--The
Discipline
of Pure Reason in Polemics 449 Sect.
Kant - Critique of Pure Reason
PRINCIPLES, AND EXTENT OF
Human Knowlbdob A PRIORI
all Theoretical
of Reason, Synthetical Judgments A PRIORI are contained as Principles . .
Sciences
VI. --Tub General Prorlem of Pure Reason
VII. --Idea and DrroioN of a Particular Science, under tub
Name of a Critique of Pure Heason
TRANSCENDENTAL DOCTRINE OF ELEMENTS,
PART FIR8T. --TRANSCENDENTAL -ESTHETIC.
$ 1. Introductory 21
Sect. I. --Of Space.
Metaphysical Exposition of this Conception 23 Transcendental Exposition of the conception of Space 2-5
4. Conclusions from the foregoing Conceptions 25 Sect. II. --Of Timb.
5. Metaphysical Exposition of this Conception 28 6. Transcendenta. Exposition of the Conception of Time 29 " Conclusions from the above Conceptions 30 Elucidation 32
General Remarks on Transcendental . Esthetic 36
xii xx;>
? ? Ii
7. 12. 3.
? TI
CONTENT*.
PAST SECOND. --TRANSCENDENTAL LOGIC. Introduction. --Idea of a Transcendental Loqio.
I. --Of Logic in general
tfi 49
II. --Of Transcendental III. -- Of the Division -- Dialectic
Logic
of General
Logic into
Analytio
and
60 scendental Analytic and Dialectic 63
IV. Of the Division of Transcendental Logic into Tran
TRANSCENDENTAL LOGIC-- FIRST
Transcendental Analytic. ? 1 Analytic op Conceptions. ? 2
D1YI8ION.
? CHAP. I. --Of the Transcendental Cine to the DiacoTeiy of all Pore Conceptions cf the Understanding.
Introductory. 6 3 56 Sect. I. --Of the Logical use of the Understanding in gene
ral. ? 4 56 Sect. II. --Of the Logical Function of the Understanding in
Judgments. ? 6
Sect. III. --Of the Pure Conceptions of the Understanding, or
Categories. ? 6
CHAP. II. --Of thb Deduction of thb Pure Conceptions op the Understanding.
Sect. I. -- Of the Principles of Transcendental Deduction in ge neral. ? 9
5*. 62
71
Transition to the Transcendental Deduction of the Catego
ries. ? 10 77
8bot II. --Transcendental Deduction op the Pure Con ceptions OF THE UnDERSTANDOU}.
Of the Possibility of a Conjunction of the manifold repre sentations given by Sense. 4 11 80 Of the Originally Synthetical Unity of Apperception. {12 81
The Principle of the Synthetical Ulity of Apperception is
the highest Principle of all exercise of the Understand
ing. ? 13 84
What Objective Unity of Self-consciousness is. 6 14 86 The Logical Form of all Judgments consists in the Objective Unity of Apperception of the Conceptions contained
therein. ? 16 86 All Sensuous Intuitions are subject to the Categories, as Conditions under which alone the manifold contents of
them can be united in one Consciousness. ? 16 88 Observations. ? 17 88 In Cognition, its Application to Objects of Experience is
the only legitimate use of the Category, f 18 90
64 66
? ? ? CONTESTS.
yjj
Of the Application of the Categories to Object! of the Senses hfi
in general. I 20
Transcendental Deduction of the universally possible em
ployment in experience of the Pure Conceptions of the
Understanding. $ 23 97 Besult of this Deduction -of the Conceptions of the Under
standing. (23
Short view of the above Deduction
TRANSCENDENTAL ANALYTIC-- BOOK 1L
Analytic or Principles
Introduction. -- Of the Transcendental Faculty of
ment in general
Judg
101 103
101 104
BS
? Transcendental. Doctrine of the Faculty of Judg ment, ob Analytic or Princifles.
CH AP. I. --Of the Schematism of the Pure Conceptions of the Un
derstanding 107
CHAP. IL--System of all Principles of the Pure Understanding. . . . US System or tub Principles or the Pure Understanding.
Sect. I. -- Of the Supreme Principle of all Analytical -- Judgments
115
Sect. II. Of the Supreme Principle of all Synthetical Judgments 117
Sect.
III. -- Systematic Representations of all Synthetical
-- Priiomles of the Pure Understanding 120
I.
II. --Anticipations of Perception III. -- Analogies of Experience
A. First Analogy. -- Principle
Axioms of Intuition
123 124 132
134
of Substance -- B. Second Analogy.
of Time -- C. Third Analogy.
Principle of the Succession
141
Principle of Co-existence . . 166 IV. --The Postulates of Empirical Thought 161
Refutation of Idealism
General Remark on the System of Principles 174
0HAP. III. --Of the Ground of the division of all objects into Phss- nomena and Noumena ITS
Appendix Of the Equivocal Nature or Amphiboly, the Conceptions of Reflection from the Confusion of
the Traiucendental with the Empirical use of
the Understanding 190
Remark on the Amphiboly of the Conceptions of Reflection 194
of
the
Permanence
166
? ? ? COITTENTS.
TRANSCENDENTAL LOGIC-- SECOND DIVISION. Transcendent ax Dialectic. -- Introduction.
I. --Of Transcendental Illusory Appearance
If. -- Of Pure Reaaon as the Seat of Transcendental
pearance
A. Op Reason in General
B. Of the Logical Usb of Reason C. Of the Poeb Ube of Reason
209
212 214 21 S
219 221 225 23?
237 237
245
251 General Remark on the Transition from Rational Psy
TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC-- BOOK I.
