The self, which through its freedom has become conscious of itself, is able to produce a
reciprocating
interaction and, subsequently, a renewed unity with the world.
Hegel_nodrm
P.
Heath.
(Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia), xi-xxxvi.
Wisenman. 1786. An den Herr Professor Kant von den Resultate Williamson, Raymond Keith. 1984. Introduction to Hegel's Philosophy of
Religion (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press).
Wo? lfflin, Heinrich. 1929. Principles of Art History: The Problem of
Development of Style in Later Art (New York: Dover Publications). Zirngiebl, E. 1867. F. H. Jacobis Leben, Dichten und Denken. Vienna:
Braumuller.
APPENDIX
SPECULATION AND REFLECTION: SCHELLING AND HEGEL'S COLLABORATIVE ENTERPRISE IN JENA
Translator's Preface
The problem of how the philosophy of Hegel is systematically and historically related to that of Schelling, i. e. the so-called "Schelling problem," as Pippen calls it in Hegel's Idealism, has been a "confusing and much debated issue. " According to Heine's Die romantische Schule (1835), the elder Schelling was convinced that Hegel stole all his ideas. But even if Schelling's characterization of Hegel as a concept-monger is wildly exaggerated, it is indisputable that Hegel entered the philosophical frenzy at Jena as a partial supporter and perceived disciple of Schelling's system. Nonetheless, even the earliest collaborative efforts during the Jenaer Zeit are - as Harris puts it - "so nearly explicit [in their critique of the Schellingean system] that one wonders how any of Hegel's readers, let alone Schelling himself, could have regarded him a mere disciple. " Indeed, Harris seems to credit Du? sing with having established what might be considered the moderate thesis of the following article when he claims that "careful study of Schelling's writings in this period does show that he learned some things from Hegel. " Indeed, current consensus tends not only to vindicate Hegel of conceptual thievery, it also credits Hegel with a more durable speculative edifice built from materials which Schelling considered unworthy of the philosophical enterprise (namely, common consciousness or reflection). This current consensus is in no small part due to the article translated below, originally published in Hegel-Studien, entitled "Spekulation und Reflexion: Zur Zusammenarbeit Schellings und Hegel in Jena. " Professor Du? sing's 1969 article not only documents the most salient points of systematic disagreement between the Schelling and Hegel's respective systems, whether before or during and after the Jena collaboration, it also sheds light on the problematic that gave rise to the distinctively Hegelian version of dialectic. Although the central theses of
148 Appendix
the following argument were thickened substantially in several of Du? sing's subsequent works (e. g. , "Tranzendentalphilosophie und Spekulation: Der Streit um die Gestalt einer Ersten Philosophie"), the decisive premises of the argument are essentially all here. Whether one agrees with the conclusions that Professor Du? sing draws toward the end of this essay, his sensitive if not also now iconic analysis of the "Schelling problem" is too important to remain untranslated. When possible, in those places where Du? sing cites passages from Schelling's Ideen zu einer Philosophie der Natur, I have used Harris and Heath's excellent translation (1988). And while I concede that this translation is by no means perfect, and that it errs on the side of the literal, I trust that it does provide a serviceable translation of an important if not seminal essay within the secondary literature on Hegel in English.
The Identita? tsphilosophie and, within the scope of this systematic approach, the novel concept of nature occupy a place of central importance in Schelling and Hegel's collaborative enterprise in Jena (1801-03). The design of the Naturphilosophie can be traced back, obviously, at least in general, to Schelling. This has been assumed to be the case, by and large, with the formulation of the Identita? tssystem as well. It would appear that at this stage of his thought Hegel essentially adopted, reorganized, and - above all else - presented systematically the philosophical suggestions made by Schelling. 1 And while an adoption and adaptation of this sort might possibly account for the realm of Naturphilosophie, though certainly not without essential modifications, such a relationship between Schelling and Hegel with regard to the design of the Identita? tsphilosophie is dubious.
It has already been suggested in various ways, or at least hinted at, in the literature that Hegel's critique of Fichte in the Differenz essay was the last nudge or even the decisive ground for Schelling's disassociation from Fichte. 2 Hegel's critique of Fichte, however, presupposes a systematic
1 See, e. g. , Zeltner: Schelling, Stuttgart, 1954, 53 and 46; Fuhrmans: Schellings Philosophie der Weltalter, Duesseldorf, 1954, 43, 165; also see Dilthey (Gesammelte Werke, Bd 4. Hrsg. v. H. Nohl. 198 ff. , 206 ff. ), which is nonetheless a restrained expression. Perhaps Schelling's later critique of Hegel also contributed to this perception of Schelling and Hegel's collaborative enterprise.
2 See, possibly, Michelet: Einleitung in Hegel's philosophische Abhandlungen in Hegel's Werke. Bd 1. Berlin 1832; Haym: Hegel und seine Zeit, Berlin, 1832, VI,
? Hegel: Hovering Over the Corpse of Faith and Reason 149
position developed - at least in its essential features - on his own, i. e. separate from Schelling. It should be shown in what follows how Schelling took up and reinterpreted Hegel's systematic suggestions regarding the conceptual pair: speculation and reflection. This conceptual pair proves to be meaningful for Schelling's own development of a system of absolute identity as well as for his critique of the contemporary philosophy, in particular the philosophy of Fichte; and it is of particular importance to Schelling's revision of the concept of speculation in this phase of his thought.
The transformation of the concept of speculation in Schelling prior to and after his encounter with Hegel in Jena is displayed most clearly by comparing the two editions of Ideen zu einer Philosophie der Natur (1797 and 1803); one such comparison will be provided below in Section I. These changes alone, however, do not sufficiently prove Schelling's adoption of the Hegelian concept of speculation and, its correlate, reflection. Already in the early formulations of the Identita? tssystem, from his Darstellung meines Systems der Philosophie (1801) forward, Schelling spoke of speculation in a manner very similar to that of Hegel. As such, it is particularly important to distinguish in detail what was borrowed and modified in order to characterize properly the meaning of this concept for Schelling's system and critique. This discussion of the relationship between speculation and reflection will ultimately lead to the problem of dialectic; this theme is developed in the Section II below.
I.
In the K. F. A. Schelling edition of Schelling's Werke, the differences between the two editions of the Ideen zu einer Philosophie der Natur is in numerous places not easy to recognize. With regard to the theme of speculation and reflection, one merely finds a global statement: namely, "Here and in the following pages, like those still later in the first edition, 'speculation' replaces 'reflection' and 'to speculate' replaces 'to reflect. '"3 But Schelling made use of several other formulations of his early concept of speculation which were neither evident from that edition nor from the further revisions which he undertook - revisions which were not, at least
145 ff. ; Kroner: Von Kant bis Hegel, 2nd edition, Tu? bingen, 1961, Bd. 2, 111, 124, 142; especially, Braun: Differenzen in Hegel-Studien, 4 (1967), 291ff. , 299.
3 II, 13 ftn. Here and in the following, we display the Roman and Arabic numbers as volume and page respectively.
? 150 Appendix
in part, indicated. The aforementioned modifications are understood most precisely and judged most accurately only when one surveys the second edition alterations alongside the original - paying close attention, of course, to the theme of speculation and reflection. We have also listed here a text within which Schelling most likely adopted, within this systematic context, one of Hegel's quotations from the Timaios. 4
Schelling: Ideen zu einer Philosophie der Natur. 1. Aufl. Leipzig 1797.
Schelling: Ideen zu einer Philosophie der Natur. Als Einleitung in das Studium dieser W issenschaft. 2. Aufl. Landshut 1803.
XII. In this connection two objects have been kept in view, first to set forth for the friends of philosophy, in the supplement to the Introduction and scattered intermittently elsewhere, the position reached through progressive development of the Philosophy of Nature in its relation to speculation in general . . . (7). 5
XVI. The greatest philosophers we always the first to return to it, and Socrates (as Plato relates), after he stood throughout the night sunk in contemplation [Spekulation], prayed in the early morning to the rising sun (10).
XVII. With that separation, reflection first begins . . . (10).
5: With that separation, speculation first begins . . .
XVIII. Mere speculation, therefore, is a spiritual sickness of mankind, and moreover the most dangerous of all, which kills the germ of man's existence and uproots his being. It is a tribulation, which, where it has once become dominant, cannot be dispelled - not by the stimulation of Nature (for what can that do to a dead soul? ), nor by the bustle of life.
4 The publisher of the fourth volume of the new Hegel-edition had already hinted at the Hegelian influence on the changes to Schelling's second edition in their editorial comments and, indeed, with regard to the conceptual pair: reflection and speculation. They see in this a proof that not only did Hegel learn and adopt a great deal from Schelling, but also Schelling from Hegel.
5 Translations of the following passages in Schelling's Ideas for a Philosophy of Nature are provided by Errol E. Harris and Peter Heath (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press), 1988.
? Hegel: Hovering Over the Corpse of Faith and Reason 151
Scandit aeratas vitiosa naves
Cura nec turmas equitum relinquit.
