" But that which is
corrected
is changed.
Summa Theologica
And since the eternal law is the type of Divine
providence, as stated above [2005](A[1]), hence the defects of natural
things are subject to the eternal law.
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Whether all human affairs are subject to the eternal law?
Objection 1: It would seem that not all human affairs are subject to
the eternal law. For the Apostle says (Gal. 5:18): "If you are led by
the spirit you are not under the law. " But the righteous who are the
sons of God by adoption, are led by the spirit of God, according to
Rom. 8:14: "Whosoever are led by the spirit of God, they are the sons
of God. " Therefore not all men are under the eternal law.
Objection 2: Further, the Apostle says (Rom. 8:7): "The prudence
[Vulg. : 'wisdom'] of the flesh is an enemy to God: for it is not
subject to the law of God. " But many are those in whom the prudence of
the flesh dominates. Therefore all men are not subject to the eternal
law which is the law of God.
Objection 3: Further, Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. i, 6) that "the
eternal law is that by which the wicked deserve misery, the good, a
life of blessedness. " But those who are already blessed, and those who
are already lost, are not in the state of merit. Therefore they are not
under the eternal law.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 12): "Nothing evades
the laws of the most high Creator and Governor, for by Him the peace of
the universe is administered. "
I answer that, There are two ways in which a thing is subject to the
eternal law, as explained above [2006](A[5]): first, by partaking of
the eternal law by way of knowledge; secondly, by way of action and
passion, i. e. by partaking of the eternal law by way of an inward
motive principle: and in this second way, irrational creatures are
subject to the eternal law, as stated above [2007](A[5]). But since the
rational nature, together with that which it has in common with all
creatures, has something proper to itself inasmuch as it is rational,
consequently it is subject to the eternal law in both ways; because
while each rational creature has some knowledge of the eternal law, as
stated above [2008](A[2]), it also has a natural inclination to that
which is in harmony with the eternal law; for "we are naturally adapted
to the recipients of virtue" (Ethic. ii, 1).
Both ways, however, are imperfect, and to a certain extent destroyed,
in the wicked; because in them the natural inclination to virtue is
corrupted by vicious habits, and, moreover, the natural knowledge of
good is darkened by passions and habits of sin. But in the good both
ways are found more perfect: because in them, besides the natural
knowledge of good, there is the added knowledge of faith and wisdom;
and again, besides the natural inclination to good, there is the added
motive of grace and virtue.
Accordingly, the good are perfectly subject to the eternal law, as
always acting according to it: whereas the wicked are subject to the
eternal law, imperfectly as to their actions, indeed, since both their
knowledge of good, and their inclination thereto, are imperfect; but
this imperfection on the part of action is supplied on the part of
passion, in so far as they suffer what the eternal law decrees
concerning them, according as they fail to act in harmony with that
law. Hence Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. i, 15): "I esteem that the
righteous act according to the eternal law; and (De Catech. Rud.
xviii): Out of the just misery of the souls which deserted Him, God
knew how to furnish the inferior parts of His creation with most
suitable laws. "
Reply to Objection 1: This saying of the Apostle may be understood in
two ways. First, so that a man is said to be under the law, through
being pinned down thereby, against his will, as by a load. Hence, on
the same passage a gloss says that "he is under the law, who refrains
from evil deeds, through fear of punishment threatened by the law, and
not from love of virtue. " In this way the spiritual man is not under
the law, because he fulfils the law willingly, through charity which is
poured into his heart by the Holy Ghost. Secondly, it can be understood
as meaning that the works of a man, who is led by the Holy Ghost, are
the works of the Holy Ghost rather than his own. Therefore, since the
Holy Ghost is not under the law, as neither is the Son, as stated above
(A[4], ad 2); it follows that such works, in so far as they are of the
Holy Ghost, are not under the law. The Apostle witnesses to this when
he says (2 Cor. 3:17): "Where the Spirit of the Lord is, there is
liberty. "
Reply to Objection 2: The prudence of the flesh cannot be subject to
the law of God as regards action; since it inclines to actions contrary
to the Divine law: yet it is subject to the law of God, as regards
passion; since it deserves to suffer punishment according to the law of
Divine justice. Nevertheless in no man does the prudence of the flesh
dominate so far as to destroy the whole good of his nature: and
consequently there remains in man the inclination to act in accordance
with the eternal law. For we have seen above ([2009]Q[85], A[2]) that
sin does not destroy entirely the good of nature.
Reply to Objection 3: A thing is maintained in the end and moved
towards the end by one and the same cause: thus gravity which makes a
heavy body rest in the lower place is also the cause of its being moved
thither. We therefore reply that as it is according to the eternal law
that some deserve happiness, others unhappiness, so is it by the
eternal law that some are maintained in a happy state, others in an
unhappy state. Accordingly both the blessed and the damned are under
the eternal law.
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OF THE NATURAL LAW (SIX ARTICLES)
We must now consider the natural law; concerning which there are six
points of inquiry:
(1) What is the natural law?
(2) What are the precepts of the natural law?
(3) Whether all acts of virtue are prescribed by the natural law?
(4) Whether the natural law is the same in all?
(5) Whether it is changeable?
(6) Whether it can be abolished from the heart of man?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the natural law is a habit?
Objection 1: It would seem that the natural law is a habit. Because, as
the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 5), "there are three things in the
soul: power, habit, and passion. " But the natural law is not one of the
soul's powers: nor is it one of the passions; as we may see by going
through them one by one. Therefore the natural law is a habit.
Objection 2: Further, Basil [*Damascene, De Fide Orth. iv, 22] says
that the conscience or "synderesis is the law of our mind"; which can
only apply to the natural law. But the "synderesis" is a habit, as was
shown in the [2010]FP, Q[79], A[12]. Therefore the natural law is a
habit.
Objection 3: Further, the natural law abides in man always, as will be
shown further on [2011](A[6]). But man's reason, which the law regards,
does not always think about the natural law. Therefore the natural law
is not an act, but a habit.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Bono Conjug. xxi) that "a habit is
that whereby something is done when necessary. " But such is not the
natural law: since it is in infants and in the damned who cannot act by
it. Therefore the natural law is not a habit.
I answer that, A thing may be called a habit in two ways. First,
properly and essentially: and thus the natural law is not a habit. For
it has been stated above ([2012]Q[90], A[1], ad 2) that the natural law
is something appointed by reason, just as a proposition is a work of
reason. Now that which a man does is not the same as that whereby he
does it: for he makes a becoming speech by the habit of grammar. Since
then a habit is that by which we act, a law cannot be a habit properly
and essentially.
Secondly, the term habit may be applied to that which we hold by a
habit: thus faith may mean that which we hold by faith. And
accordingly, since the precepts of the natural law are sometimes
considered by reason actually, while sometimes they are in the reason
only habitually, in this way the natural law may be called a habit.
Thus, in speculative matters, the indemonstrable principles are not the
habit itself whereby we hold those principles, but are the principles
the habit of which we possess.
Reply to Objection 1: The Philosopher proposes there to discover the
genus of virtue; and since it is evident that virtue is a principle of
action, he mentions only those things which are principles of human
acts, viz. powers, habits and passions. But there are other things in
the soul besides these three: there are acts; thus "to will" is in the
one that wills; again, things known are in the knower; moreover its own
natural properties are in the soul, such as immortality and the like.
Reply to Objection 2: "Synderesis" is said to be the law of our mind,
because it is a habit containing the precepts of the natural law, which
are the first principles of human actions.
Reply to Objection 3: This argument proves that the natural law is held
habitually; and this is granted.
To the argument advanced in the contrary sense we reply that sometimes
a man is unable to make use of that which is in him habitually, on
account of some impediment: thus, on account of sleep, a man is unable
to use the habit of science. In like manner, through the deficiency of
his age, a child cannot use the habit of understanding of principles,
or the natural law, which is in him habitually.
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Whether the natural law contains several precepts, or only one?
Objection 1: It would seem that the natural law contains, not several
precepts, but one only. For law is a kind of precept, as stated above
([2013]Q[92], A[2]). If therefore there were many precepts of the
natural law, it would follow that there are also many natural laws.
Objection 2: Further, the natural law is consequent to human nature.
But human nature, as a whole, is one; though, as to its parts, it is
manifold. Therefore, either there is but one precept of the law of
nature, on account of the unity of nature as a whole; or there are
many, by reason of the number of parts of human nature. The result
would be that even things relating to the inclination of the
concupiscible faculty belong to the natural law.
Objection 3: Further, law is something pertaining to reason, as stated
above ([2014]Q[90], A[1]). Now reason is but one in man. Therefore
there is only one precept of the natural law.
On the contrary, The precepts of the natural law in man stand in
relation to practical matters, as the first principles to matters of
demonstration. But there are several first indemonstrable principles.
Therefore there are also several precepts of the natural law.
I answer that, As stated above ([2015]Q[91], A[3]), the precepts of the
natural law are to the practical reason, what the first principles of
demonstrations are to the speculative reason; because both are
self-evident principles. Now a thing is said to be self-evident in two
ways: first, in itself; secondly, in relation to us. Any proposition is
said to be self-evident in itself, if its predicate is contained in the
notion of the subject: although, to one who knows not the definition of
the subject, it happens that such a proposition is not self-evident.
