Mind what follows,fays Socrates:I thought likewise that I knew the Reason why one Man is taller than another by the Head, and one Horse higherthananother:And withreferencetoplainer and more
sensible
Things, I thought, for Instance, that ten was more than eight, because two were added to it ; that two Cubits were larger than One, because they contain'd one half more.
Plato - 1701 - Works - a
Thus I shall neither deceive my self, nor impose upon you by the influ ence of 2eal and Goqd-will, or quit you like a Wasp that leaves its Sting in the Wound it has made.
jtshortk? - Tobeginthen,prayseeifIrememberrightwhat capitulationwasobjected. Simmias,asItakeit,rejectsourbe-
"obth*TM" *'e^> on'v because he fears our Souls, notwithstand- '. """' ing their being Divine and more Excellent , will
die before our Bodies, as being only a fort of Har mony. And Cebes, if I mistake not, granted that the Soul is more durable than the Body, but thinks it possible that the Soul, after having us'd several
(a) Ifthesearetrue, Iam agreatGainerwith littleTrou ble j if false, I lose nothing : O n the contrary, I have gain'd agreatdeal:ForbesidestheHopethatsupportedme through my Afflictions,Infirmitiesand Weaknesses, Ihavebeen faith ful, honest, humble , thankful, charitable, sincere and true,
and have only quitted false and contagious Pleasures in ex change for real. -nd solid ones. M. Tafcal in his\Art. 7. h^s enlarg'd upon this Truth, and back'd it wit! ) << Demonstra tionofinEr. it;force. ' \
Bodies*
? ? of the Immortality of the Soul t
i jj
Bodies,may dieatlastwhenitquitsthelastBody, ind that this death of the Soul is a true Death. Arenotthese the two PointsIam toexamine, my learSimmias and Cebes?
When they had all agteed that the Objections vere justly summ'd up ; he/ continued thus : D o rou absolutely rejectall that I have said, or do you icknowledgepartofittobetrue>They answer'd, Thattheydidnotrejectthewhole. Butwhat,says l e , i s y o u r O p i n i o n o f w h a t I t o l d y o u >? v i s . t h a t learning,isonlyRemembrance,andthatbyaneceC iry Consequence the Soul must have an Existence efbre itsconjunction with the Body.
As for me, replies Cebes, I perceiv'd the evidence fitatfirstview;and donotknow anyPrinciples f more certainty and-Truth. Iam of the fame 4ind, fays Simmias, and should think itvery strange :' e v e r I c h a n g ' d m y O p i n i o n .
.
But, my dear Tbeban, continuesSo- ? ates,youmustneedschangeit,if Somtesmakeso^ttie
onretainyourOpinionthatHarmony ggj %s ^
compounded, and that the Soul is Thoughts.
ilyafortofHarmony arisingfromthe leUnionoftheQualitiesoftheBo- ,^mmy cannotexist
r:For 'tispresum'dyouwouldnot g? * **--*** :lieveyourself,ifyousaidthatHar- * ?
ony has a Being before those Things of which it composU
Sure enough, repliesSimmias,Iwould notbelieve
7 self if I did.
D o not you see then, continues Socrates, that you
inotofapiecewithyourself,whenyousaythe
ulhadaBeingbeforeitcametoanimatetheBo-
,and at thefame time,thatitiscompounded ofForthere's
ings that had not then an Existence ? D o not you d'fi? rdin
nparetheSoultoaHarmony? Andisitnotevi-&J^'
it that the Harp, the Strings, 'and the very dis- 23s! Zd
dant Sounds exist before the Harmony, whichP>theyare
m Effectthatresultsfromallthese<<Things, and^-"^^ ishessooner thanthey? Does thislatterpartof"J, r"
irDiscoursesuitwiththefirst? * Not
? ? j38
Phedon : Or, A Dialogue
Not atall,replies Simmias.
And yet,continuesSocrates,ifeveraDiscourse beallofapiece,itoughttobesuchwhenHarmo ny isitsSubject.
That's right, fays Simmias.
But yours is not so,continues Socrates. Let's hear then which of these two Opinions you side with : Whether is Learning only Remembrance, or istheSoulafortofHarmony?
