If
Zarathustra
emerges with his language of self- and world-affirmation, this lan guage must convey the pressure of provocation through its radically self-eulogistic and "wanton" form.
Sloterdijk - Nietzsche Apostle
Recipients of the fifth "gospel" incur such high costs that, after a look at the balance sheet, it can be perceived only as bad news.
It is no coincidence, then, that its first herald was already pushed to break away from past and present humanity.
It demands of every potential disciple such radical abstinence with regard to tra ditional forms of life-serving illusion and bourgeois facilitation that, should this disciple seriously partake in the new message, the disciple would find himself alone with an unliveable disillusionment.
The odd renewal of eulogistic energies in an alternative linguistic current first opens onto a proposition designed to transmit via speech an evangel propped up on a "dis-evangel"-the expression dates from Nietzsche himself, who thus denotes St Paul's "actual" teaching.
Eugen Rosenstock-Huessy also adopts this term to characterize the major interpreters of reality in the 1 9th century-Marx, Gobineau, Nietzsche and Freud-as the first "dis evangelists" of modern dumbfoundedness: we will speak somewhat more soberly of them as the founders of discursive games about the real.
The fifth "gospel" sets out from a work of illu sion-destruction for which there is no parallel. It is
oriented around the norm of the Gay Science, which, in truth, is the most desperate science ever to have been launched, since it presupposes a level of disenchantment that plunges to almost suicidal depths. It virtually corresponds to vagus death caused by disappointment. Nietzsche never doubted that there was an indissoluble relation of production between his chronic illness and his lucidity about things psychological and metaphysi cal. His own life was for him the "experiment of the discerning"; his suffering he understood as redemption for his cognitions. And the more he paid off, the further he was carried away by his thinking and states from existing human commu nities. He drifted further and further toward an inexorable exteriority with regard to the menda cious conditions of societies. He looked upon the idols of the tribe, the market, and the cave from a distance that did not cease to grow. His private mythos of the Hyperboreans was a way of describing his sojourn in the cold as a gay and voluntary exile. He had no right to believe that he possessed in this any shared point of departure with contemporary readers; still less could he permit himselfthe supposition that he might find followers wanting to learn their lessons in similar conditions. Hence the persistent reference to his fateful loneliness; hence his view of the world as "a
40 !
door to a thousand deserts, empty and cold. " Hence, also, the mistrust he displayed toward anyone who might have dared to tap the author approvingly on the shoulder. In the chapter called "The Convalescent," Zarathustra illustrates the price of the new message when in encountering his "most abyssal thought" of disgust and disappoint ment he faints and, upon waking, hangs between life and death for seven days. The truth has "in truth" the form of an illness leading to death: it is an attack on the aletheiological immune system, which leaves people hanging at the geometrical place of lies and health. Whoever wants to resist the disruption of the hitherto known economy of illusions, has to be something other than what had been known as known human to date-a surviver vaccinated against the madness of the truth. The economic paradox of Nietzsche's good news consists in the indication that the primary, immeasurably bad news must be recompensed by an as yet unproven mobilization of creative counter-energies. The overman concept is a wager on the distant possibility of such compensation: "We have art so that we do not go to ground on the truth"-this means: we have the prospect of the overman in order that unbearable insights into the unveiled human condition may be endured. Such an offer appears as an advertisement for that which inspires
FiM1 I 41
terror. This is why the whole ofZarathustra had to take the form of an extended prelude: in its narra tive parts, it deals with nothing other than the hesitation of the herald before the announcing of his own message.
However, if one wants to have cheaper access to the new privileges of the herald, regardless of effects of terror and experimental reservations and this is the formula that practically charac terizes the whole history of Nietzsche redaction in the anti-democratic movement, including its later revisions in democratic ideology critique then one has to split the newly won eulogistic functions from the necessary enlightenment prior to it and its work of destruction, and lift the quotation marks from the password "gospel," that is, erase its newness and its irony. Nietzsche was aware of the absurd costs of his undertaking and doubted often enough whether recovering an evangelic-eulogistic stance from perfect nihilism remained, existentially speaking, a sen sible reckoning. In 1884, he wrote to Malvida von Meysenbug:
I have things on my soul that are one hundred times heavier to bear than la betise humaine. It is possible that I am a doom, the doom for all future people-and it is henceforth very possible
42 /
that one day I will become mute, out of love for humanity! ! !
Let's register the three exclamation marks after the suggested possibility of his falling silent. Every explanation of the Nietzschean message has above all to answer the question of how it is possible that the announcement won out over its internal inhi bitions. This would be tantamount to explaining how the dis-angelic factors could prevail against the eulogistic motifs in the process of offsetting them. And in this revision it would be necessary to examine the calculation as such in its immanent correctness. Does not everything point to the idea that according to Nietzsche the bad news possesses an edge over the good news that cannot be com pensated for, whereas all attempts to give primacy to the latter are based only on momentary vigor and temporary self-hypnosis? Yes, isn't Nietzsche thereby exactly the paradigmatic thinker of moder nity insofar as it is defined by the impossibility of catching up with the real through counter-factual corrections? Is modernity not defined by a con sciousness that runs ahead of the monstrousness of facts, for which discourses about art and human rights only ever consist in compensation and first aid. And for this reason is the contemporary
world, forced to admit the superiority of the
dreadful, not precisely incapable of uttering high praise from then on.
As far as Nietzsche is concerned, he knew very well that he would, for the time being, be the sole reader of Zarathustra to be seized by it; his fifth "Gospel" is, as he almost rightly says, "dark and buried and grotesque for everyone," and this is so not only on account of its prematurity. It cannot be predicted how such a document, which neces sarily renders anyone trying to spread it grotesque, could become the point of departure for a new eulogistic chain in which the spokesperson would stand to win. As, for the time being, anyone pro fessing to want to cite a passage from the fifth "gospel," renders himself even more infeasible from a bourgeois and academic standpoint than would someone attempting to do so with the unabridged form of the first four. This can in no way be altered by the conspiracy of the infeasible, who improvised their "braggart empire" by appealing to a few heavily distorted and cut up fragments of Nietzsche, translated into banal and national-populist language. No pair of scissors can save the chants of Zarathustra for the language games of the stock-standard enlightenment. Nietzsche-uncut only opens up to those who are lost enough to be able to reinvent the notion of redemption for themselves. Assuming that Nietzsche
himself had known this from the start-and the biographical and literary evidence speaks in favor of this-what could still make him believe that a new era of discourse would begin with him? How did he propose to go from the ridiculous to the sublime, from the sublime to freedom-and who could have done it after him? To solve this enigma, we will have to examine in more detail Nietzsche's sketches for an ethics ofgenerosity.
3
TOTAL SPONSORING
To learn more about Nietzsche's theory and praxis of generosity, it is also-or above all-necessary to address his "megalomania," supposing this an appropriate designation for this author's extraordi nary talent to speak about himself, his mission, and his writings in the highest of tones. Perhaps this issue here is one for which the expression addressed to the publisher about the "good news,'' "something for which there is yet no name," is once again appropriate. The alternative designa tions used to encompass the first parts of Thus Spoke Zarathustra, "Poem" and "Gospel," should also be kept in reserve as a way of qualifying Nietzsche's megalomaniacal remarks.
Megalomania, then, or poetry, or something for which there is yet no name: what follows is advisably approached with a provision of alternative
41
expressions, to avoid getting stuck with a designa tion reflex that is first best. The exposure value of Nietzsche's most conspicuous statements about himselfare so excessive that even the most favorable, the most free-spirited reader, yes even those who are willingly dazed, will look away from these passages as though not wanting to have perceived, to have countersigned, what has been committed to paper and put into print. It is possible to stare fixedly neither at the sun nor at the self-praise of the mad-for this reason we read these unbearable outbursts of self-awareness with self-praise pro tective eye-wear. We tone down that which cannot penetrate unfiltered into a reader's eyes without his having to look away out of a sense of shame for the unbridled other, or else out of one of tact,
which advises us not to use the moments in which an excited person bares himself against him. Among Nietzsche lovers it is a mark of decency not to cite this sort of thing, is it not? Today, however, we must deviate from the norm of the amateur.
The fact that a psychologist without equal is speaking in my works, this is perhaps the first thing a good reader will realize-the sort of reader I deserve, who reads me as good old philologists read their Horace. 1
Does anyone at the end of the nineteenth cen tury have a dear idea of what poets in strong ages called inspiration? If not, I will describe it . . . . This is my experience of inspiration; I do not doubt that you would need to go back thousands of years to find anyone who would say: "it is mine as well. "2
My Zarathustra has a special place for me in my writings. With it, I have given humanity the greatest gift it has ever received. 3
Leaving aside the poets: perhaps nothing has ever been done with such an excess of energy. Here, my concept of the "Dionysian" became the highest deed; all the rest of human activity looks poor and limited in comparison. The fact that a Goethe, a Shakespeare, would not know how to breathe for a second in this incredible passion and height. . . all this is the least that can be said, and does not give you any real idea of the dis tance, of the azure solitude this work lives in . . . The collective spirit and goodness of all great souls would not be capable ofproducing a single one of Zarathustra's speeches . . . . Until then, you do not know what height, what depth really is; you know even less what truth is. . . . Wisdom, investigations of the soul, the art of speaking none of this existed before Zarathustra. 4
. . . an old friend has just written to say that she is laughing at me. . . And this at a moment
Totai Sponsoring I 49
when an unspeakable responsibility rests on me-when no word can be too gentle, no look respectful enough for me. Because I am carrying the destiny of humanity on my shoulders. 5
When I measure myself by what I can do. . . I have better claims to the word "great" than any other mortal. 6
My lot would have it that I am the first decent human being, that I know myself to be opposing the hypocrisy of millennia. . . I was the first to discover the truth because I was the first to see-to smell-lies for what they are. . . I am a bearer of glad tidings as no one ever was before. . . Starting with me, the earth will know great politics . . . 7
I would like to suggest that we dwell a little longer on these unbearable phrases and slowly remove the protective eye-wear that has for a cen tury spared readers the need to engage with this eruptive, obscene profusion of self-praise and self-objectivization. I make this suggestion on the assumption that we are dealing not with some subjective disinhibition in the usual sense, or with a morbid way of letting oneself go, or even with traces of puerility, as commentators like Thomas Mann and Karl Jaspers have discerned in Nietzsche. Against the aforementioned background oflanguage
50 !
philosophy, it seems plausible to assume here that the dam behind which the self-eulogistic discursive energies had been accumulating in the most advanced civilizations finally burst, in a single indi vidual. Today we enjoy a safe distance of one hundred years that enables us to see these detona tions of self-awareness from sufficient distance. Added to this, we benefit from a large shift in men tality, a shift that traverses the 20th century toward a greater permissiveness in the expression ofnarcis sistic affects. And, finally, Nietzsche's description ofhimselfin Ecce Homo as a "buffoon" suggests the prospect of considering his Dionysian exaggerations from the aspect ofvoluntary grotesqueness. All this makes it easier to bracket the embarrassment and muster up a bit more courage.
