rest therein; but also to spread abroad their own good
amongst others, so far as possible. Hence we see that every agent, in
so far as it is perfect and in act, produces its like. It pertains,
therefore, to the nature of the will to communicate as far as possible
to others the good possessed; and especially does this pertain to the
divine will, from which all perfection is derived in some kind of
likeness. Hence, if natural things, in so far as they are perfect,
communicate their good to others, much more does it appertain to the
divine will to communicate by likeness its own good to others as much
as possible. Thus, then, He wills both Himself to be, and other things
to be; but Himself as the end, and other things as ordained to that
end; inasmuch as it befits the divine goodness that other things should
be partakers therein.
Reply to Objection 1: The divine will is God's own existence
essentially, yet they differ in aspect, according to the different ways
of understanding them and expressing them, as is clear from what has
already been said ([129]Q[13], A[4]). For when we say that God exists,
no relation to any other object is implied, as we do imply when we say
that God wills. Therefore, although He is not anything apart from
Himself, yet He does will things apart from Himself.
Reply to Objection 2: In things willed for the sake of the end, the
whole reason for our being moved is the end, and this it is that moves
the will, as most clearly appears in things willed only for the sake of
the end. He who wills to take a bitter draught, in doing so wills
nothing else than health; and this alone moves his will. It is
different with one who takes a draught that is pleasant, which anyone
may will to do, not only for the sake of health, but also for its own
sake. Hence, although God wills things apart from Himself only for the
sake of the end, which is His own goodness, it does not follow that
anything else moves His will, except His goodness. So, as He
understands things apart from Himself by understanding His own essence,
so He wills things apart from Himself by willing His own goodness.
Reply to Objection 3: From the fact that His own goodness suffices the
divine will, it does not follow that it wills nothing apart from
itself, but rather that it wills nothing except by reason of its
goodness. Thus, too, the divine intellect, though its perfection
consists in its very knowledge of the divine essence, yet in that
essence knows other things.
Reply to Objection 4: As the divine intellect is one, as seeing the
many only in the one, in the same way the divine will is one and
simple, as willing the many only through the one, that is, through its
own goodness.
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Whether whatever God wills He wills necessarily?
Objection 1: It seems that whatever God wills He wills necessarily. For
everything eternal is necessary. But whatever God wills, He wills from
eternity, for otherwise His will would be mutable. Therefore whatever
He wills, He wills necessarily.
Objection 2: Further, God wills things apart from Himself, inasmuch as
He wills His own goodness. Now God wills His own goodness necessarily.
Therefore He wills things apart from Himself necessarily.
Objection 3: Further, whatever belongs to the nature of God is
necessary, for God is of Himself necessary being, and the principle of
all necessity, as above shown ([130]Q[2], A[3]). But it belongs to His
nature to will whatever He wills; since in God there can be nothing
over and above His nature as stated in Metaph. v, 6. Therefore whatever
He wills, He wills necessarily.
Objection 4: Further, being that is not necessary, and being that is
possible not to be, are one and the same thing. If, therefore, God does
not necessarily will a thing that He wills, it is possible for Him not
to will it, and therefore possible for Him to will what He does not
will. And so the divine will is contingent upon one or the other of two
things, and imperfect, since everything contingent is imperfect and
mutable.
Objection 5: Further, on the part of that which is indifferent to one
or the other of two things, no action results unless it is inclined to
one or the other by some other power, as the Commentator [*Averroes]
says in Phys. ii. If, then, the Will of God is indifferent with regard
to anything, it follows that His determination to act comes from
another; and thus He has some cause prior to Himself.
Objection 6: Further, whatever God knows, He knows necessarily. But as
the divine knowledge is His essence, so is the divine will. Therefore
whatever God wills, He wills necessarily.
On the contrary, The Apostle says (Eph. 1:11): "Who worketh all things
according to the counsel of His will. " Now, what we work according to
the counsel of the will, we do not will necessarily. Therefore God does
not will necessarily whatever He wills.
I answer that, There are two ways in which a thing is said to be
necessary, namely, absolutely, and by supposition. We judge a thing to
be absolutely necessary from the relation of the terms, as when the
predicate forms part of the definition of the subject: thus it is
absolutely necessary that man is an animal. It is the same when the
subject forms part of the notion of the predicate; thus it is
absolutely necessary that a number must be odd or even. In this way it
is not necessary that Socrates sits: wherefore it is not necessary
absolutely, though it may be so by supposition; for, granted that he is
sitting, he must necessarily sit, as long as he is sitting. Accordingly
as to things willed by God, we must observe that He wills something of
absolute necessity: but this is not true of all that He wills. For the
divine will has a necessary relation to the divine goodness, since that
is its proper object. Hence God wills His own goodness necessarily,
even as we will our own happiness necessarily, and as any other faculty
has necessary relation to its proper and principal object, for instance
the sight to color, since it tends to it by its own nature. But God
wills things apart from Himself in so far as they are ordered to His
own goodness as their end. Now in willing an end we do not necessarily
will things that conduce to it, unless they are such that the end
cannot be attained without them; as, we will to take food to preserve
life, or to take ship in order to cross the sea. But we do not
necessarily will things without which the end is attainable, such as a
horse for a journey which we can take on foot, for we can make the
journey without one. The same applies to other means. Hence, since the
goodness of God is perfect, and can exist without other things inasmuch
as no perfection can accrue to Him from them, it follows that His
willing things apart from Himself is not absolutely necessary. Yet it
can be necessary by supposition, for supposing that He wills a thing,
then He is unable not to will it, as His will cannot change.
