10) which is
simultaneous
to the deed itself.
Abhidharmakosabhasyam-Vol-2-Vasubandhu-Poussin-Pruden-1991
274a6; Digha, iii.
269.
See also Maim, xiL2-7.
274 Hsiian-tsang adds: "light greed, etc"
275. Madyadhirati, that is to say madyatafanabandhanaalvirati; compare Digha iii. 176. Ddnejyddi (sbyin, mchod sbym); adi refers to snafanodvartanavisama{? )hastapradmadi. Ijya is almost a synonym of ddna; Hsiian-tsang has kung-yang&Mr puja; snapana and udvartana can be acts of
pujd. Mahdvyutpatti (Wogihara ed) 245,378-379 (snapana, utsadana).
276. Priyavacanadi; adi refers to dharmadeiandmdrgakathanddi.
277. All of the following discussion is according to Vtbhdsd, TD 27, p. 635al7.
278. The vijnapti (vocal action) by which I order a killing, panavijnapti, forms part of the preparation (prayoga) of this killing and is not considered as the deed itself. It is not mauli vijnapti, the principal vijnapti. The action of killing of which I am guilty and now endowed with is thus solely avijffapti.
279. Paramartha: "done in person. " Hsiian-tsang: "Six evil deeds are certainly avijhapti; these [six], accomplished in person, and adultery, are of two types. "
280. Hsiian-tsang: "if there is death, etc" The same holds for stealing, etc, as for killing.
281. Abstention from killing is a path of material action. When one undertakes the precepts (samdddnaiUa\ that is to say, the Pratimoksa precepts, there is necessarily vijnapti (the declaration: "I renounce killing"), for these precepts are always "undertaken from another" (parasmddddryate) (iv. 28). When one obtains a Dhyana,--which supposes the abandoning, at least provisionally, of
? the defilements of Kamadhatu and of bad aaions--one acquires the abstention from killing by this very fact, without any vtjfiapti being necessary; the same holds when one obtains the pure precepts (three parts of the Noble Path). This morality does not depend on being undertaken (x<im^iotf); it results from the very nature of things (dharmata): the possessor of a Dhyana possesses the avijUapti which is the abstention from killing.
282. At the moment when the chief or principle action is created, an avijfiapti arises which continues and which is consecutive to this action; furthermore one can, after having committed the action--after having killed the animal--commit actions analogous to this action--hitting the dead animal, cutting his flesh,etc (tasya karmapatbasyaanudharmam anusadfiam karma): each of these actions is consecutive action.
283. The description which follows is according to Vibhdsd) TD 27, p. 583bl2:". . . if, with a mind to kill, he destroys the life of another (prdndtipdta), the evil action of the body (kdyavijOapti) and the avijfiapti of this moment, are the killing properly so-called. . . "
284. Principle action (the killing) is the achievement of the result of the preparatory action; he who prepares the killing (yo hiprayujyate\ but does not produce the killing (maulam karmapatham na janayati), receives the "result of the preparation," but not the achievement, or completion, of this result (tasya prayogaphalam asti na tu phalaparipurih).
285. Vydkhyd: lha kaicit parasvam hartukdmo mancad uttisthati iastram grhndti paragrham gacchatisupto na vetydkarnayati parasvam sprfatiydvan na sthanat pracydvayatitdvatprayogah / yasmm tu ksane sthanat pracydvayati tatra yd vijfiaptis tatkfanikd cdvijfiaptir ayam maulah
karmapathah / dvdbydm hi karandbhydm adattdddndvadyena spfiyate prayogatah phalapafipurtal ca / tatah param avijnaptiksandb pfsfham bhavanti / ydvat tat parasvam vibhajate viknmte gopayaty anuksrtayati vd tdvad asya vijtiaptiksand api pfsfham bhavanti.
286. Maranabhava is defined iiL13c-d
287. Literally: "and that the killing is not destroyed"
=
288. Hsiian-tsang: hsi H^ uparata, nivrtta; Paramartha: wei she wet hsi ;fcj^ %,%
289. Prayogaphala = maulakarman. The pathway of the principal action thus takes place prdnino mrtdvasthdydm.
290. Vydkhyd: Yathd parasvam hartukdmah kdryasiddhaye parakryam hrtvd tena pa/und batim kurydt. . .
291. Samghabhadra (TD 29, p. 576alO) refutes these objections. 292. See Atthasdtim, p, 102.
293. One of the sources of the following definitions is the Karmaprajriapti (Mdo 72) foL 210a; see also Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 605c4.
294. This is the classic example. See the interesting story, Chavannes, Cinq cent contres, iii. 287, and the references.
295. See above note 228. The Karmaprapiapti attributes the killing to the parents to the Brahmanas of the West called mchu-skyed. Mchu gives ostha, tunda or maghd which is a Naksatra: perhaps Maghaja or Maghabhava.
Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 605cl6. There is, in the West, some Mlecchascalled Mu-chia g M who have this opinion, who establish this system: "Those who kill their decrepit and sick fathers and mothers obtain merit and not transgression. Why? A decrepit father has ruined organs and is no bnger capable of drinking and eating; if he dies, he will obtain new and strong organs, he will drink anew warm milk; one who has sickness has many painful sensations: dead, he will be freed from them. Thus he who kills them does not commit any transgression. " Such killing arises from ignorance.
Mu-chia = Maga, or more properly Magu and Muga under the influence of the initial labial [this
Footnotes 735
? 736 Chapter Pom
according to S. Levi]. On the same Mages, see below note 302.
