They say that what is truly man is the result of composition, and that what is truly soul is no more than the perfection and act of a living body, or even something that is the result of a certain sym- metry in its
constitution
and members.
Bruno-Cause-Principle-and-Unity
Pax vobis, domine magister, servus servorum et scabellum pedum tuorum.
[Peace be with you, lord master, I am your servant's servant and the footstool of your feet.
]
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Maledicattedeusinseculaseculorum. [MayGodcurseyou, world without end. ]
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . No fighting: allow us to settle these questions.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? . ProsequatorergosuadogmataTheophilus. [ThenletTeofilo continue to expound his theory. ]
? 4 Hellenism for 'ignoramus'. 5 Another hellenism formed from ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? , 'teacher'. 6 Humorous latinism meaning 'literary'.
? ?
Cause, principle and unity
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? . So I will. I say, then, that the table is not animated as table, nor are the clothes as clothes, nor leather as leather, nor the glass as glass, but that, as natural things and composites, they have within them matter and form. All things, no matter how small and minuscule, have in them part of that spiritual substance which, if it finds a suitable subject, disposes itself to be plant, or to be animal, and receives the members of such or such a body, commonly qualified as animated, for in all things there is spirit, and there is not the least corpuscle that does not contain within itself some portion that may animate it.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Ergo, quidquid est, animal est. [Therefore, whatever is, is animal. ]
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Notallthingsthathaveasoularecalledanimate. ? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Then,atleast,allthingshavelife?
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . All things that have a soul are animated, in terms of sub-
stance, but their life is not recognizable to the Peripatetics, who define life too strictly and grossly, using the extrinsic and sensible act and operation, and not the substance.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . You reveal a plausible way of supporting Anaxagoras' opin- ion that all things are in all things, for since the spirit, or soul, or the universal form is in all things, everything can be produced from everything.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Thatisnotonlyplausiblebuttrue,forthatspiritisfoundin all things which, even if they are not living creatures, are animate. If not according to the perceptible presence of life and animation, then accord- ing to the principle, and a certain primary act of life and animation. I will go no further, since I wish to look later at the properties of many stones and gems which, broken, recut or set in irregular pieces, have certain virtues of altering the spirit or of engendering affections and passions in the soul, not only in the body. And we know that these effects do not, and could not, pro- ceed from purely material qualities, but must be attributed to a symbolic principle of life and animation. Besides, we see the same phenomenon sensibly working in withered plants and roots which, purging and concen- trating humours and altering their spirits, reveal unmistakable signs of life. Not to mention that necromancers, not without reason, hope to accomplish many things using the bones of the dead, believing that they retain, if not the very activity of life, at least some sort of vitality, which can be used to achieve extraordinary effects. Other occasions will give me the chance more fully to discuss thought, the spirit, the soul, the life which penetrates all, is in all, and moves all matter, fills its bosom, and dominates it rather than
? ?
7 Virgil, Aeneid, ? ? , ? ? ? -? .
8 The author, supposed to be Solomon, of the Wisdom of Solomon, ? , ? .
Second dialogue
? being dominated by it, given that the spiritual substance cannot be surpassed by the material substance, but, rather, contains it.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . This seems to me to conform not only to the thought of Pythagoras, whose thesis the Poet states when he says:
Principio caelum ac terras camposque liquentis, lucentemque globum lunae Titaniaque astra spiritus intus alit, totamque infusa per artus mens agitat molem, totoque se corpore miscet;7
[First, the heaven and earth, and the watery plains,
the shining orb of the moon and Titan's star,
a spirit within sustains, and mind, pervading its members, sways the whole mass and mingles with its mighty frame. ]
but also the thought of the Theologian, who says, 'the spirit pervades and fills the Earth, and what contains all things. '8 Also, another, speaking per- haps of the relationships of form with matter and potency, says that act and form dominate.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . If, then, spirit, soul, life is found in all things and in varying degrees fills all matter, it can assuredly be deduced that it is the true act and true form of all things. The world soul, therefore, is the formal constitu- tive principle of the universe and all it contains. I say that if life is found in all things, the soul is necessarily the form of all things, that form presides everywhere over matter and governs the composites, determines the com- position and cohesion of the parts. That is why it seems that such form is no less enduring than matter. I conceive this form in such a way that there is only one for all things. But according to the diversity of the dispositions of matter and the capacity of the material principles, both active and pas- sive, it happens to produce different configurations and realize different potentialities, bringing forth sometimes non-sensitive life, sometimes sen- sitive but not intellective life, sometimes seeming to suppress or restrain all outside signs of life, because of the incapacity or some other characteristic of matter. Thus, changing site and state, this form cannot be annihilated, because spiritual substance is no less real than material. So only the exter- nal forms are changed, and even annihilated, because they are not things, but of things, and because they are not substances, but accidents and particularities of substances.
