No More Learning

20:9): "He that
curseth his father, or mother, dying let him die. " The Law also
recognized the "lex talionis," by prescribing (Ex. 21:24): "Eye for
eye, tooth for tooth. " Therefore it seems unreasonable that the Law
should not have inflicted the two other punishments, viz. "exile" and
"slavery. "

Objection 11: Further, no punishment is due except for a fault. But
dumb animals cannot commit a fault. Therefore the Law is unreasonable
in punishing them (Ex. 21:29): "If the ox . . . shall kill a man or a
woman," it "shall be stoned": and (Lev. 20:16): "The woman that shall
lie under any beast, shall be killed together with the same. " Therefore
it seems that matters pertaining to the relations of one man with
another were unsuitably regulated by the Law.

Objection 12: Further, the Lord commanded (Ex. 21:12) a murderer to be
punished with death. But the death of a dumb animal is reckoned of much
less account than the slaying of a man. Hence murder cannot be
sufficiently punished by the slaying of a dumb animal. Therefore it is
unfittingly prescribed (Dt. 21:1, 4) that "when there shall be found .
. . the corpse of a man slain, and it is not known who is guilty of the
murder . . . the ancients" of the nearest city "shall take a heifer of
the herd, that hath not drawn in the yoke, nor ploughed the ground, and
they shall bring her into a rough and stony valley, that never was
ploughed, nor sown; and there they shall strike off the head of the
heifer. "

On the contrary, It is recalled as a special blessing (Ps. 147:20) that
"He hath not done in like manner to every nation; and His judgments He
hath not made manifest to them. "

I answer that, As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei ii, 21), quoting Tully,
"a nation is a body of men united together by consent to the law and by
community of welfare. " Consequently it is of the essence of a nation
that the mutual relations of the citizens be ordered by just laws. Now
the relations of one man with another are twofold: some are effected
under the guidance of those in authority: others are effected by the
will of private individuals. And since whatever is subject to the power
of an individual can be disposed of according to his will, hence it is
that the decision of matters between one man and another, and the
punishment of evildoers, depend on the direction of those in authority,
to whom men are subject. On the other hand, the power of private
persons is exercised over the things they possess: and consequently
their dealings with one another, as regards such things, depend on
their own will, for instance in buying, selling, giving, and so forth.
Now the Law provided sufficiently in respect of each of these relations
between one man and another. For it established judges, as is clearly
indicated in Dt. 16:18: "Thou shalt appoint judges and magistrates in
all its [Vulg. : 'thy'] gates . . . that they may judge the people with
just judgment. " It is also directed the manner of pronouncing just
judgments, according to Dt. 1:16,17: "Judge that which is just, whether
he be one of your own country or a stranger: there shall be no
difference of persons. " It also removed an occasion of pronouncing
unjust judgment, by forbidding judges to accept bribes (Ex. 23:8; Dt.
16:19). It prescribed the number of witnesses, viz. two or three: and
it appointed certain punishments to certain crimes, as we shall state
farther on (ad 10).

But with regard to possessions, it is a very good thing, says the
Philosopher (Polit. ii, 2) that the things possessed should be
distinct, and the use thereof should be partly common, and partly
granted to others by the will of the possessors. These three points
were provided for by the Law. Because, in the first place, the
possessions themselves were divided among individuals: for it is
written (Num. 33:53,54): "I have given you" the land "for a possession:
and you shall divide it among you by lot. " And since many states have
been ruined through want of regulations in the matter of possessions,
as the Philosopher observes (Polit. ii, 6); therefore the Law provided
a threefold remedy against the regularity of possessions. The first was
that they should be divided equally, wherefore it is written (Num.
33:54): "To the more you shall give a larger part, and to the fewer, a
lesser. " A second remedy was that possessions could not be alienated
for ever, but after a certain lapse of time should return to their
former owner, so as to avoid confusion of possessions (cf. ad 3). The
third remedy aimed at the removal of this confusion, and provided that
the dead should be succeeded by their next of kin: in the first place,
the son; secondly, the daughter; thirdly, the brother; fourthly, the
father's brother; fifthly, any other next of kin. Furthermore, in order
to preserve the distinction of property, the Law enacted that heiresses
should marry within their own tribe, as recorded in Num. 36:6.

Secondly, the Law commanded that, in some respects, the use of things
should belong to all in common. Firstly, as regards the care of them;
for it was prescribed (Dt. 22:1-4): "Thou shalt not pass by, if thou
seest thy brother's ox or his sheep go astray; but thou shalt bring
them back to thy brother," and in like manner as to other things.
Secondly, as regards fruits. For all alike were allowed on entering a
friend's vineyard to eat of the fruit, but not to take any away. And,
specially, with respect to the poor, it was prescribed that the
forgotten sheaves, and the bunches of grapes and fruit, should be left
behind for them (Lev. 19:9; Dt. 24:19). Moreover, whatever grew in the
seventh year was common property, as stated in Ex. 23:11 and Lev. 25:4.

Thirdly, the law recognized the transference of goods by the owner.
There was a purely gratuitous transfer: thus it is written (Dt.
14:28,29): "The third day thou shalt separate another tithe . . . and
the Levite . . . and the stranger, and the fatherless, and the widow .
. . shall come and shall eat and be filled. " And there was a transfer
for a consideration, for instance, by selling and buying, by letting
out and hiring, by loan and also by deposit, concerning all of which we
find that the Law made ample provision. Consequently it is clear that
the Old Law provided sufficiently concerning the mutual relations of
one man with another.

Reply to Objection 1: As the Apostle says (Rom. 13:8), "he that loveth
his neighbor hath fulfilled the Law": because, to wit, all the precepts
of the Law, chiefly those concerning our neighbor, seem to aim at the
end that men should love one another. Now it is an effect of love that
men give their own goods to others: because, as stated in 1 Jn. 3:17:
"He that . . . shall see his brother in need, and shall shut up his
bowels from him: how doth the charity of God abide in him? " Hence the
purpose of the Law was to accustom men to give of their own to others
readily: thus the Apostle (1 Tim. 6:18) commands the rich "to give
easily and to communicate to others. " Now a man does not give easily to
others if he will not suffer another man to take some little thing from
him without any great injury to him. And so the Law laid down that it
should be lawful for a man, on entering his neighbor's vineyard, to eat
of the fruit there: but not to carry any away, lest this should lead to
the infliction of a grievous harm, and cause a disturbance of the
peace: for among well-behaved people, the taking of a little does not
disturb the peace; in fact, it rather strengthens friendship and
accustoms men to give things to one another.

Reply to Objection 2: The Law did not prescribe that women should
succeed to their father's estate except in default of male issue:
failing which it was necessary that succession should be granted to the
female line in order to comfort the father, who would have been sad to
think that his estate would pass to strangers. Nevertheless the Law
observed due caution in the matter, by providing that those women who
succeeded to their father's estate, should marry within their own
tribe, in order to avoid confusion of tribal possessions, as stated in
Num. 36:7,8.

Reply to Objection 3: As the Philosopher says (Polit. ii, 4), the
regulation of possessions conduces much to the preservation of a state
or nation. Consequently, as he himself observes, it was forbidden by
the law in some of the heathen states, "that anyone should sell his
possessions, except to avoid a manifest loss. " For if possessions were
to be sold indiscriminately, they might happen to come into the hands
of a few: so that it might become necessary for a state or country to
become void of inhabitants. Hence the Old Law, in order to remove this
danger, ordered things in such a way that while provision was made for
men's needs, by allowing the sale of possessions to avail for a certain
period, at the same time the said danger was removed, by prescribing
the return of those possessions after that period had elapsed. The
reason for this law was to prevent confusion of possessions, and to
ensure the continuance of a definite distinction among the tribes.

But as the town houses were not allotted to distinct estates, therefore
the Law allowed them to be sold in perpetuity, like movable goods.
Because the number of houses in a town was not fixed, whereas there was
a fixed limit to the amount of estates, which could not be exceeded,
while the number of houses in a town could be increased. On the other
hand, houses situated not in a town, but "in a village that hath no
walls," could not be sold in perpetuity: because such houses are built
merely with a view to the cultivation and care of possessions;
wherefore the Law rightly made the same prescription in regard to both
(Lev. 25).

Reply to Objection 4: As stated above (ad 1), the purpose of the Law
was to accustom men to its precepts, so as to be ready to come to one
another's assistance: because this is a very great incentive to
friendship. The Law granted these facilities for helping others in the
matter not only of gratuitous and absolute donations, but also of
mutual transfers: because the latter kind of succor is more frequent
and benefits the greater number: and it granted facilities for this
purpose in many ways. First of all by prescribing that men should be
ready to lend, and that they should not be less inclined to do so as
the year of remission drew nigh, as stated in Dt. 15:7, seqq. Secondly,
by forbidding them to burden a man to whom they might grant a loan,
either by exacting usury, or by accepting necessities of life in
security; and by prescribing that when this had been done they should
be restored at once. For it is written (Dt. 23:19): "Thou shalt not
lend to thy brother money to usury": and (Dt. 24:6): "Thou shalt not
take the nether nor the upper millstone to pledge; for he hath pledged
his life to thee": and (Ex. 22:26): "If thou take of thy neighbor a
garment in pledge, thou shalt give it him again before sunset. "
Thirdly, by forbidding them to be importunate in exacting payment.
Hence it is written (Ex. 22:25): "If thou lend money to any of my
people that is poor that dwelleth with thee, thou shalt not be hard
upon them as an extortioner. " For this reason, too, it is enacted (Dt.
24:10,11): "When thou shalt demand of thy neighbor anything that he
oweth thee, thou shalt not go into his house to take away a pledge, but
thou shalt stand without, and he shall bring out to thee what he hath":
both because a man's house is his surest refuge, wherefore it is
offensive to a man to be set upon in his own house; and because the Law
does not allow the creditor to take away whatever he likes in security,
but rather permits the debtor to give what he needs least. Fourthly,
the Law prescribed that debts should cease together after the lapse of
seven years. For it was probable that those who could conveniently pay
their debts, would do so before the seventh year, and would not defraud
the lender without cause. But if they were altogether insolvent, there
was the same reason for remitting the debt from love for them, as there
was for renewing the loan on account of their need.

As regards animals granted in loan, the Law enacted that if, through
the neglect of the person to whom they were lent, they perished or
deteriorated in his absence, he was bound to make restitution. But if
they perished or deteriorated while he was present and taking proper
care of them, he was not bound to make restitution, especially if they
were hired for a consideration: because they might have died or
deteriorated in the same way if they had remained in possession of the
lender, so that if the animal had been saved through being lent, the
lender would have gained something by the loan which would no longer
have been gratuitous. And especially was this to be observed when
animals were hired for a consideration: because then the owner received
a certain price for the use of the animals; wherefore he had no right
to any profit, by receiving indemnity for the animal, unless the person
who had charge of it were negligent. In the case, however, of animals
not hired for a consideration, equity demanded that he should receive
something by way of restitution at least to the value of the hire of
the animal that had perished or deteriorated.

Reply to Objection 5: The difference between a loan and a deposit is
that a loan is in respect of goods transferred for the use of the
person to whom they are transferred, whereas a deposit is for the
benefit of the depositor. Hence in certain cases there was a stricter
obligation of returning a loan than of restoring goods held in deposit.
Because the latter might be lost in two ways. First, unavoidably: i. e.
either through a natural cause, for instance if an animal held in
deposit were to die or depreciate in value; or through an extrinsic
cause, for instance, if it were taken by an enemy, or devoured by a
beast (in which case, however, a man was bound to restore to the owner
what was left of the animal thus slain): whereas in the other cases
mentioned above, he was not bound to make restitution; but only to take
an oath in order to clear himself of suspicion. Secondly, the goods
deposited might be lost through an avoidable cause, for instance by
theft: and then the depositary was bound to restitution on account of
his neglect. But, as stated above (ad 4), he who held an animal on
loan, was bound to restitution, even if he were absent when it
depreciated or died: because he was held responsible for less
negligence than a depositary, who was only held responsible in case of
theft.

Reply to Objection 6: Workmen who offer their labor for hire, are poor
men who toil for their daily bread: and therefore the Law commanded
wisely that they should be paid at once, lest they should lack food.
But they who offer other commodities for hire, are wont to be rich: nor
are they in such need of their price in order to gain a livelihood: and
consequently the comparison does not hold.

Reply to Objection 7: The purpose for which judges are appointed among
men, is that they may decide doubtful points in matters of justice. Now
a matter may be doubtful in two ways. First, among simple-minded
people: and in order to remove doubts of this kind, it was prescribed
(Dt. 16:18) that "judges and magistrates" should be appointed in each
tribe, "to judge the people with just judgment. " Secondly, a matter may
be doubtful even among experts: and therefore, in order to remove
doubts of this kind, the Law prescribed that all should foregather in
some chief place chosen by God, where there would be both the
high-priest, who would decide doubtful matters relating to the
ceremonies of divine worship; and the chief judge of the people, who
would decide matters relating to the judgments of men: just as even now
cases are taken from a lower to a higher court either by appeal or by
consultation. Hence it is written (Dt. 17:8,9): "If thou perceive that
there be among you a hard and doubtful matter in judgment . . . and
thou see that the words of the judges within thy gates do vary; arise
and go up to the place, which the Lord thy God shall choose; and thou
shalt come to the priests of the Levitical race, and to the judge that
shall be at that time. " But such like doubtful matters did not often
occur for judgment: wherefore the people were not burdened on this
account.

Reply to Objection 8: In the business affairs of men, there is no such
thing as demonstrative and infallible proof, and we must be content
with a certain conjectural probability, such as that which an orator
employs to persuade. Consequently, although it is quite possible for
two or three witnesses to agree to a falsehood, yet it is neither easy
nor probable that they succeed in so doing: wherefore their testimony
is taken as being true, especially if they do not waver in giving it,
or are not otherwise suspect. Moreover, in order that witnesses might
not easily depart from the truth, the Law commanded that they should be
most carefully examined, and that those who were found untruthful
should be severely punished, as stated in Dt. 19:16, seqq.

There was, however, a reason for fixing on this particular number, in
token of the unerring truth of the Divine Persons, Who are sometimes
mentioned as two, because the Holy Ghost is the bond of the other two
Persons; and sometimes as three: as Augustine observes on Jn. 8:17: "In
your law it is written that the testimony of two men is true. "

Reply to Objection 9: A severe punishment is inflicted not only on
account of the gravity of a fault, but also for other reasons. First,
on account of the greatness of the sin, because a greater sin, other
things being equal, deserves a greater punishment. Secondly, on account
of a habitual sin, since men are not easily cured of habitual sin
except by severe punishments. Thirdly, on account of a great desire for
or a great pleasure in the sin: for men are not easily deterred from
such sins unless they be severely punished. Fourthly, on account of the
facility of committing a sin and of concealing it: for such like sins,
when discovered, should be more severely punished in order to deter
others from committing them.

Again, with regard to the greatness of a sin, four degrees may be
observed, even in respect of one single deed. The first is when a sin
is committed unwillingly; because then, if the sin be altogether
involuntary, man is altogether excused from punishment; for it is
written (Dt. 22:25, seqq. ) that a damsel who suffers violence in a
field is not guilty of death, because "she cried, and there was no man
to help her. " But if a man sinned in any way voluntarily, and yet
through weakness, as for instance when a man sins from passion, the sin
is diminished: and the punishment, according to true judgment, should
be diminished also; unless perchance the common weal requires that the
sin be severely punished in order to deter others from committing such
sins, as stated above. The second degree is when a man sins through
ignorance: and then he was held to be guilty to a certain extent, on
account of his negligence in acquiring knowledge: yet he was not
punished by the judges but expiated his sin by sacrifices. Hence it is
written (Lev. 4:2): "The soul that sinneth through ignorance," etc.
This is, however, to be taken as applying to ignorance of fact; and not
to ignorance of the Divine precept, which all were bound to know. The
third degree was when a man sinned from pride, i. e. through deliberate
choice or malice: and then he was punished according to the greatness
of the sin [*Cf. Dt. 25:2]. The fourth degree was when a man sinned
from stubbornness or obstinacy: and then he was to be utterly cut off
as a rebel and a destroyer of the commandment of the Law [*Cf. Num.
15:30,31].

Accordingly we must say that, in appointing the punishment for theft,
the Law considered what would be likely to happen most frequently (Ex.
22:1-9): wherefore, as regards theft of other things which can easily
be safeguarded from a thief, the thief restored only twice their value.
But sheep cannot be easily safeguarded from a thief, because they graze
in the fields: wherefore it happened more frequently that sheep were
stolen in the fields. Consequently the Law inflicted a heavier penalty,
by ordering four sheep to be restored for the theft of one. As to
cattle, they were yet more difficult to safeguard, because they are
kept in the fields, and do not graze in flocks as sheep do; wherefore a
yet more heavy penalty was inflicted in their regard, so that five oxen
were to be restored for one ox. And this I say, unless perchance the
animal itself were discovered in the thief's possession: because in
that case he had to restore only twice the number, as in the case of
other thefts: for there was reason to presume that he intended to
restore the animal, since he kept it alive. Again, we might say,
according to a gloss, that "a cow is useful in five ways: it may be
used for sacrifice, for ploughing, for food, for milk, and its hide is
employed for various purposes": and therefore for one cow five had to
be restored. But the sheep was useful in four ways: "for sacrifice, for
meat, for milk, and for its wool. " The unruly son was slain, not
because he ate and drank: but on account of his stubbornness and
rebellion, which was always punished by death, as stated above. As to
the man who gathered sticks on the sabbath, he was stoned as a breaker
of the Law, which commanded the sabbath to be observed, to testify the
belief in the newness of the world, as stated above ([2137]Q[100],
A[5]): wherefore he was slain as an unbeliever.

Reply to Objection 10: The Old Law inflicted the death penalty for the
more grievous crimes, viz. for those which are committed against God,
and for murder, for stealing a man, irreverence towards one's parents,
adultery and incest. In the case of thief of other things it inflicted
punishment by indemnification: while in the case of blows and
mutilation it authorized punishment by retaliation; and likewise for
the sin of bearing false witness. In other faults of less degree it
prescribed the punishment of stripes or of public disgrace.

The punishment of slavery was prescribed by the Law in two cases.
First, in the case of a slave who was unwilling to avail himself of the
privilege granted by the Law, whereby he was free to depart in the
seventh year of remission: wherefore he was punished by remaining a
slave for ever. Secondly, in the case of a thief, who had not wherewith
to make restitution, as stated in Ex. 22:3.

The punishment of absolute exile was not prescribed by the Law: because
God was worshipped by that people alone, whereas all other nations were
given to idolatry: wherefore if any man were exiled from that people
absolutely, he would be in danger of falling into idolatry.
For this
reason it is related (1 Kings 26:19) that David said to Saul: "They are
cursed in the sight of the Lord, who have case me out this day, that I
should not dwell in the inheritance of the Lord, saying: Go, serve
strange gods. " There was, however, a restricted sort of exile: for it
is written in Dt. 19:4 [*Cf. Num. 35:25] that "he that striketh [Vulg. :
'killeth'] his neighbor ignorantly, and is proved to have had no hatred
against him, shall flee to one of the cities" of refuge and "abide
there until the death of the high-priest. " For then it became lawful
for him to return home, because when the whole people thus suffered a
loss they forgot their private quarrels, so that the next of kin of the
slain were not so eager to kill the slayer.

Reply to Objection 11: Dumb animals were ordered to be slain, not on
account of any fault of theirs; but as a punishment to their owners,
who had not safeguarded their beasts from these offenses. Hence the
owner was more severely punished if his ox had butted anyone "yesterday
or the day before" (in which case steps might have been taken to
butting suddenly). Or again, the animal was slain in detestation of the
sin; and lest men should be horrified at the sight thereof.

Reply to Objection 12: The literal reason for this commandment, as
Rabbi Moses declares (Doct. Perplex. iii), was because the slayer was
frequently from the nearest city: wherefore the slaying of the calf was
a means of investigating the hidden murder. This was brought about in
three ways. In the first place the elders of the city swore that they
had taken every measure for safeguarding the roads. Secondly, the owner
of the heifer was indemnified for the slaying of his beast, and if the
murder was previously discovered, the beast was not slain. Thirdly, the
place, where the heifer was slain, remained uncultivated. Wherefore, in
order to avoid this twofold loss, the men of the city would readily
make known the murderer, if they knew who he was: and it would seldom
happen but that some word or sign would escape about the matter. Or
again, this was done in order to frighten people, in detestation of
murder. Because the slaying of a heifer, which is a useful animal and
full of strength, especially before it has been put under the yoke,
signified that whoever committed murder, however useful and strong he
might be, was to forfeit his life; and that, by a cruel death, which
was implied by the striking off of its head; and that the murderer, as
vile and abject, was to be cut off from the fellowship of men, which
was betokened by the fact that the heifer after being slain was left to
rot in a rough and uncultivated place.

Mystically, the heifer taken from the herd signifies the flesh of
Christ; which had not drawn a yoke, since it had done no sin; nor did
it plough the ground, i. e. it never knew the stain of revolt. The fact
of the heifer being killed in an uncultivated valley signified the
despised death of Christ, whereby all sins are washed away, and the
devil is shown to be the arch-murderer.
__________________________________________________________________

Whether the judicial precepts regarding foreigners were framed in a suitable
manner?

Objection 1: It would seem that the judicial precepts regarding
foreigners were not suitably framed. For Peter said (Acts 10:34,35):
"In very deed I perceive that God is not a respecter of persons, but in
every nation, he that feareth Him and worketh justice is acceptable to
Him. " But those who are acceptable to God should not be excluded from
the Church of God. Therefore it is unsuitably commanded (Dt. 23:3) that
"the Ammonite and the Moabite, even after the tenth generation, shall
not enter into the church of the Lord for ever": whereas, on the other
hand, it is prescribed (Dt. 23:7) to be observed with regard to certain
other nations: "Thou shalt not abhor the Edomite, because he is thy
brother; nor the Egyptian because thou wast a stranger in his land. "

Objection 2: Further, we do not deserve to be punished for those things
which are not in our power. But it is not in man's power to be an
eunuch, or born of a prostitute. Therefore it is unsuitably commanded
(Dt. 23:1,2) that "an eunuch and one born of a prostitute shalt not
enter into the church of the Lord. "

Objection 3: Further, the Old Law mercifully forbade strangers to be
molested: for it is written (Ex. 22:21): "Thou shalt not molest a
stranger, nor afflict him; for yourselves also were strangers in the
land of Egypt": and (Ex. 23:9): "Thou shalt not molest a stranger, for
you know the hearts of strangers, for you also were strangers in the
land of Egypt. " But it is an affliction to be burdened with usury.
Therefore the Law unsuitably permitted them (Dt. 23:19,20) to lend
money to the stranger for usury.

Objection 4: Further, men are much more akin to us than trees. But we
should show greater care and love for these things that are nearest to
us, according to Ecclus. 13:19: "Every beast loveth its like: so also
every man him that is nearest to himself. " Therefore the Lord
unsuitably commanded (Dt. 20:13-19) that all the inhabitants of a
captured hostile city were to be slain, but that the fruit-trees should
not be cut down.

Objection 5: Further, every one should prefer the common good of virtue
to the good of the individual. But the common good is sought in a war
which men fight against their enemies. Therefore it is unsuitably
commanded (Dt. 20:5-7) that certain men should be sent home, for
instance a man that had built a new house, or who had planted a
vineyard, or who had married a wife.

Objection 6: Further, no man should profit by his own fault. But it is
a man's fault if he be timid or faint-hearted: since this is contrary
to the virtue of fortitude. Therefore the timid and faint-hearted are
unfittingly excused from the toil of battle (Dt. 20:8).

On the contrary, Divine Wisdom declares (Prov. 8:8): "All my words are
just, there is nothing wicked nor perverse in them. "

I answer that, Man's relations with foreigners are twofold: peaceful,
and hostile: and in directing both kinds of relation the Law contained
suitable precepts. For the Jews were offered three opportunities of
peaceful relations with foreigners. First, when foreigners passed
through their land as travelers. Secondly, when they came to dwell in
their land as newcomers. And in both these respects the Law made kind
provision in its precepts: for it is written (Ex. 22:21): "Thou shalt
not molest a stranger [advenam]"; and again (Ex. 22:9): "Thou shalt not
molest a stranger [peregrino]. " Thirdly, when any foreigners wished to
be admitted entirely to their fellowship and mode of worship. With
regard to these a certain order was observed. For they were not at once
admitted to citizenship: just as it was law with some nations that no
one was deemed a citizen except after two or three generations, as the
Philosopher says (Polit. iii, 1). The reason for this was that if
foreigners were allowed to meddle with the affairs of a nation as soon
as they settled down in its midst, many dangers might occur, since the
foreigners not yet having the common good firmly at heart might attempt
something hurtful to the people. Hence it was that the Law prescribed
in respect of certain nations that had close relations with the Jews
(viz. , the Egyptians among whom they were born and educated, and the
Idumeans, the children of Esau, Jacob's brother), that they should be
admitted to the fellowship of the people after the third generation;
whereas others (with whom their relations had been hostile, such as the
Ammonites and Moabites) were never to be admitted to citizenship; while
the Amalekites, who were yet more hostile to them, and had no
fellowship of kindred with them, were to be held as foes in perpetuity:
for it is written (Ex. 17:16): "The war of the Lord shall be against
Amalec from generation to generation. "

In like manner with regard to hostile relations with foreigners, the
Law contained suitable precepts. For, in the first place, it commanded
that war should be declared for a just cause: thus it is commanded (Dt.
20:10) that when they advanced to besiege a city, they should at first
make an offer of peace. Secondly, it enjoined that when once they had
entered on a war they should undauntedly persevere in it, putting their
trust in God. And in order that they might be the more heedful of this
command, it ordered that on the approach of battle the priest should
hearten them by promising them God's aid. Thirdly, it prescribed the
removal of whatever might prove an obstacle to the fight, and that
certain men, who might be in the way, should be sent home. Fourthly, it
enjoined that they should use moderation in pursuing the advantage of
victory, by sparing women and children, and by not cutting down
fruit-trees of that country.

Reply to Objection 1: The Law excluded the men of no nation from the
worship of God and from things pertaining to the welfare of the soul:
for it is written (Ex. 12:48): "If any stranger be willing to dwell
among you, and to keep the Phase of the Lord; all his males shall first
be circumcised, and then shall he celebrate it according to the manner,
and he shall be as that which is born in the land. " But in temporal
matters concerning the public life of the people, admission was not
granted to everyone at once, for the reason given above: but to some,
i. e. the Egyptians and Idumeans, in the third generation; while others
were excluded in perpetuity, in detestation of their past offense, i. e.
the peoples of Moab, Ammon, and Amalec. For just as one man is punished
for a sin committed by him, in order that others seeing this may be
deterred and refrain from sinning; so too may one nation or city be
punished for a crime, that others may refrain from similar crimes.

Nevertheless it was possible by dispensation for a man to be admitted
to citizenship on account of some act of virtue: thus it is related
(Judith 14:6) that Achior, the captain of the children of Ammon, "was
joined to the people of Israel, with all the succession of his
kindred. " The same applies to Ruth the Moabite who was "a virtuous
woman" (Ruth 3:11): although it may be said that this prohibition
regarded men and not women, who are not competent to be citizens
absolutely speaking.

Reply to Objection 2: As the Philosopher says (Polit. iii, 3), a man is
said to be a citizen in two ways: first, simply; secondly, in a
restricted sense. A man is a citizen simply if he has all the rights of
citizenship, for instance, the right of debating or voting in the
popular assembly. On the other hand, any man may be called citizen,
only in a restricted sense, if he dwells within the state, even common
people or children or old men, who are not fit to enjoy power in
matters pertaining to the common weal. For this reason bastards, by
reason of their base origin, were excluded from the "ecclesia," i. e.
from the popular assembly, down to the tenth generation. The same
applies to eunuchs, who were not competent to receive the honor due to
a father, especially among the Jews, where the divine worship was
continued through carnal generation: for even among the heathens, those
who had many children were marked with special honor, as the
Philosopher remarks (Polit. ii, 6). Nevertheless, in matters pertaining
to the grace of God, eunuchs were not discriminated from others, as
neither were strangers, as already stated: for it is written (Isa.
56:3): "Let not the son of the stranger that adhereth to the Lord
speak, saying: The Lord will divide and separate me from His people.
And let not the eunuch say: Behold I am a dry tree. "

Reply to Objection 3: It was not the intention of the Law to sanction
the acceptance of usury from strangers, but only to tolerate it on
account of the proneness of the Jews to avarice; and in order to
promote an amicable feeling towards those out of whom they made a
profit.

Reply to Objection 4: A distinction was observed with regard to hostile
cities. For some of them were far distant, and were not among those
which had been promised to them. When they had taken these cities, they
killed all the men who had fought against God's people; whereas the
women and children were spared. But in the neighboring cities which had
been promised to them, all were ordered to be slain, on account of
their former crimes, to punish which God sent the Israelites as
executor of Divine justice: for it is written (Dt. 9:5) "because they
have done wickedly, they are destroyed at thy coming in. " The
fruit-trees were commanded to be left untouched, for the use of the
people themselves, to whom the city with its territory was destined to
be subjected.

Reply to Objection 5: The builder of a new house, the planter of a
vineyard, the newly married husband, were excluded from fighting, for
two reasons. First, because man is wont to give all his affection to
those things which he has lately acquired, or is on the point of
having, and consequently he is apt to dread the loss of these above
other things. Wherefore it was likely enough that on account of this
affection they would fear death all the more, and be so much the less
brave in battle. Secondly, because, as the Philosopher says (Phys. ii,
5), "it is a misfortune for a man if he is prevented from obtaining
something good when it is within his grasp. " And so lest the surviving
relations should be the more grieved at the death of these men who had
not entered into the possession of the good things prepared for them;
and also lest the people should be horror-stricken at the sight of
their misfortune: these men were taken away from the danger of death by
being removed from the battle.

Reply to Objection 6: The timid were sent back home, not that they
might be the gainers thereby; but lest the people might be the losers
by their presence, since their timidity and flight might cause others
to be afraid and run away.
__________________________________________________________________

Whether the Old Law set forth suitable precepts about the members of the
household?

Objection 1: It would seem that the Old Law set forth unsuitable
precepts about the members of the household. For a slave "is in every
respect his master's property," as the Philosopher states (Polit. i,
2). But that which is a man's property should be his always. Therefore
it was unfitting for the Law to command (Ex. 21:2) that slaves should
"go out free" in the seventh year.

Objection 2: Further, a slave is his master's property, just as an
animal, e. g. an ass or an ox. But it is commanded (Dt. 22:1-3) with
regard to animals, that they should be brought back to the owner if
they be found going astray. Therefore it was unsuitably commanded (Dt.
23:15): "Thou shalt not deliver to his master the servant that is fled
to thee. "

Objection 3: Further, the Divine Law should encourage mercy more even
than the human law. But according to human laws those who ill-treat
their servants and maidservants are severely punished: and the worse
treatment of all seems to be that which results in death. Therefore it
is unfittingly commanded (Ex. 21:20,21) that "he that striketh his
bondman or bondwoman with a rod, and they die under his hands . . . if
the party remain alive a day . . . he shall not be subject to the
punishment, because it is his money. "

Objection 4: Further, the dominion of a master over his slave differs
from that of the father over his son (Polit. i, 3). But the dominion of
master over slave gives the former the right to sell his servant or
maidservant. Therefore it was unfitting for the Law to allow a man to
sell his daughter to be a servant or handmaid (Ex. 21:7).

Objection 5: Further, a father has power over his son. But he who has
power over the sinner has the right to punish him for his offenses.
Therefore it is unfittingly commanded (Dt. 21:18, seqq. ) that a father
should bring his son to the ancients of the city for punishment.

Objection 6: Further, the Lord forbade them (Dt. 7:3, seqq. ) to make
marriages with strange nations; and commanded the dissolution of such
as had been contracted (1 Esdras 10). Therefore it was unfitting to
allow them to marry captive women from strange nations (Dt. 21:10,
seqq. ).

Objection 7: Further, the Lord forbade them to marry within certain
degrees of consanguinity and affinity, according to Lev. 18. Therefore
it was unsuitably commanded (Dt. 25:5) that if any man died without
issue, his brother should marry his wife.

Objection 8: Further, as there is the greatest familiarity between man
and wife, so should there be the staunchest fidelity. But this is
impossible if the marriage bond can be sundered. Therefore it was
unfitting for the Lord to allow (Dt. 24:1-4) a man to put his wife
away, by writing a bill of divorce; and besides, that he could not take
her again to wife.

Objection 9: Further, just as a wife can be faithless to her husband,
so can a slave be to his master, and a son to his father. But the Law
did not command any sacrifice to be offered in order to investigate the
injury done by a servant to his master, or by a son to his father.
Therefore it seems to have been superfluous for the Law to prescribe
the "sacrifice of jealousy" in order to investigate a wife's adultery
(Num. 5:12, seqq. ). Consequently it seems that the Law put forth
unsuitable judicial precepts about the members of the household.

On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 18:10): "The judgments of the Lord
are true, justified in themselves. "

I answer that, The mutual relations of the members of a household
regard everyday actions directed to the necessities of life, as the
Philosopher states (Polit. i, 1). Now the preservation of man's life
may be considered from two points of view. First, from the point of
view of the individual, i. e. in so far as man preserves his
individuality: and for the purpose of the preservation of life,
considered from this standpoint, man has at his service external goods,
by means of which he provides himself with food and clothing and other
such necessaries of life: in the handling of which he has need of
servants. Secondly man's life is preserved from the point of view of
the species, by means of generation, for which purpose man needs a
wife, that she may bear him children. Accordingly the mutual relations
of the members of a household admit of a threefold combination: viz.
those of master and servant, those of husband and wife, and those of
father and son: and in respect of all these relationships the Old Law
contained fitting precepts. Thus, with regard to servants, it commanded
them to be treated with moderation---both as to their work, lest, to
wit, they should be burdened with excessive labor, wherefore the Lord
commanded (Dt. 5:14) that on the Sabbath day "thy manservant and thy
maidservant" should "rest even as thyself"---and also as to the
infliction of punishment, for it ordered those who maimed their
servants, to set them free (Ex. 21:26,27). Similar provision was made
in favor of a maidservant when married to anyone (Ex. 21:7, seqq. ).
Moreover, with regard to those servants in particular who were taken
from among the people, the Law prescribed that they should go out free
in the seventh year taking whatever they brought with them, even their
clothes (Ex. 21:2, seqq. ): and furthermore it was commanded (Dt. 15:13)
that they should be given provision for the journey.

With regard to wives the Law made certain prescriptions as to those who
were to be taken in marriage: for instance, that they should marry a
wife from their own tribe (Num. 36:6): and this lest confusion should
ensue in the property of various tribes. Also that a man should marry
the wife of his deceased brother when the latter died without issue, as
prescribed in Dt. 25:5,6: and this in order that he who could not have
successors according to carnal origin, might at least have them by a
kind of adoption, and that thus the deceased might not be entirely
forgotten. It also forbade them to marry certain women; to wit, women
of strange nations, through fear of their losing their faith; and those
of their near kindred, on account of the natural respect due to them.
Furthermore it prescribed in what way wives were to be treated after
marriage. To wit, that they should not be slandered without grave
reason: wherefore it ordered punishment to be inflicted on the man who
falsely accused his wife of a crime (Dt. 22:13, seqq. ). Also that a
man's hatred of his wife should not be detrimental to his son (Dt.
21:15, seqq. ).