Therefore {synesis} (judging well
according to common law) is not a virtue.
according to common law) is not a virtue.
Summa Theologica
Therefore caution should not be accounted a part of
prudence, distinct from foresight.
Objection 3: Further, no prudent man strives for the impossible. But no
man can take precautions against all possible evils. Therefore caution
does not belong to prudence.
On the contrary, The Apostle says (Eph. 5:15): "See how you walk
cautiously [Douay: 'circumspectly']. "
I answer that, The things with which prudence is concerned, are
contingent matters of action, wherein, even as false is found with
true, so is evil mingled with good, on account of the great variety of
these matters of action, wherein good is often hindered by evil, and
evil has the appearance of good. Wherefore prudence needs caution, so
that we may have such a grasp of good as to avoid evil.
Reply to Objection 1: Caution is required in moral acts, that we may be
on our guard, not against acts of virtue, but against the hindrance of
acts of virtue.
Reply to Objection 2: It is the same in idea, to ensue good and to
avoid the opposite evil, but the avoidance of outward hindrances is
different in idea. Hence caution differs from foresight, although they
both belong to the one virtue of prudence.
Reply to Objection 3: Of the evils which man has to avoid, some are of
frequent occurrence; the like can be grasped by reason, and against
them caution is directed, either that they may be avoided altogether,
or that they may do less harm. Others there are that occur rarely and
by chance, and these, since they are infinite in number, cannot be
grasped by reason, nor is man able to take precautions against them,
although by exercising prudence he is able to prepare against all the
surprises of chance, so as to suffer less harm thereby.
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OF THE SUBJECTIVE PARTS OF PRUDENCE (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must, in due sequence, consider the subjective parts of prudence.
And since we have already spoken of the prudence with which a man rules
himself (Q[47], seqq. ), it remains for us to discuss the species of
prudence whereby a multitude is governed. Under this head there are
four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether a species of prudence is regnative?
(2) Whether political and (3) domestic economy are species of prudence?
(4) Whether military prudence is?
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Whether a species of prudence is regnative?
Objection 1: It would seem that regnative should not be reckoned a
species of prudence. For regnative prudence is directed to the
preservation of justice, since according to Ethic. v, 6 the prince is
the guardian of justice. Therefore regnative prudence belongs to
justice rather than to prudence.
Objection 2: Further, according to the Philosopher (Polit. iii, 5) a
kingdom [regnum] is one of six species of government. But no species of
prudence is ascribed to the other five forms of government, which are
"aristocracy," "polity," also called "timocracy" [*Cf. Ethic. viii,
10], "tyranny," "oligarchy" and "democracy. " Therefore neither should a
regnative species be ascribed to a kingdom.
Objection 3: Further, lawgiving belongs not only to kings, but also to
certain others placed in authority, and even to the people, according
to Isidore (Etym. v). Now the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 8) reckons a part
of prudence to be "legislative. " Therefore it is not becoming to
substitute regnative prudence in its place.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Polit. iii, 11) that "prudence
is a virtue which is proper to the prince. " Therefore a special kind of
prudence is regnative.
I answer that, As stated above ([2788]Q[47], AA[8],10), it belongs to
prudence to govern and command, so that wherever in human acts we find
a special kind of governance and command, there must be a special kind
of prudence. Now it is evident that there is a special and perfect kind
of governance in one who has to govern not only himself but also the
perfect community of a city or kingdom; because a government is the
more perfect according as it is more universal, extends to more
matters, and attains a higher end. Hence prudence in its special and
most perfect sense, belongs to a king who is charged with the
government of a city or kingdom: for which reason a species of prudence
is reckoned to be regnative.
Reply to Objection 1: All matters connected with moral virtue belong to
prudence as their guide, wherefore "right reason in accord with
prudence" is included in the definition of moral virtue, as stated
above (Q[47], A[5], ad 1; [2789]FS, Q[58], A[2], ad 4). For this reason
also the execution of justice in so far as it is directed to the common
good, which is part of the kingly office, needs the guidance of
prudence. Hence these two virtues---prudence and justice---belong most
properly to a king, according to Jer. 23:5: "A king shall reign and
shall be wise, and shall execute justice and judgment in the earth. "
Since, however, direction belongs rather to the king, and execution to
his subjects, regnative prudence is reckoned a species of prudence
which is directive, rather than to justice which is executive.
Reply to Objection 2: A kingdom is the best of all governments, as
stated in Ethic. viii, 10: wherefore the species of prudence should be
denominated rather from a kingdom, yet so as to comprehend under
regnative all other rightful forms of government, but not perverse
forms which are opposed to virtue, and which, accordingly, do not
pertain to prudence.
Reply to Objection 3: The Philosopher names regnative prudence after
the principal act of a king which is to make laws, and although this
applies to the other forms of government, this is only in so far as
they have a share of kingly government.
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Whether political prudence is fittingly accounted a part of prudence?
Objection 1: It would seem that political prudence is not fittingly
accounted a part of prudence. For regnative is a part of political
prudence, as stated above [2790](A[1]). But a part should not be
reckoned a species with the whole. Therefore political prudence should
not be reckoned a part of prudence.
Objection 2: Further, the species of habits are distinguished by their
various objects. Now what the ruler has to command is the same as what
the subject has to execute. Therefore political prudence as regards the
subjects, should not be reckoned a species of prudence distinct from
regnative prudence.
Objection 3: Further, each subject is an individual person. Now each
individual person can direct himself sufficiently by prudence commonly
so called. Therefore there is no need of a special kind of prudence
called political.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 8) that "of the
prudence which is concerned with the state one kind is a
master-prudence and is called legislative; another kind bears the
common name political, and deals with individuals. "
I answer that, A slave is moved by his master, and a subject by his
ruler, by command, but otherwise than as irrational and inanimate
beings are set in motion by their movers. For irrational and inanimate
beings are moved only by others and do not put themselves in motion,
since they have no free-will whereby to be masters of their own
actions, wherefore the rectitude of their government is not in their
power but in the power of their movers. On the other hand, men who are
slaves or subjects in any sense, are moved by the commands of others in
such a way that they move themselves by their free-will; wherefore some
kind of rectitude of government is required in them, so that they may
direct themselves in obeying their superiors; and to this belongs that
species of prudence which is called political.
Reply to Objection 1: As stated above, regnative is the most perfect
species of prudence, wherefore the prudence of subjects, which falls
short of regnative prudence, retains the common name of political
prudence, even as in logic a convertible term which does not denote the
essence of a thing retains the name of "proper. "
Reply to Objection 2: A different aspect of the object diversifies the
species of a habit, as stated above ([2791]Q[47], A[5]). Now the same
actions are considered by the king, but under a more general aspect, as
by his subjects who obey: since many obey one king in various
departments. Hence regnative prudence is compared to this political
prudence of which we are speaking, as mastercraft to handicraft.
Reply to Objection 3: Man directs himself by prudence commonly so
called, in relation to his own good, but by political prudence, of
which we speak, he directs himself in relation to the common good.
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Whether a part of prudence should be reckoned to be domestic?
Objection 1: It would seem that domestic should not be reckoned a part
of prudence. For, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 5) "prudence
is directed to a good life in general": whereas domestic prudence is
directed to a particular end, viz. wealth, according to Ethic. i, 1.
Therefore a species of prudence is not domestic.
Objection 2: Further, as stated above ([2792]Q[47], A[13]) prudence is
only in good people. But domestic prudence may be also in wicked
people, since many sinners are provident in governing their household.
Therefore domestic prudence should not be reckoned a species of
prudence.
Objection 3: Further, just as in a kingdom there is a ruler and
subject, so also is there in a household. If therefore domestic like
political is a species of prudence, there should be a paternal
corresponding to regnative prudence. Now there is no such prudence.
Therefore neither should domestic prudence be accounted a species of
prudence.
On the contrary, The Philosopher states (Ethic. vi, 8) that there are
various kinds of prudence in the government of a multitude, "one of
which is domestic, another legislative, and another political. "
I answer that, Different aspects of an object, in respect of
universality and particularity, or of totality and partiality,
diversify arts and virtues; and in respect of such diversity one act of
virtue is principal as compared with another. Now it is evident that a
household is a mean between the individual and the city or kingdom,
since just as the individual is part of the household, so is the
household part of the city or kingdom. And therefore, just as prudence
commonly so called which governs the individual, is distinct from
political prudence, so must domestic prudence be distinct from both.
Reply to Objection 1: Riches are compared to domestic prudence, not as
its last end, but as its instrument, as stated in Polit. i, 3. On the
other hand, the end of political prudence is "a good life in general"
as regards the conduct of the household. In Ethic. i, 1 the Philosopher
speaks of riches as the end of political prudence, by way of example
and in accordance with the opinion of many.
Reply to Objection 2: Some sinners may be provident in certain matters
of detail concerning the disposition of their household, but not in
regard to "a good life in general" as regards the conduct of the
household, for which above all a virtuous life is required.
Reply to Objection 3: The father has in his household an authority like
that of a king, as stated in Ethic. viii, 10, but he has not the full
power of a king, wherefore paternal government is not reckoned a
distinct species of prudence, like regnative prudence.
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Whether military prudence should be reckoned a part of prudence?
Objection 1: It would seem that military prudence should not be
reckoned a part of prudence. For prudence is distinct from art,
according to Ethic. vi, 3. Now military prudence seems to be the art of
warfare, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 8). Therefore
military prudence should not be accounted a species of prudence.
Objection 2: Further, just as military business is contained under
political affairs, so too are many other matters, such as those of
tradesmen, craftsmen, and so forth. But there are no species of
prudence corresponding to other affairs in the state. Neither therefore
should any be assigned to military business.