I would also like to contend that Nietzsche's "narcissism" is less pertinent a phenomenon from the point of individual psychology than the marker of a cut in the linguistic history of old Europe. At bottom, it signifies the disclosure of the nature of authorship and literary discourse. The discursive event which bears the name Nietzsche is characterized by the infringement, within him, of the high culture separation between the Good News and self-celebration-which in addition unveils what it is that a modern author does: he posits the text
for himself The economy of eulogistic and miso logical discourse and its foundation in the taboo weighing on self-praise are simultaneously opened up to debate. The legitimization ofthis turn can be gleaned from Nietzsche's critique of metaphysics and morality. In it the order of lies, that in which indirect eulogy is grounded, becomes altogether transparent, laying bare the mechanisms ofcontor tion that have materialized in phrases such as "One who is humble will be elevated," or servir et dis paraitre. If it is true that this separation of praise from self is nothing other than a deferment effected through resentment, an everlasting adjournment of the moment in which an orator could say to his own existence, "linger a while so that I can praise you," one may thus understand Nietzsche's attacks against discretion as acts ofrevision that contradict the traditional morality of self-dispossession in an almost furious way. We must go back to late middle-age mysticism to be able, at least from afar, to encounter comparable phenomena. Spectacular and embarrassing as they are, they serve to restore the possibility of forging the most direct link between self and praise. What Nietzsche has in mind is not indistinctly to rejoice over oneself as bare existence: he deaves with all his might to the idea that existence must earn its exultation, or better: that it has to grow into its exultation. As no
other modern thinker, Nietzsche espouses the adaequatio iubilationis et intellectus. If there is any correspondence between its existence and good reputation, an existence must become enhanced to such an extent that the best may be said about it. Existence may well be an a priori chance for self praise; however, self-eulogistic discourse can only become legitimate a posteriori at the level of culture. Between the chance and its realization, the bridge is created by "egocentrism"-this long maligned dimension in which the best possibilities of humankind were arrested incognito. It is the selfish impulses, insofar as they are also work-obsessed, upon which Nietzsche bestows with a philosophical consecration. Belated self-praise condenses the premonition of one's own becoming and the con summation of egocentrism together in the image of self: how it is that one becomes what one is, grasping the randomness of being "me. " The "full" self-image is "realized," perhaps, in a moment, when the most ambitious anticipations of one's own ability to become are confirmed with a review of life lived. This is the type of moment spoken of on the single page inserted at the start ofEcce Homo:
On this perfect day, when everything is ripening and not only the grape turns brown, the eye of
/53
the sun just fell upon my life; I looked back, I looked forward, and never saw so many and such good things at once. (. . . ) How could Ifail to be grateful to my whole lifa? 8
If a life's elevated possibilities increase, self-praise can unfold in analogue fashion: once again the work praises the master, who is poised to disappear into the work. And it is precisely this correspon dence that creates the scandal-this limitless talking up ofmanifest and squandered wealth, this jubilatory self-review after the deed done, this complete dissolution of life in luminous positings, which remain as works of language: they form the counter-offence to the offence of the cross, exclaimed by St Paul, with which the blockade against the connection between self and praise was solidified.
That Nietzsche fittingly assessed the implica tions for the politics of language of his belated embarrassment and interpreted them on a grand historical scale can in fact be seen in the vocabulary ofhis late texts, in which the expression "cynicism" comes conspicuously to the surface. Nietzsche, the philologist, was attentive to the fact that his philo sophical battle-cry, the "re-evaluation of all values," harked back to a kynical fragment that describes the protest strategy of Diogenes of Sinope: "recoin
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the money''; he was cognizant of the fact that the appearance he emitted in the texts of 1888 could necessarily seem to be a reemergence of "Socrates gone mad. " But this is exactly what mattered to him: he pursued the reevaluation of all the source value of embarrassment, the revision of misological manners, the abolition of borders, which, for a whole age, had been drawn between creative life and its self-eulogizing force. So, on the 20th of November, 1888, Nietzsche felt able to write to the Danish critic Brandes that:
I have talked about myselfwith a cynicism that will become world historical. The book is called Ecce Homo. . .
In the section of this book called Why I write such good books Nietzsche makes the following remarks about his works:
they sometimes reach the highest elevation you will find anywhere on earth, cynicism. 9
The expression "cynicism" used in these passages indicates two directions: the first is the elevation of questions of diet and health to a level that is quasi evangelical-a turn which sums up a good part of the 1 9th and 20th centuries and already sketches the direction of the 21st in its generality; and the second is the merging of the Good News
with self-eulogizing energies. That's why the meaning of the words "cynical" and "evangelical" is henceforth in this specific case the same. At the point where their meanings intersect they signify exactly what it is that a modern author does: exhibit oneself, transform oneself in writing, ren der oneself "infeasible. " Nietzsche: "I have never taken a step in public that did not compromise me: that is my criterion for acting right. "10 Singing-one's-own praise of a life which affirms and realizes itself as artistic composition is right ly seen as the only authentic discursive form still able to merit the qualification evangelical. As message this form is simply good, when and if it comprises the self-communication of the success ful-and a sympathizing with it. It speaks the language of a life that not only has the right to make a promise but can also endorse it-and the bigger the resistance provoked by the affirmation, the more authentic its occurrence. One might call the language-traces of such a life Spinozist since they are "expressions" in the sense that they serve to announce a force of being. They breach the constraints of traditional bivalent logic, which had required for the speaker always to choose between one of two things-either vouch for god, which was unavoidably connected with the refusal of the hateful ego, or vouch for the Ego,
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which traditionally could be understood only as the satanic renunciation of god.
In the new language position Nietzsche presents himself not as a poetic redeemer, but instead as an enricher of a new type. One could label Nietzsche the first real sponsor, on the condition that we devote some time to explaining his art of giving gifts that exceed the common discourse ofgifts and poisons. Nietzsche's sponsorship of humanity starts out with the assumption that, by giving indi viduals ordinary gifts, one implicates them in a base economy: in this economy, the enhancement of the giver inevitably goes hand-in-hand with the offence of the receiver. If anyone seeks to give a more distinguished gift, it can only involve the giving of an unreciprocable gift with no strings attached. The only gift measuring up to this ambi tion is the bestowal of a title of nobility, which excuses the new bearer from the obligation to refer to the bestower. With this in view, Nietzsche invents some take-and-run gifts that take the form of aphorisms, poems and arguments. After Nietzsche it is possible for anyone to become noble ifhe rises to the sponsor's challenge. But this discourse about titles of nobility is itself provocative: what the sponsor bestows is the opposite of a title that one could "bear. " The nobility in question here cannot
be gleaned from any of the historical forms of aris tocracy. This is Nietzsche's decision thesis, namely the idea that the history of humanity is yet to know real nobility-except perhaps in the mild idiocy of the figure of Jesus and the sovereign hygiene of Buddha. However, in his view the latter incarnate deficient forms of generosity, since both are grounded in a retreat from the vita activa. They are waiting to be outdone by world-affirming, creative attitudes toward life-whence arises the ethical mandate of art, for the entire dimension of future history. From then on, historical nobleness pos sessed as a good has no value, because what could be designated as noble in feudal times was scarcely anything other than power-protected meanness. "The rabble above, the rabble below"-the words by the voluntary beggars about the rich and power ful of the present moment, to be found in the fourth part of Zarathustra, apply retroactively to historical evidence. The qualifier noble can no longer be defended through convention, to the extent noble should be the title for the birth of a deed or a thought based on an unresentful, far aiming force. Nobility is a position with respect to the future. Nietzsche's innovative gift consists in provoking one to engage in a way of being in which the receiver would take up an active force as sponsor, that is to say, in the ability to open up
richer futures. Nietzsche is a teacher of generosity in the sense that he infects the recipients of his gifts with the idea of wealth, which is necessarily not worth acquiring unless with a view to being able to squander it.
Whoever gives the provocation of gift-giving has the right to consider himself as being at the start of a new moral functional chain. Thereby is time in its entirety newly interpreted: as a delay in the future proliferation of generosity, "history" acquires content in excess of the causality that had reigned till then. The future of humanity is a test ofwhether it is possible to supersede resentment as the foremost historical force. In the ascending line of gift-giving virtues, life praises itself as an immeasurable proliferation of chances to be given. It finds the reason for its thankful praise in its participation in events ofgenerosity. History splits into the time of the economy of debt and the time of generosity. Whereas the former thinks of repay ment and retaliation, the latter is interested only in forwards-donating. Wittingly or otherwise, every life will in future be dated in accordance with this criterion: "One lives before him, one lives after him. . . "
It pays to take a closer look at the original act of the generosity-chain inaugurated by Nietzsche, since conditions ofbonding can be seen in it, from
Tota! Sponsor-! nq I 59
which it is alone possible to draw the sole valid criterion for enabling us to divide legitimate from illegitimate references to Nietzsche. It is decisive that the new "loose" chain begins with an uncon ditional gesture of expenditure, since the giver can only breach the circle of a savings-rationality through pure self-expenditure. Only unbilled expenditure has sufficient spontaneity and cen trifugal force to escape the gravitational field of avarice and its calculus. Savers and capitalists always expect to get more back than they stake, while the sponsor gets his satisfaction without any regard for "revenue. " This applies to sentences as much as to donations. What Nietzsche calls the innocence of becoming is essentially the innocence of expenditure and eo ipso the innocence of enrich ment, sought for the sake of the possibility to expend. The leap into generosity transpires through affirming the prosperity of oneself and others, since this is the necessary premise of generosity. If there is a leap [Ursprung] into generosity, then it resides in the challenge that open generosity makes to concealed generosity. Part of Nietzsche's idea of the art of giving is that the giver-ifhe cannot remain concealed, which is a priori impossible for an author-cannot present himselfin a false perfection, since he would thereby lie his way out of the world and continue simply
to fool the receiver, which is tantamount to a humiliation. Rather, when encouraging the receiver to accept the donation, he should also disclose his infirmities and idiosyncrasies, however without denying the level of the gift. Only this yields the "master-art of kindness. "11 A little vanity, a little turning in the narcissistic circle must come into play. Integral self-affirmation encompasses the everyday things that the regime of metaphysical misology had talked down, and stands in gratitude to them for the gift of being able to give. In this exercise, Nietzsche, the enlightener, can abide by the 1 9th-century custom of explaining authors on the basis of their milieus. If the author is immortal, his tics will also be.