Illuiory
Ap
? Or the Conceptions of Pure Reason Sect. J. --Of Ideas in General
Sect. II. -- Of Transcendental Ideas Sbct. III. -- System of Transcendental
Book II. -- Or the Dia'. ecticai, Reason
Idens Procedure
op
Pcee
CHAP I. -- Of the Pabalooisms op Pure Reason
Refutation of the Argument of Mendelssohn for the Sub
stantiality or Permanence of the Soul
Conclusion of the Solution of the Psychological Paralo
gism
chology to Cosmology
CITAP. II. -- Thb Antinomy of Pure Reason
Sect. I. -- System of Cosmological Ideas Sror. II. --Antithetic of Pure Reason
253
255
256
263
266
271
278
284
290
298 303
307 310
318 321
First Antinomy Second Antinomy
Third Antinomy! Fourth Antinomy
8ect. III. -- Of the Interest of dictions
Reason in
these
Sel'-Contra-
Sect. TV. -- Of the Necessity Imposed upon Pure Reason of presenting a Solution of its Transcendental
Problems
Sect. V. -- Sceptical Exposition of the Cosmological Problems -- presented in the four Transcendental Ideas . . . 8ect. VI. Transcendental Idealism as the Key to the Solution
-- of Pure Cosmological Dialectic
Sect VTT. Critical Solution of the Cosmoloficai Problems . . 8bct. VIII. -- Regulative Principle of Pure Reason in relation
to the Cosmolosical Ideas
8bot. IX. -- Of the Empirical Use of the R-;rulative Principle
of Reason, with regard to the Cosmoloeicol Ideas
? ? ? CONTENTS. 13
L-- Solution of the Cosmological Idea of the Totality of the Composition of Phenomena in the Universe 322
II. -- Solution of the Cosmological Idea of the Totality of the Division of a 'Whole given in Intuition
Causes 33(
Possibility of Freedom in Harmony with the Uni versal Law of Natural Necessity 333
Exposition of the Cosmological Idea of Freedom in Harmony with the universal Law of Natural
-- Necessity 335 IV. Solution of the Cosmological Idea of the Totality
Concluding Remark on the Solution of the Transcen dental Mathematical Ideas -- and Introductory to the Solution of the Dynamical Ideas
325
328
III. -- Solution of the Cosmological Idea of the Totality of the Deduction of Cosmical Events from their
? of the Dependence of Phenomenal Existences . . . . 346
Concluding Reason
Sect. IV. Of the Impossibility of an Ontological Proof of the
-- Existence of God 364
CHAP, ITL-- The Ideal
Sect. I. -- Of the Ideal in General
Sect. II. -- Of the Transcendental Ideal Sect. III. -- Of the Arguments Employed
349
350 352
Remarks
on the
Antinomy
of
Pure
op Pure
Reason.
Reason
-- in Proof of the Existence of a Supreme Being 359
Set. V. Of the Impossibility of a Cosmological Proof of the Existence of God
Di tection and Explanation of the Dialectical Elu sion in all Transcendental Arguments for the
370
-- Existence of a Necessary Being 377 Sect. VI. Of the Impossibility of a Physico-Theological
Proof
8ect. VII. -- Critique :f all Theology
based upon
Speculative
381
387
of Reason
Of the Regulative Employment of the Ideas of Pure
Principles
Reason 894 Of the Ultimate End of the Natural Dialectic of
Human Reason 41C
Til VNSCENDENTAL DOCTRINE OF METHOD
431
CIl AP. I. --The Discipline op Pcbe Reason 432 Skct. I. -- The Discipline of Pure Reason in the Sphere of Dog
matism 439 Sect. II.
--The Discipline of Pure Reason in Polemics 449 Sect. III. -- The Discipline of Pure Reason iu Hypothesis 467
8ect. IV. -- The Discipline of Pure Reason in Relation to Proofs
47 S
by
Speculative
? ? ? CONTENT*.
CHAP. n. --The Canon of Pure Reason 482 Sect. I. --Of the Ultimate End of the Pure Use of Reason 483 Sect. II. --Of the Ideal of the Summum Bonum as a Deter
mining Ground of the ultimate End of Pure
-- Reason 487 Sect. III. Of Opinion, Knowledge, and Belief. 498
CHAP. III. --The Architectonic of Pure Reason 503 CHAP. IV. --Tub History of Pure Reason 616
? ? ? ? TRANSLATOR'S PREFACE.
The following translation has been undertaken with the hope of rendering Kant's Kritik der reinen Vermmft intelligible to the English student.
The difficulties which meet the reader and the translator of this celebrated work arise from various causes. Kant was a man of clear, vigorous, and trenchant thought, and, after nearly twelve years' meditation, could not be in doubt as to his own system. But the Horatian rule of
Verba pravisam rem non invita sequentur,
will not apply to him. He had never studied the art of ex pression. He wearies by frequent repetitions, and employs a great number of words to express, in the clumsiest way, what could have been enounced more clearly and distinctly in a few. The main statement in his sentences is often over laid with a multitude of qualifying and explanatory clauses ; and the reader is lost in a maze, from which he has great difficulty in extricating himself. There are some passages which have no main verb ; others, in which the author loses sight of the subject with which he set out, and concludes with a predicate regarding something else mentioned in the course
of his argument. All this can be easily accounted for. Kant, as he mentions in a letter to Lambert, took nearly twelve
? ? ? ? tkanslatob' a freface.
years to excogitate his work, and only five months to write it He was a German professor, a student of solitary habits, and had never, except on one occasion, been out of Kcmigs- berg. He had, besides, to propound a new system of philoso phy, and to enounce ideas th. -. t were entirely to revolutionise European thought . On the other hand, there are many excellencies of style in this work. His expression is often as precise and forcible as his thought ; and, in some of his notes especially, he sums up, in two or three apt and powerful words, thoughts which, at other times, he employs pages to develope. His terminology, which has been so violently denounced, is really of great use in clearly deter mining his system, and in rendering its peculiarities more easy
of comprehension.
A previous translation of the Kritik exists, which, had it
been satisfactory, would have dispensed with the present. But the translator had, evidently, no very extensive acquaint ance with the German language, and still less with his subject. A translator ought to be an interpreting intellect between the author and the reader ; but, in the present case, the only interpreting medium has been the dictionary.