For instance, this proposition, "Man is a rational being," is, in its
very nature, self-evident, since who says "man," says "a rational
being": and yet to one who knows not what a man is, this proposition is
not self-evident. Hence it is that, as Boethius says (De Hebdom. ),
certain axioms or propositions are universally self-evident to all; and
such are those propositions whose terms are known to all, as, "Every
whole is greater than its part," and, "Things equal to one and the same
are equal to one another. " But some propositions are self-evident only
to the wise, who understand the meaning of the terms of such
propositions: thus to one who understands that an angel is not a body,
it is self-evident that an angel is not circumscriptively in a place:
but this is not evident to the unlearned, for they cannot grasp it.
Now a certain order is to be found in those things that are apprehended
universally. For that which, before aught else, falls under
apprehension, is "being," the notion of which is included in all things
whatsoever a man apprehends. Wherefore the first indemonstrable
principle is that "the same thing cannot be affirmed and denied at the
same time," which is based on the notion of "being" and "not-being":
and on this principle all others are based, as is stated in Metaph. iv,
text. 9. Now as "being" is the first thing that falls under the
apprehension simply, so "good" is the first thing that falls under the
apprehension of the practical reason, which is directed to action:
since every agent acts for an end under the aspect of good.
Consequently the first principle of practical reason is one founded on
the notion of good, viz. that "good is that which all things seek
after. " Hence this is the first precept of law, that "good is to be
done and pursued, and evil is to be avoided. " All other precepts of the
natural law are based upon this: so that whatever the practical reason
naturally apprehends as man's good (or evil) belongs to the precepts of
the natural law as something to be done or avoided.
Since, however, good has the nature of an end, and evil, the nature of
a contrary, hence it is that all those things to which man has a
natural inclination, are naturally apprehended by reason as being good,
and consequently as objects of pursuit, and their contraries as evil,
and objects of avoidance. Wherefore according to the order of natural
inclinations, is the order of the precepts of the natural law. Because
in man there is first of all an inclination to good in accordance with
the nature which he has in common with all substances: inasmuch as
every substance seeks the preservation of its own being, according to
its nature: and by reason of this inclination, whatever is a means of
preserving human life, and of warding off its obstacles, belongs to the
natural law. Secondly, there is in man an inclination to things that
pertain to him more specially, according to that nature which he has in
common with other animals: and in virtue of this inclination, those
things are said to belong to the natural law, "which nature has taught
to all animals" [*Pandect. Just. I, tit. i], such as sexual
intercourse, education of offspring and so forth. Thirdly, there is in
man an inclination to good, according to the nature of his reason,
which nature is proper to him: thus man has a natural inclination to
know the truth about God, and to live in society: and in this respect,
whatever pertains to this inclination belongs to the natural law; for
instance, to shun ignorance, to avoid offending those among whom one
has to live, and other such things regarding the above inclination.
Reply to Objection 1: All these precepts of the law of nature have the
character of one natural law, inasmuch as they flow from one first
precept.
Reply to Objection 2: All the inclinations of any parts whatsoever of
human nature, e. g. of the concupiscible and irascible parts, in so far
as they are ruled by reason, belong to the natural law, and are reduced
to one first precept, as stated above: so that the precepts of the
natural law are many in themselves, but are based on one common
foundation.
Reply to Objection 3: Although reason is one in itself, yet it directs
all things regarding man; so that whatever can be ruled by reason, is
contained under the law of reason.
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Whether all acts of virtue are prescribed by the natural law?
Objection 1: It would seem that not all acts of virtue are prescribed
by the natural law. Because, as stated above ([2016]Q[90], A[2]) it is
essential to a law that it be ordained to the common good. But some
acts of virtue are ordained to the private good of the individual, as
is evident especially in regards to acts of temperance. Therefore not
all acts of virtue are the subject of natural law.
Objection 2: Further, every sin is opposed to some virtuous act. If
therefore all acts of virtue are prescribed by the natural law, it
seems to follow that all sins are against nature: whereas this applies
to certain special sins.
Objection 3: Further, those things which are according to nature are
common to all. But acts of virtue are not common to all: since a thing
is virtuous in one, and vicious in another. Therefore not all acts of
virtue are prescribed by the natural law.
On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 4) that "virtues
are natural. " Therefore virtuous acts also are a subject of the natural
law.
I answer that, We may speak of virtuous acts in two ways: first, under
the aspect of virtuous; secondly, as such and such acts considered in
their proper species. If then we speak of acts of virtue, considered as
virtuous, thus all virtuous acts belong to the natural law. For it has
been stated [2017](A[2]) that to the natural law belongs everything to
which a man is inclined according to his nature. Now each thing is
inclined naturally to an operation that is suitable to it according to
its form: thus fire is inclined to give heat. Wherefore, since the
rational soul is the proper form of man, there is in every man a
natural inclination to act according to reason: and this is to act
according to virtue. Consequently, considered thus, all acts of virtue
are prescribed by the natural law: since each one's reason naturally
dictates to him to act virtuously. But if we speak of virtuous acts,
considered in themselves, i. e. in their proper species, thus not all
virtuous acts are prescribed by the natural law: for many things are
done virtuously, to which nature does not incline at first; but which,
through the inquiry of reason, have been found by men to be conducive
to well-living.
Reply to Objection 1: Temperance is about the natural concupiscences of
food, drink and sexual matters, which are indeed ordained to the
natural common good, just as other matters of law are ordained to the
moral common good.
Reply to Objection 2: By human nature we may mean either that which is
proper to man---and in this sense all sins, as being against reason,
are also against nature, as Damascene states (De Fide Orth. ii, 30): or
we may mean that nature which is common to man and other animals; and
in this sense, certain special sins are said to be against nature; thus
contrary to sexual intercourse, which is natural to all animals, is
unisexual lust, which has received the special name of the unnatural
crime.
Reply to Objection 3: This argument considers acts in themselves. For
it is owing to the various conditions of men, that certain acts are
virtuous for some, as being proportionate and becoming to them, while
they are vicious for others, as being out of proportion to them.
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Whether the natural law is the same in all men?
Objection 1: It would seem that the natural law is not the same in all.
For it is stated in the Decretals (Dist. i) that "the natural law is
that which is contained in the Law and the Gospel. " But this is not
common to all men; because, as it is written (Rom. 10:16), "all do not
obey the gospel. " Therefore the natural law is not the same in all men.
Objection 2: Further, "Things which are according to the law are said
to be just," as stated in Ethic. v. But it is stated in the same book
that nothing is so universally just as not to be subject to change in
regard to some men. Therefore even the natural law is not the same in
all men.
Objection 3: Further, as stated above ([2018]AA[2],3), to the natural
law belongs everything to which a man is inclined according to his
nature. Now different men are naturally inclined to different things;
some to the desire of pleasures, others to the desire of honors, and
other men to other things. Therefore there is not one natural law for
all.
On the contrary, Isidore says (Etym. v, 4): "The natural law is common
to all nations. "
I answer that, As stated above ([2019]AA[2],3), to the natural law
belongs those things to which a man is inclined naturally: and among
these it is proper to man to be inclined to act according to reason.
Now the process of reason is from the common to the proper, as stated
in Phys. i. The speculative reason, however, is differently situated in
this matter, from the practical reason. For, since the speculative
reason is busied chiefly with the necessary things, which cannot be
otherwise than they are, its proper conclusions, like the universal
principles, contain the truth without fail. The practical reason, on
the other hand, is busied with contingent matters, about which human
actions are concerned: and consequently, although there is necessity in
the general principles, the more we descend to matters of detail, the
more frequently we encounter defects. Accordingly then in speculative
matters truth is the same in all men, both as to principles and as to
conclusions: although the truth is not known to all as regards the
conclusions, but only as regards the principles which are called common
notions. But in matters of action, truth or practical rectitude is not
the same for all, as to matters of detail, but only as to the general
principles: and where there is the same rectitude in matters of detail,
it is not equally known to all.
It is therefore evident that, as regards the general principles whether
of speculative or of practical reason, truth or rectitude is the same
for all, and is equally known by all. As to the proper conclusions of
the speculative reason, the truth is the same for all, but is not
equally known to all: thus it is true for all that the three angles of
a triangle are together equal to two right angles, although it is not
known to all. But as to the proper conclusions of the practical reason,
neither is the truth or rectitude the same for all, nor, where it is
the same, is it equally known by all. Thus it is right and true for all
to act according to reason: and from this principle it follows as a
proper conclusion, that goods entrusted to another should be restored
to their owner. Now this is true for the majority of cases: but it may
happen in a particular case that it would be injurious, and therefore
unreasonable, to restore goods held in trust; for instance, if they are
claimed for the purpose of fighting against one's country. And this
principle will be found to fail the more, according as we descend
further into detail, e. g. if one were to say that goods held in trust
should be restored with such and such a guarantee, or in such and such
a way; because the greater the number of conditions added, the greater
the number of ways in which the principle may fail, so that it be not
right to restore or not to restore.
