But that He be for a
time not understood by us is owing to our defect: wherefore that He be
seen by us after being unseen is owing to a change not in Him but in
us.
time not understood by us is owing to our defect: wherefore that He be
seen by us after being unseen is owing to a change not in Him but in
us.
Summa Theologica
" Therefore no created
intellect will be able to see God in His essence.
Objection 5: Further, according to Dionysius (Ep. ad Hieroth. ) "God is
invisible on account of His surpassing glory. " Now His glory surpasses
the human intellect in heaven even as on the way. Therefore since He is
invisible on the way, so will He be in heaven.
Objection 6: Further, since the intelligible object is the perfection
of the intellect, there must needs be proportion between intelligible
and intellect, as between the visible object and the sight. But there
is no possible proportion between our intellect and the Divine essence,
since an infinite distance separates them. Therefore our intellect will
be unable to attain to the vision of the Divine essence.
Objection 7: Further, God is more distant from our intellect than the
created intelligible is from our senses. But the senses can nowise
attain to the sight of a spiritual creature. Therefore neither will our
intellect be able to attain to the vision of the Divine essence.
Objection 8: Further, whenever the intellect understands something
actually it needs to be informed with the likeness of the object
understood, which likeness is the principle of the intellectual
operation terminating in that object, even as heat is the principle of
heating. Accordingly if our intellect understands God, this must be by
means of some likeness informing the intellect itself. Now this cannot
be the very essence of God, since form and thing informed must needs
have one being, while the Divine essence differs from our intellect in
essence and being. Therefore the form whereby our intellect is informed
in understanding God must needs be a likeness impressed by God on our
intellect. But this likeness, being something created, cannot lead to
the knowledge of God except as an effect leads to the knowledge of its
cause. Therefore it is impossible for our intellect to see God except
through His effect. But to see God through His effect is not to see Him
in His essence. Therefore our intellect will be unable to see God in
His essence.
Objection 9: Further, the Divine essence is more distant from our
intellect than any angel or intelligence. Now according to Avicenna
(Metaph. iii), "the existence of an intelligence in our intellect does
not imply that its essence is in our intellect," because in that case
our knowledge of the intelligence would be a substance and not an
accident, "but that its likeness is impressed on our intellect. "
Therefore neither is God in our intellect, to be understood by us,
except in so far as an impression of Him is in our intellect. But this
impression cannot lead to the knowledge of the Divine essence, for
since it is infinitely distant from the Divine essence, it degenerates
to another image much more than if the image of a white thing were to
degenerate to the image of a black thing. Therefore, just as a person
in whose sight the image of a white thing degenerates to the image of a
black thing, on account of an indisposition in the organ, is not said
to see a white thing, so neither will our intellect be able to see God
in His essence, since it understands God only by means of this
impression.
Objection 10: Further, "In things devoid of matter that which
understands is the same as that which is understood" (De Anima iii).
Now God is supremely devoid of matter. Since then our intellect, which
is created, cannot attain to be an uncreated essence, it is impossible
for our intellect to see God in His essence.
Objection 11: Further, whatever is seen in its essence is known as to
what it is. But our intellect cannot know of God what He is, but only
what He is not as Dionysius (Coel. Hier. ii) and Damascene (De Fide
Orth. i) declare. Therefore our intellect will be unable to see God in
His essence.
Objection 12: Further, every infinite thing, as such, is unknown. But
God is in every way infinite. Therefore He is altogether unknown.
Therefore it will be impossible for Him to be seen in His essence by a
created intellect.
Objection 13: Further, Augustine says (De Videndo Deo: Ep. cxlvii):
"God is by nature invisible. " Now that which is in God by nature cannot
be otherwise. Therefore it is impossible for Him to be seen in His
essence.
Objection 14: Further, whatever is in one way and is seen in another
way is not seen as it is. Now God is in one way and will be seen in
another way by the saints in heaven: for He according to His own mode,
but will be seen by the saints according to their mode. Therefore He
will not be seen by the saints as He is, and thus will not be seen in
His essence.
Objection 15: Further, that which is seen through a medium is not seen
in its essence. Now God will be seen in heaven through a medium which
is the light of glory, according to Ps. 35:10, "In Thy light we shall
see light. " Therefore He will not be seen in His essence.
Objection 16: Further, in heaven God will be seen face to face,
according to 1 Cor. 13:12. Now when we see a man face to face, we see
him through his likeness. Therefore in heaven God will be seen through
His likeness, and consequently not in His essence.
On the contrary, It is written (1 Cor. 13:12): "We see now through a
glass in a dark manner, but then face to face. " Now that which is seen
face to face is seen in its essence. Therefore God will be seen in His
essence by the saints in heaven.
Further, it is written (1 Jn. 3:2): "When He shall appear we shall be
like to Him, because we shall see Him as He is. " Therefore we shall see
Him in His essence.
Further, a gloss on 1 Cor. 15:24, "When He shall have delivered up the
kingdom to God and the Father," says: "Where," i. e. in heaven, "the
essence of Father, Son, and Holy Ghost shall be seen: this is given to
the clean of heart alone and is the highest bliss. " Therefore the
blessed will see God in His essence.
Further, it is written (Jn. 14:21): "He that loveth Me shall be loved
of My Father; and I will love him, and will manifest Myself to him. "
Now that which is manifested is seen in its essence. Therefore God will
be seen in His essence by the saints in heaven.
Further, Gregory commenting (Moral. xviii) on the words of Ex. 33:20,
"Man shall not see Me and live," disapproves of the opinion of those
who said that "in this abode of bliss God can be seen in His glory but
not in His nature; for His glory differs not from His nature. " But His
nature is His essence. Therefore He will be seen in His essence.
Further, the desire of the saints cannot be altogether frustrated. Now
the common desire of the saints is to see God in His essence, according
to Ex. 33:13, "Show me Thy glory"; Ps. 79:20, "Show Thy face and we
shall be saved"; and Jn. 14:8, "Show us the Father and it is enough for
us. " Therefore the saints will see God in His essence.
I answer that, Even as we hold by faith that the last end of man's life
is to see God, so the philosophers maintained that man's ultimate
happiness is to understand immaterial substances according to their
being. Hence in reference to this question we find that philosophers
and theologians encounter the same difficulty and the same difference
of opinion. For some philosophers held that our passive intellect can
never come to understand separate substances. thus Alfarabius expresses
himself at the end of his Ethics, although he says the contrary in his
book On the Intelligence, as the Commentator attests (De Anima iii). In
like manner certain theologians held that the human intellect can never
attain to the vision of God in His essence. on either side they were
moved by the distance which separates our intellect from the Divine
essence and from separate substances. For since the intellect in act is
somewhat one with the intelligible object in act, it would seem
difficult to understand how the created intellect is made to be an
uncreated essence. Wherefore Chrysostom says (Hom. xiv in Joan. ): "How
can the creature see the uncreated? " Those who hold the passive
intellect to be the subject of generation and corruption, as being a
power dependent on the body, encounter a still greater difficulty not
only as regards the vision of God but also as regards the vision of any
separate substances. But this opinion is altogether untenable. First,
because it is in contradiction to the authority of canonical scripture,
as Augustine declares (De Videndo Deo: Ep. cxlvii). Secondly, because,
since understanding is an operation most proper to man, it follows that
his happiness must be held to consist in that operation when perfected
in him. Now since the perfection of an intelligent being as such is the
intelligible object, if in the most perfect operation of his intellect
man does not attain to the vision of the Divine essence, but to
something else, we shall be forced to conclude that something other
than God is the object of man's happiness: and since the ultimate
perfection of a thing consists in its being united to its principle, it
follows that something other than God is the effective principle of
man, which is absurd, according to us, and also according to the
philosophers who maintain that our souls emanate from the separate
substances, so that finally we may be able to understand these
substances. Consequently, according to us, it must be asserted that our
intellect will at length attain to the vision of the Divine essence,
and according to the philosophers, that it will attain to the vision of
separate substances.
It remains, then, to examine how this may come about. For some, like
Alfarabius and Avempace, held that from the very fact that our
intellect understands any intelligible objects whatever, it attains to
the vision of a separate substance. To prove this they employ two
arguments. The first is that just as the specific nature is not
diversified in various individuals, except as united to various
individuating principles, so the idea understood is not diversified in
me and you, except in so far as it is united to various imaginary
forms: and consequently when the intellect separates the idea
understood from the imaginary forms, there remains a quiddity
understood, which is one and the same in the various persons
understanding it, and such is the quiddity of a separate substance.
Hence, when our intellect attains to the supreme abstraction of any
intelligible quiddity, it thereby understands the quiddity of the
separate substance that is similar to it. The second argument is that
our intellect has a natural aptitude to abstract the quiddity from all
intelligible objects having a quiddity. If, then, the quiddity which it
abstracts from some particular individual be a quiddity without a
quiddity, the intellect by understanding it understands the quiddity of
the separate substance which has a like disposition, since separate
substances are subsisting quiddities without quiddities; for the
quiddity of a simple thing is the simple thing itself, as Avicenna says
(Met. iii). On the other hand if the quiddity abstracted from this
particular sensible be a quiddity that has a quiddity, it follows that
the intellect has a natural aptitude to abstract this quiddity, and
consequently since we cannot go on indefinitely, we shall come to some
quiddity without a quiddity, and this is what we understand by a
separate quiddity [*Cf. [5124]FP, Q[88], A[2]].