? Indeed, Kant's fate in this country has been a very hard one. Misunderstood by the ablest philosophers of the time, illustrated, explained, or translated by the most incompetent, -- it has been his lot to be either
hended, or entirely neglected. Duguld Stewart did not understand his system of philosophy -- as he had no proper opportunity of making himself acquainted with it ; Kitsch* and Willichf undertook to introduce him to the English philosophical public; Richardson and Haywood " traduced"
? A General and Introductory View of Professor Kant's Principles. By F. A. Nitsch. London, 1706.
Willich's Elements af Kant's Philosophy, Svo. 1708.
unappreciated, misappre
? ? ? TBANSLATOTl'B PREPACK.
xiU
him. More recently, an Analysis of the Kritik, by Mr. Haywood, has been published, which consists almost entirely of a selection of sentences from his own translation : -- a mode of analysis which has not served to make the subject more intelligible. In short, it may be asserted that there
is not a single English work upon Kant, which deserves to be read, or which can be read with any profit, excepting Semple's translation of the " Metaphysic of Ethics. " All are written by men who either took no pains to understand Kant, or were incapahle of understanding him. *
The following translation was begun on the basis of a MS.
translation, by a scholar of some repute, placed in my hands by
Mr. Bohn, with a request that I should revise as he had
perceived to be incorrect. After having laboured through
about eighty pages, found, from the numerous errors and
inaccuracies pervading that hardly one-fifth of the original
? MS. remained. therefore,
laid entirely aside, and com menced df novo. These eighty pages did not cancel, be
cause the careful examination
made them, as believed, not an unworthy representation of the author.
It curiam to observe, in all the English works written spe cially upon Kant, that not one of his commentators ever ventures, for moment, to leave the words of Kant, and to explain the subject he may be considering, in his own words. Nitsch and Willich, who professed to write on Kant's philosophy, are merely translators "Haywood, even in his notes, merely repeats Kant; and the translator of Beck's Principle* of the Critical Philosophy," while pretending to give, in his " Translator** Preface," his own views of the Critical Philosophy, has fabricated bis Preface out of selections from the works of Kant. The snne
case with the translator of Kant's "Essays and Treatises,"
London, 1798. ) This person has written preface to each of the volumes, and both are almost literal translations from different parts of Kant's works. He had the impudence to present the thoughts contained in there at his own few being then able to detect the plagiarism.
which they had undergone,
the vols. 8vo.
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The second edition of the Kritik, from which all tha sub sequent ones have been reprinted without alteration, is followed in the present translation. Rosenkranz, a recent editor, main tains that the author's first edition is far superior to the second ; and Schopenhauer asserts that the alterations in the second were dictated by unworthy motives. He thinks the second a Verschlbrvnbesserung of the first; and that the changes made by Kant, " in the weakness of old age," have rendered it a " self-contradictory and mutilated work. " I am not insensible to the able arguments brought forward by Scho penhauer ; while the authority of the elder Jacobi, Michelet, and others, adds weight to his opinion. But it may be doubted whether the motives imputed to Kant could have influenced him in the omission of certain passages in the second edition,--
whether fear could have induced a man of his character to retract the statements he had advanced. The opinions he expresses in many parts of the second edition, in pages 455-- 460, for example,* are not those of a philosopher who would surrender what he believed to be truth, at the"outcry of preju diced opponents. Nor are his attacks on the sacred doctrines of the old dogmatic philosophy," as Schopenhauer maintains, less bold or vigorous in the second than in the first edition. And, finally, Kant's own testimony must be held to be of greater weight than that of any number of other philosophers, however learned and profound.
No edition of the Kritik is very correct. Even those of Rosenkranz and Schubert, and Modes and Baumann, contain errors which reflect somewhat upon the care of the editors. But the common editions, as well those printed during, as after Kant's life-time, are exceedingly bad. One of these, the " third edition improved, Frankfort and Leipzig, 1791," swarms with errors, at once misleading and annoying. -- Rosenkranz hu
* Of the preient translation.
? ? ? ? preface.
suae a number of very happy conjectural emendations, the accuracy of which cannot be doubted.
It may be necessary to mention that it has been found
requisite to coin one or two new philosophical terms, to repre sent those employed by Kant. It was, of course, almost im possible to translate the Eritik with the aid of the philoso phical vocabulary at present used in England. But these new expressions have been formed according to Horace's maxim -- parch detorta. Such is the verb intuite for anschauen ; the manifold in intuition has also been employed for dot Mannig- faltige der Amchauung, by which Kant designates the varied contents of a perception or intuition. Kant's own terminology has the merit of being precise and consistent.
Whatever may be the opinion of the reader with regard to the possibility of metaphysics --whatever his estimate of the utility of such discussions, --the value of Kant's work, as an instrument of mental discipline, cannot easily be overrated. If the present translation contribute in the least to the ad vancement of scientific cultivation, if it aid in the formation of habits of severer and more profound thought, the translator will consider himself well compensated for his arduous and long-protracted labour.
J. M. D. M.
translator's
? ? ? ? PREFACE TO THE FIRST ED1TI0N. -O781. )
Human reason, in one sphere of its cognition, is called upon to consider questions, which it cannot decline, as they are presented by its own nature, but which it cannot answer, aa they transcend every faculty of the mind.
It falls into this difficulty without any fault of its own. It begins with principles, which cannot be dispensed with in the field of experience, and the truth and sufficiency of which are, at the same time, insured by experience. With these principles it rises, in obedience to the laws of its own nature, to ever higher and more remote conditions. But it quickly discovers that, in this way, its labours must remain ever incomplete, because new questions never cease to present themselves ; and thus it finds itself compelled to have recourse to principles which transcend the region of experience, while they are regarded by common sense without distrust. It thus falls into confusion and contradictions, from which it conjectures the presence of latent errors, which, however, it is unable to dis cover, because the principles it employs, transcending the limits of experience, cannot be tested by that criterion. The arena of these endless contests is called Metaphyric.
Time was, when she was the queen of all the sciences ; and, if we take the will for the deed, she certainly deserves, so far as regards the high importance of her object-matter, this title of honour. Now. it is the fashion of the time to heap con tempt and scorn upon her ; and the matron mourns, forlorn and forsaken, like Hecuba,
" Modo maxima rerura, Tot generis, natisque poteni . . .