Consequently we must say that the natural law, as to general
principles, is the same for all, both as to rectitude and as to
knowledge. But as to certain matters of detail, which are conclusions,
as it were, of those general principles, it is the same for all in the
majority of cases, both as to rectitude and as to knowledge; and yet in
some few cases it may fail, both as to rectitude, by reason of certain
obstacles (just as natures subject to generation and corruption fail in
some few cases on account of some obstacle), and as to knowledge, since
in some the reason is perverted by passion, or evil habit, or an evil
disposition of nature; thus formerly, theft, although it is expressly
contrary to the natural law, was not considered wrong among the
Germans, as Julius Caesar relates (De Bello Gall. vi).
Reply to Objection 1: The meaning of the sentence quoted is not that
whatever is contained in the Law and the Gospel belongs to the natural
law, since they contain many things that are above nature; but that
whatever belongs to the natural law is fully contained in them.
Wherefore Gratian, after saying that "the natural law is what is
contained in the Law and the Gospel," adds at once, by way of example,
"by which everyone is commanded to do to others as he would be done
by. "
Reply to Objection 2: The saying of the Philosopher is to be understood
of things that are naturally just, not as general principles, but as
conclusions drawn from them, having rectitude in the majority of cases,
but failing in a few.
Reply to Objection 3: As, in man, reason rules and commands the other
powers, so all the natural inclinations belonging to the other powers
must needs be directed according to reason. Wherefore it is universally
right for all men, that all their inclinations should be directed
according to reason.
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Whether the natural law can be changed?
Objection 1: It would seem that the natural law can be changed. Because
on Ecclus. 17:9, "He gave them instructions, and the law of life," the
gloss says: "He wished the law of the letter to be written, in order to
correct the law of nature.
" But that which is corrected is changed.
Therefore the natural law can be changed.
Objection 2: Further, the slaying of the innocent, adultery, and theft
are against the natural law. But we find these things changed by God:
as when God commanded Abraham to slay his innocent son (Gn. 22:2); and
when he ordered the Jews to borrow and purloin the vessels of the
Egyptians (Ex. 12:35); and when He commanded Osee to take to himself "a
wife of fornications" (Osee 1:2). Therefore the natural law can be
changed.
Objection 3: Further, Isidore says (Etym. 5:4) that "the possession of
all things in common, and universal freedom, are matters of natural
law. " But these things are seen to be changed by human laws. Therefore
it seems that the natural law is subject to change.
On the contrary, It is said in the Decretals (Dist. v): "The natural
law dates from the creation of the rational creature. It does not vary
according to time, but remains unchangeable. "
I answer that, A change in the natural law may be understood in two
ways. First, by way of addition. In this sense nothing hinders the
natural law from being changed: since many things for the benefit of
human life have been added over and above the natural law, both by the
Divine law and by human laws.
Secondly, a change in the natural law may be understood by way of
subtraction, so that what previously was according to the natural law,
ceases to be so. In this sense, the natural law is altogether
unchangeable in its first principles: but in its secondary principles,
which, as we have said [2020](A[4]), are certain detailed proximate
conclusions drawn from the first principles, the natural law is not
changed so that what it prescribes be not right in most cases. But it
may be changed in some particular cases of rare occurrence, through
some special causes hindering the observance of such precepts, as
stated above [2021](A[4]).
Reply to Objection 1: The written law is said to be given for the
correction of the natural law, either because it supplies what was
wanting to the natural law; or because the natural law was perverted in
the hearts of some men, as to certain matters, so that they esteemed
those things good which are naturally evil; which perversion stood in
need of correction.
Reply to Objection 2: All men alike, both guilty and innocent, die the
death of nature: which death of nature is inflicted by the power of God
on account of original sin, according to 1 Kings 2:6: "The Lord killeth
and maketh alive. " Consequently, by the command of God, death can be
inflicted on any man, guilty or innocent, without any injustice
whatever. In like manner adultery is intercourse with another's wife;
who is allotted to him by the law emanating from God. Consequently
intercourse with any woman, by the command of God, is neither adultery
nor fornication. The same applies to theft, which is the taking of
another's property. For whatever is taken by the command of God, to
Whom all things belong, is not taken against the will of its owner,
whereas it is in this that theft consists. Nor is it only in human
things, that whatever is commanded by God is right; but also in natural
things, whatever is done by God, is, in some way, natural, as stated in
the [2022]FP, Q[105], A[6], ad 1.
Reply to Objection 3: A thing is said to belong to the natural law in
two ways. First, because nature inclines thereto: e. g. that one should
not do harm to another. Secondly, because nature did not bring in the
contrary: thus we might say that for man to be naked is of the natural
law, because nature did not give him clothes, but art invented them. In
this sense, "the possession of all things in common and universal
freedom" are said to be of the natural law, because, to wit, the
distinction of possessions and slavery were not brought in by nature,
but devised by human reason for the benefit of human life. Accordingly
the law of nature was not changed in this respect, except by addition.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the law of nature can be abolished from the heart of man?
Objection 1: It would seem that the natural law can be abolished from
the heart of man. Because on Rom. 2:14, "When the Gentiles who have not
the law," etc. a gloss says that "the law of righteousness, which sin
had blotted out, is graven on the heart of man when he is restored by
grace. " But the law of righteousness is the law of nature. Therefore
the law of nature can be blotted out.
Objection 2: Further, the law of grace is more efficacious than the law
of nature. But the law of grace is blotted out by sin. Much more
therefore can the law of nature be blotted out.
Objection 3: Further, that which is established by law is made just.
But many things are enacted by men, which are contrary to the law of
nature. Therefore the law of nature can be abolished from the heart of
man.
On the contrary, Augustine says (Confess. ii): "Thy law is written in
the hearts of men, which iniquity itself effaces not. " But the law
which is written in men's hearts is the natural law. Therefore the
natural law cannot be blotted out.
I answer that, As stated above ([2023]AA[4],5), there belong to the
natural law, first, certain most general precepts, that are known to
all; and secondly, certain secondary and more detailed precepts, which
are, as it were, conclusions following closely from first principles.
As to those general principles, the natural law, in the abstract, can
nowise be blotted out from men's hearts. But it is blotted out in the
case of a particular action, in so far as reason is hindered from
applying the general principle to a particular point of practice, on
account of concupiscence or some other passion, as stated above (Q[77],
A[2]). But as to the other, i. e. the secondary precepts, the natural
law can be blotted out from the human heart, either by evil
persuasions, just as in speculative matters errors occur in respect of
necessary conclusions; or by vicious customs and corrupt habits, as
among some men, theft, and even unnatural vices, as the Apostle states
(Rom. i), were not esteemed sinful.
Reply to Objection 1: Sin blots out the law of nature in particular
cases, not universally, except perchance in regard to the secondary
precepts of the natural law, in the way stated above.
Reply to Objection 2: Although grace is more efficacious than nature,
yet nature is more essential to man, and therefore more enduring.
Reply to Objection 3: This argument is true of the secondary precepts
of the natural law, against which some legislators have framed certain
enactments which are unjust.
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OF HUMAN LAW (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider human law; and (1) this law considered in itself;
(2) its power; (3) its mutability. Under the first head there are four
points of inquiry:
(1) Its utility.
(2) Its origin.
(3) Its quality.
(4) Its division.
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Whether it was useful for laws to be framed by men?
Objection 1: It would seem that it was not useful for laws to be framed
by men. Because the purpose of every law is that man be made good
thereby, as stated above ([2024]Q[92], A[1]). But men are more to be
induced to be good willingly by means of admonitions, than against
their will, by means of laws. Therefore there was no need to frame
laws.
Objection 2: Further, As the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 4), "men have
recourse to a judge as to animate justice. " But animate justice is
better than inanimate justice, which contained in laws. Therefore it
would have been better for the execution of justice to be entrusted to
the decision of judges, than to frame laws in addition.
Objection 3: Further, every law is framed for the direction of human
actions, as is evident from what has been stated above ([2025]Q[90],
AA[1],2). But since human actions are about singulars, which are
infinite in number, matter pertaining to the direction of human actions
cannot be taken into sufficient consideration except by a wise man, who
looks into each one of them. Therefore it would have been better for
human acts to be directed by the judgment of wise men, than by the
framing of laws. Therefore there was no need of human laws.
On the contrary, Isidore says (Etym. v, 20): "Laws were made that in
fear thereof human audacity might be held in check, that innocence
might be safeguarded in the midst of wickedness, and that the dread of
punishment might prevent the wicked from doing harm. " But these things
are most necessary to mankind. Therefore it was necessary that human
laws should be made.
I answer that, As stated above ([2026]Q[63], A[1];[2027] Q[94], A[3]),
man has a natural aptitude for virtue; but the perfection of virtue
must be acquired by man by means of some kind of training. Thus we
observe that man is helped by industry in his necessities, for
instance, in food and clothing. Certain beginnings of these he has from
nature, viz. his reason and his hands; but he has not the full
complement, as other animals have, to whom nature has given sufficiency
of clothing and food. Now it is difficult to see how man could suffice
for himself in the matter of this training: since the perfection of
virtue consists chiefly in withdrawing man from undue pleasures, to
which above all man is inclined, and especially the young, who are more
capable of being trained. Consequently a man needs to receive this
training from another, whereby to arrive at the perfection of virtue.