The Mahayana admits that one may kill a person who is going to commit a mortal (dnantarya)
transgression, Siksasamuccaya, p. 168.
296. Compare Jdtaka, Fausboll, vL208,210; Nariman in Revue Histoire des Religions, 1912,189 and JRAS. 1912, 255; J. Charpentier, in the Zeitschrtft fur Indohgie und Iranistick, il p. 145 (Leipzig, 1923), whichcompares theKambojas,pious killers of k%as,patangas, bbekas,termsand makkhikas, to the Zoroastrjans of Vendidad 145-6 and of Herodotus, L140.
297. According to Hsuan-tsang, this is the opinion of certain Ttrthikas; according to Paramartha, the opinion if the Tirthika P'm-na-ko(Vinnaka? ). Hsuan-tsang: "Serpents. . . harm humans; he who kills them produces great merit; sheep. . . are essential to nourishment: killing them is not a transgression. "
On the killing of animals and the use of meat and fish, seel, the Fifth
Asoka; 2. the "pure three," aditfha, asuta, aparisankha, Majjhima, i. 368, Anguttara, iv. 187, Duha, m. foL 28 (apud Rockhill, life, p. 38 note); for fish only, Mahdvagga, vi. 31,14 and Cullavagga, vii. 3. 15 (schism of Devadatta); in Dulva, IV, foL 453, Devadatta reproaches the Buddha for authorizing "pure" meat; Religieux eminents, p. 48, Takakusu, btsmg, p. 46,58, etc The meat of humans, of elephants, etc, isforbidden;3. E W. Hopkins, "The buddhistic rule against meat" JAm. Or. Soc 1906,455-464.
It is forbidden to cut off the leaves of a tree (above iv. 35a-b), to trample down green herbs (tmdm), or to destroy "living beings having an organ" (ekmdrtyajtva). Mahdvagga,ml.
298. Vydkhyd: Anyaldbhasydrthe parasvam harantiyathdfvahdrikdh.
299. The origiiial isfamishedus by th^
which shows the lack of authority of Brahamankal texts. These texts say: na hhnsydt sarvabhMdm, but they order the killing of five hundred and seven animals in the Asvamedha; they say: ndnrtam bruyat,andthenexplainthefivetypesofliestfat arepermitted;thesan*:adatt&ianamanekadha mrosya pafcdd uktam / yady api brdhmano hathena parakryam ddatte balena vd tathspi tasya nadattdddnamyatahsarvamidambramanebhyodattam/ brdhmanandmtudaurbalySdvfsalah paribhufijate / tasmad apaharan brdhmanab svam ddatte / svam eva brdhmano bhunkte svam vaste evam dadatiti. Compare Manu, LlOl (Bhdgavata Purana, All AS). The reading dharbalydt
(Manu: dnrlamsydt) is certain: dmas pa. .
300. Hsuan-tsang: Persians praise abrahmacarya with their mothers, etc
301. Gosava,transcribedbyParamartha(ck'U-so-p'oW^M,translatedbybalan 'bran,"bornof bulls. "
The Vydkhyd has: Tatra mohaprddhdnydd upaiti mdtram abrabmacarydrthe / upasvasdram upaititivartate/ upasvasdramupaitibhagmhnityarthah/ upasagotramupaitisamdnagotrdmity arthah/ upahd(? )yajamdnah. ItisclearthatYasomitradidnotunderstandthisVedktextvery welL
The helpfulness of M. Keith has permitted us to discover Gosava in the Jaimmiya Brdhmano, it 133: tasya vratam / upa mdtaram iydd upa svasdram upa sagotram visfhd vmdet tat tad vitiffhetdnuauho ha lokam/ayati Here we have Vasubandhu's source M. W. Caland consented to explain and to complete the translation that he has given to trm passage Qaimimya in Auswabl, p. 157). ApastambhasrautaxxiLlS: tenesfvdsamvatsarampa/uvrato bhavet / updvahdyodakam. . . ; another Sutra has upanigdhya pibet: M. Caland corrects upanigdhya to updvahdya, "to lower. " Visfha would be "natural need," vifpheta would signify "to spread the legs. " We would thus have: "In whatever place the need grasps him, he satisfies it" The end signifies: "He seizes the world of the bulls. "
This translation is with reference to the Tibetan version. Vidhi-mat qualifies the water, one cannot translate "the ritual water. " Better to understand this as "he who has undertaken the rite drinks the water . . . "
? Hsiian-tsang: "Women and men undertake the vow of bulls (govrata); they sip water; they cut grass with their teeth; they either stay in one place, or they go about; without distinguishing who is their parent or who is distant from them, as they encounter them, they unite with them. "
Paramartha: "Furthermore, as in the Gosava sacrifke,the other women sip water, chew grass; men go about, taking their parent, or taking their daughter, aunt, elder or younger daughters, women of the same dan, etc"
302. This is the opinion of the Tirthika Fin-na-ko (Paramartha). Hsiian-tsang adds: "a ladder, a road, or a ship".
According to Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 606al6: "In the West, there are some Mlecchas called Mu-chia who have this opinion, who establish this system that there is no transgression in having intercourse. . . Why? Because their women are like dried beef. . . "
Compare Dkydvaddna, p. 257 (xviii story of Dharmaruci): panthdsamo matrgrdmal? . . . ththasamo 'pi ca matrgrdmah / yatrawa hi tirthe pita sndti putro'pi tasmm sndti . . . api ca pratyantesujanapatesudharntatahaisdydtoevapitadM . .