I fide with the first, replies Simmias.
tcmfarifom (a)AndthatOpinionIhaveexplain'dtoyou, and similes without having any recourse to Demonstrations full ftfJsKU~ of Similes and Examples, which are rather colours
dml*' oftheTruth,andthereforepleasethePeoplebest; but as for me ,I am of Opinion that all Di scourses proving their Point by Similes, are full of vanity, and apt to seduce and deceive, unless one be very cautious, whether it relate to Geometry or any other Science : Whereas the Discourse I made for proving that Knowledge is Remembrance, isground ed upon a very creditable Hypothesis :For I told you that the Soul exists as well as its Essence before
itcomestoanimatetheBody. ByEssence1mean
(a) Marfilius Vicinal and de Serrts have strangely misunder stood this Passage, not only in making Simmiat speak all this ;
. -bnt what is more considerable, in putting a favourable Con struction on those words, v&ni <<xoV(C)- tivU x) 'eurpzWnf, which the one. renders, veristmitittantum-venustiqueexempli in-
*dicatione;andtheOther,txveristmiliquadam convenientiajand in separating the words Ivch Sro/^'/fsa*;whereas they are joyn'd;for'Socratesfays,/made thisDiscourse,withouthaving recourse to Demonfirations cramm'd with Similes and Colours' that t. dn:somuchwiththeTevfle. IneffectScordusdidnotibmuch as make life of one Comparison in makiroe good the Opinion
? ofRemembrance, WhereasSimmiashadbroughtintheCom parisonofa Harp to prove that theSoil}isa Harmony. N o w there's nothing misleads the Ignorant more than Simi litudes, for the Imagination is so feduc'd by the representa tion, that it blindly embraces all that presents it self to it. And by thatmeansthisOpinionofSimmias'sdidalwaysmeet withafavourablereception,anddoestothisdayamongthe Ignorant. ThisisaveryimportantPassage,anddefery'da larger Explication.
the
? ? of the Immortality os the Soul. 139
the Principle from which it derives its Being, which has no other name, but that whichts. And this Proof I take to be good and sufficient,
By that reason, lays Simmias, I must not listen ei therto my selfor others, who assertthe Soulto be a fort'of Harmony.
? In earnest Simmias, replies Socrates, do you think #***<<>>> that a Harmony, or any other Composure, can be %fijfij*j^ any thing different from the Parts of which it issratien? ilt
compounded ? fa composi- By no means, Socrates'. **>>>>j <<*?
Or can it do or suffer, what those Parts do not ? *jfcl"' not.
Simmias answefd, It could not. Then, says So
crates, a Harmony does not precede, but follows Harmmy "
theThings itiscomposedof. AnditcannothaveTMZ7y"Tits Sounds, Motions, or any thing else contrary tovans? ,hut itsParts. '? ' theSouiu
No sure, replies Simmias. But what, continuest0the* ^
Socrates, is not all Harmony only such in propor tion to the Concord of itsParts ?
I do not well understand you, fays Simmias.
I mean, according as the Parts have more or less ofConcord,theHarmonyismoreorleftaHarmo ny. Isitnot?
Yes, sure.
CanwelayoftheSoul,atthesamerate,thataj-st smalldifference makes aSoul tobemore orlessasJb,lmT Soul ? capableof
No, sure,Socrates. receiving Howisitthen,intheNameofGod? Do notleI'ormr''
w e fay, for Example, that such a Soul endow'd with Understanding and Vertue, is good -, and another filFd with Folly and Mischief, is wicked ? Is not thistight? .
Yes, sure, cjuoth Simmias.
But those who hokl. the Soul to be a Harmony, what willtheycalltheseQpalitiesoftheSoul,that Vice and that Vertue? Will they fay, the one's Harmony, and the other Discord ? That a vertuous
and good Soul,being Harmony initsNature, isen- ;' "- titled
? ? v.
titled to another Harmony ; and that a vicious wick ed Soul wants that additional Harmony.
I c a n n o t b e p o s i t i v e , r e p l i e s S i m m i a s t, b u t i n d e e d 'sisveryprobablethePatronsofthatOpinion may advancesome such thing.
But we concluded, that one Soul is not more or less a Soul than another ; that is, that it is not more or less a Harmony, than another Harmony.
I o w n it, fays Simmias.
Andsinceitisnotmore orlessaHarmonythen, ithasnotmoreorlessConcord. Isitnotso?
Yes, sure, Socrates.
And since it has not more or less of Concord ;
can one have more Harmony than another, or must
theHarmony of'emallbeequal? Questionless it must be equal.
s}nce one soui cannot be more or less a Soul
149
Phedon : Or, A Dialogue
1 ? 'M Souls
^">>m? t*iananother,bythelamereasonitcannothave w t h is * >> r << P r e ? r l e f t o f C o n c o r d t h a n a n o t h e r .
absurdity. "That'strue.
Then it follows necessarily that one Soul cannot have' either more Harmony or more Discord than another ?
I agree to it.
And by consequence, since the Soul is of that Nature, it cannot have more Vertue or Vice than another -,if so be that Vice is Discord, and Vertue Harmony ?
