Yet that which is the object of
faith, on account of the certainty of faith, is also deemed impossible
to be otherwise; and the reason why science and faith cannot be about
the same object and in the same respect is because the object of
science is something seen whereas the object of faith is the unseen, as
stated above.
faith, on account of the certainty of faith, is also deemed impossible
to be otherwise; and the reason why science and faith cannot be about
the same object and in the same respect is because the object of
science is something seen whereas the object of faith is the unseen, as
stated above.
Summa Theologica
But to the just who are aided by these evils they are not
punishments but medicines as stated above ([2257]Q[87], A[8]).
Reply to Objection 4: All things happen equally to the good and the
wicked, as regards the substance of temporal good or evil; but not as
regards the end, since the good and not the wicked are led to beatitude
by them.
And now enough has been said regarding morals in general.
__________________________________________________________________
SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART (SS) (QQ[1]-189)
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TREATISE ON THE THEOLOGICAL VIRTUES (QQ[1]-46)
__________________________________________________________________
OF FAITH (TEN ARTICLES)
Having to treat now of the theological virtues, we shall begin with
Faith, secondly we shall speak of Hope, and thirdly, of Charity.
The treatise on Faith will be fourfold: (1) Of faith itself; (2) Of the
corresponding gifts, knowledge and understanding; (3) Of the opposite
vices; (4) Of the precepts pertaining to this virtue.
About faith itself we shall consider: (1) its object; (2) its act; (3)
the habit of faith.
Under the first head there are ten points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the object of faith is the First Truth?
(2) Whether the object of faith is something complex or incomplex, i. e.
whether it is a thing or a proposition?
(3) Whether anything false can come under faith?
(4) Whether the object of faith can be anything seen?
(5) Whether it can be anything known?
(6) Whether the things to be believed should be divided into a certain
number of articles?
(7) Whether the same articles are of faith for all times?
(8) Of the number of articles;
(9) Of the manner of embodying the articles in a symbol;
(10) Who has the right to propose a symbol of faith?
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Whether the object of faith is the First Truth?
Objection 1: It would seem that the object of faith is not the First
Truth. For it seems that the object of faith is that which is proposed
to us to be believed. Now not only things pertaining to the Godhead,
i. e. the First Truth, are proposed to us to be believed, but also
things concerning Christ's human nature, and the sacraments of the
Church, and the condition of creatures. Therefore the object of faith
is not only the First Truth.
Objection 2: Further, faith and unbelief have the same object since
they are opposed to one another. Now unbelief can be about all things
contained in Holy Writ, for whichever one of them a man denies, he is
considered an unbeliever. Therefore faith also is about all things
contained in Holy Writ. But there are many things therein, concerning
man and other creatures. Therefore the object of faith is not only the
First Truth, but also created truth.
Objection 3: Further, faith is condivided with charity, as stated above
([2258]FS, Q[62], A[3]). Now by charity we love not only God, who is
the sovereign Good, but also our neighbor. Therefore the object of
Faith is not only the First Truth.
On the contrary, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. vii) that "faith is about
the simple and everlasting truth. " Now this is the First Truth.
Therefore the object of faith is the First Truth.
I answer that, The object of every cognitive habit includes two things:
first, that which is known materially, and is the material object, so
to speak, and, secondly, that whereby it is known, which is the formal
aspect of the object. Thus in the science of geometry, the conclusions
are what is known materially, while the formal aspect of the science is
the mean of demonstration, through which the conclusions are known.
Accordingly if we consider, in faith, the formal aspect of the object,
it is nothing else than the First Truth. For the faith of which we are
speaking, does not assent to anything, except because it is revealed by
God. Hence the mean on which faith is based is the Divine Truth. If,
however, we consider materially the things to which faith assents, they
include not only God, but also many other things, which, nevertheless,
do not come under the assent of faith, except as bearing some relation
to God, in as much as, to wit, through certain effects of the Divine
operation, man is helped on his journey towards the enjoyment of God.
Consequently from this point of view also the object of faith is, in a
way, the First Truth, in as much as nothing comes under faith except in
relation to God, even as the object of the medical art is health, for
it considers nothing save in relation to health.
Reply to Objection 1: Things concerning Christ's human nature, and the
sacraments of the Church, or any creatures whatever, come under faith,
in so far as by them we are directed to God, and in as much as we
assent to them on account of the Divine Truth.
The same answer applies to the Second Objection, as regards all things
contained in Holy Writ.
Reply to Objection 3: Charity also loves our neighbor on account of
God, so that its object, properly speaking, is God, as we shall show
further on ([2259]Q[25] , A[1]).
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Whether the object of faith is something complex, by way of a proposition?
Objection 1: It would seem that the object of faith is not something
complex by way of a proposition. For the object of faith is the First
Truth, as stated above [2260](A[1]). Now the First Truth is something
simple. Therefore the object of faith is not something complex.
Objection 2: Further, the exposition of faith is contained in the
symbol. Now the symbol does not contain propositions, but things: for
it is not stated therein that God is almighty, but: "I believe in God .
. . almighty. " Therefore the object of faith is not a proposition but a
thing.
Objection 3: Further, faith is succeeded by vision, according to 1 Cor.
13:12: "We see now through a glass in a dark manner; but then face to
face. Now I know in part; but then I shall know even as I am known. "
But the object of the heavenly vision is something simple, for it is
the Divine Essence. Therefore the faith of the wayfarer is also.
On the contrary, Faith is a mean between science and opinion. Now the
mean is in the same genus as the extremes. Since, then, science and
opinion are about propositions, it seems that faith is likewise about
propositions; so that its object is something complex.
I answer that, The thing known is in the knower according to the mode
of the knower. Now the mode proper to the human intellect is to know
the truth by synthesis and analysis, as stated in the [2261]FP, Q[85],
A[5]. Hence things that are simple in themselves, are known by the
intellect with a certain amount of complexity, just as on the other
hand, the Divine intellect knows, without any complexity, things that
are complex in themselves.
Accordingly the object of faith may be considered in two ways. First,
as regards the thing itself which is believed, and thus the object of
faith is something simple, namely the thing itself about which we have
faith. Secondly, on the part of the believer, and in this respect the
object of faith is something complex by way of a proposition.
Hence in the past both opinions have been held with a certain amount of
truth.
Reply to Objection 1: This argument considers the object of faith on
the part of the thing believed.
Reply to Objection 2: The symbol mentions the things about which faith
is, in so far as the act of the believer is terminated in them, as is
evident from the manner of speaking about them. Now the act of the
believer does not terminate in a proposition, but in a thing. For as in
science we do not form propositions, except in order to have knowledge
about things through their means, so is it in faith.
Reply to Objection 3: The object of the heavenly vision will be the
First Truth seen in itself, according to 1 Jn. 3:2: "We know that when
He shall appear, we shall be like to Him: because we shall see Him as
He is": hence that vision will not be by way of a proposition but by
way of a simple understanding. On the other hand, by faith, we do not
apprehend the First Truth as it is in itself. Hence the comparison
fails.
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Whether anything false can come under faith?
Objection 1: It would seem that something false can come under faith.
For faith is condivided with hope and charity. Now something false can
come under hope, since many hope to have eternal life, who will not
obtain it. The same may be said of charity, for many are loved as being
good, who, nevertheless, are not good. Therefore something false can be
the object of faith.
Objection 2: Further, Abraham believed that Christ would be born,
according to Jn. 8:56: "Abraham your father rejoiced that he might see
My day: he saw it, and was glad. " But after the time of Abraham, God
might not have taken flesh, for it was merely because He willed that He
did, so that what Abraham believed about Christ would have been false.
Therefore the object of faith can be something false.
Objection 3: Further, the ancients believed in the future birth of
Christ, and many continued so to believe, until they heard the
preaching of the Gospel. Now, when once Christ was born, even before He
began to preach, it was false that Christ was yet to be born. Therefore
something false can come under faith.
Objection 4: Further, it is a matter of faith, that one should believe
that the true Body of Christ is contained in the Sacrament of the
altar. But it might happen that the bread was not rightly consecrated,
and that there was not Christ's true Body there, but only bread.
Therefore something false can come under faith.
On the contrary, No virtue that perfects the intellect is related to
the false, considered as the evil of the intellect, as the Philosopher
declares (Ethic. vi, 2). Now faith is a virtue that perfects the
intellect, as we shall show further on ([2262]Q[4], AA[2],5). Therefore
nothing false can come under it.
I answer that, Nothing comes under any power, habit or act, except by
means of the formal aspect of the object: thus color cannot be seen
except by means of light, and a conclusion cannot be known save through
the mean of demonstration. Now it has been stated [2263](A[1]) that the
formal aspect of the object of faith is the First Truth; so that
nothing can come under faith, save in so far as it stands under the
First Truth, under which nothing false can stand, as neither can
non-being stand under being, nor evil under goodness. It follows
therefore that nothing false can come under faith.
Reply to Objection 1: Since the true is the good of the intellect, but
not of the appetitive power, it follows that all virtues which perfect
the intellect, exclude the false altogether, because it belongs to the
nature of a virtue to bear relation to the good alone. On the other
hand those virtues which perfect the appetitive faculty, do not
entirely exclude the false, for it is possible to act in accordance
with justice or temperance, while having a false opinion about what one
is doing. Therefore, as faith perfects the intellect, whereas hope and
charity perfect the appetitive part, the comparison between them fails.