Every weapon is justifiable against a philosophy which makes speculation no a means but an end. For it torments human reason with chimeras . . .
6: Mere reflection, therefore, is a spiritual sickness in mankind, the more so where it imposes itself in domination over the whole man, and kills at the root what in germ is his highest being, his spiritual life, which issues only from Identity. It is an evil which accompanies man into life itself, and distorts all his intuition even for the more familiar objects of consideration. But its preoccupation with dissection does not extend only to the phenomenal world; so far as it separates the spiritual principle from this, it fills the intellectual world with chimeras . . . (11).
XVIII: In contrast to this stands the true philosophy, which regards speculation as such merely as a means.
7: In contrast to this stands the true philosophy, which regards reflection as such merely as a means (11).
XVIII: Therefore it assigns to speculation only negative value.
7: Therefore it assigns to reflection only negative value (11).
XIX. The philosopher who spends his life, or part of it, pursuing speculative philosophy into its bottomless abysses, in order there to dig out its deepest foundation, brings to humanity an offering which, because it is the sacrifice of the noblest that he has, may perhaps be respected as much as most others. It is fortunate enough if he brings philosophy to the point at which even the ultimate necessity for it as a special science, and therewith his own name, vanishes forever from the memory of mankind.
7: The philosopher who might employ his life, or a part of it, in pursuing the philosophy of reflection in its endless dichotomizing, in order to eliminate it in its ultimate ramifications, would earn for himself the most worthy place by this service, which, although it remains negative, may be respected equally with the highest, even if he were not himself to have the satisfaction of seeing philosophy in its absolute form resurrect itself self- consciously out of the dismembering activities of reflection (11-12).
152 Appendix
LV. Hence the peculiar aura which surrounds this problem, an aura which the philosophy of mere speculation, which sets out only to separate, can never develop, whereas the pure intuition, or rather, the creative imagination, long since discovered the symbolic language, which one has only to construe in order to discover that Nature speaks to us more intelligibly the less we think of her in a merely speculative way.
52: Hence the peculiar aura which surrounds this problem, an aura which the philosophy of mere reflection, which sets out only to separate, can never develop, whereas the pure intuition, or rather, the creative imagination, long since discovered the symbolic language, which one has only to construe in order to discover that Nature speaks to us more intelligibly the less we think of her in a merely reflective way (1988: 35).
83: From the side of the speculative cognition of nature as such, or considered as a speculative physics, there is nothing comparable to the philosophy of nature. . .
86: Fichte's philosophy was the first to restore validity to the universal form of subject-objectivity, as the one and all of philosophy; but the more it developed, the more it seemed to restrict that very identity, again as a special feature, to the subjective consciousness; yet as absolute and in itself, to make it the object of an endless task, an absolute demand, and in this way after extracting all substance from speculation, to abandon it as just empty froth, which proceeding, on the other hand, like the Kantian theory, to reconnect absoluteness with the deepest subjectivity, through action and faith (1988: 54).
86 Note: It is not even necessary to invoke the Bestimmung des Menschen, the Sonnenklaren Berichte, etc. , on behalf of this total rejection of all speculation from pure knowing and the integration of the latter in its vacuity through faith (1988: 54).
97: We posit, however, a third mass (similar, again, to the first two), but what follows?
Let us suppose that the combined powers of attraction and repulsion were directed against those which originally empowered A and B, the power of each exercising its influence in tandem on the remaining two, handicapping the other in such a way that the remaining two draw their original power from the third.
Hegel: Hovering Over the Corpse of Faith and Reason 153
247f. . . . but if we posit a third mass (similar, again, to the first two), this will be the purest, the fairest and the most fundamental relationship.
For two equal masses cannot, as such, be external to one another, and therefore different, without again being one and internal to each other in the third, and this without being added together therein, or the one augmenting the other; for otherwise they would again be merely in this third, and not externally to one another, but in such a way that the two would be one among themselves, and with the third, and each of the first two would be simultaneously all for the third and one side of it. For, as Plato says in the Timeaus, two things cannot, in general, exist without a third, and the fairest bond is that which best unites itself and the bonded into one, so that the first is related to the second as the latter is to the one between.
108: But because, in speculation, it is possible to conceive of attractive and repulsive forces as distinct from matter, people suppose (through a deception by no means uncommon) that what can be separated in thought is also separate in fact.
266: But because, in reflection, it is possible to conceive of attractive and repulsive forces as distinct from matter, people suppose (through a deception by no means uncommon) that what can be separated in thought is also separate in fact (1988: 154).
108: The same illusion of speculation which led people astray about these principles, extends its influence over all the sciences.
267: The same illusion of reflection which led people astray about these principles, extends its influence over all the sciences (1988: 154).
109: Even when Newton found himself faced with the alternatives, of regarding the universal force of attraction either as an occult quality, which he did not want and could not do, or as merely seeming, i. e. , as the effect of an alien cause, he never, so it seems, himself worked out the speculative reason which drove him back and forth uncertainly between two contradictory claims.
268: Our age, which not only discovers itself, but also investigates the possibility of the earlier inventions, has has found out this error of reflection, which runs through all sciences (1988: 155).
154 Appendix
109: Our age, which not only discovers itself, but also investigates the possibility of the earlier inventions, has has found out this error of speculation, which runs through all sciences.
110: Philosophy itself, in the meantime, however much its principles agree with what is generally known to and assumed by common sense, has still not succeeded, as yet, in getting rid of that obscure scholasticism which, ignorant in regard to all the demands which experience and the empirical sciences make upon philosophy, continues even now to indulge its speculative illusions, and, priding itself upon a supposed knowledge of the real, to look down with distain upon all attempts to confine our knowledge solely to the world of experience. People have not seen that things are not distinct from their effects, and are preoccupied even now with fancies about things that are supposed to be present externally to things themselves. Because speculation is able to separate what in itself is never separated, because the fancy can divide the object from its property, the actual from its action, and thereby keep a hold upon them, the supposition is that these real objects without properties, things without action, can also exist outside the fancy - regardless of the fact that, apart from speculation, every object is present for us only through its properties, everything through its action alone.
268f. Philosophy itself, in the meantime, however much its principles agree with what is generally known to and assumed by common sense, has still not succeeded, as yet, in getting rid of that obscure scholasticism, which carries over to sensory things what is valid only in an absolute sphere, that of reason; which degrades Ideas into physical causes; and which, while in actuality not advancing a step beyond the world of experience, still prides itself on a real acquaintance with things supersensible. People have not yet seen, for the most part, that the ideality of things is also the only reality, and are preoccupied with fancies about things external to sensory objects, which still retain their properties about them, nonetheless. Because reflection is able to separate what in itself is never separated, because the fancy can divide the object from its property, the actual from its action, and thereby keep a hold upon them, the supposition is that these real objects without properties, things without action, can also exist outside the fancy - regardless of the fact that, apart from reflection, every object is present for us only through its properties, every thing through its action alone (1988: 155-6).
Hegel: Hovering Over the Corpse of Faith and Reason 155
275: So the concept of these two forces, as Kant defines it, is a purely formal concept engendered by reflection (1988: 158).
278: For knowledge of these exhalted relationships, the understanding is thus wholly dead - they are evident only to reason (1988: 160).
125: The mechanical physics is a purely speculative system.
292: The mechanical physics is a purely ratiocinatory system (1988: 167).
127: The whole system [of le Sage] proceeds from speculative concepts, which cannot be represented in any intuition.
295: The whole system [of le Sage] proceeds from abstract concepts, which cannot be represented in any intuition (1988: 169).
318: The two first dimensions in physical things are related as quantity and quality; the first is their determination for reflection or the concept, the other for judgment (1988: 181).
142: The basic forces of matter are thus nothing else but the expression of those original activities for the understanding; and thus it will be easy for us to specify them with perfect completeness.
322: The basic forces of matter are thus nothing else but the expression of those original activities for the understanding, for reflection; not the true in-itself, which exists only in intuition; and thus it will be easy for us to specify them with perfect completeness (1988: 183).
149: But the object is never without its limit, or matter without its form. The two may be separated in speculation; to think of them divided in reality is absurd.
331: But the object is never without its limit, or matter without its form. The two may be separated in reflection; to think of them divided in reality is absurd (1988: 187).
156: Speculation alone is able to separate what reality always unites.
343: Reflection alone is able to separate what reality always unites (1988: 193).
156 Appendix
From the comparison of these passages (i. e. , the original and the revised edition of the Ideen), it is evident that in most cases Schelling merely replaced the earlier concept of speculation with that of reflection. Speculation meant, in the first edition, a separation of that which is originally united in nature and reality. This concept of speculation has consequences for both the scientific character of the Naturphilosophie and the life of the self-conscious Ich in the world. According to Schelling, then, it is by means of speculatively constructed propositions alone that the fundamental forces of matter, which are essentially united in nature, came to be understood as something divided. Speculation is incapable, therefore, of comprehending the real in its origin; it remains a mere formula, thought abstracted from reality;6 this thought, through which the propositions of Naturphilosophie are determined, is grounded in a relationship to the world characterized by speculation. The first act of speculation and, subsequently, the beginning of philosophy consists in the separation of self-consciousness from the world. This division was proceeded by an early stage in history in which humanity lived in an original unity of nature and itself.