303. Thisisthestanza:nanarmayuktamvacanamhinasti. . . SyddvddamaHjari,p. 32;Mbh. 182. 16, etc;compareGautama,v. 24;Vasispbasmfti,xvL30. MaxMuller,India,Whatcanit. . . p. 272:venial untruths.
304. Ndndvdsa (translated literally by the Lotsava, gnas sna tshogs and by Paramartha, pu kung chuA^Q. , translated by Hsiian-tsang *schieh-t'anl$M "precept alter," which is elsewhere the equivalent of simd) see iv. 39b) is explained in the Vydkhyd: Ndndvdsam praviiatUi man^alam pravifat&yarthak/ ndndvdsahitasmmmahdsmtdmanaalebhavanti
305. For the Sanskrit sources, A Fragment of the Sanskrit Vinaya; Bhiksumkarrnavdcana, Bulletin of the School of Oriental Studies, Liii (1920). For the Pali sources, see for example K. Seidenstucker, Pali Buddhismus (German Pali Society); Kern, Manual, p. 78.
One should understand that preparatory action lasts up to the last moment of the third
karmavdcana.
306. Paramartha translates: "Until the moment when one says thefourniirayas (Ok), all vqhapti and avijnapti dependent (##0 on this principal action,--as long as the series is not cut off,--is consecutive action. " Hsiian-tsang is also obscure: chih^(ydvat) shuoWliaroc) ssu-iVBlfc(catvdro nUraydh) chilk(ca)yu i? ifesa, anya) i$L(nifraya) ch'ien fij (prddurbhavanti ? ).
Vydkhyd: Catvdro nifraydf cwarapinaapdtas'ayyasamgldtktpratyayabhaq
307. Note of Saeki: A parkydga thought is a tatksanasamutthdna cause (iv.
10) which is simultaneous to the deed itself.
Parkydga, yons-su 'dorba, translated by Hsiian-tsang as mu-so-ku$$f\W^ "not to regard, to neglect," is a euphemism for "to destroy, kilL" See below note 313. Compare Atthasdlim, p. 91: gabbham. . . pdpakenamanasdnupekkhakohoti,"tonotbeindifferentwithregardtotheembryo" that is, "to desire its destructioa"
:
"Mind of violence," parusadtta; Paramartha: she {&, rough, harsh, uneven, karkafa; Hsiian-
tsang: ts'uM (auddrika) as in pdrusya. 308. Adbisfhdna - adhikarana, visaya.
Atthasdlim, p. 101.
309. Vydkhyd: Ndmakdyddhisfhdnd mfsavddddayo vdg ndmnipravartata hi kftvd See Vyakhydad
iii. 30c-d
310. See p. 643.
311. This refers to the principal action itself.
312. Paramartha: "If a person has the intention 1 shall kill so-and-so'; and if, with respect to such a one, there is the notion of 'such a one'; and if he kills such a one and not another by error, then by
Footnotes 1^1
? 738 Chapter Four
reason of these three factors the killing is the action itself. "
Samcintya = samcicca, Mahavyutpatti, 245. 68; P? r. iii. Karmaprajttapti, Mdo 62, chap. xi.
Buddhaghosa, AtthasdUm, p. 97 (=SumangalavUasint, p. 69); Sp. Hardy, Manual, p. 478; Bigandet (1914), ii. 195. Five things are necessary for killing: papa, panasa&itita, vadhakacUta, upakkama, and marana. The killing itself can be sahatthika, anattika, nissaggika, thdvara, vijjamaya, and iddhimaya. (See the translation of Maung Tin and Mrs. Rhys Davids, Expositor, 129: vijjd = art, iddhi = potency).
313. Hsuan-tsang: 'There is killing even when there is doubt: a person, with respect to the object that he desires to kill, is in doubt: I s this a living being or not? And, if it is living, is it such a one or another? ' then he makes the decision: 'Whether this is one or the other, I shall kill him': by reason of this parUyaga thought, if he kills a living being, he commits the action. " Paramartha: " . . . by reason of these three factors, there is the action (above, note 312). If this is the case,then a person can be in doubt and kill (=commit the transgression of murder): 'Is this a living being or not? Is this such a one or not? ' This person, with respect to the object to be killed, is determined to kill: 'Whether this be one or the other, I shall kill him. ' There is thus production of a parUyaga thought. If he kills, he obtains the transgression of killing. "
The Tibetan gives us: "There is only a parUyaga thought" or better: "He has indeed a parUyaga thought"
We do not see bow parUyaga differs from marana.
314. The skandhas are momentary, that is, perish in and of themselves (svarasena vinafvara). How
cantheirdestructionbecausedbyanexternalcause? (Seeiitrans,p. 244,and ivlb. )
315. Prdna depends on the mind since it does not exist among persons who have entered into the two absorptions of unconsciousness (iL42).
AtthasdUm, p. 97: prana = sattatJivUendrtya.
316. An objection may be formulated against the first definition that there is no as*vasapraivasa during the first four periods of embryonic life. Thus killing an embryo during this period will not be an aaion in and of itself. Hui-hui quotes the Wu-fen chieh-pen (a Maru&saka Pratimoksa, TD 22, number 1422) which makes the embryo up to the forty-ninth day the manusyavigraha of Pirijika iii (See Pratimoksa of the Sarvdstivddms by Finot-Huber, JAs. 1913, ii. 477, and Bhiksum- karmavacana, p. 138).