That's a standing Truth, faysSimmias.
ifAtSoul Or,wouldnotrightReasonrathersaythatVice w e r e a H a r - c o u $ & f i n d n o p l a c e i n t h e S o u l , i f s o b e t h e S o u l is
ZZulZl Harmony ; for Harmony, continuing in its perfect, suchthmg'Nature, isnotcapableofDiscord?
asaVuious There'snoquestionofthat.
w- InlikemannertheSoul,whileperfectlya Soul,
is not capable of Vice.
According to the Principles we agreed upon, i
cannot fee how itfhou'd.
Froir
? ? of she Immortality of the Soil. 14 i
From the same very Principles, it will follow Tj*s<nd,0f that the Souls of all Animals are equally good, since *r*m
theyareequallySouls. J * ^
So I think, fays SimnHas. tJe ? it1* But do you think that it stands with right Rea- those <</?
son, if the Hypothesis of the Souls being a Harmo- Mn>
nybetrue?
No, sure, Socrates. ThenIaskyou,Simmias,ifofallthePartsof/? m**the
aMan, the Soulisnot bestentitledtoCommand,So>>icam- eipeciallywhen (heisPrudentandWise>>> m4ndsthe
There's no other Part can pretend to it. ? ? ? r
DoesitCommandby givingwaytothePassionsy^/^^ of the Body; or by resisting them > As for Exam- commands
pie, when the Body is seiz'd with Thirst in the cold tbe Har- Fit of a Fever, does not the Soul restrain it from mm>
drinking ? Or, when 'tis hungry, does it not re strain it from eating ? As well as in a thousand other Instances,which manifestly shew that the Soul curbsthePassionsoftheBody. Isitnotso?
Without question.
ButweagreedabovethattheSoulbeing asortofTi>eSoul Harmony , can never found contrary to the sound th^ts th'
ofthosethings which raise,orlower,ormoveitj^bX- nor have other Passions, different from those of its^uid, it
Parts-,and thatitisnecessarilyoblig'dtofollowcouldnot them, as being uncapable to guide them. do, ifit
'Tis certain we agreed upon that, fays Simmias :^ * How couldwe avoidit?
But,faysSocrate. iyisitnot evidentthattheCon duct of the Soul is the downright contrary ? That it governs and rules those very Things which are alledg'd for Ingredients in its Composition ; that it thwarts and attack's 'em almost all its life-time ;that is every way their Mistress, punishing and repres sing some by the harder measures of Pain, School- Exercises and Physick-, and treating others more gently, as contenting it-self with threatning or in filltingoveritsLusts,PassionandFear. In aword, w e iee the Soul speaks to the Body as something
of
? ? 14,2 Phedon : Or, A Dialogue
ofadifferent Nature from itself;which Homer was sensible of, when, in his Odyjses he HomerlTMwthatthe tellsthatUlyssesbeatinghisBreastsre-
HatureoftheSoulisdis- fatfj fa Hgart and said to z>, sup-
19thB>>okofhisOdyS- gainst harder and more difficultthings than these.
Do you think the Poet spoke that, under the
apprehensions of the Souls being a Harmony to be managed and conducted by the Body ? Or, do not
you rather believe that he knew, 'twas the Souls partto Command, andthatitisofa more Divine Nature than Harmony ?
Yes,Socrates;IswearIam persuadedHomer knew that Truth.
And by Consequence, my dear Simmias,continues
Socrates, there isnot the least Colour of Reason for t h e S o u l s b e i n g a H a r m o n y ? , s h o u l d w e a s s e r t i t t o
besuch,we shouldcontradictboth Homer,thatdi vinePoet,andlikewiseourselves. Simmiasyielded; and Socrates proceeded thus.
I think w e have sufficiently tempet'd and m o d e
rated this (a) Theban Harmony, so that itwill do
IvhyCebesusnoharm- ButCebes,howshallwedotoap- wascall'dpeafeand disarmthis(b)Cadmm? How shallwe
fieitem. hitonaDiscourse,dulyqualifiedwithapersuasive 1force ?
If you'll be at the pains, Socrates, you can easily ( find such a Discourse. The last you had against' the Harmony of the Soul, mov'd me mightily, and
(a)HecallsSimmias'sOpinionaTheban Harmony,alluding to the Fable of ^imfhion, who by the Harmony ot"his Harp built the Walls of Thebes. In like manner Simmias with his pretended Harmony rear'd up the humane Body.
(b) H e calls Cebes another Cadmus, because as Cadmus b y s o w ing the Teeth of the Dragon he had kill'd, fetch'd out of the Bosom or the Earth a Race of fierce Men that liv'd but one Minute : So Cebes by the Opinion os the Mortality of the Soul, a thing more poysonous than the Teeth of a Dragon, made allMen earthly and beastly,and left'embut a very short Life.
indeed
? ? of the Immortality of the Soul. 145
indeed beyond my expectation :For when Simmlas propos'd his Doubts, I thought nothing short of a Prodigy or Miracle could solve 'em :And I was mightily surpris'd when I saw he could not stand yourfirstAttack. Sothatnowitwillbenosur- prisal to me to see Cadmus undergo the same fate.