Objection 3: Further, the soldiers' bravery counts for a great deal in
warfare. Therefore military prudence pertains to fortitude rather than
to prudence.
On the contrary, It is written (Prov. 24:6): "War is managed by due
ordering, and there shall be safety where there are many counsels. " Now
it belongs to prudence to take counsel. Therefore there is great need
in warfare for that species of prudence which is called "military. "
I answer that, Whatever things are done according to art or reason,
should be made to conform to those which are in accordance with nature,
and are established by the Divine Reason. Now nature has a twofold
tendency: first, to govern each thing in itself, secondly, to withstand
outward assailants and corruptives: and for this reason she has
provided animals not only with the concupiscible faculty, whereby they
are moved to that which is conducive to their well-being, but also with
the irascible power, whereby the animal withstands an assailant.
Therefore in those things also which are in accordance with reason,
there should be not only "political" prudence, which disposes in a
suitable manner such things as belong to the common good, but also a
"military" prudence, whereby hostile attacks are repelled.
Reply to Objection 1: Military prudence may be an art, in so far as it
has certain rules for the right use of certain external things, such as
arms and horses, but in so far as it is directed to the common good, it
belongs rather to prudence.
Reply to Objection 2: Other matters in the state are directed to the
profit of individuals, whereas the business of soldiering is directed
to the service belongs to fortitude, but the direction, protection of
the entire common good.
Reply to Objection 3: The execution of military service belongs to
fortitude, but the direction, especially in so far as it concerns the
commander-in-chief, belongs to prudence.
__________________________________________________________________
OF THE VIRTUES WHICH ARE CONNECTED WITH PRUDENCE (FOUR ARTICLES)
In due sequence, we must consider the virtues that are connected with
prudence, and which are its quasi-potential parts. Under this head
there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether {euboulia}, is a virtue?
(2) Whether it is a special virtue, distinct from prudence?
(3) Whether {synesis} is a special virtue?
(4) Whether {gnome} is a special virtue?
[*These three Greek words may be rendered as the faculties of
deliberating well {euboulia}, of judging well according to common law
{synesis}, and of judging well according to general law {gnome},
respectively. ]
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Whether {euboulia} (deliberating well) is a virtue?
Objection 1: It would seem that {euboulia} (deliberating well) is not a
virtue. For, according to Augustine (De Lib. Arb. ii, 18,19) "no man
makes evil use of virtue. " Now some make evil use of {euboulia}
(deliberating well) or good counsel, either through devising crafty
counsels in order to achieve evil ends, or through committing sin in
order that they may achieve good ends, as those who rob that they may
give alms. Therefore {euboulia} (deliberating well) is not a virtue.
Objection 2: Further, virtue is a perfection, according to Phys. vii.
But {euboulia} (deliberating well) is concerned with counsel, which
implies doubt and research, and these are marks of imperfection.
Therefore {euboulia} (deliberating well) is not a virtue.
Objection 3: Further, virtues are connected with one another, as stated
above ([2793]FS, Q[65]). Now {euboulia} (deliberating well) is not
connected with the other virtues, since many sinners take good-counsel,
and many godly men are slow in taking counsel. Therefore {euboulia}
(deliberating well) is not a virtue.
On the contrary, According to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 9) {euboulia}
(deliberating well) "is a right counselling. " Now the perfection of
virtue consists in right reason. Therefore {euboulia} (deliberating
well) is a virtue.
I answer that, As stated above ([2794]Q[47], A[4]) the nature of a
human virtue consists in making a human act good. Now among the acts of
man, it is proper to him to take counsel, since this denotes a research
of the reason about the actions he has to perform and whereof human
life consists, for the speculative life is above man, as stated in
Ethic. x. But {euboulia} (deliberating well) signifies goodness of
counsel, for it is derived from the {eu}, good, and {boule}, counsel,
being "a good counsel" or rather "a disposition to take good counsel. "
Hence it is evident that {euboulia} (deliberating well) is a human
virtue.
Reply to Objection 1: There is no good counsel either in deliberating
for an evil end, or in discovering evil means for attaining a good end,
even as in speculative matters, there is no good reasoning either in
coming to a false conclusion, or in coming to a true conclusion from
false premisses through employing an unsuitable middle term. Hence both
the aforesaid processes are contrary to {euboulia} (deliberating well),
as the Philosopher declares (Ethic. vi, 9).
Reply to Objection 2: Although virtue is essentially a perfection, it
does not follow that whatever is the matter of a virtue implies
perfection. For man needs to be perfected by virtues in all his parts,
and this not only as regards the acts of reason, of which counsel is
one, but also as regards the passions of the sensitive appetite, which
are still more imperfect.
It may also be replied that human virtue is a perfection according to
the mode of man, who is unable by simple insight to comprehend with
certainty the truth of things, especially in matters of action which
are contingent.
Reply to Objection 3: In no sinner as such is {euboulia} (deliberating
well) to be found: since all sin is contrary to taking good counsel.
For good counsel requires not only the discovery or devising of fit
means for the end, but also other circumstances. Such are suitable
time, so that one be neither too slow nor too quick in taking counsel,
and the mode of taking counsel, so that one be firm in the counsel
taken, and other like due circumstances, which sinners fail to observe
when they sin. On the other hand, every virtuous man takes good counsel
in those things which are directed to the end of virtue, although
perhaps he does not take good counsel in other particular matters, for
instance in matters of trade, or warfare, or the like.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether {euboulia} (deliberating well) is a special virtue, distinct from
prudence?
Objection 1: It would seem that {euboulia} (deliberating well) is not a
distinct virtue from prudence. For, according to the Philosopher
(Ethic. vi, 5), the "prudent man is, seemingly, one who takes good
counsel. " Now this belongs to {euboulia} (deliberating well) as stated
above. Therefore {euboulia} (deliberating well) is not distinct from
prudence.
Objection 2: Further, human acts to which human virtues are directed,
are specified chiefly by their end, as stated above ([2795]FS, Q[1],
A[3]; [2796]FS, Q[18], AA[4],6). Now {euboulia} (deliberating well) and
prudence are directed to the same end, as stated in Ethic. vi, 9, not
indeed to some particular end, but to the common end of all life.
Therefore {euboulia} (deliberating well) is not a distinct virtue from
prudence.
Objection 3: Further, in speculative sciences, research and decision
belong to the same science. Therefore in like manner these belong to
the same virtue in practical matters. Now research belongs to
{euboulia} (deliberating well), while decision belongs to prudence.
There {euboulia} (deliberating well) is not a distinct virtue from
prudence.
On the contrary, Prudence is preceptive, according to Ethic. vi, 10.
But this does not apply to {euboulia} (deliberating well). Therefore
{euboulia} (deliberating well) is a distinct virtue from prudence.
I answer that, As stated above [2797](A[1]), virtue is properly
directed to an act which it renders good; and consequently virtues must
differ according to different acts, especially when there is a
different kind of goodness in the acts. For, if various acts contained
the same kind of goodness, they would belong to the same virtue: thus
the goodness of love, desire and joy depends on the same, wherefore all
these belong to the same virtue of charity.
Now acts of the reason that are ordained to action are diverse, nor
have they the same kind of goodness: since it is owing to different
causes that a man acquires good counsel, good judgment, or good
command, inasmuch as these are sometimes separated from one another.
Consequently {euboulia} (deliberating well) which makes man take good
counsel must needs be a distinct virtue from prudence, which makes man
command well. And since counsel is directed to command as to that which
is principal, so {euboulia} (deliberating well) is directed to prudence
as to a principal virtue, without which it would be no virtue at all,
even as neither are the moral virtues without prudence, nor the other
virtues without charity.
Reply to Objection 1: It belongs to prudence to take good counsel by
commanding it, to {euboulia} (deliberating well) by eliciting it.
Reply to Objection 2: Different acts are directed in different degrees
to the one end which is "a good life in general" [*Ethic. vi, 5]: for
counsel comes first, judgment follows, and command comes last. The last
named has an immediate relation to the last end: whereas the other two
acts are related thereto remotely. Nevertheless these have certain
proximate ends of their own, the end of counsel being the discovery of
what has to be done, and the end of judgment, certainty. Hence this
proves not that {euboulia} (deliberating well) is not a distinct virtue
from prudence, but that it is subordinate thereto, as a secondary to a
principal virtue.
Reply to Objection 3: Even in speculative matters the rational science
of dialectics, which is directed to research and discovery, is distinct
from demonstrative science, which decides the truth.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether {synesis} (judging well according to common law) is a virtue?
Objection 1: It would seem that {synesis} is not a virtue. Virtues are
not in us by nature, according to Ethic. ii, 1. But {synesis} (judging
well according to common law) is natural to some, as the Philosopher
states (Ethic. vi, 11). Therefore {synesis} (judging well according to
common law) is not a virtue.
Objection 2: Further, as stated in the same book (10), {synesis}
(judging well according to common law) is nothing but "a faculty of
judging. " But judgment without command can be even in the wicked. Since
then virtue is only in the good, it seems that {synesis} (judging well
according to common law) is not a virtue.
Objection 3: Further, there is never a defective command, unless there
be a defective judgment, at least in a particular matter of action; for
it is in this that every wicked man errs. If therefore {synesis}
(judging well according to common law) be reckoned a virtue directed to
good judgment, it seems that there is no need for any other virtue
directed to good command: and consequently prudence would be
superfluous, which is not reasonable.
Therefore {synesis} (judging well
according to common law) is not a virtue.
On the contrary, Judgment is more perfect than counsel. But {euboulia},
or good counsel, is a virtue. Much more, therefore, is {synesis}
(judging well according to common law) a virtue, as being good
judgment.