But this reasoning is seemingly inconclusive. First, because the
quiddity of the material substance, which the intellect abstracts, is
not of the same nature as the quiddity of the separate substances, and
consequently from the fact that our intellect abstracts the quiddities
of material substances and knows them, it does not follow that it knows
the quiddity of a separate substance, especially of the Divine essence,
which more than any other is of a different nature from any created
quiddity. Secondly, because granted that it be of the same nature,
nevertheless the knowledge of a composite thing would not lead to the
knowledge of a separate substance, except in the point of the most
remote genus, namely substance: and such a knowledge is imperfect
unless it reach to the properties of a thing. For to know a man only as
an animal is to know him only in a restricted sense and potentially:
and much less is it to know only the nature of substance in him. Hence
to know God thus, or other separate substances, is not to see the
essence of God or the quiddity of a separate substance, but to know Him
in His effect and in a mirror as it were. For this reason Avicenna in
his Metaphysics. propounds another way of understanding separate
substances, to wit that separate substances are understood by us by
means of intentions of their quiddities, such intentions being images
of their substances, not indeed abstracted therefrom, since they are
immaterial, but impressed thereby on our souls. But this way also seems
inadequate to the Divine vision which we seek. For it is agreed that
"whatever is received into any thing is therein after the mode of the
recipient": and consequently the likeness of the Divine essence
impressed on our intellect will be according to the mode of our
intellect: and the mode of our intellect falls short of a perfect
reception of the Divine likeness. Now the lack of perfect likeness may
occur in as many ways, as unlikeness may occur. For in one way there is
a deficient likeness, when the form is participated according to the
same specific nature, but not in the same measure of perfection: such
is the defective likeness in a subject that has little whiteness in
comparison with one that has much. In another way the likeness is yet
more defective, when it does not attain to the same specific nature but
only to the same generic nature: such is the likeness of an
orange-colored or yellowish object in comparison with a white one. In
another way, still more defective is the likeness when it does not
attain to the same generic nature, but only to a certain analogy or
proportion: such is the likeness of whiteness to man, in that each is a
being: and in this way every likeness received into a creature is
defective in comparison with the Divine essence. Now in order that the
sight know whiteness, it is necessary for it to receive the likeness of
whiteness according to its specific nature, although not according to
the same manner of being because the form has a manner of being in the
sense other from that which it has in the thing outside the soul: for
if the form of yellowness were received into the eye, the eye would not
be said to see whiteness. In like manner in order that the intellect
understand a quiddity, it is necessary for it to receive its likeness
according to the same specific nature, although there may possibly not
be the same manner of being on either side: for the form which is in
the intellect or sense is not the principle of knowledge according to
its manner of being on both sides, but according to its common ratio
with the external object. Hence it is clear that by no likeness
received in the created intellect can God be understood, so that His
essence be seen immediately. And for this reason those who held the
Divine essence to be seen in this way alone, said that the essence
itself will not be seen, but a certain brightness, as it were a
radiance thereof. Consequently neither does this way suffice for the
Divine vision that we seek.
Therefore we must take the other way, which also certain philosophers
held, namely Alexander and Averroes (De Anima iii. ). For since in every
knowledge some form is required whereby the object is known or seen,
this form by which the intellect is perfected so as to see separate
substances is neither a quiddity abstracted by the intellect from
composite things, as the first opinion maintained, nor an impression
left on our intellect by the separate substance, as the second opinion
affirmed; but the separate substance itself united to our intellect as
its form, so as to be both that which is understood, and that whereby
it is understood. And whatever may be the case with other separate
substances, we must nevertheless allow this to be our way of seeing God
in His essence, because by whatever other form our intellect were
informed, it could not be led thereby to the Divine essence. This,
however, must not be understood as though the Divine essence were in
reality the form of our intellect, or as though from its conjunction
with our intellect there resulted one being simply, as in natural
things from the natural form and matter: but the meaning is that the
proportion of the Divine essence to our intellect is as the proportion
of form to matter. For whenever two things, one of which is the
perfection of the other, are received into the same recipient, the
proportion of one to the other, namely of the more perfect to the less
perfect, is as the proportion of form to matter: thus light and color
are received into a transparent object, light being to color as form to
matter. When therefore intellectual light is received into the soul,
together with the indwelling Divine essence, though they are not
received in the same way, the Divine essence will be to the intellect
as form to matter: and that this suffices for the intellect to be able
to see the Divine essence by the Divine essence itself may be shown as
follows.
As from the natural form (whereby a thing has being) and matter, there
results one thing simply, so from the form whereby the intellect
understands, and the intellect itself, there results one thing
intelligibly. Now in natural things a self-subsistent thing cannot be
the form of any matter, if that thing has matter as one of its parts,
since it is impossible for matter to be the form of a thing. But if
this self-subsistent thing be a mere form, nothing hinders it from
being the form of some matter and becoming that whereby the composite
itself is [*Literally,---and becoming the 'whereby-it-is' of the
composite itself] as instanced in the soul. Now in the intellect we
must take the intellect itself in potentiality as matter, and the
intelligible species as form; so that the intellect actually
understanding will be the composite as it were resulting from both.
Hence if there be a self-subsistent thing, that has nothing in itself
besides that which is intelligible, such a thing can by itself be the
form whereby the intellect understands. Now a thing is intelligible in
respect of its actuality and not of its potentiality (Met. ix): in
proof of which an intelligible form needs to be abstracted from matter
and from all the properties of matter. Therefore, since the Divine
essence is pure act, it will be possible for it to be the form whereby
the intellect understands: and this will be the beatific vision. Hence
the Master says (Sent. ii, D, 1) that the union of the body with the
soul is an illustration of the blissful union of the spirit with God.
Reply to Objection 1: The words quoted can be explained in three ways,
according to Augustine (De Videndo Deo: Ep. cxlvii). In one way as
excluding corporeal vision, whereby no one ever saw or will see God in
His essence; secondly, as excluding intellectual vision of God in His
essence from those who dwell in this mortal flesh; thirdly, as
excluding the vision of comprehension from a created intellect. It is
thus that Chrysostom understands the saying wherefore he adds: "By
seeing, the evangelist means a most clear perception, and such a
comprehension as the Father has of the Son. " This also is the meaning
of the evangelist, since he adds: "The Only-begotten Son Who is in the
bosom of the Father, He hath declared Him": his intention being to
prove the Son to be God from His comprehending God.
Reply to Objection 2: Just as God, by His infinite essence, surpasses
all existing things which have a determinate being, so His knowledge,
whereby He knows, is above all knowledge. Wherefore as our knowledge is
to our created essence, so is the Divine knowledge to His infinite
essence. Now two things contribute to knowledge, to wit, the knower and
the thing known. Again, the vision whereby we shall see God in His
essence is the same whereby God sees Himself, as regards that whereby
He is seen, because as He sees Himself in His essence so shall we also
see Him. But as regards the knower there is the difference that is
between the Divine intellect and ours. Now in the order of knowledge
the object known follows the form by which we know, since by the form
of a stone we see a stone: whereas the efficacy of knowledge follows
the power of the knower: thus he who has stronger sight sees more
clearly. Consequently in that vision we shall see the same thing that
God sees, namely His essence, but not so effectively.
Reply to Objection 3: Dionysius is speaking there of the knowledge
whereby wayfarers know God by a created form, whereby our intellect is
informed so as to see God. But as Augustine says (De Videndo Deo: Ep.
cxlvii), "God evades every form of our intellect," because whatever
form our intellect conceive, that form is out of proportion to the
Divine essence. Hence He cannot be fathomed by our intellect: but our
most perfect knowledge of Him as wayfarers is to know that He is above
all that our intellect can conceive, and thus we are united to Him as
to something unknown. In heaven, however, we shall see Him by a form
which is His essence, and we shall be united to Him as to something
known.
Reply to Objection 4: God is light (Jn. 1:9). Now illumination is the
impression of light on an illuminated object. And since the Divine
essence is of a different mode from any likeness thereof impressed on
the intellect, he (Dionysius) says that the "Divine darkness is
impervious to all illumination," because, to wit, the Divine essence,
which he calls "darkness" on account of its surpassing brightness,
remains undemonstrated by the impression on our intellect, and
consequently is "hidden from all knowledge. " Therefore if anyone in
seeing God conceives something in his mind, this is not God but one of
God's effects.
Reply to Objection 5: Although the glory of God surpasses any form by
which our intellect is informed now, it does not surpass the Divine
essence, which will be the form of our intellect in heaven: and
therefore although it is invisible now, it will be visible then.
Reply to Objection 6: Although there can be no proportion between
finite and infinite, since the excess of the infinite over the finite
is indeterminate, there can be proportionateness or a likeness to
proportion between them: for as a finite thing is equal to some finite
thing, so is an infinite thing equal to an infinite thing. Now in order
that a thing be known totally, it is sometimes necessary that there be
proportion between knower and known, because the power of the knower
needs to be adequate to the knowableness of the thing known, and
equality is a kind of proportion. Sometimes, however, the knowableness
of the thing surpasses the power of the knower, as when we know God, or
conversely when He knows creatures: and then there is no need for
proportion between knower and known, but only for proportionateness; so
that, to wit, as the knower is to the knowable object, so is the
knowable object to the fact of its being known: and this
proportionateness suffices for the infinite to be known by the finite,
or conversely.
We may also reply that proportion according to the strict sense in
which it is employed signifies a ratio of quantity to quantity based on
a certain fixed excess or equality; but is further transferred to
denote any ratio of any one thing to another; and in this sense we say
that matter should be proportionate to its form. In this sense nothing
hinders our intellect, although finite, being described as
proportionate to the vision of the Divine essence; but not to the
comprehension thereof, on account of its immensity.
Reply to Objection 7: Likeness and distance are twofold. One is
according to agreement in nature; and thus God is more distant from the
created intellect than the created intelligible is from the sense. The
other is according to proportionateness; and thus it is the other way
about, for sense is not proportionate to the knowledge of the
immaterial, as the intellect is proportionate to the knowledge of any
immaterial object whatsoever. It is this likeness and not the former
that is requisite for knowledge, for it is clear that the intellect
understanding a stone is not like it in its natural being; thus also
the sight apprehends red honey and red gall, though it does not
apprehend sweet honey, for the redness of gall is more becoming to
honey as visible, than the sweetness of honey to honey.
Reply to Objection 8: In the vision wherein God will be seen in His
essence, the Divine essence itself will be the form, as it were, of the
intellect, by which it will understand: nor is it necessary for them to
become one in being, but only to become one as regards the act of
understanding.
Reply to Objection 9: We do not uphold the saying of Avicenna as
regards the point at issue, for in this other philosophers also
disagree with him. Unless perhaps we might say that Avicenna refers to
the knowledge of separate substances, in so far as they are known by
the habits of speculative sciences and the likeness of other things.
Hence he makes this statement in order to prove that in us knowledge is
not a substance but an accident. Nevertheless, although the Divine
essence is more distant, as to the property of its nature, from our
intellect, than is the substance of an angel, it surpasses it in the
point of intelligibility, since it is pure act without any admixture of
potentiality, which is not the case with other separate substances. Nor
will that knowledge whereby we shall see God in His essence be in the
genus of accident as regards that whereby He will be seen, but only as
regards the act of the one who understands Him, for this act will not
be the very substance either of the person understanding or of the
thing understood.