Nunc trahor exul, inopa. "*
At first, her government, under the administration of the
? Ovid, Metamorphoses.
? ? ? ? rviii
PREFAOK TO TM FtRST EDITION.
dogmatists, was an absolute despotism. But, as the legislative continued to show traces of the ancient barbaric rule, her empire gradually broke up, and intestine nn introduced the reign of anarchy ; while the sceptics, like nomadic tribes, who hate a permanent habitation and settled mode of living, attacked from time to time those who had organised them selves into civil communities. But their number was, very happily, small ; atid thus they could not entirely put a slop to the exertions of those who persisted in raising new edifices, although on no settled or uniform plan. In recent times the hope dawned upon us of seeing those disputes settled, and the legitimacy of her claims established by a kind of physiology of the human understanding--that of the celebrated Locke. But it was found that, --although it was affirmed that this so-called queen could not refer her descent to any higher source than that of common experience, a circumstance which necessarily brought suspicion on her claims, --as this genealogy was incorrect, she persisted in the advancement of her claims to sovereignty. Thus metaphysics necessarily fell back into t he antiquated and rotten constitution of dogmatism, and again became obnoxious to the contempt from which efforts had been made to save it. At present, as all methods, according to the general persuasion, have been tried in vain, there reigns
of chaos and night in the scientific world, but at the same time the source of, or at least the prelude to, the re-creation and reinstallation of a science, when it has fallen into confusion, obscurity, and disuse from ill- directed effort.
For it is in reality vain to profess indifference in regard to such inquiries, the object of which cannot be indifferent to humanity.
Besides, these pretended indifferentists, however much they may try to disguise themselves by the assumption of a popular style and by changes on the language of the schools, un avoidably fall into metaphysical declarations and propositions, which they profess to regard with so much contempt. At the same time, this indifference, which has arisen in the world of science, and which relates to that kind of knowledge which we should wish to see destroyed the last, is a phenomenon that well deserves our attention and reflection. It is plainly not the effect of the levity, but of the matured judgment* of the
? We very often hear complaints of the shallowneu of the present age.
? ? ? ? PREFACE TO THE FIRST EDITIOJT. xii
age, which refuses to be any longer entertained with illusory ' knowledge. It in fact, call to reason, again tc undertake the most laborious of all tasks --that of self-examination, and to establish tribunal, which may secure in its well-grounde claims, while pronounces against all baseless assumption* and pretensions, not in an arbitrary manner, but according to its own eternal and unchangeable laws. This tribunal nothing less than the Critical Jnreetiyation of Pure Reason.
do not mean this criticism of books and systems, but critical inquiry into the faculty of reason, with reference to
the cognitions to which strives to attain without the aid experience in other words, the solution of the question re garding the possibility or impossibility of Metaphysics, and the determination of the origin, as well as of the extent and limits of this science. All this must be done on the basis of principles. -- --
This path the only one now remaining has been entered upon me and flatter myself that have, in this way, dis covered the cause of -- and consequently the mode of removing --all the errors which have hitherto set reason at variance with itself, in the sphere of non-empirical thought. have not returned an evasive answer to the questions of reason, alleging the inability and limitation of the faculties of the mind have, on the contrary, examined them completely
the light of principles, and, after having discovered the cause of the doubts and contradictions into which reason fell, have solved them to its perfect satisfaction. true, these ques tions have not been solved as dogmatism, in its vain fancies
and of the decay of profound science. Bat do not think that those which rest upon secure foundation, such as Mathematics, Physical Science, 4c. , in the least deserve this reproach, but that they rather maintain their ancient fame, and in the latter case, indeed, far surpass it. The same would he the case with the other kinds of cognition, their principles were but firmly established. In the absence of this security, indifference, doubt, and finally, severe criticism are rather signs of pro found habit of thought. Our age the age of criticism, to which every thing must he subjected. The sacrednesa of religion, and the authority of legislation, are many regarded as grounds of exemption froni the examination of this tribunal. But, they are exempted, they become the subjects of just suspicion, and cannot lay claim to sincere respect, which reason accords only to that which has stood the . <<t of free and public examination.
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? sx PKEFACB TO THE FIBST EDITIOK.
and desires, Lad expected ; for it can only be satisfied by the exercise of magical arts, and of these I have no knowledge. But neither do these come within the compass of our mental powers ; and it was the d<<ty of philosophy to destroy the illusions which had their origin in misconceptions, whatever darling hopes and valued expectations may be ruined by its explanations. My chief aim in this work has been thorough ness ; and I make bold to say, that there is not a single meta physical problem that does not find its solution, or at least the key to its solution, here. Pure reason is a perfect unity ; and therefore, if the principle presented by it prove to be in sufficient for the solution of even a single one of those
? to which the very nature of reason gives birth, we must reject as we could not be perfectly certain of its suffi ciency in the case of the others.
While say this, think see upon the countenance of the reader signs of dissatisfaction mingled with contempt, when he hears declarations which sound so boastful and extravagant and yet they are beyond comparison more moderate than those advanced the commonest author of the commonest philo sophical programme, in which the dogmatist professes to de monstrate the simple nature of the soul, or the necessity of primal being. Such dogmatist promises to extend human knowledge beyond the limits of possible experience while
humbly confess that this completely beyond my power. Instead of any such attempt, confine myself to the exami
nation of reason alone and its pure thought and do not need to seek far for the sum-total of its cognition, because has its seat my own mind. Besides, common logic presents me with complete and systematic catalogue of all the simple operations of reason and my task to answer the question how far reason can go, without the material presented and the aid furnished by experience.
-'""So much for the completeness and thoroughness necessary the execution of the present task. The aims set before ua
are not arbitrarily proposed, but are imposed upon us by the nature of cognition itself.
The above remarks relate to the mattur of our critical in-
questions
As regards the form, there are two indispensable con- itioni, which any one who undertakes sc difficult task as
airy.