I answer that, {synesis} (judging well according to common law)
signifies a right judgment, not indeed about speculative matters, but
about particular practical matters, about which also is prudence. Hence
in Greek some, in respect of {synesis} (judging well according to
common law) are said to be {synetoi}, i. e. "persons of sense," or
{eusynetoi}, i. e. "men of good sense," just as on the other hand, those
who lack this virtue are called {asynetoi}, i. e. "senseless. "
Now, different acts which cannot be ascribed to the same cause, must
correspond to different virtues. And it is evident that goodness of
counsel and goodness of judgment are not reducible to the same cause,
for many can take good counsel, without having good sense so as to
judge well. Even so, in speculative matters some are good at research,
through their reason being quick at arguing from one thing to another
(which seems to be due to a disposition of their power of imagination,
which has a facility in forming phantasms), and yet such persons
sometimes lack good judgment (and this is due to a defect in the
intellect arising chiefly from a defective disposition of the common
sense which fails to judge aright). Hence there is need, besides
{euboulia} (deliberating well), for another virtue, which judges well,
and this is called {synesis} (judging well according to common law).
Reply to Objection 1: Right judgment consists in the cognitive power
apprehending a thing just as it is in reality, and this is due to the
right disposition of the apprehensive power. Thus if a mirror be well
disposed the forms of bodies are reflected in it just as they are,
whereas if it be ill disposed, the images therein appear distorted and
misshapen. Now that the cognitive power be well disposed to receive
things just as they are in reality, is radically due to nature, but, as
to its consummation, is due to practice or to a gift of grace, and this
in two ways. First directly, on the part of the cognitive power itself,
for instance, because it is imbued, not with distorted, but with true
and correct ideas: this belongs to {synesis} (judging well according to
common law) which in this respect is a special virtue. Secondly
indirectly, through the good disposition of the appetitive power, the
result being that one judges well of the objects of appetite: and thus
a good judgment of virtue results from the habits of moral virtue; but
this judgment is about the ends, whereas {synesis} (judging well
according to common law) is rather about the means.
Reply to Objection 2: In wicked men there may be right judgment of a
universal principle, but their judgment is always corrupt in the
particular matter of action, as stated above ([2798]Q[47], A[13]).
Reply to Objection 3: Sometimes after judging aright we delay to
execute or execute negligently or inordinately. Hence after the virtue
which judges aright there is a further need of a final and principal
virtue, which commands aright, and this is prudence.
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Whether {gnome} (judging well according to general law) is a special virtue?
Objection 1: It would seem that {gnome} (judging well according to
general law) is not a special virtue distinct from {synesis} (judging
well according to common law). For a man is said, in respect of
{synesis} (judging well according to common law), to have good
judgment. Now no man can be said to have good judgment, unless he judge
aright in all things. Therefore {synesis} (judging well according to
common law) extends to all matters of judgment, and consequently there
is no other virtue of good judgment called {gnome} (judging well
according to general law).
Objection 2: Further, judgment is midway between counsel and precept.
Now there is only one virtue of good counsel, viz. {euboulia}
(deliberating well) and only one virtue of good command, viz. prudence.
Therefore there is only one virtue of good judgment, viz. {synesis}
(judging well according to common law).
Objection 3: Further, rare occurrences wherein there is need to depart
from the common law, seem for the most part to happen by chance, and
with such things reason is not concerned, as stated in Phys. ii, 5. Now
all the intellectual virtues depend on right reason. Therefore there is
no intellectual virtue about such matters.
On the contrary, The Philosopher concludes (Ethic. vi, 11) that {gnome}
(judging well according to general law) is a special virtue.
I answer that cognitive habits differ according to higher and lower
principles: thus in speculative matters wisdom considers higher
principles than science does, and consequently is distinguished from
it; and so must it be also in practical matters. Now it is evident that
what is beside the order of a lower principle or cause, is sometimes
reducible to the order of a higher principle; thus monstrous births of
animals are beside the order of the active seminal force, and yet they
come under the order of a higher principle, namely, of a heavenly body,
or higher still, of Divine Providence. Hence by considering the active
seminal force one could not pronounce a sure judgment on such
monstrosities, and yet this is possible if we consider Divine
Providence.
Now it happens sometimes that something has to be done which is not
covered by the common rules of actions, for instance in the case of the
enemy of one's country, when it would be wrong to give him back his
deposit, or in other similar cases. Hence it is necessary to judge of
such matters according to higher principles than the common laws,
according to which {synesis} (judging according to common law) judges:
and corresponding to such higher principles it is necessary to have a
higher virtue of judgment, which is called {gnome} (judging according
to general law), and which denotes a certain discrimination in
judgment.
Reply to Objection 1: {Synesis} (judging well according to common law)
judges rightly about all actions that are covered by the common rules:
but certain things have to be judged beside these common rules, as
stated above.
Reply to Objection 2: Judgment about a thing should be formed from the
proper principles thereof, whereas research is made by employing also
common principles. Wherefore also in speculative matters, dialectics
which aims at research proceeds from common principles; while
demonstration which tends to judgment, proceeds from proper principles.
Hence {euboulia} (deliberating well) to which the research of counsel
belongs is one for all, but not so {synesis} (judging well according to
common law) whose act is judicial. Command considers in all matters the
one aspect of good, wherefore prudence also is only one.
Reply to Objection 3: It belongs to Divine Providence alone to consider
all things that may happen beside the common course. On the other hand,
among men, he who is most discerning can judge a greater number of such
things by his reason: this belongs to {gnome} (judging well according
to general law), which denotes a certain discrimination in judgment.
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OF THE GIFT OF COUNSEL (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider the gift of counsel which corresponds to prudence.
Under this head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether counsel should be reckoned among the seven gifts of the
Holy Ghost?
(2) Whether the gift of counsel corresponds to prudence?
(3) Whether the gift of counsel remains in heaven?
(4) Whether the fifth beatitude, "Blessed are the merciful," etc.
corresponds to the gift of counsel?
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Whether counsel should be reckoned among the gifts of the Holy Ghost?
Objection 1: It would seem that counsel should not be reckoned among
the gifts of the Holy Ghost. The gifts of the Holy Ghost are given as a
help to the virtues, according to Gregory (Moral. ii, 49). Now for the
purpose of taking counsel, man is sufficiently perfected by the virtue
of prudence, or even of {euboulia} (deliberating well), as is evident
from what has been said ([2799]Q[47], A[1], ad 2;[2800] Q[51],
AA[1],2). Therefore counsel should not be reckoned among the gifts of
the Holy Ghost.
Objection 2: Further, the difference between the seven gifts of the
Holy Ghost and the gratuitous graces seems to be that the latter are
not given to all, but are divided among various people, whereas the
gifts of the Holy Ghost are given to all who have the Holy Ghost. But
counsel seems to be one of those things which are given by the Holy
Ghost specially to certain persons, according to 1 Macc. 2:65: "Behold
. . . your brother Simon is a man of counsel. " Therefore counsel should
be numbered among the gratuitous graces rather than among the seven
gifts of the Holy Ghost.
Objection 3: Further, it is written (Rom. 8:14): "Whosoever are led by
the Spirit of God, they are the sons of God. " But counselling is not
consistent with being led by another. Since then the gifts of the Holy
Ghost are most befitting the children of God, who "have received the
spirit of adoption of sons," it would seem that counsel should not be
numbered among the gifts of the Holy Ghost.
On the contrary, It is written (Is. 11:2): "(The Spirit of the Lord)
shall rest upon him . . . the spirit of counsel, and of fortitude. "
I answer that, As stated above ([2801]FS, Q[68], A[1]), the gifts of
the Holy Ghost are dispositions whereby the soul is rendered amenable
to the motion of the Holy Ghost. Now God moves everything according to
the mode of the thing moved: thus He moves the corporeal creature
through time and place, and the spiritual creature through time, but
not through place, as Augustine declares (Gen. ad lit. viii, 20,22).
Again, it is proper to the rational creature to be moved through the
research of reason to perform any particular action, and this research
is called counsel. Hence the Holy Ghost is said to move the rational
creature by way of counsel, wherefore counsel is reckoned among the
gifts of the Holy Ghost.
Reply to Objection 1: Prudence or {euboulia} (deliberating well),
whether acquired or infused, directs man in the research of counsel
according to principles that the reason can grasp; hence prudence or
{euboulia} (deliberating well) makes man take good counsel either for
himself or for another. Since, however, human reason is unable to grasp
the singular and contingent things which may occur, the result is that
"the thoughts of mortal men are fearful, and our counsels uncertain"
(Wis. 9:14). Hence in the research of counsel, man requires to be
directed by God who comprehends all things: and this is done through
the gift of counsel, whereby man is directed as though counseled by
God, just as, in human affairs, those who are unable to take counsel
for themselves, seek counsel from those who are wiser.
Reply to Objection 2: That a man be of such good counsel as to counsel
others, may be due to a gratuitous grace; but that a man be counselled
by God as to what he ought to do in matters necessary for salvation is
common to all holy persons.
Reply to Objection 3: The children of God are moved by the Holy Ghost
according to their mode, without prejudice to their free-will which is
the "faculty of will and reason" [*Sent. iii, D, 24]. Accordingly the
gift of counsel is befitting the children of God in so far as the
reason is instructed by the Holy Ghost about what we have to do.
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Whether the gift of counsel corresponds to the virtue of prudence?
Objection 1: It would seem that the gift of counsel does not fittingly
correspond to the virtue of prudence. For "the highest point of that
which is underneath touches that which is above," as Dionysius observes
(Div. Nom. vii), even as a man comes into contact with the angel in
respect of his intellect. Now cardinal virtues are inferior to the
gifts, as stated above ([2802]FS, Q[68], A[8]). Since, then, counsel is
the first and lowest act of prudence, while command is its highest act,
and judgment comes between, it seems that the gift corresponding to
prudence is not counsel, but rather a gift of judgment or command.