If Zarathustra emerges with his language of self- and world-affirmation, this lan guage must convey the pressure of provocation through its radically self-eulogistic and "wanton" form. The impact of Nietzsche's sayings and arrows, which take the form of pure dictates, become for easily provoked readers a therapeutic insult eliciting an immune reaction. This corre sponds to a vaccination procedure at the moral level. Anyone who has become a sponsor some other way will perhaps know that it is possible to become one without Nietzsche. Those who are not yet sponsors, however, can experience how he infects them with the memory of the possibility of
Total Sponsoring I 61
generosity-a memory that the receiver cannot let sit, to the extent he is ready and able to enter into the noble space of resonance. That the non receivers pursue other dealings is, on another level, certainly also perfectly fine.
Erupting from the motive of "virtuous giving" is a spring ofpluralism leading beyond all expecta tions of unity. The nature of provocative generosity is such that it is unable to be alone and wants even less to be so. The sponsor's generosity as such aims to generate dissensus, which is to say competition. It would consider itself to have failed were it to be said it had obtained a monopoly. To be as it would like to be, it must posit competition. It would prefer to lay itself open to rejection, than it would to subordinate imitations. The generous, then, stand in opposition to the good, who for Nietzsche are rightly called decadents, since they-as we have known since the Genealogy ofMoratS-pursue the dream of monopolizing merely good sentiments. For them, bad is anything that expects that they prove their goodness; while anything which belabors their consensus with questions and exits their circle of blackmail strikes them as immediately devilish. In Nietzsche, decadence represents the epitome of conditions in which resentment is guaranteed it will always hit upon its ideal lan guage situation. The relations bearing witness to
62 I Nietzsche Apcs1le
decadence are those in which "the yes-man [Mucker] is in charge"-to put it in Nietzsche's words. If the good are so good, it is onlyfaute de mieux. The decadence ideal holds power only so long as, and because, "it has not had any competi- tion. "12 That is why if one wants to oppose the better to the good in questions of gospel, one must
resolve to count to five.
4
OF SUNS AND HUMANS
If, today, one hundred years after Nietzsche's death, we look back at this author for authors and non-authors and grasp his place in his time, we become aware that Nietzsche-for all his claims to originality and despite his pride at being the first in essential things-was in many respects actually only a privileged medium for the execution of tendencies that in one way or another would have forged ahead without him. His achievement consists in knowing how to transform an accident of the name Friedrich Nietzsche into an event, provided that we understand by event the poten tiation of the accidental into the destinal. Destiny might also be spoken of in the case where a designer latches onto that something that is going to happen in any event, impelling it further, and stamping his name on it. In this sense Nietzsche is
65
a destiny-or, as one would say today, a trend designer. The trend which he embodied and gave form to was the individualist wave, which, since the Industrial Revolution and its cultural projec tions in romanticism, had proceeded inexorably through modern civil society and has not ceased doing so. Individualism, then, is to be understood not as an accidental or avoidable current in the history of mentalities, but rather as an anthropo logical break which first made possible the emer gence of a type of human being surrounded by enough media and means ofdischarge to be able to individualize counter to its "societal precondi tions. " In individualism is articulated the third post-historical insulation of "human beings" after the first, prehistorical in nature, led to its emancipation from nature, and the second, his torical one, led to the "reign of man over man. "1 Individualism constantly forges changing alliances with all that has made up the modern world: with progress and reaction, with left-wing and right-wing political programs, with national and transnational motives, with masculinist, femi nist and infantilist projects, with technophile and technophobe sentiments, with ascetic and hedo nist moralities, with avant-gardist and conservative conceptions of art, with analytical and cathartic therapies, with sporty and non-sporty lifestyles,
with performance readiness and refusal of per formance, with belief in success as well as unbelief in it, with still Christian as well as no-longer Christian forms of life, with ecumenical openings and local closings, with humanist and post humanist ethics, with the ego necessarily able to accompany all my representations, as well as with the dissolved self, which exists only as the hall of mirrors of its masks. Individualism is capable of alliances with all sides, and Nietzsche is its designer, its prophet.
Nietzsche's pretention to be an artist and much more than an artist is grounded in his radical, modern concept ofsuccess: for him, at stake is not only to throw products on today's market, but instead to create the market wave itself, by which the work is belatedly carried to success. In this way he anticipated the strategies of the avant-garde, which Boris Groys has described in his already classic work on The TotalArt ofStalinism. If one wants to be a market leader, one must first operate as a market maker. And to be successful as a mar ket maker, one must anticipate and endorse what many will choose once they learn they are allowed to want. Nietzsche had understood that the phenome non that would emerge irresistibly in tomorrow's culture was the need to distinguish oneself from the mass. It was immediately present to him that
CJt Suns
the stuff out of which the future would be made, could be found in individuals' demands to be better and other than the rest, and thereby precisely better than all others. The theme of the 20th century is self-referentiality, in the systemic as well as the psychological senses. Only: self-referential systems are autological and self-eulogistic systems. The author Nietzsche still has this knowledge in advance over contemporary theory. On his under standing, or rather intuition, he created, in his lifetime, the conditions for his twofold posthu mous success: he inscribed his name in the list of classics, which throughout culture are handed down as reference points of approval and critique. This is what he described as his fulfilled need for immortality; in addition, however, through the detour of his first interpreters and intermediaries, he above all imposed his name as a brand name for a successful immaterial product, for a literary lifestyle-drug or an elevated way-of-life. This is the Nietzschean design of individualism: We free spirits! We who live dangerously! When the author iden tifies himself as author, the self-eulogistic melody appears; when the market-maker launches the brand, the advertisement appears. Nietzsche libe rated modern language in associating eulogies with publicity. Only a jester, only a poet, only a copywriter. This connection alone enables us to
understand how that most resolute proponent of high culture could have yielded effects on mass culture. It is undeniable that Nietzsche's second success, his seduction as brand, or as ethos and attitude, in the field of individualism, by far con stitutes his greatest effect-and also contains his more distant future possibilities. Indeed, it is pre cisely because the Nietzsche life-style-brand, far more than the name of the author, still radiates an almost irresistible attraction, that, over the course ofthe last third ofthe 20th century, with the onset of the overtly individualist conjuncture of the post-May '68 period, it could recover from the incursions of fascist redactors and their copies. Doubtless, the author Nietzsche, even given the then dire state of editing, was unacceptable to national-socialist collectivism and that the brand Nietzsche alone-and indeed only in rare and par ticular aspects-suggested itself for reproduction in national pop culture. To understand this point, we have to factor in the fact that, procedurally, fascism is nothing other than the incursion of pop and kitsch-procedures into politics. As Clement Greenberg already showed in 1939-confronting the critical case-kitsch is the world language of triumphant mass culture. It depends on the mechanized forgery ofsuccess. Pop and kitsch are, culturally as politically, short-cut procedures to get
Of Suns and Humans I 69
to the apparent taste of the masses. With this they content themselves with copying success and, with copies of the successful in hand, with triumphing once again. Hitler's success strategy as pop and kitsch politician consisted in tying a pop-nationalism with an event-militarism, as the simplest way to have the narcissism of the masses effervesce. In doing so, radiophone acquisition techniques and open-air paramilitary liturgies played the key roles. Through them, the population learned that it shall be a people and that it had to listen to the rabble rousing voices of its projected self. In this sense, all fascism is an effect of redaction. It is deutero fascistic from the start, since it has no original; if a derivative can be insurrectionary, it is precisely by way of an insurrection of scissors, which always know what they must cut, how, and to what ends. From the energetic aspect, fascism is the event culture of resentment-a definition, incidentally, which renders intelligible the shocking convertibility of leftwing affects into rightwing ones, and vice versa. So long as publicness functions as a director's theater of resentment, the ability to rape texts and to seduce the public as a "mass" is presupposed. Brand Nietzsche could play a role in the semantic advertising drives of the NS-Movement insofar as their imitations omitted his basic assessments, as implacably individualistic and avant-gardist as
they are, and retained only the "fast climber" atti tudes, along with a martial decor of the dictum. Hitler's clique edited Nietzsche with scissors and pasted him into a collectivist gospel-shortly before, moreover, Nietzsche's sister had employed her scissors to prepare a ready-made of brand Nietzsche. To the shame of German academic phi losophy after 1933, one is forced to remark that it did exactly the same thing on its level, as did the anti-Nietzscheans, who are still today unable to do more than merely compile their self-pasted incrimination files-but how far must one reach back to find university philosophers who do not philosophize with scissors? The National Socialists, resolute editors of everything that guaranteed social and national success, were able to retain far less of Nietzsche than Jefferson could of Jesus-most of his writings were too inappropriate for their kitsch system, too anti-nationalist, too anti-German, too anti-philistine, too anti-revanchist, too anti-collec tivist, too anti-militarist, too anti-antirationalist, too disdainful of every concept of "national self-interest" [Volker-Selbstsucht],2 and, finally, to mention the decisive barrier, too incompatible with any politics of resentment, regardless of whether this presents itselfas nationalist or socialist or as a multi-purpose form ofvengeance politics; national/socialist. That there is no path leading from Nietzsche to the
German's posing as masters must be obvious to
anyone who's come into contact with his writings too incisive was Nietzsche's insight that Germans, whether they have graduated or not, have as their temptation not to feel good if they cannot belittle others-but what else is Nietzsche's moral philo sophical oeuvre if not a single exercise in overcoming the need to disparage others? That nationalist politics rests on the pathetic propensity to humiliate foreigners-who has brought this into sharper focus than Nietzsche, and who was able to trace hooliganism to Wilhelmina? Nietzsche, to be sure, is anti-egalitarian, but this is not in order to make common cause with revenge-hungry populists, as German moral philosophers, whose differences can no longer impress, avidly continue to assert in the wisdom of their years. Instead, it is in order to defend the freedom of self-enhancement against the consumerdom of the last men. From one per spective only is a concession to be made to those who disparage Nietzsche and attempt to guard against his influence. It is correct that Nietzsche, as the designer of a brand of "destiny," was obliged to ask himself whether his products should not have been endowed with better copy protection and whether the brand should even have been allowed to appear next to the authorial name. Could he not have known that from the riff-raff he repelled,
l2 I
his most tenacious clientele could emerge? Proof that these questions did not escape Nietzsche's consideration can be seen-that is, apart from Zarathustra's prophetic sayings, more or less criti cal of the Church, about the parasites of the noble soul3-in certain letters and work notes in which he pondered, in dread of the monstrousness of his insights, whether to abdicate from his authorship. However, even if he had done this, it would have been imperative to disclose why he gave up being an author-and the result would have been nearly the same. Perhaps Nietzsche knew the answer to such objections in advance, as he did for nearly everything else: "I am not on my guard for deceivers, I have to be without caution-my fate wants it so. "4
In order to gauge what was unique in Nietzsche's great success as individualism's trend designer, a comparison with alternative designs suggests itself There are only a few strong versions of his epoch-making expression "become what you are" and the corresponding "do what you will. " Ultimately the work of one single author can serve as a rival project and foil to Nietzsche's own, one
who the author of The Gay Science himself inci dentally named "a glorious, great nature," not without adding that to date the most ingenious philosophical writer of the 1 9th century had been
/ 73
an American, namely Ralph Waldo Emerson. If Nietzsche's design of life in self-creating individu ality is presented under the title "Free spirits," Emerson brings his product on the market under the brand name "non-conformism. " It is to this that the greatest of Emerson's early essays are devoted; the beacon with whom American philoso phy yielded to its first astonished witnesses the proof of its existence. Not coincidentally, this was under the heading Self-Reliance, a prose piece of barely thirty pages, incomparable in its a-systemic density, the declaration of independence of the American essay and the revocation of American servitude to the European canon, and to every canon in general. What takes shape in him is an anti-humility program which, over the course of the next one hundred and fifty years, would reveal itself as the specific timbre ofAmerican freedom a color that dominated until the '70s of last century, before US academia dedicated itself to the import of European maso-theories. But in the year of 1841, the inundation of critical theory was still a ways off:
To believe your own thought, to believe that what is true for you in your private heart is true for all men-that is genius. Speak your latent conviction, and it shall be the universal sense; for
the inmost in due time becomes the outmost and our first thought is rendered back to us by the trumpets of the Last Judgment. ( . . . ) Great works of art have no more affecting lesson for us than this. They teach us to abide by our spontaneous impression with good-humored inflexibility than most when the whole cry of voices is on the other side. Else, tomorrow a stranger will say (. . . ) precisely what we have thought and felt all the time, and we shall be forced to take with shame our own opinion from another.
