No More Learning

29b-c. The ten dhdtus which are exclusively material are 124
capable of being struck.
The ten dhdtus which are included within the rilpaskandha are 125
capable of being struck.
1. Striking, or collision, is of three types: dvaranapratighdta,
visayapratighdta, and Mambanapratighdta (Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 391c6). a. Avaranapratighdta, being struck by reason of resistance: the quality that belongs to a body of making an obstacle to the arising of another body in the place where it itself is found; impenetrability. When a hand strikes a hand or a rock, when a rock strikes a rock or a
hand, it is counterstruck or repelled.
b. Visayapratighdta, the striking of the organ with that which is its 126
sphere of action. According to the Prajnapti: "There is an eye, an organ of sight, which is struck by water and not by dryness, namely the eye of a fish; there is an eye which is struck by dryness and not by water, namely, the eyes of humans in general, (with the exception of fishermen); there is an eye which is struck by water and by dryness, namely, the eye of a crocodile, a crab, a frog, or fishermen; there is an eye which is neither struck by water nor by dryness, namely the eyes which are not of the preceeding categories (for example, the eyes of beings who perish in the womb). There is an eye struck by night, namely the eye of a bat, an owl, etc. ; there is an eye which is struck by daylight, namely the eye of humans in general, (with the exception of thieves, etc. ); there is an eye which is struck by the night and by daylight, namely the eye of a dog, a jackal, a horse, a leopard, a cat, etc. ; there is an eye which is not struck by either night or daylight, namely
127
c. Alambanapratighdta, the striking of the mind and mental states
the eyes which are not of the preceeding categories. "
? with their object. (ii. 62c).
What is the difference between a sphere, visaya, and an object,
Mambana?
Visaya is the place where the organ exercises its activity, seeing,
hearing, etc. ; Mambana is what is grasped by the mind and the mental states. Thus, whereas the mind and mental states have both visaya and dlambana, the eye, the ear, etc. , have only visaya.
Why term "striking" or "evolving'' the activity of the organ or the mind with respects to its visaya or Mambana?
Because the organ does not proceed, is not active, beyond the visaya: thus it is struck by the visaya (for one says in common usage that one is struck by a wall beyond which one cannot "proceed"). Or rather, "to strike" signifies "to encounter:" this is the process or activity of the organ with respect to its own sphere.
2. When we say that ten dhatus are capable of being struck, or sapratigha, "characterized by pratighata" we are speaking of avarana- pratighdta\ these bodies are mutually impenetrable, capable of collision.
3. Are the dharmas which are sapratigha through "striking the sphere of action," also sapratigha through "impenetrability? "
Four alternatives: 1. the seven cittadhdtus (i. l6c) and one part of the dharmadhdtu, namely the samprayuktas (ii. 23), are sapratigha solely through "striking the sphere of action;" 2. the five spheres, visible matter, etc. (i. 9) are sapratigha solely through "impenetra- bility;" 3. the five organs, eye, etc. (i. 9) are sapratigha from the above two points of view; 4. one part of the dharmadhdtu, namely the viprayuktas (ii. 35), are not sapratigha through "striking the sphere of action," but are sapratigha through "striking the object. "
Let us now answer the second term of the question: the dharmas which are sapratigha through "striking the object"are also sapratigha through "striking the sphere of action": but there are dharmas which are sapratigha through "striking the sphere of action" without being at the same time sapratigha through "striking the object," namely the five organs.
4. The Bhadanta Kumaralabha says: "Sapratigha is that in which and with regard to which the consciousness can be hindered from
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128 arising by a foreign body; apratigha is the opposite. "
***
Among the eighteen dhdtus, how many are good, how many are bad, and how many are morally neutral {avydkrta, iv. 8,9,45)?
29c. Eight dhdtus are morally neutral.
What are the eight? These are the ten dhdtus which are character-
ized as sapratigha (i. 29b-c),
29d. Minus visible matter and sound.
"Minus visible matter and sound," that is to say, eight dhdtus: the five material organs, odor, taste and the tangible, are neutral, not being defined as good or bad; or rather, according to another opinion, not being defined from the point of view of retribution {vipaka).