Nevertheless neither can anything false come under hope, for a man
hopes to obtain eternal life, not by his own power (since this would be
an act of presumption), but with the help of grace; and if he
perseveres therein he will obtain eternal life surely and infallibly.
In like manner it belongs to charity to love God, wherever He may be;
so that it matters not to charity, whether God be in the individual
whom we love for God's sake.
Reply to Objection 2: That "God would not take flesh," considered in
itself was possible even after Abraham's time, but in so far as it
stands in God's foreknowledge, it has a certain necessity of
infallibility, as explained in the [2264]FP, Q[14], AA[13],15: and it
is thus that it comes under faith. Hence in so far as it comes under
faith, it cannot be false.
Reply to Objection 3: After Christ's birth, to believe in Him, was to
believe in Christ's birth at some time or other. The fixing of the
time, wherein some were deceived was not due to their faith, but to a
human conjecture. For it is possible for a believer to have a false
opinion through a human conjecture, but it is quite impossible for a
false opinion to be the outcome of faith.
Reply to Objection 4: The faith of the believer is not directed to such
and such accidents of bread, but to the fact that the true body of
Christ is under the appearances of sensible bread, when it is rightly
consecrated. Hence if it be not rightly consecrated, it does not follow
that anything false comes under faith.
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Whether the object of faith can be something seen?
Objection 1: It would seem that the object of faith is something seen.
For Our Lord said to Thomas (Jn. 20:29): "Because thou hast seen Me,
Thomas, thou hast believed. " Therefore vision and faith regard the same
object.
Objection 2: Further, the Apostle, while speaking of the knowledge of
faith, says (1 Cor. 13:12): "We see now through a glass in a dark
manner. " Therefore what is believed is seen.
Objection 3: Further, faith is a spiritual light. Now something is seen
under every light. Therefore faith is of things seen.
Objection 4: Further, "Every sense is a kind of sight," as Augustine
states (De Verb. Domini, Serm. xxxiii). But faith is of things heard,
according to Rom. 10:17: "Faith . . . cometh by hearing. " Therefore
faith is of things seen.
On the contrary, The Apostle says (Heb. 11:1) that "faith is the
evidence of things that appear not. "
I answer that, Faith implies assent of the intellect to that which is
believed. Now the intellect assents to a thing in two ways. First,
through being moved to assent by its very object, which is known either
by itself (as in the case of first principles, which are held by the
habit of understanding), or through something else already known (as in
the case of conclusions which are held by the habit of science).
Secondly the intellect assents to something, not through being
sufficiently moved to this assent by its proper object, but through an
act of choice, whereby it turns voluntarily to one side rather than to
the other: and if this be accompanied by doubt or fear of the opposite
side, there will be opinion, while, if there be certainty and no fear
of the other side, there will be faith.
Now those things are said to be seen which, of themselves, move the
intellect or the senses to knowledge of them. Wherefore it is evident
that neither faith nor opinion can be of things seen either by the
senses or by the intellect.
Reply to Objection 1: Thomas "saw one thing, and believed another"
[*St. Gregory: Hom. xxvi in Evang. ]: he saw the Man, and believing Him
to be God, he made profession of his faith, saying: "My Lord and my
God. "
Reply to Objection 2: Those things which come under faith can be
considered in two ways. First, in particular; and thus they cannot be
seen and believed at the same time, as shown above. Secondly, in
general, that is, under the common aspect of credibility; and in this
way they are seen by the believer. For he would not believe unless, on
the evidence of signs, or of something similar, he saw that they ought
to be believed.
Reply to Objection 3: The light of faith makes us see what we believe.
For just as, by the habits of the other virtues, man sees what is
becoming to him in respect of that habit, so, by the habit of faith,
the human mind is directed to assent to such things as are becoming to
a right faith, and not to assent to others.
Reply to Objection 4: Hearing is of words signifying what is of faith,
but not of the things themselves that are believed; hence it does not
follow that these things are seen.
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Whether those things that are of faith can be an object of science [*Science
is certain knowledge of a demonstrated conclusion through its
demonstration]?
Objection 1: It would seem that those things that are of faith can be
an object of science. For where science is lacking there is ignorance,
since ignorance is the opposite of science. Now we are not in ignorance
of those things we have to believe, since ignorance of such things
savors of unbelief, according to 1 Tim. 1:13: "I did it ignorantly in
unbelief. " Therefore things that are of faith can be an object of
science.
Objection 2: Further, science is acquired by reasons. Now sacred
writers employ reasons to inculcate things that are of faith. Therefore
such things can be an object of science.
Objection 3: Further, things which are demonstrated are an object of
science, since a "demonstration is a syllogism that produces science. "
Now certain matters of faith have been demonstrated by the
philosophers, such as the Existence and Unity of God, and so forth.
Therefore things that are of faith can be an object of science.
Objection 4: Further, opinion is further from science than faith is,
since faith is said to stand between opinion and science. Now opinion
and science can, in a way, be about the same object, as stated in
Poster. i. Therefore faith and science can be about the same object
also.
On the contrary, Gregory says (Hom. xxvi in Evang. ) that "when a thing
is manifest, it is the object, not of faith, but of perception. "
Therefore things that are of faith are not the object of perception,
whereas what is an object of science is the object of perception.
Therefore there can be no faith about things which are an object of
science.
I answer that, All science is derived from self-evident and therefore
"seen" principles; wherefore all objects of science must needs be, in a
fashion, seen.
Now as stated above [2265](A[4]), it is impossible that one and the
same thing should be believed and seen by the same person. Hence it is
equally impossible for one and the same thing to be an object of
science and of belief for the same person. It may happen, however, that
a thing which is an object of vision or science for one, is believed by
another: since we hope to see some day what we now believe about the
Trinity, according to 1 Cor. 13:12: "We see now through a glass in a
dark manner; but then face to face": which vision the angels possess
already; so that what we believe, they see. In like manner it may
happen that what is an object of vision or scientific knowledge for one
man, even in the state of a wayfarer, is, for another man, an object of
faith, because he does not know it by demonstration.
Nevertheless that which is proposed to be believed equally by all, is
equally unknown by all as an object of science: such are the things
which are of faith simply. Consequently faith and science are not about
the same things.
Reply to Objection 1: Unbelievers are in ignorance of things that are
of faith, for neither do they see or know them in themselves, nor do
they know them to be credible. The faithful, on the other hand, know
them, not as by demonstration, but by the light of faith which makes
them see that they ought to believe them, as stated above (A[4], ad
2,3).
Reply to Objection 2: The reasons employed by holy men to prove things
that are of faith, are not demonstrations; they are either persuasive
arguments showing that what is proposed to our faith is not impossible,
or else they are proofs drawn from the principles of faith, i. e. from
the authority of Holy Writ, as Dionysius declares (Div. Nom. ii).
Whatever is based on these principles is as well proved in the eyes of
the faithful, as a conclusion drawn from self-evident principles is in
the eyes of all. Hence again, theology is a science, as we stated at
the outset of this work ([2266]FP, Q[1], A[2]).
Reply to Objection 3: Things which can be proved by demonstration are
reckoned among the articles of faith, not because they are believed
simply by all, but because they are a necessary presupposition to
matters of faith, so that those who do not known them by demonstration
must know them first of all by faith.
Reply to Objection 4: As the Philosopher says (Poster. i), "science and
opinion about the same object can certainly be in different men," as we
have stated above about science and faith; yet it is possible for one
and the same man to have science and faith about the same thing
relatively, i. e. in relation to the object, but not in the same
respect. For it is possible for the same person, about one and the same
object, to know one thing and to think another: and, in like manner,
one may know by demonstration the unity of the Godhead, and, by faith,
the Trinity. On the other hand, in one and the same man, about the same
object, and in the same respect, science is incompatible with either
opinion or faith, yet for different reasons. Because science is
incompatible with opinion about the same object simply, for the reason
that science demands that its object should be deemed impossible to be
otherwise, whereas it is essential to opinion, that its object should
be deemed possible to be otherwise.
Yet that which is the object of
faith, on account of the certainty of faith, is also deemed impossible
to be otherwise; and the reason why science and faith cannot be about
the same object and in the same respect is because the object of
science is something seen whereas the object of faith is the unseen, as
stated above.
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Whether those things that are of faith should be divided into certain
articles?
Objection 1: It would seem that those things that are of faith should
not be divided into certain articles. For all things contained in Holy
Writ are matters of faith. But these, by reason of their multitude,
cannot be reduced to a certain number. Therefore it seems superfluous
to distinguish certain articles of faith.
Objection 2: Further, material differences can be multiplied
indefinitely, and therefore art should take no notice of them. Now the
formal aspect of the object of faith is one and indivisible, as stated
above [2267](A[1]), viz. the First Truth, so that matters of faith
cannot be distinguished in respect of their formal object. Therefore no
notice should be taken of a material division of matters of faith into
articles.
Objection 3: Further, it has been said by some [*Cf. William of
Auxerre, Summa Aurea] that "an article is an indivisible truth
concerning God, exacting [arctans] our belief. " Now belief is a
voluntary act, since, as Augustine says (Tract. xxvi in Joan. ), "no man
believes against his will. " Therefore it seems that matters of faith
should not be divided into articles.