Reply to Objection 10: A substance that is separate from matter
understands both itself and other things; and in both cases the
authority quoted can be verified. For since the very essence of a
separate substance is of itself intelligible and actual, through being
separate from matter, it is clear that when a separate substance
understands itself, that which understands and that which is understood
are absolutely identical, for it does not understand itself by an
intention abstracted from itself, as we understand material objects.
And this is apparently the meaning of the Philosopher (De Anima iii. )
as indicated by the Commentator (De Anima iii). But when it understands
other things, the object actually understood becomes one with the
intellect in act, in so far as the form of the object understood
becomes the form of the intellect, for as much as the intellect is in
act; not that it becomes identified with the essence of the intellect,
as Avicenna proves (De Natural. vi. ), because the essence of the
intellect remains one under two forms whereby it understands two things
in succession, in the same way as primary matter remains one under
various forms. Hence also the Commentator (De Anima iii. ) compares the
passive intellect, in this respect, to primary matter. Thus it by no
means follows that our intellect in seeing God becomes the very essence
of God, but that the latter is compared to it as its perfection or
form.
Reply to Objection 11: These and all like authorities must be
understood to refer to the knowledge whereby we know God on the way,
for the reason given above.
Reply to Objection 12: The infinite is unknown if we take it in the
privative sense, as such, because it indicates removal of completion
whence knowledge of a thing is derived. Wherefore the infinite amounts
to the same as matter subject to privation, as stated in Phys. iii. But
if we take the infinite in the negative sense, it indicates the absence
of limiting matter, since even a form is somewhat limited by its
matter. Hence the infinite in this sense is of itself most knowable;
and it is in this way that God is infinite.
Reply to Objection 13: Augustine is speaking of bodily vision, by which
God will never be seen. This is evident from what precedes: "For no man
hath seen God at any time, nor can any man see Him as these things
which we call visible are seen: in this way He is by nature invisible
even as He is incorruptible. " As, however, He is by nature supremely
being, so He is in Himself supremely intelligible.
But that He be for a
time not understood by us is owing to our defect: wherefore that He be
seen by us after being unseen is owing to a change not in Him but in
us.
Reply to Objection 14: In heaven God will be seen by the saints as He
is, if this be referred to the mode of the object seen, for the saints
will see that God has the mode which He has. But if we refer the mode
to the knower, He will not be seen as He is, because the created
intellect will not have so great an efficacy in seeing, as the Divine
essence has to the effect of being seen.
Reply to Objection 15: There is a threefold medium both in bodily and
in intellectual vision. The first is the medium "under which" the
object is seen, and this is something perfecting the sight so as to see
in general, without determining the sight to any particular object.
Such is bodily light in relation to bodily vision; and the light of the
active intellect in relation to the passive intellect, in so far as
this light is a medium. The second is the light "by which" the object
is seen, and this is the visible form whereby either sight is
determined to a special object, for instance by the form of a stone to
know a stone. The third is the medium "in which" it is seen; and this
is something by gazing on which the sight is led to something else:
thus by looking in a mirror it is led to see the things reflected in
the mirror, and by looking at an image it is led to the thing
represented by the image. In this way, too, the intellect from knowing
an effect is led to the cause, or conversely. Accordingly in the
heavenly vision there will be no third medium, so that, to wit, God be
known by the images of other things, as He is known now, for which
reason we are said to see now in a glass: nor will there be the second
medium, because the essence itself of God will be that whereby our
intellect will see God. But there will only be the first medium, which
will upraise our intellect so that it will be possible for it to be
united to the uncreated substance in the aforesaid manner. Yet this
medium will not cause that knowledge to be mediate, because it does not
come in between the knower and the thing known, but is that which gives
the knower the power to know [*Cf. [5125]FP, Q[12], A[5]].
Reply to Objection 16: Corporeal creatures are not said to be seen
immediately, except when that which in them is capable of being brought
into conjunction with the sight is in conjunction therewith. Now they
are not capable of being in conjunction with the sight of their essence
on account of their materiality: hence they are seen immediately when
their image is in conjunction with the sight. But God is able to be
united to the intellect by His essence: wherefore He would not be seen
immediately, unless His essence were united to the intellect: and this
vision, which is effected immediately, is called "vision of face. "
Moreover the likeness of the corporeal object is received into the
sight according to the same ratio as it is in the object, although not
according to the same mode of being. Wherefore this likeness leads to
the object directly: whereas no likeness can lead our intellect in this
way to God, as shown above: and for this reason the comparison fails.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether after the resurrection the saints will see God with the eyes of the
body? [*Cf. FP, Q[12], A[3]]
Objection 1: It would seem that after the resurrection the saints will
see God with the eyes of the body. Because the glorified eye has
greater power than one that is not glorified. Now the blessed Job saw
God with his eyes (Job 42:5): "With the hearing of the ear, I have
heard Thee, but now my eye seeth Thee. " Much more therefore will the
glorified eye be able to see God in His essence.
Objection 2: Further, it is written (Job 19:26): "In my flesh I shall
see God my Saviour [Vulg. : 'my God']. " Therefore in heaven God will be
seen with the eyes of the body.
Objection 3: Further. Augustine, speaking of the sight of the glorified
eyes, expresses himself as follows (De Civ. Dei xxii): "A greater power
will be in those eyes, not to see more keenly, as certain serpents or
eagles are reported to see (for whatever acuteness of vision is
possessed by these animals they can see only corporeal things), but to
see even incorporeal things. " Now any power that is capable of knowing
incorporeal things can be upraised to see God. Therefore the glorified
eyes will be able to see God.
Objection 4: Further, the disparity of corporeal to incorporeal things
is the same as of incorporeal to corporeal. Now the incorporeal eye can
see corporeal things. Therefore the corporeal eye can see the
incorporeal: and consequently the same conclusion follows.
Objection 5: Further, Gregory, commenting on Job 4:16, "There stood one
whose countenance I knew not," says (Moral. v): "Man who, had he been
willing to obey the command, would have been spiritual in the flesh,
became, by sinning, carnal even in mind. " Now through becoming carnal
in mind, "he thinks only of those things which he draws to his soul by
the images of bodies" (Moral. v). Therefore when he will be spiritual
in the flesh (which is promised to the saints after the resurrection),
he will be able even in the flesh to see spiritual things. Therefore
the same conclusion follows.
Objection 6: Further, man can be beatified by God alone. Now he will be
beatified not only in soul but also in body. Therefore God will be
visible not only to his intellect but also to his flesh.
Objection 7: Further, even as God is present to the intellect by His
essence, so will He be to the senses, because He will be "all in all"
(1 Cor. 15:28). Now He will be seen by the intellect through the union
of His essence therewith. Therefore He will also be visible to the
sense.
On the contrary, Ambrose, commenting on Lk. 1:2, "There appeared to him
an angel," says: "God is not sought with the eyes of the body, nor
surveyed by the sight, nor clasped by the touch. " Therefore God will by
no means be visible to the bodily sense.
Further, Jerome, commenting on Is. 6:1, "I saw the Lord sitting," says:
"The Godhead not only of the Father, but also of the Son and of the
Holy Ghost is visible, not to carnal eyes, but only to the eyes of the
mind, of which it is said: Blessed are the pure in heart. "
Further, Jerome says again (as quoted by Augustine, Ep. cxlvii): "An
incorporeal thing is invisible to a corporeal eye. " But God is
supremely incorporeal. Therefore, etc.
Further, Augustine says (De Videndo Deo, Ep. cxlvii): "No man hath seen
God as He is at any time, neither in this life, nor in the angelic
life, in the same way as these visible things which are seen with the
corporeal sight. " Now the angelic life is the life of the blessed,
wherein they will live after the resurrection. Therefore, etc.
Further, according to Augustine (De Trin. xiv. ), "man is said to be
made to God's image inasmuch as he is able to see God. " But man is in
God's image as regards his mind, and not as regards his flesh.
Therefore he will see God with his mind and not with his flesh.
I answer that, A thing is perceptible to the senses of the body in two
ways, directly and indirectly. A thing is perceptible directly if it
can act directly on the bodily senses. And a thing can act directly
either on sense as such or on a particular sense as such. That which
acts directly in this second way on a sense is called a proper
sensible, for instance color in relation to the sight, and sound in
relation to the hearing. But as sense as such makes use of a bodily
organ, nothing can be received therein except corporeally, since
whatever is received into a thing is therein after the mode of the
recipient. Hence all sensibles act on the sense as such, according to
their magnitude: and consequently magnitude and all its consequences,
such as movement, rest, number, and the like, are called common
sensibles, and yet they are direct objects of sense.
An indirect object of sense is that which does not act on the sense,
neither as sense nor as a particular sense, but is annexed to those
things that act on sense directly: for instance Socrates; the son of
Diares; a friend and the like which are the direct object of the
intellect's knowledge in the universal, and in the particular are the
object of the cogitative power in man, and of the estimative power in
other animals. The external sense is said to perceive things of this
kind, although indirectly, when the apprehensive power (whose province
it is to know directly this thing known), from that which is sensed
directly, apprehends them at once and without any doubt or discourse
(thus we see that a person is alive from the fact that he speaks):
otherwise the sense is not said to perceive it even indirectly.
I say then that God can nowise be seen with the eyes of the body, or
perceived by any of the senses, as that which is seen directly, neither
here, nor in heaven: for if that which belongs to sense as such be
removed from sense, there will be no sense, and in like manner if that
which belongs to sight as sight be removed therefrom, there will be no
sight. Accordingly seeing that sense as sense perceives magnitude, and
sight as such a sense perceives color, it is impossible for the sight
to perceive that which is neither color nor magnitude, unless we call
it a sense equivocally. Since then sight and sense will be specifically
the same in the glorified body, as in a non-glorified body, it will be
impossible for it to see the Divine essence as an object of direct
vision; yet it will see it as an object of indirect vision, because on
the one hand the bodily sight will see so great a glory of God in
bodies, especially in the glorified bodies and most of all in the body
of Christ, and, on the other hand, the intellect will see God so
clearly, that God will be perceived in things seen with the eye of the
body, even as life is perceived in speech. For although our intellect
will not then see God from seeing His creatures, yet it will see God in
His creatures seen corporeally. This manner of seeing God corporeally
is indicated by Augustine (De Civ. Dei xxii), as is clear if we take
note of his words, for he says: "It is very credible that we shall so
see the mundane bodies of the new heaven and the new earth, as to see
most clearly God everywhere present, governing all corporeal things,
not as we now see the invisible things of God as understood by those
that are made, but as when we see men . . . we do not believe but see
that they live. "
Reply to Objection 1: This saying of Job refers to the spiritual eye,
of which the Apostle says (Eph. 1:18): "The eyes of our [Vulg. : 'your']
heart enlightened. "
Reply to Objection 2: The passage quoted does not mean that we are to
see God with the eyes of the flesh, but that, in the flesh, we shall
see God.