(. . . ) but God will not have his work made manifest by cowards. ( . . . ) Trust thyself: every heart vibrates to that iron string.
Society everywhere is in conspiracy against the manhood of every one of its members.
Society is a joint-stock company, in which the members agree, for the better securing of his bread to each shareholder, to surrender the liberty and culture of the eater. The virtue in most request is conformity. Self-reliance is its aversion. It loves not realities and creators, but names and customs.
Whoso would be a man must be a noncon formist. He who would gather immortal palms must not be hindered by the name of goodness, but must explore if it be goodness. Nothing is at
last sacred but the integrity of your own mind. Absolve you to yourself, and you shall have the suffrage of the world
Your goodness must have some edge to it else it is none. The doctrine of hatred must be preached as the counteraction of the doctrine of love when that pules and whines. (. . . ) I would write on the lintels of the door-post, Whim. ( . . . ) we cannot spend the day in explanation.
Leave your theory, as Joseph his coat in the hand of the harlot, and flee.
To be great is to be misunderstood. (. . . ) Your conformity explains nothing. Act singly, and what you have already done singly will justify you now.
The centuries are conspirators against the sanity and authority of the soul . . . history is an impertinence and an injury, if it be any thing more than a cheerful apologue or parable of my being and becoming.
"To the persevering mortal," said Zoroaster, "the blessed Immortals are swift. "5
Emerson possesses a temporal advance over Nietzsche, in addition to a psycho-political one. Since while Emerson's non-conformism seems as if it were made to unfold, against a certain resistance, toward an ambivalent narcissism of the mass, one
still balanced by democracy at the end of the day, Nietzsche's free spirit brand ran a greater risk of being imitated by a success-hungry movement of losers. Fascisms, past and future, are politically nothing other than insurrections ofenergy-charged losers, who, for a time of exception, change the rules in order to appear as victors. The Nietzsche brand was recuperated by losers and loser-redactors, because it promised to be the brand of winners. As this horrific episode did not and could not last, Emerson's project won out over Nietzsche's on the brand front. That's why most of us today are non conformists, not free spirits. Our average thoughts and feelings are all made in the USA, not made in Sils-Maria.
The significance of this difference can be seen by returning again to Nietzsche, the author. When, in the euphoric productions of the first parts ofZarathustra, he undertook the most radical short circuit between self-praising discourse and evangelical discourse, his concept of "Dionysian" had necessarily; according to the author, become the "highest fact. " In these colorful episodes ofwriting, Nietzsche, as never before or after, amended lan guage use by producing a discourse that was a pure self-advert of creative ecstasy. Even so, he was not exactly correct in exclusively reserving the predi cate "Dionysian" for his "highest deed. " What
Of Suns and Humans I 77
came to light in these expression-eruptions, rather were more Apollonian irradiations, in which Dionysian fragmentations appeared to have been overcome. It is not by chance that, in the gospel according to Zarathustra, the sun-the star of Apollo-plays the role of the exemplary Being, and it falls to the new prophet to perfect himself in imitation of the sun. ''All that I touch becomes light"-only suns can talk in this way about them selves. This applies above all to their most important gestures and talents-the readiness to over-expend themselves unconditionally and the ability to set without regret. In both respects the teachings of the late Nietzsche point to an imitation solis. The sun alone is heroic right to the moment of setting and remains generous until it goes down. "Heroism is the good will to absolute self-demise," the author had once written for his young Russian girlfriend. Only suns can be so profligate that they can be placed under the guardianship of rational heirs, when the economic ideas ofthe latter manage to prevail. Only the sun has a giving virtue as first nature; only suns care nothing for the sym metry between giving and taking; only suns shine sovereignly over proponents and opponents; and only suns read no critiques. On this last point the author Nietzsche did not totally succeed in his becoming-sun. Moreover, there are also some other
78 I Nietzsche Apostle
respects that give ground for suspIC10n that Nietzsche's sun participates far more in humanity than the metaphor betrays. This begins with Zarathustra's first address to it: "You great star! What would your happiness be if you had not those for whom you shine? (. . . ) we. . . took your overflow from you and blessed you for it. "6 And it culminates in Zarathustra's prayer to his will:
That I may one day be ready and ripe in the great noon;
-ready for myself and for my most hidden will; a bow burning for its arrow, an arrow burning for its star-
-a star ready and ripe in its noon, glowing, skewered, blissful with annihilating arrows of the sun-
-a sun itself and an inexorable will of the sun. . . 7
One sees in these phrases that the author sympa thizes neither with philosophical hallucinations, which proclaim the flight into identity in the name of the "subject," nor with the philosophy of dia logue, in which subjects address each other face to face or accuse each other of turning away from dialogue. Nietzsche's interests are directed at a theory of the penetrated penetration, an ethics of
overflowing into and entering into others, a logic of absorption and of new-radiation. He does not know of symmetrical discussions, negotiation, of the middle-value between banalities, but instead of inter-solar relations, the traffic of rays from start to star, the penetration from viscera to viscera, being pregnant and making-pregnant. "In the belly ofthe whale I become the herald oflife. "8 His interest lies not in opinions but in emanations. On an intellec tual level he is a radical bisexual, a star which fevers to be penetrated, and a sun which penetrates and "prevails. " I am penetrated, therefore I am; I radiate in you, therefore you are. By sexualizing the sun, he reverses the direction of imitation and compels the sun to become the imitator ofpeople, provided that the individual is an author-that is, one who is penetrated by language, by music, a voice, which seeks ears and creates them.
From this point it is possible to give yet another twist to the interpretation of Nietzsche's work from within the critique oflanguage. IfNietzsche's evangelical operation liberates self-praise, then a transformed light falls on the self of this praise. In noting that Nietzsche's poetics abolishes the rules of indirect eulogy and substitutes praise of the foreigner with self-praise, we see only the outer layer of the turmoil created. On a deeper level, Nietzsche's affirmative language remains obliged to
80 I
praise the foreigner-better, it praises the non-self such as it has never been celebrated before. However, it devotes itself to a foreignness that is more than the otherness of another person. It exposes itself to a foreignness that traverses the speaker as it would a reverberant corridor, a foreign ness that penetrates him and makes him possible it is exposed to the foreigner's culture, language, educators, illnesses, contaminations, temptations, friends, indeed even the self which places paren theses it ostensibly owns around phenomena. It celebrates in itself a fullness of foreignness called the world. Whatever Nietzsche alleges about these magnitudes is transformed into praise of the foreigner in itself: ''As my father I am already dead and as my mother I am still alive. . . "9 Thus Nietzsche's selflessness must be sought beneath the level of apparent self-praise-in his opening to the inner foreignness, in his excessive mediality, in his indulgent curiosity for everything, and in his never totally compensated imbecility. This is why the author is no simple sun, but a resonance-body. As my mother I still speak, as my future friends I am still to be heard. Nietzsche could be described as the discoverer of hetero-narcissism: what he ulti mately affirms in himself are the othernesses which gather in him and make him up like a composi tion, which penetrate him, delight him, torture
I 81
him and surprise him. Without surprise life would
be a fallacy. There must be something in the world that is faster than causes. What comes to be dis cussed under the title of "the will to power" is the prelude to a composition qua theory of pure positings. The theory of the will was a detour on the way to the unwritten, complete teaching, to that critique of eulogistic reason which describes the world as an objection and its overcoming.
Perhaps we ought to permit ourselves to remark that, as an author of German language and European syntax:, Nietzsche reached the pinnacle. In his culminations as thinker-singer, he could feel himself to be an organon of the universe, creating sites of self-affirmation in individuals. As a philosopher, he would have rejoiced too early, had he assembled the sketches ofhis theory ofwill into a work and published it himself But we know that the exploiters, recyclers, and accelerators did this for him, using his authorial name as a brand. They did this rather unbeknownst to the author, who often came to the point in his research at which the alleged system, the supposed fundamental theory, cancelled itself out: there is no will, and therefore no will to power. Will is only an idiom. There is only a multiplicity of forces, speech, gestures, and their being composed under the direction of an ego, which gets affirmed, lost, and transformed.