On the contrary, Isidore says: "An article is a glimpse of Divine
truth, tending thereto. " Now we can only get a glimpse of Divine truth
by way of analysis, since things which in God are one, are manifold in
our intellect. Therefore matters of faith should be divided into
articles.
I answer that, the word "article" is apparently derived from the Greek;
for the Greek {arthron} [*Cf. William of Auxerre, Summa Aurea] which
the Latin renders "articulus," signifies a fitting together of distinct
parts: wherefore the small parts of the body which fit together are
called the articulations of the limbs. Likewise, in the Greek grammar,
articles are parts of speech which are affixed to words to show their
gender, number or case. Again in rhetoric, articles are parts that fit
together in a sentence, for Tully says (Rhet. iv) that an article is
composed of words each pronounced singly and separately, thus: "Your
passion, your voice, your look, have struck terror into your foes. "
Hence matters of Christian faith are said to contain distinct articles,
in so far as they are divided into parts, and fit together. Now the
object of faith is something unseen in connection with God, as stated
above [2268](A[4]). Consequently any matter that, for a special reason,
is unseen, is a special article; whereas when several matters are known
or not known, under the same aspect, we are not to distinguish various
articles. Thus one encounters one difficulty in seeing that God
suffered, and another in seeing that He rose again from the dead,
wherefore the article of the Resurrection is distinct from the article
of the Passion. But that He suffered, died and was buried, present the
same difficulty, so that if one be accepted, it is not difficult to
accept the others; wherefore all these belong to one article.
Reply to Objection 1: Some things are proposed to our belief are in
themselves of faith, while others are of faith, not in themselves but
only in relation to others: even as in sciences certain propositions
are put forward on their own account, while others are put forward in
order to manifest others. Now, since the chief object of faith consists
in those things which we hope to see, according to Heb. 11:2: "Faith is
the substance of things to be hoped for," it follows that those things
are in themselves of faith, which order us directly to eternal life.
Such are the Trinity of Persons in Almighty God [*The Leonine Edition
reads: The Three Persons, the omnipotence of God, etc. ], the mystery of
Christ's Incarnation, and the like: and these are distinct articles of
faith. On the other hand certain things in Holy Writ are proposed to
our belief, not chiefly on their own account, but for the manifestation
of those mentioned above: for instance, that Abraham had two sons, that
a dead man rose again at the touch of Eliseus' bones, and the like,
which are related in Holy Writ for the purpose of manifesting the
Divine mystery or the Incarnation of Christ: and such things should not
form distinct articles.
Reply to Objection 2: The formal aspect of the object of faith can be
taken in two ways: first, on the part of the thing believed, and thus
there is one formal aspect of all matters of faith, viz. the First
Truth: and from this point of view there is no distinction of articles.
Secondly, the formal aspect of matters of faith, can be considered from
our point of view; and thus the formal aspect of a matter of faith is
that it is something unseen; and from this point of view there are
various distinct articles of faith, as we saw above.
Reply to Objection 3: This definition of an article is taken from an
etymology of the word as derived from the Latin, rather than in
accordance with its real meaning, as derived from the Greek: hence it
does not carry much weight. Yet even then it could be said that
although faith is exacted of no man by a necessity of coercion, since
belief is a voluntary act, yet it is exacted of him by a necessity of
end, since "he that cometh to God must believe that He is," and
"without faith it is impossible to please God," as the Apostle declares
(Heb. 11:6).
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the articles of faith have increased in course of time?
Objection 1: It would seem that the articles of faith have not
increased in course of time. Because, as the Apostle says (Heb. 11:1),
"faith is the substance of things to be hoped for. " Now the same things
are to be hoped for at all times. Therefore, at all times, the same
things are to be believed.
Objection 2: Further, development has taken place, in sciences devised
by man, on account of the lack of knowledge in those who discovered
them, as the Philosopher observes (Metaph. ii). Now the doctrine of
faith was not devised by man, but was delivered to us by God, as stated
in Eph. 2:8: "It is the gift of God. " Since then there can be no lack
of knowledge in God, it seems that knowledge of matters of faith was
perfect from the beginning and did not increase as time went on.
Objection 3: Further, the operation of grace proceeds in orderly
fashion no less than the operation of nature. Now nature always makes a
beginning with perfect things, as Boethius states (De Consol. iii).
Therefore it seems that the operation of grace also began with perfect
things, so that those who were the first to deliver the faith, knew it
most perfectly.
Objection 4: Further, just as the faith of Christ was delivered to us
through the apostles, so too, in the Old Testament, the knowledge of
faith was delivered by the early fathers to those who came later,
according to Dt. 32:7: "Ask thy father, and he will declare to thee. "
Now the apostles were most fully instructed about the mysteries, for
"they received them more fully than others, even as they received them
earlier," as a gloss says on Rom. 8:23: "Ourselves also who have the
first fruits of the Spirit. " Therefore it seems that knowledge of
matters of faith has not increased as time went on.
On the contrary, Gregory says (Hom. xvi in Ezech. ) that "the knowledge
of the holy fathers increased as time went on . . . and the nearer they
were to Our Savior's coming, the more fully did they received the
mysteries of salvation. "
I answer that, The articles of faith stand in the same relation to the
doctrine of faith, as self-evident principles to a teaching based on
natural reason. Among these principles there is a certain order, so
that some are contained implicitly in others; thus all principles are
reduced, as to their first principle, to this one: "The same thing
cannot be affirmed and denied at the same time," as the Philosopher
states (Metaph. iv, text. 9). In like manner all the articles are
contained implicitly in certain primary matters of faith, such as God's
existence, and His providence over the salvation of man, according to
Heb. 11: "He that cometh to God, must believe that He is, and is a
rewarder to them that seek Him. " For the existence of God includes all
that we believe to exist in God eternally, and in these our happiness
consists; while belief in His providence includes all those things
which God dispenses in time, for man's salvation, and which are the way
to that happiness: and in this way, again, some of those articles which
follow from these are contained in others: thus faith in the Redemption
of mankind includes belief in the Incarnation of Christ, His Passion
and so forth.
Accordingly we must conclude that, as regards the substance of the
articles of faith, they have not received any increase as time went on:
since whatever those who lived later have believed, was contained,
albeit implicitly, in the faith of those Fathers who preceded them. But
there was an increase in the number of articles believed explicitly,
since to those who lived in later times some were known explicitly
which were not known explicitly by those who lived before them. Hence
the Lord said to Moses (Ex. 6:2,3): "I am the God of Abraham, the God
of Isaac, the God of Jacob [*Vulg. : 'I am the Lord that appeared to
Abraham, to Isaac, and to Jacob'] . . . and My name Adonai I did not
show them": David also said (Ps. 118:100): "I have had understanding
above ancients": and the Apostle says (Eph. 3:5) that the mystery of
Christ, "in other generations was not known, as it is now revealed to
His holy apostles and prophets. "
Reply to Objection 1: Among men the same things were always to be hoped
for from Christ. But as they did not acquire this hope save through
Christ, the further they were removed from Christ in point of time, the
further they were from obtaining what they hoped for. Hence the Apostle
says (Heb. 11:13): "All these died according to faith, not having
received the promises, but beholding them afar off. " Now the further
off a thing is the less distinctly is it seen; wherefore those who were
nigh to Christ's advent had a more distinct knowledge of the good
things to be hoped for.
Reply to Objection 2: Progress in knowledge occurs in two ways. First,
on the part of the teacher, be he one or many, who makes progress in
knowledge as time goes on: and this is the kind of progress that takes
place in sciences devised by man. Secondly, on the part of the learner;
thus the master, who has perfect knowledge of the art, does not deliver
it all at once to his disciple from the very outset, for he would not
be able to take it all in, but he condescends to the disciple's
capacity and instructs him little by little. It is in this way that men
made progress in the knowledge of faith as time went on. Hence the
Apostle (Gal. 3:24) compares the state of the Old Testament to
childhood.
Reply to Objection 3: Two causes are requisite before actual generation
can take place, an agent, namely, and matter. In the order of the
active cause, the more perfect is naturally first; and in this way
nature makes a beginning with perfect things, since the imperfect is
not brought to perfection, except by something perfect already in
existence. On the other hand, in the order of the material cause, the
imperfect comes first, and in this way nature proceeds from the
imperfect to the perfect. Now in the manifestation of faith, God is the
active cause, having perfect knowledge from all eternity; while man is
likened to matter in receiving the influx of God's action. Hence, among
men, the knowledge of faith had to proceed from imperfection to
perfection; and, although some men have been after the manner of active
causes, through being doctors of faith, nevertheless the manifestation
of the Spirit is given to such men for the common good, according to 1
Cor. 12:7; so that the knowledge of faith was imparted to the Fathers
who were instructors in the faith, so far as was necessary at the time
for the instruction of the people, either openly or in figures.
Reply to Objection 4: The ultimate consummation of grace was effected
by Christ, wherefore the time of His coming is called the "time of
fulness [*Vulg. : 'fulness of time']" (Gal. 4:4). Hence those who were
nearest to Christ, wherefore before, like John the Baptist, or after,
like the apostles, had a fuller knowledge of the mysteries of faith;
for even with regard to man's state we find that the perfection of
manhood comes in youth, and that a man's state is all the more perfect,
whether before or after, the nearer it is to the time of his youth.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the articles of faith are suitably formulated?