Reply to Objection 3: In these words Augustine speaks as one inquiring
and conditionally. This appears from what he had said before:
"Therefore they will have an altogether different power, if they shall
see that incorporeal nature": and then he goes on to say: "Accordingly
a greater power," etc. , and afterwards he explains himself.
Reply to Objection 4: All knowledge results from some kind of
abstraction from matter. Wherefore the more a corporeal form is
abstracted from matter, the more is it a principle of knowledge. Hence
it is that a form existing in matter is in no way a principle of
knowledge, while a form existing in the senses is somewhat a principle
of knowledge, in so far as it is abstracted from matter, and a form
existing in the intellect is still better a principle of knowledge.
Therefore the spiritual eye, whence the obstacle to knowledge is
removed, can see a corporeal object: but it does not follow that the
corporeal eye, in which the cognitive power is deficient as
participating in matter, be able to know perfectly incorporeal objects
of knowledge.
Reply to Objection 5: Although the mind that has become carnal cannot
think but of things received from the senses, it thinks of them
immaterially. In like manner whatever the sight apprehends it must
always apprehend it corporeally: wherefore it cannot know things which
cannot be apprehended corporeally.
Reply to Objection 6: Beatitude is the perfection of man as man. And
since man is man not through his body but through his soul, and the
body is essential to man, in so far as it is perfected by the soul: it
follows that man's beatitude does not consist chiefly otherwise than in
an act of the soul, and passes from the soul on to the body by a kind
of overflow, as explained above ([5126]Q[85], A[1]). Yet our body will
have a certain beatitude from seeing God in sensible creatures: and
especially in Christ's body.
Reply to Objection 7: The intellect can perceive spiritual things,
whereas the eyes of the body cannot: wherefore the intellect will be
able to know the Divine essence united to it, but the eyes of the body
will not.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the saints, seeing God, see all that God sees? [*Cf. FP, Q[12],
AA[7],8]
Objection 1: It would seem that the saints, seeing God in His essence,
see all that God sees in Himself. For as Isidore says (De Sum. Bon.
1. ): "The angels know all things in the World of God, before they
happen. " Now the saints will be equal to the angels of God (Mat.
22:30). Therefore the saints also in seeing God see all things.
Objection 2: Further, Gregory says (Dial. iv. ): "Since all see God
there with equal clearness, what do they not know, who know Him Who
knows all things? " and he refers to the blessed who see God in His
essence. Therefore those who see God in His essence know all things.
Objection 3: Further, it is stated in De Anima (iii, text. 7), that
"when an intellect understands the greatest things, it is all the more
able to understand the least things. " Now God is the greatest of
intelligible things. Therefore the power of the intellect is greatly
increased by understanding Him. Therefore the intellect seeing Him
understands all things.
Objection 4: Further, the intellect is not hindered from understanding
a thing except by this surpassing it. Now no creature surpasses the
intellect that understands God, since, as Gregory says (Dial. ii. ), "to
the soul which sees its Creator all creatures are small. " Therefore
those who see God in His essence know all things.
Objection 5: Further, every passive power that is not reduced to act is
imperfect. Now the passive intellect of the human soul is a power that
is passive as it were to the knowledge of all things, since "the
passive intellect is in which all are in potentiality" (De Anima iii,
text. 18). If then in that beatitude it were not to understand all
things, it would remain imperfect, which is absurd.
Objection 6: Further, whoever sees a mirror sees the things reflected
in the mirror. Now all things are reflected in the Word of God as in a
mirror, because He is the type and image of all. Therefore the saints
who see the Word in its essence see all created things.
Objection 7: Further, according to Prov. 10:24, "to the just their
desire shall be given. " Now the just desire to know all things, since
"all men desire naturally to know," and nature is not done away by
glory. Therefore God will grant them to know all things.
Objection 8: Further, ignorance is one of the penalties of the present
life [*Cf. [5127]FS, Q[85], A[3]]. Now all penalty will be removed from
the saints by glory. Therefore all ignorance will be removed: and
consequently they will know all.
Objection 9: Further, the beatitude of the saints is in their soul
before being in their body. Now the bodies of the saints will be
reformed in glory to the likeness of Christ's body (Phil. 3:21).
Therefore their souls will be perfected in likeness to the soul of
Christ. Now Christ's soul sees all things in the Word. Therefore all
the souls of the saints will also see all things in the Word.
Objection 10: Further, the intellect, like the senses, knows all the
things with the image of which it is informed. Now the Divine essence
shows a thing forth more clearly than any other image thereof.
Therefore since in that blessed vision the Divine essence becomes the
form as it were of our intellect, it would seem that the saints seeing
God see all.
Objection 11: Further, the Commentator says (De Anima iii), that "if
the active intellect were the form of the passive intellect, we should
understand all things. " Now the Divine essence represents all things
more clearly than the active intellect. Therefore the intellect that
sees God in His essence knows all things.
Objection 12: Further, the lower angels are enlightened by the higher
about the things they are ignorant of, for the reason that they know
not all things. Now after the day of judgment, one angel will not
enlighten another; for then all superiority will cease, as a gloss
observes on 1 Cor. 15:24, "When He shall have brought to nought," etc.
Therefore the lower angels will then know all things, and for the same
reason all the other saints who will see God in His essence.
On the contrary, Dionysius says (Hier. Eccles. vi): "The higher angels
cleanse the lower angels from ignorance. " Now the lower angels see the
Divine essence. Therefore an angel while seeing the Divine essence may
be ignorant of certain things. But the soul will not see God more
perfectly than an angel. Therefore the souls seeing God will not
necessarily see all things.
Further, Christ alone has the spirit not "by measure" (Jn. 3:34). Now
it becomes Christ, as having the spirit without measure, to know all
things in the Word: wherefore it is stated in the same place (Jn. 3:35)
that "the Father . . . hath given all things into His hand. " Therefore
none but Christ is competent to know all things in the Word.
Further, the more perfectly a principle is known, the more of its
effects are known thereby. Now some of those who see God in His essence
will know God more perfectly than others. Therefore some will know more
things than others, and consequently every one will not know all.
I answer that, God by seeing his essence knows all things whatsoever
that are, shall be, or have been: and He is said to know these things
by His "knowledge of vision," because He knows them as though they were
present in likeness to corporeal vision. Moreover by seeing this
essence He knows all that He can do, although He never did them, nor
ever will: else He would not know His power perfectly; since a power
cannot be known unless its objects be known: and this is called His
"science" or "knowledge of simple intelligence. " Now it is impossible
for a created intellect, by seeing the Divine essence, to know all that
God can do, because the more perfectly a principle is known, the more
things are known in it; thus in one principle of demonstration one who
is quick of intelligence sees more conclusions than one who is slow of
intelligence. Since then the extent of the Divine power is measured
according to what it can do, if an intellect were to see in the Divine
essence all that God can do, its perfection in understanding would
equal in extent the Divine power in producing its effects, and thus it
would comprehend the Divine power, which is impossible for any created
intellect to do. Yet there is a created intellect, namely the soul of
Christ [*Cf. [5128]TP, Q[16], A[2]], which knows in the Word all that
God knows by the knowledge of vision. But regarding others who see the
Divine essence there are two opinions. For some say that all who see
God in His essence see all that God sees by His knowledge of vision.
This, however, is contrary to the sayings of holy men, who hold that
angels are ignorant of some things; and yet it is clear that according
to faith all the angels see God in His essence. Wherefore others say
that others than Christ, although they see God in His essence, do not
see all that God sees because they do not comprehend the Divine
essence. For it is not necessary that he who knows a cause should know
all its effects, unless he comprehend the cause: and this is not in the
competency of a created intellect. Consequently of those who see God in
His essence, each one sees in His essence so much the more things
according as he sees the Divine essence the more clearly: and hence it
is that one is able to instruct another concerning these things. Thus
the knowledge of the angels and of the souls of the saints can go on
increasing until the day of judgment, even as other things pertaining
to the accidental reward. But afterwards it will increase no more,
because then will be the final state of things, and in that state it is
possible that all will know everything that God knows by the knowledge
of vision.
Reply to Objection 1: The saying of Isidore, that "the angels know in
the Word all things before they happen," cannot refer to those things
which God knows only by the knowledge of simple intelligence, because
those things will never happen; but it must refer to those things which
God knows only by the knowledge of vision. Even of these he does not
say that all the angels know them all, but that perhaps some do; and
that even those who know do not know all perfectly. For in one and the
same thing there are many intelligible aspects to be considered, such
as its various properties and relations to other things: and it is
possible that while one thing is known in common by two persons, one of
them perceives more aspects, and that the one learns these aspects from
the other. Hence Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that "the lower angels
learn from the higher angels the intelligible aspects of things. "
Wherefore it does not follow that even the angels who know all
creatures are able to see all that can be understood in them.
Reply to Objection 2: It follows from this saying of Gregory that this
blessed vision suffices for the seeing of all things on the part of the
Divine essence, which is the medium by which one sees, and whereby God
sees all things. That all things, however, are not seen is owing to the
deficiency of the created intellect which does not comprehend the
Divine essence.
Reply to Objection 3: The created intellect sees the Divine essence not
according to the mode of that same essence, but according to its own
mode which is finite. Hence its efficacy in knowing would need to be
infinitely increased by reason of that vision in order for it to know
all things.
Reply to Objection 4: Defective knowledge results not only from excess
and deficiency of the knowable object in relation to the intellect, but
also from the fact that the aspect of knowableness is not united to the
intellect: thus sometimes the sight sees not a stone, through the image
of the stone not being united to it. And although the Divine essence
which is the type of all things is united to the intellect of one who
sees God, it is united thereto not as the type of all things, but as
the type of some and of so much the more according as one sees the
Divine essence more fully.
intellect will be able to see God in His essence.