The self, which through its freedom has become conscious of itself, is able to produce a reciprocating interaction and, subsequently, a renewed unity with the world. 7 From this starting point, Schelling is able to characterize "mere speculation" - when it gains control over an individual - by diagnosing it as a "mental illness" which disturbs the unity of individual with the world and, at the same time, undermine the necessary foundation of their existence. 8 This anthropological-historical notion of the elementary unity of the individual with the world, which once constituted their whole reality and always remains the unconscious foundation of their existence, is reinterpreted in the second edition as an ideal derivation of their loftier being and the spiritual life intrinsic to absolute identity.
6 See, e. g. , 149/331 (II, 234); 156/343 (II, 242). The number just prior to the slash means here and in the following the page number in the first edition, while that behind the slash refers to the second edition; in passages which are found only in the second edition, we designated by placing a (2) ahead of the page reference. The additional roman and arabic numbers in parethases refer to their position within the Werken (see ftn. 3 above).
7 Schiller's distinction between the state of nature and the state of culture, and their mutual development into a higher unity may well, above all else, stand in the background here.
8 XVIII/6 (II, 13ff. ). See XVII/5 (II,13); also see I, 341.
? Hegel: Hovering Over the Corpse of Faith and Reason 157
In contrast to this "mental illness" of merely divided and abstracted thought, which is called "speculation" in the first edition, Schelling now sees "health" as a "balance of powers" - as a reciprocity and unity in the world similar to that which is also possible in the self-conscious Ich. 9 Indeed, this philosophy presupposes the opposition of the self to the world and, therefore, requires speculation; but there is another philosophy within which speculation is employed merely as a means, which Schelling calls "healthy philosophy" - i. e. , a philosophy aimed at reproducing or reestablishing the unity and wholeness of humanity. Perhaps Schelling substitutes "true philosophy"10 for "healthy philosophy" in the second edition in order to avoid any allusion to the healthy and common human understanding with which Hegel and he now opposed so fiercely in the Kritischen Journal. 11
Scientific and philosophic knowledge presupposed, therefore, a division between the self and the world. [Since it tends to think that what is separable in speculation is also separable in actuality, speculation - designated here as dependent on the capacity to separate and abstract - must constantly ward off appearance and illusion. ] Schelling displays this paradigmatically in his discussion of the fundamental powers of matter. Speculation can only grasp matter in divided determinations, namely, in the powers of attraction and repulsion; the "speculative illusion" consists in viewing these separated determinations as also separated in the thing. 12 But it would then follow that one must assume that matter, which one must think of as unified, is different from and independent of these two powers/forces. In this way, the powers of attraction and repulsion were not at all the conditions for the possibility of matter. Employing Kantian terminology, Schelling here characterizes the confusion between the
9 XVIII/6 (II, 13).
10 XVIII/7 (II, 14). See also LV/52 (II, 47); 110/268 (II, 194). In similar contexts, Schelling also often allows the attribute "healthy" to stand, e. g. 125/292 (II, 209); 172/371 (II, 260).
11 See also Hegel's Differenz essay: Gesammelte Werke. Bd 4, 20-3. With regard to the (hier vor allem zugrunde gelegten) interpretation of Schelling's "Introduction" in the Ideen, see Wieland: Die Anfaenge der Philosophie Schellings und die Frage nach der Natur in Natur und Geschichte, K. Loewith (on his 70th Birthday), Stuttgart 1967, 420-426.
12 See 108ff. /266ff. (II, 192 ff. ) At LV/52 (II, 47), the aforementioned "appearance" had another meaning.
? 158 Appendix
conditions of thought and speculation with the conditions of being itself - a confusion based on a "speculative deception" - as "dogmatism. "13
Exposing this speculative deception proves that speculation, when it is viewed as alone sufficient for the recognition of reality, plainly fails to capture reality. In reference to its understanding of actuality, speculation is more dependent on another act of the human spirit in which thought first actually professes something real, viz. , intuition. For Schelling, intuition is a more original and more highly intellectual capacity than speculation; and since its highest potency is expressed in the production of the genius, it is more than that (something which Schelling does not discuss in the Ideen). Intuition holds a higher position of priority in the Naturphilosophie as well; in the Naturphilosophie, the real is given through intuition alone and the fundamental determination of matter in its original unity is reserved for intuition itself. The understanding merely brings the pre-conscious products of intuition to a state of consciousness in which it separates and, then, isolates those determinations. 14 This "idealist" foundation of matter15 and its fundamental determinations in the productive intuition of the Ich was - for the early Schelling - an initial vindication of the objective reality of nature and, thereby, an answer to the skeptical denial [of every form of cognitive reality. 16] Therefore, speculation - characterized here as abstracted and separated thought, i. e. as understanding - is dependent on the productive activity of intuition; Schelling emphasized this dependence much more clearly in several of the revised passages in the second edition. 17
Although the notion of speculation is - in most contexts - characterized as it was in the first edition of the Ideen, it is replaced in the second edition by the term reflection. Prior to his encounter with Hegel in Jena, Schelling
13 111/270 (II, 195). With regard to the concept of a speculative appearance, Schelling was inspired by Kant - although uses it in a completely different context. Schelling way of arguing corresponds earliest to that of the "Amphibolie der Reflexionsbegriffe" (see Kritik der reinen Vernunft, B 319ff. ). With regard to Schelling's critique of Newton's "Scheinbrauch" of principles of attraction and repulsion in particulars, also see Kant's Metaphysische Anfangsgruend der Naturwissenschaft in Bd 4 of Kant's gesammelten Schriften (Akademieausg. ), 514 f. .
14 See 131f/301ff. (II, 215f); 138ff/311ff (II, 221ff. ). Also see 127/295 (II, 211); I, 355; I,359 f u. a.
15 See (2)339, (II, 239).
16 See also 131 ftn. /302 ftn. (II, 215 ftn. ); I, 353; I, 361 f.
17 See (2)52 (II, 47); (2)322 (II, 228).
? Hegel: Hovering Over the Corpse of Faith and Reason 159
had already assigned the role of supervening, segregating, and abstracting to the understanding and opposed it to the activity of the intuition. 18 This employment of reflection is not repeated in the second edition. But the eradication of the earlier concept of speculation, which he maintains in most places in the Ideen,19 leads one to conclude that Schelling's sense of speculation had decisively drifted.
In the second edition of the Ideen, which is above all else concerned with the critique of contemporary or "reflective philosophy, one notices a marked similarity to Hegel's conceptual pair, viz. , speculation and reflection; the expression itself, "reflective philosophy" (which replaced speculative philosophy in the first edition),20 is hinted at in the subtitle of Glauben und Wissen and the conceptual pair is employed throughout the Journal essay. When Schelling speaks here of the "sublation" [Aufhebung] of the "endless estrangement" of the Reflexionsphilosophie and the "rupturings of reflection," he is openly adopting the concepts and thoughts of Hegel. Granted, Schelling spoke in similar terms of an "original division" which stood in need of being sublated [aufgehoben] in his U? ber das Verha? ltniss der Naurphilosophie zur Philosophie u? berhaupt (1802), but we can already see in that text the result of a tight collaboration between Schelling and Hegel. 21 In this revised passage in the Ideen, the term "division" - in his contrast between a natural-philosophical and a transcendental-philosophical meaning of these concepts, which Schelling also recognized earlier22 - should be understood as the condition of reflective philosophy and, moreover, a historical condition which is characteristic of an entire age (as sketched by Hegel in, above all else, the Differenz essay23). In his notion of the "sublation" [Aufhebung] of reflective oppositions and disunion, Hegel emphasizes in these years the negation, the complete annihilation of finitude, out of which a living unity
18 e. g. III, 285f; III, 501f; III, 505 f u. a.
19 Speculation in the meaning characterized above remains--probably without particular purpose--in the second edition in the following passages: XXV/15 (II,20); XLVI/41 (II, 39); LIX/60 (II, 52); 131 ftn. /302 ftn. (II, 215 ftn. ); 134/305 (II, 218); 140 ftn. /313 ftn. (II, 223 ftn. ).
20 XIX/7 (II, 14f).
21 In Hegel: Gesammelte Werke, Bd 4, 271 ff.
22 e. g. III, 297 f; III, 301 ff; IV, 7. With regard to the division of opposing activities within the Ich, see III, 626. Also, the term "Aufhebung" in the then common parlance can be found earlier in Schelling's discussions of natural philosophy; see, e. g. , 96/247 (II, 179).