On this precise point the author contradicts his own brand, and his statements on this are explicit. Perhaps we can do no better, then, on the hun dredth anniversary of his death, than to repeat these statements, in the hope that no future redac tion can excise them:
The whole surface of consciousness-conscious ness is a surface-has to be kept free from all of the great imperatives. Be careful even of great words, great attitudes . . . .
The fifth "gospel" sets out from a work of illu sion-destruction for which there is no parallel. It is
oriented around the norm of the Gay Science, which, in truth, is the most desperate science ever to have been launched, since it presupposes a level of disenchantment that plunges to almost suicidal depths. It virtually corresponds to vagus death caused by disappointment. Nietzsche never doubted that there was an indissoluble relation of production between his chronic illness and his lucidity about things psychological and metaphysi cal. His own life was for him the "experiment of the discerning"; his suffering he understood as redemption for his cognitions. And the more he paid off, the further he was carried away by his thinking and states from existing human commu nities. He drifted further and further toward an inexorable exteriority with regard to the menda cious conditions of societies. He looked upon the idols of the tribe, the market, and the cave from a distance that did not cease to grow. His private mythos of the Hyperboreans was a way of describing his sojourn in the cold as a gay and voluntary exile. He had no right to believe that he possessed in this any shared point of departure with contemporary readers; still less could he permit himselfthe supposition that he might find followers wanting to learn their lessons in similar conditions. Hence the persistent reference to his fateful loneliness; hence his view of the world as "a
40 !
door to a thousand deserts, empty and cold. " Hence, also, the mistrust he displayed toward anyone who might have dared to tap the author approvingly on the shoulder. In the chapter called "The Convalescent," Zarathustra illustrates the price of the new message when in encountering his "most abyssal thought" of disgust and disappoint ment he faints and, upon waking, hangs between life and death for seven days. The truth has "in truth" the form of an illness leading to death: it is an attack on the aletheiological immune system, which leaves people hanging at the geometrical place of lies and health. Whoever wants to resist the disruption of the hitherto known economy of illusions, has to be something other than what had been known as known human to date-a surviver vaccinated against the madness of the truth. The economic paradox of Nietzsche's good news consists in the indication that the primary, immeasurably bad news must be recompensed by an as yet unproven mobilization of creative counter-energies. The overman concept is a wager on the distant possibility of such compensation: "We have art so that we do not go to ground on the truth"-this means: we have the prospect of the overman in order that unbearable insights into the unveiled human condition may be endured. Such an offer appears as an advertisement for that which inspires
FiM1 I 41
terror. This is why the whole ofZarathustra had to take the form of an extended prelude: in its narra tive parts, it deals with nothing other than the hesitation of the herald before the announcing of his own message.
However, if one wants to have cheaper access to the new privileges of the herald, regardless of effects of terror and experimental reservations and this is the formula that practically charac terizes the whole history of Nietzsche redaction in the anti-democratic movement, including its later revisions in democratic ideology critique then one has to split the newly won eulogistic functions from the necessary enlightenment prior to it and its work of destruction, and lift the quotation marks from the password "gospel," that is, erase its newness and its irony. Nietzsche was aware of the absurd costs of his undertaking and doubted often enough whether recovering an evangelic-eulogistic stance from perfect nihilism remained, existentially speaking, a sen sible reckoning. In 1884, he wrote to Malvida von Meysenbug:
I have things on my soul that are one hundred times heavier to bear than la betise humaine. It is possible that I am a doom, the doom for all future people-and it is henceforth very possible
42 /
that one day I will become mute, out of love for humanity! ! !
Let's register the three exclamation marks after the suggested possibility of his falling silent. Every explanation of the Nietzschean message has above all to answer the question of how it is possible that the announcement won out over its internal inhi bitions. This would be tantamount to explaining how the dis-angelic factors could prevail against the eulogistic motifs in the process of offsetting them. And in this revision it would be necessary to examine the calculation as such in its immanent correctness. Does not everything point to the idea that according to Nietzsche the bad news possesses an edge over the good news that cannot be com pensated for, whereas all attempts to give primacy to the latter are based only on momentary vigor and temporary self-hypnosis? Yes, isn't Nietzsche thereby exactly the paradigmatic thinker of moder nity insofar as it is defined by the impossibility of catching up with the real through counter-factual corrections? Is modernity not defined by a con sciousness that runs ahead of the monstrousness of facts, for which discourses about art and human rights only ever consist in compensation and first aid. And for this reason is the contemporary
world, forced to admit the superiority of the
dreadful, not precisely incapable of uttering high praise from then on.
As far as Nietzsche is concerned, he knew very well that he would, for the time being, be the sole reader of Zarathustra to be seized by it; his fifth "Gospel" is, as he almost rightly says, "dark and buried and grotesque for everyone," and this is so not only on account of its prematurity. It cannot be predicted how such a document, which neces sarily renders anyone trying to spread it grotesque, could become the point of departure for a new eulogistic chain in which the spokesperson would stand to win. As, for the time being, anyone pro fessing to want to cite a passage from the fifth "gospel," renders himself even more infeasible from a bourgeois and academic standpoint than would someone attempting to do so with the unabridged form of the first four. This can in no way be altered by the conspiracy of the infeasible, who improvised their "braggart empire" by appealing to a few heavily distorted and cut up fragments of Nietzsche, translated into banal and national-populist language. No pair of scissors can save the chants of Zarathustra for the language games of the stock-standard enlightenment. Nietzsche-uncut only opens up to those who are lost enough to be able to reinvent the notion of redemption for themselves. Assuming that Nietzsche
himself had known this from the start-and the biographical and literary evidence speaks in favor of this-what could still make him believe that a new era of discourse would begin with him? How did he propose to go from the ridiculous to the sublime, from the sublime to freedom-and who could have done it after him? To solve this enigma, we will have to examine in more detail Nietzsche's sketches for an ethics ofgenerosity.
3
TOTAL SPONSORING
To learn more about Nietzsche's theory and praxis of generosity, it is also-or above all-necessary to address his "megalomania," supposing this an appropriate designation for this author's extraordi nary talent to speak about himself, his mission, and his writings in the highest of tones. Perhaps this issue here is one for which the expression addressed to the publisher about the "good news,'' "something for which there is yet no name," is once again appropriate. The alternative designa tions used to encompass the first parts of Thus Spoke Zarathustra, "Poem" and "Gospel," should also be kept in reserve as a way of qualifying Nietzsche's megalomaniacal remarks.
Megalomania, then, or poetry, or something for which there is yet no name: what follows is advisably approached with a provision of alternative
41
expressions, to avoid getting stuck with a designa tion reflex that is first best. The exposure value of Nietzsche's most conspicuous statements about himselfare so excessive that even the most favorable, the most free-spirited reader, yes even those who are willingly dazed, will look away from these passages as though not wanting to have perceived, to have countersigned, what has been committed to paper and put into print. It is possible to stare fixedly neither at the sun nor at the self-praise of the mad-for this reason we read these unbearable outbursts of self-awareness with self-praise pro tective eye-wear. We tone down that which cannot penetrate unfiltered into a reader's eyes without his having to look away out of a sense of shame for the unbridled other, or else out of one of tact,
which advises us not to use the moments in which an excited person bares himself against him. Among Nietzsche lovers it is a mark of decency not to cite this sort of thing, is it not? Today, however, we must deviate from the norm of the amateur.
The fact that a psychologist without equal is speaking in my works, this is perhaps the first thing a good reader will realize-the sort of reader I deserve, who reads me as good old philologists read their Horace. 1
Does anyone at the end of the nineteenth cen tury have a dear idea of what poets in strong ages called inspiration? If not, I will describe it . . . . This is my experience of inspiration; I do not doubt that you would need to go back thousands of years to find anyone who would say: "it is mine as well. "2
My Zarathustra has a special place for me in my writings. With it, I have given humanity the greatest gift it has ever received. 3
Leaving aside the poets: perhaps nothing has ever been done with such an excess of energy. Here, my concept of the "Dionysian" became the highest deed; all the rest of human activity looks poor and limited in comparison. The fact that a Goethe, a Shakespeare, would not know how to breathe for a second in this incredible passion and height. . . all this is the least that can be said, and does not give you any real idea of the dis tance, of the azure solitude this work lives in . . . The collective spirit and goodness of all great souls would not be capable ofproducing a single one of Zarathustra's speeches . . . . Until then, you do not know what height, what depth really is; you know even less what truth is. . . . Wisdom, investigations of the soul, the art of speaking none of this existed before Zarathustra. 4
. . . an old friend has just written to say that she is laughing at me. . . And this at a moment
Totai Sponsoring I 49
when an unspeakable responsibility rests on me-when no word can be too gentle, no look respectful enough for me. Because I am carrying the destiny of humanity on my shoulders. 5
When I measure myself by what I can do. . . I have better claims to the word "great" than any other mortal. 6
My lot would have it that I am the first decent human being, that I know myself to be opposing the hypocrisy of millennia. . . I was the first to discover the truth because I was the first to see-to smell-lies for what they are. . . I am a bearer of glad tidings as no one ever was before. . . Starting with me, the earth will know great politics . . . 7
I would like to suggest that we dwell a little longer on these unbearable phrases and slowly remove the protective eye-wear that has for a cen tury spared readers the need to engage with this eruptive, obscene profusion of self-praise and self-objectivization. I make this suggestion on the assumption that we are dealing not with some subjective disinhibition in the usual sense, or with a morbid way of letting oneself go, or even with traces of puerility, as commentators like Thomas Mann and Karl Jaspers have discerned in Nietzsche. Against the aforementioned background oflanguage
50 !
philosophy, it seems plausible to assume here that the dam behind which the self-eulogistic discursive energies had been accumulating in the most advanced civilizations finally burst, in a single indi vidual. Today we enjoy a safe distance of one hundred years that enables us to see these detona tions of self-awareness from sufficient distance. Added to this, we benefit from a large shift in men tality, a shift that traverses the 20th century toward a greater permissiveness in the expression ofnarcis sistic affects. And, finally, Nietzsche's description ofhimselfin Ecce Homo as a "buffoon" suggests the prospect of considering his Dionysian exaggerations from the aspect ofvoluntary grotesqueness. All this makes it easier to bracket the embarrassment and muster up a bit more courage.