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? PnEFACE TO THE MUST EDITION. MB
that of a critique of pure reason, is bound to fulfil. These conditions are certitude and clearness.
Human Knowlbdob A PRIORI
all Theoretical
of Reason, Synthetical Judgments A PRIORI are contained as Principles . .
Sciences
VI. --Tub General Prorlem of Pure Reason
VII. --Idea and DrroioN of a Particular Science, under tub
Name of a Critique of Pure Heason
TRANSCENDENTAL DOCTRINE OF ELEMENTS,
PART FIR8T. --TRANSCENDENTAL -ESTHETIC.
$ 1. Introductory 21
Sect. I. --Of Space.
Metaphysical Exposition of this Conception 23 Transcendental Exposition of the conception of Space 2-5
4. Conclusions from the foregoing Conceptions 25 Sect. II. --Of Timb.
5. Metaphysical Exposition of this Conception 28 6. Transcendenta. Exposition of the Conception of Time 29 " Conclusions from the above Conceptions 30 Elucidation 32
General Remarks on Transcendental . Esthetic 36
xii xx;>
? ? Ii
7. 12. 3.
? TI
CONTENT*.
PAST SECOND. --TRANSCENDENTAL LOGIC. Introduction. --Idea of a Transcendental Loqio.
I. --Of Logic in general
tfi 49
II. --Of Transcendental III. -- Of the Division -- Dialectic
Logic
of General
Logic into
Analytio
and
60 scendental Analytic and Dialectic 63
IV. Of the Division of Transcendental Logic into Tran
TRANSCENDENTAL LOGIC-- FIRST
Transcendental Analytic. ? 1 Analytic op Conceptions. ? 2
D1YI8ION.
? CHAP. I. --Of the Transcendental Cine to the DiacoTeiy of all Pore Conceptions cf the Understanding.
Introductory. 6 3 56 Sect. I. --Of the Logical use of the Understanding in gene
ral. ? 4 56 Sect. II. --Of the Logical Function of the Understanding in
Judgments. ? 6
Sect. III. --Of the Pure Conceptions of the Understanding, or
Categories. ? 6
CHAP. II. --Of thb Deduction of thb Pure Conceptions op the Understanding.
Sect. I. -- Of the Principles of Transcendental Deduction in ge neral. ? 9
5*. 62
71
Transition to the Transcendental Deduction of the Catego
ries. ? 10 77
8bot II. --Transcendental Deduction op the Pure Con ceptions OF THE UnDERSTANDOU}.
Of the Possibility of a Conjunction of the manifold repre sentations given by Sense. 4 11 80 Of the Originally Synthetical Unity of Apperception. {12 81
The Principle of the Synthetical Ulity of Apperception is
the highest Principle of all exercise of the Understand
ing. ? 13 84
What Objective Unity of Self-consciousness is. 6 14 86 The Logical Form of all Judgments consists in the Objective Unity of Apperception of the Conceptions contained
therein. ? 16 86 All Sensuous Intuitions are subject to the Categories, as Conditions under which alone the manifold contents of
them can be united in one Consciousness. ? 16 88 Observations. ? 17 88 In Cognition, its Application to Objects of Experience is
the only legitimate use of the Category, f 18 90
64 66
? ? ? CONTESTS.
yjj
Of the Application of the Categories to Object! of the Senses hfi
in general. I 20
Transcendental Deduction of the universally possible em
ployment in experience of the Pure Conceptions of the
Understanding. $ 23 97 Besult of this Deduction -of the Conceptions of the Under
standing. (23
Short view of the above Deduction
TRANSCENDENTAL ANALYTIC-- BOOK 1L
Analytic or Principles
Introduction. -- Of the Transcendental Faculty of
ment in general
Judg
101 103
101 104
BS
? Transcendental. Doctrine of the Faculty of Judg ment, ob Analytic or Princifles.
CH AP. I. --Of the Schematism of the Pure Conceptions of the Un
derstanding 107
CHAP. IL--System of all Principles of the Pure Understanding. . . . US System or tub Principles or the Pure Understanding.
Sect. I. -- Of the Supreme Principle of all Analytical -- Judgments
115
Sect. II. Of the Supreme Principle of all Synthetical Judgments 117
Sect.
III. -- Systematic Representations of all Synthetical
-- Priiomles of the Pure Understanding 120
I.
II. --Anticipations of Perception III. -- Analogies of Experience
A. First Analogy. -- Principle
Axioms of Intuition
123 124 132
134
of Substance -- B. Second Analogy.
of Time -- C. Third Analogy.
Principle of the Succession
141
Principle of Co-existence . . 166 IV. --The Postulates of Empirical Thought 161
Refutation of Idealism
General Remark on the System of Principles 174
0HAP. III. --Of the Ground of the division of all objects into Phss- nomena and Noumena ITS
Appendix Of the Equivocal Nature or Amphiboly, the Conceptions of Reflection from the Confusion of
the Traiucendental with the Empirical use of
the Understanding 190
Remark on the Amphiboly of the Conceptions of Reflection 194
of
the
Permanence
166
? ? ? COITTENTS.
TRANSCENDENTAL LOGIC-- SECOND DIVISION. Transcendent ax Dialectic. -- Introduction.
I. --Of Transcendental Illusory Appearance
If. -- Of Pure Reaaon as the Seat of Transcendental
pearance
A. Op Reason in General
B. Of the Logical Usb of Reason C. Of the Poeb Ube of Reason
209
212 214 21 S
219 221 225 23?
237 237
245
251 General Remark on the Transition from Rational Psy
TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC-- BOOK I.