Objection 1: It would seem that the articles of faith are unsuitably
formulated. For those things, which can be known by demonstration, do
not belong to faith as to an object of belief for all, as stated above
(A[5] ). Now it can be known by demonstration that there is one God;
hence the Philosopher proves this (Metaph. xii, text. 52) and many
other philosophers demonstrated the same truth. Therefore that "there
is one God" should not be set down as an article of faith.
Objection 2: Further, just as it is necessary to faith that we should
believe God to be almighty, so is it too that we should believe Him to
be "all-knowing" and "provident for all," about both of which points
some have erred. Therefore, among the articles of faith, mention should
have been made of God's wisdom and providence, even as of His
omnipotence.
Objection 3: Further, to know the Father is the same things as to know
the Son, according to Jn. 14:9: "He that seeth Me, seeth the Father
also. " Therefore there ought to be but one article about the Father and
Son, and, for the same reason, about the Holy Ghost.
Objection 4: Further, the Person of the Father is no less than the
Person of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost. Now there are several
articles about the Person of the Holy Ghost, and likewise about the
Person of the Son. Therefore there should be several articles about the
Person of the Father.
Objection 5: Further, just as certain things are said by appropriation,
of the Person of the Father and of the Person of the Holy Ghost, so too
is something appropriated to the Person of the Son, in respect of His
Godhead. Now, among the articles of faith, a place is given to a work
appropriated to the Father, viz. the creation, and likewise, a work
appropriated to the Holy Ghost, viz. that "He spoke by the prophets. "
Therefore the articles of faith should contain some work appropriated
to the Son in respect of His Godhead.
Objection 6: Further, the sacrament of the Eucharist presents a special
difficulty over and above the other articles. Therefore it should have
been mentioned in a special article: and consequently it seems that
there is not a sufficient number of articles.
On the contrary stands the authority of the Church who formulates the
articles thus.
I answer that, As stated above ([2269]AA[4],6), to faith those things
in themselves belong, the sight of which we shall enjoy in eternal
life, and by which we are brought to eternal life. Now two things are
proposed to us to be seen in eternal life: viz. the secret of the
Godhead, to see which is to possess happiness; and the mystery of
Christ's Incarnation, "by Whom we have access" to the glory of the sons
of God, according to Rom. 5:2. Hence it is written (Jn. 17:3): "This is
eternal life: that they may know Thee, the . . . true God, and Jesus
Christ Whom Thou hast sent. " Wherefore the first distinction in matters
of faith is that some concern the majesty of the Godhead, while others
pertain to the mystery of Christ's human nature, which is the "mystery
of godliness" (1 Tim. 3:16).
Now with regard to the majesty of the Godhead, three things are
proposed to our belief: first, the unity of the Godhead, to which the
first article refers; secondly, the trinity of the Persons, to which
three articles refer, corresponding to the three Persons; and thirdly,
the works proper to the Godhead, the first of which refers to the order
of nature, in relation to which the article about the creation is
proposed to us; the second refers to the order of grace, in relation to
which all matters concerning the sanctification of man are included in
one article; while the third refers to the order of glory, and in
relation to this another article is proposed to us concerning the
resurrection of the dead and life everlasting. Thus there are seven
articles referring to the Godhead.
In like manner, with regard to Christ's human nature, there are seven
articles, the first of which refers to Christ's incarnation or
conception; the second, to His virginal birth; the third, to His
Passion, death and burial; the fourth, to His descent into hell; the
fifth, to His resurrection; the sixth, to His ascension; the seventh,
to His coming for the judgment, so that in all there are fourteen
articles.
Some, however, distinguish twelve articles, six pertaining to the
Godhead, and six to the humanity. For they include in one article the
three about the three Persons; because we have one knowledge of the
three Persons: while they divide the article referring to the work of
glorification into two, viz. the resurrection of the body, and the
glory of the soul. Likewise they unite the conception and nativity into
one article.
Reply to Objection 1: By faith we hold many truths about God, which the
philosophers were unable to discover by natural reason, for instance
His providence and omnipotence, and that He alone is to be worshiped,
all of which are contained in the one article of the unity of God.
Reply to Objection 2: The very name of the Godhead implies a kind of
watching over things, as stated in the [2270]FP, Q[13], A[8]. Now in
beings having an intellect, power does not work save by the will and
knowledge. Hence God's omnipotence includes, in a way, universal
knowledge and providence. For He would not be able to do all He wills
in things here below, unless He knew them, and exercised His providence
over them.
Reply to Objection 3: We have but one knowledge of the Father, Son, and
Holy Ghost, as to the unity of the Essence, to which the first article
refers: but, as to the distinction of the Persons, which is by the
relations of origin, knowledge of the Father does indeed, in a way,
include knowledge of the Son, for He would not be Father, had He not a
Son; the bond whereof being the Holy Ghost. From this point of view,
there was a sufficient motive for those who referred one article to the
three Persons. Since, however, with regard to each Person, certain
points have to be observed, about which some happen to fall into error,
looking at it in this way, we may distinguish three articles about the
three Persons. For Arius believed in the omnipotence and eternity of
the Father, but did not believe the Son to be co-equal and
consubstantial with the Father; hence the need for an article about the
Person of the Son in order to settle this point. In like manner it was
necessary to appoint a third article about the Person of the Holy
Ghost, against Macedonius. In the same way Christ's conception and
birth, just as the resurrection and life everlasting, can from one
point of view be united together in one article, in so far as they are
ordained to one end; while, from another point of view, they can be
distinct articles, in as much as each one separately presents a special
difficulty.
Reply to Objection 4: It belongs to the Son and Holy Ghost to be sent
to sanctify the creature; and about this several things have to be
believed. Hence it is that there are more articles about the Persons of
the Son and Holy Ghost than about the Person of the Father, Who is
never sent, as we stated in the [2271]FP, Q[43], A[4].
Reply to Objection 5: The sanctification of a creature by grace, and
its consummation by glory, is also effected by the gift of charity,
which is appropriated to the Holy Ghost, and by the gift of wisdom,
which is appropriated to the Son: so that each work belongs by
appropriation, but under different aspects, both to the Son and to the
Holy Ghost.
Reply to Objection 6: Two things may be considered in the sacrament of
the Eucharist. One is the fact that it is a sacrament, and in this
respect it is like the other effects of sanctifying grace. The other is
that Christ's body is miraculously contained therein and thus it is
included under God's omnipotence, like all other miracles which are
ascribed to God's almighty power.
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Whether it is suitable for the articles of faith to be embodied in a symbol?
Objection 1: It would seem that it is unsuitable for the articles of
faith to be embodied in a symbol. Because Holy Writ is the rule of
faith, to which no addition or subtraction can lawfully be made, since
it is written (Dt. 4:2): "You shall not add to the word that I speak to
you, neither shall you take away from it. " Therefore it was unlawful to
make a symbol as a rule of faith, after the Holy Writ had once been
published.
Objection 2: Further, according to the Apostle (Eph. 4:5) there is but
"one faith. " Now the symbol is a profession of faith. Therefore it is
not fitting that there should be more than one symbol.
Objection 3: Further, the confession of faith, which is contained in
the symbol, concerns all the faithful. Now the faithful are not all
competent to believe in God, but only those who have living faith.
Therefore it is unfitting for the symbol of faith to be expressed in
the words: "I believe in one God. "
Objection 4: Further, the descent into hell is one of the articles of
faith, as stated above [2272](A[8]). But the descent into hell is not
mentioned in the symbol of the Fathers. Therefore the latter is
expressed inadequately.
Objection 5: Further, Augustine (Tract. xxix in Joan. ) expounding the
passage, "You believe in God, believe also in Me" (Jn. 14:1) says: "We
believe Peter or Paul, but we speak only of believing 'in' God. " Since
then the Catholic Church is merely a created being, it seems unfitting
to say: "In the One, Holy, Catholic and Apostolic Church. "
Objection 6: Further, a symbol is drawn up that it may be a rule of
faith. Now a rule of faith ought to be proposed to all, and that
publicly. Therefore every symbol, besides the symbol of the Fathers,
should be sung at Mass. Therefore it seems unfitting to publish the
articles of faith in a symbol.
On the contrary, The universal Church cannot err, since she is governed
by the Holy Ghost, Who is the Spirit of truth: for such was Our Lord's
promise to His disciples (Jn. 16:13): "When He, the Spirit of truth, is
come, He will teach you all truth. " Now the symbol is published by the
authority of the universal Church. Therefore it contains nothing
defective.
I answer that, As the Apostle says (Heb. 11:6), "he that cometh to God,
must believe that He is. " Now a man cannot believe, unless the truth be
proposed to him that he may believe it. Hence the need for the truth of
faith to be collected together, so that it might the more easily be
proposed to all, lest anyone might stray from the truth through
ignorance of the faith. It is from its being a collection of maxims of
faith that the symbol [*The Greek {symballein}] takes its name.
Reply to Objection 1: The truth of faith is contained in Holy Writ,
diffusely, under various modes of expression, and sometimes obscurely,
so that, in order to gather the truth of faith from Holy Writ, one
needs long study and practice, which are unattainable by all those who
require to know the truth of faith, many of whom have no time for
study, being busy with other affairs. And so it was necessary to gather
together a clear summary from the sayings of Holy Writ, to be proposed
to the belief of all. This indeed was no addition to Holy Writ, but
something taken from it.