I would also like to contend that Nietzsche's "narcissism" is less pertinent a phenomenon from the point of individual psychology than the marker of a cut in the linguistic history of old Europe. At bottom, it signifies the disclosure of the nature of authorship and literary discourse. The discursive event which bears the name Nietzsche is characterized by the infringement, within him, of the high culture separation between the Good News and self-celebration-which in addition unveils what it is that a modern author does: he posits the text
for himself The economy of eulogistic and miso logical discourse and its foundation in the taboo weighing on self-praise are simultaneously opened up to debate. The legitimization ofthis turn can be gleaned from Nietzsche's critique of metaphysics and morality. In it the order of lies, that in which indirect eulogy is grounded, becomes altogether transparent, laying bare the mechanisms ofcontor tion that have materialized in phrases such as "One who is humble will be elevated," or servir et dis paraitre. If it is true that this separation of praise from self is nothing other than a deferment effected through resentment, an everlasting adjournment of the moment in which an orator could say to his own existence, "linger a while so that I can praise you," one may thus understand Nietzsche's attacks against discretion as acts ofrevision that contradict the traditional morality of self-dispossession in an almost furious way. We must go back to late middle-age mysticism to be able, at least from afar, to encounter comparable phenomena. Spectacular and embarrassing as they are, they serve to restore the possibility of forging the most direct link between self and praise. What Nietzsche has in mind is not indistinctly to rejoice over oneself as bare existence: he deaves with all his might to the idea that existence must earn its exultation, or better: that it has to grow into its exultation. As no
other modern thinker, Nietzsche espouses the adaequatio iubilationis et intellectus. If there is any correspondence between its existence and good reputation, an existence must become enhanced to such an extent that the best may be said about it. Existence may well be an a priori chance for self praise; however, self-eulogistic discourse can only become legitimate a posteriori at the level of culture. Between the chance and its realization, the bridge is created by "egocentrism"-this long maligned dimension in which the best possibilities of humankind were arrested incognito. It is the selfish impulses, insofar as they are also work-obsessed, upon which Nietzsche bestows with a philosophical consecration. Belated self-praise condenses the premonition of one's own becoming and the con summation of egocentrism together in the image of self: how it is that one becomes what one is, grasping the randomness of being "me. " The "full" self-image is "realized," perhaps, in a moment, when the most ambitious anticipations of one's own ability to become are confirmed with a review of life lived. This is the type of moment spoken of on the single page inserted at the start ofEcce Homo:
On this perfect day, when everything is ripening and not only the grape turns brown, the eye of
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the sun just fell upon my life; I looked back, I looked forward, and never saw so many and such good things at once. (. . . ) How could Ifail to be grateful to my whole lifa? 8
If a life's elevated possibilities increase, self-praise can unfold in analogue fashion: once again the work praises the master, who is poised to disappear into the work. And it is precisely this correspon dence that creates the scandal-this limitless talking up ofmanifest and squandered wealth, this jubilatory self-review after the deed done, this complete dissolution of life in luminous positings, which remain as works of language: they form the counter-offence to the offence of the cross, exclaimed by St Paul, with which the blockade against the connection between self and praise was solidified.
That Nietzsche fittingly assessed the implica tions for the politics of language of his belated embarrassment and interpreted them on a grand historical scale can in fact be seen in the vocabulary ofhis late texts, in which the expression "cynicism" comes conspicuously to the surface. Nietzsche, the philologist, was attentive to the fact that his philo sophical battle-cry, the "re-evaluation of all values," harked back to a kynical fragment that describes the protest strategy of Diogenes of Sinope: "recoin
54 /
the money''; he was cognizant of the fact that the appearance he emitted in the texts of 1888 could necessarily seem to be a reemergence of "Socrates gone mad. " But this is exactly what mattered to him: he pursued the reevaluation of all the source value of embarrassment, the revision of misological manners, the abolition of borders, which, for a whole age, had been drawn between creative life and its self-eulogizing force. So, on the 20th of November, 1888, Nietzsche felt able to write to the Danish critic Brandes that:
I have talked about myselfwith a cynicism that will become world historical. The book is called Ecce Homo. . .
In the section of this book called Why I write such good books Nietzsche makes the following remarks about his works:
they sometimes reach the highest elevation you will find anywhere on earth, cynicism. 9
The expression "cynicism" used in these passages indicates two directions: the first is the elevation of questions of diet and health to a level that is quasi evangelical-a turn which sums up a good part of the 1 9th and 20th centuries and already sketches the direction of the 21st in its generality; and the second is the merging of the Good News
with self-eulogizing energies. That's why the meaning of the words "cynical" and "evangelical" is henceforth in this specific case the same. At the point where their meanings intersect they signify exactly what it is that a modern author does: exhibit oneself, transform oneself in writing, ren der oneself "infeasible. " Nietzsche: "I have never taken a step in public that did not compromise me: that is my criterion for acting right. "10 Singing-one's-own praise of a life which affirms and realizes itself as artistic composition is right ly seen as the only authentic discursive form still able to merit the qualification evangelical. As message this form is simply good, when and if it comprises the self-communication of the success ful-and a sympathizing with it. It speaks the language of a life that not only has the right to make a promise but can also endorse it-and the bigger the resistance provoked by the affirmation, the more authentic its occurrence. One might call the language-traces of such a life Spinozist since they are "expressions" in the sense that they serve to announce a force of being. They breach the constraints of traditional bivalent logic, which had required for the speaker always to choose between one of two things-either vouch for god, which was unavoidably connected with the refusal of the hateful ego, or vouch for the Ego,
56 /
which traditionally could be understood only as the satanic renunciation of god.
In the new language position Nietzsche presents himself not as a poetic redeemer, but instead as an enricher of a new type. One could label Nietzsche the first real sponsor, on the condition that we devote some time to explaining his art of giving gifts that exceed the common discourse ofgifts and poisons. Nietzsche's sponsorship of humanity starts out with the assumption that, by giving indi viduals ordinary gifts, one implicates them in a base economy: in this economy, the enhancement of the giver inevitably goes hand-in-hand with the offence of the receiver. If anyone seeks to give a more distinguished gift, it can only involve the giving of an unreciprocable gift with no strings attached. The only gift measuring up to this ambi tion is the bestowal of a title of nobility, which excuses the new bearer from the obligation to refer to the bestower. With this in view, Nietzsche invents some take-and-run gifts that take the form of aphorisms, poems and arguments. After Nietzsche it is possible for anyone to become noble ifhe rises to the sponsor's challenge. But this discourse about titles of nobility is itself provocative: what the sponsor bestows is the opposite of a title that one could "bear. " The nobility in question here cannot
be gleaned from any of the historical forms of aris tocracy. This is Nietzsche's decision thesis, namely the idea that the history of humanity is yet to know real nobility-except perhaps in the mild idiocy of the figure of Jesus and the sovereign hygiene of Buddha. However, in his view the latter incarnate deficient forms of generosity, since both are grounded in a retreat from the vita activa. They are waiting to be outdone by world-affirming, creative attitudes toward life-whence arises the ethical mandate of art, for the entire dimension of future history. From then on, historical nobleness pos sessed as a good has no value, because what could be designated as noble in feudal times was scarcely anything other than power-protected meanness. "The rabble above, the rabble below"-the words by the voluntary beggars about the rich and power ful of the present moment, to be found in the fourth part of Zarathustra, apply retroactively to historical evidence. The qualifier noble can no longer be defended through convention, to the extent noble should be the title for the birth of a deed or a thought based on an unresentful, far aiming force. Nobility is a position with respect to the future. Nietzsche's innovative gift consists in provoking one to engage in a way of being in which the receiver would take up an active force as sponsor, that is to say, in the ability to open up
richer futures. Nietzsche is a teacher of generosity in the sense that he infects the recipients of his gifts with the idea of wealth, which is necessarily not worth acquiring unless with a view to being able to squander it.
Whoever gives the provocation of gift-giving has the right to consider himself as being at the start of a new moral functional chain. Thereby is time in its entirety newly interpreted: as a delay in the future proliferation of generosity, "history" acquires content in excess of the causality that had reigned till then. The future of humanity is a test ofwhether it is possible to supersede resentment as the foremost historical force. In the ascending line of gift-giving virtues, life praises itself as an immeasurable proliferation of chances to be given. It finds the reason for its thankful praise in its participation in events ofgenerosity. History splits into the time of the economy of debt and the time of generosity. Whereas the former thinks of repay ment and retaliation, the latter is interested only in forwards-donating. Wittingly or otherwise, every life will in future be dated in accordance with this criterion: "One lives before him, one lives after him. . . "
It pays to take a closer look at the original act of the generosity-chain inaugurated by Nietzsche, since conditions ofbonding can be seen in it, from
Tota! Sponsor-! nq I 59
which it is alone possible to draw the sole valid criterion for enabling us to divide legitimate from illegitimate references to Nietzsche. It is decisive that the new "loose" chain begins with an uncon ditional gesture of expenditure, since the giver can only breach the circle of a savings-rationality through pure self-expenditure. Only unbilled expenditure has sufficient spontaneity and cen trifugal force to escape the gravitational field of avarice and its calculus. Savers and capitalists always expect to get more back than they stake, while the sponsor gets his satisfaction without any regard for "revenue. " This applies to sentences as much as to donations. What Nietzsche calls the innocence of becoming is essentially the innocence of expenditure and eo ipso the innocence of enrich ment, sought for the sake of the possibility to expend. The leap into generosity transpires through affirming the prosperity of oneself and others, since this is the necessary premise of generosity. If there is a leap [Ursprung] into generosity, then it resides in the challenge that open generosity makes to concealed generosity. Part of Nietzsche's idea of the art of giving is that the giver-ifhe cannot remain concealed, which is a priori impossible for an author-cannot present himselfin a false perfection, since he would thereby lie his way out of the world and continue simply
to fool the receiver, which is tantamount to a humiliation. Rather, when encouraging the receiver to accept the donation, he should also disclose his infirmities and idiosyncrasies, however without denying the level of the gift. Only this yields the "master-art of kindness. "11 A little vanity, a little turning in the narcissistic circle must come into play. Integral self-affirmation encompasses the everyday things that the regime of metaphysical misology had talked down, and stands in gratitude to them for the gift of being able to give. In this exercise, Nietzsche, the enlightener, can abide by the 1 9th-century custom of explaining authors on the basis of their milieus. If the author is immortal, his tics will also be.