23 See Hegel: Gesammelte Werke, Bd. 4, 12 ff.
? 160 Appendix
and true philosophy could emerge. 24 Schelling adopts here25 only the negative character of sublation, leaving open the possibility (contrary to Hegel's intentions) that the sublation [Aufhebung] of the division of the Reflexionsphilosophie might not coincide with the emergence of philosophy in its "absolute form. " One may well assume, in light of the indictment of Hegel in this passage of the Ideen, that Schelling meant Hegel when he refers to those "philosophers" who assume the work of critiquing the Reflexionsphilosophie. In other contexts at this time, contexts not yet discussed, Schelling was more than willing to assign a merely negative and critical function to Hegel, while reserving the positive and true presentation of the matter for himself. By restricting the meaning of negation in this way, Schelling misses what Hegel considered the decisive and positive sense of the contradiction and antinomies - viz. , that it is a negation which is brought about by reason.
In his critique of contemporary philosophy, Schelling's nemesis - with whom he argues repeatedly - is Fichte. Schelling discusses the Fichtean philosophy at the end of the appendix to the introduction in the Ideen and critiques it with arguments which come rather close to Hegel's objections. In this context, Schelling employs the concept of speculation only twice and in a sense quite distinct from the first edition. 26 Particularly in his remark at the end of this appendix, Schelling adopts Hegel's fundamental critique of Fichte - namely, that he eliminates speculation completely from true knowledge and for that reason sought the absolute in the subjectivity of faith. In this text, the presupposed meaning of speculation, as a pure rational cognition of the absolute, is the one which Hegel established in the critical essays of the Jenazeit and which he hoped to retain in his exposition of the philosophy of his time. Speculation is in this case, therefore, the opposite of reflection. Thus, this new concept of speculation may well have been the occasion for extinguishing the earlier notion of speculation as an abstract form of thought identified with the understanding and replacing it with the term "reflection. "
In the second edition of the Ideen, Schelling also uses the concept of speculation in another sense - one which diverges from the first edition - namely, as "speculative cognition" within a "speculative physics. "27 The idea of a speculative physics, and the specific notion of theory contained
24 See, e. g. , Hegel: Gesammelte Werke, Bd. 4, 17; 24; also 208. 25 XIX/7 (II, 14f).
26 See (2)86 (II, 72); (2)86 Ftn. (II, 72 ftn. ).
27 (2)83 (II, 70).
? Hegel: Hovering Over the Corpse of Faith and Reason 161
within it, was developed by Schelling for the first time after 1797. Therefore, the elimination of the earlier concept of speculation in the second edition - e. g. , when Schelling no longer designates the opposing mechanistic physics as "pure-speculation" but rather as "pure-rationalistic system"28 - certainly leads one back to a transitionary concept in the development of a speculative physics. But perhaps it should be mentioned here that certain particulars within the domain of Naturphilosophie, viz. , those concerned with a speculative physics, could be credited to Hegel as well. Indeed, Schelling appears to have borrowed the notion of the "beautiful bond," which "produces both itself and the bound unity,"29 from the Timaios passage in the Schelling chapter of the Differenz essay and incorporated it into the discussion of the relationship between masses in a physical system. But since Schelling was familiar with Plato quite early in his career, one must in this case assume a reciprocal stimulation. 30
With his idea of a speculative physics, established principally in the Einleitung zu dem Entwurf eines Systems der Naturphilosophie (1799), Schelling had already altered his earlier concept of speculation as the divided and abstract thought of the understanding. As such, it is necessary to explain the relationship between this altered conception of speculation, within the speculative physics, and the later conception of speculation as rational cognition of the absolute; if speculation qua absolute cognition were merely an imminent development of that speculative cognition within the speculative physic, one need not admit a Hegelian influence on the new characterization of speculation in the second edition of the Ideen. Above all else, however, one must take into account the fact that Schelling did not use the concept of speculation as rational cognition of the absolute for the first time there, but rather already in his "Darstellung meines Systems der Philosophie" (1801) - an essay which appeared some time prior to the Differenz essay. But if the adoption of Hegel's concept of speculation is to be assumed in the second edition of the Ideen, it will also be necessary to prove that Schelling had adopted this conception in those
28 125/292 (II, 209).
29 Hegel: Gesammelte Werke, Bd 4, 65 ftn. See Schelling: Idee (2)247 (II, 179 f. ). 30 Hegel obviously explained, in the Jenazeit, the analogy of the Timaios as well as the trinity with the help of the bond. These observations most likely do not belong to the Frankfurterzeit to which Rosenkranz attributes them (Rosenkranz: Hegel's urspruengliches System. 1798-1806 in Literarhistorisches Taschenbuch, Hrsg. v. Prutz, Leipzig 1844, 158). The Timaios passage is most likely still looming in the background for Schelling in 1806 in his remarks concerning the "absolute bond" that binds infinitude and finitude.
? 162 Appendix
texts which span from the early essays to the Identita? tssystem (1801-03). The comparison of the two editions of the Ideen merely shows that it is conceivable that Schelling's new conception of speculation, which stands in opposition to reflection, was stimulated by Hegel; a more stringent proof, however, has yet to be carried out.
II.
Schelling's development of a speculative physics implies, when compared to the first edition of the Ideen, an alteration in the concept of speculation. The function of speculative physics is characterized, quite briefly, as an a priori-like "construction" of nature - i. e. , a derivation of all appearances of nature from a singular principle. In this way, nature becomes a system; a "true system," however, is an "organic whole. "31 The decisive problem raised by this statement of speculative physics is the relationship between an a priori theoretical design on the one hand and experience on the other. In this context, Schelling identifies speculation with an a priori theory qua pure science and opposes it to the empirical (which, for Schelling, is a "mere collection of facts" and incapable of ever becoming science). 32 In the attempt to clarify the relationship between speculation and empiricism, it must nevertheless be noticed that Schelling had a very peculiar notion of an a priori judgment; for Schelling, a priori judgments were those judgments of which "one must necessarily become conscious," but whose "content is, after all, whatever one wishes it to be. "33 Therefore, special consideration must also be given to the fact that the arrangement of the particular rules, to the extent that they are unified systematically and thereby - for Schelling - already fulfill the requirement of necessity, could be expressed in an a priori judgment. Empirical and a priori judgments differ from one another merely by varying degrees of certainty and not, as in Kant, through the justification of its validity. Schelling admittedly shrinks back from the consequences of autonomy of a theory developed a priori or speculatively. He admits, then, the validity of the experiment and the empirical trial as a confirmation or disconfirmation of the theoretical design. 34 Experience is clearly the criterion by which to judge the accuracy or inaccuracy of the speculative construction of nature (the sense of which is merely regulative). Therefore,
31 See III, 278 f.
32 Ibid. , 282; also see IV, 28; IV, 32 u. a. 33 Ibid. , 278.
34 Ibid. , 277; see IV, 96 f.
? Hegel: Hovering Over the Corpse of Faith and Reason 163
Schelling's teaching on the cognitive worth of pure theory or speculation is, at the very least, inharmonious. 35
In this context, therefore, speculation no longer means divided, abstract, merely formal thinking, but instead the construction - especially the self-construction - of the theory of nature; speculation apprehends nature not only as product, but at the same time productivity: as natura naturans. 36 Proceeding from this concept of speculation, whose relationship to experience remains nonetheless duplicitous, it appears again in two formulas in the essay entitled Allgemeine Deduktion des dynamischen Processes (1800); already in these texts, the notion of speculation is approaching the formulation characteristic of the Identita? tssystem: "If speculation ascends beyond this absolute unity of opposing facts, which we think in the concept of nature, then we have no other object except the absolutely identical . . . "; this is, nonetheless, according to Schelling, displayed "for the intuition" through "the absolute deficiency in nature. "37 For speculation, the absolute unity of both powers is extended to the first "relative or synthetic" unity. 38 Speculation, therefore, strives to establish an absolute identity over the dualisms of fundamental powers of nature which absolute identity takes as its basis - namely, nature itself. Already in the early essay: Von Ich, which at one point claims, e. g. , "speculation demands the unconditioned";39 this observation is made in connection with the alternative: Idealism-Dogmatism. The meaning of speculation as the demand for the absolute unconditioned may have been suggested by, when set in the context of Fichtean thought, Kant; but the representation of speculation as a striving toward the absolute identity of nature, i. e. the notion of nature as the unity of product and productivity, is clearly borrowed from Schelling's own articulation of a speculative physics. 40 This refinement of the concept of speculation within Naturphilosophie is, however, just as clearly distinguishable from Schelling's concept of
35 Metzer, however, presents Schelling construction of a speculative physics as merely an expression of a panlogism (Die Epochen:Eine Interpretation der Frueg- und Spaetphilosophie Schellings der Schellingschen Philosophie von 1795 bis 1802, Heidelberg 1911, 82 ff. ). Chr. Wild's Reflexion und Erfahrung: (Freiburg u. Muenchen 1969, 39 ff and 45 ff. ) emphasizes the task of experience for the Naturerkenntnis in the early Schelling.