Objection 5: Further, according to Dionysius (Ep. ad Hieroth. ) "God is
invisible on account of His surpassing glory. " Now His glory surpasses
the human intellect in heaven even as on the way. Therefore since He is
invisible on the way, so will He be in heaven.
Objection 6: Further, since the intelligible object is the perfection
of the intellect, there must needs be proportion between intelligible
and intellect, as between the visible object and the sight. But there
is no possible proportion between our intellect and the Divine essence,
since an infinite distance separates them. Therefore our intellect will
be unable to attain to the vision of the Divine essence.
Objection 7: Further, God is more distant from our intellect than the
created intelligible is from our senses. But the senses can nowise
attain to the sight of a spiritual creature. Therefore neither will our
intellect be able to attain to the vision of the Divine essence.
Objection 8: Further, whenever the intellect understands something
actually it needs to be informed with the likeness of the object
understood, which likeness is the principle of the intellectual
operation terminating in that object, even as heat is the principle of
heating. Accordingly if our intellect understands God, this must be by
means of some likeness informing the intellect itself. Now this cannot
be the very essence of God, since form and thing informed must needs
have one being, while the Divine essence differs from our intellect in
essence and being. Therefore the form whereby our intellect is informed
in understanding God must needs be a likeness impressed by God on our
intellect. But this likeness, being something created, cannot lead to
the knowledge of God except as an effect leads to the knowledge of its
cause. Therefore it is impossible for our intellect to see God except
through His effect. But to see God through His effect is not to see Him
in His essence. Therefore our intellect will be unable to see God in
His essence.
Objection 9: Further, the Divine essence is more distant from our
intellect than any angel or intelligence. Now according to Avicenna
(Metaph. iii), "the existence of an intelligence in our intellect does
not imply that its essence is in our intellect," because in that case
our knowledge of the intelligence would be a substance and not an
accident, "but that its likeness is impressed on our intellect. "
Therefore neither is God in our intellect, to be understood by us,
except in so far as an impression of Him is in our intellect. But this
impression cannot lead to the knowledge of the Divine essence, for
since it is infinitely distant from the Divine essence, it degenerates
to another image much more than if the image of a white thing were to
degenerate to the image of a black thing. Therefore, just as a person
in whose sight the image of a white thing degenerates to the image of a
black thing, on account of an indisposition in the organ, is not said
to see a white thing, so neither will our intellect be able to see God
in His essence, since it understands God only by means of this
impression.
Objection 10: Further, "In things devoid of matter that which
understands is the same as that which is understood" (De Anima iii).
Now God is supremely devoid of matter. Since then our intellect, which
is created, cannot attain to be an uncreated essence, it is impossible
for our intellect to see God in His essence.
Objection 11: Further, whatever is seen in its essence is known as to
what it is. But our intellect cannot know of God what He is, but only
what He is not as Dionysius (Coel. Hier. ii) and Damascene (De Fide
Orth. i) declare. Therefore our intellect will be unable to see God in
His essence.
Objection 12: Further, every infinite thing, as such, is unknown. But
God is in every way infinite. Therefore He is altogether unknown.
Therefore it will be impossible for Him to be seen in His essence by a
created intellect.
Objection 13: Further, Augustine says (De Videndo Deo: Ep. cxlvii):
"God is by nature invisible. " Now that which is in God by nature cannot
be otherwise. Therefore it is impossible for Him to be seen in His
essence.
Objection 14: Further, whatever is in one way and is seen in another
way is not seen as it is. Now God is in one way and will be seen in
another way by the saints in heaven: for He according to His own mode,
but will be seen by the saints according to their mode. Therefore He
will not be seen by the saints as He is, and thus will not be seen in
His essence.
Objection 15: Further, that which is seen through a medium is not seen
in its essence. Now God will be seen in heaven through a medium which
is the light of glory, according to Ps. 35:10, "In Thy light we shall
see light. " Therefore He will not be seen in His essence.
Objection 16: Further, in heaven God will be seen face to face,
according to 1 Cor. 13:12. Now when we see a man face to face, we see
him through his likeness. Therefore in heaven God will be seen through
His likeness, and consequently not in His essence.
On the contrary, It is written (1 Cor. 13:12): "We see now through a
glass in a dark manner, but then face to face. " Now that which is seen
face to face is seen in its essence. Therefore God will be seen in His
essence by the saints in heaven.
Further, it is written (1 Jn. 3:2): "When He shall appear we shall be
like to Him, because we shall see Him as He is. " Therefore we shall see
Him in His essence.
Further, a gloss on 1 Cor. 15:24, "When He shall have delivered up the
kingdom to God and the Father," says: "Where," i. e. in heaven, "the
essence of Father, Son, and Holy Ghost shall be seen: this is given to
the clean of heart alone and is the highest bliss. " Therefore the
blessed will see God in His essence.
Further, it is written (Jn. 14:21): "He that loveth Me shall be loved
of My Father; and I will love him, and will manifest Myself to him. "
Now that which is manifested is seen in its essence. Therefore God will
be seen in His essence by the saints in heaven.
Further, Gregory commenting (Moral. xviii) on the words of Ex. 33:20,
"Man shall not see Me and live," disapproves of the opinion of those
who said that "in this abode of bliss God can be seen in His glory but
not in His nature; for His glory differs not from His nature. " But His
nature is His essence. Therefore He will be seen in His essence.
Further, the desire of the saints cannot be altogether frustrated. Now
the common desire of the saints is to see God in His essence, according
to Ex. 33:13, "Show me Thy glory"; Ps. 79:20, "Show Thy face and we
shall be saved"; and Jn. 14:8, "Show us the Father and it is enough for
us. " Therefore the saints will see God in His essence.
I answer that, Even as we hold by faith that the last end of man's life
is to see God, so the philosophers maintained that man's ultimate
happiness is to understand immaterial substances according to their
being. Hence in reference to this question we find that philosophers
and theologians encounter the same difficulty and the same difference
of opinion. For some philosophers held that our passive intellect can
never come to understand separate substances. thus Alfarabius expresses
himself at the end of his Ethics, although he says the contrary in his
book On the Intelligence, as the Commentator attests (De Anima iii). In
like manner certain theologians held that the human intellect can never
attain to the vision of God in His essence. on either side they were
moved by the distance which separates our intellect from the Divine
essence and from separate substances. For since the intellect in act is
somewhat one with the intelligible object in act, it would seem
difficult to understand how the created intellect is made to be an
uncreated essence. Wherefore Chrysostom says (Hom. xiv in Joan. ): "How
can the creature see the uncreated? " Those who hold the passive
intellect to be the subject of generation and corruption, as being a
power dependent on the body, encounter a still greater difficulty not
only as regards the vision of God but also as regards the vision of any
separate substances. But this opinion is altogether untenable. First,
because it is in contradiction to the authority of canonical scripture,
as Augustine declares (De Videndo Deo: Ep. cxlvii). Secondly, because,
since understanding is an operation most proper to man, it follows that
his happiness must be held to consist in that operation when perfected
in him. Now since the perfection of an intelligent being as such is the
intelligible object, if in the most perfect operation of his intellect
man does not attain to the vision of the Divine essence, but to
something else, we shall be forced to conclude that something other
than God is the object of man's happiness: and since the ultimate
perfection of a thing consists in its being united to its principle, it
follows that something other than God is the effective principle of
man, which is absurd, according to us, and also according to the
philosophers who maintain that our souls emanate from the separate
substances, so that finally we may be able to understand these
substances. Consequently, according to us, it must be asserted that our
intellect will at length attain to the vision of the Divine essence,
and according to the philosophers, that it will attain to the vision of
separate substances.
It remains, then, to examine how this may come about. For some, like
Alfarabius and Avempace, held that from the very fact that our
intellect understands any intelligible objects whatever, it attains to
the vision of a separate substance. To prove this they employ two
arguments. The first is that just as the specific nature is not
diversified in various individuals, except as united to various
individuating principles, so the idea understood is not diversified in
me and you, except in so far as it is united to various imaginary
forms: and consequently when the intellect separates the idea
understood from the imaginary forms, there remains a quiddity
understood, which is one and the same in the various persons
understanding it, and such is the quiddity of a separate substance.
Hence, when our intellect attains to the supreme abstraction of any
intelligible quiddity, it thereby understands the quiddity of the
separate substance that is similar to it. The second argument is that
our intellect has a natural aptitude to abstract the quiddity from all
intelligible objects having a quiddity. If, then, the quiddity which it
abstracts from some particular individual be a quiddity without a
quiddity, the intellect by understanding it understands the quiddity of
the separate substance which has a like disposition, since separate
substances are subsisting quiddities without quiddities; for the
quiddity of a simple thing is the simple thing itself, as Avicenna says
(Met. iii). On the other hand if the quiddity abstracted from this
particular sensible be a quiddity that has a quiddity, it follows that
the intellect has a natural aptitude to abstract this quiddity, and
consequently since we cannot go on indefinitely, we shall come to some
quiddity without a quiddity, and this is what we understand by a
separate quiddity [*Cf. [5124]FP, Q[88], A[2]].