M y dear Cebes, replies Socrates? 0 not you speak too big upon the matter, lest Envy should overturn all I have said, and render it useless and ineffectual* Butthat'sintheHandsofGod. Asforus,letus approach one another, as Homer fays, and try our StrengthandArms. Whatyouwantcomesallto this Point ; you would have the Immortality and Incorruptibility of the Soul demonstrated, to the end that a Philosopher, w h o dies bravely in the hopes of being infinitelymore happy in the other World than inthis,maynothopeinvain. Youfay,theSoul's being a durable and divine Substance, existing before
its joyning with the Body, does not conclude its Immortality-, and the only Inference that it will bear,is,thatitlastsagreat whilelonger,andwas inbeingmany Agesbeforeus,duringwhichitknew
and did several things ; but without Immortality :
For on the contrary, the first Minute of its descent intotheBody,istheCommencementofitsDeath;
or, as it were a Disease to it : For it passes this Life
in Anguish and Trouble, and at last is quite swal- low'dupandannihilatedby whatwecallDeath. You
add, that 'tis the fame thing, whether itanimatesThorewlii a Body only once, or returns to itseveral times,bdieyethe since that does not alter the occasion of our Fears, Mortality forasmuchasallwifeMen oughtstilltofearDeath,*? ***Smi>
while they are uncertain of the Immortality of|"fr'^? t/j
theirSouls. This,Itakeit,istheSummofwhatitsannibi-
you saidjand Irepeat itsooften,onpurpose,'<<*'*>><*<* that nothing may escape my view, and that yovlutikJ"*
,'7_? cjj- -? ? canstoffeat m a y h a v e t h e o p p o r t u n i t y o r a d d i n g , o r i m p a i r i n g t0 Jal l 'w\rt
as you please. Mi>>. At present, says Cebes, I have nothing to alter :
That
? ? |44
Phedoft : 0ry A Dthlogm
That is the just Summ of all I have yet . said.
Socrates was silent, a pretty while , as being
drown'd in profound Meditation : At last, Cebes,
lays he, 'tis truly not a small matter that you de>
mand ; for in order to a just satisfaction, there's a
. necessityof making a narrow Enquiryintothecause
of Generation and Corruption. If you please I'l
tellyouwhat happen'dtomeuponthislamevery matter ? and if what I fay seem useful to you, you
shall be at liberty to make use of it to support your Sentiments.
With allmy heart,faysSimmias. <Praygweearthen,faysSocrates:InmyyouthI
SocratesinhaeLan insatiable desire to learn that Science, which tisyouth, iS caii'd Natural. Historyh for I thought it was
iWe/ *somethingGreatandDivinetoknowtheCausesof vhysicks. everything,oftheirGeneration,Death,andExistence. And I fpar'd no Pains, nor omitted any Means, for trying in the first place, if (a) a certain corruption ofhotand cold,will,assome pretend,,giveBeing and Nourishmentto Animals;ifthe. Bloodmakes
theThought;ifAiror Fire,,orthe Brain alone is
the cause of our Senses, of Seeing, Hearing, Smel
ling, &c. ifMemory and Opinion take their rise
from these Senses, and if Knowledge be the result
ofMemoryandOpinion. Then Iwantedtoknow the
causesoftheirCorruption,andextendedmy curiosity
both to the Heavens and the cavities ofthe Earth,and
would fain have known the Cause ofall thePhenome
nawemeetwith. Atlast,afteragreatdealoftrou\
ble,! foundmy selfstrangelyunqualifiedforsuchEn- ' q u i r i e s ? , a n d o f t h i s I a m a b o u t t o g i v e y o u a s e n s i
ble Proof (b) This tine study made me ib blind in
(a) Socrates said he was ignorant of all these Things, be causehe knew nothingbutSecondCauses. Nowtoknow them justly, one ought to know God, and the Vertue he di splays in Nature.
(b) Its utmost reach amounts to no more than an imper fectKnowledgeofSecondCauses. Now theseSecondCauses do not lead us into the knowledge of the Essence of Things.