If Zarathustra emerges with his language of self- and world-affirmation, this lan guage must convey the pressure of provocation through its radically self-eulogistic and "wanton" form. The impact of Nietzsche's sayings and arrows, which take the form of pure dictates, become for easily provoked readers a therapeutic insult eliciting an immune reaction. This corre sponds to a vaccination procedure at the moral level. Anyone who has become a sponsor some other way will perhaps know that it is possible to become one without Nietzsche. Those who are not yet sponsors, however, can experience how he infects them with the memory of the possibility of
Total Sponsoring I 61
generosity-a memory that the receiver cannot let sit, to the extent he is ready and able to enter into the noble space of resonance. That the non receivers pursue other dealings is, on another level, certainly also perfectly fine.
Erupting from the motive of "virtuous giving" is a spring ofpluralism leading beyond all expecta tions of unity. The nature of provocative generosity is such that it is unable to be alone and wants even less to be so. The sponsor's generosity as such aims to generate dissensus, which is to say competition. It would consider itself to have failed were it to be said it had obtained a monopoly. To be as it would like to be, it must posit competition. It would prefer to lay itself open to rejection, than it would to subordinate imitations. The generous, then, stand in opposition to the good, who for Nietzsche are rightly called decadents, since they-as we have known since the Genealogy ofMoratS-pursue the dream of monopolizing merely good sentiments. For them, bad is anything that expects that they prove their goodness; while anything which belabors their consensus with questions and exits their circle of blackmail strikes them as immediately devilish. In Nietzsche, decadence represents the epitome of conditions in which resentment is guaranteed it will always hit upon its ideal lan guage situation. The relations bearing witness to
62 I Nietzsche Apcs1le
decadence are those in which "the yes-man [Mucker] is in charge"-to put it in Nietzsche's words. If the good are so good, it is onlyfaute de mieux. The decadence ideal holds power only so long as, and because, "it has not had any competi- tion. "12 That is why if one wants to oppose the better to the good in questions of gospel, one must
resolve to count to five.
4
OF SUNS AND HUMANS
If, today, one hundred years after Nietzsche's death, we look back at this author for authors and non-authors and grasp his place in his time, we become aware that Nietzsche-for all his claims to originality and despite his pride at being the first in essential things-was in many respects actually only a privileged medium for the execution of tendencies that in one way or another would have forged ahead without him. His achievement consists in knowing how to transform an accident of the name Friedrich Nietzsche into an event, provided that we understand by event the poten tiation of the accidental into the destinal. Destiny might also be spoken of in the case where a designer latches onto that something that is going to happen in any event, impelling it further, and stamping his name on it. In this sense Nietzsche is
65
a destiny-or, as one would say today, a trend designer. The trend which he embodied and gave form to was the individualist wave, which, since the Industrial Revolution and its cultural projec tions in romanticism, had proceeded inexorably through modern civil society and has not ceased doing so. Individualism, then, is to be understood not as an accidental or avoidable current in the history of mentalities, but rather as an anthropo logical break which first made possible the emer gence of a type of human being surrounded by enough media and means ofdischarge to be able to individualize counter to its "societal precondi tions. " In individualism is articulated the third post-historical insulation of "human beings" after the first, prehistorical in nature, led to its emancipation from nature, and the second, his torical one, led to the "reign of man over man. "1 Individualism constantly forges changing alliances with all that has made up the modern world: with progress and reaction, with left-wing and right-wing political programs, with national and transnational motives, with masculinist, femi nist and infantilist projects, with technophile and technophobe sentiments, with ascetic and hedo nist moralities, with avant-gardist and conservative conceptions of art, with analytical and cathartic therapies, with sporty and non-sporty lifestyles,
with performance readiness and refusal of per formance, with belief in success as well as unbelief in it, with still Christian as well as no-longer Christian forms of life, with ecumenical openings and local closings, with humanist and post humanist ethics, with the ego necessarily able to accompany all my representations, as well as with the dissolved self, which exists only as the hall of mirrors of its masks. Individualism is capable of alliances with all sides, and Nietzsche is its designer, its prophet.
Nietzsche's pretention to be an artist and much more than an artist is grounded in his radical, modern concept ofsuccess: for him, at stake is not only to throw products on today's market, but instead to create the market wave itself, by which the work is belatedly carried to success. In this way he anticipated the strategies of the avant-garde, which Boris Groys has described in his already classic work on The TotalArt ofStalinism. If one wants to be a market leader, one must first operate as a market maker. And to be successful as a mar ket maker, one must anticipate and endorse what many will choose once they learn they are allowed to want. Nietzsche had understood that the phenome non that would emerge irresistibly in tomorrow's culture was the need to distinguish oneself from the mass. It was immediately present to him that
CJt Suns
the stuff out of which the future would be made, could be found in individuals' demands to be better and other than the rest, and thereby precisely better than all others. The theme of the 20th century is self-referentiality, in the systemic as well as the psychological senses. Only: self-referential systems are autological and self-eulogistic systems. The author Nietzsche still has this knowledge in advance over contemporary theory. On his under standing, or rather intuition, he created, in his lifetime, the conditions for his twofold posthu mous success: he inscribed his name in the list of classics, which throughout culture are handed down as reference points of approval and critique. This is what he described as his fulfilled need for immortality; in addition, however, through the detour of his first interpreters and intermediaries, he above all imposed his name as a brand name for a successful immaterial product, for a literary lifestyle-drug or an elevated way-of-life. This is the Nietzschean design of individualism: We free spirits! We who live dangerously! When the author iden tifies himself as author, the self-eulogistic melody appears; when the market-maker launches the brand, the advertisement appears. Nietzsche libe rated modern language in associating eulogies with publicity. Only a jester, only a poet, only a copywriter. This connection alone enables us to
understand how that most resolute proponent of high culture could have yielded effects on mass culture. It is undeniable that Nietzsche's second success, his seduction as brand, or as ethos and attitude, in the field of individualism, by far con stitutes his greatest effect-and also contains his more distant future possibilities. Indeed, it is pre cisely because the Nietzsche life-style-brand, far more than the name of the author, still radiates an almost irresistible attraction, that, over the course ofthe last third ofthe 20th century, with the onset of the overtly individualist conjuncture of the post-May '68 period, it could recover from the incursions of fascist redactors and their copies. Doubtless, the author Nietzsche, even given the then dire state of editing, was unacceptable to national-socialist collectivism and that the brand Nietzsche alone-and indeed only in rare and par ticular aspects-suggested itself for reproduction in national pop culture. To understand this point, we have to factor in the fact that, procedurally, fascism is nothing other than the incursion of pop and kitsch-procedures into politics. As Clement Greenberg already showed in 1939-confronting the critical case-kitsch is the world language of triumphant mass culture. It depends on the mechanized forgery ofsuccess. Pop and kitsch are, culturally as politically, short-cut procedures to get
Of Suns and Humans I 69
to the apparent taste of the masses. With this they content themselves with copying success and, with copies of the successful in hand, with triumphing once again. Hitler's success strategy as pop and kitsch politician consisted in tying a pop-nationalism with an event-militarism, as the simplest way to have the narcissism of the masses effervesce. In doing so, radiophone acquisition techniques and open-air paramilitary liturgies played the key roles. Through them, the population learned that it shall be a people and that it had to listen to the rabble rousing voices of its projected self. In this sense, all fascism is an effect of redaction. It is deutero fascistic from the start, since it has no original; if a derivative can be insurrectionary, it is precisely by way of an insurrection of scissors, which always know what they must cut, how, and to what ends. From the energetic aspect, fascism is the event culture of resentment-a definition, incidentally, which renders intelligible the shocking convertibility of leftwing affects into rightwing ones, and vice versa. So long as publicness functions as a director's theater of resentment, the ability to rape texts and to seduce the public as a "mass" is presupposed. Brand Nietzsche could play a role in the semantic advertising drives of the NS-Movement insofar as their imitations omitted his basic assessments, as implacably individualistic and avant-gardist as
they are, and retained only the "fast climber" atti tudes, along with a martial decor of the dictum. Hitler's clique edited Nietzsche with scissors and pasted him into a collectivist gospel-shortly before, moreover, Nietzsche's sister had employed her scissors to prepare a ready-made of brand Nietzsche. To the shame of German academic phi losophy after 1933, one is forced to remark that it did exactly the same thing on its level, as did the anti-Nietzscheans, who are still today unable to do more than merely compile their self-pasted incrimination files-but how far must one reach back to find university philosophers who do not philosophize with scissors? The National Socialists, resolute editors of everything that guaranteed social and national success, were able to retain far less of Nietzsche than Jefferson could of Jesus-most of his writings were too inappropriate for their kitsch system, too anti-nationalist, too anti-German, too anti-philistine, too anti-revanchist, too anti-collec tivist, too anti-militarist, too anti-antirationalist, too disdainful of every concept of "national self-interest" [Volker-Selbstsucht],2 and, finally, to mention the decisive barrier, too incompatible with any politics of resentment, regardless of whether this presents itselfas nationalist or socialist or as a multi-purpose form ofvengeance politics; national/socialist. That there is no path leading from Nietzsche to the
German's posing as masters must be obvious to
anyone who's come into contact with his writings too incisive was Nietzsche's insight that Germans, whether they have graduated or not, have as their temptation not to feel good if they cannot belittle others-but what else is Nietzsche's moral philo sophical oeuvre if not a single exercise in overcoming the need to disparage others? That nationalist politics rests on the pathetic propensity to humiliate foreigners-who has brought this into sharper focus than Nietzsche, and who was able to trace hooliganism to Wilhelmina? Nietzsche, to be sure, is anti-egalitarian, but this is not in order to make common cause with revenge-hungry populists, as German moral philosophers, whose differences can no longer impress, avidly continue to assert in the wisdom of their years. Instead, it is in order to defend the freedom of self-enhancement against the consumerdom of the last men. From one per spective only is a concession to be made to those who disparage Nietzsche and attempt to guard against his influence. It is correct that Nietzsche, as the designer of a brand of "destiny," was obliged to ask himself whether his products should not have been endowed with better copy protection and whether the brand should even have been allowed to appear next to the authorial name. Could he not have known that from the riff-raff he repelled,
l2 I
his most tenacious clientele could emerge? Proof that these questions did not escape Nietzsche's consideration can be seen-that is, apart from Zarathustra's prophetic sayings, more or less criti cal of the Church, about the parasites of the noble soul3-in certain letters and work notes in which he pondered, in dread of the monstrousness of his insights, whether to abdicate from his authorship. However, even if he had done this, it would have been imperative to disclose why he gave up being an author-and the result would have been nearly the same. Perhaps Nietzsche knew the answer to such objections in advance, as he did for nearly everything else: "I am not on my guard for deceivers, I have to be without caution-my fate wants it so. "4
In order to gauge what was unique in Nietzsche's great success as individualism's trend designer, a comparison with alternative designs suggests itself There are only a few strong versions of his epoch-making expression "become what you are" and the corresponding "do what you will. " Ultimately the work of one single author can serve as a rival project and foil to Nietzsche's own, one
who the author of The Gay Science himself inci dentally named "a glorious, great nature," not without adding that to date the most ingenious philosophical writer of the 1 9th century had been
/ 73
an American, namely Ralph Waldo Emerson. If Nietzsche's design of life in self-creating individu ality is presented under the title "Free spirits," Emerson brings his product on the market under the brand name "non-conformism. " It is to this that the greatest of Emerson's early essays are devoted; the beacon with whom American philoso phy yielded to its first astonished witnesses the proof of its existence. Not coincidentally, this was under the heading Self-Reliance, a prose piece of barely thirty pages, incomparable in its a-systemic density, the declaration of independence of the American essay and the revocation of American servitude to the European canon, and to every canon in general. What takes shape in him is an anti-humility program which, over the course of the next one hundred and fifty years, would reveal itself as the specific timbre ofAmerican freedom a color that dominated until the '70s of last century, before US academia dedicated itself to the import of European maso-theories. But in the year of 1841, the inundation of critical theory was still a ways off:
To believe your own thought, to believe that what is true for you in your private heart is true for all men-that is genius. Speak your latent conviction, and it shall be the universal sense; for
the inmost in due time becomes the outmost and our first thought is rendered back to us by the trumpets of the Last Judgment. ( . . . ) Great works of art have no more affecting lesson for us than this. They teach us to abide by our spontaneous impression with good-humored inflexibility than most when the whole cry of voices is on the other side. Else, tomorrow a stranger will say (. . . ) precisely what we have thought and felt all the time, and we shall be forced to take with shame our own opinion from another.