Reply to Objection 1: From the fact that God wills from eternity
whatever He wills, it does not follow that He wills it necessarily;
except by supposition.
Reply to Objection 2: Although God necessarily wills His own goodness,
He does not necessarily will things willed on account of His goodness;
for it can exist without other things.
Reply to Objection 3: It is not natural to God to will any of those
other things that He does not will necessarily; and yet it is not
unnatural or contrary to His nature, but voluntary.
Reply to Objection 4: Sometimes a necessary cause has a non-necessary
relation to an effect; owing to a deficiency in the effect, and not in
the cause. Even so, the sun's power has a non-necessary relation to
some contingent events on this earth, owing to a defect not in the
solar power, but in the effect that proceeds not necessarily from the
cause. In the same way, that God does not necessarily will some of the
things that He wills, does not result from defect in the divine will,
but from a defect belonging to the nature of the thing willed, namely,
that the perfect goodness of God can be without it; and such defect
accompanies all created good.
Reply to Objection 5: A naturally contingent cause must be determined
to act by some external power. The divine will, which by its nature is
necessary, determines itself to will things to which it has no
necessary relation.
Reply to Objection 6: As the divine essence is necessary of itself, so
is the divine will and the divine knowledge; but the divine knowledge
has a necessary relation to the thing known; not the divine will to the
thing willed. The reason for this is that knowledge is of things as
they exist in the knower; but the will is directed to things as they
exist in themselves. Since then all other things have necessary
existence inasmuch as they exist in God; but no absolute necessity so
as to be necessary in themselves, in so far as they exist in
themselves; it follows that God knows necessarily whatever He wills,
but does not will necessarily whatever He wills.
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Whether the will of God is the cause of things?
Objection 1: It seems that the will of God is not the cause of things.
For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv, 1): "As our sun, not by reason nor by
pre-election, but by its very being, enlightens all things that can
participate in its light, so the divine good by its very essence pours
the rays of goodness upon everything that exists. " But every voluntary
agent acts by reason and pre-election. Therefore God does not act by
will; and so His will is not the cause of things.
Objection 2: Further, The first in any order is that which is
essentially so, thus in the order of burning things, that comes first
which is fire by its essence. But God is the first agent. Therefore He
acts by His essence; and that is His nature. He acts then by nature,
and not by will. Therefore the divine will is not the cause of things.
Objection 3: Further, Whatever is the cause of anything, through being
"such" a thing, is the cause by nature, and not by will. For fire is
the cause of heat, as being itself hot; whereas an architect is the
cause of a house, because he wills to build it. Now Augustine says (De
Doctr. Christ. i, 32), "Because God is good, we exist. " Therefore God
is the cause of things by His nature, and not by His will.
Objection 4: Further, Of one thing there is one cause. But the created
things is the knowledge of God, as said before ([131]Q[14], A[8]).
Therefore the will of God cannot be considered the cause of things.
On the contrary, It is said (Wis. 11:26), "How could anything endure,
if Thou wouldst not? "
I answer that, We must hold that the will of God is the cause of
things; and that He acts by the will, and not, as some have supposed,
by a necessity of His nature.
This can be shown in three ways: First, from the order itself of active
causes. Since both intellect and nature act for an end, as proved in
Phys. ii, 49, the natural agent must have the end and the necessary
means predetermined for it by some higher intellect; as the end and
definite movement is predetermined for the arrow by the archer. Hence
the intellectual and voluntary agent must precede the agent that acts
by nature. Hence, since God is first in the order of agents, He must
act by intellect and will.
This is shown, secondly, from the character of a natural agent, of
which the property is to produce one and the same effect; for nature
operates in one and the same way unless it be prevented. This is
because the nature of the act is according to the nature of the agent;
and hence as long as it has that nature, its acts will be in accordance
with that nature; for every natural agent has a determinate being.
Since, then, the Divine Being is undetermined, and contains in Himself
the full perfection of being, it cannot be that He acts by a necessity
of His nature, unless He were to cause something undetermined and
indefinite in being: and that this is impossible has been already shown
([132]Q[7], A[2]). He does not, therefore, act by a necessity of His
nature, but determined effects proceed from His own infinite perfection
according to the determination of His will and intellect.
Thirdly, it is shown by the relation of effects to their cause. For
effects proceed from the agent that causes them, in so far as they
pre-exist in the agent; since every agent produces its like. Now
effects pre-exist in their cause after the mode of the cause. Wherefore
since the Divine Being is His own intellect, effects pre-exist in Him
after the mode of intellect, and therefore proceed from Him after the
same mode. Consequently, they proceed from Him after the mode of will,
for His inclination to put in act what His intellect has conceived
appertains to the will.