A
? ? of the Immortality of the Soul. 145; intheThingsIknew more evidently before^accord-~*strange
ingtomyown and otherPersonsThoughts, that iffif'i'1"
q u i t e f o r g o t a l l t h a t I h a d k n o w n u p o n s e v e r a l S u b - - p h y f y L . - jects,particularlythatofaMan'sgrowth, {"thoughtitblind,
twas evident to the whole World , that a Man '>>st'*dof grows only by eating and drinking : For Flesh jjJjJS*
beingaddedtoFlesh^BonestoBones,and allthestanding"' other Parts joyn'd to their similar Parts by Nourish- v
m e n t , ,m a k e a s m a l l B u l k t o s w e l l a n d g r o w , s o t h a t alittleManbecomeslarge. ThiswasmyThought. x Do notyouthink'twasjust?
Yes sure, replies Cebes.
Mind what follows,fays Socrates:I thought likewise that I knew the Reason why one Man is taller than another by the Head, and one Horse higherthananother:And withreferencetoplainer and more sensible Things, I thought, for Instance, that ten was more than eight, because two were added to it ; that two Cubits were larger than One, because they contain'd one half more.
And what are your present Thoughts of those Things,fays Cebes?
I am so far, replies Socrates, from
thinking that I know the Causes of all & afterwards givfS thesethings;that,whenoneis. added ***W<<>>? /**>>/<<D<<rf<<,
to one, I do not believe I can tellwhe- theritisthatveryonetowhichthe
, . ,,,,? '.
otheris added thatbecomes twojor
whethertheoneadded,andtheoneto
which the addition was made make
:wo together > For in their separate state, each of em wasoneandnottwo;andaftertheirbeing
\. Man is so far from improving his Knowledge by them, hat he must needs own his Ignorance of the Things he pre- ended to know. All Philosophers at this day know that M o u r i s l i m e n t b y t h e m e a n s o f H e a t is t h e c a u s e o f t h e g r o w t h )fanyAnimal. Butthey'reallatalosstoknowbywhat Virtue it grows or ceases to grow, and what are the limits )fitsgrowth. What;misfortuneisitforaMantoplodall lis life-time for the knowing of nothing !
K k plac'd
JSSv T fa\h tmjmanar d , when they amidnotstewboworwhy
<>>><<andonemaketwo.
? ? 146
Phedon: Or, A Dialogae
plac'donebytheother,theybecametwo. Neither canItellhow, uponthedivisionofanything,what was formerly one becomes two, from the very mi nuteofdivision:Forthat Causeisquitecontrary to that which makes one and ohe become two.
There this ohe, and this one become two, by reason
of their being plac'd near and added, the one to
the other : But, here this one Thing becomes two by
reasonofitsdivisionandseparation. Farlessdo
I pretend to know whence this one Thing comes, and
bythisMethod (i. e. byPhysicalReasons)Ican
not findouthow theleast Thing takes rife or pe- Hemeansrifhes,orhowitexists. ButwithoutsomuchCe-
rTolrfetl remony> I mix another Method ofmy own with thefirst this,forbythisIcanlearnnothing:Havingone
cau. fe,far day heard some Body reading a Book of (b) Anaxa- exhumingg0ras\ whosaidthe DivineIntellectwasthecause
*lytZ? ? L. ? f a^ Beings, and drew 'em up in their proper
ficks. ^ Ranks and Clasies? ,I was ravish'd with Joy. I
7>obUbegin-perceiv'd there was nothing more certain than this <<<>>? /"? a-Principle, that the Intellectisthe cause ofall Be- '
naxaSoras. ifigs> Fq]. jjufllythought thattMsInteUeahaving
methodis'd all Things and rank'd 'em in their Clas ses, (c) planted every Thing in the Place and Con-
( b ) ^ i n a x a g o r a s w a s t h e first t h a t s a i d t h e I n t e l l e c t o r S p i r i t of God rank'd the Parts of Matter, and put 'em in motion. And 'twasthatPrinciplethatusher'dinhisPhysicks. This fair Exordium gave Socrates occasion to think thathe would ex-M plain allthe Secrets ofNature,by unfolding the divine VertueB difplay'duponit,andassigningtheReasonswhy everyThing! wassoandso. ButthatPhilosopherdidnotkeepup'tohis first Principle ; for he wav'd the first Cause, and inhsted on second Causes, and by so doing frustrated the expectation ot hisKeaders. ' ' .
(c) Here Socrates recals us to the first Truth, that G o d cre ated allThingsgood,and intheirbestslate;accordingto Mofcs,who fays,Godsaw allThingsthathehadmade,and be laidtheywereverygood. Now inordertoknowwhy Things arethusgood,wemustenquireintothe'Nature ofthisOri ginal Goodness, and survey the sttate they were created in. What asorrythingisPhysicksthen,thatknows nothing butsecond Causes,or rather,thatdoesnotcertainlyknow tiitfe second Cause; ?
dition
? ? bf the Imhtdrtalit) bfifre Soul 147
dition that was best and most useful for it, in which itcould best do and suffer whatever the Intellect hadallottedto it*and Iapprehended thatthe re sultof this Principle, was, that the only Thing a Man ought to look for, either for himselfor others*
1 isthisbetterandmoreusefulthing:Forhavingonce found what is best and most useful, he'll necessarily know what is worst, since there is but one Know ledge both for the one and the other.