317. In fact, there is no living being, prSmn, that can be called dead.
318. VySkhya: Pudgalaprastisedhaprakarane. This refers to the last chapter of the Ko/a. (The passage referred to by Vasubandhu is translated by Stcherbatski, The soul theory ofthe Buddhists, p. 853; Hsiian-tsang's translation, TD 29, p. 152b. )
319. Quoted ad ii45a (trans, p. 233) and ciil3c
320. Milmda pp. 84,158; Kathavatthu, xx. 1. Sutrdkrtdnga,u. 6,26 (Sacred Books, 45, p. 414), also ii. 2
(five types of killing). See above note 3. Nirgrantha = nagnafaka.
321. The Tibetan adds: "In the same way the sufferings of illness and the herbs which cause death are guilty" (? ? nadpalagnodpadanfibanasmanparnams. ReacUr^dcHirxful). Not in the Chinese translations.
322. AtthasaHni, p. 97-98. Mahavyutpatti, 281. 28-33: adattasya paflcamasakadeh steyacUtena manusyagatiparigxhUasyatatsamjh^ahara^ Bhiksunskarmaifdcana, p. 137-8
. . . antatah phalatusam api paraktyam nadatavyam kah punar vadah paficamasikam uttara- partcamasikam va. . .
325. Vyakhya:Nanyatrasamjfidvibhramat/yadi devadattadravyamharamUiyajnadattadravyam harati nadattadanam Uy abhtprayaJb. Correct: anyatra samjffavibbramat. Compare p. 76, line 12, anyatrajHSnM; p. 65, line 4, anyatra gldnyat; Para. 4, anyatrShimdanat, etc
? 324. See iv. 121, a different doctrine.
325. Opinion of the second masters of Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 585a7; an erroneous opinion, for, as they admit, the guardians of a Stupa would not steal what belongs to the Stupa.
326. Vydkhyd: Pofwartakam mrtasya bbiksoi cwarddidravyam {parwatteU, "to exchange," CuUavagga, vi. 19? ). According to the Tibetan, to take the goods of a dead person (ft ba'i norphrogs fla);according toParamarthaandHsiian-tsang,totakethegoodsoiabui-cb'uan W? 4 ,thatis,of a pratikranta (Mabavyutpatti, 130. 17).
327. The Sangha of the parish, Hsiian-tsang: chieh-nei seng # fa fH"; Paramartha: chih pu kung chu jen^^^^EA- ndndvdsagatdb; Tibetan: 'tshams kyi nan du gtogs pa mams - antahstmd- patydpanndb.
328. AtthasaUm, p. 98. According to the Mahayana (Le. , the YogScSra) quoted by Saeki, there are six prohibitions: 1. avisaya, agamya: males, and women such as one's mother, etc; 2. amdrga ananga: only the yommdrga; 3. asamaya: when the woman is having her period (hm-hsia H T ), is pregnant, is nursing a baby, has undertaken the Upavasa, or is sick; 4. asthana; 5. "without measure," manam atikramya gaccbati; and 6. ayoga: "not conforming to the rules of the world. "
329. Hsiian-tsang adds: " . . . and the rest to: protected by the king. " See the classic list MabSvyutpatti, 281. 251 (pitrraksitd, etc).
330. Mabavyutpatti, 281. 26-27: pravispah sparfasvtkftau / prasrdvakarane prasrdvakaranasya mukhe varcomdrge vd. Compare Siksasamuccaya, p. 76: evam svastrisv apy ayonimdrgena gacchatab;Suttavibhanga,i. 9. 3:angajdtenavaccamaggam. . . passdvamaggam. . . mukham. . .
331. Saeki glosses the ? W-fl&'*Mlll(distant place, etc) of Hsiian-tsang by a-lien-jo j|gl$f aranya; Paramartha: "place where one cultivates brahmacarya. " "Open place" is doubtless abhyavakdia.
332. Vydkhyd: Garbhmigamane garbboparodhah / dpyayanti (? see iv. 103) stanyopabhogdvastha- putrikd stri/ abrahmacarye hi tasydh stanyam ksiyate / bdlakasya vdpuspaye tatstonyam bhavati.
333. = posadhikd, iv. 28 = sdrakkhd of Atthasdlini, p. 98. Hsiian-tsang: "When the woman has undertaken the upavasa. " Siksasamuccaya, p. 76: evam upavdsastbdsu . . . See the Sanskrit commentary on the Uvdsagadasdo, e d Hoernle, p. 11, on the laws of marriage among the Jains.
334. Hsiian-tsang adds: "And vice versa. The same if one were to be mistaken with respect to the path, the time, etc"
335. Vydkhyd: Anyasmm vastuni prayogo'bhipreto'nyac ca vastu prihhuktam.
336. The version of Paramartha: "Lying is saying this discourse with another mind in order to
explain the meaning" (although in the karika we have: "indeed lying to another. . . ").
337. Hsiian-tsang: To which time period does the expression "who understands the sense" (arthdbhyfid*) refer to? Should we understand "he who understands at the present time [through manovijtidna] what he has heard? " Or should we understand: "he who is capable of presently understanding what he has presently heard [through the smtravynana]? " What consequences do these two solutions lead to? In the first hypothesis, the sense of the discourse, the object of mental consciousness and vocal vijfiapti [which the hearer misunderstands], would disappear at the same time as the auditive consciousness [which is mistaken], and the action will only be avij&apti [since the mental consciousness has not yet arisen]. In the second hypothesis, this objection does not hold, but as he does not understand the sense, how, at the moment when he understands, can he be said to be "capable of understanding? " The best explanation is that "he who is capable of understanding" is one in whom there are no causes of confusion, and in whom the auditive consciousness has already arisen. One should explain the text in a manner that does not lead to objections.