36 See IV, 96f; III, 284; also III, 298 f. 37 IV, 6.
38 IV, 9.
Wisenman. 1786. An den Herr Professor Kant von den Resultate Williamson, Raymond Keith. 1984. Introduction to Hegel's Philosophy of
Religion (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press).
Wo? lfflin, Heinrich. 1929. Principles of Art History: The Problem of
Development of Style in Later Art (New York: Dover Publications). Zirngiebl, E. 1867. F. H. Jacobis Leben, Dichten und Denken. Vienna:
Braumuller.
APPENDIX
SPECULATION AND REFLECTION: SCHELLING AND HEGEL'S COLLABORATIVE ENTERPRISE IN JENA
Translator's Preface
The problem of how the philosophy of Hegel is systematically and historically related to that of Schelling, i. e. the so-called "Schelling problem," as Pippen calls it in Hegel's Idealism, has been a "confusing and much debated issue. " According to Heine's Die romantische Schule (1835), the elder Schelling was convinced that Hegel stole all his ideas. But even if Schelling's characterization of Hegel as a concept-monger is wildly exaggerated, it is indisputable that Hegel entered the philosophical frenzy at Jena as a partial supporter and perceived disciple of Schelling's system. Nonetheless, even the earliest collaborative efforts during the Jenaer Zeit are - as Harris puts it - "so nearly explicit [in their critique of the Schellingean system] that one wonders how any of Hegel's readers, let alone Schelling himself, could have regarded him a mere disciple. " Indeed, Harris seems to credit Du? sing with having established what might be considered the moderate thesis of the following article when he claims that "careful study of Schelling's writings in this period does show that he learned some things from Hegel. " Indeed, current consensus tends not only to vindicate Hegel of conceptual thievery, it also credits Hegel with a more durable speculative edifice built from materials which Schelling considered unworthy of the philosophical enterprise (namely, common consciousness or reflection). This current consensus is in no small part due to the article translated below, originally published in Hegel-Studien, entitled "Spekulation und Reflexion: Zur Zusammenarbeit Schellings und Hegel in Jena. " Professor Du? sing's 1969 article not only documents the most salient points of systematic disagreement between the Schelling and Hegel's respective systems, whether before or during and after the Jena collaboration, it also sheds light on the problematic that gave rise to the distinctively Hegelian version of dialectic. Although the central theses of
148 Appendix
the following argument were thickened substantially in several of Du? sing's subsequent works (e. g. , "Tranzendentalphilosophie und Spekulation: Der Streit um die Gestalt einer Ersten Philosophie"), the decisive premises of the argument are essentially all here. Whether one agrees with the conclusions that Professor Du? sing draws toward the end of this essay, his sensitive if not also now iconic analysis of the "Schelling problem" is too important to remain untranslated. When possible, in those places where Du? sing cites passages from Schelling's Ideen zu einer Philosophie der Natur, I have used Harris and Heath's excellent translation (1988). And while I concede that this translation is by no means perfect, and that it errs on the side of the literal, I trust that it does provide a serviceable translation of an important if not seminal essay within the secondary literature on Hegel in English.
The Identita? tsphilosophie and, within the scope of this systematic approach, the novel concept of nature occupy a place of central importance in Schelling and Hegel's collaborative enterprise in Jena (1801-03). The design of the Naturphilosophie can be traced back, obviously, at least in general, to Schelling. This has been assumed to be the case, by and large, with the formulation of the Identita? tssystem as well. It would appear that at this stage of his thought Hegel essentially adopted, reorganized, and - above all else - presented systematically the philosophical suggestions made by Schelling. 1 And while an adoption and adaptation of this sort might possibly account for the realm of Naturphilosophie, though certainly not without essential modifications, such a relationship between Schelling and Hegel with regard to the design of the Identita? tsphilosophie is dubious.
It has already been suggested in various ways, or at least hinted at, in the literature that Hegel's critique of Fichte in the Differenz essay was the last nudge or even the decisive ground for Schelling's disassociation from Fichte. 2 Hegel's critique of Fichte, however, presupposes a systematic
1 See, e. g. , Zeltner: Schelling, Stuttgart, 1954, 53 and 46; Fuhrmans: Schellings Philosophie der Weltalter, Duesseldorf, 1954, 43, 165; also see Dilthey (Gesammelte Werke, Bd 4. Hrsg. v. H. Nohl. 198 ff. , 206 ff. ), which is nonetheless a restrained expression. Perhaps Schelling's later critique of Hegel also contributed to this perception of Schelling and Hegel's collaborative enterprise.
2 See, possibly, Michelet: Einleitung in Hegel's philosophische Abhandlungen in Hegel's Werke. Bd 1. Berlin 1832; Haym: Hegel und seine Zeit, Berlin, 1832, VI,
? Hegel: Hovering Over the Corpse of Faith and Reason 149
position developed - at least in its essential features - on his own, i. e. separate from Schelling. It should be shown in what follows how Schelling took up and reinterpreted Hegel's systematic suggestions regarding the conceptual pair: speculation and reflection. This conceptual pair proves to be meaningful for Schelling's own development of a system of absolute identity as well as for his critique of the contemporary philosophy, in particular the philosophy of Fichte; and it is of particular importance to Schelling's revision of the concept of speculation in this phase of his thought.
The transformation of the concept of speculation in Schelling prior to and after his encounter with Hegel in Jena is displayed most clearly by comparing the two editions of Ideen zu einer Philosophie der Natur (1797 and 1803); one such comparison will be provided below in Section I. These changes alone, however, do not sufficiently prove Schelling's adoption of the Hegelian concept of speculation and, its correlate, reflection. Already in the early formulations of the Identita? tssystem, from his Darstellung meines Systems der Philosophie (1801) forward, Schelling spoke of speculation in a manner very similar to that of Hegel. As such, it is particularly important to distinguish in detail what was borrowed and modified in order to characterize properly the meaning of this concept for Schelling's system and critique. This discussion of the relationship between speculation and reflection will ultimately lead to the problem of dialectic; this theme is developed in the Section II below.
I.
In the K. F. A. Schelling edition of Schelling's Werke, the differences between the two editions of the Ideen zu einer Philosophie der Natur is in numerous places not easy to recognize. With regard to the theme of speculation and reflection, one merely finds a global statement: namely, "Here and in the following pages, like those still later in the first edition, 'speculation' replaces 'reflection' and 'to speculate' replaces 'to reflect. '"3 But Schelling made use of several other formulations of his early concept of speculation which were neither evident from that edition nor from the further revisions which he undertook - revisions which were not, at least
145 ff. ; Kroner: Von Kant bis Hegel, 2nd edition, Tu? bingen, 1961, Bd. 2, 111, 124, 142; especially, Braun: Differenzen in Hegel-Studien, 4 (1967), 291ff. , 299.
3 II, 13 ftn. Here and in the following, we display the Roman and Arabic numbers as volume and page respectively.
? 150 Appendix
in part, indicated. The aforementioned modifications are understood most precisely and judged most accurately only when one surveys the second edition alterations alongside the original - paying close attention, of course, to the theme of speculation and reflection. We have also listed here a text within which Schelling most likely adopted, within this systematic context, one of Hegel's quotations from the Timaios. 4
Schelling: Ideen zu einer Philosophie der Natur. 1. Aufl. Leipzig 1797.
Schelling: Ideen zu einer Philosophie der Natur. Als Einleitung in das Studium dieser W issenschaft. 2. Aufl. Landshut 1803.
XII. In this connection two objects have been kept in view, first to set forth for the friends of philosophy, in the supplement to the Introduction and scattered intermittently elsewhere, the position reached through progressive development of the Philosophy of Nature in its relation to speculation in general . . . (7). 5
XVI. The greatest philosophers we always the first to return to it, and Socrates (as Plato relates), after he stood throughout the night sunk in contemplation [Spekulation], prayed in the early morning to the rising sun (10).
XVII. With that separation, reflection first begins . . . (10).
5: With that separation, speculation first begins . . .
XVIII. Mere speculation, therefore, is a spiritual sickness of mankind, and moreover the most dangerous of all, which kills the germ of man's existence and uproots his being. It is a tribulation, which, where it has once become dominant, cannot be dispelled - not by the stimulation of Nature (for what can that do to a dead soul? ), nor by the bustle of life.
4 The publisher of the fourth volume of the new Hegel-edition had already hinted at the Hegelian influence on the changes to Schelling's second edition in their editorial comments and, indeed, with regard to the conceptual pair: reflection and speculation. They see in this a proof that not only did Hegel learn and adopt a great deal from Schelling, but also Schelling from Hegel.
5 Translations of the following passages in Schelling's Ideas for a Philosophy of Nature are provided by Errol E. Harris and Peter Heath (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press), 1988.
? Hegel: Hovering Over the Corpse of Faith and Reason 151
Scandit aeratas vitiosa naves
Cura nec turmas equitum relinquit.