Objection 2: Further, one gift suffices to help one virtue, since the
higher a thing is the more one it is, as proved in De Causis. Now
prudence is helped by the gift of knowledge, which is not only
speculative but also practical, as shown above ([2803]Q[9], A[3]).
Therefore the gift of counsel does not correspond to the virtue of
prudence.
Objection 3: Further, it belongs properly to prudence to direct, as
stated above (Q[47], A[8]). But it belongs to the gift of counsel that
man should be directed by God, as stated above [2804](A[1]). Therefore
the gift of counsel does not correspond to the virtue of prudence.
On the contrary, The gift of counsel is about what has to be done for
the sake of the end. Now prudence is about the same matter. Therefore
they correspond to one another.
I answer that, A lower principle of movement is helped chiefly, and is
perfected through being moved by a higher principle of movement, as a
body through being moved by a spirit. Now it is evident that the
rectitude of human reason is compared to the Divine Reason, as a lower
motive principle to a higher: for the Eternal Reason is the supreme
rule of all human rectitude. Consequently prudence, which denotes
rectitude of reason, is chiefly perfected and helped through being
ruled and moved by the Holy Ghost, and this belongs to the gift of
counsel, as stated above [2805](A[1]). Therefore the gift of counsel
corresponds to prudence, as helping and perfecting it.
Reply to Objection 1: To judge and command belongs not to the thing
moved, but to the mover. Wherefore, since in the gifts of the Holy
Ghost, the position of the human mind is of one moved rather than of a
mover, as stated above [2806](A[1]; [2807]FS, Q[68], A[1]), it follows
that it would be unfitting to call the gift corresponding to prudence
by the name of command or judgment rather than of counsel whereby it is
possible to signify that the counselled mind is moved by another
counselling it.
Reply to Objection 2: The gift of knowledge does not directly
correspond to prudence, since it deals with speculative matters: yet by
a kind of extension it helps it. On the other hand the gift of counsel
corresponds to prudence directly, because it is concerned about the
same things.
Reply to Objection 3: The mover that is moved, moves through being
moved. Hence the human mind, from the very fact that it is directed by
the Holy Ghost, is enabled to direct itself and others.
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Whether the gift of counsel remains in heaven?
Objection 1: It would seem that the gift of counsel does not remain in
heaven. For counsel is about what has to be done for the sake of an
end. But in heaven nothing will have to be done for the sake of an end,
since there man possesses the last end. Therefore the gift of counsel
is not in heaven.
Objection 2: Further, counsel implies doubt, for it is absurd to take
counsel in matters that are evident, as the Philosopher observes
(Ethic. iii, 3). Now all doubt will cease in heaven. Therefore there is
no counsel in heaven.
Objection 3: Further, the saints in heaven are most conformed to God,
according to 1 Jn. 3:2, "When He shall appear, we shall be like to
Him. " But counsel is not becoming to God, according to Rom. 11:34, "Who
hath been His counsellor? " Therefore neither to the saints in heaven is
the gift of counsel becoming.
On the contrary, Gregory says (Moral. xvii, 12): "When either the guilt
or the righteousness of each nation is brought into the debate of the
heavenly Court, the guardian of that nation is said to have won in the
conflict, or not to have won. "
I answer that, As stated above [2808](A[2]; [2809]FS, Q[68], A[1]), the
gifts of the Holy Ghost are connected with the motion of the rational
creature by God. Now we must observe two points concerning the motion
of the human mind by God. First, that the disposition of that which is
moved, differs while it is being moved from its disposition when it is
in the term of movement. Indeed if the mover is the principle of the
movement alone, when the movement ceases, the action of the mover
ceases as regards the thing moved, since it has already reached the
term of movement, even as a house, after it is built, ceases being
built by the builder. On the other hand, when the mover is cause not
only of the movement, but also of the form to which the movement tends,
then the action of the mover does not cease even after the form has
been attained: thus the sun lightens the air even after it is
lightened. In this way, then, God causes in us virtue and knowledge,
not only when we first acquire them, but also as long as we persevere
in them: and it is thus that God causes in the blessed a knowledge of
what is to be done, not as though they were ignorant, but by continuing
that knowledge in them.
Nevertheless there are things which the blessed, whether angels or men,
do not know: such things are not essential to blessedness, but concern
the government of things according to Divine Providence. As regards
these, we must make a further observation, namely, that God moves the
mind of the blessed in one way, and the mind of the wayfarer, in
another. For God moves the mind of the wayfarer in matters of action,
by soothing the pre-existing anxiety of doubt; whereas there is simple
nescience in the mind of the blessed as regards the things they do not
know. From this nescience the angel's mind is cleansed, according to
Dionysius (Coel. Hier. vii), nor does there precede in them any
research of doubt, for they simply turn to God; and this is to take
counsel of God, for as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. v, 19) "the angels
take counsel of God about things beneath them": wherefore the
instruction which they receive from God in such matters is called
"counsel. "
Accordingly the gift of counsel is in the blessed, in so far as God
preserves in them the knowledge that they have, and enlightens them in
their nescience of what has to be done.
Reply to Objection 1: Even in the blessed there are acts directed to an
end, or resulting, as it were, from their attainment of the end, such
as the acts of praising God, or of helping on others to the end which
they themselves have attained, for example the ministrations of the
angels, and the prayers of the saints. In this respect the gift of
counsel finds a place in them.
Reply to Objection 2: Doubt belongs to counsel according to the present
state of life, but not to that counsel which takes place in heaven.
Even so neither have the theological virtues quite the same acts in
heaven as on the way thither.
Reply to Objection 3: Counsel is in God, not as receiving but as giving
it: and the saints in heaven are conformed to God, as receivers to the
source whence they receive.
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Whether the fifth beatitude, which is that of mercy, corresponds to the gift
of counsel?
Objection 1: It would seem that the fifth beatitude, which is that of
mercy, does not correspond to the gift of counsel. For all the
beatitudes are acts of virtue, as stated above ([2810]FS, Q[69], A[1]).
Now we are directed by counsel in all acts of virtue. Therefore the
fifth beatitude does not correspond more than any other to counsel.
Objection 2: Further, precepts are given about matters necessary for
salvation, while counsel is given about matters which are not necessary
for salvation. Now mercy is necessary for salvation, according to James
2:13, "Judgment without mercy to him that hath not done mercy. " On the
other hand poverty is not necessary for salvation, but belongs to the
life of perfection, according to Mat. 19:21. Therefore the beatitude of
poverty corresponds to the gift of counsel, rather than to the
beatitude of mercy.
Objection 3: Further, the fruits result from the beatitudes, for they
denote a certain spiritual delight resulting from perfect acts of
virtue. Now none of the fruits correspond to the gift of counsel, as
appears from Gal. 5:22, 23. Therefore neither does the beatitude of
mercy correspond to the gift of counsel.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. iv): "Counsel is
befitting the merciful, because the one remedy is to be delivered from
evils so great, to pardon, and to give. "
I answer that, Counsel is properly about things useful for an end.
Hence such things as are of most use for an end, should above all
correspond to the gift of counsel. Now such is mercy, according to 1
Tim. 4:8, "Godliness [*'Pietas,' which our English word 'pity,' which
is the same as mercy; see note on [2811]SS, Q[30], A[1]] is profitable
to all things. " Therefore the beatitude of mercy specially corresponds
to the gift of counsel, not as eliciting but as directing mercy.
Reply to Objection 1: Although counsel directs in all the acts of
virtue, it does so in a special way in works of mercy, for the reason
given above.
Reply to Objection 2: Counsel considered as a gift of the Holy Ghost
guides us in all matters that are directed to the end of eternal life
whether they be necessary for salvation or not, and yet not every work
of mercy is necessary for salvation.
Reply to Objection 3: Fruit denotes something ultimate. Now the
ultimate in practical matters consists not in knowledge but in an
action which is the end. Hence nothing pertaining to practical
knowledge is numbered among the fruits, but only such things as pertain
to action, in which practical knowledge is the guide. Among these we
find "goodness" and "benignity" which correspond to mercy.
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OF IMPRUDENCE (SIX ARTICLES)
We must now consider the vices opposed to prudence. For Augustine says
(Contra Julian. iv, 3): "There are vices opposed to every virtue, not
only vices that are in manifest opposition to virtue, as temerity is
opposed to prudence, but also vices which have a kind of kinship and
not a true but a spurious likeness to virtue; thus in opposition to
prudence we have craftiness. "
Accordingly we must consider first of all those vices which are in
evident opposition to prudence, those namely which are due to a defect
either of prudence or of those things which are requisite for prudence,
and secondly those vices which have a false resemblance to prudence,
those namely which are due to abuse of the things required for
prudence. And since solicitude pertains to prudence, the first of these
considerations will be twofold: (1) Of imprudence; (2) Of negligence
which is opposed to solicitude.
Under the first head there are six points of inquiry:
(1) Concerning imprudence, whether it is a sin?
(2) Whether it is a special sin?
(3) Of precipitation or temerity;
(4) Of thoughtlessness;
(5) Of inconstancy;
(6) Concerning the origin of these vices.
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Whether imprudence is a sin?
Objection 1: It would seem that imprudence is not a sin. For every sin
is voluntary, according to Augustine [*De Vera Relig. xiv]; whereas
imprudence is not voluntary, since no man wishes to be imprudent.
Therefore imprudence is not a sin.
Objection 2: Further, none but original sin comes to man with his
birth. But imprudence comes to man with his birth, wherefore the young
are imprudent; and yet it is not original sin which is opposed to
original justice. Therefore imprudence is not a sin.
prudence, distinct from foresight.