But this reasoning is seemingly inconclusive. First, because the
quiddity of the material substance, which the intellect abstracts, is
not of the same nature as the quiddity of the separate substances, and
consequently from the fact that our intellect abstracts the quiddities
of material substances and knows them, it does not follow that it knows
the quiddity of a separate substance, especially of the Divine essence,
which more than any other is of a different nature from any created
quiddity. Secondly, because granted that it be of the same nature,
nevertheless the knowledge of a composite thing would not lead to the
knowledge of a separate substance, except in the point of the most
remote genus, namely substance: and such a knowledge is imperfect
unless it reach to the properties of a thing. For to know a man only as
an animal is to know him only in a restricted sense and potentially:
and much less is it to know only the nature of substance in him. Hence
to know God thus, or other separate substances, is not to see the
essence of God or the quiddity of a separate substance, but to know Him
in His effect and in a mirror as it were. For this reason Avicenna in
his Metaphysics. propounds another way of understanding separate
substances, to wit that separate substances are understood by us by
means of intentions of their quiddities, such intentions being images
of their substances, not indeed abstracted therefrom, since they are
immaterial, but impressed thereby on our souls. But this way also seems
inadequate to the Divine vision which we seek. For it is agreed that
"whatever is received into any thing is therein after the mode of the
recipient": and consequently the likeness of the Divine essence
impressed on our intellect will be according to the mode of our
intellect: and the mode of our intellect falls short of a perfect
reception of the Divine likeness. Now the lack of perfect likeness may
occur in as many ways, as unlikeness may occur. For in one way there is
a deficient likeness, when the form is participated according to the
same specific nature, but not in the same measure of perfection: such
is the defective likeness in a subject that has little whiteness in
comparison with one that has much. In another way the likeness is yet
more defective, when it does not attain to the same specific nature but
only to the same generic nature: such is the likeness of an
orange-colored or yellowish object in comparison with a white one. In
another way, still more defective is the likeness when it does not
attain to the same generic nature, but only to a certain analogy or
proportion: such is the likeness of whiteness to man, in that each is a
being: and in this way every likeness received into a creature is
defective in comparison with the Divine essence. Now in order that the
sight know whiteness, it is necessary for it to receive the likeness of
whiteness according to its specific nature, although not according to
the same manner of being because the form has a manner of being in the
sense other from that which it has in the thing outside the soul: for
if the form of yellowness were received into the eye, the eye would not
be said to see whiteness. In like manner in order that the intellect
understand a quiddity, it is necessary for it to receive its likeness
according to the same specific nature, although there may possibly not
be the same manner of being on either side: for the form which is in
the intellect or sense is not the principle of knowledge according to
its manner of being on both sides, but according to its common ratio
with the external object. Hence it is clear that by no likeness
received in the created intellect can God be understood, so that His
essence be seen immediately. And for this reason those who held the
Divine essence to be seen in this way alone, said that the essence
itself will not be seen, but a certain brightness, as it were a
radiance thereof. Consequently neither does this way suffice for the
Divine vision that we seek.
Therefore we must take the other way, which also certain philosophers
held, namely Alexander and Averroes (De Anima iii. ). For since in every
knowledge some form is required whereby the object is known or seen,
this form by which the intellect is perfected so as to see separate
substances is neither a quiddity abstracted by the intellect from
composite things, as the first opinion maintained, nor an impression
left on our intellect by the separate substance, as the second opinion
affirmed; but the separate substance itself united to our intellect as
its form, so as to be both that which is understood, and that whereby
it is understood. And whatever may be the case with other separate
substances, we must nevertheless allow this to be our way of seeing God
in His essence, because by whatever other form our intellect were
informed, it could not be led thereby to the Divine essence. This,
however, must not be understood as though the Divine essence were in
reality the form of our intellect, or as though from its conjunction
with our intellect there resulted one being simply, as in natural
things from the natural form and matter: but the meaning is that the
proportion of the Divine essence to our intellect is as the proportion
of form to matter. For whenever two things, one of which is the
perfection of the other, are received into the same recipient, the
proportion of one to the other, namely of the more perfect to the less
perfect, is as the proportion of form to matter: thus light and color
are received into a transparent object, light being to color as form to
matter. When therefore intellectual light is received into the soul,
together with the indwelling Divine essence, though they are not
received in the same way, the Divine essence will be to the intellect
as form to matter: and that this suffices for the intellect to be able
to see the Divine essence by the Divine essence itself may be shown as
follows.
As from the natural form (whereby a thing has being) and matter, there
results one thing simply, so from the form whereby the intellect
understands, and the intellect itself, there results one thing
intelligibly. Now in natural things a self-subsistent thing cannot be
the form of any matter, if that thing has matter as one of its parts,
since it is impossible for matter to be the form of a thing. But if
this self-subsistent thing be a mere form, nothing hinders it from
being the form of some matter and becoming that whereby the composite
itself is [*Literally,---and becoming the 'whereby-it-is' of the
composite itself] as instanced in the soul. Now in the intellect we
must take the intellect itself in potentiality as matter, and the
intelligible species as form; so that the intellect actually
understanding will be the composite as it were resulting from both.
Hence if there be a self-subsistent thing, that has nothing in itself
besides that which is intelligible, such a thing can by itself be the
form whereby the intellect understands. Now a thing is intelligible in
respect of its actuality and not of its potentiality (Met. ix): in
proof of which an intelligible form needs to be abstracted from matter
and from all the properties of matter. Therefore, since the Divine
essence is pure act, it will be possible for it to be the form whereby
the intellect understands: and this will be the beatific vision. Hence
the Master says (Sent. ii, D, 1) that the union of the body with the
soul is an illustration of the blissful union of the spirit with God.
Reply to Objection 1: The words quoted can be explained in three ways,
according to Augustine (De Videndo Deo: Ep. cxlvii). In one way as
excluding corporeal vision, whereby no one ever saw or will see God in
His essence; secondly, as excluding intellectual vision of God in His
essence from those who dwell in this mortal flesh; thirdly, as
excluding the vision of comprehension from a created intellect. It is
thus that Chrysostom understands the saying wherefore he adds: "By
seeing, the evangelist means a most clear perception, and such a
comprehension as the Father has of the Son. " This also is the meaning
of the evangelist, since he adds: "The Only-begotten Son Who is in the
bosom of the Father, He hath declared Him": his intention being to
prove the Son to be God from His comprehending God.
Reply to Objection 2: Just as God, by His infinite essence, surpasses
all existing things which have a determinate being, so His knowledge,
whereby He knows, is above all knowledge. Wherefore as our knowledge is
to our created essence, so is the Divine knowledge to His infinite
essence. Now two things contribute to knowledge, to wit, the knower and
the thing known. Again, the vision whereby we shall see God in His
essence is the same whereby God sees Himself, as regards that whereby
He is seen, because as He sees Himself in His essence so shall we also
see Him. But as regards the knower there is the difference that is
between the Divine intellect and ours. Now in the order of knowledge
the object known follows the form by which we know, since by the form
of a stone we see a stone: whereas the efficacy of knowledge follows
the power of the knower: thus he who has stronger sight sees more
clearly. Consequently in that vision we shall see the same thing that
God sees, namely His essence, but not so effectively.
Reply to Objection 3: Dionysius is speaking there of the knowledge
whereby wayfarers know God by a created form, whereby our intellect is
informed so as to see God. But as Augustine says (De Videndo Deo: Ep.
cxlvii), "God evades every form of our intellect," because whatever
form our intellect conceive, that form is out of proportion to the
Divine essence. Hence He cannot be fathomed by our intellect: but our
most perfect knowledge of Him as wayfarers is to know that He is above
all that our intellect can conceive, and thus we are united to Him as
to something unknown. In heaven, however, we shall see Him by a form
which is His essence, and we shall be united to Him as to something
known.
Reply to Objection 4: God is light (Jn. 1:9). Now illumination is the
impression of light on an illuminated object. And since the Divine
essence is of a different mode from any likeness thereof impressed on
the intellect, he (Dionysius) says that the "Divine darkness is
impervious to all illumination," because, to wit, the Divine essence,
which he calls "darkness" on account of its surpassing brightness,
remains undemonstrated by the impression on our intellect, and
consequently is "hidden from all knowledge. " Therefore if anyone in
seeing God conceives something in his mind, this is not God but one of
God's effects.
Reply to Objection 5: Although the glory of God surpasses any form by
which our intellect is informed now, it does not surpass the Divine
essence, which will be the form of our intellect in heaven: and
therefore although it is invisible now, it will be visible then.
Reply to Objection 6: Although there can be no proportion between
finite and infinite, since the excess of the infinite over the finite
is indeterminate, there can be proportionateness or a likeness to
proportion between them: for as a finite thing is equal to some finite
thing, so is an infinite thing equal to an infinite thing. Now in order
that a thing be known totally, it is sometimes necessary that there be
proportion between knower and known, because the power of the knower
needs to be adequate to the knowableness of the thing known, and
equality is a kind of proportion. Sometimes, however, the knowableness
of the thing surpasses the power of the knower, as when we know God, or
conversely when He knows creatures: and then there is no need for
proportion between knower and known, but only for proportionateness; so
that, to wit, as the knower is to the knowable object, so is the
knowable object to the fact of its being known: and this
proportionateness suffices for the infinite to be known by the finite,
or conversely.
We may also reply that proportion according to the strict sense in
which it is employed signifies a ratio of quantity to quantity based on
a certain fixed excess or equality; but is further transferred to
denote any ratio of any one thing to another; and in this sense we say
that matter should be proportionate to its form. In this sense nothing
hinders our intellect, although finite, being described as
proportionate to the vision of the Divine essence; but not to the
comprehension thereof, on account of its immensity.
Reply to Objection 7: Likeness and distance are twofold. One is
according to agreement in nature; and thus God is more distant from the
created intellect than the created intelligible is from the sense. The
other is according to proportionateness; and thus it is the other way
about, for sense is not proportionate to the knowledge of the
immaterial, as the intellect is proportionate to the knowledge of any
immaterial object whatsoever. It is this likeness and not the former
that is requisite for knowledge, for it is clear that the intellect
understanding a stone is not like it in its natural being; thus also
the sight apprehends red honey and red gall, though it does not
apprehend sweet honey, for the redness of gall is more becoming to
honey as visible, than the sweetness of honey to honey.
Reply to Objection 8: In the vision wherein God will be seen in His
essence, the Divine essence itself will be the form, as it were, of the
intellect, by which it will understand: nor is it necessary for them to
become one in being, but only to become one as regards the act of
understanding.
Reply to Objection 9: We do not uphold the saying of Avicenna as
regards the point at issue, for in this other philosophers also
disagree with him. Unless perhaps we might say that Avicenna refers to
the knowledge of separate substances, in so far as they are known by
the habits of speculative sciences and the likeness of other things.
Hence he makes this statement in order to prove that in us knowledge is
not a substance but an accident. Nevertheless, although the Divine
essence is more distant, as to the property of its nature, from our
intellect, than is the substance of an angel, it surpasses it in the
point of intelligibility, since it is pure act without any admixture of
potentiality, which is not the case with other separate substances. Nor
will that knowledge whereby we shall see God in His essence be in the
genus of accident as regards that whereby He will be seen, but only as
regards the act of the one who understands Him, for this act will not
be the very substance either of the person understanding or of the
thing understood.