338. Dirgha, TD 1, p. 50b27; Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 86ib20; Anguttara, ii. 246, iv.
275. Madyadhirati, that is to say madyatafanabandhanaalvirati; compare Digha iii. 176. Ddnejyddi (sbyin, mchod sbym); adi refers to snafanodvartanavisama{? )hastapradmadi. Ijya is almost a synonym of ddna; Hsiian-tsang has kung-yang&Mr puja; snapana and udvartana can be acts of
pujd. Mahdvyutpatti (Wogihara ed) 245,378-379 (snapana, utsadana).
276. Priyavacanadi; adi refers to dharmadeiandmdrgakathanddi.
277. All of the following discussion is according to Vtbhdsd, TD 27, p. 635al7.
278. The vijnapti (vocal action) by which I order a killing, panavijnapti, forms part of the preparation (prayoga) of this killing and is not considered as the deed itself. It is not mauli vijnapti, the principal vijnapti. The action of killing of which I am guilty and now endowed with is thus solely avijffapti.
279. Paramartha: "done in person. " Hsiian-tsang: "Six evil deeds are certainly avijhapti; these [six], accomplished in person, and adultery, are of two types. "
280. Hsiian-tsang: "if there is death, etc" The same holds for stealing, etc, as for killing.
281. Abstention from killing is a path of material action. When one undertakes the precepts (samdddnaiUa\ that is to say, the Pratimoksa precepts, there is necessarily vijnapti (the declaration: "I renounce killing"), for these precepts are always "undertaken from another" (parasmddddryate) (iv. 28). When one obtains a Dhyana,--which supposes the abandoning, at least provisionally, of
? the defilements of Kamadhatu and of bad aaions--one acquires the abstention from killing by this very fact, without any vtjfiapti being necessary; the same holds when one obtains the pure precepts (three parts of the Noble Path). This morality does not depend on being undertaken (x<im^iotf); it results from the very nature of things (dharmata): the possessor of a Dhyana possesses the avijUapti which is the abstention from killing.
282. At the moment when the chief or principle action is created, an avijfiapti arises which continues and which is consecutive to this action; furthermore one can, after having committed the action--after having killed the animal--commit actions analogous to this action--hitting the dead animal, cutting his flesh,etc (tasya karmapatbasyaanudharmam anusadfiam karma): each of these actions is consecutive action.
283. The description which follows is according to Vibhdsd) TD 27, p. 583bl2:". . . if, with a mind to kill, he destroys the life of another (prdndtipdta), the evil action of the body (kdyavijOapti) and the avijfiapti of this moment, are the killing properly so-called. . . "
284. Principle action (the killing) is the achievement of the result of the preparatory action; he who prepares the killing (yo hiprayujyate\ but does not produce the killing (maulam karmapatham na janayati), receives the "result of the preparation," but not the achievement, or completion, of this result (tasya prayogaphalam asti na tu phalaparipurih).
285. Vydkhyd: lha kaicit parasvam hartukdmo mancad uttisthati iastram grhndti paragrham gacchatisupto na vetydkarnayati parasvam sprfatiydvan na sthanat pracydvayatitdvatprayogah / yasmm tu ksane sthanat pracydvayati tatra yd vijfiaptis tatkfanikd cdvijfiaptir ayam maulah
karmapathah / dvdbydm hi karandbhydm adattdddndvadyena spfiyate prayogatah phalapafipurtal ca / tatah param avijnaptiksandb pfsfham bhavanti / ydvat tat parasvam vibhajate viknmte gopayaty anuksrtayati vd tdvad asya vijtiaptiksand api pfsfham bhavanti.
286. Maranabhava is defined iiL13c-d
287. Literally: "and that the killing is not destroyed"
=
288. Hsiian-tsang: hsi H^ uparata, nivrtta; Paramartha: wei she wet hsi ;fcj^ %,%
289. Prayogaphala = maulakarman. The pathway of the principal action thus takes place prdnino mrtdvasthdydm.
290. Vydkhyd: Yathd parasvam hartukdmah kdryasiddhaye parakryam hrtvd tena pa/und batim kurydt. . .
291. Samghabhadra (TD 29, p. 576alO) refutes these objections. 292. See Atthasdtim, p, 102.
293. One of the sources of the following definitions is the Karmaprajriapti (Mdo 72) foL 210a; see also Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 605c4.
294. This is the classic example. See the interesting story, Chavannes, Cinq cent contres, iii. 287, and the references.
295. See above note 228. The Karmaprapiapti attributes the killing to the parents to the Brahmanas of the West called mchu-skyed. Mchu gives ostha, tunda or maghd which is a Naksatra: perhaps Maghaja or Maghabhava.
Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 605cl6. There is, in the West, some Mlecchascalled Mu-chia g M who have this opinion, who establish this system: "Those who kill their decrepit and sick fathers and mothers obtain merit and not transgression. Why? A decrepit father has ruined organs and is no bnger capable of drinking and eating; if he dies, he will obtain new and strong organs, he will drink anew warm milk; one who has sickness has many painful sensations: dead, he will be freed from them. Thus he who kills them does not commit any transgression. " Such killing arises from ignorance.
Mu-chia = Maga, or more properly Magu and Muga under the influence of the initial labial [this
Footnotes 735
? 736 Chapter Pom
according to S. Levi]. On the same Mages, see below note 302.
The Mahayana admits that one may kill a person who is going to commit a mortal (dnantarya)
transgression, Siksasamuccaya, p. 168.