Reply to Objection 2: The same doctrine of faith is taught in all the
symbols. Nevertheless, the people need more careful instruction about
the truth of faith, when errors arise, lest the faith of simple-minded
persons be corrupted by heretics.
punishments but medicines as stated above ([2257]Q[87], A[8]).
Reply to Objection 4: All things happen equally to the good and the
wicked, as regards the substance of temporal good or evil; but not as
regards the end, since the good and not the wicked are led to beatitude
by them.
And now enough has been said regarding morals in general.
__________________________________________________________________
SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART (SS) (QQ[1]-189)
__________________________________________________________________
TREATISE ON THE THEOLOGICAL VIRTUES (QQ[1]-46)
__________________________________________________________________
OF FAITH (TEN ARTICLES)
Having to treat now of the theological virtues, we shall begin with
Faith, secondly we shall speak of Hope, and thirdly, of Charity.
The treatise on Faith will be fourfold: (1) Of faith itself; (2) Of the
corresponding gifts, knowledge and understanding; (3) Of the opposite
vices; (4) Of the precepts pertaining to this virtue.
About faith itself we shall consider: (1) its object; (2) its act; (3)
the habit of faith.
Under the first head there are ten points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the object of faith is the First Truth?
(2) Whether the object of faith is something complex or incomplex, i. e.
whether it is a thing or a proposition?
(3) Whether anything false can come under faith?
(4) Whether the object of faith can be anything seen?
(5) Whether it can be anything known?
(6) Whether the things to be believed should be divided into a certain
number of articles?
(7) Whether the same articles are of faith for all times?
(8) Of the number of articles;
(9) Of the manner of embodying the articles in a symbol;
(10) Who has the right to propose a symbol of faith?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the object of faith is the First Truth?
Objection 1: It would seem that the object of faith is not the First
Truth. For it seems that the object of faith is that which is proposed
to us to be believed. Now not only things pertaining to the Godhead,
i. e. the First Truth, are proposed to us to be believed, but also
things concerning Christ's human nature, and the sacraments of the
Church, and the condition of creatures. Therefore the object of faith
is not only the First Truth.
Objection 2: Further, faith and unbelief have the same object since
they are opposed to one another. Now unbelief can be about all things
contained in Holy Writ, for whichever one of them a man denies, he is
considered an unbeliever. Therefore faith also is about all things
contained in Holy Writ. But there are many things therein, concerning
man and other creatures. Therefore the object of faith is not only the
First Truth, but also created truth.
Objection 3: Further, faith is condivided with charity, as stated above
([2258]FS, Q[62], A[3]). Now by charity we love not only God, who is
the sovereign Good, but also our neighbor. Therefore the object of
Faith is not only the First Truth.
On the contrary, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. vii) that "faith is about
the simple and everlasting truth. " Now this is the First Truth.
Therefore the object of faith is the First Truth.
I answer that, The object of every cognitive habit includes two things:
first, that which is known materially, and is the material object, so
to speak, and, secondly, that whereby it is known, which is the formal
aspect of the object. Thus in the science of geometry, the conclusions
are what is known materially, while the formal aspect of the science is
the mean of demonstration, through which the conclusions are known.
Accordingly if we consider, in faith, the formal aspect of the object,
it is nothing else than the First Truth. For the faith of which we are
speaking, does not assent to anything, except because it is revealed by
God. Hence the mean on which faith is based is the Divine Truth. If,
however, we consider materially the things to which faith assents, they
include not only God, but also many other things, which, nevertheless,
do not come under the assent of faith, except as bearing some relation
to God, in as much as, to wit, through certain effects of the Divine
operation, man is helped on his journey towards the enjoyment of God.
Consequently from this point of view also the object of faith is, in a
way, the First Truth, in as much as nothing comes under faith except in
relation to God, even as the object of the medical art is health, for
it considers nothing save in relation to health.
Reply to Objection 1: Things concerning Christ's human nature, and the
sacraments of the Church, or any creatures whatever, come under faith,
in so far as by them we are directed to God, and in as much as we
assent to them on account of the Divine Truth.
The same answer applies to the Second Objection, as regards all things
contained in Holy Writ.
Reply to Objection 3: Charity also loves our neighbor on account of
God, so that its object, properly speaking, is God, as we shall show
further on ([2259]Q[25] , A[1]).
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the object of faith is something complex, by way of a proposition?
Objection 1: It would seem that the object of faith is not something
complex by way of a proposition. For the object of faith is the First
Truth, as stated above [2260](A[1]). Now the First Truth is something
simple. Therefore the object of faith is not something complex.
Objection 2: Further, the exposition of faith is contained in the
symbol. Now the symbol does not contain propositions, but things: for
it is not stated therein that God is almighty, but: "I believe in God .
. . almighty. " Therefore the object of faith is not a proposition but a
thing.
Objection 3: Further, faith is succeeded by vision, according to 1 Cor.
13:12: "We see now through a glass in a dark manner; but then face to
face. Now I know in part; but then I shall know even as I am known. "
But the object of the heavenly vision is something simple, for it is
the Divine Essence. Therefore the faith of the wayfarer is also.
On the contrary, Faith is a mean between science and opinion. Now the
mean is in the same genus as the extremes. Since, then, science and
opinion are about propositions, it seems that faith is likewise about
propositions; so that its object is something complex.
I answer that, The thing known is in the knower according to the mode
of the knower. Now the mode proper to the human intellect is to know
the truth by synthesis and analysis, as stated in the [2261]FP, Q[85],
A[5]. Hence things that are simple in themselves, are known by the
intellect with a certain amount of complexity, just as on the other
hand, the Divine intellect knows, without any complexity, things that
are complex in themselves.
Accordingly the object of faith may be considered in two ways. First,
as regards the thing itself which is believed, and thus the object of
faith is something simple, namely the thing itself about which we have
faith. Secondly, on the part of the believer, and in this respect the
object of faith is something complex by way of a proposition.
Hence in the past both opinions have been held with a certain amount of
truth.
Reply to Objection 1: This argument considers the object of faith on
the part of the thing believed.
Reply to Objection 2: The symbol mentions the things about which faith
is, in so far as the act of the believer is terminated in them, as is
evident from the manner of speaking about them. Now the act of the
believer does not terminate in a proposition, but in a thing. For as in
science we do not form propositions, except in order to have knowledge
about things through their means, so is it in faith.
Reply to Objection 3: The object of the heavenly vision will be the
First Truth seen in itself, according to 1 Jn. 3:2: "We know that when
He shall appear, we shall be like to Him: because we shall see Him as
He is": hence that vision will not be by way of a proposition but by
way of a simple understanding. On the other hand, by faith, we do not
apprehend the First Truth as it is in itself. Hence the comparison
fails.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether anything false can come under faith?
Objection 1: It would seem that something false can come under faith.
For faith is condivided with hope and charity. Now something false can
come under hope, since many hope to have eternal life, who will not
obtain it. The same may be said of charity, for many are loved as being
good, who, nevertheless, are not good. Therefore something false can be
the object of faith.
Objection 2: Further, Abraham believed that Christ would be born,
according to Jn. 8:56: "Abraham your father rejoiced that he might see
My day: he saw it, and was glad. " But after the time of Abraham, God
might not have taken flesh, for it was merely because He willed that He
did, so that what Abraham believed about Christ would have been false.
Therefore the object of faith can be something false.
Objection 3: Further, the ancients believed in the future birth of
Christ, and many continued so to believe, until they heard the
preaching of the Gospel. Now, when once Christ was born, even before He
began to preach, it was false that Christ was yet to be born. Therefore
something false can come under faith.
Objection 4: Further, it is a matter of faith, that one should believe
that the true Body of Christ is contained in the Sacrament of the
altar. But it might happen that the bread was not rightly consecrated,
and that there was not Christ's true Body there, but only bread.
Therefore something false can come under faith.
On the contrary, No virtue that perfects the intellect is related to
the false, considered as the evil of the intellect, as the Philosopher
declares (Ethic. vi, 2). Now faith is a virtue that perfects the
intellect, as we shall show further on ([2262]Q[4], AA[2],5). Therefore
nothing false can come under it.
I answer that, Nothing comes under any power, habit or act, except by
means of the formal aspect of the object: thus color cannot be seen
except by means of light, and a conclusion cannot be known save through
the mean of demonstration. Now it has been stated [2263](A[1]) that the
formal aspect of the object of faith is the First Truth; so that
nothing can come under faith, save in so far as it stands under the
First Truth, under which nothing false can stand, as neither can
non-being stand under being, nor evil under goodness. It follows
therefore that nothing false can come under faith.
Reply to Objection 1: Since the true is the good of the intellect, but
not of the appetitive power, it follows that all virtues which perfect
the intellect, exclude the false altogether, because it belongs to the
nature of a virtue to bear relation to the good alone. On the other
hand those virtues which perfect the appetitive faculty, do not
entirely exclude the false, for it is possible to act in accordance
with justice or temperance, while having a false opinion about what one
is doing. Therefore, as faith perfects the intellect, whereas hope and
charity perfect the appetitive part, the comparison between them fails.
Nevertheless neither can anything false come under hope, for a man
hopes to obtain eternal life, not by his own power (since this would be
an act of presumption), but with the help of grace; and if he
perseveres therein he will obtain eternal life surely and infallibly.