And as to those young people who are inclined to acts of virtue, by
their good natural disposition, or by custom, or rather by the gift of
God, paternal training suffices, which is by admonitions. But since
some are found to be depraved, and prone to vice, and not easily
amenable to words, it was necessary for such to be restrained from evil
by force and fear, in order that, at least, they might desist from
evil-doing, and leave others in peace, and that they themselves, by
being habituated in this way, might be brought to do willingly what
hitherto they did from fear, and thus become virtuous. Now this kind of
training, which compels through fear of punishment, is the discipline
of laws. Therefore in order that man might have peace and virtue, it
was necessary for laws to be framed: for, as the Philosopher says
(Polit. i, 2), "as man is the most noble of animals if he be perfect in
virtue, so is he the lowest of all, if he be severed from law and
righteousness"; because man can use his reason to devise means of
satisfying his lusts and evil passions, which other animals are unable
to do.
Reply to Objection 1: Men who are well disposed are led willingly to
virtue by being admonished better than by coercion: but men who are
evilly disposed are not led to virtue unless they are compelled.
Reply to Objection 2: As the Philosopher says (Rhet. i, 1), "it is
better that all things be regulated by law, than left to be decided by
judges": and this for three reasons. First, because it is easier to
find a few wise men competent to frame right laws, than to find the
many who would be necessary to judge aright of each single case.
Secondly, because those who make laws consider long beforehand what
laws to make; whereas judgment on each single case has to be pronounced
as soon as it arises: and it is easier for man to see what is right, by
taking many instances into consideration, than by considering one
solitary fact. Thirdly, because lawgivers judge in the abstract and of
future events; whereas those who sit in judgment of things present,
towards which they are affected by love, hatred, or some kind of
cupidity; wherefore their judgment is perverted.
Since then the animated justice of the judge is not found in every man,
and since it can be deflected, therefore it was necessary, whenever
possible, for the law to determine how to judge, and for very few
matters to be left to the decision of men.
Reply to Objection 3: Certain individual facts which cannot be covered
by the law "have necessarily to be committed to judges," as the
Philosopher says in the same passage: for instance, "concerning
something that has happened or not happened," and the like.
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Whether every human law is derived from the natural law?
Objection 1: It would seem that not every human law is derived from the
natural law. For the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 7) that "the legal
just is that which originally was a matter of indifference. " But those
things which arise from the natural law are not matters of
indifference. Therefore the enactments of human laws are not derived
from the natural law.
Objection 2: Further, positive law is contrasted with natural law, as
stated by Isidore (Etym. v, 4) and the Philosopher (Ethic. v, 7). But
those things which flow as conclusions from the general principles of
the natural law belong to the natural law, as stated above
([2028]Q[94], A[4]). Therefore that which is established by human law
does not belong to the natural law.
Objection 3: Further, the law of nature is the same for all; since the
Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 7) that "the natural just is that which is
equally valid everywhere. " If therefore human laws were derived from
the natural law, it would follow that they too are the same for all:
which is clearly false.
Objection 4: Further, it is possible to give a reason for things which
are derived from the natural law. But "it is not possible to give the
reason for all the legal enactments of the lawgivers," as the jurist
says [*Pandect. Justin. lib. i, ff, tit. iii, v; De Leg. et Senat. ].
Therefore not all human laws are derived from the natural law.
On the contrary, Tully says (Rhet. ii): "Things which emanated from
nature and were approved by custom, were sanctioned by fear and
reverence for the laws. "
I answer that, As Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. i, 5) "that which is not
just seems to be no law at all": wherefore the force of a law depends
on the extent of its justice. Now in human affairs a thing is said to
be just, from being right, according to the rule of reason. But the
first rule of reason is the law of nature, as is clear from what has
been stated above ([2029]Q[91], A[2], ad 2). Consequently every human
law has just so much of the nature of law, as it is derived from the
law of nature. But if in any point it deflects from the law of nature,
it is no longer a law but a perversion of law.
But it must be noted that something may be derived from the natural law
in two ways: first, as a conclusion from premises, secondly, by way of
determination of certain generalities. The first way is like to that by
which, in sciences, demonstrated conclusions are drawn from the
principles: while the second mode is likened to that whereby, in the
arts, general forms are particularized as to details: thus the
craftsman needs to determine the general form of a house to some
particular shape. Some things are therefore derived from the general
principles of the natural law, by way of conclusions; e. g. that "one
must not kill" may be derived as a conclusion from the principle that
"one should do harm to no man": while some are derived therefrom by way
of determination; e. g. the law of nature has it that the evil-doer
should be punished; but that he be punished in this or that way, is a
determination of the law of nature.
Accordingly both modes of derivation are found in the human law. But
those things which are derived in the first way, are contained in human
law not as emanating therefrom exclusively, but have some force from
the natural law also. But those things which are derived in the second
way, have no other force than that of human law.
Reply to Objection 1: The Philosopher is speaking of those enactments
which are by way of determination or specification of the precepts of
the natural law.
Reply to Objection 2: This argument avails for those things that are
derived from the natural law, by way of conclusions.
Reply to Objection 3: The general principles of the natural law cannot
be applied to all men in the same way on account of the great variety
of human affairs: and hence arises the diversity of positive laws among
various people.
Reply to Objection 4: These words of the Jurist are to be understood as
referring to decisions of rulers in determining particular points of
the natural law: on which determinations the judgment of expert and
prudent men is based as on its principles; in so far, to wit, as they
see at once what is the best thing to decide.
Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 11) that in such matters, "we
ought to pay as much attention to the undemonstrated sayings and
opinions of persons who surpass us in experience, age and prudence, as
to their demonstrations. "
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Whether Isidore's description of the quality of positive law is appropriate?
Objection 1: It would seem that Isidore's description of the quality of
positive law is not appropriate, when he says (Etym. v, 21): "Law shall
be virtuous, just, possible to nature, according to the custom of the
country, suitable to place and time, necessary, useful; clearly
expressed, lest by its obscurity it lead to misunderstanding; framed
for no private benefit, but for the common good. " Because he had
previously expressed the quality of law in three conditions, saying
that "law is anything founded on reason, provided that it foster
religion, be helpful to discipline, and further the common weal. "
Therefore it was needless to add any further conditions to these.
Objection 2: Further, Justice is included in honesty, as Tully says (De
Offic. vii). Therefore after saying "honest" it was superfluous to add
"just. "
Objection 3: Further, written law is condivided with custom, according
to Isidore (Etym. ii, 10). Therefore it should not be stated in the
definition of law that it is "according to the custom of the country. "
Objection 4: Further, a thing may be necessary in two ways. It may be
necessary simply, because it cannot be otherwise: and that which is
necessary in this way, is not subject to human judgment, wherefore
human law is not concerned with necessity of this kind. Again a thing
may be necessary for an end: and this necessity is the same as
usefulness. Therefore it is superfluous to say both "necessary" and
"useful. "
On the contrary, stands the authority of Isidore.
I answer that, Whenever a thing is for an end, its form must be
determined proportionately to that end; as the form of a saw is such as
to be suitable for cutting (Phys. ii, text. 88). Again, everything that
is ruled and measured must have a form proportionate to its rule and
measure. Now both these conditions are verified of human law: since it
is both something ordained to an end; and is a rule or measure ruled or
measured by a higher measure. And this higher measure is twofold, viz.
the Divine law and the natural law, as explained above [2030](A[2];
Q[93], A[3] ). Now the end of human law is to be useful to man, as the
jurist states [*Pandect. Justin. lib. xxv, ff. , tit. iii; De Leg. et
Senat. ]. Wherefore Isidore in determining the nature of law, lays down,
at first, three conditions; viz. that it "foster religion," inasmuch as
it is proportionate to the Divine law; that it be "helpful to
discipline," inasmuch as it is proportionate to the nature law; and
that it "further the common weal," inasmuch as it is proportionate to
the utility of mankind.
All the other conditions mentioned by him are reduced to these three.
For it is called virtuous because it fosters religion. And when he goes
on to say that it should be "just, possible to nature, according to the
customs of the country, adapted to place and time," he implies that it
should be helpful to discipline. For human discipline depends on first
on the order of reason, to which he refers by saying "just": secondly,
it depends on the ability of the agent; because discipline should be
adapted to each one according to his ability, taking also into account
the ability of nature (for the same burdens should be not laid on
children as adults); and should be according to human customs; since
man cannot live alone in society, paying no heed to others: thirdly, it
depends on certain circumstances, in respect of which he says, "adapted
to place and time. " The remaining words, "necessary, useful," etc. mean
that law should further the common weal: so that "necessity" refers to
the removal of evils; "usefulness" to the attainment of good;
"clearness of expression," to the need of preventing any harm ensuing
from the law itself. And since, as stated above ([2031]Q[90], A[2]),
law is ordained to the common good, this is expressed in the last part
of the description.
This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.
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Whether Isidore's division of human laws is appropriate?
Objection 1: It would seem that Isidore wrongly divided human statutes
or human law (Etym. v, 4, seqq. ). For under this law he includes the
"law of nations," so called, because, as he says, "nearly all nations
use it. " But as he says, "natural law is that which is common to all
nations. " Therefore the law of nations is not contained under positive
human law, but rather under natural law.
Objection 2: Further, those laws which have the same force, seem to
differ not formally but only materially. But "statutes, decrees of the
commonalty, senatorial decrees," and the like which he mentions (Etym.
providence, as stated above [2005](A[1]), hence the defects of natural
things are subject to the eternal law.