Every weapon is justifiable against a philosophy which makes speculation no a means but an end. For it torments human reason with chimeras . . .
6: Mere reflection, therefore, is a spiritual sickness in mankind, the more so where it imposes itself in domination over the whole man, and kills at the root what in germ is his highest being, his spiritual life, which issues only from Identity. It is an evil which accompanies man into life itself, and distorts all his intuition even for the more familiar objects of consideration. But its preoccupation with dissection does not extend only to the phenomenal world; so far as it separates the spiritual principle from this, it fills the intellectual world with chimeras . . . (11).
XVIII: In contrast to this stands the true philosophy, which regards speculation as such merely as a means.
7: In contrast to this stands the true philosophy, which regards reflection as such merely as a means (11).
XVIII: Therefore it assigns to speculation only negative value.
7: Therefore it assigns to reflection only negative value (11).
XIX. The philosopher who spends his life, or part of it, pursuing speculative philosophy into its bottomless abysses, in order there to dig out its deepest foundation, brings to humanity an offering which, because it is the sacrifice of the noblest that he has, may perhaps be respected as much as most others. It is fortunate enough if he brings philosophy to the point at which even the ultimate necessity for it as a special science, and therewith his own name, vanishes forever from the memory of mankind.
7: The philosopher who might employ his life, or a part of it, in pursuing the philosophy of reflection in its endless dichotomizing, in order to eliminate it in its ultimate ramifications, would earn for himself the most worthy place by this service, which, although it remains negative, may be respected equally with the highest, even if he were not himself to have the satisfaction of seeing philosophy in its absolute form resurrect itself self- consciously out of the dismembering activities of reflection (11-12).
152 Appendix
LV. Hence the peculiar aura which surrounds this problem, an aura which the philosophy of mere speculation, which sets out only to separate, can never develop, whereas the pure intuition, or rather, the creative imagination, long since discovered the symbolic language, which one has only to construe in order to discover that Nature speaks to us more intelligibly the less we think of her in a merely speculative way.
52: Hence the peculiar aura which surrounds this problem, an aura which the philosophy of mere reflection, which sets out only to separate, can never develop, whereas the pure intuition, or rather, the creative imagination, long since discovered the symbolic language, which one has only to construe in order to discover that Nature speaks to us more intelligibly the less we think of her in a merely reflective way (1988: 35).
83: From the side of the speculative cognition of nature as such, or considered as a speculative physics, there is nothing comparable to the philosophy of nature. . .
86: Fichte's philosophy was the first to restore validity to the universal form of subject-objectivity, as the one and all of philosophy; but the more it developed, the more it seemed to restrict that very identity, again as a special feature, to the subjective consciousness; yet as absolute and in itself, to make it the object of an endless task, an absolute demand, and in this way after extracting all substance from speculation, to abandon it as just empty froth, which proceeding, on the other hand, like the Kantian theory, to reconnect absoluteness with the deepest subjectivity, through action and faith (1988: 54).
86 Note: It is not even necessary to invoke the Bestimmung des Menschen, the Sonnenklaren Berichte, etc. , on behalf of this total rejection of all speculation from pure knowing and the integration of the latter in its vacuity through faith (1988: 54).
97: We posit, however, a third mass (similar, again, to the first two), but what follows?
Let us suppose that the combined powers of attraction and repulsion were directed against those which originally empowered A and B, the power of each exercising its influence in tandem on the remaining two, handicapping the other in such a way that the remaining two draw their original power from the third.
Hegel: Hovering Over the Corpse of Faith and Reason 153
247f. . . . but if we posit a third mass (similar, again, to the first two), this will be the purest, the fairest and the most fundamental relationship.
For two equal masses cannot, as such, be external to one another, and therefore different, without again being one and internal to each other in the third, and this without being added together therein, or the one augmenting the other; for otherwise they would again be merely in this third, and not externally to one another, but in such a way that the two would be one among themselves, and with the third, and each of the first two would be simultaneously all for the third and one side of it. For, as Plato says in the Timeaus, two things cannot, in general, exist without a third, and the fairest bond is that which best unites itself and the bonded into one, so that the first is related to the second as the latter is to the one between.
108: But because, in speculation, it is possible to conceive of attractive and repulsive forces as distinct from matter, people suppose (through a deception by no means uncommon) that what can be separated in thought is also separate in fact.
266: But because, in reflection, it is possible to conceive of attractive and repulsive forces as distinct from matter, people suppose (through a deception by no means uncommon) that what can be separated in thought is also separate in fact (1988: 154).
108: The same illusion of speculation which led people astray about these principles, extends its influence over all the sciences.
267: The same illusion of reflection which led people astray about these principles, extends its influence over all the sciences (1988: 154).
109: Even when Newton found himself faced with the alternatives, of regarding the universal force of attraction either as an occult quality, which he did not want and could not do, or as merely seeming, i. e. , as the effect of an alien cause, he never, so it seems, himself worked out the speculative reason which drove him back and forth uncertainly between two contradictory claims.
268: Our age, which not only discovers itself, but also investigates the possibility of the earlier inventions, has has found out this error of reflection, which runs through all sciences (1988: 155).
154 Appendix
109: Our age, which not only discovers itself, but also investigates the possibility of the earlier inventions, has has found out this error of speculation, which runs through all sciences.
110: Philosophy itself, in the meantime, however much its principles agree with what is generally known to and assumed by common sense, has still not succeeded, as yet, in getting rid of that obscure scholasticism which, ignorant in regard to all the demands which experience and the empirical sciences make upon philosophy, continues even now to indulge its speculative illusions, and, priding itself upon a supposed knowledge of the real, to look down with distain upon all attempts to confine our knowledge solely to the world of experience. People have not seen that things are not distinct from their effects, and are preoccupied even now with fancies about things that are supposed to be present externally to things themselves. Because speculation is able to separate what in itself is never separated, because the fancy can divide the object from its property, the actual from its action, and thereby keep a hold upon them, the supposition is that these real objects without properties, things without action, can also exist outside the fancy - regardless of the fact that, apart from speculation, every object is present for us only through its properties, everything through its action alone.
268f. Philosophy itself, in the meantime, however much its principles agree with what is generally known to and assumed by common sense, has still not succeeded, as yet, in getting rid of that obscure scholasticism, which carries over to sensory things what is valid only in an absolute sphere, that of reason; which degrades Ideas into physical causes; and which, while in actuality not advancing a step beyond the world of experience, still prides itself on a real acquaintance with things supersensible. People have not yet seen, for the most part, that the ideality of things is also the only reality, and are preoccupied with fancies about things external to sensory objects, which still retain their properties about them, nonetheless. Because reflection is able to separate what in itself is never separated, because the fancy can divide the object from its property, the actual from its action, and thereby keep a hold upon them, the supposition is that these real objects without properties, things without action, can also exist outside the fancy - regardless of the fact that, apart from reflection, every object is present for us only through its properties, every thing through its action alone (1988: 155-6).
Hegel: Hovering Over the Corpse of Faith and Reason 155
275: So the concept of these two forces, as Kant defines it, is a purely formal concept engendered by reflection (1988: 158).
278: For knowledge of these exhalted relationships, the understanding is thus wholly dead - they are evident only to reason (1988: 160).
125: The mechanical physics is a purely speculative system.
292: The mechanical physics is a purely ratiocinatory system (1988: 167).
127: The whole system [of le Sage] proceeds from speculative concepts, which cannot be represented in any intuition.
295: The whole system [of le Sage] proceeds from abstract concepts, which cannot be represented in any intuition (1988: 169).
318: The two first dimensions in physical things are related as quantity and quality; the first is their determination for reflection or the concept, the other for judgment (1988: 181).
142: The basic forces of matter are thus nothing else but the expression of those original activities for the understanding; and thus it will be easy for us to specify them with perfect completeness.
322: The basic forces of matter are thus nothing else but the expression of those original activities for the understanding, for reflection; not the true in-itself, which exists only in intuition; and thus it will be easy for us to specify them with perfect completeness (1988: 183).
149: But the object is never without its limit, or matter without its form. The two may be separated in speculation; to think of them divided in reality is absurd.
331: But the object is never without its limit, or matter without its form. The two may be separated in reflection; to think of them divided in reality is absurd (1988: 187).
156: Speculation alone is able to separate what reality always unites.
343: Reflection alone is able to separate what reality always unites (1988: 193).
156 Appendix
From the comparison of these passages (i. e. , the original and the revised edition of the Ideen), it is evident that in most cases Schelling merely replaced the earlier concept of speculation with that of reflection. Speculation meant, in the first edition, a separation of that which is originally united in nature and reality. This concept of speculation has consequences for both the scientific character of the Naturphilosophie and the life of the self-conscious Ich in the world. According to Schelling, then, it is by means of speculatively constructed propositions alone that the fundamental forces of matter, which are essentially united in nature, came to be understood as something divided. Speculation is incapable, therefore, of comprehending the real in its origin; it remains a mere formula, thought abstracted from reality;6 this thought, through which the propositions of Naturphilosophie are determined, is grounded in a relationship to the world characterized by speculation. The first act of speculation and, subsequently, the beginning of philosophy consists in the separation of self-consciousness from the world. This division was proceeded by an early stage in history in which humanity lived in an original unity of nature and itself.