In like manner it belongs to charity to love God, wherever He may be;
so that it matters not to charity, whether God be in the individual
whom we love for God's sake.
Reply to Objection 2: That "God would not take flesh," considered in
itself was possible even after Abraham's time, but in so far as it
stands in God's foreknowledge, it has a certain necessity of
infallibility, as explained in the [2264]FP, Q[14], AA[13],15: and it
is thus that it comes under faith. Hence in so far as it comes under
faith, it cannot be false.
Reply to Objection 3: After Christ's birth, to believe in Him, was to
believe in Christ's birth at some time or other. The fixing of the
time, wherein some were deceived was not due to their faith, but to a
human conjecture. For it is possible for a believer to have a false
opinion through a human conjecture, but it is quite impossible for a
false opinion to be the outcome of faith.
Reply to Objection 4: The faith of the believer is not directed to such
and such accidents of bread, but to the fact that the true body of
Christ is under the appearances of sensible bread, when it is rightly
consecrated. Hence if it be not rightly consecrated, it does not follow
that anything false comes under faith.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the object of faith can be something seen?
Objection 1: It would seem that the object of faith is something seen.
For Our Lord said to Thomas (Jn. 20:29): "Because thou hast seen Me,
Thomas, thou hast believed. " Therefore vision and faith regard the same
object.
Objection 2: Further, the Apostle, while speaking of the knowledge of
faith, says (1 Cor. 13:12): "We see now through a glass in a dark
manner. " Therefore what is believed is seen.
Objection 3: Further, faith is a spiritual light. Now something is seen
under every light. Therefore faith is of things seen.
Objection 4: Further, "Every sense is a kind of sight," as Augustine
states (De Verb. Domini, Serm. xxxiii). But faith is of things heard,
according to Rom. 10:17: "Faith . . . cometh by hearing. " Therefore
faith is of things seen.
On the contrary, The Apostle says (Heb. 11:1) that "faith is the
evidence of things that appear not. "
I answer that, Faith implies assent of the intellect to that which is
believed. Now the intellect assents to a thing in two ways. First,
through being moved to assent by its very object, which is known either
by itself (as in the case of first principles, which are held by the
habit of understanding), or through something else already known (as in
the case of conclusions which are held by the habit of science).
Secondly the intellect assents to something, not through being
sufficiently moved to this assent by its proper object, but through an
act of choice, whereby it turns voluntarily to one side rather than to
the other: and if this be accompanied by doubt or fear of the opposite
side, there will be opinion, while, if there be certainty and no fear
of the other side, there will be faith.
Now those things are said to be seen which, of themselves, move the
intellect or the senses to knowledge of them. Wherefore it is evident
that neither faith nor opinion can be of things seen either by the
senses or by the intellect.
Reply to Objection 1: Thomas "saw one thing, and believed another"
[*St. Gregory: Hom. xxvi in Evang. ]: he saw the Man, and believing Him
to be God, he made profession of his faith, saying: "My Lord and my
God. "
Reply to Objection 2: Those things which come under faith can be
considered in two ways. First, in particular; and thus they cannot be
seen and believed at the same time, as shown above. Secondly, in
general, that is, under the common aspect of credibility; and in this
way they are seen by the believer. For he would not believe unless, on
the evidence of signs, or of something similar, he saw that they ought
to be believed.
Reply to Objection 3: The light of faith makes us see what we believe.
For just as, by the habits of the other virtues, man sees what is
becoming to him in respect of that habit, so, by the habit of faith,
the human mind is directed to assent to such things as are becoming to
a right faith, and not to assent to others.
Reply to Objection 4: Hearing is of words signifying what is of faith,
but not of the things themselves that are believed; hence it does not
follow that these things are seen.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether those things that are of faith can be an object of science [*Science
is certain knowledge of a demonstrated conclusion through its
demonstration]?
Objection 1: It would seem that those things that are of faith can be
an object of science. For where science is lacking there is ignorance,
since ignorance is the opposite of science. Now we are not in ignorance
of those things we have to believe, since ignorance of such things
savors of unbelief, according to 1 Tim. 1:13: "I did it ignorantly in
unbelief. " Therefore things that are of faith can be an object of
science.
Objection 2: Further, science is acquired by reasons. Now sacred
writers employ reasons to inculcate things that are of faith. Therefore
such things can be an object of science.
Objection 3: Further, things which are demonstrated are an object of
science, since a "demonstration is a syllogism that produces science. "
Now certain matters of faith have been demonstrated by the
philosophers, such as the Existence and Unity of God, and so forth.
Therefore things that are of faith can be an object of science.
Objection 4: Further, opinion is further from science than faith is,
since faith is said to stand between opinion and science. Now opinion
and science can, in a way, be about the same object, as stated in
Poster. i. Therefore faith and science can be about the same object
also.
On the contrary, Gregory says (Hom. xxvi in Evang. ) that "when a thing
is manifest, it is the object, not of faith, but of perception. "
Therefore things that are of faith are not the object of perception,
whereas what is an object of science is the object of perception.
Therefore there can be no faith about things which are an object of
science.
I answer that, All science is derived from self-evident and therefore
"seen" principles; wherefore all objects of science must needs be, in a
fashion, seen.
Now as stated above [2265](A[4]), it is impossible that one and the
same thing should be believed and seen by the same person. Hence it is
equally impossible for one and the same thing to be an object of
science and of belief for the same person. It may happen, however, that
a thing which is an object of vision or science for one, is believed by
another: since we hope to see some day what we now believe about the
Trinity, according to 1 Cor. 13:12: "We see now through a glass in a
dark manner; but then face to face": which vision the angels possess
already; so that what we believe, they see. In like manner it may
happen that what is an object of vision or scientific knowledge for one
man, even in the state of a wayfarer, is, for another man, an object of
faith, because he does not know it by demonstration.
Nevertheless that which is proposed to be believed equally by all, is
equally unknown by all as an object of science: such are the things
which are of faith simply. Consequently faith and science are not about
the same things.
Reply to Objection 1: Unbelievers are in ignorance of things that are
of faith, for neither do they see or know them in themselves, nor do
they know them to be credible. The faithful, on the other hand, know
them, not as by demonstration, but by the light of faith which makes
them see that they ought to believe them, as stated above (A[4], ad
2,3).
Reply to Objection 2: The reasons employed by holy men to prove things
that are of faith, are not demonstrations; they are either persuasive
arguments showing that what is proposed to our faith is not impossible,
or else they are proofs drawn from the principles of faith, i. e. from
the authority of Holy Writ, as Dionysius declares (Div. Nom. ii).
Whatever is based on these principles is as well proved in the eyes of
the faithful, as a conclusion drawn from self-evident principles is in
the eyes of all. Hence again, theology is a science, as we stated at
the outset of this work ([2266]FP, Q[1], A[2]).
Reply to Objection 3: Things which can be proved by demonstration are
reckoned among the articles of faith, not because they are believed
simply by all, but because they are a necessary presupposition to
matters of faith, so that those who do not known them by demonstration
must know them first of all by faith.
Reply to Objection 4: As the Philosopher says (Poster. i), "science and
opinion about the same object can certainly be in different men," as we
have stated above about science and faith; yet it is possible for one
and the same man to have science and faith about the same thing
relatively, i. e. in relation to the object, but not in the same
respect. For it is possible for the same person, about one and the same
object, to know one thing and to think another: and, in like manner,
one may know by demonstration the unity of the Godhead, and, by faith,
the Trinity. On the other hand, in one and the same man, about the same
object, and in the same respect, science is incompatible with either
opinion or faith, yet for different reasons. Because science is
incompatible with opinion about the same object simply, for the reason
that science demands that its object should be deemed impossible to be
otherwise, whereas it is essential to opinion, that its object should
be deemed possible to be otherwise.
Yet that which is the object of
faith, on account of the certainty of faith, is also deemed impossible
to be otherwise; and the reason why science and faith cannot be about
the same object and in the same respect is because the object of
science is something seen whereas the object of faith is the unseen, as
stated above.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether those things that are of faith should be divided into certain
articles?
Objection 1: It would seem that those things that are of faith should
not be divided into certain articles. For all things contained in Holy
Writ are matters of faith. But these, by reason of their multitude,
cannot be reduced to a certain number. Therefore it seems superfluous
to distinguish certain articles of faith.
Objection 2: Further, material differences can be multiplied
indefinitely, and therefore art should take no notice of them. Now the
formal aspect of the object of faith is one and indivisible, as stated
above [2267](A[1]), viz. the First Truth, so that matters of faith
cannot be distinguished in respect of their formal object. Therefore no
notice should be taken of a material division of matters of faith into
articles.
Objection 3: Further, it has been said by some [*Cf. William of
Auxerre, Summa Aurea] that "an article is an indivisible truth
concerning God, exacting [arctans] our belief. " Now belief is a
voluntary act, since, as Augustine says (Tract. xxvi in Joan. ), "no man
believes against his will. " Therefore it seems that matters of faith
should not be divided into articles.
On the contrary, Isidore says: "An article is a glimpse of Divine
truth, tending thereto. " Now we can only get a glimpse of Divine truth
by way of analysis, since things which in God are one, are manifold in
our intellect. Therefore matters of faith should be divided into
articles.