? ? ?
Cause, principle and unity
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Non entia sed entium. [Not entities, but of entities. ]
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Certainly, if something of the substances were annihilated, the world would be emptied.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Thus,wehaveanintrinsicformalprinciple,eternalandsub- sistent, incomparably superior to that imagined by the Sophists9 who, ignoring the substance of things, treat only of the accidents, and arrive at positing corruptible substances from the fact that what they call essentially, fundamentally and principally substance is what results from composition, which is only an accident, not containing in itself either stability or truth, and reduced to nothing.
They say that what is truly man is the result of composition, and that what is truly soul is no more than the perfection and act of a living body, or even something that is the result of a certain sym- metry in its constitution and members. Hence, it is not surprising that they make so much, and are so greatly afraid, of death and dissolution, since they believe the loss of being is imminent. Nature cries out against such madness, assuring us that neither the body nor the soul need fear death, because both matter and form are absolutely unalterable principles:
O genus attonitum gelidae formidine mortis,
quid Styga, quid tenebras et nomina vana timetis, materiam vatum falsique pericula mundi?
Corpora sive rogus flamma seu tabe vetustas abstulerit, mala posse pati non ulla putetis:
morte carent animae domibus habitantque receptae. Omnia mutantur, nihil interit.
[You people, dismayed by fear of icy death, why are you terrified by the Styx, by shadows and empty names, the stuff of poets' tales, by the dangers of a world that doesn't exist? Our bodies, whether destroyed by the flames of the funeral pyre, or by slow decay, do not feel any suffering. Our souls are immortal and are ever received into new homes, where they live and dwell, when they have left their previous abode. All things change, but nothing dies. ]10
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . I believe Solomon, esteemed the wisest among Hebrews, says something comparable: 'Quod est quod est? Ipsum quod fuit. Quid est quod fuit? Ipsum quod est. Nihil sub sole novum' [What is that which is? That which was. What is the thing that was? That which is. There is nothing new under the sun]. 11 And, thus, this form which you posit is not something
9 For Bruno, the followers of Aristotle. 10 Ovid, Metamorphoses, ? ? , ? ? ? -? and ? ? ? , cited from memory. 11 Ecclesiastes, ? , ? , cited from memory.
? ? ?
Second dialogue
? that exists only in matter and is fixed to it according to its being, and does not depend on the body or matter for its existence?
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Indeed. What is more, I leave open the possibility of a form existing without matter, though I firmly assert that no part of matter exists without form, except when it is considered logically, as it is by Aristotle, who never tires of dividing by reason what in nature and in truth is indivisible.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Doyounotadmitanyotherformthanthiseternalassociate of matter?