The self, which through its freedom has become conscious of itself, is able to produce a reciprocating interaction and, subsequently, a renewed unity with the world. 7 From this starting point, Schelling is able to characterize "mere speculation" - when it gains control over an individual - by diagnosing it as a "mental illness" which disturbs the unity of individual with the world and, at the same time, undermine the necessary foundation of their existence. 8 This anthropological-historical notion of the elementary unity of the individual with the world, which once constituted their whole reality and always remains the unconscious foundation of their existence, is reinterpreted in the second edition as an ideal derivation of their loftier being and the spiritual life intrinsic to absolute identity.
6 See, e. g. , 149/331 (II, 234); 156/343 (II, 242). The number just prior to the slash means here and in the following the page number in the first edition, while that behind the slash refers to the second edition; in passages which are found only in the second edition, we designated by placing a (2) ahead of the page reference. The additional roman and arabic numbers in parethases refer to their position within the Werken (see ftn. 3 above).
7 Schiller's distinction between the state of nature and the state of culture, and their mutual development into a higher unity may well, above all else, stand in the background here.
8 XVIII/6 (II, 13ff. ). See XVII/5 (II,13); also see I, 341.
? Hegel: Hovering Over the Corpse of Faith and Reason 157
In contrast to this "mental illness" of merely divided and abstracted thought, which is called "speculation" in the first edition, Schelling now sees "health" as a "balance of powers" - as a reciprocity and unity in the world similar to that which is also possible in the self-conscious Ich. 9 Indeed, this philosophy presupposes the opposition of the self to the world and, therefore, requires speculation; but there is another philosophy within which speculation is employed merely as a means, which Schelling calls "healthy philosophy" - i. e. , a philosophy aimed at reproducing or reestablishing the unity and wholeness of humanity. Perhaps Schelling substitutes "true philosophy"10 for "healthy philosophy" in the second edition in order to avoid any allusion to the healthy and common human understanding with which Hegel and he now opposed so fiercely in the Kritischen Journal. 11
Scientific and philosophic knowledge presupposed, therefore, a division between the self and the world. [Since it tends to think that what is separable in speculation is also separable in actuality, speculation - designated here as dependent on the capacity to separate and abstract - must constantly ward off appearance and illusion. ] Schelling displays this paradigmatically in his discussion of the fundamental powers of matter. Speculation can only grasp matter in divided determinations, namely, in the powers of attraction and repulsion; the "speculative illusion" consists in viewing these separated determinations as also separated in the thing. 12 But it would then follow that one must assume that matter, which one must think of as unified, is different from and independent of these two powers/forces. In this way, the powers of attraction and repulsion were not at all the conditions for the possibility of matter. Employing Kantian terminology, Schelling here characterizes the confusion between the
9 XVIII/6 (II, 13).
10 XVIII/7 (II, 14). See also LV/52 (II, 47); 110/268 (II, 194). In similar contexts, Schelling also often allows the attribute "healthy" to stand, e. g. 125/292 (II, 209); 172/371 (II, 260).
11 See also Hegel's Differenz essay: Gesammelte Werke. Bd 4, 20-3. With regard to the (hier vor allem zugrunde gelegten) interpretation of Schelling's "Introduction" in the Ideen, see Wieland: Die Anfaenge der Philosophie Schellings und die Frage nach der Natur in Natur und Geschichte, K. Loewith (on his 70th Birthday), Stuttgart 1967, 420-426.
12 See 108ff. /266ff. (II, 192 ff. ) At LV/52 (II, 47), the aforementioned "appearance" had another meaning.
? 158 Appendix
conditions of thought and speculation with the conditions of being itself - a confusion based on a "speculative deception" - as "dogmatism. "13
Exposing this speculative deception proves that speculation, when it is viewed as alone sufficient for the recognition of reality, plainly fails to capture reality. In reference to its understanding of actuality, speculation is more dependent on another act of the human spirit in which thought first actually professes something real, viz. , intuition. For Schelling, intuition is a more original and more highly intellectual capacity than speculation; and since its highest potency is expressed in the production of the genius, it is more than that (something which Schelling does not discuss in the Ideen). Intuition holds a higher position of priority in the Naturphilosophie as well; in the Naturphilosophie, the real is given through intuition alone and the fundamental determination of matter in its original unity is reserved for intuition itself. The understanding merely brings the pre-conscious products of intuition to a state of consciousness in which it separates and, then, isolates those determinations. 14 This "idealist" foundation of matter15 and its fundamental determinations in the productive intuition of the Ich was - for the early Schelling - an initial vindication of the objective reality of nature and, thereby, an answer to the skeptical denial [of every form of cognitive reality. 16] Therefore, speculation - characterized here as abstracted and separated thought, i. e. as understanding - is dependent on the productive activity of intuition; Schelling emphasized this dependence much more clearly in several of the revised passages in the second edition. 17
Although the notion of speculation is - in most contexts - characterized as it was in the first edition of the Ideen, it is replaced in the second edition by the term reflection. Prior to his encounter with Hegel in Jena, Schelling
13 111/270 (II, 195). With regard to the concept of a speculative appearance, Schelling was inspired by Kant - although uses it in a completely different context. Schelling way of arguing corresponds earliest to that of the "Amphibolie der Reflexionsbegriffe" (see Kritik der reinen Vernunft, B 319ff. ). With regard to Schelling's critique of Newton's "Scheinbrauch" of principles of attraction and repulsion in particulars, also see Kant's Metaphysische Anfangsgruend der Naturwissenschaft in Bd 4 of Kant's gesammelten Schriften (Akademieausg. ), 514 f. .
14 See 131f/301ff. (II, 215f); 138ff/311ff (II, 221ff. ). Also see 127/295 (II, 211); I, 355; I,359 f u. a.
15 See (2)339, (II, 239).
16 See also 131 ftn. /302 ftn. (II, 215 ftn. ); I, 353; I, 361 f.
17 See (2)52 (II, 47); (2)322 (II, 228).
? Hegel: Hovering Over the Corpse of Faith and Reason 159
had already assigned the role of supervening, segregating, and abstracting to the understanding and opposed it to the activity of the intuition. 18 This employment of reflection is not repeated in the second edition. But the eradication of the earlier concept of speculation, which he maintains in most places in the Ideen,19 leads one to conclude that Schelling's sense of speculation had decisively drifted.
In the second edition of the Ideen, which is above all else concerned with the critique of contemporary or "reflective philosophy, one notices a marked similarity to Hegel's conceptual pair, viz. , speculation and reflection; the expression itself, "reflective philosophy" (which replaced speculative philosophy in the first edition),20 is hinted at in the subtitle of Glauben und Wissen and the conceptual pair is employed throughout the Journal essay. When Schelling speaks here of the "sublation" [Aufhebung] of the "endless estrangement" of the Reflexionsphilosophie and the "rupturings of reflection," he is openly adopting the concepts and thoughts of Hegel. Granted, Schelling spoke in similar terms of an "original division" which stood in need of being sublated [aufgehoben] in his U? ber das Verha? ltniss der Naurphilosophie zur Philosophie u? berhaupt (1802), but we can already see in that text the result of a tight collaboration between Schelling and Hegel. 21 In this revised passage in the Ideen, the term "division" - in his contrast between a natural-philosophical and a transcendental-philosophical meaning of these concepts, which Schelling also recognized earlier22 - should be understood as the condition of reflective philosophy and, moreover, a historical condition which is characteristic of an entire age (as sketched by Hegel in, above all else, the Differenz essay23). In his notion of the "sublation" [Aufhebung] of reflective oppositions and disunion, Hegel emphasizes in these years the negation, the complete annihilation of finitude, out of which a living unity
18 e. g. III, 285f; III, 501f; III, 505 f u. a.
19 Speculation in the meaning characterized above remains--probably without particular purpose--in the second edition in the following passages: XXV/15 (II,20); XLVI/41 (II, 39); LIX/60 (II, 52); 131 ftn. /302 ftn. (II, 215 ftn. ); 134/305 (II, 218); 140 ftn. /313 ftn. (II, 223 ftn. ).
20 XIX/7 (II, 14f).
21 In Hegel: Gesammelte Werke, Bd 4, 271 ff.
22 e. g. III, 297 f; III, 301 ff; IV, 7. With regard to the division of opposing activities within the Ich, see III, 626. Also, the term "Aufhebung" in the then common parlance can be found earlier in Schelling's discussions of natural philosophy; see, e. g. , 96/247 (II, 179).