Reply to Objection 10: A substance that is separate from matter
understands both itself and other things; and in both cases the
authority quoted can be verified. For since the very essence of a
separate substance is of itself intelligible and actual, through being
separate from matter, it is clear that when a separate substance
understands itself, that which understands and that which is understood
are absolutely identical, for it does not understand itself by an
intention abstracted from itself, as we understand material objects.
And this is apparently the meaning of the Philosopher (De Anima iii. )
as indicated by the Commentator (De Anima iii). But when it understands
other things, the object actually understood becomes one with the
intellect in act, in so far as the form of the object understood
becomes the form of the intellect, for as much as the intellect is in
act; not that it becomes identified with the essence of the intellect,
as Avicenna proves (De Natural. vi. ), because the essence of the
intellect remains one under two forms whereby it understands two things
in succession, in the same way as primary matter remains one under
various forms. Hence also the Commentator (De Anima iii. ) compares the
passive intellect, in this respect, to primary matter. Thus it by no
means follows that our intellect in seeing God becomes the very essence
of God, but that the latter is compared to it as its perfection or
form.
Reply to Objection 11: These and all like authorities must be
understood to refer to the knowledge whereby we know God on the way,
for the reason given above.
Reply to Objection 12: The infinite is unknown if we take it in the
privative sense, as such, because it indicates removal of completion
whence knowledge of a thing is derived. Wherefore the infinite amounts
to the same as matter subject to privation, as stated in Phys. iii. But
if we take the infinite in the negative sense, it indicates the absence
of limiting matter, since even a form is somewhat limited by its
matter. Hence the infinite in this sense is of itself most knowable;
and it is in this way that God is infinite.
Reply to Objection 13: Augustine is speaking of bodily vision, by which
God will never be seen. This is evident from what precedes: "For no man
hath seen God at any time, nor can any man see Him as these things
which we call visible are seen: in this way He is by nature invisible
even as He is incorruptible. " As, however, He is by nature supremely
being, so He is in Himself supremely intelligible.
But that He be for a
time not understood by us is owing to our defect: wherefore that He be
seen by us after being unseen is owing to a change not in Him but in
us.
Reply to Objection 14: In heaven God will be seen by the saints as He
is, if this be referred to the mode of the object seen, for the saints
will see that God has the mode which He has. But if we refer the mode
to the knower, He will not be seen as He is, because the created
intellect will not have so great an efficacy in seeing, as the Divine
essence has to the effect of being seen.
Reply to Objection 15: There is a threefold medium both in bodily and
in intellectual vision. The first is the medium "under which" the
object is seen, and this is something perfecting the sight so as to see
in general, without determining the sight to any particular object.
Such is bodily light in relation to bodily vision; and the light of the
active intellect in relation to the passive intellect, in so far as
this light is a medium. The second is the light "by which" the object
is seen, and this is the visible form whereby either sight is
determined to a special object, for instance by the form of a stone to
know a stone. The third is the medium "in which" it is seen; and this
is something by gazing on which the sight is led to something else:
thus by looking in a mirror it is led to see the things reflected in
the mirror, and by looking at an image it is led to the thing
represented by the image. In this way, too, the intellect from knowing
an effect is led to the cause, or conversely. Accordingly in the
heavenly vision there will be no third medium, so that, to wit, God be
known by the images of other things, as He is known now, for which
reason we are said to see now in a glass: nor will there be the second
medium, because the essence itself of God will be that whereby our
intellect will see God. But there will only be the first medium, which
will upraise our intellect so that it will be possible for it to be
united to the uncreated substance in the aforesaid manner. Yet this
medium will not cause that knowledge to be mediate, because it does not
come in between the knower and the thing known, but is that which gives
the knower the power to know [*Cf. [5125]FP, Q[12], A[5]].
Reply to Objection 16: Corporeal creatures are not said to be seen
immediately, except when that which in them is capable of being brought
into conjunction with the sight is in conjunction therewith. Now they
are not capable of being in conjunction with the sight of their essence
on account of their materiality: hence they are seen immediately when
their image is in conjunction with the sight. But God is able to be
united to the intellect by His essence: wherefore He would not be seen
immediately, unless His essence were united to the intellect: and this
vision, which is effected immediately, is called "vision of face. "
Moreover the likeness of the corporeal object is received into the
sight according to the same ratio as it is in the object, although not
according to the same mode of being. Wherefore this likeness leads to
the object directly: whereas no likeness can lead our intellect in this
way to God, as shown above: and for this reason the comparison fails.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether after the resurrection the saints will see God with the eyes of the
body? [*Cf. FP, Q[12], A[3]]
Objection 1: It would seem that after the resurrection the saints will
see God with the eyes of the body. Because the glorified eye has
greater power than one that is not glorified. Now the blessed Job saw
God with his eyes (Job 42:5): "With the hearing of the ear, I have
heard Thee, but now my eye seeth Thee. " Much more therefore will the
glorified eye be able to see God in His essence.
Objection 2: Further, it is written (Job 19:26): "In my flesh I shall
see God my Saviour [Vulg. : 'my God']. " Therefore in heaven God will be
seen with the eyes of the body.
Objection 3: Further. Augustine, speaking of the sight of the glorified
eyes, expresses himself as follows (De Civ. Dei xxii): "A greater power
will be in those eyes, not to see more keenly, as certain serpents or
eagles are reported to see (for whatever acuteness of vision is
possessed by these animals they can see only corporeal things), but to
see even incorporeal things. " Now any power that is capable of knowing
incorporeal things can be upraised to see God. Therefore the glorified
eyes will be able to see God.
Objection 4: Further, the disparity of corporeal to incorporeal things
is the same as of incorporeal to corporeal. Now the incorporeal eye can
see corporeal things. Therefore the corporeal eye can see the
incorporeal: and consequently the same conclusion follows.
Objection 5: Further, Gregory, commenting on Job 4:16, "There stood one
whose countenance I knew not," says (Moral. v): "Man who, had he been
willing to obey the command, would have been spiritual in the flesh,
became, by sinning, carnal even in mind. " Now through becoming carnal
in mind, "he thinks only of those things which he draws to his soul by
the images of bodies" (Moral. v). Therefore when he will be spiritual
in the flesh (which is promised to the saints after the resurrection),
he will be able even in the flesh to see spiritual things. Therefore
the same conclusion follows.
Objection 6: Further, man can be beatified by God alone. Now he will be
beatified not only in soul but also in body. Therefore God will be
visible not only to his intellect but also to his flesh.
Objection 7: Further, even as God is present to the intellect by His
essence, so will He be to the senses, because He will be "all in all"
(1 Cor. 15:28). Now He will be seen by the intellect through the union
of His essence therewith. Therefore He will also be visible to the
sense.
On the contrary, Ambrose, commenting on Lk. 1:2, "There appeared to him
an angel," says: "God is not sought with the eyes of the body, nor
surveyed by the sight, nor clasped by the touch. " Therefore God will by
no means be visible to the bodily sense.
Further, Jerome, commenting on Is. 6:1, "I saw the Lord sitting," says:
"The Godhead not only of the Father, but also of the Son and of the
Holy Ghost is visible, not to carnal eyes, but only to the eyes of the
mind, of which it is said: Blessed are the pure in heart. "
Further, Jerome says again (as quoted by Augustine, Ep. cxlvii): "An
incorporeal thing is invisible to a corporeal eye. " But God is
supremely incorporeal. Therefore, etc.
Further, Augustine says (De Videndo Deo, Ep. cxlvii): "No man hath seen
God as He is at any time, neither in this life, nor in the angelic
life, in the same way as these visible things which are seen with the
corporeal sight. " Now the angelic life is the life of the blessed,
wherein they will live after the resurrection. Therefore, etc.
Further, according to Augustine (De Trin. xiv. ), "man is said to be
made to God's image inasmuch as he is able to see God. " But man is in
God's image as regards his mind, and not as regards his flesh.
Therefore he will see God with his mind and not with his flesh.
I answer that, A thing is perceptible to the senses of the body in two
ways, directly and indirectly. A thing is perceptible directly if it
can act directly on the bodily senses. And a thing can act directly
either on sense as such or on a particular sense as such. That which
acts directly in this second way on a sense is called a proper
sensible, for instance color in relation to the sight, and sound in
relation to the hearing. But as sense as such makes use of a bodily
organ, nothing can be received therein except corporeally, since
whatever is received into a thing is therein after the mode of the
recipient. Hence all sensibles act on the sense as such, according to
their magnitude: and consequently magnitude and all its consequences,
such as movement, rest, number, and the like, are called common
sensibles, and yet they are direct objects of sense.
An indirect object of sense is that which does not act on the sense,
neither as sense nor as a particular sense, but is annexed to those
things that act on sense directly: for instance Socrates; the son of
Diares; a friend and the like which are the direct object of the
intellect's knowledge in the universal, and in the particular are the
object of the cogitative power in man, and of the estimative power in
other animals. The external sense is said to perceive things of this
kind, although indirectly, when the apprehensive power (whose province
it is to know directly this thing known), from that which is sensed
directly, apprehends them at once and without any doubt or discourse
(thus we see that a person is alive from the fact that he speaks):
otherwise the sense is not said to perceive it even indirectly.
I say then that God can nowise be seen with the eyes of the body, or
perceived by any of the senses, as that which is seen directly, neither
here, nor in heaven: for if that which belongs to sense as such be
removed from sense, there will be no sense, and in like manner if that
which belongs to sight as sight be removed therefrom, there will be no
sight. Accordingly seeing that sense as sense perceives magnitude, and
sight as such a sense perceives color, it is impossible for the sight
to perceive that which is neither color nor magnitude, unless we call
it a sense equivocally. Since then sight and sense will be specifically
the same in the glorified body, as in a non-glorified body, it will be
impossible for it to see the Divine essence as an object of direct
vision; yet it will see it as an object of indirect vision, because on
the one hand the bodily sight will see so great a glory of God in
bodies, especially in the glorified bodies and most of all in the body
of Christ, and, on the other hand, the intellect will see God so
clearly, that God will be perceived in things seen with the eye of the
body, even as life is perceived in speech. For although our intellect
will not then see God from seeing His creatures, yet it will see God in
His creatures seen corporeally. This manner of seeing God corporeally
is indicated by Augustine (De Civ. Dei xxii), as is clear if we take
note of his words, for he says: "It is very credible that we shall so
see the mundane bodies of the new heaven and the new earth, as to see
most clearly God everywhere present, governing all corporeal things,
not as we now see the invisible things of God as understood by those
that are made, but as when we see men . . . we do not believe but see
that they live. "
Reply to Objection 1: This saying of Job refers to the spiritual eye,
of which the Apostle says (Eph. 1:18): "The eyes of our [Vulg. : 'your']
heart enlightened. "
Reply to Objection 2: The passage quoted does not mean that we are to
see God with the eyes of the flesh, but that, in the flesh, we shall
see God.