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Yes,andastillmorenaturalformthanthematerialform,of which we shall treat later. For now, note this distinction of forms: first, there is a sort of form which informs, and which is extended and depen- dent. Since it informs everything, it is in everything; since it is extended, it communicates the perfection of the whole to the parts; since it is depen- dent and has no operation through itself, it communicates the operation of the whole to the parts; similarly it communicates the name and the being to them. Such is the material form, like that of fire: because every part of fire warms, is called fire, and is fire. Secondly, there is another sort of form, which informs and is dependent, but which is not extended. Since it per- fects and activates the whole, it is in the whole and in each of its parts. Since it is not extended, the result is that it cannot attribute the action of the whole to the parts. Since it is dependent, it communicates the action of the whole to the parts. Such is the vegetative and sensitive soul, since no part of the animal is animal, yet each part nonetheless lives and feels. Thirdly, there is another kind of form, which actuates and makes perfect the whole but is not extended nor dependent as regards its operation. Since it per- fects and actuates, it is in the whole, in its totality and in each of its parts. Since it is not extended, it does not attribute the perfection of the whole to the parts. Since it is not dependent, it does not communicate its action to them. Such is the soul, in so far as it can exercise intellectual power, and it is called intellective: it does not cause any part of man to be called man, or to be man, nor to be described as intelligent. Of these three kinds, the first is material, for it cannot be conceived, nor can it exist, without matter. The two other kinds (which, in fact, come together as one, according to their substance and being, and are distinguished in the fashion we have indicated above) express the formal principle, as distinct from the material principle.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Iunderstand.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Furthermore,Iwouldliketopointoutthatif,usingcommon terms, we say there are five grades of form, namely, the elemental, the
? ?
Cause, principle and unity
? mixed, the vegetative, the sensitive and the intellective, we do not, how- ever, understand form in the vulgar sense, for that distinction is valid from the point of view of the operations which appear in the subjects and proceed from them, but not from the point of view of the primordial and fundamental essence of that form and spiritual life that fills all things, which it does in different ways.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . I understand. Inasmuch as this form that you posit as prin- ciple is a substantial form, it makes up a perfect species, is to itself its own genus, and is not, like the Peripatetic form, part of a species.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Exactly.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . The distinction of forms in matter is not a function of the accidental dispositions which depend on material form.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Correct.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . From which it follows that this separated form cannot be multiplied in the numerical sense, since all numerical multiplication depends on matter.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Yes.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Further, it is invariable in itself, but varies because of the subjects and the diversity of matter. And such form, although it differentiates the part from the whole in the subject, is not, however, itself different in the part and in the whole, even if the definition we use for it differs according to whether it is considered as substantial by itself, or con- sidered in so far as it is the act and perfection of some subject - and in that case, it is considered according to that specification and that individuation which it has assumed in this or that subject.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Exactly.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Youdonotconceiveofthisformasbeingaccidental,notas accidental form, not as mingled with matter or inherent in it, but as exist- ing in it, associating itself with and assisting it.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . ThatisjustwhatIsay.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Maledicattedeusinseculaseculorum. [MayGodcurseyou, world without end. ]
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . No fighting: allow us to settle these questions.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? . ProsequatorergosuadogmataTheophilus. [ThenletTeofilo continue to expound his theory. ]
? 4 Hellenism for 'ignoramus'. 5 Another hellenism formed from ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? , 'teacher'. 6 Humorous latinism meaning 'literary'.
? ?
Cause, principle and unity
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? . So I will. I say, then, that the table is not animated as table, nor are the clothes as clothes, nor leather as leather, nor the glass as glass, but that, as natural things and composites, they have within them matter and form. All things, no matter how small and minuscule, have in them part of that spiritual substance which, if it finds a suitable subject, disposes itself to be plant, or to be animal, and receives the members of such or such a body, commonly qualified as animated, for in all things there is spirit, and there is not the least corpuscle that does not contain within itself some portion that may animate it.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Ergo, quidquid est, animal est. [Therefore, whatever is, is animal. ]
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Notallthingsthathaveasoularecalledanimate. ? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Then,atleast,allthingshavelife?
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . All things that have a soul are animated, in terms of sub-
stance, but their life is not recognizable to the Peripatetics, who define life too strictly and grossly, using the extrinsic and sensible act and operation, and not the substance.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . You reveal a plausible way of supporting Anaxagoras' opin- ion that all things are in all things, for since the spirit, or soul, or the universal form is in all things, everything can be produced from everything.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Thatisnotonlyplausiblebuttrue,forthatspiritisfoundin all things which, even if they are not living creatures, are animate. If not according to the perceptible presence of life and animation, then accord- ing to the principle, and a certain primary act of life and animation. I will go no further, since I wish to look later at the properties of many stones and gems which, broken, recut or set in irregular pieces, have certain virtues of altering the spirit or of engendering affections and passions in the soul, not only in the body. And we know that these effects do not, and could not, pro- ceed from purely material qualities, but must be attributed to a symbolic principle of life and animation. Besides, we see the same phenomenon sensibly working in withered plants and roots which, purging and concen- trating humours and altering their spirits, reveal unmistakable signs of life. Not to mention that necromancers, not without reason, hope to accomplish many things using the bones of the dead, believing that they retain, if not the very activity of life, at least some sort of vitality, which can be used to achieve extraordinary effects. Other occasions will give me the chance more fully to discuss thought, the spirit, the soul, the life which penetrates all, is in all, and moves all matter, fills its bosom, and dominates it rather than
? ?