23 See Hegel: Gesammelte Werke, Bd. 4, 12 ff.
? 160 Appendix
and true philosophy could emerge. 24 Schelling adopts here25 only the negative character of sublation, leaving open the possibility (contrary to Hegel's intentions) that the sublation [Aufhebung] of the division of the Reflexionsphilosophie might not coincide with the emergence of philosophy in its "absolute form. " One may well assume, in light of the indictment of Hegel in this passage of the Ideen, that Schelling meant Hegel when he refers to those "philosophers" who assume the work of critiquing the Reflexionsphilosophie. In other contexts at this time, contexts not yet discussed, Schelling was more than willing to assign a merely negative and critical function to Hegel, while reserving the positive and true presentation of the matter for himself. By restricting the meaning of negation in this way, Schelling misses what Hegel considered the decisive and positive sense of the contradiction and antinomies - viz. , that it is a negation which is brought about by reason.
In his critique of contemporary philosophy, Schelling's nemesis - with whom he argues repeatedly - is Fichte. Schelling discusses the Fichtean philosophy at the end of the appendix to the introduction in the Ideen and critiques it with arguments which come rather close to Hegel's objections. In this context, Schelling employs the concept of speculation only twice and in a sense quite distinct from the first edition. 26 Particularly in his remark at the end of this appendix, Schelling adopts Hegel's fundamental critique of Fichte - namely, that he eliminates speculation completely from true knowledge and for that reason sought the absolute in the subjectivity of faith. In this text, the presupposed meaning of speculation, as a pure rational cognition of the absolute, is the one which Hegel established in the critical essays of the Jenazeit and which he hoped to retain in his exposition of the philosophy of his time. Speculation is in this case, therefore, the opposite of reflection. Thus, this new concept of speculation may well have been the occasion for extinguishing the earlier notion of speculation as an abstract form of thought identified with the understanding and replacing it with the term "reflection. "
In the second edition of the Ideen, Schelling also uses the concept of speculation in another sense - one which diverges from the first edition - namely, as "speculative cognition" within a "speculative physics. "27 The idea of a speculative physics, and the specific notion of theory contained
24 See, e. g. , Hegel: Gesammelte Werke, Bd. 4, 17; 24; also 208. 25 XIX/7 (II, 14f).
26 See (2)86 (II, 72); (2)86 Ftn. (II, 72 ftn. ).
27 (2)83 (II, 70).
? Hegel: Hovering Over the Corpse of Faith and Reason 161
within it, was developed by Schelling for the first time after 1797. Therefore, the elimination of the earlier concept of speculation in the second edition - e. g. , when Schelling no longer designates the opposing mechanistic physics as "pure-speculation" but rather as "pure-rationalistic system"28 - certainly leads one back to a transitionary concept in the development of a speculative physics. But perhaps it should be mentioned here that certain particulars within the domain of Naturphilosophie, viz. , those concerned with a speculative physics, could be credited to Hegel as well. Indeed, Schelling appears to have borrowed the notion of the "beautiful bond," which "produces both itself and the bound unity,"29 from the Timaios passage in the Schelling chapter of the Differenz essay and incorporated it into the discussion of the relationship between masses in a physical system. But since Schelling was familiar with Plato quite early in his career, one must in this case assume a reciprocal stimulation. 30
With his idea of a speculative physics, established principally in the Einleitung zu dem Entwurf eines Systems der Naturphilosophie (1799), Schelling had already altered his earlier concept of speculation as the divided and abstract thought of the understanding. As such, it is necessary to explain the relationship between this altered conception of speculation, within the speculative physics, and the later conception of speculation as rational cognition of the absolute; if speculation qua absolute cognition were merely an imminent development of that speculative cognition within the speculative physic, one need not admit a Hegelian influence on the new characterization of speculation in the second edition of the Ideen. Above all else, however, one must take into account the fact that Schelling did not use the concept of speculation as rational cognition of the absolute for the first time there, but rather already in his "Darstellung meines Systems der Philosophie" (1801) - an essay which appeared some time prior to the Differenz essay. But if the adoption of Hegel's concept of speculation is to be assumed in the second edition of the Ideen, it will also be necessary to prove that Schelling had adopted this conception in those
28 125/292 (II, 209).
29 Hegel: Gesammelte Werke, Bd 4, 65 ftn. See Schelling: Idee (2)247 (II, 179 f. ). 30 Hegel obviously explained, in the Jenazeit, the analogy of the Timaios as well as the trinity with the help of the bond. These observations most likely do not belong to the Frankfurterzeit to which Rosenkranz attributes them (Rosenkranz: Hegel's urspruengliches System. 1798-1806 in Literarhistorisches Taschenbuch, Hrsg. v. Prutz, Leipzig 1844, 158). The Timaios passage is most likely still looming in the background for Schelling in 1806 in his remarks concerning the "absolute bond" that binds infinitude and finitude.
? 162 Appendix
texts which span from the early essays to the Identita? tssystem (1801-03). The comparison of the two editions of the Ideen merely shows that it is conceivable that Schelling's new conception of speculation, which stands in opposition to reflection, was stimulated by Hegel; a more stringent proof, however, has yet to be carried out.
II.
Schelling's development of a speculative physics implies, when compared to the first edition of the Ideen, an alteration in the concept of speculation. The function of speculative physics is characterized, quite briefly, as an a priori-like "construction" of nature - i. e. , a derivation of all appearances of nature from a singular principle. In this way, nature becomes a system; a "true system," however, is an "organic whole. "31 The decisive problem raised by this statement of speculative physics is the relationship between an a priori theoretical design on the one hand and experience on the other. In this context, Schelling identifies speculation with an a priori theory qua pure science and opposes it to the empirical (which, for Schelling, is a "mere collection of facts" and incapable of ever becoming science). 32 In the attempt to clarify the relationship between speculation and empiricism, it must nevertheless be noticed that Schelling had a very peculiar notion of an a priori judgment; for Schelling, a priori judgments were those judgments of which "one must necessarily become conscious," but whose "content is, after all, whatever one wishes it to be. "33 Therefore, special consideration must also be given to the fact that the arrangement of the particular rules, to the extent that they are unified systematically and thereby - for Schelling - already fulfill the requirement of necessity, could be expressed in an a priori judgment. Empirical and a priori judgments differ from one another merely by varying degrees of certainty and not, as in Kant, through the justification of its validity. Schelling admittedly shrinks back from the consequences of autonomy of a theory developed a priori or speculatively. He admits, then, the validity of the experiment and the empirical trial as a confirmation or disconfirmation of the theoretical design. 34 Experience is clearly the criterion by which to judge the accuracy or inaccuracy of the speculative construction of nature (the sense of which is merely regulative). Therefore,
31 See III, 278 f.
32 Ibid. , 282; also see IV, 28; IV, 32 u. a. 33 Ibid. , 278.
34 Ibid. , 277; see IV, 96 f.
? Hegel: Hovering Over the Corpse of Faith and Reason 163
Schelling's teaching on the cognitive worth of pure theory or speculation is, at the very least, inharmonious. 35
In this context, therefore, speculation no longer means divided, abstract, merely formal thinking, but instead the construction - especially the self-construction - of the theory of nature; speculation apprehends nature not only as product, but at the same time productivity: as natura naturans. 36 Proceeding from this concept of speculation, whose relationship to experience remains nonetheless duplicitous, it appears again in two formulas in the essay entitled Allgemeine Deduktion des dynamischen Processes (1800); already in these texts, the notion of speculation is approaching the formulation characteristic of the Identita? tssystem: "If speculation ascends beyond this absolute unity of opposing facts, which we think in the concept of nature, then we have no other object except the absolutely identical . . . "; this is, nonetheless, according to Schelling, displayed "for the intuition" through "the absolute deficiency in nature. "37 For speculation, the absolute unity of both powers is extended to the first "relative or synthetic" unity. 38 Speculation, therefore, strives to establish an absolute identity over the dualisms of fundamental powers of nature which absolute identity takes as its basis - namely, nature itself. Already in the early essay: Von Ich, which at one point claims, e. g. , "speculation demands the unconditioned";39 this observation is made in connection with the alternative: Idealism-Dogmatism. The meaning of speculation as the demand for the absolute unconditioned may have been suggested by, when set in the context of Fichtean thought, Kant; but the representation of speculation as a striving toward the absolute identity of nature, i. e. the notion of nature as the unity of product and productivity, is clearly borrowed from Schelling's own articulation of a speculative physics. 40 This refinement of the concept of speculation within Naturphilosophie is, however, just as clearly distinguishable from Schelling's concept of
35 Metzer, however, presents Schelling construction of a speculative physics as merely an expression of a panlogism (Die Epochen:Eine Interpretation der Frueg- und Spaetphilosophie Schellings der Schellingschen Philosophie von 1795 bis 1802, Heidelberg 1911, 82 ff. ). Chr. Wild's Reflexion und Erfahrung: (Freiburg u. Muenchen 1969, 39 ff and 45 ff. ) emphasizes the task of experience for the Naturerkenntnis in the early Schelling.
36 See IV, 96f; III, 284; also III, 298 f. 37 IV, 6.
38 IV, 9.