30a. The others are of three types.
The other dhdtus can be, according to the case, good, bad, or neutral.
1. The seven dhdtus (cittadhdtavah, i. l6c). are good when they are associated with the three good roots (iv. 8), bad when they are
13 associated with bad roots, and neutral in all other cases. ?
2. The dharmadhdtu (i. l5c-d) includes (1) the good roots, the dharmas associated with these roots, the dharmas that issue from these roots, and pratisamkhydnirodha or Nirvana; (2) the bad roots, the dharmas associated with these roots, the dharmas that issue from these roots; and (3) neutral dharmas, for example space.
3. Rupadhdtu and sabdadhdtu, the visible matter and the audible, are good or bad when they constitute a bodily or vocal action (iv. 26,3d) that issued from a good or bad mind. They are neutral in all other cases.
***
Among the eighteen dhdtus, how many exist in each sphere of
129
? existence, Kamadhatu, Rupadhatu, and Arupyadhatu (iii. 1-3)?
131 30a-b. All exist in Kamadhatu.
All the dhdtus are associated with, or bound to Kamadhatu, not disassociated from Kamadhatu {Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 746d).
30b. Fourteen exist in Rupadhatu. There are fourteen dhdtus in Rupadhatu.
30c-d With the exception of odor, taste, the consciousness of
132 odor, and the consciousness of taste.
1. Odor and taste are lacking there, for they are "morsel-food" (iii. 39) and no one is born into Rupadhatu who is not detached from this food. Since odor and taste are lacking, the consciousness of odor and taste are lacking also.
Objection: Tangible things should be lacking also, for it is also tangible food by the "mouthful. "
No, for tangible things are not exclusively food. Tangibles which are not food do exist in Rupadhatu.
Objection: One can reason in the same way with respect to odor and taste.
No. The tangible has a useful function apart from food: it serves as the point of support of the organs; it serves as a support in general; and it serves as clothing. Odor and taste have no function outside of eating: they are of no use to beings detached from food.
ii. Srllabha gives a different explanation: When a person in Kamadhatu enters into absorption or dhydna, he sees visible matter; he hears sounds; his body is comforted by a certain tangible which accompanies physical well-being produced by the dhydna (vii. 9b). One can conclude from this fact that, in the celestial abodes of Rupadhatu which bear the name of dhydna {upapattidhydna, iii. 2, viii. l), there are visible, audible and tangible things, but not taste and odor.
iii. We think that, if odor and taste are lacking in Rupadhatu, the organs of smell and taste should also be lacking, for they do not serve any purpose. (Thus there are only twelve dhdtus in Rupadhatu. )
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1. [Answer of a master who speaks for the Vaibhasikas, vaibhd- sikadesiya. '] The organs of smell and taste are useful in Rupadhatu, for, without them, beauty and elocution would be missing.
The nose, support of the subtle matter that constitutes the organ of smell, suffices for beauty (i. 44); the tongue, the place of the organ of taste, suffices for elocution.
[The Vaibhasikadesfya. ] The members,--nose and tongue,--which support the organ, cannot be deprived of this organ. There is no nose or tongue where the subtle matter that constitutes the organ of smell or the organ of taste is missing, in the same way that the sexual member is always endowed with a special organ of touch which is called the sexual organ (i. 44a, ii. 2c-d).
One can well conceive that the sexual member is lacking when the sexual organ is lacking, for, stripped of this organ, it serves no function; but the nose and the tongue are useful independent of the organs of smell and taste. Thus the nose and tongue exist in Rupadhatu, although the prgans which correspond to them are lacking. Thus there are only twelve dhdtus in Rupadhatu
2. [Answer of the Vaibhasikas:] But an organ can arise without having any use, for example the organs of beings destined to perish in the womb.
Agreed! The arising of an organ can be without usefulness: but it is never without a cause. What is the cause of the arising of an organ, if not a certain act commanded by a desire relative to this organ? Now whoever is without attachment to the object, odor, is also without attachment to the organ, the organ of smell. Thus there is no reason for the organs of smell and taste to appear among beings who are reborn in Rupadhatu, since these beings are detached from odors and tastes. Otherwise, why is the sexual organ lacking in Rupadhatu?