I answer that, the word "article" is apparently derived from the Greek;
for the Greek {arthron} [*Cf. William of Auxerre, Summa Aurea] which
the Latin renders "articulus," signifies a fitting together of distinct
parts: wherefore the small parts of the body which fit together are
called the articulations of the limbs. Likewise, in the Greek grammar,
articles are parts of speech which are affixed to words to show their
gender, number or case. Again in rhetoric, articles are parts that fit
together in a sentence, for Tully says (Rhet. iv) that an article is
composed of words each pronounced singly and separately, thus: "Your
passion, your voice, your look, have struck terror into your foes. "
Hence matters of Christian faith are said to contain distinct articles,
in so far as they are divided into parts, and fit together. Now the
object of faith is something unseen in connection with God, as stated
above [2268](A[4]). Consequently any matter that, for a special reason,
is unseen, is a special article; whereas when several matters are known
or not known, under the same aspect, we are not to distinguish various
articles. Thus one encounters one difficulty in seeing that God
suffered, and another in seeing that He rose again from the dead,
wherefore the article of the Resurrection is distinct from the article
of the Passion. But that He suffered, died and was buried, present the
same difficulty, so that if one be accepted, it is not difficult to
accept the others; wherefore all these belong to one article.
Reply to Objection 1: Some things are proposed to our belief are in
themselves of faith, while others are of faith, not in themselves but
only in relation to others: even as in sciences certain propositions
are put forward on their own account, while others are put forward in
order to manifest others. Now, since the chief object of faith consists
in those things which we hope to see, according to Heb. 11:2: "Faith is
the substance of things to be hoped for," it follows that those things
are in themselves of faith, which order us directly to eternal life.
Such are the Trinity of Persons in Almighty God [*The Leonine Edition
reads: The Three Persons, the omnipotence of God, etc. ], the mystery of
Christ's Incarnation, and the like: and these are distinct articles of
faith. On the other hand certain things in Holy Writ are proposed to
our belief, not chiefly on their own account, but for the manifestation
of those mentioned above: for instance, that Abraham had two sons, that
a dead man rose again at the touch of Eliseus' bones, and the like,
which are related in Holy Writ for the purpose of manifesting the
Divine mystery or the Incarnation of Christ: and such things should not
form distinct articles.
Reply to Objection 2: The formal aspect of the object of faith can be
taken in two ways: first, on the part of the thing believed, and thus
there is one formal aspect of all matters of faith, viz. the First
Truth: and from this point of view there is no distinction of articles.
Secondly, the formal aspect of matters of faith, can be considered from
our point of view; and thus the formal aspect of a matter of faith is
that it is something unseen; and from this point of view there are
various distinct articles of faith, as we saw above.
Reply to Objection 3: This definition of an article is taken from an
etymology of the word as derived from the Latin, rather than in
accordance with its real meaning, as derived from the Greek: hence it
does not carry much weight. Yet even then it could be said that
although faith is exacted of no man by a necessity of coercion, since
belief is a voluntary act, yet it is exacted of him by a necessity of
end, since "he that cometh to God must believe that He is," and
"without faith it is impossible to please God," as the Apostle declares
(Heb. 11:6).
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the articles of faith have increased in course of time?
Objection 1: It would seem that the articles of faith have not
increased in course of time. Because, as the Apostle says (Heb. 11:1),
"faith is the substance of things to be hoped for. " Now the same things
are to be hoped for at all times. Therefore, at all times, the same
things are to be believed.
Objection 2: Further, development has taken place, in sciences devised
by man, on account of the lack of knowledge in those who discovered
them, as the Philosopher observes (Metaph. ii). Now the doctrine of
faith was not devised by man, but was delivered to us by God, as stated
in Eph. 2:8: "It is the gift of God. " Since then there can be no lack
of knowledge in God, it seems that knowledge of matters of faith was
perfect from the beginning and did not increase as time went on.
Objection 3: Further, the operation of grace proceeds in orderly
fashion no less than the operation of nature. Now nature always makes a
beginning with perfect things, as Boethius states (De Consol. iii).
Therefore it seems that the operation of grace also began with perfect
things, so that those who were the first to deliver the faith, knew it
most perfectly.
Objection 4: Further, just as the faith of Christ was delivered to us
through the apostles, so too, in the Old Testament, the knowledge of
faith was delivered by the early fathers to those who came later,
according to Dt. 32:7: "Ask thy father, and he will declare to thee. "
Now the apostles were most fully instructed about the mysteries, for
"they received them more fully than others, even as they received them
earlier," as a gloss says on Rom. 8:23: "Ourselves also who have the
first fruits of the Spirit. " Therefore it seems that knowledge of
matters of faith has not increased as time went on.
On the contrary, Gregory says (Hom. xvi in Ezech. ) that "the knowledge
of the holy fathers increased as time went on . . . and the nearer they
were to Our Savior's coming, the more fully did they received the
mysteries of salvation. "
I answer that, The articles of faith stand in the same relation to the
doctrine of faith, as self-evident principles to a teaching based on
natural reason. Among these principles there is a certain order, so
that some are contained implicitly in others; thus all principles are
reduced, as to their first principle, to this one: "The same thing
cannot be affirmed and denied at the same time," as the Philosopher
states (Metaph. iv, text. 9). In like manner all the articles are
contained implicitly in certain primary matters of faith, such as God's
existence, and His providence over the salvation of man, according to
Heb. 11: "He that cometh to God, must believe that He is, and is a
rewarder to them that seek Him. " For the existence of God includes all
that we believe to exist in God eternally, and in these our happiness
consists; while belief in His providence includes all those things
which God dispenses in time, for man's salvation, and which are the way
to that happiness: and in this way, again, some of those articles which
follow from these are contained in others: thus faith in the Redemption
of mankind includes belief in the Incarnation of Christ, His Passion
and so forth.
Accordingly we must conclude that, as regards the substance of the
articles of faith, they have not received any increase as time went on:
since whatever those who lived later have believed, was contained,
albeit implicitly, in the faith of those Fathers who preceded them. But
there was an increase in the number of articles believed explicitly,
since to those who lived in later times some were known explicitly
which were not known explicitly by those who lived before them. Hence
the Lord said to Moses (Ex. 6:2,3): "I am the God of Abraham, the God
of Isaac, the God of Jacob [*Vulg. : 'I am the Lord that appeared to
Abraham, to Isaac, and to Jacob'] . . . and My name Adonai I did not
show them": David also said (Ps. 118:100): "I have had understanding
above ancients": and the Apostle says (Eph. 3:5) that the mystery of
Christ, "in other generations was not known, as it is now revealed to
His holy apostles and prophets. "
Reply to Objection 1: Among men the same things were always to be hoped
for from Christ. But as they did not acquire this hope save through
Christ, the further they were removed from Christ in point of time, the
further they were from obtaining what they hoped for. Hence the Apostle
says (Heb. 11:13): "All these died according to faith, not having
received the promises, but beholding them afar off. " Now the further
off a thing is the less distinctly is it seen; wherefore those who were
nigh to Christ's advent had a more distinct knowledge of the good
things to be hoped for.
Reply to Objection 2: Progress in knowledge occurs in two ways. First,
on the part of the teacher, be he one or many, who makes progress in
knowledge as time goes on: and this is the kind of progress that takes
place in sciences devised by man. Secondly, on the part of the learner;
thus the master, who has perfect knowledge of the art, does not deliver
it all at once to his disciple from the very outset, for he would not
be able to take it all in, but he condescends to the disciple's
capacity and instructs him little by little. It is in this way that men
made progress in the knowledge of faith as time went on. Hence the
Apostle (Gal. 3:24) compares the state of the Old Testament to
childhood.
Reply to Objection 3: Two causes are requisite before actual generation
can take place, an agent, namely, and matter. In the order of the
active cause, the more perfect is naturally first; and in this way
nature makes a beginning with perfect things, since the imperfect is
not brought to perfection, except by something perfect already in
existence. On the other hand, in the order of the material cause, the
imperfect comes first, and in this way nature proceeds from the
imperfect to the perfect. Now in the manifestation of faith, God is the
active cause, having perfect knowledge from all eternity; while man is
likened to matter in receiving the influx of God's action. Hence, among
men, the knowledge of faith had to proceed from imperfection to
perfection; and, although some men have been after the manner of active
causes, through being doctors of faith, nevertheless the manifestation
of the Spirit is given to such men for the common good, according to 1
Cor. 12:7; so that the knowledge of faith was imparted to the Fathers
who were instructors in the faith, so far as was necessary at the time
for the instruction of the people, either openly or in figures.
Reply to Objection 4: The ultimate consummation of grace was effected
by Christ, wherefore the time of His coming is called the "time of
fulness [*Vulg. : 'fulness of time']" (Gal. 4:4). Hence those who were
nearest to Christ, wherefore before, like John the Baptist, or after,
like the apostles, had a fuller knowledge of the mysteries of faith;
for even with regard to man's state we find that the perfection of
manhood comes in youth, and that a man's state is all the more perfect,
whether before or after, the nearer it is to the time of his youth.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the articles of faith are suitably formulated?
Objection 1: It would seem that the articles of faith are unsuitably
formulated. For those things, which can be known by demonstration, do
not belong to faith as to an object of belief for all, as stated above
(A[5] ). Now it can be known by demonstration that there is one God;
hence the Philosopher proves this (Metaph. xii, text. 52) and many
other philosophers demonstrated the same truth. Therefore that "there
is one God" should not be set down as an article of faith.