Illuiory
Ap
? Or the Conceptions of Pure Reason Sect. J. --Of Ideas in General
Sect. II. -- Of Transcendental Ideas Sbct. III. -- System of Transcendental
Book II. -- Or the Dia'. ecticai, Reason
Idens Procedure
op
Pcee
CHAP I. -- Of the Pabalooisms op Pure Reason
Refutation of the Argument of Mendelssohn for the Sub
stantiality or Permanence of the Soul
Conclusion of the Solution of the Psychological Paralo
gism
chology to Cosmology
CITAP. II. -- Thb Antinomy of Pure Reason
Sect. I. -- System of Cosmological Ideas Sror. II. --Antithetic of Pure Reason
253
255
256
263
266
271
278
284
290
298 303
307 310
318 321
First Antinomy Second Antinomy
Third Antinomy! Fourth Antinomy
8ect. III. -- Of the Interest of dictions
Reason in
these
Sel'-Contra-
Sect. TV. -- Of the Necessity Imposed upon Pure Reason of presenting a Solution of its Transcendental
Problems
Sect. V. -- Sceptical Exposition of the Cosmological Problems -- presented in the four Transcendental Ideas . . . 8ect. VI. Transcendental Idealism as the Key to the Solution
-- of Pure Cosmological Dialectic
Sect VTT. Critical Solution of the Cosmoloficai Problems . . 8bct. VIII. -- Regulative Principle of Pure Reason in relation
to the Cosmolosical Ideas
8bot. IX. -- Of the Empirical Use of the R-;rulative Principle
of Reason, with regard to the Cosmoloeicol Ideas
? ? ? CONTENTS. 13
L-- Solution of the Cosmological Idea of the Totality of the Composition of Phenomena in the Universe 322
II. -- Solution of the Cosmological Idea of the Totality of the Division of a 'Whole given in Intuition
Causes 33(
Possibility of Freedom in Harmony with the Uni versal Law of Natural Necessity 333
Exposition of the Cosmological Idea of Freedom in Harmony with the universal Law of Natural
-- Necessity 335 IV. Solution of the Cosmological Idea of the Totality
Concluding Remark on the Solution of the Transcen dental Mathematical Ideas -- and Introductory to the Solution of the Dynamical Ideas
325
328
III. -- Solution of the Cosmological Idea of the Totality of the Deduction of Cosmical Events from their
? of the Dependence of Phenomenal Existences . . . . 346
Concluding Reason
Sect. IV. Of the Impossibility of an Ontological Proof of the
-- Existence of God 364
CHAP, ITL-- The Ideal
Sect. I. -- Of the Ideal in General
Sect. II. -- Of the Transcendental Ideal Sect. III. -- Of the Arguments Employed
349
350 352
Remarks
on the
Antinomy
of
Pure
op Pure
Reason.
Reason
-- in Proof of the Existence of a Supreme Being 359
Set. V. Of the Impossibility of a Cosmological Proof of the Existence of God
Di tection and Explanation of the Dialectical Elu sion in all Transcendental Arguments for the
370
-- Existence of a Necessary Being 377 Sect. VI. Of the Impossibility of a Physico-Theological
Proof
8ect. VII. -- Critique :f all Theology
based upon
Speculative
381
387
of Reason
Of the Regulative Employment of the Ideas of Pure
Principles
Reason 894 Of the Ultimate End of the Natural Dialectic of
Human Reason 41C
Til VNSCENDENTAL DOCTRINE OF METHOD
431
CIl AP. I. --The Discipline op Pcbe Reason 432 Skct. I. -- The Discipline of Pure Reason in the Sphere of Dog
matism 439 Sect. II.
--The Discipline of Pure Reason in Polemics 449 Sect. III. -- The Discipline of Pure Reason iu Hypothesis 467
8ect. IV. -- The Discipline of Pure Reason in Relation to Proofs
47 S
by
Speculative
? ? ? CONTENT*.
CHAP. n. --The Canon of Pure Reason 482 Sect. I. --Of the Ultimate End of the Pure Use of Reason 483 Sect. II. --Of the Ideal of the Summum Bonum as a Deter
mining Ground of the ultimate End of Pure
-- Reason 487 Sect. III. Of Opinion, Knowledge, and Belief. 498
CHAP. III. --The Architectonic of Pure Reason 503 CHAP. IV. --Tub History of Pure Reason 616
? ? ? ? TRANSLATOR'S PREFACE.
The following translation has been undertaken with the hope of rendering Kant's Kritik der reinen Vermmft intelligible to the English student.
The difficulties which meet the reader and the translator of this celebrated work arise from various causes. Kant was a man of clear, vigorous, and trenchant thought, and, after nearly twelve years' meditation, could not be in doubt as to his own system. But the Horatian rule of
Verba pravisam rem non invita sequentur,
will not apply to him. He had never studied the art of ex pression. He wearies by frequent repetitions, and employs a great number of words to express, in the clumsiest way, what could have been enounced more clearly and distinctly in a few. The main statement in his sentences is often over laid with a multitude of qualifying and explanatory clauses ; and the reader is lost in a maze, from which he has great difficulty in extricating himself. There are some passages which have no main verb ; others, in which the author loses sight of the subject with which he set out, and concludes with a predicate regarding something else mentioned in the course
of his argument. All this can be easily accounted for. Kant, as he mentions in a letter to Lambert, took nearly twelve
? ? ? ? tkanslatob' a freface.
years to excogitate his work, and only five months to write it He was a German professor, a student of solitary habits, and had never, except on one occasion, been out of Kcmigs- berg. He had, besides, to propound a new system of philoso phy, and to enounce ideas th. -. t were entirely to revolutionise European thought . On the other hand, there are many excellencies of style in this work. His expression is often as precise and forcible as his thought ; and, in some of his notes especially, he sums up, in two or three apt and powerful words, thoughts which, at other times, he employs pages to develope. His terminology, which has been so violently denounced, is really of great use in clearly deter mining his system, and in rendering its peculiarities more easy
of comprehension.
A previous translation of the Kritik exists, which, had it
been satisfactory, would have dispensed with the present. But the translator had, evidently, no very extensive acquaint ance with the German language, and still less with his subject. A translator ought to be an interpreting intellect between the author and the reader ; but, in the present case, the only interpreting medium has been the dictionary.