Reply of the Vaibhasikas. The sexual organ is a cause of ugliness (ii. 12).
Is it not beautiful among beings who possess the marks of the Mahapurusas? Moreover, it is not by reason of its utility that the sexual organ arises, but rather by reason of its cause. Given its cause, it will arise, even if it is ugly.
? 3. [Argument from authority. ] According to the Vaibhasikas, to
maintain that the organs of smell and taste are lacking in Rupadhatu is
133
to contradict the Sutra. The Sutra teaches that beings of Rupadhatu
possess, complete, all the organs: they are never one-eyed, or only one-eared (iii. 98a).
This text teaches that beings of Rupadhatu possess, complete, the organs that exist in Rupadhatu. If the Vaibhasikas do not understand it thus, they must then attribute the sexual organ to those beings.
[4. Reply and conclusion of the Vaibhasikas. ]
Although odor and taste are lacking there, the organs of smell and taste exist in Rupadhatu.
In fact, a person who is detached from odors keeps his attachement with respect to the organ of smell which is part of his person. Thirst (=desire) enters into action with regard to these six organs of consciousness, not by reason of the object of these six organs, but by reason of the person himself. Thus the arising of the organs of smell
and taste has a cause, even if one were detached from odors and tastes. But the same does not hold for the sexual organ. Attachment relative to this organ has for its principle attachment to the tactile conscious- ness of sexual union. Now beings who will be reborn in Rupadhatu are detached from this consciousness; thus they have not accomplished actions commanded by a desire relative to the sexual organ; thus this
134 organ is lacking in Rupadhatu.
31a-b. In Arupyadhatu, there is a mental organ, an object of the mental consciousness, and the mental consciousness.
Beings detached from matter arise in Arupyadhatu, thus the ten dhatus which are material, namely the five organs and their objects, and the five consciousnesses which have for their point of support and for their objects a material dhatu (viii. 3c), are lacking in Arupyadhatu.
***
How many dhatus are impure? How many are pure?
31c-d. The three dhatus which have just been named can be
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pure or impure.
They are pure when they form part of the Truth of the Path or of unconditioned things; in the opposite case they are impure (i. 4).
3 Id. The others are impure.
The other dhatus, fifteen in number, are solely impure.
***
How many dhtitus are associated with vitarka and with victim, free from vitarka and associated with vicara, or free from both vitarka and
136
victim!
32a-b. Five consciousnesses always include vitarka and vicara.
They are always associated with vitarka and with victim, for they are gross, being turned towards externals. The word hi, "always," indicates restriction; they are exclusively dharmas which include vitarka and victim.
32c. The last three dhatus are of three types.
These dhatus are the mental organ, the object of mental con- sciousness, and the mental consciousness.
1. In Kamadhatu and in the First Dhyana (viii. 7, 11), (1) the manodhtitu, (2) manovijntinadhtitu, and (3) that part of the dharma- dhtiytu which is associated with the mind (ii. 23), with the exception of vitarka and victim themselves, are associated with vitarka and victim.
2. In the intermediary dhytina (dhytintintara, viii. 22d), these same are free from vitarka, but associated with victim.
3. In the higher stages up to and including the last stage, these same are free from both vitarka and victim (viii. 23c-d).
4. The part of the dharmadhtitu which is disassociated from the mind (ii. 35) and the victim of the intermediary dhytina are free from both vitarka and victim.
5. As for vitarka, it is always accompanied by victim', it is always free from vitarka, since two simultaneous vitarkas are impossible. But
1? 5
? the vicdra of Kamadhatu and the First Dhyana are not placed within any of the three categories: in fact, it is always associated with vitarka, and it is never accompanied by vicdra, two simultaneous vicdras being impossible.