7 Virgil, Aeneid, ? ? , ? ? ? -? .
8 The author, supposed to be Solomon, of the Wisdom of Solomon, ? , ? .
Second dialogue
? being dominated by it, given that the spiritual substance cannot be surpassed by the material substance, but, rather, contains it.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . This seems to me to conform not only to the thought of Pythagoras, whose thesis the Poet states when he says:
Principio caelum ac terras camposque liquentis, lucentemque globum lunae Titaniaque astra spiritus intus alit, totamque infusa per artus mens agitat molem, totoque se corpore miscet;7
[First, the heaven and earth, and the watery plains,
the shining orb of the moon and Titan's star,
a spirit within sustains, and mind, pervading its members, sways the whole mass and mingles with its mighty frame. ]
but also the thought of the Theologian, who says, 'the spirit pervades and fills the Earth, and what contains all things. '8 Also, another, speaking per- haps of the relationships of form with matter and potency, says that act and form dominate.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . If, then, spirit, soul, life is found in all things and in varying degrees fills all matter, it can assuredly be deduced that it is the true act and true form of all things. The world soul, therefore, is the formal constitu- tive principle of the universe and all it contains. I say that if life is found in all things, the soul is necessarily the form of all things, that form presides everywhere over matter and governs the composites, determines the com- position and cohesion of the parts. That is why it seems that such form is no less enduring than matter. I conceive this form in such a way that there is only one for all things. But according to the diversity of the dispositions of matter and the capacity of the material principles, both active and pas- sive, it happens to produce different configurations and realize different potentialities, bringing forth sometimes non-sensitive life, sometimes sen- sitive but not intellective life, sometimes seeming to suppress or restrain all outside signs of life, because of the incapacity or some other characteristic of matter. Thus, changing site and state, this form cannot be annihilated, because spiritual substance is no less real than material. So only the exter- nal forms are changed, and even annihilated, because they are not things, but of things, and because they are not substances, but accidents and particularities of substances.
? ? ?
Cause, principle and unity
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Non entia sed entium. [Not entities, but of entities. ]
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Certainly, if something of the substances were annihilated, the world would be emptied.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Thus,wehaveanintrinsicformalprinciple,eternalandsub- sistent, incomparably superior to that imagined by the Sophists9 who, ignoring the substance of things, treat only of the accidents, and arrive at positing corruptible substances from the fact that what they call essentially, fundamentally and principally substance is what results from composition, which is only an accident, not containing in itself either stability or truth, and reduced to nothing.
They say that what is truly man is the result of composition, and that what is truly soul is no more than the perfection and act of a living body, or even something that is the result of a certain sym- metry in its constitution and members. Hence, it is not surprising that they make so much, and are so greatly afraid, of death and dissolution, since they believe the loss of being is imminent. Nature cries out against such madness, assuring us that neither the body nor the soul need fear death, because both matter and form are absolutely unalterable principles:
O genus attonitum gelidae formidine mortis,
quid Styga, quid tenebras et nomina vana timetis, materiam vatum falsique pericula mundi?
Corpora sive rogus flamma seu tabe vetustas abstulerit, mala posse pati non ulla putetis:
morte carent animae domibus habitantque receptae. Omnia mutantur, nihil interit.