Reply to Objection 3: In these words Augustine speaks as one inquiring
and conditionally. This appears from what he had said before:
"Therefore they will have an altogether different power, if they shall
see that incorporeal nature": and then he goes on to say: "Accordingly
a greater power," etc. , and afterwards he explains himself.
Reply to Objection 4: All knowledge results from some kind of
abstraction from matter. Wherefore the more a corporeal form is
abstracted from matter, the more is it a principle of knowledge. Hence
it is that a form existing in matter is in no way a principle of
knowledge, while a form existing in the senses is somewhat a principle
of knowledge, in so far as it is abstracted from matter, and a form
existing in the intellect is still better a principle of knowledge.
Therefore the spiritual eye, whence the obstacle to knowledge is
removed, can see a corporeal object: but it does not follow that the
corporeal eye, in which the cognitive power is deficient as
participating in matter, be able to know perfectly incorporeal objects
of knowledge.
Reply to Objection 5: Although the mind that has become carnal cannot
think but of things received from the senses, it thinks of them
immaterially. In like manner whatever the sight apprehends it must
always apprehend it corporeally: wherefore it cannot know things which
cannot be apprehended corporeally.
Reply to Objection 6: Beatitude is the perfection of man as man. And
since man is man not through his body but through his soul, and the
body is essential to man, in so far as it is perfected by the soul: it
follows that man's beatitude does not consist chiefly otherwise than in
an act of the soul, and passes from the soul on to the body by a kind
of overflow, as explained above ([5126]Q[85], A[1]). Yet our body will
have a certain beatitude from seeing God in sensible creatures: and
especially in Christ's body.
Reply to Objection 7: The intellect can perceive spiritual things,
whereas the eyes of the body cannot: wherefore the intellect will be
able to know the Divine essence united to it, but the eyes of the body
will not.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the saints, seeing God, see all that God sees? [*Cf. FP, Q[12],
AA[7],8]
Objection 1: It would seem that the saints, seeing God in His essence,
see all that God sees in Himself. For as Isidore says (De Sum. Bon.
1. ): "The angels know all things in the World of God, before they
happen. " Now the saints will be equal to the angels of God (Mat.
22:30). Therefore the saints also in seeing God see all things.
Objection 2: Further, Gregory says (Dial. iv. ): "Since all see God
there with equal clearness, what do they not know, who know Him Who
knows all things? " and he refers to the blessed who see God in His
essence. Therefore those who see God in His essence know all things.
Objection 3: Further, it is stated in De Anima (iii, text. 7), that
"when an intellect understands the greatest things, it is all the more
able to understand the least things. " Now God is the greatest of
intelligible things. Therefore the power of the intellect is greatly
increased by understanding Him. Therefore the intellect seeing Him
understands all things.
Objection 4: Further, the intellect is not hindered from understanding
a thing except by this surpassing it. Now no creature surpasses the
intellect that understands God, since, as Gregory says (Dial. ii. ), "to
the soul which sees its Creator all creatures are small. " Therefore
those who see God in His essence know all things.
Objection 5: Further, every passive power that is not reduced to act is
imperfect. Now the passive intellect of the human soul is a power that
is passive as it were to the knowledge of all things, since "the
passive intellect is in which all are in potentiality" (De Anima iii,
text. 18). If then in that beatitude it were not to understand all
things, it would remain imperfect, which is absurd.
Objection 6: Further, whoever sees a mirror sees the things reflected
in the mirror. Now all things are reflected in the Word of God as in a
mirror, because He is the type and image of all. Therefore the saints
who see the Word in its essence see all created things.
Objection 7: Further, according to Prov. 10:24, "to the just their
desire shall be given. " Now the just desire to know all things, since
"all men desire naturally to know," and nature is not done away by
glory. Therefore God will grant them to know all things.
Objection 8: Further, ignorance is one of the penalties of the present
life [*Cf. [5127]FS, Q[85], A[3]]. Now all penalty will be removed from
the saints by glory. Therefore all ignorance will be removed: and
consequently they will know all.
Objection 9: Further, the beatitude of the saints is in their soul
before being in their body. Now the bodies of the saints will be
reformed in glory to the likeness of Christ's body (Phil. 3:21).
Therefore their souls will be perfected in likeness to the soul of
Christ. Now Christ's soul sees all things in the Word. Therefore all
the souls of the saints will also see all things in the Word.
Objection 10: Further, the intellect, like the senses, knows all the
things with the image of which it is informed. Now the Divine essence
shows a thing forth more clearly than any other image thereof.
Therefore since in that blessed vision the Divine essence becomes the
form as it were of our intellect, it would seem that the saints seeing
God see all.
Objection 11: Further, the Commentator says (De Anima iii), that "if
the active intellect were the form of the passive intellect, we should
understand all things. " Now the Divine essence represents all things
more clearly than the active intellect. Therefore the intellect that
sees God in His essence knows all things.
Objection 12: Further, the lower angels are enlightened by the higher
about the things they are ignorant of, for the reason that they know
not all things. Now after the day of judgment, one angel will not
enlighten another; for then all superiority will cease, as a gloss
observes on 1 Cor. 15:24, "When He shall have brought to nought," etc.
Therefore the lower angels will then know all things, and for the same
reason all the other saints who will see God in His essence.
On the contrary, Dionysius says (Hier. Eccles. vi): "The higher angels
cleanse the lower angels from ignorance. " Now the lower angels see the
Divine essence. Therefore an angel while seeing the Divine essence may
be ignorant of certain things. But the soul will not see God more
perfectly than an angel. Therefore the souls seeing God will not
necessarily see all things.
Further, Christ alone has the spirit not "by measure" (Jn. 3:34). Now
it becomes Christ, as having the spirit without measure, to know all
things in the Word: wherefore it is stated in the same place (Jn. 3:35)
that "the Father . . . hath given all things into His hand. " Therefore
none but Christ is competent to know all things in the Word.
Further, the more perfectly a principle is known, the more of its
effects are known thereby. Now some of those who see God in His essence
will know God more perfectly than others. Therefore some will know more
things than others, and consequently every one will not know all.
I answer that, God by seeing his essence knows all things whatsoever
that are, shall be, or have been: and He is said to know these things
by His "knowledge of vision," because He knows them as though they were
present in likeness to corporeal vision. Moreover by seeing this
essence He knows all that He can do, although He never did them, nor
ever will: else He would not know His power perfectly; since a power
cannot be known unless its objects be known: and this is called His
"science" or "knowledge of simple intelligence. " Now it is impossible
for a created intellect, by seeing the Divine essence, to know all that
God can do, because the more perfectly a principle is known, the more
things are known in it; thus in one principle of demonstration one who
is quick of intelligence sees more conclusions than one who is slow of
intelligence. Since then the extent of the Divine power is measured
according to what it can do, if an intellect were to see in the Divine
essence all that God can do, its perfection in understanding would
equal in extent the Divine power in producing its effects, and thus it
would comprehend the Divine power, which is impossible for any created
intellect to do. Yet there is a created intellect, namely the soul of
Christ [*Cf. [5128]TP, Q[16], A[2]], which knows in the Word all that
God knows by the knowledge of vision. But regarding others who see the
Divine essence there are two opinions. For some say that all who see
God in His essence see all that God sees by His knowledge of vision.
This, however, is contrary to the sayings of holy men, who hold that
angels are ignorant of some things; and yet it is clear that according
to faith all the angels see God in His essence. Wherefore others say
that others than Christ, although they see God in His essence, do not
see all that God sees because they do not comprehend the Divine
essence. For it is not necessary that he who knows a cause should know
all its effects, unless he comprehend the cause: and this is not in the
competency of a created intellect. Consequently of those who see God in
His essence, each one sees in His essence so much the more things
according as he sees the Divine essence the more clearly: and hence it
is that one is able to instruct another concerning these things. Thus
the knowledge of the angels and of the souls of the saints can go on
increasing until the day of judgment, even as other things pertaining
to the accidental reward. But afterwards it will increase no more,
because then will be the final state of things, and in that state it is
possible that all will know everything that God knows by the knowledge
of vision.
Reply to Objection 1: The saying of Isidore, that "the angels know in
the Word all things before they happen," cannot refer to those things
which God knows only by the knowledge of simple intelligence, because
those things will never happen; but it must refer to those things which
God knows only by the knowledge of vision. Even of these he does not
say that all the angels know them all, but that perhaps some do; and
that even those who know do not know all perfectly. For in one and the
same thing there are many intelligible aspects to be considered, such
as its various properties and relations to other things: and it is
possible that while one thing is known in common by two persons, one of
them perceives more aspects, and that the one learns these aspects from
the other. Hence Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that "the lower angels
learn from the higher angels the intelligible aspects of things. "
Wherefore it does not follow that even the angels who know all
creatures are able to see all that can be understood in them.
Reply to Objection 2: It follows from this saying of Gregory that this
blessed vision suffices for the seeing of all things on the part of the
Divine essence, which is the medium by which one sees, and whereby God
sees all things. That all things, however, are not seen is owing to the
deficiency of the created intellect which does not comprehend the
Divine essence.
Reply to Objection 3: The created intellect sees the Divine essence not
according to the mode of that same essence, but according to its own
mode which is finite. Hence its efficacy in knowing would need to be
infinitely increased by reason of that vision in order for it to know
all things.
Reply to Objection 4: Defective knowledge results not only from excess
and deficiency of the knowable object in relation to the intellect, but
also from the fact that the aspect of knowableness is not united to the
intellect: thus sometimes the sight sees not a stone, through the image
of the stone not being united to it. And although the Divine essence
which is the type of all things is united to the intellect of one who
sees God, it is united thereto not as the type of all things, but as
the type of some and of so much the more according as one sees the
Divine essence more fully.