Objection 3: Further, no prudent man strives for the impossible. But no
man can take precautions against all possible evils. Therefore caution
does not belong to prudence.
On the contrary, The Apostle says (Eph. 5:15): "See how you walk
cautiously [Douay: 'circumspectly']. "
I answer that, The things with which prudence is concerned, are
contingent matters of action, wherein, even as false is found with
true, so is evil mingled with good, on account of the great variety of
these matters of action, wherein good is often hindered by evil, and
evil has the appearance of good. Wherefore prudence needs caution, so
that we may have such a grasp of good as to avoid evil.
Reply to Objection 1: Caution is required in moral acts, that we may be
on our guard, not against acts of virtue, but against the hindrance of
acts of virtue.
Reply to Objection 2: It is the same in idea, to ensue good and to
avoid the opposite evil, but the avoidance of outward hindrances is
different in idea. Hence caution differs from foresight, although they
both belong to the one virtue of prudence.
Reply to Objection 3: Of the evils which man has to avoid, some are of
frequent occurrence; the like can be grasped by reason, and against
them caution is directed, either that they may be avoided altogether,
or that they may do less harm. Others there are that occur rarely and
by chance, and these, since they are infinite in number, cannot be
grasped by reason, nor is man able to take precautions against them,
although by exercising prudence he is able to prepare against all the
surprises of chance, so as to suffer less harm thereby.
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OF THE SUBJECTIVE PARTS OF PRUDENCE (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must, in due sequence, consider the subjective parts of prudence.
And since we have already spoken of the prudence with which a man rules
himself (Q[47], seqq. ), it remains for us to discuss the species of
prudence whereby a multitude is governed. Under this head there are
four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether a species of prudence is regnative?
(2) Whether political and (3) domestic economy are species of prudence?
(4) Whether military prudence is?
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Whether a species of prudence is regnative?
Objection 1: It would seem that regnative should not be reckoned a
species of prudence. For regnative prudence is directed to the
preservation of justice, since according to Ethic. v, 6 the prince is
the guardian of justice. Therefore regnative prudence belongs to
justice rather than to prudence.
Objection 2: Further, according to the Philosopher (Polit. iii, 5) a
kingdom [regnum] is one of six species of government. But no species of
prudence is ascribed to the other five forms of government, which are
"aristocracy," "polity," also called "timocracy" [*Cf. Ethic. viii,
10], "tyranny," "oligarchy" and "democracy. " Therefore neither should a
regnative species be ascribed to a kingdom.
Objection 3: Further, lawgiving belongs not only to kings, but also to
certain others placed in authority, and even to the people, according
to Isidore (Etym. v). Now the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 8) reckons a part
of prudence to be "legislative. " Therefore it is not becoming to
substitute regnative prudence in its place.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Polit. iii, 11) that "prudence
is a virtue which is proper to the prince. " Therefore a special kind of
prudence is regnative.
I answer that, As stated above ([2788]Q[47], AA[8],10), it belongs to
prudence to govern and command, so that wherever in human acts we find
a special kind of governance and command, there must be a special kind
of prudence. Now it is evident that there is a special and perfect kind
of governance in one who has to govern not only himself but also the
perfect community of a city or kingdom; because a government is the
more perfect according as it is more universal, extends to more
matters, and attains a higher end. Hence prudence in its special and
most perfect sense, belongs to a king who is charged with the
government of a city or kingdom: for which reason a species of prudence
is reckoned to be regnative.
Reply to Objection 1: All matters connected with moral virtue belong to
prudence as their guide, wherefore "right reason in accord with
prudence" is included in the definition of moral virtue, as stated
above (Q[47], A[5], ad 1; [2789]FS, Q[58], A[2], ad 4). For this reason
also the execution of justice in so far as it is directed to the common
good, which is part of the kingly office, needs the guidance of
prudence. Hence these two virtues---prudence and justice---belong most
properly to a king, according to Jer. 23:5: "A king shall reign and
shall be wise, and shall execute justice and judgment in the earth. "
Since, however, direction belongs rather to the king, and execution to
his subjects, regnative prudence is reckoned a species of prudence
which is directive, rather than to justice which is executive.
Reply to Objection 2: A kingdom is the best of all governments, as
stated in Ethic. viii, 10: wherefore the species of prudence should be
denominated rather from a kingdom, yet so as to comprehend under
regnative all other rightful forms of government, but not perverse
forms which are opposed to virtue, and which, accordingly, do not
pertain to prudence.
Reply to Objection 3: The Philosopher names regnative prudence after
the principal act of a king which is to make laws, and although this
applies to the other forms of government, this is only in so far as
they have a share of kingly government.
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Whether political prudence is fittingly accounted a part of prudence?
Objection 1: It would seem that political prudence is not fittingly
accounted a part of prudence. For regnative is a part of political
prudence, as stated above [2790](A[1]). But a part should not be
reckoned a species with the whole. Therefore political prudence should
not be reckoned a part of prudence.
Objection 2: Further, the species of habits are distinguished by their
various objects. Now what the ruler has to command is the same as what
the subject has to execute. Therefore political prudence as regards the
subjects, should not be reckoned a species of prudence distinct from
regnative prudence.
Objection 3: Further, each subject is an individual person. Now each
individual person can direct himself sufficiently by prudence commonly
so called. Therefore there is no need of a special kind of prudence
called political.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 8) that "of the
prudence which is concerned with the state one kind is a
master-prudence and is called legislative; another kind bears the
common name political, and deals with individuals. "
I answer that, A slave is moved by his master, and a subject by his
ruler, by command, but otherwise than as irrational and inanimate
beings are set in motion by their movers. For irrational and inanimate
beings are moved only by others and do not put themselves in motion,
since they have no free-will whereby to be masters of their own
actions, wherefore the rectitude of their government is not in their
power but in the power of their movers. On the other hand, men who are
slaves or subjects in any sense, are moved by the commands of others in
such a way that they move themselves by their free-will; wherefore some
kind of rectitude of government is required in them, so that they may
direct themselves in obeying their superiors; and to this belongs that
species of prudence which is called political.
Reply to Objection 1: As stated above, regnative is the most perfect
species of prudence, wherefore the prudence of subjects, which falls
short of regnative prudence, retains the common name of political
prudence, even as in logic a convertible term which does not denote the
essence of a thing retains the name of "proper. "
Reply to Objection 2: A different aspect of the object diversifies the
species of a habit, as stated above ([2791]Q[47], A[5]). Now the same
actions are considered by the king, but under a more general aspect, as
by his subjects who obey: since many obey one king in various
departments. Hence regnative prudence is compared to this political
prudence of which we are speaking, as mastercraft to handicraft.
Reply to Objection 3: Man directs himself by prudence commonly so
called, in relation to his own good, but by political prudence, of
which we speak, he directs himself in relation to the common good.
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Whether a part of prudence should be reckoned to be domestic?
Objection 1: It would seem that domestic should not be reckoned a part
of prudence. For, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 5) "prudence
is directed to a good life in general": whereas domestic prudence is
directed to a particular end, viz. wealth, according to Ethic. i, 1.
Therefore a species of prudence is not domestic.
Objection 2: Further, as stated above ([2792]Q[47], A[13]) prudence is
only in good people. But domestic prudence may be also in wicked
people, since many sinners are provident in governing their household.
Therefore domestic prudence should not be reckoned a species of
prudence.
Objection 3: Further, just as in a kingdom there is a ruler and
subject, so also is there in a household. If therefore domestic like
political is a species of prudence, there should be a paternal
corresponding to regnative prudence. Now there is no such prudence.
Therefore neither should domestic prudence be accounted a species of
prudence.
On the contrary, The Philosopher states (Ethic. vi, 8) that there are
various kinds of prudence in the government of a multitude, "one of
which is domestic, another legislative, and another political. "
I answer that, Different aspects of an object, in respect of
universality and particularity, or of totality and partiality,
diversify arts and virtues; and in respect of such diversity one act of
virtue is principal as compared with another. Now it is evident that a
household is a mean between the individual and the city or kingdom,
since just as the individual is part of the household, so is the
household part of the city or kingdom. And therefore, just as prudence
commonly so called which governs the individual, is distinct from
political prudence, so must domestic prudence be distinct from both.
Reply to Objection 1: Riches are compared to domestic prudence, not as
its last end, but as its instrument, as stated in Polit. i, 3. On the
other hand, the end of political prudence is "a good life in general"
as regards the conduct of the household. In Ethic. i, 1 the Philosopher
speaks of riches as the end of political prudence, by way of example
and in accordance with the opinion of many.
Reply to Objection 2: Some sinners may be provident in certain matters
of detail concerning the disposition of their household, but not in
regard to "a good life in general" as regards the conduct of the
household, for which above all a virtuous life is required.
Reply to Objection 3: The father has in his household an authority like
that of a king, as stated in Ethic. viii, 10, but he has not the full
power of a king, wherefore paternal government is not reckoned a
distinct species of prudence, like regnative prudence.
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Whether military prudence should be reckoned a part of prudence?
Objection 1: It would seem that military prudence should not be
reckoned a part of prudence. For prudence is distinct from art,
according to Ethic. vi, 3. Now military prudence seems to be the art of
warfare, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 8). Therefore
military prudence should not be accounted a species of prudence.
Objection 2: Further, just as military business is contained under
political affairs, so too are many other matters, such as those of
tradesmen, craftsmen, and so forth. But there are no species of
prudence corresponding to other affairs in the state. Neither therefore
should any be assigned to military business.
Objection 3: Further, the soldiers' bravery counts for a great deal in
warfare. Therefore military prudence pertains to fortitude rather than
to prudence.