[You people, dismayed by fear of icy death, why are you terrified by the Styx, by shadows and empty names, the stuff of poets' tales, by the dangers of a world that doesn't exist? Our bodies, whether destroyed by the flames of the funeral pyre, or by slow decay, do not feel any suffering. Our souls are immortal and are ever received into new homes, where they live and dwell, when they have left their previous abode. All things change, but nothing dies. ]10
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . I believe Solomon, esteemed the wisest among Hebrews, says something comparable: 'Quod est quod est? Ipsum quod fuit. Quid est quod fuit? Ipsum quod est. Nihil sub sole novum' [What is that which is? That which was. What is the thing that was? That which is. There is nothing new under the sun]. 11 And, thus, this form which you posit is not something
9 For Bruno, the followers of Aristotle. 10 Ovid, Metamorphoses, ? ? , ? ? ? -? and ? ? ? , cited from memory. 11 Ecclesiastes, ? , ? , cited from memory.
? ? ?
Second dialogue
? that exists only in matter and is fixed to it according to its being, and does not depend on the body or matter for its existence?
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Indeed. What is more, I leave open the possibility of a form existing without matter, though I firmly assert that no part of matter exists without form, except when it is considered logically, as it is by Aristotle, who never tires of dividing by reason what in nature and in truth is indivisible.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Doyounotadmitanyotherformthanthiseternalassociate of matter?
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Yes,andastillmorenaturalformthanthematerialform,of which we shall treat later. For now, note this distinction of forms: first, there is a sort of form which informs, and which is extended and depen- dent. Since it informs everything, it is in everything; since it is extended, it communicates the perfection of the whole to the parts; since it is depen- dent and has no operation through itself, it communicates the operation of the whole to the parts; similarly it communicates the name and the being to them. Such is the material form, like that of fire: because every part of fire warms, is called fire, and is fire. Secondly, there is another sort of form, which informs and is dependent, but which is not extended. Since it per- fects and activates the whole, it is in the whole and in each of its parts. Since it is not extended, the result is that it cannot attribute the action of the whole to the parts. Since it is dependent, it communicates the action of the whole to the parts. Such is the vegetative and sensitive soul, since no part of the animal is animal, yet each part nonetheless lives and feels. Thirdly, there is another kind of form, which actuates and makes perfect the whole but is not extended nor dependent as regards its operation. Since it per- fects and actuates, it is in the whole, in its totality and in each of its parts. Since it is not extended, it does not attribute the perfection of the whole to the parts. Since it is not dependent, it does not communicate its action to them. Such is the soul, in so far as it can exercise intellectual power, and it is called intellective: it does not cause any part of man to be called man, or to be man, nor to be described as intelligent. Of these three kinds, the first is material, for it cannot be conceived, nor can it exist, without matter. The two other kinds (which, in fact, come together as one, according to their substance and being, and are distinguished in the fashion we have indicated above) express the formal principle, as distinct from the material principle.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Iunderstand.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Furthermore,Iwouldliketopointoutthatif,usingcommon terms, we say there are five grades of form, namely, the elemental, the
? ?
Cause, principle and unity
? mixed, the vegetative, the sensitive and the intellective, we do not, how- ever, understand form in the vulgar sense, for that distinction is valid from the point of view of the operations which appear in the subjects and proceed from them, but not from the point of view of the primordial and fundamental essence of that form and spiritual life that fills all things, which it does in different ways.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . I understand. Inasmuch as this form that you posit as prin- ciple is a substantial form, it makes up a perfect species, is to itself its own genus, and is not, like the Peripatetic form, part of a species.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Exactly.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . The distinction of forms in matter is not a function of the accidental dispositions which depend on material form.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Correct.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . From which it follows that this separated form cannot be multiplied in the numerical sense, since all numerical multiplication depends on matter.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Yes.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Further, it is invariable in itself, but varies because of the subjects and the diversity of matter. And such form, although it differentiates the part from the whole in the subject, is not, however, itself different in the part and in the whole, even if the definition we use for it differs according to whether it is considered as substantial by itself, or con- sidered in so far as it is the act and perfection of some subject - and in that case, it is considered according to that specification and that individuation which it has assumed in this or that subject.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Exactly.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Youdonotconceiveofthisformasbeingaccidental,notas accidental form, not as mingled with matter or inherent in it, but as exist- ing in it, associating itself with and assisting it.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . ThatisjustwhatIsay.
