Therefore the first
supposition
holds good.
Summa Theologica
For all being, as being,
has actuality and is in some way perfect; since every act implies some
sort of perfection; and perfection implies desirability and goodness,
as is clear from A[1]. Hence it follows that every being as such is
good.
Reply to Objection 1: Substance, quantity, quality, and everything
included in them, limit being by applying it to some essence or nature.
Now in this sense, goodness does not add anything to being beyond the
aspect of desirability and perfection, which is also proper to being,
whatever kind of nature it may be. Hence goodness does not limit being.
Reply to Objection 2: No being can be spoken of as evil, formally as
being, but only so far as it lacks being. Thus a man is said to be
evil, because he lacks some virtue; and an eye is said to be evil,
because it lacks the power to see well.
Reply to Objection 3: As primary matter has only potential being, so it
is only potentially good. Although, according to the Platonists,
primary matter may be said to be a non-being on account of the
privation attaching to it, nevertheless, it does participate to a
certain extent in goodness, viz. by its relation to, or aptitude for,
goodness. Consequently, to be desirable is not its property, but to
desire.
Reply to Objection 4: Mathematical entities do not subsist as
realities; because they would be in some sort good if they subsisted;
but they have only logical existence, inasmuch as they are abstracted
from motion and matter; thus they cannot have the aspect of an end,
which itself has the aspect of moving another. Nor is it repugnant that
there should be in some logical entity neither goodness nor form of
goodness; since the idea of being is prior to the idea of goodness, as
was said in the preceding article.
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Whether goodness has the aspect of a final cause?
Objection 1: It seems that goodness has not the aspect of a final
cause, but rather of the other causes. For, as Dionysius says (Div.
Nom. iv), "Goodness is praised as beauty. " But beauty has the aspect of
a formal cause. Therefore goodness has the aspect of a formal cause.
Objection 2: Further, goodness is self-diffusive; for Dionysius says
(Div. Nom. iv) that goodness is that whereby all things subsist, and
are. But to be self-giving implies the aspect of an efficient cause.
Therefore goodness has the aspect of an efficient cause.
Objection 3: Further, Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 31) that "we
exist because God is good. " But we owe our existence to God as the
efficient cause. Therefore goodness implies the aspect of an efficient
cause.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Phys. ii) that "that is to be
considered as the end and the good of other things, for the sake of
which something is. " Therefore goodness has the aspect of a final
cause.
I answer that, Since goodness is that which all things desire, and
since this has the aspect of an end, it is clear that goodness implies
the aspect of an end. Nevertheless, the idea of goodness presupposes
the idea of an efficient cause, and also of a formal cause. For we see
that what is first in causing, is last in the thing caused. Fire, e. g.
heats first of all before it reproduces the form of fire; though the
heat in the fire follows from its substantial form. Now in causing,
goodness and the end come first, both of which move the agent to act;
secondly, the action of the agent moving to the form; thirdly, comes
the form. Hence in that which is caused the converse ought to take
place, so that there should be first, the form whereby it is a being;
secondly, we consider in it its effective power, whereby it is perfect
in being, for a thing is perfect when it can reproduce its like, as the
Philosopher says (Meteor. iv); thirdly, there follows the formality of
goodness which is the basic principle of its perfection.
Reply to Objection 1: Beauty and goodness in a thing are identical
fundamentally; for they are based upon the same thing, namely, the
form; and consequently goodness is praised as beauty. But they differ
logically, for goodness properly relates to the appetite (goodness
being what all things desire); and therefore it has the aspect of an
end (the appetite being a kind of movement towards a thing). On the
other hand, beauty relates to the cognitive faculty; for beautiful
things are those which please when seen. Hence beauty consists in due
proportion; for the senses delight in things duly proportioned, as in
what is after their own kind---because even sense is a sort of reason,
just as is every cognitive faculty. Now since knowledge is by
assimilation, and similarity relates to form, beauty properly belongs
to the nature of a formal cause.
Reply to Objection 2: Goodness is described as self-diffusive in the
sense that an end is said to move.
Reply to Objection 3: He who has a will is said to be good, so far as
he has a good will; because it is by our will that we employ whatever
powers we may have. Hence a man is said to be good, not by his good
understanding; but by his good will. Now the will relates to the end as
to its proper object. Thus the saying, "we exist because God is good"
has reference to the final cause.
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Whether the essence of goodness consists in mode, species and order?
Objection 1: It seems that the essence of goodness does not consist in
mode, species and order. For goodness and being differ logically. But
mode, species and order seem to belong to the nature of being, for it
is written: "Thou hast ordered all things in measure, and number, and
weight" (Wis. 11:21). And to these three can be reduced species, mode
and order, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. iv, 3): "Measure fixes the
mode of everything, number gives it its species, and weight gives it
rest and stability. " Therefore the essence of goodness does not consist
in mode, species and order.
Objection 2: Further, mode, species and order are themselves good.
Therefore if the essence of goodness consists in mode, species and
order, then every mode must have its own mode, species and order. The
same would be the case with species and order in endless succession.
Objection 3: Further, evil is the privation of mode, species and order.
But evil is not the total absence of goodness. Therefore the essence of
goodness does not consist in mode, species and order.
Objection 4: Further, that wherein consists the essence of goodness
cannot be spoken of as evil. Yet we can speak of an evil mode, species
and order. Therefore the essence of goodness does not consist in mode,
species and order.
Objection 5: Further, mode, species and order are caused by weight,
number and measure, as appears from the quotation from Augustine. But
not every good thing has weight, number and measure; for Ambrose says
(Hexam. i, 9): "It is of the nature of light not to have been created
in number, weight and measure. " Therefore the essence of goodness does
not consist in mode, species and order.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Nat. Boni. iii): "These
three---mode, species and order---as common good things, are in
everything God has made; thus, where these three abound the things are
very good; where they are less, the things are less good; where they do
not exist at all, there can be nothing good. " But this would not be
unless the essence of goodness consisted in them. Therefore the essence
of goodness consists in mode, species and order.
I answer that, Everything is said to be good so far as it is perfect;
for in that way only is it desirable (as shown above [24]AA[1],3). Now
a thing is said to be perfect if it lacks nothing according to the mode
of its perfection. But since everything is what it is by its form (and
since the form presupposes certain things, and from the form certain
things necessarily follow), in order for a thing to be perfect and good
it must have a form, together with all that precedes and follows upon
that form. Now the form presupposes determination or commensuration of
its principles, whether material or efficient, and this is signified by
the mode: hence it is said that the measure marks the mode. But the
form itself is signified by the species; for everything is placed in
its species by its form. Hence the number is said to give the species,
for definitions signifying species are like numbers, according to the
Philosopher (Metaph. x); for as a unit added to, or taken from a
number, changes its species, so a difference added to, or taken from a
definition, changes its species. Further, upon the form follows an
inclination to the end, or to an action, or something of the sort; for
everything, in so far as it is in act, acts and tends towards that
which is in accordance with its form; and this belongs to weight and
order. Hence the essence of goodness, so far as it consists in
perfection, consists also in mode, species and order.
Reply to Objection 1: These three only follow upon being, so far as it
is perfect, and according to this perfection is it good.
Reply to Objection 2: Mode, species and order are said to be good, and
to be beings, not as though they themselves were subsistences, but
because it is through them that other things are both beings and good.
Hence they have no need of other things whereby they are good: for they
are spoken of as good, not as though formally constituted so by
something else, but as formally constituting others good: thus
whiteness is not said to be a being as though it were by anything else;
but because, by it, something else has accidental being, as an object
that is white.
Reply to Objection 3: Every being is due to some form. Hence, according
to every being of a thing is its mode, species, order. Thus, a man has
a mode, species and order as he is white, virtuous, learned and so on;
according to everything predicated of him. But evil deprives a thing of
some sort of being, as blindness deprives us of that being which is
sight; yet it does not destroy every mode, species and order, but only
such as follow upon the being of sight.
Reply to Objection 4: Augustine says (De Nat. Boni. xxiii), "Every
mode, as mode, is good" (and the same can be said of species and
order). "But an evil mode, species and order are so called as being
less than they ought to be, or as not belonging to that which they
ought to belong. Therefore they are called evil, because they are out
of place and incongruous. "
Reply to Objection 5: The nature of light is spoken of as being without
number, weight and measure, not absolutely, but in comparison with
corporeal things, because the power of light extends to all corporeal
things; inasmuch as it is an active quality of the first body that
causes change, i. e. the heavens.
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Whether goodness is rightly divided into the virtuous*, the useful and the
pleasant? [*"Bonum honestum" is the virtuous good considered as fitting.
(cf. SS, Q[141], A[3]; SS, Q[145])]
Objection 1: It seems that goodness is not rightly divided into the
virtuous, the useful and the pleasant. For goodness is divided by the
ten predicaments, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. i). But the virtuous,
the useful and the pleasant can be found under one predicament.
Therefore goodness is not rightly divided by them.
Objection 2: Further, every division is made by opposites. But these
three do not seem to be opposites; for the virtuous is pleasing, and no
wickedness is useful; whereas this ought to be the case if the division
were made by opposites, for then the virtuous and the useful would be
opposed; and Tully speaks of this (De Offic. ii). Therefore this
division is incorrect.
Objection 3: Further, where one thing is on account of another, there
is only one thing. But the useful is not goodness, except so far as it
is pleasing and virtuous. Therefore the useful ought not to divided
against the pleasant and the virtuous.
On the contrary, Ambrose makes use of this division of goodness (De
Offic. i, 9)
I answer that, This division properly concerns human goodness. But if
we consider the nature of goodness from a higher and more universal
point of view, we shall find that this division properly concerns
goodness as such. For everything is good so far as it is desirable, and
is a term of the movement of the appetite; the term of whose movement
can be seen from a consideration of the movement of a natural body. Now
the movement of a natural body is terminated by the end absolutely; and
relatively by the means through which it comes to the end, where the
movement ceases; so a thing is called a term of movement, so far as it
terminates any part of that movement. Now the ultimate term of movement
can be taken in two ways, either as the thing itself towards which it
tends, e. g. a place or form; or a state of rest in that thing. Thus, in
the movement of the appetite, the thing desired that terminates the
movement of the appetite relatively, as a means by which something
tends towards another, is called the useful; but that sought after as
the last thing absolutely terminating the movement of the appetite, as
a thing towards which for its own sake the appetite tends, is called
the virtuous; for the virtuous is that which is desired for its own
sake; but that which terminates the movement of the appetite in the
form of rest in the thing desired, is called the pleasant.
Reply to Objection 1: Goodness, so far as it is identical with being,
is divided by the ten predicaments. But this division belongs to it
according to its proper formality.
Reply to Objection 2: This division is not by opposite things; but by
opposite aspects. Now those things are called pleasing which have no
other formality under which they are desirable except the pleasant,
being sometimes hurtful and contrary to virtue. Whereas the useful
applies to such as have nothing desirable in themselves, but are
desired only as helpful to something further, as the taking of bitter
medicine; while the virtuous is predicated of such as are desirable in
themselves.
Reply to Objection 3: Goodness is not divided into these three as
something univocal to be predicated equally of them all; but as
something analogical to be predicated of them according to priority and
posteriority. Hence it is predicated chiefly of the virtuous; then of
the pleasant; and lastly of the useful.
__________________________________________________________________
THE GOODNESS OF GOD (FOUR ARTICLES)
We next consider the goodness of God; under which head there are four
points of inquiry:
(1) Whether goodness belongs to God?
(2) Whether God is the supreme good?
(3) Whether He alone is essentially good?
(4) Whether all things are good by the divine goodness?
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Whether God is good?
Objection 1: It seems that to be good does not belong to God. For
goodness consists in mode, species and order. But these do not seem to
belong to God; since God is immense and is not ordered to anything
else. Therefore to be good does not belong to God.
Objection 2: Further, the good is what all things desire. But all
things do not desire God, because all things do not know Him; and
nothing is desired unless it is known. Therefore to be good does not
belong to God.
On the contrary, It is written (Lam. 3:25): "The Lord is good to them
that hope in Him, to the soul that seeketh Him. "
I answer that, To be good belongs pre-eminently to God. For a thing is
good according to its desirableness. Now everything seeks after its own
perfection; and the perfection and form of an effect consist in a
certain likeness to the agent, since every agent makes its like; and
hence the agent itself is desirable and has the nature of good. For the
very thing which is desirable in it is the participation of its
likeness. Therefore, since God is the first effective cause of all
things, it is manifest that the aspect of good and of desirableness
belong to Him; and hence Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv) attributes good to
God as to the first efficient cause, saying that, God is called good
"as by Whom all things subsist. "
Reply to Objection 1: To have mode, species and order belongs to the
essence of caused good; but good is in God as in its cause, and hence
it belongs to Him to impose mode, species and order on others;
wherefore these three things are in God as in their cause.
Reply to Objection 2: All things, by desiring their own perfection,
desire God Himself, inasmuch as the perfections of all things are so
many similitudes of the divine being; as appears from what is said
above ([25]Q[4] , A[3]). And so of those things which desire God, some
know Him as He is Himself, and this is proper to the rational creature;
others know some participation of His goodness, and this belongs also
to sensible knowledge; others have a natural desire without knowledge,
as being directed to their ends by a higher intelligence.
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Whether God is the supreme good?
Objection 1: It seems that God is not the supreme good. For the supreme
good adds something to good; otherwise it would belong to every good.
But everything which is an addition to anything else is a compound
thing: therefore the supreme good is a compound. But God is supremely
simple; as was shown above ([26]Q[3], A[7]). Therefore God is not the
supreme good.
Objection 2: Further, "Good is what all desire," as the Philosopher
says (Ethic. i, 1). Now what all desire is nothing but God, Who is the
end of all things: therefore there is no other good but God. This
appears also from what is said (Lk. 18:19): "None is good but God
alone. " But we use the word supreme in comparison with others, as e. g.
supreme heat is used in comparison with all other heats. Therefore God
cannot be called the supreme good.
Objection 3: Further, supreme implies comparison. But things not in the
same genus are not comparable; as, sweetness is not properly greater or
less than a line. Therefore, since God is not in the same genus as
other good things, as appears above ([27]Q[3], A[5]; [28]Q[4], A[3]) it
seems that God cannot be called the supreme good in relation to others.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. ii) that, the Trinity of the
divine persons is "the supreme good, discerned by purified minds. "
I answer that, God is the supreme good simply, and not only as existing
in any genus or order of things. For good is attributed to God, as was
said in the preceding article, inasmuch as all desired perfections flow
from Him as from the first cause. They do not, however, flow from Him
as from a univocal agent, as shown above ([29]Q[4], A[2]); but as from
an agent which does not agree with its effects either in species or
genus. Now the likeness of an effect in the univocal cause is found
uniformly; but in the equivocal cause it is found more excellently, as,
heat is in the sun more excellently than it is in fire. Therefore as
good is in God as in the first, but not the univocal, cause of all
things, it must be in Him in a most excellent way; and therefore He is
called the supreme good.
Reply to Objection 1: The supreme good does not add to good any
absolute thing, but only a relation. Now a relation of God to
creatures, is not a reality in God, but in the creature; for it is in
God in our idea only: as, what is knowable is so called with relation
to knowledge, not that it depends on knowledge, but because knowledge
depends on it. Thus it is not necessary that there should be
composition in the supreme good, but only that other things are
deficient in comparison with it.
Reply to Objection 2: When we say that good is what all desire, it is
not to be understood that every kind of good thing is desired by all;
but that whatever is desired has the nature of good. And when it is
said, "None is good but God alone," this is to be understood of
essential goodness, as will be explained in the next article.
Reply to Objection 3: Things not of the same genus are in no way
comparable to each other if indeed they are in different genera. Now we
say that God is not in the same genus with other good things; not that
He is any other genus, but that He is outside genus, and is the
principle of every genus; and thus He is compared to others by excess,
and it is this kind of comparison the supreme good implies.
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Whether to be essentially good belongs to God alone?
Objection 1: It seems that to be essentially good does not belong to
God alone. For as "one" is convertible with "being," so is "good"; as
we said above ([30]Q[5], A[1]). But every being is one essentially, as
appears from the Philosopher (Metaph. iv); therefore every being is
good essentially.
Objection 2: Further, if good is what all things desire, since being
itself is desired by all, then the being of each thing is its good. But
everything is a being essentially; therefore every being is good
essentially.
Objection 3: Further, everything is good by its own goodness. Therefore
if there is anything which is not good essentially, it is necessary to
say that its goodness is not its own essence. Therefore its goodness,
since it is a being, must be good; and if it is good by some other
goodness, the same question applies to that goodness also; therefore we
must either proceed to infinity, or come to some goodness which is not
good by any other goodness.
Therefore the first supposition holds good.
Therefore everything is good essentially.
On the contrary, Boethius says (De Hebdom. ), that "all things but God
are good by participation. " Therefore they are not good essentially.
I answer that, God alone is good essentially. For everything is called
good according to its perfection. Now perfection of a thing is
threefold: first, according to the constitution of its own being;
secondly, in respect of any accidents being added as necessary for its
perfect operation; thirdly, perfection consists in the attaining to
something else as the end. Thus, for instance, the first perfection of
fire consists in its existence, which it has through its own
substantial form; its secondary perfection consists in heat, lightness
and dryness, and the like; its third perfection is to rest in its own
place. This triple perfection belongs to no creature by its own
essence; it belongs to God only, in Whom alone essence is existence; in
Whom there are no accidents; since whatever belongs to others
accidentally belongs to Him essentially; as, to be powerful, wise and
the like, as appears from what is stated above ([31]Q[3], A[6]); and He
is not directed to anything else as to an end, but is Himself the last
end of all things. Hence it is manifest that God alone has every kind
of perfection by His own essence; therefore He Himself alone is good
essentially.
Reply to Objection 1: "One" does not include the idea of perfection,
but only of indivision, which belongs to everything according to its
own essence. Now the essences of simple things are undivided both
actually and potentially, but the essences of compounds are undivided
only actually; and therefore everything must be one essentially, but
not good essentially, as was shown above.
Reply to Objection 2: Although everything is good in that it has being,
yet the essence of a creature is not very being; and therefore it does
not follow that a creature is good essentially.
Reply to Objection 3: The goodness of a creature is not its very
essence, but something superadded; it is either its existence, or some
added perfection, or the order to its end. Still, the goodness itself
thus added is good, just as it is being. But for this reason is it
called being because by it something has being, not because it itself
has being through something else: hence for this reason is it called
good because by it something is good, and not because it itself has
some other goodness whereby it is good.
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Whether all things are good by the divine goodness?
Objection 1: It seems that all things are good by the divine goodness.
For Augustine says (De Trin. viii), "This and that are good; take away
this and that, and see good itself if thou canst; and so thou shalt see
God, good not by any other good, but the good of every good. " But
everything is good by its own good; therefore everything is good by
that very good which is God.
Objection 2: Further, as Boethius says (De Hebdom. ), all things are
called good, accordingly as they are directed to God, and this is by
reason of the divine goodness; therefore all things are good by the
divine goodness.
On the contrary, All things are good, inasmuch as they have being. But
they are not called beings through the divine being, but through their
own being; therefore all things are not good by the divine goodness,
but by their own goodness.
I answer that, As regards relative things, we must admit extrinsic
denomination; as, a thing is denominated "placed" from "place," and
"measured" from "measure. " But as regards absolute things opinions
differ. Plato held the existence of separate ideas ([32]Q[84], A[4]) of
all things, and that individuals were denominated by them as
participating in the separate ideas; for instance, that Socrates is
called man according to the separate idea of man. Now just as he laid
down separate ideas of man and horse which he called absolute man and
absolute horse, so likewise he laid down separate ideas of "being" and
of "one," and these he called absolute being and absolute oneness; and
by participation of these, everything was called "being" or "one"; and
what was thus absolute being and absolute one, he said was the supreme
good. And because good is convertible with being, as one is also; he
called God the absolute good, from whom all things are called good by
way of participation.
Although this opinion appears to be unreasonable in affirming separate
ideas of natural things as subsisting of themselves---as Aristotle
argues in many ways---still, it is absolutely true that there is first
something which is essentially being and essentially good, which we
call God, as appears from what is shown above ([33]Q[2], A[3]), and
Aristotle agrees with this. Hence from the first being, essentially
such, and good, everything can be called good and a being, inasmuch as
it participates in it by way of a certain assimilation which is far
removed and defective; as appears from the above ([34]Q[4], A[3]).
Everything is therefore called good from the divine goodness, as from
the first exemplary effective and final principle of all goodness.
Nevertheless, everything is called good by reason of the similitude of
the divine goodness belonging to it, which is formally its own
goodness, whereby it is denominated good. And so of all things there is
one goodness, and yet many goodnesses.
This is a sufficient Reply to the Objections.
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THE INFINITY OF GOD (FOUR ARTICLES)
After considering the divine perfection we must consider the divine
infinity, and God's existence in things: for God is everywhere, and in
all things, inasmuch as He is boundless and infinite.
Concerning the first, there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether God is infinite?
(2) Whether anything besides Him is infinite in essence?
(3) Whether anything can be infinitude in magnitude?
(4) Whether an infinite multitude can exist?
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Whether God is infinite?
Objection 1: It seems that God is not infinite. For everything infinite
is imperfect, as the Philosopher says; because it has parts and matter,
as is said in Phys. iii. But God is most perfect; therefore He is not
infinite.
Objection 2: Further, according to the Philosopher (Phys. i), finite
and infinite belong to quantity. But there is no quantity in God, for
He is not a body, as was shown above ([35]Q[3], A[1]). Therefore it
does not belong to Him to be infinite.
Objection 3: Further, what is here in such a way as not to be
elsewhere, is finite according to place. Therefore that which is a
thing in such a way as not to be another thing, is finite according to
substance. But God is this, and not another; for He is not a stone or
wood. Therefore God is not infinite in substance.
On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. i, 4) that "God is
infinite and eternal, and boundless. "
I answer that, All the ancient philosophers attribute infinitude to the
first principle, as is said (Phys. iii), and with reason; for they
considered that things flow forth infinitely from the first principle.
But because some erred concerning the nature of the first principle, as
a consequence they erred also concerning its infinity; forasmuch as
they asserted that matter was the first principle; consequently they
attributed to the first principle a material infinity to the effect
that some infinite body was the first principle of things.
We must consider therefore that a thing is called infinite because it
is not finite. Now matter is in a way made finite by form, and the form
by matter. Matter indeed is made finite by form, inasmuch as matter,
before it receives its form, is in potentiality to many forms; but on
receiving a form, it is terminated by that one. Again, form is made
finite by matter, inasmuch as form, considered in itself, is common to
many; but when received in matter, the form is determined to this one
particular thing. Now matter is perfected by the form by which it is
made finite; therefore infinite as attributed to matter, has the nature
of something imperfect; for it is as it were formless matter. On the
other hand, form is not made perfect by matter, but rather is
contracted by matter; and hence the infinite, regarded on the part of
the form not determined by matter, has the nature of something perfect.
Now being is the most formal of all things, as appears from what is
shown above ([36]Q[4], A[1], OBJ[3]). Since therefore the divine being
is not a being received in anything, but He is His own subsistent being
as was shown above ([37]Q[3], A[4]), it is clear that God Himself is
infinite and perfect.
From this appears the Reply to the First Objection.
Reply to Objection 2: Quantity is terminated by its form, which can be
seen in the fact that a figure which consists in quantity terminated,
is a kind of quantitative form. Hence the infinite of quantity is the
infinite of matter; such a kind of infinite cannot be attributed to
God; as was said above, in this article.
Reply to Objection 3: The fact that the being of God is
self-subsisting, not received in any other, and is thus called
infinite, shows Him to be distinguished from all other beings, and all
others to be apart from Him. Even so, were there such a thing as a
self-subsisting whiteness, the very fact that it did not exist in
anything else, would make it distinct from every other whiteness
existing in a subject.
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Whether anything but God can be essentially infinite?
Objection 1: It seems that something else besides God can be
essentially infinite. For the power of anything is proportioned to its
essence. Now if the essence of God is infinite, His power must also be
infinite. Therefore He can produce an infinite effect, since the extent
of a power is known by its effect.
Objection 2: Further, whatever has infinite power, has an infinite
essence. Now the created intellect has an infinite power; for it
apprehends the universal, which can extend itself to an infinitude of
singular things. Therefore every created intellectual substance is
infinite.
Objection 3: Further, primary matter is something other than God, as
was shown above ([38]Q[3], A[8]). But primary matter is infinite.
Therefore something besides God can be infinite.
On the contrary, The infinite cannot have a beginning, as said in Phys.
iii. But everything outside God is from God as from its first
principle. Therefore besides God nothing can be infinite.
I answer that, Things other than God can be relatively infinite, but
not absolutely infinite. For with regard to infinite as applied to
matter, it is manifest that everything actually existing possesses a
form; and thus its matter is determined by form. But because matter,
considered as existing under some substantial form, remains in
potentiality to many accidental forms, which is absolutely finite can
be relatively infinite; as, for example, wood is finite according to
its own form, but still it is relatively infinite, inasmuch as it is in
potentiality to an infinite number of shapes. But if we speak of the
infinite in reference to form, it is manifest that those things, the
forms of which are in matter, are absolutely finite, and in no way
infinite. If, however, any created forms are not received into matter,
but are self-subsisting, as some think is the case with angels, these
will be relatively infinite, inasmuch as such kinds of forms are not
terminated, nor contracted by any matter. But because a created form
thus subsisting has being, and yet is not its own being, it follows
that its being is received and contracted to a determinate nature.
Hence it cannot be absolutely infinite.
Reply to Objection 1: It is against the nature of a made thing for its
essence to be its existence; because subsisting being is not a created
being; hence it is against the nature of a made thing to be absolutely
infinite. Therefore, as God, although He has infinite power, cannot
make a thing to be not made (for this would imply that two
contradictories are true at the same time), so likewise He cannot make
anything to be absolutely infinite.
Reply to Objection 2: The fact that the power of the intellect extends
itself in a way to infinite things, is because the intellect is a form
not in matter, but either wholly separated from matter, as is the
angelic substance, or at least an intellectual power, which is not the
act of any organ, in the intellectual soul joined to a body.
Reply to Objection 3: Primary matter does not exist by itself in
nature, since it is not actually being, but potentially only; hence it
is something concreated rather than created. Nevertheless, primary
matter even as a potentiality is not absolutely infinite, but
relatively, because its potentiality extends only to natural forms.
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Whether an actually infinite magnitude can exist?
Objection 1: It seems that there can be something actually infinite in
magnitude. For in mathematics there is no error, since "there is no lie
in things abstract," as the Philosopher says (Phys. ii). But
mathematics uses the infinite in magnitude; thus, the geometrician in
his demonstrations says, "Let this line be infinite. " Therefore it is
not impossible for a thing to be infinite in magnitude.
Objection 2: Further, what is not against the nature of anything, can
agree with it. Now to be infinite is not against the nature of
magnitude; but rather both the finite and the infinite seem to be
properties of quantity. Therefore it is not impossible for some
magnitude to be infinite.
Objection 3: Further, magnitude is infinitely divisible, for the
continuous is defined that which is infinitely divisible, as is clear
from Phys. iii. But contraries are concerned about one and the same
thing. Since therefore addition is opposed to division, and increase
opposed to diminution, it appears that magnitude can be increased to
infinity. Therefore it is possible for magnitude to be infinite.
Objection 4: Further, movement and time have quantity and continuity
derived from the magnitude over which movement passes, as is said in
Phys. iv. But it is not against the nature of time and movement to be
infinite, since every determinate indivisible in time and circular
movement is both a beginning and an end. Therefore neither is it
against the nature of magnitude to be infinite.
On the contrary, Every body has a surface. But every body which has a
surface is finite; because surface is the term of a finite body.
Therefore all bodies are finite. The same applies both to surface and
to a line. Therefore nothing is infinite in magnitude.
I answer that, It is one thing to be infinite in essence, and another
to be infinite in magnitude. For granted that a body exists infinite in
magnitude, as fire or air, yet this could not be infinite in essence,
because its essence would be terminated in a species by its form, and
confined to individuality by matter. And so assuming from these
premises that no creature is infinite in essence, it still remains to
inquire whether any creature can be infinite in magnitude.
We must therefore observe that a body, which is a complete magnitude,
can be considered in two ways; mathematically, in respect to its
quantity only; and naturally, as regards its matter and form.
Now it is manifest that a natural body cannot be actually infinite. For
every natural body has some determined substantial form. Since
therefore the accidents follow upon the substantial form, it is
necessary that determinate accidents should follow upon a determinate
form; and among these accidents is quantity. So every natural body has
a greater or smaller determinate quantity. Hence it is impossible for a
natural body to be infinite. The same appears from movement; because
every natural body has some natural movement; whereas an infinite body
could not have any natural movement; neither direct, because nothing
moves naturally by a direct movement unless it is out of its place; and
this could not happen to an infinite body, for it would occupy every
place, and thus every place would be indifferently its own place.
Neither could it move circularly; forasmuch as circular motion requires
that one part of the body is necessarily transferred to a place
occupied by another part, and this could not happen as regards an
infinite circular body: for if two lines be drawn from the centre, the
farther they extend from the centre, the farther they are from each
other; therefore, if a body were infinite, the lines would be
infinitely distant from each other; and thus one could never occupy the
place belonging to any other.
The same applies to a mathematical body. For if we imagine a
mathematical body actually existing, we must imagine it under some
form, because nothing is actual except by its form; hence, since the
form of quantity as such is figure, such a body must have some figure,
and so would be finite; for figure is confined by a term or boundary.
Reply to Objection 1: A geometrician does not need to assume a line
actually infinite, but takes some actually finite line, from which he
subtracts whatever he finds necessary; which line he calls infinite.
Reply to Objection 2: Although the infinite is not against the nature
of magnitude in general, still it is against the nature of any species
of it; thus, for instance, it is against the nature of a bicubical or
tricubical magnitude, whether circular or triangular, and so on. Now
what is not possible in any species cannot exist in the genus; hence
there cannot be any infinite magnitude, since no species of magnitude
is infinite.
Reply to Objection 3: The infinite in quantity, as was shown above,
belongs to matter. Now by division of the whole we approach to matter,
forasmuch as parts have the aspect of matter; but by addition we
approach to the whole which has the aspect of a form. Therefore the
infinite is not in the addition of magnitude, but only in division.
Reply to Objection 4: Movement and time are whole, not actually but
successively; hence they have potentiality mixed with actuality. But
magnitude is an actual whole; therefore the infinite in quantity refers
to matter, and does not agree with the totality of magnitude; yet it
agrees with the totality of time and movement: for it is proper to
matter to be in potentiality.
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Whether an infinite multitude can exist?
Objection 1: It seems that an actually infinite multitude is possible.
For it is not impossible for a potentiality to be made actual. But
number can be multiplied to infinity. Therefore it is possible for an
infinite multitude actually to exist.
Objection 2: Further, it is possible for any individual of any species
to be made actual. But the species of figures are infinite. Therefore
an infinite number of actual figures is possible.
Objection 3: Further, things not opposed to each other do not obstruct
each other. But supposing a multitude of things to exist, there can
still be many others not opposed to them. Therefore it is not
impossible for others also to coexist with them, and so on to
infinitude; therefore an actual infinite number of things is possible.
On the contrary, It is written, "Thou hast ordered all things in
measure, and number, and weight" (Wis. 11:21).
I answer that, A twofold opinion exists on this subject. Some, as
Avicenna and Algazel, said that it was impossible for an actually
infinite multitude to exist absolutely; but that an accidentally
infinite multitude was not impossible. A multitude is said to be
infinite absolutely, when an infinite multitude is necessary that
something may exist. Now this is impossible; because it would entail
something dependent on an infinity for its existence; and hence its
generation could never come to be, because it is impossible to pass
through an infinite medium.
A multitude is said to be accidentally infinite when its existence as
such is not necessary, but accidental. This can be shown, for example,
in the work of a carpenter requiring a certain absolute multitude;
namely, art in the soul, the movement of the hand, and a hammer; and
supposing that such things were infinitely multiplied, the carpentering
work would never be finished, forasmuch as it would depend on an
infinite number of causes. But the multitude of hammers, inasmuch as
one may be broken and another used, is an accidental multitude; for it
happens by accident that many hammers are used, and it matters little
whether one or two, or many are used, or an infinite number, if the
work is carried on for an infinite time. In this way they said that
there can be an accidentally infinite multitude.
This, however, is impossible; since every kind of multitude must belong
to a species of multitude. Now the species of multitude are to be
reckoned by the species of numbers. But no species of number is
infinite; for every number is multitude measured by one. Hence it is
impossible for there to be an actually infinite multitude, either
absolute or accidental. Likewise multitude in nature is created; and
everything created is comprehended under some clear intention of the
Creator; for no agent acts aimlessly. Hence everything created must be
comprehended in a certain number. Therefore it is impossible for an
actually infinite multitude to exist, even accidentally. But a
potentially infinite multitude is possible; because the increase of
multitude follows upon the division of magnitude; since the more a
thing is divided, the greater number of things result. Hence, as the
infinite is to be found potentially in the division of the continuous,
because we thus approach matter, as was shown in the preceding article,
by the same rule, the infinite can be also found potentially in the
addition of multitude.
Reply to Objection 1: Every potentiality is made actual according to
its mode of being; for instance, a day is reduced to act successively,
and not all at once. Likewise the infinite in multitude is reduced to
act successively, and not all at once; because every multitude can be
succeeded by another multitude to infinity.
Reply to Objection 2: Species of figures are infinite by infinitude of
number. Now there are various species of figures, such as trilateral,
quadrilateral and so on; and as an infinitely numerable multitude is
not all at once reduced to act, so neither is the multitude of figures.
Reply to Objection 3: Although the supposition of some things does not
preclude the supposition of others, still the supposition of an
infinite number is opposed to any single species of multitude. Hence it
is not possible for an actually infinite multitude to exist.
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THE EXISTENCE OF GOD IN THINGS (FOUR ARTICLES)
Since it evidently belongs to the infinite to be present everywhere,
and in all things, we now consider whether this belongs to God; and
concerning this there arise four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether God is in all things?
(2) Whether God is everywhere?
(3) Whether God is everywhere by essence, power, and presence?
(4) Whether to be everywhere belongs to God alone?
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Whether God is in all things?
Objection 1: It seems that God is not in all things. For what is above
all things is not in all things. But God is above all, according to the
Psalm (Ps. 112:4), "The Lord is high above all nations," etc. Therefore
God is not in all things.
Objection 2: Further, what is in anything is thereby contained. Now God
is not contained by things, but rather does He contain them. Therefore
God is not in things but things are rather in Him. Hence Augustine says
(Octog. Tri. Quaest. qu. 20), that "in Him things are, rather than He
is in any place. "
Objection 3: Further, the more powerful an agent is, the more extended
is its action. But God is the most powerful of all agents. Therefore
His action can extend to things which are far removed from Him; nor is
it necessary that He should be in all things.
has actuality and is in some way perfect; since every act implies some
sort of perfection; and perfection implies desirability and goodness,
as is clear from A[1]. Hence it follows that every being as such is
good.
Reply to Objection 1: Substance, quantity, quality, and everything
included in them, limit being by applying it to some essence or nature.
Now in this sense, goodness does not add anything to being beyond the
aspect of desirability and perfection, which is also proper to being,
whatever kind of nature it may be. Hence goodness does not limit being.
Reply to Objection 2: No being can be spoken of as evil, formally as
being, but only so far as it lacks being. Thus a man is said to be
evil, because he lacks some virtue; and an eye is said to be evil,
because it lacks the power to see well.
Reply to Objection 3: As primary matter has only potential being, so it
is only potentially good. Although, according to the Platonists,
primary matter may be said to be a non-being on account of the
privation attaching to it, nevertheless, it does participate to a
certain extent in goodness, viz. by its relation to, or aptitude for,
goodness. Consequently, to be desirable is not its property, but to
desire.
Reply to Objection 4: Mathematical entities do not subsist as
realities; because they would be in some sort good if they subsisted;
but they have only logical existence, inasmuch as they are abstracted
from motion and matter; thus they cannot have the aspect of an end,
which itself has the aspect of moving another. Nor is it repugnant that
there should be in some logical entity neither goodness nor form of
goodness; since the idea of being is prior to the idea of goodness, as
was said in the preceding article.
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Whether goodness has the aspect of a final cause?
Objection 1: It seems that goodness has not the aspect of a final
cause, but rather of the other causes. For, as Dionysius says (Div.
Nom. iv), "Goodness is praised as beauty. " But beauty has the aspect of
a formal cause. Therefore goodness has the aspect of a formal cause.
Objection 2: Further, goodness is self-diffusive; for Dionysius says
(Div. Nom. iv) that goodness is that whereby all things subsist, and
are. But to be self-giving implies the aspect of an efficient cause.
Therefore goodness has the aspect of an efficient cause.
Objection 3: Further, Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 31) that "we
exist because God is good. " But we owe our existence to God as the
efficient cause. Therefore goodness implies the aspect of an efficient
cause.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Phys. ii) that "that is to be
considered as the end and the good of other things, for the sake of
which something is. " Therefore goodness has the aspect of a final
cause.
I answer that, Since goodness is that which all things desire, and
since this has the aspect of an end, it is clear that goodness implies
the aspect of an end. Nevertheless, the idea of goodness presupposes
the idea of an efficient cause, and also of a formal cause. For we see
that what is first in causing, is last in the thing caused. Fire, e. g.
heats first of all before it reproduces the form of fire; though the
heat in the fire follows from its substantial form. Now in causing,
goodness and the end come first, both of which move the agent to act;
secondly, the action of the agent moving to the form; thirdly, comes
the form. Hence in that which is caused the converse ought to take
place, so that there should be first, the form whereby it is a being;
secondly, we consider in it its effective power, whereby it is perfect
in being, for a thing is perfect when it can reproduce its like, as the
Philosopher says (Meteor. iv); thirdly, there follows the formality of
goodness which is the basic principle of its perfection.
Reply to Objection 1: Beauty and goodness in a thing are identical
fundamentally; for they are based upon the same thing, namely, the
form; and consequently goodness is praised as beauty. But they differ
logically, for goodness properly relates to the appetite (goodness
being what all things desire); and therefore it has the aspect of an
end (the appetite being a kind of movement towards a thing). On the
other hand, beauty relates to the cognitive faculty; for beautiful
things are those which please when seen. Hence beauty consists in due
proportion; for the senses delight in things duly proportioned, as in
what is after their own kind---because even sense is a sort of reason,
just as is every cognitive faculty. Now since knowledge is by
assimilation, and similarity relates to form, beauty properly belongs
to the nature of a formal cause.
Reply to Objection 2: Goodness is described as self-diffusive in the
sense that an end is said to move.
Reply to Objection 3: He who has a will is said to be good, so far as
he has a good will; because it is by our will that we employ whatever
powers we may have. Hence a man is said to be good, not by his good
understanding; but by his good will. Now the will relates to the end as
to its proper object. Thus the saying, "we exist because God is good"
has reference to the final cause.
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Whether the essence of goodness consists in mode, species and order?
Objection 1: It seems that the essence of goodness does not consist in
mode, species and order. For goodness and being differ logically. But
mode, species and order seem to belong to the nature of being, for it
is written: "Thou hast ordered all things in measure, and number, and
weight" (Wis. 11:21). And to these three can be reduced species, mode
and order, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. iv, 3): "Measure fixes the
mode of everything, number gives it its species, and weight gives it
rest and stability. " Therefore the essence of goodness does not consist
in mode, species and order.
Objection 2: Further, mode, species and order are themselves good.
Therefore if the essence of goodness consists in mode, species and
order, then every mode must have its own mode, species and order. The
same would be the case with species and order in endless succession.
Objection 3: Further, evil is the privation of mode, species and order.
But evil is not the total absence of goodness. Therefore the essence of
goodness does not consist in mode, species and order.
Objection 4: Further, that wherein consists the essence of goodness
cannot be spoken of as evil. Yet we can speak of an evil mode, species
and order. Therefore the essence of goodness does not consist in mode,
species and order.
Objection 5: Further, mode, species and order are caused by weight,
number and measure, as appears from the quotation from Augustine. But
not every good thing has weight, number and measure; for Ambrose says
(Hexam. i, 9): "It is of the nature of light not to have been created
in number, weight and measure. " Therefore the essence of goodness does
not consist in mode, species and order.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Nat. Boni. iii): "These
three---mode, species and order---as common good things, are in
everything God has made; thus, where these three abound the things are
very good; where they are less, the things are less good; where they do
not exist at all, there can be nothing good. " But this would not be
unless the essence of goodness consisted in them. Therefore the essence
of goodness consists in mode, species and order.
I answer that, Everything is said to be good so far as it is perfect;
for in that way only is it desirable (as shown above [24]AA[1],3). Now
a thing is said to be perfect if it lacks nothing according to the mode
of its perfection. But since everything is what it is by its form (and
since the form presupposes certain things, and from the form certain
things necessarily follow), in order for a thing to be perfect and good
it must have a form, together with all that precedes and follows upon
that form. Now the form presupposes determination or commensuration of
its principles, whether material or efficient, and this is signified by
the mode: hence it is said that the measure marks the mode. But the
form itself is signified by the species; for everything is placed in
its species by its form. Hence the number is said to give the species,
for definitions signifying species are like numbers, according to the
Philosopher (Metaph. x); for as a unit added to, or taken from a
number, changes its species, so a difference added to, or taken from a
definition, changes its species. Further, upon the form follows an
inclination to the end, or to an action, or something of the sort; for
everything, in so far as it is in act, acts and tends towards that
which is in accordance with its form; and this belongs to weight and
order. Hence the essence of goodness, so far as it consists in
perfection, consists also in mode, species and order.
Reply to Objection 1: These three only follow upon being, so far as it
is perfect, and according to this perfection is it good.
Reply to Objection 2: Mode, species and order are said to be good, and
to be beings, not as though they themselves were subsistences, but
because it is through them that other things are both beings and good.
Hence they have no need of other things whereby they are good: for they
are spoken of as good, not as though formally constituted so by
something else, but as formally constituting others good: thus
whiteness is not said to be a being as though it were by anything else;
but because, by it, something else has accidental being, as an object
that is white.
Reply to Objection 3: Every being is due to some form. Hence, according
to every being of a thing is its mode, species, order. Thus, a man has
a mode, species and order as he is white, virtuous, learned and so on;
according to everything predicated of him. But evil deprives a thing of
some sort of being, as blindness deprives us of that being which is
sight; yet it does not destroy every mode, species and order, but only
such as follow upon the being of sight.
Reply to Objection 4: Augustine says (De Nat. Boni. xxiii), "Every
mode, as mode, is good" (and the same can be said of species and
order). "But an evil mode, species and order are so called as being
less than they ought to be, or as not belonging to that which they
ought to belong. Therefore they are called evil, because they are out
of place and incongruous. "
Reply to Objection 5: The nature of light is spoken of as being without
number, weight and measure, not absolutely, but in comparison with
corporeal things, because the power of light extends to all corporeal
things; inasmuch as it is an active quality of the first body that
causes change, i. e. the heavens.
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Whether goodness is rightly divided into the virtuous*, the useful and the
pleasant? [*"Bonum honestum" is the virtuous good considered as fitting.
(cf. SS, Q[141], A[3]; SS, Q[145])]
Objection 1: It seems that goodness is not rightly divided into the
virtuous, the useful and the pleasant. For goodness is divided by the
ten predicaments, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. i). But the virtuous,
the useful and the pleasant can be found under one predicament.
Therefore goodness is not rightly divided by them.
Objection 2: Further, every division is made by opposites. But these
three do not seem to be opposites; for the virtuous is pleasing, and no
wickedness is useful; whereas this ought to be the case if the division
were made by opposites, for then the virtuous and the useful would be
opposed; and Tully speaks of this (De Offic. ii). Therefore this
division is incorrect.
Objection 3: Further, where one thing is on account of another, there
is only one thing. But the useful is not goodness, except so far as it
is pleasing and virtuous. Therefore the useful ought not to divided
against the pleasant and the virtuous.
On the contrary, Ambrose makes use of this division of goodness (De
Offic. i, 9)
I answer that, This division properly concerns human goodness. But if
we consider the nature of goodness from a higher and more universal
point of view, we shall find that this division properly concerns
goodness as such. For everything is good so far as it is desirable, and
is a term of the movement of the appetite; the term of whose movement
can be seen from a consideration of the movement of a natural body. Now
the movement of a natural body is terminated by the end absolutely; and
relatively by the means through which it comes to the end, where the
movement ceases; so a thing is called a term of movement, so far as it
terminates any part of that movement. Now the ultimate term of movement
can be taken in two ways, either as the thing itself towards which it
tends, e. g. a place or form; or a state of rest in that thing. Thus, in
the movement of the appetite, the thing desired that terminates the
movement of the appetite relatively, as a means by which something
tends towards another, is called the useful; but that sought after as
the last thing absolutely terminating the movement of the appetite, as
a thing towards which for its own sake the appetite tends, is called
the virtuous; for the virtuous is that which is desired for its own
sake; but that which terminates the movement of the appetite in the
form of rest in the thing desired, is called the pleasant.
Reply to Objection 1: Goodness, so far as it is identical with being,
is divided by the ten predicaments. But this division belongs to it
according to its proper formality.
Reply to Objection 2: This division is not by opposite things; but by
opposite aspects. Now those things are called pleasing which have no
other formality under which they are desirable except the pleasant,
being sometimes hurtful and contrary to virtue. Whereas the useful
applies to such as have nothing desirable in themselves, but are
desired only as helpful to something further, as the taking of bitter
medicine; while the virtuous is predicated of such as are desirable in
themselves.
Reply to Objection 3: Goodness is not divided into these three as
something univocal to be predicated equally of them all; but as
something analogical to be predicated of them according to priority and
posteriority. Hence it is predicated chiefly of the virtuous; then of
the pleasant; and lastly of the useful.
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THE GOODNESS OF GOD (FOUR ARTICLES)
We next consider the goodness of God; under which head there are four
points of inquiry:
(1) Whether goodness belongs to God?
(2) Whether God is the supreme good?
(3) Whether He alone is essentially good?
(4) Whether all things are good by the divine goodness?
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Whether God is good?
Objection 1: It seems that to be good does not belong to God. For
goodness consists in mode, species and order. But these do not seem to
belong to God; since God is immense and is not ordered to anything
else. Therefore to be good does not belong to God.
Objection 2: Further, the good is what all things desire. But all
things do not desire God, because all things do not know Him; and
nothing is desired unless it is known. Therefore to be good does not
belong to God.
On the contrary, It is written (Lam. 3:25): "The Lord is good to them
that hope in Him, to the soul that seeketh Him. "
I answer that, To be good belongs pre-eminently to God. For a thing is
good according to its desirableness. Now everything seeks after its own
perfection; and the perfection and form of an effect consist in a
certain likeness to the agent, since every agent makes its like; and
hence the agent itself is desirable and has the nature of good. For the
very thing which is desirable in it is the participation of its
likeness. Therefore, since God is the first effective cause of all
things, it is manifest that the aspect of good and of desirableness
belong to Him; and hence Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv) attributes good to
God as to the first efficient cause, saying that, God is called good
"as by Whom all things subsist. "
Reply to Objection 1: To have mode, species and order belongs to the
essence of caused good; but good is in God as in its cause, and hence
it belongs to Him to impose mode, species and order on others;
wherefore these three things are in God as in their cause.
Reply to Objection 2: All things, by desiring their own perfection,
desire God Himself, inasmuch as the perfections of all things are so
many similitudes of the divine being; as appears from what is said
above ([25]Q[4] , A[3]). And so of those things which desire God, some
know Him as He is Himself, and this is proper to the rational creature;
others know some participation of His goodness, and this belongs also
to sensible knowledge; others have a natural desire without knowledge,
as being directed to their ends by a higher intelligence.
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Whether God is the supreme good?
Objection 1: It seems that God is not the supreme good. For the supreme
good adds something to good; otherwise it would belong to every good.
But everything which is an addition to anything else is a compound
thing: therefore the supreme good is a compound. But God is supremely
simple; as was shown above ([26]Q[3], A[7]). Therefore God is not the
supreme good.
Objection 2: Further, "Good is what all desire," as the Philosopher
says (Ethic. i, 1). Now what all desire is nothing but God, Who is the
end of all things: therefore there is no other good but God. This
appears also from what is said (Lk. 18:19): "None is good but God
alone. " But we use the word supreme in comparison with others, as e. g.
supreme heat is used in comparison with all other heats. Therefore God
cannot be called the supreme good.
Objection 3: Further, supreme implies comparison. But things not in the
same genus are not comparable; as, sweetness is not properly greater or
less than a line. Therefore, since God is not in the same genus as
other good things, as appears above ([27]Q[3], A[5]; [28]Q[4], A[3]) it
seems that God cannot be called the supreme good in relation to others.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. ii) that, the Trinity of the
divine persons is "the supreme good, discerned by purified minds. "
I answer that, God is the supreme good simply, and not only as existing
in any genus or order of things. For good is attributed to God, as was
said in the preceding article, inasmuch as all desired perfections flow
from Him as from the first cause. They do not, however, flow from Him
as from a univocal agent, as shown above ([29]Q[4], A[2]); but as from
an agent which does not agree with its effects either in species or
genus. Now the likeness of an effect in the univocal cause is found
uniformly; but in the equivocal cause it is found more excellently, as,
heat is in the sun more excellently than it is in fire. Therefore as
good is in God as in the first, but not the univocal, cause of all
things, it must be in Him in a most excellent way; and therefore He is
called the supreme good.
Reply to Objection 1: The supreme good does not add to good any
absolute thing, but only a relation. Now a relation of God to
creatures, is not a reality in God, but in the creature; for it is in
God in our idea only: as, what is knowable is so called with relation
to knowledge, not that it depends on knowledge, but because knowledge
depends on it. Thus it is not necessary that there should be
composition in the supreme good, but only that other things are
deficient in comparison with it.
Reply to Objection 2: When we say that good is what all desire, it is
not to be understood that every kind of good thing is desired by all;
but that whatever is desired has the nature of good. And when it is
said, "None is good but God alone," this is to be understood of
essential goodness, as will be explained in the next article.
Reply to Objection 3: Things not of the same genus are in no way
comparable to each other if indeed they are in different genera. Now we
say that God is not in the same genus with other good things; not that
He is any other genus, but that He is outside genus, and is the
principle of every genus; and thus He is compared to others by excess,
and it is this kind of comparison the supreme good implies.
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Whether to be essentially good belongs to God alone?
Objection 1: It seems that to be essentially good does not belong to
God alone. For as "one" is convertible with "being," so is "good"; as
we said above ([30]Q[5], A[1]). But every being is one essentially, as
appears from the Philosopher (Metaph. iv); therefore every being is
good essentially.
Objection 2: Further, if good is what all things desire, since being
itself is desired by all, then the being of each thing is its good. But
everything is a being essentially; therefore every being is good
essentially.
Objection 3: Further, everything is good by its own goodness. Therefore
if there is anything which is not good essentially, it is necessary to
say that its goodness is not its own essence. Therefore its goodness,
since it is a being, must be good; and if it is good by some other
goodness, the same question applies to that goodness also; therefore we
must either proceed to infinity, or come to some goodness which is not
good by any other goodness.
Therefore the first supposition holds good.
Therefore everything is good essentially.
On the contrary, Boethius says (De Hebdom. ), that "all things but God
are good by participation. " Therefore they are not good essentially.
I answer that, God alone is good essentially. For everything is called
good according to its perfection. Now perfection of a thing is
threefold: first, according to the constitution of its own being;
secondly, in respect of any accidents being added as necessary for its
perfect operation; thirdly, perfection consists in the attaining to
something else as the end. Thus, for instance, the first perfection of
fire consists in its existence, which it has through its own
substantial form; its secondary perfection consists in heat, lightness
and dryness, and the like; its third perfection is to rest in its own
place. This triple perfection belongs to no creature by its own
essence; it belongs to God only, in Whom alone essence is existence; in
Whom there are no accidents; since whatever belongs to others
accidentally belongs to Him essentially; as, to be powerful, wise and
the like, as appears from what is stated above ([31]Q[3], A[6]); and He
is not directed to anything else as to an end, but is Himself the last
end of all things. Hence it is manifest that God alone has every kind
of perfection by His own essence; therefore He Himself alone is good
essentially.
Reply to Objection 1: "One" does not include the idea of perfection,
but only of indivision, which belongs to everything according to its
own essence. Now the essences of simple things are undivided both
actually and potentially, but the essences of compounds are undivided
only actually; and therefore everything must be one essentially, but
not good essentially, as was shown above.
Reply to Objection 2: Although everything is good in that it has being,
yet the essence of a creature is not very being; and therefore it does
not follow that a creature is good essentially.
Reply to Objection 3: The goodness of a creature is not its very
essence, but something superadded; it is either its existence, or some
added perfection, or the order to its end. Still, the goodness itself
thus added is good, just as it is being. But for this reason is it
called being because by it something has being, not because it itself
has being through something else: hence for this reason is it called
good because by it something is good, and not because it itself has
some other goodness whereby it is good.
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Whether all things are good by the divine goodness?
Objection 1: It seems that all things are good by the divine goodness.
For Augustine says (De Trin. viii), "This and that are good; take away
this and that, and see good itself if thou canst; and so thou shalt see
God, good not by any other good, but the good of every good. " But
everything is good by its own good; therefore everything is good by
that very good which is God.
Objection 2: Further, as Boethius says (De Hebdom. ), all things are
called good, accordingly as they are directed to God, and this is by
reason of the divine goodness; therefore all things are good by the
divine goodness.
On the contrary, All things are good, inasmuch as they have being. But
they are not called beings through the divine being, but through their
own being; therefore all things are not good by the divine goodness,
but by their own goodness.
I answer that, As regards relative things, we must admit extrinsic
denomination; as, a thing is denominated "placed" from "place," and
"measured" from "measure. " But as regards absolute things opinions
differ. Plato held the existence of separate ideas ([32]Q[84], A[4]) of
all things, and that individuals were denominated by them as
participating in the separate ideas; for instance, that Socrates is
called man according to the separate idea of man. Now just as he laid
down separate ideas of man and horse which he called absolute man and
absolute horse, so likewise he laid down separate ideas of "being" and
of "one," and these he called absolute being and absolute oneness; and
by participation of these, everything was called "being" or "one"; and
what was thus absolute being and absolute one, he said was the supreme
good. And because good is convertible with being, as one is also; he
called God the absolute good, from whom all things are called good by
way of participation.
Although this opinion appears to be unreasonable in affirming separate
ideas of natural things as subsisting of themselves---as Aristotle
argues in many ways---still, it is absolutely true that there is first
something which is essentially being and essentially good, which we
call God, as appears from what is shown above ([33]Q[2], A[3]), and
Aristotle agrees with this. Hence from the first being, essentially
such, and good, everything can be called good and a being, inasmuch as
it participates in it by way of a certain assimilation which is far
removed and defective; as appears from the above ([34]Q[4], A[3]).
Everything is therefore called good from the divine goodness, as from
the first exemplary effective and final principle of all goodness.
Nevertheless, everything is called good by reason of the similitude of
the divine goodness belonging to it, which is formally its own
goodness, whereby it is denominated good. And so of all things there is
one goodness, and yet many goodnesses.
This is a sufficient Reply to the Objections.
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THE INFINITY OF GOD (FOUR ARTICLES)
After considering the divine perfection we must consider the divine
infinity, and God's existence in things: for God is everywhere, and in
all things, inasmuch as He is boundless and infinite.
Concerning the first, there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether God is infinite?
(2) Whether anything besides Him is infinite in essence?
(3) Whether anything can be infinitude in magnitude?
(4) Whether an infinite multitude can exist?
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Whether God is infinite?
Objection 1: It seems that God is not infinite. For everything infinite
is imperfect, as the Philosopher says; because it has parts and matter,
as is said in Phys. iii. But God is most perfect; therefore He is not
infinite.
Objection 2: Further, according to the Philosopher (Phys. i), finite
and infinite belong to quantity. But there is no quantity in God, for
He is not a body, as was shown above ([35]Q[3], A[1]). Therefore it
does not belong to Him to be infinite.
Objection 3: Further, what is here in such a way as not to be
elsewhere, is finite according to place. Therefore that which is a
thing in such a way as not to be another thing, is finite according to
substance. But God is this, and not another; for He is not a stone or
wood. Therefore God is not infinite in substance.
On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. i, 4) that "God is
infinite and eternal, and boundless. "
I answer that, All the ancient philosophers attribute infinitude to the
first principle, as is said (Phys. iii), and with reason; for they
considered that things flow forth infinitely from the first principle.
But because some erred concerning the nature of the first principle, as
a consequence they erred also concerning its infinity; forasmuch as
they asserted that matter was the first principle; consequently they
attributed to the first principle a material infinity to the effect
that some infinite body was the first principle of things.
We must consider therefore that a thing is called infinite because it
is not finite. Now matter is in a way made finite by form, and the form
by matter. Matter indeed is made finite by form, inasmuch as matter,
before it receives its form, is in potentiality to many forms; but on
receiving a form, it is terminated by that one. Again, form is made
finite by matter, inasmuch as form, considered in itself, is common to
many; but when received in matter, the form is determined to this one
particular thing. Now matter is perfected by the form by which it is
made finite; therefore infinite as attributed to matter, has the nature
of something imperfect; for it is as it were formless matter. On the
other hand, form is not made perfect by matter, but rather is
contracted by matter; and hence the infinite, regarded on the part of
the form not determined by matter, has the nature of something perfect.
Now being is the most formal of all things, as appears from what is
shown above ([36]Q[4], A[1], OBJ[3]). Since therefore the divine being
is not a being received in anything, but He is His own subsistent being
as was shown above ([37]Q[3], A[4]), it is clear that God Himself is
infinite and perfect.
From this appears the Reply to the First Objection.
Reply to Objection 2: Quantity is terminated by its form, which can be
seen in the fact that a figure which consists in quantity terminated,
is a kind of quantitative form. Hence the infinite of quantity is the
infinite of matter; such a kind of infinite cannot be attributed to
God; as was said above, in this article.
Reply to Objection 3: The fact that the being of God is
self-subsisting, not received in any other, and is thus called
infinite, shows Him to be distinguished from all other beings, and all
others to be apart from Him. Even so, were there such a thing as a
self-subsisting whiteness, the very fact that it did not exist in
anything else, would make it distinct from every other whiteness
existing in a subject.
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Whether anything but God can be essentially infinite?
Objection 1: It seems that something else besides God can be
essentially infinite. For the power of anything is proportioned to its
essence. Now if the essence of God is infinite, His power must also be
infinite. Therefore He can produce an infinite effect, since the extent
of a power is known by its effect.
Objection 2: Further, whatever has infinite power, has an infinite
essence. Now the created intellect has an infinite power; for it
apprehends the universal, which can extend itself to an infinitude of
singular things. Therefore every created intellectual substance is
infinite.
Objection 3: Further, primary matter is something other than God, as
was shown above ([38]Q[3], A[8]). But primary matter is infinite.
Therefore something besides God can be infinite.
On the contrary, The infinite cannot have a beginning, as said in Phys.
iii. But everything outside God is from God as from its first
principle. Therefore besides God nothing can be infinite.
I answer that, Things other than God can be relatively infinite, but
not absolutely infinite. For with regard to infinite as applied to
matter, it is manifest that everything actually existing possesses a
form; and thus its matter is determined by form. But because matter,
considered as existing under some substantial form, remains in
potentiality to many accidental forms, which is absolutely finite can
be relatively infinite; as, for example, wood is finite according to
its own form, but still it is relatively infinite, inasmuch as it is in
potentiality to an infinite number of shapes. But if we speak of the
infinite in reference to form, it is manifest that those things, the
forms of which are in matter, are absolutely finite, and in no way
infinite. If, however, any created forms are not received into matter,
but are self-subsisting, as some think is the case with angels, these
will be relatively infinite, inasmuch as such kinds of forms are not
terminated, nor contracted by any matter. But because a created form
thus subsisting has being, and yet is not its own being, it follows
that its being is received and contracted to a determinate nature.
Hence it cannot be absolutely infinite.
Reply to Objection 1: It is against the nature of a made thing for its
essence to be its existence; because subsisting being is not a created
being; hence it is against the nature of a made thing to be absolutely
infinite. Therefore, as God, although He has infinite power, cannot
make a thing to be not made (for this would imply that two
contradictories are true at the same time), so likewise He cannot make
anything to be absolutely infinite.
Reply to Objection 2: The fact that the power of the intellect extends
itself in a way to infinite things, is because the intellect is a form
not in matter, but either wholly separated from matter, as is the
angelic substance, or at least an intellectual power, which is not the
act of any organ, in the intellectual soul joined to a body.
Reply to Objection 3: Primary matter does not exist by itself in
nature, since it is not actually being, but potentially only; hence it
is something concreated rather than created. Nevertheless, primary
matter even as a potentiality is not absolutely infinite, but
relatively, because its potentiality extends only to natural forms.
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Whether an actually infinite magnitude can exist?
Objection 1: It seems that there can be something actually infinite in
magnitude. For in mathematics there is no error, since "there is no lie
in things abstract," as the Philosopher says (Phys. ii). But
mathematics uses the infinite in magnitude; thus, the geometrician in
his demonstrations says, "Let this line be infinite. " Therefore it is
not impossible for a thing to be infinite in magnitude.
Objection 2: Further, what is not against the nature of anything, can
agree with it. Now to be infinite is not against the nature of
magnitude; but rather both the finite and the infinite seem to be
properties of quantity. Therefore it is not impossible for some
magnitude to be infinite.
Objection 3: Further, magnitude is infinitely divisible, for the
continuous is defined that which is infinitely divisible, as is clear
from Phys. iii. But contraries are concerned about one and the same
thing. Since therefore addition is opposed to division, and increase
opposed to diminution, it appears that magnitude can be increased to
infinity. Therefore it is possible for magnitude to be infinite.
Objection 4: Further, movement and time have quantity and continuity
derived from the magnitude over which movement passes, as is said in
Phys. iv. But it is not against the nature of time and movement to be
infinite, since every determinate indivisible in time and circular
movement is both a beginning and an end. Therefore neither is it
against the nature of magnitude to be infinite.
On the contrary, Every body has a surface. But every body which has a
surface is finite; because surface is the term of a finite body.
Therefore all bodies are finite. The same applies both to surface and
to a line. Therefore nothing is infinite in magnitude.
I answer that, It is one thing to be infinite in essence, and another
to be infinite in magnitude. For granted that a body exists infinite in
magnitude, as fire or air, yet this could not be infinite in essence,
because its essence would be terminated in a species by its form, and
confined to individuality by matter. And so assuming from these
premises that no creature is infinite in essence, it still remains to
inquire whether any creature can be infinite in magnitude.
We must therefore observe that a body, which is a complete magnitude,
can be considered in two ways; mathematically, in respect to its
quantity only; and naturally, as regards its matter and form.
Now it is manifest that a natural body cannot be actually infinite. For
every natural body has some determined substantial form. Since
therefore the accidents follow upon the substantial form, it is
necessary that determinate accidents should follow upon a determinate
form; and among these accidents is quantity. So every natural body has
a greater or smaller determinate quantity. Hence it is impossible for a
natural body to be infinite. The same appears from movement; because
every natural body has some natural movement; whereas an infinite body
could not have any natural movement; neither direct, because nothing
moves naturally by a direct movement unless it is out of its place; and
this could not happen to an infinite body, for it would occupy every
place, and thus every place would be indifferently its own place.
Neither could it move circularly; forasmuch as circular motion requires
that one part of the body is necessarily transferred to a place
occupied by another part, and this could not happen as regards an
infinite circular body: for if two lines be drawn from the centre, the
farther they extend from the centre, the farther they are from each
other; therefore, if a body were infinite, the lines would be
infinitely distant from each other; and thus one could never occupy the
place belonging to any other.
The same applies to a mathematical body. For if we imagine a
mathematical body actually existing, we must imagine it under some
form, because nothing is actual except by its form; hence, since the
form of quantity as such is figure, such a body must have some figure,
and so would be finite; for figure is confined by a term or boundary.
Reply to Objection 1: A geometrician does not need to assume a line
actually infinite, but takes some actually finite line, from which he
subtracts whatever he finds necessary; which line he calls infinite.
Reply to Objection 2: Although the infinite is not against the nature
of magnitude in general, still it is against the nature of any species
of it; thus, for instance, it is against the nature of a bicubical or
tricubical magnitude, whether circular or triangular, and so on. Now
what is not possible in any species cannot exist in the genus; hence
there cannot be any infinite magnitude, since no species of magnitude
is infinite.
Reply to Objection 3: The infinite in quantity, as was shown above,
belongs to matter. Now by division of the whole we approach to matter,
forasmuch as parts have the aspect of matter; but by addition we
approach to the whole which has the aspect of a form. Therefore the
infinite is not in the addition of magnitude, but only in division.
Reply to Objection 4: Movement and time are whole, not actually but
successively; hence they have potentiality mixed with actuality. But
magnitude is an actual whole; therefore the infinite in quantity refers
to matter, and does not agree with the totality of magnitude; yet it
agrees with the totality of time and movement: for it is proper to
matter to be in potentiality.
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Whether an infinite multitude can exist?
Objection 1: It seems that an actually infinite multitude is possible.
For it is not impossible for a potentiality to be made actual. But
number can be multiplied to infinity. Therefore it is possible for an
infinite multitude actually to exist.
Objection 2: Further, it is possible for any individual of any species
to be made actual. But the species of figures are infinite. Therefore
an infinite number of actual figures is possible.
Objection 3: Further, things not opposed to each other do not obstruct
each other. But supposing a multitude of things to exist, there can
still be many others not opposed to them. Therefore it is not
impossible for others also to coexist with them, and so on to
infinitude; therefore an actual infinite number of things is possible.
On the contrary, It is written, "Thou hast ordered all things in
measure, and number, and weight" (Wis. 11:21).
I answer that, A twofold opinion exists on this subject. Some, as
Avicenna and Algazel, said that it was impossible for an actually
infinite multitude to exist absolutely; but that an accidentally
infinite multitude was not impossible. A multitude is said to be
infinite absolutely, when an infinite multitude is necessary that
something may exist. Now this is impossible; because it would entail
something dependent on an infinity for its existence; and hence its
generation could never come to be, because it is impossible to pass
through an infinite medium.
A multitude is said to be accidentally infinite when its existence as
such is not necessary, but accidental. This can be shown, for example,
in the work of a carpenter requiring a certain absolute multitude;
namely, art in the soul, the movement of the hand, and a hammer; and
supposing that such things were infinitely multiplied, the carpentering
work would never be finished, forasmuch as it would depend on an
infinite number of causes. But the multitude of hammers, inasmuch as
one may be broken and another used, is an accidental multitude; for it
happens by accident that many hammers are used, and it matters little
whether one or two, or many are used, or an infinite number, if the
work is carried on for an infinite time. In this way they said that
there can be an accidentally infinite multitude.
This, however, is impossible; since every kind of multitude must belong
to a species of multitude. Now the species of multitude are to be
reckoned by the species of numbers. But no species of number is
infinite; for every number is multitude measured by one. Hence it is
impossible for there to be an actually infinite multitude, either
absolute or accidental. Likewise multitude in nature is created; and
everything created is comprehended under some clear intention of the
Creator; for no agent acts aimlessly. Hence everything created must be
comprehended in a certain number. Therefore it is impossible for an
actually infinite multitude to exist, even accidentally. But a
potentially infinite multitude is possible; because the increase of
multitude follows upon the division of magnitude; since the more a
thing is divided, the greater number of things result. Hence, as the
infinite is to be found potentially in the division of the continuous,
because we thus approach matter, as was shown in the preceding article,
by the same rule, the infinite can be also found potentially in the
addition of multitude.
Reply to Objection 1: Every potentiality is made actual according to
its mode of being; for instance, a day is reduced to act successively,
and not all at once. Likewise the infinite in multitude is reduced to
act successively, and not all at once; because every multitude can be
succeeded by another multitude to infinity.
Reply to Objection 2: Species of figures are infinite by infinitude of
number. Now there are various species of figures, such as trilateral,
quadrilateral and so on; and as an infinitely numerable multitude is
not all at once reduced to act, so neither is the multitude of figures.
Reply to Objection 3: Although the supposition of some things does not
preclude the supposition of others, still the supposition of an
infinite number is opposed to any single species of multitude. Hence it
is not possible for an actually infinite multitude to exist.
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THE EXISTENCE OF GOD IN THINGS (FOUR ARTICLES)
Since it evidently belongs to the infinite to be present everywhere,
and in all things, we now consider whether this belongs to God; and
concerning this there arise four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether God is in all things?
(2) Whether God is everywhere?
(3) Whether God is everywhere by essence, power, and presence?
(4) Whether to be everywhere belongs to God alone?
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Whether God is in all things?
Objection 1: It seems that God is not in all things. For what is above
all things is not in all things. But God is above all, according to the
Psalm (Ps. 112:4), "The Lord is high above all nations," etc. Therefore
God is not in all things.
Objection 2: Further, what is in anything is thereby contained. Now God
is not contained by things, but rather does He contain them. Therefore
God is not in things but things are rather in Him. Hence Augustine says
(Octog. Tri. Quaest. qu. 20), that "in Him things are, rather than He
is in any place. "
Objection 3: Further, the more powerful an agent is, the more extended
is its action. But God is the most powerful of all agents. Therefore
His action can extend to things which are far removed from Him; nor is
it necessary that He should be in all things.