On the contrary, It is written (Prov. 24:6): "War is managed by due
ordering, and there shall be safety where there are many counsels. " Now
it belongs to prudence to take counsel. Therefore there is great need
in warfare for that species of prudence which is called "military. "
I answer that, Whatever things are done according to art or reason,
should be made to conform to those which are in accordance with nature,
and are established by the Divine Reason. Now nature has a twofold
tendency: first, to govern each thing in itself, secondly, to withstand
outward assailants and corruptives: and for this reason she has
provided animals not only with the concupiscible faculty, whereby they
are moved to that which is conducive to their well-being, but also with
the irascible power, whereby the animal withstands an assailant.
Therefore in those things also which are in accordance with reason,
there should be not only "political" prudence, which disposes in a
suitable manner such things as belong to the common good, but also a
"military" prudence, whereby hostile attacks are repelled.
Reply to Objection 1: Military prudence may be an art, in so far as it
has certain rules for the right use of certain external things, such as
arms and horses, but in so far as it is directed to the common good, it
belongs rather to prudence.
Reply to Objection 2: Other matters in the state are directed to the
profit of individuals, whereas the business of soldiering is directed
to the service belongs to fortitude, but the direction, protection of
the entire common good.
Reply to Objection 3: The execution of military service belongs to
fortitude, but the direction, especially in so far as it concerns the
commander-in-chief, belongs to prudence.
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OF THE VIRTUES WHICH ARE CONNECTED WITH PRUDENCE (FOUR ARTICLES)
In due sequence, we must consider the virtues that are connected with
prudence, and which are its quasi-potential parts. Under this head
there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether {euboulia}, is a virtue?
(2) Whether it is a special virtue, distinct from prudence?
(3) Whether {synesis} is a special virtue?
(4) Whether {gnome} is a special virtue?
[*These three Greek words may be rendered as the faculties of
deliberating well {euboulia}, of judging well according to common law
{synesis}, and of judging well according to general law {gnome},
respectively. ]
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Whether {euboulia} (deliberating well) is a virtue?
Objection 1: It would seem that {euboulia} (deliberating well) is not a
virtue. For, according to Augustine (De Lib. Arb. ii, 18,19) "no man
makes evil use of virtue. " Now some make evil use of {euboulia}
(deliberating well) or good counsel, either through devising crafty
counsels in order to achieve evil ends, or through committing sin in
order that they may achieve good ends, as those who rob that they may
give alms. Therefore {euboulia} (deliberating well) is not a virtue.
Objection 2: Further, virtue is a perfection, according to Phys. vii.
But {euboulia} (deliberating well) is concerned with counsel, which
implies doubt and research, and these are marks of imperfection.
Therefore {euboulia} (deliberating well) is not a virtue.
Objection 3: Further, virtues are connected with one another, as stated
above ([2793]FS, Q[65]). Now {euboulia} (deliberating well) is not
connected with the other virtues, since many sinners take good-counsel,
and many godly men are slow in taking counsel. Therefore {euboulia}
(deliberating well) is not a virtue.
On the contrary, According to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 9) {euboulia}
(deliberating well) "is a right counselling. " Now the perfection of
virtue consists in right reason. Therefore {euboulia} (deliberating
well) is a virtue.
I answer that, As stated above ([2794]Q[47], A[4]) the nature of a
human virtue consists in making a human act good. Now among the acts of
man, it is proper to him to take counsel, since this denotes a research
of the reason about the actions he has to perform and whereof human
life consists, for the speculative life is above man, as stated in
Ethic. x. But {euboulia} (deliberating well) signifies goodness of
counsel, for it is derived from the {eu}, good, and {boule}, counsel,
being "a good counsel" or rather "a disposition to take good counsel. "
Hence it is evident that {euboulia} (deliberating well) is a human
virtue.
Reply to Objection 1: There is no good counsel either in deliberating
for an evil end, or in discovering evil means for attaining a good end,
even as in speculative matters, there is no good reasoning either in
coming to a false conclusion, or in coming to a true conclusion from
false premisses through employing an unsuitable middle term. Hence both
the aforesaid processes are contrary to {euboulia} (deliberating well),
as the Philosopher declares (Ethic. vi, 9).
Reply to Objection 2: Although virtue is essentially a perfection, it
does not follow that whatever is the matter of a virtue implies
perfection. For man needs to be perfected by virtues in all his parts,
and this not only as regards the acts of reason, of which counsel is
one, but also as regards the passions of the sensitive appetite, which
are still more imperfect.
It may also be replied that human virtue is a perfection according to
the mode of man, who is unable by simple insight to comprehend with
certainty the truth of things, especially in matters of action which
are contingent.
Reply to Objection 3: In no sinner as such is {euboulia} (deliberating
well) to be found: since all sin is contrary to taking good counsel.
For good counsel requires not only the discovery or devising of fit
means for the end, but also other circumstances. Such are suitable
time, so that one be neither too slow nor too quick in taking counsel,
and the mode of taking counsel, so that one be firm in the counsel
taken, and other like due circumstances, which sinners fail to observe
when they sin. On the other hand, every virtuous man takes good counsel
in those things which are directed to the end of virtue, although
perhaps he does not take good counsel in other particular matters, for
instance in matters of trade, or warfare, or the like.
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Whether {euboulia} (deliberating well) is a special virtue, distinct from
prudence?
Objection 1: It would seem that {euboulia} (deliberating well) is not a
distinct virtue from prudence. For, according to the Philosopher
(Ethic. vi, 5), the "prudent man is, seemingly, one who takes good
counsel. " Now this belongs to {euboulia} (deliberating well) as stated
above. Therefore {euboulia} (deliberating well) is not distinct from
prudence.
Objection 2: Further, human acts to which human virtues are directed,
are specified chiefly by their end, as stated above ([2795]FS, Q[1],
A[3]; [2796]FS, Q[18], AA[4],6). Now {euboulia} (deliberating well) and
prudence are directed to the same end, as stated in Ethic. vi, 9, not
indeed to some particular end, but to the common end of all life.
Therefore {euboulia} (deliberating well) is not a distinct virtue from
prudence.
Objection 3: Further, in speculative sciences, research and decision
belong to the same science. Therefore in like manner these belong to
the same virtue in practical matters. Now research belongs to
{euboulia} (deliberating well), while decision belongs to prudence.
There {euboulia} (deliberating well) is not a distinct virtue from
prudence.
On the contrary, Prudence is preceptive, according to Ethic. vi, 10.
But this does not apply to {euboulia} (deliberating well). Therefore
{euboulia} (deliberating well) is a distinct virtue from prudence.
I answer that, As stated above [2797](A[1]), virtue is properly
directed to an act which it renders good; and consequently virtues must
differ according to different acts, especially when there is a
different kind of goodness in the acts. For, if various acts contained
the same kind of goodness, they would belong to the same virtue: thus
the goodness of love, desire and joy depends on the same, wherefore all
these belong to the same virtue of charity.
Now acts of the reason that are ordained to action are diverse, nor
have they the same kind of goodness: since it is owing to different
causes that a man acquires good counsel, good judgment, or good
command, inasmuch as these are sometimes separated from one another.
Consequently {euboulia} (deliberating well) which makes man take good
counsel must needs be a distinct virtue from prudence, which makes man
command well. And since counsel is directed to command as to that which
is principal, so {euboulia} (deliberating well) is directed to prudence
as to a principal virtue, without which it would be no virtue at all,
even as neither are the moral virtues without prudence, nor the other
virtues without charity.
Reply to Objection 1: It belongs to prudence to take good counsel by
commanding it, to {euboulia} (deliberating well) by eliciting it.
Reply to Objection 2: Different acts are directed in different degrees
to the one end which is "a good life in general" [*Ethic. vi, 5]: for
counsel comes first, judgment follows, and command comes last. The last
named has an immediate relation to the last end: whereas the other two
acts are related thereto remotely. Nevertheless these have certain
proximate ends of their own, the end of counsel being the discovery of
what has to be done, and the end of judgment, certainty. Hence this
proves not that {euboulia} (deliberating well) is not a distinct virtue
from prudence, but that it is subordinate thereto, as a secondary to a
principal virtue.
Reply to Objection 3: Even in speculative matters the rational science
of dialectics, which is directed to research and discovery, is distinct
from demonstrative science, which decides the truth.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether {synesis} (judging well according to common law) is a virtue?
Objection 1: It would seem that {synesis} is not a virtue. Virtues are
not in us by nature, according to Ethic. ii, 1. But {synesis} (judging
well according to common law) is natural to some, as the Philosopher
states (Ethic. vi, 11). Therefore {synesis} (judging well according to
common law) is not a virtue.
Objection 2: Further, as stated in the same book (10), {synesis}
(judging well according to common law) is nothing but "a faculty of
judging. " But judgment without command can be even in the wicked. Since
then virtue is only in the good, it seems that {synesis} (judging well
according to common law) is not a virtue.
Objection 3: Further, there is never a defective command, unless there
be a defective judgment, at least in a particular matter of action; for
it is in this that every wicked man errs. If therefore {synesis}
(judging well according to common law) be reckoned a virtue directed to
good judgment, it seems that there is no need for any other virtue
directed to good command: and consequently prudence would be
superfluous, which is not reasonable.
Therefore {synesis} (judging well
according to common law) is not a virtue.
On the contrary, Judgment is more perfect than counsel. But {euboulia},
or good counsel, is a virtue. Much more, therefore, is {synesis}
(judging well according to common law) a virtue, as being good
judgment.