Upon this score I was infinitely glad, that I had
foundsuchaMasterasAnaxagoras^who Ihop'd
would give a satisfactory Account of the Cause of allThings? ,and would not only tellme, for In-^f"*? *. *"<<
stance, that the Earth is broad or round, but like-yftf*fophei wifeassignthe necessaryCauseobligingittobeso:0(^JH Who wouldpointouttomewhatwasbest,andatteach: thefametimegivemetounderstandwhyitwas
so. Inlikemanner, ifheaffirm'dtheSeatofthe
Earth to be in the Centre of the World, I expected -hewould give meaReasonwhyitwasso:And, after Ishould have received sufficient Instruction from him, defign'd never to admit of any other
Causefora Principle.
I prepare some Questions, to be put to him con-
fcerningtheSun,Moon,and otherStars,inorderto know the Reasons of their Revolutions, Motions, and other Accidents, and why what each of them
? d o e s is always the best : For I could not imagine. ,
I that after he had told me, that the Intellect rank'd "them, anddrewthemupinorder,thathecou'dgiveindeed,that
me nootherreasonofthatOrderthanthis,thatitwasXw*fe&e
best. AndIflatter'dmyselfwithhopes,thatafterhe^fj^ hadaffign'dboththegeneraland particularCauses,9mthanad
he would giveme toknow, wherein the particularTnafirest Good ofeveryindividualThing,aswellasthecom-But'fVf0*
monGoodofallThingsconsists. Iwouldnothavefn*TMui;-L ? jbarted with these Hopes for all the Treasures of the
World. SoIboughthisBookswithagreatdealofIm-
? >atience;gridmade itmyBusinesstoperuse'emas Kk i ? fdori
? 148
Phedon : Or, A Dialogue
Socrates
soon as possibly I could, in order to a speedy know ledgeoftheGoodandtheEvilofallThings:But Ifound my selffrustrated ofmy mighty Hopesj for as soon as I had made a small progress in the perusal,IfoundtheAuthormade no useofthisIn tellect, and affign'd no Reason of that fine Order and Disposition ; but affign'd as Causes the Air, Whirlwinds, the Waters, and other Things equally absur'd.
ridiculesth* His whole Performance ieem'd to reach no far- ? pbysieis ther,thanifaManshouldfay,thatSocratesdoes
otfI"si a^tythe*nteHe&>andafterthat,meaningtogive TendclJfis. a Reason for all my Actions, should say, for In-
'stance, to day I am set upon my Bed,because my Body is composed of Bones and Nerves-, theBones being hard and solid, are separated by the Joints;
and the Nerves being capable to bend and unbend. ? uni. trthe themselves, tye the Bones to the Flesh, and the" ? Notionof Skin,which receivesand includesboththeoneand
<<m7<<W*the0t'ier'^at*e Bones beingdisengag'datthe 'jZsiles. 'Joints, the Nerves which bend and unbend, enable m e to fold m y Legs as you fee, and that fotiooth
isthereason thatIsitinthis Posture: Or,ifaMan pretending to assign the Cause of my present Con ferencewithyou, shouldinsistonlyupon thesecond Causes, the Voice, the Air, Hearing, and such other Things , and should take no notice of the true Cause, viz. that the Athenians thought it fit to conl demn me, and that by the same reason I thought it] fittestfor me to behere,and patiently wait the e x e c u t i o n o f - m y S e n t e n c e -, f o r I c a n s a f e l y ( a ) s w e a r that these Nerves and these Bones should long ere now have been translated to Megara, or Bceotia^ if
{a)IntheGreekitruns,ForIswearbytheDog. Lattantitu checkshimforthisOath. ButSt. Augi-stininLib. IV. Os tin trueReligion,justifieshim,asifSocratesmean'dto give thf Athenianstoknow,thatevenaDog,beingtheWorkman shiposGod, deierv'dmore Honourthan alltheIdols the' sworeby. Itmaylikewisebealledg'dthatSocratessworeb aDog, aGoose, &c. inorder to accustom Men to forbea taking the N a m e of G o d so often in vain.
th;
? ? of the Immortality ofthe Soul. 149
that had been fitter for me, and if I had not been still persuaded that it was better and fitter for m e toendurethePunishment Iam doom'd tobymy Country, than to flee like a Slave or a banish'd Person. As I take it, 'tis highly ridiculous to as sign such Causes upon such an Occasion, and to rest satisfiedin them.