296. Compare Jdtaka, Fausboll, vL208,210; Nariman in Revue Histoire des Religions, 1912,189 and JRAS. 1912, 255; J. Charpentier, in the Zeitschrtft fur Indohgie und Iranistick, il p. 145 (Leipzig, 1923), whichcompares theKambojas,pious killers of k%as,patangas, bbekas,termsand makkhikas, to the Zoroastrjans of Vendidad 145-6 and of Herodotus, L140.
297. According to Hsuan-tsang, this is the opinion of certain Ttrthikas; according to Paramartha, the opinion if the Tirthika P'm-na-ko(Vinnaka? ). Hsuan-tsang: "Serpents. . . harm humans; he who kills them produces great merit; sheep. . . are essential to nourishment: killing them is not a transgression. "
On the killing of animals and the use of meat and fish, seel, the Fifth
Asoka; 2. the "pure three," aditfha, asuta, aparisankha, Majjhima, i. 368, Anguttara, iv. 187, Duha, m. foL 28 (apud Rockhill, life, p. 38 note); for fish only, Mahdvagga, vi. 31,14 and Cullavagga, vii. 3. 15 (schism of Devadatta); in Dulva, IV, foL 453, Devadatta reproaches the Buddha for authorizing "pure" meat; Religieux eminents, p. 48, Takakusu, btsmg, p. 46,58, etc The meat of humans, of elephants, etc, isforbidden;3. E W. Hopkins, "The buddhistic rule against meat" JAm. Or. Soc 1906,455-464.
It is forbidden to cut off the leaves of a tree (above iv. 35a-b), to trample down green herbs (tmdm), or to destroy "living beings having an organ" (ekmdrtyajtva). Mahdvagga,ml.
298. Vydkhyd: Anyaldbhasydrthe parasvam harantiyathdfvahdrikdh.
299. The origiiial isfamishedus by th^
which shows the lack of authority of Brahamankal texts. These texts say: na hhnsydt sarvabhMdm, but they order the killing of five hundred and seven animals in the Asvamedha; they say: ndnrtam bruyat,andthenexplainthefivetypesofliestfat arepermitted;thesan*:adatt&ianamanekadha mrosya pafcdd uktam / yady api brdhmano hathena parakryam ddatte balena vd tathspi tasya nadattdddnamyatahsarvamidambramanebhyodattam/ brdhmanandmtudaurbalySdvfsalah paribhufijate / tasmad apaharan brdhmanab svam ddatte / svam eva brdhmano bhunkte svam vaste evam dadatiti. Compare Manu, LlOl (Bhdgavata Purana, All AS). The reading dharbalydt
(Manu: dnrlamsydt) is certain: dmas pa. .
300. Hsuan-tsang: Persians praise abrahmacarya with their mothers, etc
301. Gosava,transcribedbyParamartha(ck'U-so-p'oW^M,translatedbybalan 'bran,"bornof bulls. "
The Vydkhyd has: Tatra mohaprddhdnydd upaiti mdtram abrabmacarydrthe / upasvasdram upaititivartate/ upasvasdramupaitibhagmhnityarthah/ upasagotramupaitisamdnagotrdmity arthah/ upahd(? )yajamdnah. ItisclearthatYasomitradidnotunderstandthisVedktextvery welL
The helpfulness of M. Keith has permitted us to discover Gosava in the Jaimmiya Brdhmano, it 133: tasya vratam / upa mdtaram iydd upa svasdram upa sagotram visfhd vmdet tat tad vitiffhetdnuauho ha lokam/ayati Here we have Vasubandhu's source M. W. Caland consented to explain and to complete the translation that he has given to trm passage Qaimimya in Auswabl, p. 157). ApastambhasrautaxxiLlS: tenesfvdsamvatsarampa/uvrato bhavet / updvahdyodakam. . . ; another Sutra has upanigdhya pibet: M. Caland corrects upanigdhya to updvahdya, "to lower. " Visfha would be "natural need," vifpheta would signify "to spread the legs. " We would thus have: "In whatever place the need grasps him, he satisfies it" The end signifies: "He seizes the world of the bulls. "
This translation is with reference to the Tibetan version. Vidhi-mat qualifies the water, one cannot translate "the ritual water. " Better to understand this as "he who has undertaken the rite drinks the water . . . "
? Hsiian-tsang: "Women and men undertake the vow of bulls (govrata); they sip water; they cut grass with their teeth; they either stay in one place, or they go about; without distinguishing who is their parent or who is distant from them, as they encounter them, they unite with them. "
Paramartha: "Furthermore, as in the Gosava sacrifke,the other women sip water, chew grass; men go about, taking their parent, or taking their daughter, aunt, elder or younger daughters, women of the same dan, etc"
302. This is the opinion of the Tirthika Fin-na-ko (Paramartha). Hsiian-tsang adds: "a ladder, a road, or a ship".
According to Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 606al6: "In the West, there are some Mlecchas called Mu-chia who have this opinion, who establish this system that there is no transgression in having intercourse. . . Why? Because their women are like dried beef. . . "
Compare Dkydvaddna, p. 257 (xviii story of Dharmaruci): panthdsamo matrgrdmal? . . . ththasamo 'pi ca matrgrdmah / yatrawa hi tirthe pita sndti putro'pi tasmm sndti . . . api ca pratyantesujanapatesudharntatahaisdydtoevapitadM . .
303. Thisisthestanza:nanarmayuktamvacanamhinasti. . . SyddvddamaHjari,p. 32;Mbh. 182. 16, etc;compareGautama,v. 24;Vasispbasmfti,xvL30. MaxMuller,India,Whatcanit. . . p. 272:venial untruths.