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Whether all human affairs are subject to the eternal law?
Objection 1: It would seem that not all human affairs are subject to
the eternal law. For the Apostle says (Gal. 5:18): "If you are led by
the spirit you are not under the law. " But the righteous who are the
sons of God by adoption, are led by the spirit of God, according to
Rom. 8:14: "Whosoever are led by the spirit of God, they are the sons
of God. " Therefore not all men are under the eternal law.
Objection 2: Further, the Apostle says (Rom. 8:7): "The prudence
[Vulg. : 'wisdom'] of the flesh is an enemy to God: for it is not
subject to the law of God. " But many are those in whom the prudence of
the flesh dominates. Therefore all men are not subject to the eternal
law which is the law of God.
Objection 3: Further, Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. i, 6) that "the
eternal law is that by which the wicked deserve misery, the good, a
life of blessedness. " But those who are already blessed, and those who
are already lost, are not in the state of merit. Therefore they are not
under the eternal law.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 12): "Nothing evades
the laws of the most high Creator and Governor, for by Him the peace of
the universe is administered. "
I answer that, There are two ways in which a thing is subject to the
eternal law, as explained above [2006](A[5]): first, by partaking of
the eternal law by way of knowledge; secondly, by way of action and
passion, i. e. by partaking of the eternal law by way of an inward
motive principle: and in this second way, irrational creatures are
subject to the eternal law, as stated above [2007](A[5]). But since the
rational nature, together with that which it has in common with all
creatures, has something proper to itself inasmuch as it is rational,
consequently it is subject to the eternal law in both ways; because
while each rational creature has some knowledge of the eternal law, as
stated above [2008](A[2]), it also has a natural inclination to that
which is in harmony with the eternal law; for "we are naturally adapted
to the recipients of virtue" (Ethic. ii, 1).
Both ways, however, are imperfect, and to a certain extent destroyed,
in the wicked; because in them the natural inclination to virtue is
corrupted by vicious habits, and, moreover, the natural knowledge of
good is darkened by passions and habits of sin. But in the good both
ways are found more perfect: because in them, besides the natural
knowledge of good, there is the added knowledge of faith and wisdom;
and again, besides the natural inclination to good, there is the added
motive of grace and virtue.
Accordingly, the good are perfectly subject to the eternal law, as
always acting according to it: whereas the wicked are subject to the
eternal law, imperfectly as to their actions, indeed, since both their
knowledge of good, and their inclination thereto, are imperfect; but
this imperfection on the part of action is supplied on the part of
passion, in so far as they suffer what the eternal law decrees
concerning them, according as they fail to act in harmony with that
law. Hence Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. i, 15): "I esteem that the
righteous act according to the eternal law; and (De Catech. Rud.
xviii): Out of the just misery of the souls which deserted Him, God
knew how to furnish the inferior parts of His creation with most
suitable laws. "
Reply to Objection 1: This saying of the Apostle may be understood in
two ways. First, so that a man is said to be under the law, through
being pinned down thereby, against his will, as by a load. Hence, on
the same passage a gloss says that "he is under the law, who refrains
from evil deeds, through fear of punishment threatened by the law, and
not from love of virtue. " In this way the spiritual man is not under
the law, because he fulfils the law willingly, through charity which is
poured into his heart by the Holy Ghost. Secondly, it can be understood
as meaning that the works of a man, who is led by the Holy Ghost, are
the works of the Holy Ghost rather than his own. Therefore, since the
Holy Ghost is not under the law, as neither is the Son, as stated above
(A[4], ad 2); it follows that such works, in so far as they are of the
Holy Ghost, are not under the law. The Apostle witnesses to this when
he says (2 Cor. 3:17): "Where the Spirit of the Lord is, there is
liberty. "
Reply to Objection 2: The prudence of the flesh cannot be subject to
the law of God as regards action; since it inclines to actions contrary
to the Divine law: yet it is subject to the law of God, as regards
passion; since it deserves to suffer punishment according to the law of
Divine justice. Nevertheless in no man does the prudence of the flesh
dominate so far as to destroy the whole good of his nature: and
consequently there remains in man the inclination to act in accordance
with the eternal law. For we have seen above ([2009]Q[85], A[2]) that
sin does not destroy entirely the good of nature.
Reply to Objection 3: A thing is maintained in the end and moved
towards the end by one and the same cause: thus gravity which makes a
heavy body rest in the lower place is also the cause of its being moved
thither. We therefore reply that as it is according to the eternal law
that some deserve happiness, others unhappiness, so is it by the
eternal law that some are maintained in a happy state, others in an
unhappy state. Accordingly both the blessed and the damned are under
the eternal law.
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OF THE NATURAL LAW (SIX ARTICLES)
We must now consider the natural law; concerning which there are six
points of inquiry:
(1) What is the natural law?
(2) What are the precepts of the natural law?
(3) Whether all acts of virtue are prescribed by the natural law?
(4) Whether the natural law is the same in all?
(5) Whether it is changeable?
(6) Whether it can be abolished from the heart of man?
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Whether the natural law is a habit?
Objection 1: It would seem that the natural law is a habit. Because, as
the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 5), "there are three things in the
soul: power, habit, and passion. " But the natural law is not one of the
soul's powers: nor is it one of the passions; as we may see by going
through them one by one. Therefore the natural law is a habit.
Objection 2: Further, Basil [*Damascene, De Fide Orth. iv, 22] says
that the conscience or "synderesis is the law of our mind"; which can
only apply to the natural law. But the "synderesis" is a habit, as was
shown in the [2010]FP, Q[79], A[12]. Therefore the natural law is a
habit.
Objection 3: Further, the natural law abides in man always, as will be
shown further on [2011](A[6]). But man's reason, which the law regards,
does not always think about the natural law. Therefore the natural law
is not an act, but a habit.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Bono Conjug. xxi) that "a habit is
that whereby something is done when necessary. " But such is not the
natural law: since it is in infants and in the damned who cannot act by
it. Therefore the natural law is not a habit.
I answer that, A thing may be called a habit in two ways. First,
properly and essentially: and thus the natural law is not a habit. For
it has been stated above ([2012]Q[90], A[1], ad 2) that the natural law
is something appointed by reason, just as a proposition is a work of
reason. Now that which a man does is not the same as that whereby he
does it: for he makes a becoming speech by the habit of grammar. Since
then a habit is that by which we act, a law cannot be a habit properly
and essentially.
Secondly, the term habit may be applied to that which we hold by a
habit: thus faith may mean that which we hold by faith. And
accordingly, since the precepts of the natural law are sometimes
considered by reason actually, while sometimes they are in the reason
only habitually, in this way the natural law may be called a habit.
Thus, in speculative matters, the indemonstrable principles are not the
habit itself whereby we hold those principles, but are the principles
the habit of which we possess.
Reply to Objection 1: The Philosopher proposes there to discover the
genus of virtue; and since it is evident that virtue is a principle of
action, he mentions only those things which are principles of human
acts, viz. powers, habits and passions. But there are other things in
the soul besides these three: there are acts; thus "to will" is in the
one that wills; again, things known are in the knower; moreover its own
natural properties are in the soul, such as immortality and the like.
Reply to Objection 2: "Synderesis" is said to be the law of our mind,
because it is a habit containing the precepts of the natural law, which
are the first principles of human actions.
Reply to Objection 3: This argument proves that the natural law is held
habitually; and this is granted.
To the argument advanced in the contrary sense we reply that sometimes
a man is unable to make use of that which is in him habitually, on
account of some impediment: thus, on account of sleep, a man is unable
to use the habit of science. In like manner, through the deficiency of
his age, a child cannot use the habit of understanding of principles,
or the natural law, which is in him habitually.
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Whether the natural law contains several precepts, or only one?
Objection 1: It would seem that the natural law contains, not several
precepts, but one only. For law is a kind of precept, as stated above
([2013]Q[92], A[2]). If therefore there were many precepts of the
natural law, it would follow that there are also many natural laws.
Objection 2: Further, the natural law is consequent to human nature.
But human nature, as a whole, is one; though, as to its parts, it is
manifold. Therefore, either there is but one precept of the law of
nature, on account of the unity of nature as a whole; or there are
many, by reason of the number of parts of human nature. The result
would be that even things relating to the inclination of the
concupiscible faculty belong to the natural law.
Objection 3: Further, law is something pertaining to reason, as stated
above ([2014]Q[90], A[1]). Now reason is but one in man. Therefore
there is only one precept of the natural law.
On the contrary, The precepts of the natural law in man stand in
relation to practical matters, as the first principles to matters of
demonstration. But there are several first indemonstrable principles.
Therefore there are also several precepts of the natural law.
I answer that, As stated above ([2015]Q[91], A[3]), the precepts of the
natural law are to the practical reason, what the first principles of
demonstrations are to the speculative reason; because both are
self-evident principles. Now a thing is said to be self-evident in two
ways: first, in itself; secondly, in relation to us. Any proposition is
said to be self-evident in itself, if its predicate is contained in the
notion of the subject: although, to one who knows not the definition of
the subject, it happens that such a proposition is not self-evident.