We therefore say that, in the stages which include vitarka and vicdra (viii. 7), there are four categories: 1. The dharmas associated with the mind, with the exception of vitarka and vicdra, are accom- panied by vitarka and vicdra. 2. Vitarka is free from vitarka, but accompanied by vicdra. 3. The dharmas disassociated from the mind are free from vitarka and vicdra. 4. Vicdra is free from vicdra, and is accompanied by vitarka.
32d. The other dhatus are free from the one and the other.
The other dhatus are the ten material dhatus. Not being associated
with the mind, they are free from both vitarka and vicdra. ##*
But, if the five sense consciousnesses are always accompanied by vitarka and vicdra, how are they defined as free from vikalpa?
33a-b. They are free from vikalpa to the extent that they are
137 free from nirupandvikalpa and from anusmaranavikalpa.
138
According to the Vaibhasikas, vikalpa is of three types: vikalpa
in and of itself or by definition, vikalpa consisting of examination, and 139
vikalpa consisting of remembering. The five sense consciousnesses
include the first type of vikalpa but not the other two.
one says that they are free from vikalpa, in the same way that when a
This is why horse has only one foot, one says that it does not have any feet.
%%
on the mental states (ii. 33). As for the other two vikalpas:
Vikalpa by definition" is vitarka, which we shall study in the chapter
33c-d. They are dispersed mental prajna, mental memory whatever it may be.
Mental prajna, that is, the discernment of the dharmas associated with the mental consciousness, but dispersed, that is to say, not
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concentrated, not in the state of absorption (viii. 1), is either vikalpa of examination or by definition. All mental memory, concentrated or not
141 concentrated, is vikalpa of remembering.
###
How many dhatus "have an object," that is to say, are the subject of consciousness?
142 34a-b. The seven dhatus which are mind have an object.
Only the dhatus of visual, auditory, olfactory, taste, touch, and mental consciousness have an object, because they always grasp their spheres.
34b. And also one part of the dharmadhatu.
That part which consists of the dharmas associated with the mind (ii. 23). The other dhatus, namely the ten material dhatus and the part of the dharmadhatu which is not associated with the mind (ii. 35), do not have an object.
***
How many dhatus are non-appropriated? How many are appropriated?
34c. Nine are non-appropriated.
What are these nine? The seven that have been mentioned which have an object, together with one-half of the eighth.
34c. The eight that have been mentioned, and sound.
These nine are never appropriated: the seven dhatus of mind
(i. l6c), the dharmadhatu (i. l5c), and sound are never appropriated. 34d. The other nine are of two types.
They are sometimes appropriated, sometimes non-appropriated.
? 1. The five organs of sense consciousness (caksurdhatu, etc), of the present time, are appropriated They are not appropriated in the future and in the past.
Four objects,--visible matter, odor, taste, and tangible things,--are appropriated when they are present, when they are an integral part of the organs. Every other visible matter, every other odor, every other taste, and every other tangible is not appropriated: for example, the physical matter,--cofor and shape--, of hair, body hair, nails and teeth,--with the exception of their roots, which are bound to the body or to the organ of touch; color and shape of excrement, urine, saliva, mucus, blood, etc. ; the color and shape of earth, water, fire, etc.
2. What is the meaning of the expression "appropriated? " That
which the mind and the mental states grasp and appropriate to
themselves in the quality of a support is called "appropriated" Organic
matter, that is to say matter which constitutes the five organs of
consciousness, as well as matter not separable from organic matter, is
"appropriated," is "made one's own," by the mind: this results from
the fact that, in the case of well-being or illness, there is a reciprocal
reaction between the mind and this matter. Matter that the Abhi-
dharma calls "appropriated," is called in common language, sacetand or 143
***
How many dhatus are primary matter, or the great, primary elements? How many are secondary matter, matter derived from the
144 primary elements?
35a. The tangible is of two types.
Tangibles are (1) the four primary elements, solidity, fluidity, heat, and motion (i. 12); and (2) sevenfold secondary matter, the soft, the hard, etc. (i. lOd).
35b. The other nine material dhatus are solely secondary matter.
sensitive matter.
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The other material dhdtus, the five organs and the objects of the first four organs, are solely secondary matter.