? Indeed, Kant's fate in this country has been a very hard one. Misunderstood by the ablest philosophers of the time, illustrated, explained, or translated by the most incompetent, -- it has been his lot to be either
hended, or entirely neglected. Duguld Stewart did not understand his system of philosophy -- as he had no proper opportunity of making himself acquainted with it ; Kitsch* and Willichf undertook to introduce him to the English philosophical public; Richardson and Haywood " traduced"
? A General and Introductory View of Professor Kant's Principles. By F. A. Nitsch. London, 1706.
Willich's Elements af Kant's Philosophy, Svo. 1708.
unappreciated, misappre
? ? ? TBANSLATOTl'B PREPACK.
xiU
him. More recently, an Analysis of the Kritik, by Mr. Haywood, has been published, which consists almost entirely of a selection of sentences from his own translation : -- a mode of analysis which has not served to make the subject more intelligible. In short, it may be asserted that there
is not a single English work upon Kant, which deserves to be read, or which can be read with any profit, excepting Semple's translation of the " Metaphysic of Ethics. " All are written by men who either took no pains to understand Kant, or were incapahle of understanding him. *
The following translation was begun on the basis of a MS.
translation, by a scholar of some repute, placed in my hands by
Mr. Bohn, with a request that I should revise as he had
perceived to be incorrect. After having laboured through
about eighty pages, found, from the numerous errors and
inaccuracies pervading that hardly one-fifth of the original
? MS. remained. therefore,
laid entirely aside, and com menced df novo. These eighty pages did not cancel, be
cause the careful examination
made them, as believed, not an unworthy representation of the author.
It curiam to observe, in all the English works written spe cially upon Kant, that not one of his commentators ever ventures, for moment, to leave the words of Kant, and to explain the subject he may be considering, in his own words. Nitsch and Willich, who professed to write on Kant's philosophy, are merely translators "Haywood, even in his notes, merely repeats Kant; and the translator of Beck's Principle* of the Critical Philosophy," while pretending to give, in his " Translator** Preface," his own views of the Critical Philosophy, has fabricated bis Preface out of selections from the works of Kant. The snne
case with the translator of Kant's "Essays and Treatises,"
London, 1798. ) This person has written preface to each of the volumes, and both are almost literal translations from different parts of Kant's works. He had the impudence to present the thoughts contained in there at his own few being then able to detect the plagiarism.
which they had undergone,
the vols. 8vo.
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The second edition of the Kritik, from which all tha sub sequent ones have been reprinted without alteration, is followed in the present translation. Rosenkranz, a recent editor, main tains that the author's first edition is far superior to the second ; and Schopenhauer asserts that the alterations in the second were dictated by unworthy motives. He thinks the second a Verschlbrvnbesserung of the first; and that the changes made by Kant, " in the weakness of old age," have rendered it a " self-contradictory and mutilated work. " I am not insensible to the able arguments brought forward by Scho penhauer ; while the authority of the elder Jacobi, Michelet, and others, adds weight to his opinion. But it may be doubted whether the motives imputed to Kant could have influenced him in the omission of certain passages in the second edition,--
whether fear could have induced a man of his character to retract the statements he had advanced. The opinions he expresses in many parts of the second edition, in pages 455-- 460, for example,* are not those of a philosopher who would surrender what he believed to be truth, at the"outcry of preju diced opponents. Nor are his attacks on the sacred doctrines of the old dogmatic philosophy," as Schopenhauer maintains, less bold or vigorous in the second than in the first edition. And, finally, Kant's own testimony must be held to be of greater weight than that of any number of other philosophers, however learned and profound.
No edition of the Kritik is very correct. Even those of Rosenkranz and Schubert, and Modes and Baumann, contain errors which reflect somewhat upon the care of the editors. But the common editions, as well those printed during, as after Kant's life-time, are exceedingly bad. One of these, the " third edition improved, Frankfort and Leipzig, 1791," swarms with errors, at once misleading and annoying. -- Rosenkranz hu
* Of the preient translation.
? ? ? ? preface.
suae a number of very happy conjectural emendations, the accuracy of which cannot be doubted.
It may be necessary to mention that it has been found
requisite to coin one or two new philosophical terms, to repre sent those employed by Kant. It was, of course, almost im possible to translate the Eritik with the aid of the philoso phical vocabulary at present used in England. But these new expressions have been formed according to Horace's maxim -- parch detorta. Such is the verb intuite for anschauen ; the manifold in intuition has also been employed for dot Mannig- faltige der Amchauung, by which Kant designates the varied contents of a perception or intuition. Kant's own terminology has the merit of being precise and consistent.
Whatever may be the opinion of the reader with regard to the possibility of metaphysics --whatever his estimate of the utility of such discussions, --the value of Kant's work, as an instrument of mental discipline, cannot easily be overrated. If the present translation contribute in the least to the ad vancement of scientific cultivation, if it aid in the formation of habits of severer and more profound thought, the translator will consider himself well compensated for his arduous and long-protracted labour.
J. M. D. M.
translator's
? ? ? ? PREFACE TO THE FIRST ED1TI0N. -O781. )
Human reason, in one sphere of its cognition, is called upon to consider questions, which it cannot decline, as they are presented by its own nature, but which it cannot answer, aa they transcend every faculty of the mind.
It falls into this difficulty without any fault of its own. It begins with principles, which cannot be dispensed with in the field of experience, and the truth and sufficiency of which are, at the same time, insured by experience. With these principles it rises, in obedience to the laws of its own nature, to ever higher and more remote conditions. But it quickly discovers that, in this way, its labours must remain ever incomplete, because new questions never cease to present themselves ; and thus it finds itself compelled to have recourse to principles which transcend the region of experience, while they are regarded by common sense without distrust. It thus falls into confusion and contradictions, from which it conjectures the presence of latent errors, which, however, it is unable to dis cover, because the principles it employs, transcending the limits of experience, cannot be tested by that criterion. The arena of these endless contests is called Metaphyric.
Time was, when she was the queen of all the sciences ; and, if we take the will for the deed, she certainly deserves, so far as regards the high importance of her object-matter, this title of honour. Now. it is the fashion of the time to heap con tempt and scorn upon her ; and the matron mourns, forlorn and forsaken, like Hecuba,
" Modo maxima rerura, Tot generis, natisque poteni . . .