(. . . ) but God will not have his work made manifest by cowards. ( . . . ) Trust thyself: every heart vibrates to that iron string.
Society everywhere is in conspiracy against the manhood of every one of its members.
Society is a joint-stock company, in which the members agree, for the better securing of his bread to each shareholder, to surrender the liberty and culture of the eater. The virtue in most request is conformity. Self-reliance is its aversion. It loves not realities and creators, but names and customs.
Whoso would be a man must be a noncon formist. He who would gather immortal palms must not be hindered by the name of goodness, but must explore if it be goodness. Nothing is at
last sacred but the integrity of your own mind. Absolve you to yourself, and you shall have the suffrage of the world
Your goodness must have some edge to it else it is none. The doctrine of hatred must be preached as the counteraction of the doctrine of love when that pules and whines. (. . . ) I would write on the lintels of the door-post, Whim. ( . . . ) we cannot spend the day in explanation.
Leave your theory, as Joseph his coat in the hand of the harlot, and flee.
To be great is to be misunderstood. (. . . ) Your conformity explains nothing. Act singly, and what you have already done singly will justify you now.
The centuries are conspirators against the sanity and authority of the soul . . . history is an impertinence and an injury, if it be any thing more than a cheerful apologue or parable of my being and becoming.
"To the persevering mortal," said Zoroaster, "the blessed Immortals are swift. "5
Emerson possesses a temporal advance over Nietzsche, in addition to a psycho-political one. Since while Emerson's non-conformism seems as if it were made to unfold, against a certain resistance, toward an ambivalent narcissism of the mass, one
still balanced by democracy at the end of the day, Nietzsche's free spirit brand ran a greater risk of being imitated by a success-hungry movement of losers. Fascisms, past and future, are politically nothing other than insurrections ofenergy-charged losers, who, for a time of exception, change the rules in order to appear as victors. The Nietzsche brand was recuperated by losers and loser-redactors, because it promised to be the brand of winners. As this horrific episode did not and could not last, Emerson's project won out over Nietzsche's on the brand front. That's why most of us today are non conformists, not free spirits. Our average thoughts and feelings are all made in the USA, not made in Sils-Maria.
The significance of this difference can be seen by returning again to Nietzsche, the author. When, in the euphoric productions of the first parts ofZarathustra, he undertook the most radical short circuit between self-praising discourse and evangelical discourse, his concept of "Dionysian" had necessarily; according to the author, become the "highest fact. " In these colorful episodes ofwriting, Nietzsche, as never before or after, amended lan guage use by producing a discourse that was a pure self-advert of creative ecstasy. Even so, he was not exactly correct in exclusively reserving the predi cate "Dionysian" for his "highest deed. " What
Of Suns and Humans I 77
came to light in these expression-eruptions, rather were more Apollonian irradiations, in which Dionysian fragmentations appeared to have been overcome. It is not by chance that, in the gospel according to Zarathustra, the sun-the star of Apollo-plays the role of the exemplary Being, and it falls to the new prophet to perfect himself in imitation of the sun. ''All that I touch becomes light"-only suns can talk in this way about them selves. This applies above all to their most important gestures and talents-the readiness to over-expend themselves unconditionally and the ability to set without regret. In both respects the teachings of the late Nietzsche point to an imitation solis. The sun alone is heroic right to the moment of setting and remains generous until it goes down. "Heroism is the good will to absolute self-demise," the author had once written for his young Russian girlfriend. Only suns can be so profligate that they can be placed under the guardianship of rational heirs, when the economic ideas ofthe latter manage to prevail. Only the sun has a giving virtue as first nature; only suns care nothing for the sym metry between giving and taking; only suns shine sovereignly over proponents and opponents; and only suns read no critiques. On this last point the author Nietzsche did not totally succeed in his becoming-sun. Moreover, there are also some other
78 I Nietzsche Apostle
respects that give ground for suspIC10n that Nietzsche's sun participates far more in humanity than the metaphor betrays. This begins with Zarathustra's first address to it: "You great star! What would your happiness be if you had not those for whom you shine? (. . . ) we. . . took your overflow from you and blessed you for it. "6 And it culminates in Zarathustra's prayer to his will:
That I may one day be ready and ripe in the great noon;
-ready for myself and for my most hidden will; a bow burning for its arrow, an arrow burning for its star-
-a star ready and ripe in its noon, glowing, skewered, blissful with annihilating arrows of the sun-
-a sun itself and an inexorable will of the sun. . . 7
One sees in these phrases that the author sympa thizes neither with philosophical hallucinations, which proclaim the flight into identity in the name of the "subject," nor with the philosophy of dia logue, in which subjects address each other face to face or accuse each other of turning away from dialogue. Nietzsche's interests are directed at a theory of the penetrated penetration, an ethics of
overflowing into and entering into others, a logic of absorption and of new-radiation. He does not know of symmetrical discussions, negotiation, of the middle-value between banalities, but instead of inter-solar relations, the traffic of rays from start to star, the penetration from viscera to viscera, being pregnant and making-pregnant. "In the belly ofthe whale I become the herald oflife. "8 His interest lies not in opinions but in emanations. On an intellec tual level he is a radical bisexual, a star which fevers to be penetrated, and a sun which penetrates and "prevails. " I am penetrated, therefore I am; I radiate in you, therefore you are. By sexualizing the sun, he reverses the direction of imitation and compels the sun to become the imitator ofpeople, provided that the individual is an author-that is, one who is penetrated by language, by music, a voice, which seeks ears and creates them.
From this point it is possible to give yet another twist to the interpretation of Nietzsche's work from within the critique oflanguage. IfNietzsche's evangelical operation liberates self-praise, then a transformed light falls on the self of this praise. In noting that Nietzsche's poetics abolishes the rules of indirect eulogy and substitutes praise of the foreigner with self-praise, we see only the outer layer of the turmoil created. On a deeper level, Nietzsche's affirmative language remains obliged to
80 I
praise the foreigner-better, it praises the non-self such as it has never been celebrated before. However, it devotes itself to a foreignness that is more than the otherness of another person. It exposes itself to a foreignness that traverses the speaker as it would a reverberant corridor, a foreign ness that penetrates him and makes him possible it is exposed to the foreigner's culture, language, educators, illnesses, contaminations, temptations, friends, indeed even the self which places paren theses it ostensibly owns around phenomena. It celebrates in itself a fullness of foreignness called the world. Whatever Nietzsche alleges about these magnitudes is transformed into praise of the foreigner in itself: ''As my father I am already dead and as my mother I am still alive. . . "9 Thus Nietzsche's selflessness must be sought beneath the level of apparent self-praise-in his opening to the inner foreignness, in his excessive mediality, in his indulgent curiosity for everything, and in his never totally compensated imbecility. This is why the author is no simple sun, but a resonance-body. As my mother I still speak, as my future friends I am still to be heard. Nietzsche could be described as the discoverer of hetero-narcissism: what he ulti mately affirms in himself are the othernesses which gather in him and make him up like a composi tion, which penetrate him, delight him, torture
I 81
him and surprise him. Without surprise life would
be a fallacy. There must be something in the world that is faster than causes. What comes to be dis cussed under the title of "the will to power" is the prelude to a composition qua theory of pure positings. The theory of the will was a detour on the way to the unwritten, complete teaching, to that critique of eulogistic reason which describes the world as an objection and its overcoming.
Perhaps we ought to permit ourselves to remark that, as an author of German language and European syntax:, Nietzsche reached the pinnacle. In his culminations as thinker-singer, he could feel himself to be an organon of the universe, creating sites of self-affirmation in individuals. As a philosopher, he would have rejoiced too early, had he assembled the sketches ofhis theory ofwill into a work and published it himself But we know that the exploiters, recyclers, and accelerators did this for him, using his authorial name as a brand. They did this rather unbeknownst to the author, who often came to the point in his research at which the alleged system, the supposed fundamental theory, cancelled itself out: there is no will, and therefore no will to power. Will is only an idiom. There is only a multiplicity of forces, speech, gestures, and their being composed under the direction of an ego, which gets affirmed, lost, and transformed.
On this precise point the author contradicts his own brand, and his statements on this are explicit. Perhaps we can do no better, then, on the hun dredth anniversary of his death, than to repeat these statements, in the hope that no future redac tion can excise them:
The whole surface of consciousness-conscious ness is a surface-has to be kept free from all of the great imperatives. Be careful even of great words, great attitudes . . . .