145 35c. As is the part of the dharmadhdbu which is material.
The same for avijnapti (i. ll), which forms part of the dharma- dhdtu (i. l5c-d).
The dhdtus of mind (i. l6c) are neither primary matter nor secondary matter; the same for the dharmadhdtu, with the exception of avijnapti.
i. According to the Bhadanta Buddhadeva, the ten ayatanas, that is, the five organs of consciousness and their objects, are solely primary
146 matter.
An inadmissible opinion. The Sutra teaches, in a limited manner,
that there are four primary elements, and it defines them in a limited
manner as being solidity, fludity, etc. , (i. l2d). Now solidity, fluidity, etc. ,
are tangibles and solely tangibles: solidity is not preceived by the organ
of sight. Furthermore, each organ attains to the secondary matter
which is appropriate to it: color is not preceived by the organ of
147 touch.
Further, that the tangible is primary matter and secondary matter, and that the nine other materials ayatanas are solely secondary matter, results from the same words of the Sutra: "Oh Bhik? us, the eye, the internal source of consciousness (i. 39), a subtle matter derived from the primary elements, material sources, invisible, capable of being struck," and so on with respect to the four other material organs which are described in the same terms. With respect to the first four objects: "The visible matter is an external sources of consciousness, deriving from the primary elements, material, visible, capable of being struck. " The same with respect to odor and taste. But, with respect to the tangible: "Tangibles are an external source of consciousness, the four primary elements and matter deriving from the four primary elements . . . "
ii. One can maintain that the five organs are primary matter, for the Sutra (Samyukta, 11. 1) says: "Everything that is in the eye, a ball of flesh, is solid, resistant. . . "
? Reply. Here the Sutra refers to the ball of flesh which is not separable from the organ of sight, and not to the organ itself.
So be it. But, according to the Garbhdvakrdntisutra (note 120) "a person is the six dhdtus** the primary element of earth, the primary element of water, the primary element of fire, the primary element of wind, the space element and the vijndna element. Thus, in the embryonic state, the body is made up of primary matter, not secondary matter.
No. For in this first phrase, "a person is the six dhdtus** the Sutra
148
give an exhaustive definition. In fact, the Sutr& then says that a person
means to describe the essence of a person,
is the six points of support of the mental dharma called contact (ii. 24),
149
that is to say, the six organs.
"a person is the six dhdtus** one would infer the non-existence of the mental states (caitta, ii. 24, 34), for the mental states are not included within vijndnadhdtu, which is the mind
Would one maintain that the mental states are the mind, and as a consequence are included within vijndnadhdtu?
One cannot, for the Sutra says "Sensation and ideas are dharmas which are mental states, dharmas associated with the mind, having the mind for their point of support;" and the Sutra speaks of a "mind possessing desire;" thus desire, which is a mental state, is not the mind (vii. lld).
15 It is thus proven that our definition (i. 35a-c) is correct. ?
***
How many dhdtus are agglomerations? How many are not agglomerations?
151 35d. The ten material dhdtus are agglomerations.
The five organs of sense consciousness, and their objects, are agglomerations of atoms (ii. 22).
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and it does not pretend to
Further, to take this definition literally:
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Among the eighteen dhatus, how many cut, and how many are cut; how many burn, and how many are burned; and how many weigh, and how many are weighed?
36e. Four external dhatus cut, are cut;
Visible matter, smell, taste and tangible cut, when they bear the name of axe, etc; they are cut, when they bear the name of wood, etc.
What is the dharma that is called "to cut? "
To cut is to produce the sectioning of the procress of an agglomeration the nature of which is to continue itself in an uninterrupted series. The axe cuts a piece of wood which is a series, and makes of it two series which exist and which develop separately.
The organs cannot be cut off. For example, when all of the parts of the organ of touch or the body are cut off, they are not, for all this, multiple: the members which have been cut, that is to say, seperated from the trunk, do not possess touch.
The organs themselves do not cut, by reason of their translucidity, like the sparkle of a jewel.
36b. The same are burned and weighed.