For instance, this proposition, "Man is a rational being," is, in its
very nature, self-evident, since who says "man," says "a rational
being": and yet to one who knows not what a man is, this proposition is
not self-evident. Hence it is that, as Boethius says (De Hebdom. ),
certain axioms or propositions are universally self-evident to all; and
such are those propositions whose terms are known to all, as, "Every
whole is greater than its part," and, "Things equal to one and the same
are equal to one another. " But some propositions are self-evident only
to the wise, who understand the meaning of the terms of such
propositions: thus to one who understands that an angel is not a body,
it is self-evident that an angel is not circumscriptively in a place:
but this is not evident to the unlearned, for they cannot grasp it.
Now a certain order is to be found in those things that are apprehended
universally. For that which, before aught else, falls under
apprehension, is "being," the notion of which is included in all things
whatsoever a man apprehends. Wherefore the first indemonstrable
principle is that "the same thing cannot be affirmed and denied at the
same time," which is based on the notion of "being" and "not-being":
and on this principle all others are based, as is stated in Metaph. iv,
text. 9. Now as "being" is the first thing that falls under the
apprehension simply, so "good" is the first thing that falls under the
apprehension of the practical reason, which is directed to action:
since every agent acts for an end under the aspect of good.
Consequently the first principle of practical reason is one founded on
the notion of good, viz. that "good is that which all things seek
after. " Hence this is the first precept of law, that "good is to be
done and pursued, and evil is to be avoided. " All other precepts of the
natural law are based upon this: so that whatever the practical reason
naturally apprehends as man's good (or evil) belongs to the precepts of
the natural law as something to be done or avoided.
Since, however, good has the nature of an end, and evil, the nature of
a contrary, hence it is that all those things to which man has a
natural inclination, are naturally apprehended by reason as being good,
and consequently as objects of pursuit, and their contraries as evil,
and objects of avoidance. Wherefore according to the order of natural
inclinations, is the order of the precepts of the natural law. Because
in man there is first of all an inclination to good in accordance with
the nature which he has in common with all substances: inasmuch as
every substance seeks the preservation of its own being, according to
its nature: and by reason of this inclination, whatever is a means of
preserving human life, and of warding off its obstacles, belongs to the
natural law. Secondly, there is in man an inclination to things that
pertain to him more specially, according to that nature which he has in
common with other animals: and in virtue of this inclination, those
things are said to belong to the natural law, "which nature has taught
to all animals" [*Pandect. Just. I, tit. i], such as sexual
intercourse, education of offspring and so forth. Thirdly, there is in
man an inclination to good, according to the nature of his reason,
which nature is proper to him: thus man has a natural inclination to
know the truth about God, and to live in society: and in this respect,
whatever pertains to this inclination belongs to the natural law; for
instance, to shun ignorance, to avoid offending those among whom one
has to live, and other such things regarding the above inclination.
Reply to Objection 1: All these precepts of the law of nature have the
character of one natural law, inasmuch as they flow from one first
precept.
Reply to Objection 2: All the inclinations of any parts whatsoever of
human nature, e. g. of the concupiscible and irascible parts, in so far
as they are ruled by reason, belong to the natural law, and are reduced
to one first precept, as stated above: so that the precepts of the
natural law are many in themselves, but are based on one common
foundation.
Reply to Objection 3: Although reason is one in itself, yet it directs
all things regarding man; so that whatever can be ruled by reason, is
contained under the law of reason.
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Whether all acts of virtue are prescribed by the natural law?
Objection 1: It would seem that not all acts of virtue are prescribed
by the natural law. Because, as stated above ([2016]Q[90], A[2]) it is
essential to a law that it be ordained to the common good. But some
acts of virtue are ordained to the private good of the individual, as
is evident especially in regards to acts of temperance. Therefore not
all acts of virtue are the subject of natural law.
Objection 2: Further, every sin is opposed to some virtuous act. If
therefore all acts of virtue are prescribed by the natural law, it
seems to follow that all sins are against nature: whereas this applies
to certain special sins.
Objection 3: Further, those things which are according to nature are
common to all. But acts of virtue are not common to all: since a thing
is virtuous in one, and vicious in another. Therefore not all acts of
virtue are prescribed by the natural law.
On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 4) that "virtues
are natural. " Therefore virtuous acts also are a subject of the natural
law.
I answer that, We may speak of virtuous acts in two ways: first, under
the aspect of virtuous; secondly, as such and such acts considered in
their proper species. If then we speak of acts of virtue, considered as
virtuous, thus all virtuous acts belong to the natural law. For it has
been stated [2017](A[2]) that to the natural law belongs everything to
which a man is inclined according to his nature. Now each thing is
inclined naturally to an operation that is suitable to it according to
its form: thus fire is inclined to give heat. Wherefore, since the
rational soul is the proper form of man, there is in every man a
natural inclination to act according to reason: and this is to act
according to virtue. Consequently, considered thus, all acts of virtue
are prescribed by the natural law: since each one's reason naturally
dictates to him to act virtuously. But if we speak of virtuous acts,
considered in themselves, i. e. in their proper species, thus not all
virtuous acts are prescribed by the natural law: for many things are
done virtuously, to which nature does not incline at first; but which,
through the inquiry of reason, have been found by men to be conducive
to well-living.
Reply to Objection 1: Temperance is about the natural concupiscences of
food, drink and sexual matters, which are indeed ordained to the
natural common good, just as other matters of law are ordained to the
moral common good.
Reply to Objection 2: By human nature we may mean either that which is
proper to man---and in this sense all sins, as being against reason,
are also against nature, as Damascene states (De Fide Orth. ii, 30): or
we may mean that nature which is common to man and other animals; and
in this sense, certain special sins are said to be against nature; thus
contrary to sexual intercourse, which is natural to all animals, is
unisexual lust, which has received the special name of the unnatural
crime.
Reply to Objection 3: This argument considers acts in themselves. For
it is owing to the various conditions of men, that certain acts are
virtuous for some, as being proportionate and becoming to them, while
they are vicious for others, as being out of proportion to them.
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Whether the natural law is the same in all men?
Objection 1: It would seem that the natural law is not the same in all.
For it is stated in the Decretals (Dist. i) that "the natural law is
that which is contained in the Law and the Gospel. " But this is not
common to all men; because, as it is written (Rom. 10:16), "all do not
obey the gospel. " Therefore the natural law is not the same in all men.
Objection 2: Further, "Things which are according to the law are said
to be just," as stated in Ethic. v. But it is stated in the same book
that nothing is so universally just as not to be subject to change in
regard to some men. Therefore even the natural law is not the same in
all men.
Objection 3: Further, as stated above ([2018]AA[2],3), to the natural
law belongs everything to which a man is inclined according to his
nature. Now different men are naturally inclined to different things;
some to the desire of pleasures, others to the desire of honors, and
other men to other things. Therefore there is not one natural law for
all.
On the contrary, Isidore says (Etym. v, 4): "The natural law is common
to all nations. "
I answer that, As stated above ([2019]AA[2],3), to the natural law
belongs those things to which a man is inclined naturally: and among
these it is proper to man to be inclined to act according to reason.
Now the process of reason is from the common to the proper, as stated
in Phys. i. The speculative reason, however, is differently situated in
this matter, from the practical reason. For, since the speculative
reason is busied chiefly with the necessary things, which cannot be
otherwise than they are, its proper conclusions, like the universal
principles, contain the truth without fail. The practical reason, on
the other hand, is busied with contingent matters, about which human
actions are concerned: and consequently, although there is necessity in
the general principles, the more we descend to matters of detail, the
more frequently we encounter defects. Accordingly then in speculative
matters truth is the same in all men, both as to principles and as to
conclusions: although the truth is not known to all as regards the
conclusions, but only as regards the principles which are called common
notions. But in matters of action, truth or practical rectitude is not
the same for all, as to matters of detail, but only as to the general
principles: and where there is the same rectitude in matters of detail,
it is not equally known to all.
It is therefore evident that, as regards the general principles whether
of speculative or of practical reason, truth or rectitude is the same
for all, and is equally known by all. As to the proper conclusions of
the speculative reason, the truth is the same for all, but is not
equally known to all: thus it is true for all that the three angles of
a triangle are together equal to two right angles, although it is not
known to all. But as to the proper conclusions of the practical reason,
neither is the truth or rectitude the same for all, nor, where it is
the same, is it equally known by all. Thus it is right and true for all
to act according to reason: and from this principle it follows as a
proper conclusion, that goods entrusted to another should be restored
to their owner. Now this is true for the majority of cases: but it may
happen in a particular case that it would be injurious, and therefore
unreasonable, to restore goods held in trust; for instance, if they are
claimed for the purpose of fighting against one's country. And this
principle will be found to fail the more, according as we descend
further into detail, e. g. if one were to say that goods held in trust
should be restored with such and such a guarantee, or in such and such
a way; because the greater the number of conditions added, the greater
the number of ways in which the principle may fail, so that it be not
right to restore or not to restore.