I answer that, {synesis} (judging well according to common law)
signifies a right judgment, not indeed about speculative matters, but
about particular practical matters, about which also is prudence. Hence
in Greek some, in respect of {synesis} (judging well according to
common law) are said to be {synetoi}, i. e. "persons of sense," or
{eusynetoi}, i. e. "men of good sense," just as on the other hand, those
who lack this virtue are called {asynetoi}, i. e. "senseless. "
Now, different acts which cannot be ascribed to the same cause, must
correspond to different virtues. And it is evident that goodness of
counsel and goodness of judgment are not reducible to the same cause,
for many can take good counsel, without having good sense so as to
judge well. Even so, in speculative matters some are good at research,
through their reason being quick at arguing from one thing to another
(which seems to be due to a disposition of their power of imagination,
which has a facility in forming phantasms), and yet such persons
sometimes lack good judgment (and this is due to a defect in the
intellect arising chiefly from a defective disposition of the common
sense which fails to judge aright). Hence there is need, besides
{euboulia} (deliberating well), for another virtue, which judges well,
and this is called {synesis} (judging well according to common law).
Reply to Objection 1: Right judgment consists in the cognitive power
apprehending a thing just as it is in reality, and this is due to the
right disposition of the apprehensive power. Thus if a mirror be well
disposed the forms of bodies are reflected in it just as they are,
whereas if it be ill disposed, the images therein appear distorted and
misshapen. Now that the cognitive power be well disposed to receive
things just as they are in reality, is radically due to nature, but, as
to its consummation, is due to practice or to a gift of grace, and this
in two ways. First directly, on the part of the cognitive power itself,
for instance, because it is imbued, not with distorted, but with true
and correct ideas: this belongs to {synesis} (judging well according to
common law) which in this respect is a special virtue. Secondly
indirectly, through the good disposition of the appetitive power, the
result being that one judges well of the objects of appetite: and thus
a good judgment of virtue results from the habits of moral virtue; but
this judgment is about the ends, whereas {synesis} (judging well
according to common law) is rather about the means.
Reply to Objection 2: In wicked men there may be right judgment of a
universal principle, but their judgment is always corrupt in the
particular matter of action, as stated above ([2798]Q[47], A[13]).
Reply to Objection 3: Sometimes after judging aright we delay to
execute or execute negligently or inordinately. Hence after the virtue
which judges aright there is a further need of a final and principal
virtue, which commands aright, and this is prudence.
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Whether {gnome} (judging well according to general law) is a special virtue?
Objection 1: It would seem that {gnome} (judging well according to
general law) is not a special virtue distinct from {synesis} (judging
well according to common law). For a man is said, in respect of
{synesis} (judging well according to common law), to have good
judgment. Now no man can be said to have good judgment, unless he judge
aright in all things. Therefore {synesis} (judging well according to
common law) extends to all matters of judgment, and consequently there
is no other virtue of good judgment called {gnome} (judging well
according to general law).
Objection 2: Further, judgment is midway between counsel and precept.
Now there is only one virtue of good counsel, viz. {euboulia}
(deliberating well) and only one virtue of good command, viz. prudence.
Therefore there is only one virtue of good judgment, viz. {synesis}
(judging well according to common law).
Objection 3: Further, rare occurrences wherein there is need to depart
from the common law, seem for the most part to happen by chance, and
with such things reason is not concerned, as stated in Phys. ii, 5. Now
all the intellectual virtues depend on right reason. Therefore there is
no intellectual virtue about such matters.
On the contrary, The Philosopher concludes (Ethic. vi, 11) that {gnome}
(judging well according to general law) is a special virtue.
I answer that cognitive habits differ according to higher and lower
principles: thus in speculative matters wisdom considers higher
principles than science does, and consequently is distinguished from
it; and so must it be also in practical matters. Now it is evident that
what is beside the order of a lower principle or cause, is sometimes
reducible to the order of a higher principle; thus monstrous births of
animals are beside the order of the active seminal force, and yet they
come under the order of a higher principle, namely, of a heavenly body,
or higher still, of Divine Providence. Hence by considering the active
seminal force one could not pronounce a sure judgment on such
monstrosities, and yet this is possible if we consider Divine
Providence.
Now it happens sometimes that something has to be done which is not
covered by the common rules of actions, for instance in the case of the
enemy of one's country, when it would be wrong to give him back his
deposit, or in other similar cases. Hence it is necessary to judge of
such matters according to higher principles than the common laws,
according to which {synesis} (judging according to common law) judges:
and corresponding to such higher principles it is necessary to have a
higher virtue of judgment, which is called {gnome} (judging according
to general law), and which denotes a certain discrimination in
judgment.
Reply to Objection 1: {Synesis} (judging well according to common law)
judges rightly about all actions that are covered by the common rules:
but certain things have to be judged beside these common rules, as
stated above.
Reply to Objection 2: Judgment about a thing should be formed from the
proper principles thereof, whereas research is made by employing also
common principles. Wherefore also in speculative matters, dialectics
which aims at research proceeds from common principles; while
demonstration which tends to judgment, proceeds from proper principles.
Hence {euboulia} (deliberating well) to which the research of counsel
belongs is one for all, but not so {synesis} (judging well according to
common law) whose act is judicial. Command considers in all matters the
one aspect of good, wherefore prudence also is only one.
Reply to Objection 3: It belongs to Divine Providence alone to consider
all things that may happen beside the common course. On the other hand,
among men, he who is most discerning can judge a greater number of such
things by his reason: this belongs to {gnome} (judging well according
to general law), which denotes a certain discrimination in judgment.
__________________________________________________________________
OF THE GIFT OF COUNSEL (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider the gift of counsel which corresponds to prudence.
Under this head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether counsel should be reckoned among the seven gifts of the
Holy Ghost?
(2) Whether the gift of counsel corresponds to prudence?
(3) Whether the gift of counsel remains in heaven?
(4) Whether the fifth beatitude, "Blessed are the merciful," etc.
corresponds to the gift of counsel?
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Whether counsel should be reckoned among the gifts of the Holy Ghost?
Objection 1: It would seem that counsel should not be reckoned among
the gifts of the Holy Ghost. The gifts of the Holy Ghost are given as a
help to the virtues, according to Gregory (Moral. ii, 49). Now for the
purpose of taking counsel, man is sufficiently perfected by the virtue
of prudence, or even of {euboulia} (deliberating well), as is evident
from what has been said ([2799]Q[47], A[1], ad 2;[2800] Q[51],
AA[1],2). Therefore counsel should not be reckoned among the gifts of
the Holy Ghost.
Objection 2: Further, the difference between the seven gifts of the
Holy Ghost and the gratuitous graces seems to be that the latter are
not given to all, but are divided among various people, whereas the
gifts of the Holy Ghost are given to all who have the Holy Ghost. But
counsel seems to be one of those things which are given by the Holy
Ghost specially to certain persons, according to 1 Macc. 2:65: "Behold
. . . your brother Simon is a man of counsel. " Therefore counsel should
be numbered among the gratuitous graces rather than among the seven
gifts of the Holy Ghost.
Objection 3: Further, it is written (Rom. 8:14): "Whosoever are led by
the Spirit of God, they are the sons of God. " But counselling is not
consistent with being led by another. Since then the gifts of the Holy
Ghost are most befitting the children of God, who "have received the
spirit of adoption of sons," it would seem that counsel should not be
numbered among the gifts of the Holy Ghost.
On the contrary, It is written (Is. 11:2): "(The Spirit of the Lord)
shall rest upon him . . . the spirit of counsel, and of fortitude. "
I answer that, As stated above ([2801]FS, Q[68], A[1]), the gifts of
the Holy Ghost are dispositions whereby the soul is rendered amenable
to the motion of the Holy Ghost. Now God moves everything according to
the mode of the thing moved: thus He moves the corporeal creature
through time and place, and the spiritual creature through time, but
not through place, as Augustine declares (Gen. ad lit. viii, 20,22).
Again, it is proper to the rational creature to be moved through the
research of reason to perform any particular action, and this research
is called counsel. Hence the Holy Ghost is said to move the rational
creature by way of counsel, wherefore counsel is reckoned among the
gifts of the Holy Ghost.
Reply to Objection 1: Prudence or {euboulia} (deliberating well),
whether acquired or infused, directs man in the research of counsel
according to principles that the reason can grasp; hence prudence or
{euboulia} (deliberating well) makes man take good counsel either for
himself or for another. Since, however, human reason is unable to grasp
the singular and contingent things which may occur, the result is that
"the thoughts of mortal men are fearful, and our counsels uncertain"
(Wis. 9:14). Hence in the research of counsel, man requires to be
directed by God who comprehends all things: and this is done through
the gift of counsel, whereby man is directed as though counseled by
God, just as, in human affairs, those who are unable to take counsel
for themselves, seek counsel from those who are wiser.
Reply to Objection 2: That a man be of such good counsel as to counsel
others, may be due to a gratuitous grace; but that a man be counselled
by God as to what he ought to do in matters necessary for salvation is
common to all holy persons.
Reply to Objection 3: The children of God are moved by the Holy Ghost
according to their mode, without prejudice to their free-will which is
the "faculty of will and reason" [*Sent. iii, D, 24]. Accordingly the
gift of counsel is befitting the children of God in so far as the
reason is instructed by the Holy Ghost about what we have to do.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the gift of counsel corresponds to the virtue of prudence?
Objection 1: It would seem that the gift of counsel does not fittingly
correspond to the virtue of prudence. For "the highest point of that
which is underneath touches that which is above," as Dionysius observes
(Div. Nom. vii), even as a man comes into contact with the angel in
respect of his intellect. Now cardinal virtues are inferior to the
gifts, as stated above ([2802]FS, Q[68], A[8]). Since, then, counsel is
the first and lowest act of prudence, while command is its highest act,
and judgment comes between, it seems that the gift corresponding to
prudence is not counsel, but rather a gift of judgment or command.