The same holds for being burned and weigh as for cutting off and being cut off. Four external dhatus alone are burned. They weigh, for example, when they constitute a scales. Not the organs, by reason of their translucidity, like the sparkle of a jewel.
Sound does not cut off, is not cut off, is not burned, and does not weigh, for it does not exist in a series.
36c-d. There is no agreement with respect to that which is
152 burned and weighed.
There is no agreement with respect to what burns and what is weighed. According to some, the same four external dhatus burn and are weighed. According to others, only the primary element of fire burns, when it manifests its own manner of being in the flame; only weight, which is one type of secondary matter (i. l0d), is weighed: lightweight things, light, etc. , where nevertheless rupa manifests its
? own manner of being, are not weighed ***
Among the eighteen dhatus, how many are fruition, accumulation, or outflowing? How many are conjoined with material substances? And how many are momentary?
37a. Five internal dhatus are of fruition and accumulation.
i. Definitions.
1. Vipdkaja, "of fruition," or literally, "arisen from fruition" instead of "arisen from the cause of fruition" {vipdkahetuja, ii. 54), by ommis- sion of the middle word, the same way that one says "ox-cart" for "ox-drawn cart. "
Or else, in the expression vipdkaja, "arisen from vipdka" the word vipdka designates not the fruition, but the ripened action, the action
153
arriving at the time period when it gives forth its fruit. That which
arises from ripened action, namely the fruit of retribution, is called
"arisen from vipdka! * The fruit is furthermore also called vipdka, 154
because it is cooked (=done).
Or else the expression vipdkaja, "arisen from fruition," signifies
"arisen from the causes of fruition," but one should not say that the word "cause" is omitted. In fact, a cause is often designated by the name of its effect, the same way that an effect is often designated by the name of its cause: "The present six organs are past action" (Ekottara, p. 9a7; Samyutta, ii. 65, iv. 132; below ii. 28).
2. Aupacayika, "of accumulation," that is to say "that which is
accumulated nearby" through certain foods (iii. 39), certain actions
(bathing, etc. ), certain sleep, or certain absorptions (iv. 6c). According
155
to one opinion, chastity is also a cause of accumulation; but in reality,
chastity causes there to be no diminution; it is not a cause of accumulation.
Matter "of accumulation" protects the matter "of retribution" as a wall does, by surrounding it.
3. Naisyandika, "of outflowing," that is to say, nisyandaphala
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(ii. 57), "that which is produced by a cause similar to its effect. "
ii. Five organs or internal dhatus, with the exclusion of the mental organ, are of fruition and accumulation. They are not outflowing, for
156 they are outflowing only when they are fruition and accumulation.
iii. Sound is accumulation, for the voice is in a weak state when the
157
body is emaciated. It is also outflowing. It is not a cause of fruition,
158 for the voice proceeds from a desire for action {chanda, ii. 24).
37b. Sound is not of retribution.
Objection. The Prajnaptisastra says, "This mark of the Maha- purusa (iii. 98) which is called 'the voice of Brahma* results from the
159 perfect practice of abstaining from harmful language (iv. 76c). " Thus
sound is fruition.
Etiology of sound. First opinion. One should distinguish three
moments: (1) action; (2) primary elements arising from this action which are of retribution; and (3) sound, which arises from the primary elements.
Second opinion. One should distinguish five moments: (1) action; (2) primary elements of retribution; (3) primary elements of accumu- lation; (4) primary elements of outflowing; and (5) sound. Thus sound is not retribution, because it does not immediately proceed from action.
Objection. To reason thus, bodily sensation (ii. 7), not being produced immediately through action but being immediately produced through the primary elements arisen from action (iii. 32), will not be retribution.
Reply. But sensation is not provoked by a desire to experience such a sensation, whereas sound is provoked by a desire to speak. If it were provoked by desire, it would not be retribution.
37c-d. The eight dhatus free from resistance are of outflowing and also of fruition.
iv. The eight dhatus not capable of resistance (i. 29b), namely the seven dhatus of mind and the dharmadhatu, are outflowing and retribution; they are outflowing when they are produced by similar causes (sabhagahetu, ii.