Objection 2: Further, just as it is necessary to faith that we should
believe God to be almighty, so is it too that we should believe Him to
be "all-knowing" and "provident for all," about both of which points
some have erred. Therefore, among the articles of faith, mention should
have been made of God's wisdom and providence, even as of His
omnipotence.
Objection 3: Further, to know the Father is the same things as to know
the Son, according to Jn. 14:9: "He that seeth Me, seeth the Father
also. " Therefore there ought to be but one article about the Father and
Son, and, for the same reason, about the Holy Ghost.
Objection 4: Further, the Person of the Father is no less than the
Person of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost. Now there are several
articles about the Person of the Holy Ghost, and likewise about the
Person of the Son. Therefore there should be several articles about the
Person of the Father.
Objection 5: Further, just as certain things are said by appropriation,
of the Person of the Father and of the Person of the Holy Ghost, so too
is something appropriated to the Person of the Son, in respect of His
Godhead. Now, among the articles of faith, a place is given to a work
appropriated to the Father, viz. the creation, and likewise, a work
appropriated to the Holy Ghost, viz. that "He spoke by the prophets. "
Therefore the articles of faith should contain some work appropriated
to the Son in respect of His Godhead.
Objection 6: Further, the sacrament of the Eucharist presents a special
difficulty over and above the other articles. Therefore it should have
been mentioned in a special article: and consequently it seems that
there is not a sufficient number of articles.
On the contrary stands the authority of the Church who formulates the
articles thus.
I answer that, As stated above ([2269]AA[4],6), to faith those things
in themselves belong, the sight of which we shall enjoy in eternal
life, and by which we are brought to eternal life. Now two things are
proposed to us to be seen in eternal life: viz. the secret of the
Godhead, to see which is to possess happiness; and the mystery of
Christ's Incarnation, "by Whom we have access" to the glory of the sons
of God, according to Rom. 5:2. Hence it is written (Jn. 17:3): "This is
eternal life: that they may know Thee, the . . . true God, and Jesus
Christ Whom Thou hast sent. " Wherefore the first distinction in matters
of faith is that some concern the majesty of the Godhead, while others
pertain to the mystery of Christ's human nature, which is the "mystery
of godliness" (1 Tim. 3:16).
Now with regard to the majesty of the Godhead, three things are
proposed to our belief: first, the unity of the Godhead, to which the
first article refers; secondly, the trinity of the Persons, to which
three articles refer, corresponding to the three Persons; and thirdly,
the works proper to the Godhead, the first of which refers to the order
of nature, in relation to which the article about the creation is
proposed to us; the second refers to the order of grace, in relation to
which all matters concerning the sanctification of man are included in
one article; while the third refers to the order of glory, and in
relation to this another article is proposed to us concerning the
resurrection of the dead and life everlasting. Thus there are seven
articles referring to the Godhead.
In like manner, with regard to Christ's human nature, there are seven
articles, the first of which refers to Christ's incarnation or
conception; the second, to His virginal birth; the third, to His
Passion, death and burial; the fourth, to His descent into hell; the
fifth, to His resurrection; the sixth, to His ascension; the seventh,
to His coming for the judgment, so that in all there are fourteen
articles.
Some, however, distinguish twelve articles, six pertaining to the
Godhead, and six to the humanity. For they include in one article the
three about the three Persons; because we have one knowledge of the
three Persons: while they divide the article referring to the work of
glorification into two, viz. the resurrection of the body, and the
glory of the soul. Likewise they unite the conception and nativity into
one article.
Reply to Objection 1: By faith we hold many truths about God, which the
philosophers were unable to discover by natural reason, for instance
His providence and omnipotence, and that He alone is to be worshiped,
all of which are contained in the one article of the unity of God.
Reply to Objection 2: The very name of the Godhead implies a kind of
watching over things, as stated in the [2270]FP, Q[13], A[8]. Now in
beings having an intellect, power does not work save by the will and
knowledge. Hence God's omnipotence includes, in a way, universal
knowledge and providence. For He would not be able to do all He wills
in things here below, unless He knew them, and exercised His providence
over them.
Reply to Objection 3: We have but one knowledge of the Father, Son, and
Holy Ghost, as to the unity of the Essence, to which the first article
refers: but, as to the distinction of the Persons, which is by the
relations of origin, knowledge of the Father does indeed, in a way,
include knowledge of the Son, for He would not be Father, had He not a
Son; the bond whereof being the Holy Ghost. From this point of view,
there was a sufficient motive for those who referred one article to the
three Persons. Since, however, with regard to each Person, certain
points have to be observed, about which some happen to fall into error,
looking at it in this way, we may distinguish three articles about the
three Persons. For Arius believed in the omnipotence and eternity of
the Father, but did not believe the Son to be co-equal and
consubstantial with the Father; hence the need for an article about the
Person of the Son in order to settle this point. In like manner it was
necessary to appoint a third article about the Person of the Holy
Ghost, against Macedonius. In the same way Christ's conception and
birth, just as the resurrection and life everlasting, can from one
point of view be united together in one article, in so far as they are
ordained to one end; while, from another point of view, they can be
distinct articles, in as much as each one separately presents a special
difficulty.
Reply to Objection 4: It belongs to the Son and Holy Ghost to be sent
to sanctify the creature; and about this several things have to be
believed. Hence it is that there are more articles about the Persons of
the Son and Holy Ghost than about the Person of the Father, Who is
never sent, as we stated in the [2271]FP, Q[43], A[4].
Reply to Objection 5: The sanctification of a creature by grace, and
its consummation by glory, is also effected by the gift of charity,
which is appropriated to the Holy Ghost, and by the gift of wisdom,
which is appropriated to the Son: so that each work belongs by
appropriation, but under different aspects, both to the Son and to the
Holy Ghost.
Reply to Objection 6: Two things may be considered in the sacrament of
the Eucharist. One is the fact that it is a sacrament, and in this
respect it is like the other effects of sanctifying grace. The other is
that Christ's body is miraculously contained therein and thus it is
included under God's omnipotence, like all other miracles which are
ascribed to God's almighty power.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether it is suitable for the articles of faith to be embodied in a symbol?
Objection 1: It would seem that it is unsuitable for the articles of
faith to be embodied in a symbol. Because Holy Writ is the rule of
faith, to which no addition or subtraction can lawfully be made, since
it is written (Dt. 4:2): "You shall not add to the word that I speak to
you, neither shall you take away from it. " Therefore it was unlawful to
make a symbol as a rule of faith, after the Holy Writ had once been
published.
Objection 2: Further, according to the Apostle (Eph. 4:5) there is but
"one faith. " Now the symbol is a profession of faith. Therefore it is
not fitting that there should be more than one symbol.
Objection 3: Further, the confession of faith, which is contained in
the symbol, concerns all the faithful. Now the faithful are not all
competent to believe in God, but only those who have living faith.
Therefore it is unfitting for the symbol of faith to be expressed in
the words: "I believe in one God. "
Objection 4: Further, the descent into hell is one of the articles of
faith, as stated above [2272](A[8]). But the descent into hell is not
mentioned in the symbol of the Fathers. Therefore the latter is
expressed inadequately.
Objection 5: Further, Augustine (Tract. xxix in Joan. ) expounding the
passage, "You believe in God, believe also in Me" (Jn. 14:1) says: "We
believe Peter or Paul, but we speak only of believing 'in' God. " Since
then the Catholic Church is merely a created being, it seems unfitting
to say: "In the One, Holy, Catholic and Apostolic Church. "
Objection 6: Further, a symbol is drawn up that it may be a rule of
faith. Now a rule of faith ought to be proposed to all, and that
publicly. Therefore every symbol, besides the symbol of the Fathers,
should be sung at Mass. Therefore it seems unfitting to publish the
articles of faith in a symbol.
On the contrary, The universal Church cannot err, since she is governed
by the Holy Ghost, Who is the Spirit of truth: for such was Our Lord's
promise to His disciples (Jn. 16:13): "When He, the Spirit of truth, is
come, He will teach you all truth. " Now the symbol is published by the
authority of the universal Church. Therefore it contains nothing
defective.
I answer that, As the Apostle says (Heb. 11:6), "he that cometh to God,
must believe that He is. " Now a man cannot believe, unless the truth be
proposed to him that he may believe it. Hence the need for the truth of
faith to be collected together, so that it might the more easily be
proposed to all, lest anyone might stray from the truth through
ignorance of the faith. It is from its being a collection of maxims of
faith that the symbol [*The Greek {symballein}] takes its name.
Reply to Objection 1: The truth of faith is contained in Holy Writ,
diffusely, under various modes of expression, and sometimes obscurely,
so that, in order to gather the truth of faith from Holy Writ, one
needs long study and practice, which are unattainable by all those who
require to know the truth of faith, many of whom have no time for
study, being busy with other affairs. And so it was necessary to gather
together a clear summary from the sayings of Holy Writ, to be proposed
to the belief of all. This indeed was no addition to Holy Writ, but
something taken from it.
Reply to Objection 2: The same doctrine of faith is taught in all the
symbols. Nevertheless, the people need more careful instruction about
the truth of faith, when errors arise, lest the faith of simple-minded
persons be corrupted by heretics.