If itbe replied,That without Bones and Nerves, andsuchotherThings,IcouldnotdowhatImeanTheum? fi
to do5the Allegation istrue. But itsavours^>fp*jy?
thegreatestAbsurdity, to fanfiethattheseBones ornZTthey
Nerves should be the cause of m y Actions rather are at a than thechoice ofwhat isbest;andthatmy In-fi"nd-
tellect is employed on that score : For that were to sink the Difference between the Cause-, and the Thing without which the Cause could not be such. And yet the vulgar People, who take Things by hearsay, and see by other Peoples Eyes, as if they
walk'd in thick Darkness, take the true Cause of Things to be of that Nature. Pursuant to this
Notion some surround the Earth with a Vortex that _ turns eternally round, and suppose it to be fix'd in ^s0%*fon
the Centre of the Universe : Others conceive it to osAaaxi-
be a broad and large Trough, which has the Air for menes, a- itsBaseandFoundation. AndasforthePowerofntxagoras, himwho rank'danddisposedofeveryThingtoits *? e~
best advantage that is not in their view, and they
don't believe that he's intitled to any Divine Vertjue :p>;s m 1 m They fanfie they know ofa strongerand more Ira-<<theirown mortal Atlas, more capable to support all Things Judgment, And thisgoodaadimmortalTye,thatisonlyca-01T7**, pable to unite and comprehend all Things, they take ! jTML 'ani for a Chimera. ' Weakness.
Iam notoftheirmind,butwouldwillinglylist
m y self a Disciple to any that could tell m e this
Cause,letitbewhatitwill. But,sinceIcould
not compass the knowledge of it, neither by my s e l f n o r o t h e r s ? , i f y o u p l e a s e , I ' l l g i v e y o u a n A c
count of a second Trial 1 made in order to'find it. Kk3 Iam
? ? ijo
Phedon: Or, A Dialogue
Iam verydesiroustohearit,faysCebes.
After I had wearied my self in examining all things,IthoughtitmyDutytobecautiousofal- voiding what happens to those who contemplate an Eclipse of the Sun : For they lose the fight of it, without they be so careful as to view its Reflection
in Water or any other Medium. A Bycontemplatingobjeiii Thought much like to that came into
* X Sr&Vfc m Head andIfearedIwouldlose
Mnd. * rbeyoughttobelook'd
the Eyes of the Soul, it I viewed Ob- jectswiththeEyesoftheBody, orem- pWd any0fmySensesinindeavour-
uponthoughaMedium,
W tfc*Medium>>Jfei- jngtQknQW>em> jthoughtjfbaM
M
have recourse to Reason, and contem plate the Truth of all Things as reflected from it. 'Tispossiblethe Simile I useinexplainingmy self, isnotveryiast (<z);ForImy selfcannotaffirm, that he who beholds Things in the Glass of Reason, sees 'em more by Reflection and Similitude, than he who beholds'emintheirOperations. However,theway I followed was this : From that time forward I
grounded all upon the Reason that seemed to be best, and took all for Truth, that I found confor mable to it, whether in Things or Causes. And what was not conformable I rejected, as being false. I'llexplainmy meaningmoredistinctly$forIfancy
you do not yet understand me.
I'llswear, says Cebes, I do not well understand
you.
But, after all, fays Socrates, I advance no new
thing. This is no more than what I have saida" thousand times, and particularly in the foregoing Dispute : For all that I aim at , is to demonstrate what fort of Cause this is, that I sought after so carefully: Ibegin with his Qualities, which are so much talked or, and which \ take for the Founda-
(a) H e justly checks himself: for Reasons are not like other Mediums: theygiveustoknow theEssenceofThings insome measure,whichtheOperationsdonot. . . . . . ,. 4
tlOTL
? ? of the Immortality of the Soul. i? i
tion. I say then, there is something thatisgood,fine,justandgreatofit ***immaterialande- self. If you grant me this Principle, t<<TMisi>>duush*yea>>e- Z. . *. ? 1 n. i r* r ceffaryrelationtotheIm- IhopebyittodemonstratetheCause, 2rtdityoftheSo>>i-J>>cb
andmakeouttheImmortalityofthe asaCausehutottsEffetis.
jjoul.
I grant it, says Cebes : you cannot be too quick
intersecting your Demonstration.
Mind what follows , and fee if you agree to it as. J. Take it,ifthereisany thing fine,besides fineness it self, it must be such by partaking of that firstgood:andsoofalltheotherQualities. Are
you of this Opinion ?
Iam.