304. Ndndvdsa (translated literally by the Lotsava, gnas sna tshogs and by Paramartha, pu kung chuA^Q. , translated by Hsiian-tsang *schieh-t'anl$M "precept alter," which is elsewhere the equivalent of simd) see iv. 39b) is explained in the Vydkhyd: Ndndvdsam praviiatUi man^alam pravifat&yarthak/ ndndvdsahitasmmmahdsmtdmanaalebhavanti
305. For the Sanskrit sources, A Fragment of the Sanskrit Vinaya; Bhiksumkarrnavdcana, Bulletin of the School of Oriental Studies, Liii (1920). For the Pali sources, see for example K. Seidenstucker, Pali Buddhismus (German Pali Society); Kern, Manual, p. 78.
One should understand that preparatory action lasts up to the last moment of the third
karmavdcana.
306. Paramartha translates: "Until the moment when one says thefourniirayas (Ok), all vqhapti and avijnapti dependent (##0 on this principal action,--as long as the series is not cut off,--is consecutive action. " Hsiian-tsang is also obscure: chih^(ydvat) shuoWliaroc) ssu-iVBlfc(catvdro nUraydh) chilk(ca)yu i? ifesa, anya) i$L(nifraya) ch'ien fij (prddurbhavanti ? ).
Vydkhyd: Catvdro nifraydf cwarapinaapdtas'ayyasamgldtktpratyayabhaq
307. Note of Saeki: A parkydga thought is a tatksanasamutthdna cause (iv.
10) which is simultaneous to the deed itself.
Parkydga, yons-su 'dorba, translated by Hsiian-tsang as mu-so-ku$$f\W^ "not to regard, to neglect," is a euphemism for "to destroy, kilL" See below note 313. Compare Atthasdlim, p. 91: gabbham. . . pdpakenamanasdnupekkhakohoti,"tonotbeindifferentwithregardtotheembryo" that is, "to desire its destructioa"
:
"Mind of violence," parusadtta; Paramartha: she {&, rough, harsh, uneven, karkafa; Hsiian-
tsang: ts'uM (auddrika) as in pdrusya. 308. Adbisfhdna - adhikarana, visaya.
Atthasdlim, p. 101.
309. Vydkhyd: Ndmakdyddhisfhdnd mfsavddddayo vdg ndmnipravartata hi kftvd See Vyakhydad
iii. 30c-d
310. See p. 643.
311. This refers to the principal action itself.
312. Paramartha: "If a person has the intention 1 shall kill so-and-so'; and if, with respect to such a one, there is the notion of 'such a one'; and if he kills such a one and not another by error, then by
Footnotes 1^1
? 738 Chapter Four
reason of these three factors the killing is the action itself. "
Samcintya = samcicca, Mahavyutpatti, 245. 68; P? r. iii. Karmaprajttapti, Mdo 62, chap. xi.
Buddhaghosa, AtthasdUm, p. 97 (=SumangalavUasint, p. 69); Sp. Hardy, Manual, p. 478; Bigandet (1914), ii. 195. Five things are necessary for killing: papa, panasa&itita, vadhakacUta, upakkama, and marana. The killing itself can be sahatthika, anattika, nissaggika, thdvara, vijjamaya, and iddhimaya. (See the translation of Maung Tin and Mrs. Rhys Davids, Expositor, 129: vijjd = art, iddhi = potency).
313. Hsuan-tsang: 'There is killing even when there is doubt: a person, with respect to the object that he desires to kill, is in doubt: I s this a living being or not? And, if it is living, is it such a one or another? ' then he makes the decision: 'Whether this is one or the other, I shall kill him': by reason of this parUyaga thought, if he kills a living being, he commits the action. " Paramartha: " . . . by reason of these three factors, there is the action (above, note 312). If this is the case,then a person can be in doubt and kill (=commit the transgression of murder): 'Is this a living being or not? Is this such a one or not? ' This person, with respect to the object to be killed, is determined to kill: 'Whether this be one or the other, I shall kill him. ' There is thus production of a parUyaga thought. If he kills, he obtains the transgression of killing. "
The Tibetan gives us: "There is only a parUyaga thought" or better: "He has indeed a parUyaga thought"
We do not see bow parUyaga differs from marana.
314. The skandhas are momentary, that is, perish in and of themselves (svarasena vinafvara). How
cantheirdestructionbecausedbyanexternalcause? (Seeiitrans,p. 244,and ivlb. )
315. Prdna depends on the mind since it does not exist among persons who have entered into the two absorptions of unconsciousness (iL42).
AtthasdUm, p. 97: prana = sattatJivUendrtya.
316. An objection may be formulated against the first definition that there is no as*vasapraivasa during the first four periods of embryonic life. Thus killing an embryo during this period will not be an aaion in and of itself. Hui-hui quotes the Wu-fen chieh-pen (a Maru&saka Pratimoksa, TD 22, number 1422) which makes the embryo up to the forty-ninth day the manusyavigraha of Pirijika iii (See Pratimoksa of the Sarvdstivddms by Finot-Huber, JAs. 1913, ii. 477, and Bhiksum- karmavacana, p. 138).