Nunc trahor exul, inopa. "*
At first, her government, under the administration of the
? Ovid, Metamorphoses.
? ? ? ? rviii
PREFAOK TO TM FtRST EDITION.
dogmatists, was an absolute despotism. But, as the legislative continued to show traces of the ancient barbaric rule, her empire gradually broke up, and intestine nn introduced the reign of anarchy ; while the sceptics, like nomadic tribes, who hate a permanent habitation and settled mode of living, attacked from time to time those who had organised them selves into civil communities. But their number was, very happily, small ; atid thus they could not entirely put a slop to the exertions of those who persisted in raising new edifices, although on no settled or uniform plan. In recent times the hope dawned upon us of seeing those disputes settled, and the legitimacy of her claims established by a kind of physiology of the human understanding--that of the celebrated Locke. But it was found that, --although it was affirmed that this so-called queen could not refer her descent to any higher source than that of common experience, a circumstance which necessarily brought suspicion on her claims, --as this genealogy was incorrect, she persisted in the advancement of her claims to sovereignty. Thus metaphysics necessarily fell back into t he antiquated and rotten constitution of dogmatism, and again became obnoxious to the contempt from which efforts had been made to save it. At present, as all methods, according to the general persuasion, have been tried in vain, there reigns
of chaos and night in the scientific world, but at the same time the source of, or at least the prelude to, the re-creation and reinstallation of a science, when it has fallen into confusion, obscurity, and disuse from ill- directed effort.
For it is in reality vain to profess indifference in regard to such inquiries, the object of which cannot be indifferent to humanity.
Besides, these pretended indifferentists, however much they may try to disguise themselves by the assumption of a popular style and by changes on the language of the schools, un avoidably fall into metaphysical declarations and propositions, which they profess to regard with so much contempt. At the same time, this indifference, which has arisen in the world of science, and which relates to that kind of knowledge which we should wish to see destroyed the last, is a phenomenon that well deserves our attention and reflection. It is plainly not the effect of the levity, but of the matured judgment* of the
? We very often hear complaints of the shallowneu of the present age.
? ? ? ? PREFACE TO THE FIRST EDITIOJT. xii
age, which refuses to be any longer entertained with illusory ' knowledge. It in fact, call to reason, again tc undertake the most laborious of all tasks --that of self-examination, and to establish tribunal, which may secure in its well-grounde claims, while pronounces against all baseless assumption* and pretensions, not in an arbitrary manner, but according to its own eternal and unchangeable laws. This tribunal nothing less than the Critical Jnreetiyation of Pure Reason.
do not mean this criticism of books and systems, but critical inquiry into the faculty of reason, with reference to
the cognitions to which strives to attain without the aid experience in other words, the solution of the question re garding the possibility or impossibility of Metaphysics, and the determination of the origin, as well as of the extent and limits of this science. All this must be done on the basis of principles. -- --
This path the only one now remaining has been entered upon me and flatter myself that have, in this way, dis covered the cause of -- and consequently the mode of removing --all the errors which have hitherto set reason at variance with itself, in the sphere of non-empirical thought. have not returned an evasive answer to the questions of reason, alleging the inability and limitation of the faculties of the mind have, on the contrary, examined them completely
the light of principles, and, after having discovered the cause of the doubts and contradictions into which reason fell, have solved them to its perfect satisfaction. true, these ques tions have not been solved as dogmatism, in its vain fancies
and of the decay of profound science. Bat do not think that those which rest upon secure foundation, such as Mathematics, Physical Science, 4c. , in the least deserve this reproach, but that they rather maintain their ancient fame, and in the latter case, indeed, far surpass it. The same would he the case with the other kinds of cognition, their principles were but firmly established. In the absence of this security, indifference, doubt, and finally, severe criticism are rather signs of pro found habit of thought. Our age the age of criticism, to which every thing must he subjected. The sacrednesa of religion, and the authority of legislation, are many regarded as grounds of exemption froni the examination of this tribunal. But, they are exempted, they become the subjects of just suspicion, and cannot lay claim to sincere respect, which reason accords only to that which has stood the . <<t of free and public examination.
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? sx PKEFACB TO THE FIBST EDITIOK.
and desires, Lad expected ; for it can only be satisfied by the exercise of magical arts, and of these I have no knowledge. But neither do these come within the compass of our mental powers ; and it was the d<<ty of philosophy to destroy the illusions which had their origin in misconceptions, whatever darling hopes and valued expectations may be ruined by its explanations. My chief aim in this work has been thorough ness ; and I make bold to say, that there is not a single meta physical problem that does not find its solution, or at least the key to its solution, here. Pure reason is a perfect unity ; and therefore, if the principle presented by it prove to be in sufficient for the solution of even a single one of those
? to which the very nature of reason gives birth, we must reject as we could not be perfectly certain of its suffi ciency in the case of the others.
While say this, think see upon the countenance of the reader signs of dissatisfaction mingled with contempt, when he hears declarations which sound so boastful and extravagant and yet they are beyond comparison more moderate than those advanced the commonest author of the commonest philo sophical programme, in which the dogmatist professes to de monstrate the simple nature of the soul, or the necessity of primal being. Such dogmatist promises to extend human knowledge beyond the limits of possible experience while
humbly confess that this completely beyond my power. Instead of any such attempt, confine myself to the exami
nation of reason alone and its pure thought and do not need to seek far for the sum-total of its cognition, because has its seat my own mind. Besides, common logic presents me with complete and systematic catalogue of all the simple operations of reason and my task to answer the question how far reason can go, without the material presented and the aid furnished by experience.
-'""So much for the completeness and thoroughness necessary the execution of the present task. The aims set before ua
are not arbitrarily proposed, but are imposed upon us by the nature of cognition itself.
The above remarks relate to the mattur of our critical in-
questions
As regards the form, there are two indispensable con- itioni, which any one who undertakes sc difficult task as
airy.
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that of a critique of pure reason, is bound to fulfil. These conditions are certitude and clearness.