Consequently we must say that the natural law, as to general
principles, is the same for all, both as to rectitude and as to
knowledge. But as to certain matters of detail, which are conclusions,
as it were, of those general principles, it is the same for all in the
majority of cases, both as to rectitude and as to knowledge; and yet in
some few cases it may fail, both as to rectitude, by reason of certain
obstacles (just as natures subject to generation and corruption fail in
some few cases on account of some obstacle), and as to knowledge, since
in some the reason is perverted by passion, or evil habit, or an evil
disposition of nature; thus formerly, theft, although it is expressly
contrary to the natural law, was not considered wrong among the
Germans, as Julius Caesar relates (De Bello Gall. vi).
Reply to Objection 1: The meaning of the sentence quoted is not that
whatever is contained in the Law and the Gospel belongs to the natural
law, since they contain many things that are above nature; but that
whatever belongs to the natural law is fully contained in them.
Wherefore Gratian, after saying that "the natural law is what is
contained in the Law and the Gospel," adds at once, by way of example,
"by which everyone is commanded to do to others as he would be done
by. "
Reply to Objection 2: The saying of the Philosopher is to be understood
of things that are naturally just, not as general principles, but as
conclusions drawn from them, having rectitude in the majority of cases,
but failing in a few.
Reply to Objection 3: As, in man, reason rules and commands the other
powers, so all the natural inclinations belonging to the other powers
must needs be directed according to reason. Wherefore it is universally
right for all men, that all their inclinations should be directed
according to reason.
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Whether the natural law can be changed?
Objection 1: It would seem that the natural law can be changed. Because
on Ecclus. 17:9, "He gave them instructions, and the law of life," the
gloss says: "He wished the law of the letter to be written, in order to
correct the law of nature.
" But that which is corrected is changed.
Therefore the natural law can be changed.
Objection 2: Further, the slaying of the innocent, adultery, and theft
are against the natural law. But we find these things changed by God:
as when God commanded Abraham to slay his innocent son (Gn. 22:2); and
when he ordered the Jews to borrow and purloin the vessels of the
Egyptians (Ex. 12:35); and when He commanded Osee to take to himself "a
wife of fornications" (Osee 1:2). Therefore the natural law can be
changed.
Objection 3: Further, Isidore says (Etym. 5:4) that "the possession of
all things in common, and universal freedom, are matters of natural
law. " But these things are seen to be changed by human laws. Therefore
it seems that the natural law is subject to change.
On the contrary, It is said in the Decretals (Dist. v): "The natural
law dates from the creation of the rational creature. It does not vary
according to time, but remains unchangeable. "
I answer that, A change in the natural law may be understood in two
ways. First, by way of addition. In this sense nothing hinders the
natural law from being changed: since many things for the benefit of
human life have been added over and above the natural law, both by the
Divine law and by human laws.
Secondly, a change in the natural law may be understood by way of
subtraction, so that what previously was according to the natural law,
ceases to be so. In this sense, the natural law is altogether
unchangeable in its first principles: but in its secondary principles,
which, as we have said [2020](A[4]), are certain detailed proximate
conclusions drawn from the first principles, the natural law is not
changed so that what it prescribes be not right in most cases. But it
may be changed in some particular cases of rare occurrence, through
some special causes hindering the observance of such precepts, as
stated above [2021](A[4]).
Reply to Objection 1: The written law is said to be given for the
correction of the natural law, either because it supplies what was
wanting to the natural law; or because the natural law was perverted in
the hearts of some men, as to certain matters, so that they esteemed
those things good which are naturally evil; which perversion stood in
need of correction.
Reply to Objection 2: All men alike, both guilty and innocent, die the
death of nature: which death of nature is inflicted by the power of God
on account of original sin, according to 1 Kings 2:6: "The Lord killeth
and maketh alive. " Consequently, by the command of God, death can be
inflicted on any man, guilty or innocent, without any injustice
whatever. In like manner adultery is intercourse with another's wife;
who is allotted to him by the law emanating from God. Consequently
intercourse with any woman, by the command of God, is neither adultery
nor fornication. The same applies to theft, which is the taking of
another's property. For whatever is taken by the command of God, to
Whom all things belong, is not taken against the will of its owner,
whereas it is in this that theft consists. Nor is it only in human
things, that whatever is commanded by God is right; but also in natural
things, whatever is done by God, is, in some way, natural, as stated in
the [2022]FP, Q[105], A[6], ad 1.
Reply to Objection 3: A thing is said to belong to the natural law in
two ways. First, because nature inclines thereto: e. g. that one should
not do harm to another. Secondly, because nature did not bring in the
contrary: thus we might say that for man to be naked is of the natural
law, because nature did not give him clothes, but art invented them. In
this sense, "the possession of all things in common and universal
freedom" are said to be of the natural law, because, to wit, the
distinction of possessions and slavery were not brought in by nature,
but devised by human reason for the benefit of human life. Accordingly
the law of nature was not changed in this respect, except by addition.
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Whether the law of nature can be abolished from the heart of man?
Objection 1: It would seem that the natural law can be abolished from
the heart of man. Because on Rom. 2:14, "When the Gentiles who have not
the law," etc. a gloss says that "the law of righteousness, which sin
had blotted out, is graven on the heart of man when he is restored by
grace. " But the law of righteousness is the law of nature. Therefore
the law of nature can be blotted out.
Objection 2: Further, the law of grace is more efficacious than the law
of nature. But the law of grace is blotted out by sin. Much more
therefore can the law of nature be blotted out.
Objection 3: Further, that which is established by law is made just.
But many things are enacted by men, which are contrary to the law of
nature. Therefore the law of nature can be abolished from the heart of
man.
On the contrary, Augustine says (Confess. ii): "Thy law is written in
the hearts of men, which iniquity itself effaces not. " But the law
which is written in men's hearts is the natural law. Therefore the
natural law cannot be blotted out.
I answer that, As stated above ([2023]AA[4],5), there belong to the
natural law, first, certain most general precepts, that are known to
all; and secondly, certain secondary and more detailed precepts, which
are, as it were, conclusions following closely from first principles.
As to those general principles, the natural law, in the abstract, can
nowise be blotted out from men's hearts. But it is blotted out in the
case of a particular action, in so far as reason is hindered from
applying the general principle to a particular point of practice, on
account of concupiscence or some other passion, as stated above (Q[77],
A[2]). But as to the other, i. e. the secondary precepts, the natural
law can be blotted out from the human heart, either by evil
persuasions, just as in speculative matters errors occur in respect of
necessary conclusions; or by vicious customs and corrupt habits, as
among some men, theft, and even unnatural vices, as the Apostle states
(Rom. i), were not esteemed sinful.
Reply to Objection 1: Sin blots out the law of nature in particular
cases, not universally, except perchance in regard to the secondary
precepts of the natural law, in the way stated above.
Reply to Objection 2: Although grace is more efficacious than nature,
yet nature is more essential to man, and therefore more enduring.
Reply to Objection 3: This argument is true of the secondary precepts
of the natural law, against which some legislators have framed certain
enactments which are unjust.
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OF HUMAN LAW (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider human law; and (1) this law considered in itself;
(2) its power; (3) its mutability. Under the first head there are four
points of inquiry:
(1) Its utility.
(2) Its origin.
(3) Its quality.
(4) Its division.
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Whether it was useful for laws to be framed by men?
Objection 1: It would seem that it was not useful for laws to be framed
by men. Because the purpose of every law is that man be made good
thereby, as stated above ([2024]Q[92], A[1]). But men are more to be
induced to be good willingly by means of admonitions, than against
their will, by means of laws. Therefore there was no need to frame
laws.
Objection 2: Further, As the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 4), "men have
recourse to a judge as to animate justice. " But animate justice is
better than inanimate justice, which contained in laws. Therefore it
would have been better for the execution of justice to be entrusted to
the decision of judges, than to frame laws in addition.
Objection 3: Further, every law is framed for the direction of human
actions, as is evident from what has been stated above ([2025]Q[90],
AA[1],2). But since human actions are about singulars, which are
infinite in number, matter pertaining to the direction of human actions
cannot be taken into sufficient consideration except by a wise man, who
looks into each one of them. Therefore it would have been better for
human acts to be directed by the judgment of wise men, than by the
framing of laws. Therefore there was no need of human laws.
On the contrary, Isidore says (Etym. v, 20): "Laws were made that in
fear thereof human audacity might be held in check, that innocence
might be safeguarded in the midst of wickedness, and that the dread of
punishment might prevent the wicked from doing harm. " But these things
are most necessary to mankind. Therefore it was necessary that human
laws should be made.
I answer that, As stated above ([2026]Q[63], A[1];[2027] Q[94], A[3]),
man has a natural aptitude for virtue; but the perfection of virtue
must be acquired by man by means of some kind of training. Thus we
observe that man is helped by industry in his necessities, for
instance, in food and clothing. Certain beginnings of these he has from
nature, viz. his reason and his hands; but he has not the full
complement, as other animals have, to whom nature has given sufficiency
of clothing and food. Now it is difficult to see how man could suffice
for himself in the matter of this training: since the perfection of
virtue consists chiefly in withdrawing man from undue pleasures, to
which above all man is inclined, and especially the young, who are more
capable of being trained. Consequently a man needs to receive this
training from another, whereby to arrive at the perfection of virtue.