317. In fact, there is no living being, prSmn, that can be called dead.
318. VySkhya: Pudgalaprastisedhaprakarane. This refers to the last chapter of the Ko/a. (The passage referred to by Vasubandhu is translated by Stcherbatski, The soul theory ofthe Buddhists, p. 853; Hsiian-tsang's translation, TD 29, p. 152b. )
319. Quoted ad ii45a (trans, p. 233) and ciil3c
320. Milmda pp. 84,158; Kathavatthu, xx. 1. Sutrdkrtdnga,u. 6,26 (Sacred Books, 45, p. 414), also ii. 2
(five types of killing). See above note 3. Nirgrantha = nagnafaka.
321. The Tibetan adds: "In the same way the sufferings of illness and the herbs which cause death are guilty" (? ? nadpalagnodpadanfibanasmanparnams. ReacUr^dcHirxful). Not in the Chinese translations.
322. AtthasaHni, p. 97-98. Mahavyutpatti, 281. 28-33: adattasya paflcamasakadeh steyacUtena manusyagatiparigxhUasyatatsamjh^ahara^ Bhiksunskarmaifdcana, p. 137-8
. . . antatah phalatusam api paraktyam nadatavyam kah punar vadah paficamasikam uttara- partcamasikam va. . .
325. Vyakhya:Nanyatrasamjfidvibhramat/yadi devadattadravyamharamUiyajnadattadravyam harati nadattadanam Uy abhtprayaJb. Correct: anyatra samjffavibbramat. Compare p. 76, line 12, anyatrajHSnM; p. 65, line 4, anyatra gldnyat; Para. 4, anyatrShimdanat, etc
? 324. See iv. 121, a different doctrine.
325. Opinion of the second masters of Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 585a7; an erroneous opinion, for, as they admit, the guardians of a Stupa would not steal what belongs to the Stupa.
326. Vydkhyd: Pofwartakam mrtasya bbiksoi cwarddidravyam {parwatteU, "to exchange," CuUavagga, vi. 19? ). According to the Tibetan, to take the goods of a dead person (ft ba'i norphrogs fla);according toParamarthaandHsiian-tsang,totakethegoodsoiabui-cb'uan W? 4 ,thatis,of a pratikranta (Mabavyutpatti, 130. 17).
327. The Sangha of the parish, Hsiian-tsang: chieh-nei seng # fa fH"; Paramartha: chih pu kung chu jen^^^^EA- ndndvdsagatdb; Tibetan: 'tshams kyi nan du gtogs pa mams - antahstmd- patydpanndb.
328. AtthasaUm, p. 98. According to the Mahayana (Le. , the YogScSra) quoted by Saeki, there are six prohibitions: 1. avisaya, agamya: males, and women such as one's mother, etc; 2. amdrga ananga: only the yommdrga; 3. asamaya: when the woman is having her period (hm-hsia H T ), is pregnant, is nursing a baby, has undertaken the Upavasa, or is sick; 4. asthana; 5. "without measure," manam atikramya gaccbati; and 6. ayoga: "not conforming to the rules of the world. "
329. Hsiian-tsang adds: " . . . and the rest to: protected by the king. " See the classic list MabSvyutpatti, 281. 251 (pitrraksitd, etc).
330. Mabavyutpatti, 281. 26-27: pravispah sparfasvtkftau / prasrdvakarane prasrdvakaranasya mukhe varcomdrge vd. Compare Siksasamuccaya, p. 76: evam svastrisv apy ayonimdrgena gacchatab;Suttavibhanga,i. 9. 3:angajdtenavaccamaggam. . . passdvamaggam. . . mukham. . .
331. Saeki glosses the ? W-fl&'*Mlll(distant place, etc) of Hsiian-tsang by a-lien-jo j|gl$f aranya; Paramartha: "place where one cultivates brahmacarya. " "Open place" is doubtless abhyavakdia.
332. Vydkhyd: Garbhmigamane garbboparodhah / dpyayanti (? see iv. 103) stanyopabhogdvastha- putrikd stri/ abrahmacarye hi tasydh stanyam ksiyate / bdlakasya vdpuspaye tatstonyam bhavati.
333. = posadhikd, iv. 28 = sdrakkhd of Atthasdlini, p. 98. Hsiian-tsang: "When the woman has undertaken the upavasa. " Siksasamuccaya, p. 76: evam upavdsastbdsu . . . See the Sanskrit commentary on the Uvdsagadasdo, e d Hoernle, p. 11, on the laws of marriage among the Jains.
334. Hsiian-tsang adds: "And vice versa. The same if one were to be mistaken with respect to the path, the time, etc"
335. Vydkhyd: Anyasmm vastuni prayogo'bhipreto'nyac ca vastu prihhuktam.
336. The version of Paramartha: "Lying is saying this discourse with another mind in order to
explain the meaning" (although in the karika we have: "indeed lying to another. . . ").
337. Hsiian-tsang: To which time period does the expression "who understands the sense" (arthdbhyfid*) refer to? Should we understand "he who understands at the present time [through manovijtidna] what he has heard? " Or should we understand: "he who is capable of presently understanding what he has presently heard [through the smtravynana]? " What consequences do these two solutions lead to? In the first hypothesis, the sense of the discourse, the object of mental consciousness and vocal vijfiapti [which the hearer misunderstands], would disappear at the same time as the auditive consciousness [which is mistaken], and the action will only be avij&apti [since the mental consciousness has not yet arisen]. In the second hypothesis, this objection does not hold, but as he does not understand the sense, how, at the moment when he understands, can he be said to be "capable of understanding? " The best explanation is that "he who is capable of understanding" is one in whom there are no causes of confusion, and in whom the auditive consciousness has already arisen. One should explain the text in a manner that does not lead to objections.
338. Dirgha, TD 1, p. 50b27; Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 86ib20; Anguttara, ii. 246, iv.