Objection 2: Further, one gift suffices to help one virtue, since the
higher a thing is the more one it is, as proved in De Causis. Now
prudence is helped by the gift of knowledge, which is not only
speculative but also practical, as shown above ([2803]Q[9], A[3]).
Therefore the gift of counsel does not correspond to the virtue of
prudence.
Objection 3: Further, it belongs properly to prudence to direct, as
stated above (Q[47], A[8]). But it belongs to the gift of counsel that
man should be directed by God, as stated above [2804](A[1]). Therefore
the gift of counsel does not correspond to the virtue of prudence.
On the contrary, The gift of counsel is about what has to be done for
the sake of the end. Now prudence is about the same matter. Therefore
they correspond to one another.
I answer that, A lower principle of movement is helped chiefly, and is
perfected through being moved by a higher principle of movement, as a
body through being moved by a spirit. Now it is evident that the
rectitude of human reason is compared to the Divine Reason, as a lower
motive principle to a higher: for the Eternal Reason is the supreme
rule of all human rectitude. Consequently prudence, which denotes
rectitude of reason, is chiefly perfected and helped through being
ruled and moved by the Holy Ghost, and this belongs to the gift of
counsel, as stated above [2805](A[1]). Therefore the gift of counsel
corresponds to prudence, as helping and perfecting it.
Reply to Objection 1: To judge and command belongs not to the thing
moved, but to the mover. Wherefore, since in the gifts of the Holy
Ghost, the position of the human mind is of one moved rather than of a
mover, as stated above [2806](A[1]; [2807]FS, Q[68], A[1]), it follows
that it would be unfitting to call the gift corresponding to prudence
by the name of command or judgment rather than of counsel whereby it is
possible to signify that the counselled mind is moved by another
counselling it.
Reply to Objection 2: The gift of knowledge does not directly
correspond to prudence, since it deals with speculative matters: yet by
a kind of extension it helps it. On the other hand the gift of counsel
corresponds to prudence directly, because it is concerned about the
same things.
Reply to Objection 3: The mover that is moved, moves through being
moved. Hence the human mind, from the very fact that it is directed by
the Holy Ghost, is enabled to direct itself and others.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the gift of counsel remains in heaven?
Objection 1: It would seem that the gift of counsel does not remain in
heaven. For counsel is about what has to be done for the sake of an
end. But in heaven nothing will have to be done for the sake of an end,
since there man possesses the last end. Therefore the gift of counsel
is not in heaven.
Objection 2: Further, counsel implies doubt, for it is absurd to take
counsel in matters that are evident, as the Philosopher observes
(Ethic. iii, 3). Now all doubt will cease in heaven. Therefore there is
no counsel in heaven.
Objection 3: Further, the saints in heaven are most conformed to God,
according to 1 Jn. 3:2, "When He shall appear, we shall be like to
Him. " But counsel is not becoming to God, according to Rom. 11:34, "Who
hath been His counsellor? " Therefore neither to the saints in heaven is
the gift of counsel becoming.
On the contrary, Gregory says (Moral. xvii, 12): "When either the guilt
or the righteousness of each nation is brought into the debate of the
heavenly Court, the guardian of that nation is said to have won in the
conflict, or not to have won. "
I answer that, As stated above [2808](A[2]; [2809]FS, Q[68], A[1]), the
gifts of the Holy Ghost are connected with the motion of the rational
creature by God. Now we must observe two points concerning the motion
of the human mind by God. First, that the disposition of that which is
moved, differs while it is being moved from its disposition when it is
in the term of movement. Indeed if the mover is the principle of the
movement alone, when the movement ceases, the action of the mover
ceases as regards the thing moved, since it has already reached the
term of movement, even as a house, after it is built, ceases being
built by the builder. On the other hand, when the mover is cause not
only of the movement, but also of the form to which the movement tends,
then the action of the mover does not cease even after the form has
been attained: thus the sun lightens the air even after it is
lightened. In this way, then, God causes in us virtue and knowledge,
not only when we first acquire them, but also as long as we persevere
in them: and it is thus that God causes in the blessed a knowledge of
what is to be done, not as though they were ignorant, but by continuing
that knowledge in them.
Nevertheless there are things which the blessed, whether angels or men,
do not know: such things are not essential to blessedness, but concern
the government of things according to Divine Providence. As regards
these, we must make a further observation, namely, that God moves the
mind of the blessed in one way, and the mind of the wayfarer, in
another. For God moves the mind of the wayfarer in matters of action,
by soothing the pre-existing anxiety of doubt; whereas there is simple
nescience in the mind of the blessed as regards the things they do not
know. From this nescience the angel's mind is cleansed, according to
Dionysius (Coel. Hier. vii), nor does there precede in them any
research of doubt, for they simply turn to God; and this is to take
counsel of God, for as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. v, 19) "the angels
take counsel of God about things beneath them": wherefore the
instruction which they receive from God in such matters is called
"counsel. "
Accordingly the gift of counsel is in the blessed, in so far as God
preserves in them the knowledge that they have, and enlightens them in
their nescience of what has to be done.
Reply to Objection 1: Even in the blessed there are acts directed to an
end, or resulting, as it were, from their attainment of the end, such
as the acts of praising God, or of helping on others to the end which
they themselves have attained, for example the ministrations of the
angels, and the prayers of the saints. In this respect the gift of
counsel finds a place in them.
Reply to Objection 2: Doubt belongs to counsel according to the present
state of life, but not to that counsel which takes place in heaven.
Even so neither have the theological virtues quite the same acts in
heaven as on the way thither.
Reply to Objection 3: Counsel is in God, not as receiving but as giving
it: and the saints in heaven are conformed to God, as receivers to the
source whence they receive.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the fifth beatitude, which is that of mercy, corresponds to the gift
of counsel?
Objection 1: It would seem that the fifth beatitude, which is that of
mercy, does not correspond to the gift of counsel. For all the
beatitudes are acts of virtue, as stated above ([2810]FS, Q[69], A[1]).
Now we are directed by counsel in all acts of virtue. Therefore the
fifth beatitude does not correspond more than any other to counsel.
Objection 2: Further, precepts are given about matters necessary for
salvation, while counsel is given about matters which are not necessary
for salvation. Now mercy is necessary for salvation, according to James
2:13, "Judgment without mercy to him that hath not done mercy. " On the
other hand poverty is not necessary for salvation, but belongs to the
life of perfection, according to Mat. 19:21. Therefore the beatitude of
poverty corresponds to the gift of counsel, rather than to the
beatitude of mercy.
Objection 3: Further, the fruits result from the beatitudes, for they
denote a certain spiritual delight resulting from perfect acts of
virtue. Now none of the fruits correspond to the gift of counsel, as
appears from Gal. 5:22, 23. Therefore neither does the beatitude of
mercy correspond to the gift of counsel.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. iv): "Counsel is
befitting the merciful, because the one remedy is to be delivered from
evils so great, to pardon, and to give. "
I answer that, Counsel is properly about things useful for an end.
Hence such things as are of most use for an end, should above all
correspond to the gift of counsel. Now such is mercy, according to 1
Tim. 4:8, "Godliness [*'Pietas,' which our English word 'pity,' which
is the same as mercy; see note on [2811]SS, Q[30], A[1]] is profitable
to all things. " Therefore the beatitude of mercy specially corresponds
to the gift of counsel, not as eliciting but as directing mercy.
Reply to Objection 1: Although counsel directs in all the acts of
virtue, it does so in a special way in works of mercy, for the reason
given above.
Reply to Objection 2: Counsel considered as a gift of the Holy Ghost
guides us in all matters that are directed to the end of eternal life
whether they be necessary for salvation or not, and yet not every work
of mercy is necessary for salvation.
Reply to Objection 3: Fruit denotes something ultimate. Now the
ultimate in practical matters consists not in knowledge but in an
action which is the end. Hence nothing pertaining to practical
knowledge is numbered among the fruits, but only such things as pertain
to action, in which practical knowledge is the guide. Among these we
find "goodness" and "benignity" which correspond to mercy.
__________________________________________________________________
OF IMPRUDENCE (SIX ARTICLES)
We must now consider the vices opposed to prudence. For Augustine says
(Contra Julian. iv, 3): "There are vices opposed to every virtue, not
only vices that are in manifest opposition to virtue, as temerity is
opposed to prudence, but also vices which have a kind of kinship and
not a true but a spurious likeness to virtue; thus in opposition to
prudence we have craftiness. "
Accordingly we must consider first of all those vices which are in
evident opposition to prudence, those namely which are due to a defect
either of prudence or of those things which are requisite for prudence,
and secondly those vices which have a false resemblance to prudence,
those namely which are due to abuse of the things required for
prudence. And since solicitude pertains to prudence, the first of these
considerations will be twofold: (1) Of imprudence; (2) Of negligence
which is opposed to solicitude.
Under the first head there are six points of inquiry:
(1) Concerning imprudence, whether it is a sin?
(2) Whether it is a special sin?
(3) Of precipitation or temerity;
(4) Of thoughtlessness;
(5) Of inconstancy;
(6) Concerning the origin of these vices.
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Whether imprudence is a sin?
Objection 1: It would seem that imprudence is not a sin. For every sin
is voluntary, according to Augustine [*De Vera Relig. xiv]; whereas
imprudence is not voluntary, since no man wishes to be imprudent.
Therefore imprudence is not a sin.
Objection 2: Further, none but original sin comes to man with his
birth. But imprudence comes to man with his birth, wherefore the young
are imprudent; and yet it is not original sin which is opposed to
original justice. Therefore imprudence is not a sin.