And as to those young people who are inclined to acts of virtue, by
their good natural disposition, or by custom, or rather by the gift of
God, paternal training suffices, which is by admonitions. But since
some are found to be depraved, and prone to vice, and not easily
amenable to words, it was necessary for such to be restrained from evil
by force and fear, in order that, at least, they might desist from
evil-doing, and leave others in peace, and that they themselves, by
being habituated in this way, might be brought to do willingly what
hitherto they did from fear, and thus become virtuous. Now this kind of
training, which compels through fear of punishment, is the discipline
of laws. Therefore in order that man might have peace and virtue, it
was necessary for laws to be framed: for, as the Philosopher says
(Polit. i, 2), "as man is the most noble of animals if he be perfect in
virtue, so is he the lowest of all, if he be severed from law and
righteousness"; because man can use his reason to devise means of
satisfying his lusts and evil passions, which other animals are unable
to do.
Reply to Objection 1: Men who are well disposed are led willingly to
virtue by being admonished better than by coercion: but men who are
evilly disposed are not led to virtue unless they are compelled.
Reply to Objection 2: As the Philosopher says (Rhet. i, 1), "it is
better that all things be regulated by law, than left to be decided by
judges": and this for three reasons. First, because it is easier to
find a few wise men competent to frame right laws, than to find the
many who would be necessary to judge aright of each single case.
Secondly, because those who make laws consider long beforehand what
laws to make; whereas judgment on each single case has to be pronounced
as soon as it arises: and it is easier for man to see what is right, by
taking many instances into consideration, than by considering one
solitary fact. Thirdly, because lawgivers judge in the abstract and of
future events; whereas those who sit in judgment of things present,
towards which they are affected by love, hatred, or some kind of
cupidity; wherefore their judgment is perverted.
Since then the animated justice of the judge is not found in every man,
and since it can be deflected, therefore it was necessary, whenever
possible, for the law to determine how to judge, and for very few
matters to be left to the decision of men.
Reply to Objection 3: Certain individual facts which cannot be covered
by the law "have necessarily to be committed to judges," as the
Philosopher says in the same passage: for instance, "concerning
something that has happened or not happened," and the like.
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Whether every human law is derived from the natural law?
Objection 1: It would seem that not every human law is derived from the
natural law. For the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 7) that "the legal
just is that which originally was a matter of indifference. " But those
things which arise from the natural law are not matters of
indifference. Therefore the enactments of human laws are not derived
from the natural law.
Objection 2: Further, positive law is contrasted with natural law, as
stated by Isidore (Etym. v, 4) and the Philosopher (Ethic. v, 7). But
those things which flow as conclusions from the general principles of
the natural law belong to the natural law, as stated above
([2028]Q[94], A[4]). Therefore that which is established by human law
does not belong to the natural law.
Objection 3: Further, the law of nature is the same for all; since the
Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 7) that "the natural just is that which is
equally valid everywhere. " If therefore human laws were derived from
the natural law, it would follow that they too are the same for all:
which is clearly false.
Objection 4: Further, it is possible to give a reason for things which
are derived from the natural law. But "it is not possible to give the
reason for all the legal enactments of the lawgivers," as the jurist
says [*Pandect. Justin. lib. i, ff, tit. iii, v; De Leg. et Senat. ].
Therefore not all human laws are derived from the natural law.
On the contrary, Tully says (Rhet. ii): "Things which emanated from
nature and were approved by custom, were sanctioned by fear and
reverence for the laws. "
I answer that, As Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. i, 5) "that which is not
just seems to be no law at all": wherefore the force of a law depends
on the extent of its justice. Now in human affairs a thing is said to
be just, from being right, according to the rule of reason. But the
first rule of reason is the law of nature, as is clear from what has
been stated above ([2029]Q[91], A[2], ad 2). Consequently every human
law has just so much of the nature of law, as it is derived from the
law of nature. But if in any point it deflects from the law of nature,
it is no longer a law but a perversion of law.
But it must be noted that something may be derived from the natural law
in two ways: first, as a conclusion from premises, secondly, by way of
determination of certain generalities. The first way is like to that by
which, in sciences, demonstrated conclusions are drawn from the
principles: while the second mode is likened to that whereby, in the
arts, general forms are particularized as to details: thus the
craftsman needs to determine the general form of a house to some
particular shape. Some things are therefore derived from the general
principles of the natural law, by way of conclusions; e. g. that "one
must not kill" may be derived as a conclusion from the principle that
"one should do harm to no man": while some are derived therefrom by way
of determination; e. g. the law of nature has it that the evil-doer
should be punished; but that he be punished in this or that way, is a
determination of the law of nature.
Accordingly both modes of derivation are found in the human law. But
those things which are derived in the first way, are contained in human
law not as emanating therefrom exclusively, but have some force from
the natural law also. But those things which are derived in the second
way, have no other force than that of human law.
Reply to Objection 1: The Philosopher is speaking of those enactments
which are by way of determination or specification of the precepts of
the natural law.
Reply to Objection 2: This argument avails for those things that are
derived from the natural law, by way of conclusions.
Reply to Objection 3: The general principles of the natural law cannot
be applied to all men in the same way on account of the great variety
of human affairs: and hence arises the diversity of positive laws among
various people.
Reply to Objection 4: These words of the Jurist are to be understood as
referring to decisions of rulers in determining particular points of
the natural law: on which determinations the judgment of expert and
prudent men is based as on its principles; in so far, to wit, as they
see at once what is the best thing to decide.
Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 11) that in such matters, "we
ought to pay as much attention to the undemonstrated sayings and
opinions of persons who surpass us in experience, age and prudence, as
to their demonstrations. "
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Whether Isidore's description of the quality of positive law is appropriate?
Objection 1: It would seem that Isidore's description of the quality of
positive law is not appropriate, when he says (Etym. v, 21): "Law shall
be virtuous, just, possible to nature, according to the custom of the
country, suitable to place and time, necessary, useful; clearly
expressed, lest by its obscurity it lead to misunderstanding; framed
for no private benefit, but for the common good. " Because he had
previously expressed the quality of law in three conditions, saying
that "law is anything founded on reason, provided that it foster
religion, be helpful to discipline, and further the common weal. "
Therefore it was needless to add any further conditions to these.
Objection 2: Further, Justice is included in honesty, as Tully says (De
Offic. vii). Therefore after saying "honest" it was superfluous to add
"just. "
Objection 3: Further, written law is condivided with custom, according
to Isidore (Etym. ii, 10). Therefore it should not be stated in the
definition of law that it is "according to the custom of the country. "
Objection 4: Further, a thing may be necessary in two ways. It may be
necessary simply, because it cannot be otherwise: and that which is
necessary in this way, is not subject to human judgment, wherefore
human law is not concerned with necessity of this kind. Again a thing
may be necessary for an end: and this necessity is the same as
usefulness. Therefore it is superfluous to say both "necessary" and
"useful. "
On the contrary, stands the authority of Isidore.
I answer that, Whenever a thing is for an end, its form must be
determined proportionately to that end; as the form of a saw is such as
to be suitable for cutting (Phys. ii, text. 88). Again, everything that
is ruled and measured must have a form proportionate to its rule and
measure. Now both these conditions are verified of human law: since it
is both something ordained to an end; and is a rule or measure ruled or
measured by a higher measure. And this higher measure is twofold, viz.
the Divine law and the natural law, as explained above [2030](A[2];
Q[93], A[3] ). Now the end of human law is to be useful to man, as the
jurist states [*Pandect. Justin. lib. xxv, ff. , tit. iii; De Leg. et
Senat. ]. Wherefore Isidore in determining the nature of law, lays down,
at first, three conditions; viz. that it "foster religion," inasmuch as
it is proportionate to the Divine law; that it be "helpful to
discipline," inasmuch as it is proportionate to the nature law; and
that it "further the common weal," inasmuch as it is proportionate to
the utility of mankind.
All the other conditions mentioned by him are reduced to these three.
For it is called virtuous because it fosters religion. And when he goes
on to say that it should be "just, possible to nature, according to the
customs of the country, adapted to place and time," he implies that it
should be helpful to discipline. For human discipline depends on first
on the order of reason, to which he refers by saying "just": secondly,
it depends on the ability of the agent; because discipline should be
adapted to each one according to his ability, taking also into account
the ability of nature (for the same burdens should be not laid on
children as adults); and should be according to human customs; since
man cannot live alone in society, paying no heed to others: thirdly, it
depends on certain circumstances, in respect of which he says, "adapted
to place and time. " The remaining words, "necessary, useful," etc. mean
that law should further the common weal: so that "necessity" refers to
the removal of evils; "usefulness" to the attainment of good;
"clearness of expression," to the need of preventing any harm ensuing
from the law itself. And since, as stated above ([2031]Q[90], A[2]),
law is ordained to the common good, this is expressed in the last part
of the description.
This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.
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Whether Isidore's division of human laws is appropriate?
Objection 1: It would seem that Isidore wrongly divided human statutes
or human law (Etym. v, 4, seqq. ). For under this law he includes the
"law of nations," so called, because, as he says, "nearly all nations
use it. " But as he says, "natural law is that which is common to all
nations. " Therefore the law of nations is not contained under positive
human law, but rather under natural law.
Objection 2: Further, those laws which have the same force, seem to
differ not formally but only materially. But "statutes, decrees of the
commonalty, senatorial decrees," and the like which he mentions (Etym.