I protest, cotinues Socrates,. I cannot well under- nis * *>> standalltheotherlearnedCauses, thatarecommon-Irm>
Jygivenus. ButifanyManaskmewhatmakesa
thing fine, whether the liveliness of its Colours, or
the just proportion of its Parts and the like ; I wave alltheseplausibleReasons whichserve . w onlytoconfoundme;andwithoutLe- whatcom? unicatesofthe remonyorArt,makeanswer,andper- firstfinebeing,\. e. oe- hapstoosimply,thatitsfinenessisonly cordingtotheproportionof
owingtothepresence,orapproach,or Z s ^ o / ^ X communicationoftheoriginalfineBe- prstCa>>fiosallThing,. ing, whatever be the way of that com
munication. ForIamnotyetcertaininwhatman
ner it is : I only k n o w certainly, that all these fine Things are render'd such by the presence of this fine Being. WhileIstandbythisPrinciple,IreckonI capnot be deceiv'd; and I a m perswaded, that I m a y safely make answer to all Questions whatsoever, that all fine Things owe their Fineness to the presence oftheabove-mentionedBeing. Arenotyouofthe- same mind?
Yes, sure, Soerates.
Are net great and small things render'd such in likemanner? IfOnetoldyou,thatsuchathingis Kk 4 larger
? ? \
iji
Phedon : Or, A Dialogue
larger than another by the Head ; (a) would not you t h i n k t h e E x p r e s s i o n f a r f r o m b e i n g e x a c t ? , a n d w o u l d
not you make answer, that whatever is larger is render'd such by magnitude it self, and what is smal lerowesitslittlenesstolittlenessitself> Forifyou said, that such a thing is greater or smaller than anoi ther by the Head , I fancy you would fear bjjjg
censur'd, for making both the greater and MBer t h i n g t o b e s u c h b y t h e l a m e c a u s e ? , a n d b e a d e s , f o r
using such an Expression as seems to imply, that' the Head, which is a small part, makes the largnels of the greater, which in effect is a Monster ; for what can be more absurd than to lay, that a small Matter makesathinglarge> WouldnotyoufearsuchOb
jections>
. Yes, sure, replies Cebes, smiling.
By the same reason would not you be afrraid to say,thattenismorethaneight, andsurpassesitby two ? And would not you rather fay, that ten are morethaneightbyquantity> Inlikemanner,of two Cubits would not you fay, they are larger than One by magnitude, rather than by the half? For still there's the fame occasion of fear.
You fay well.
But when one is added to one, or a thing divided
into halfs, would not you avoid saying, that in the
former Case addition makes one and one two, and
In the latter division makes one thing become two?
Andwouldnotyouprotest,thatyouknownoother fat"r'iEf~cause of the existence of things, than the participa-
fZdlnr'up-tl0n? ftne essencethat'speculiar toevery subject'; onthefirst and consequently no other reason why one and one
Truth, viz. makes two, but the participation of duality, as one G"hi)h 1Sonekytneparticipationofunity? Wouldnotyou
"Jhsistl'anddiscard these additions, divisions and all the other
fromwhencetec answers, and leave 'em to those who know more it proceeds.
(a) So;rates does not condemn the receiv'd Expressions, but means tn shew, that they do not reach the Nature and Essence of Thiny j and, being always ty'd to Matter, cannot bear up to the true EiUnce that does all.
ofanim-
than
? ? of the Immortality of the Soul I$j
than you do ? And, for fear of your own Shadow,
as the Proverb goes, or rather of your Ignorance,
would not you confine your self to this Principle >
And, if any one attack'd it, would not you let it
stand without daigning him an answer, tillyou had
surveyed all the consequences , to fee if they are of
a. piece or not ? And if afterwards you should be
obligedtogiveareasonforthem, wouldnotyoudoa trueway
itby havingrecoursetosomeoftheseotherHypotbe-? ffi^s /<<,that should appear to be the best ; and so proceed ? *^/,e
from Hypothesis to Hypothesis, till you lighted upon something that satisfied you, as being a sure and
standing truth ? At the fame time you would be loth FortheEf- toperplexand confound allthings asthoseDilpu-feflsaremt tantsdo,whocallallthingsinquestion. 'Tistrue,{*-^*'\? he these Disputants perhaps are not much cqncern'd for ^J>>rea^4 t h e t r u t h ? , a n d b y t h u s m i n g l i n g a n d p e r p l e x i n g a l l E s s e n c e o f things by an effect of their profound knowledge, Ctutst- theycaresuretopleasethemselves. Butasforyou,
if you are true Philosophers, you'll do as I fay. Simmias and Cebes jointly replied, that he said
well.
Echec, Indeed, Phedon, Ithink it no wonder ; for
to m y mind, Socrates explain'd his Principles with a wonderful neatness, sufficient to make an impression upon any Man ofcommon Sense.
Phed. All the Audience thought the same.
E c h e c . E v e n w e , w h o h a v e it o n l y a t s e c o n d h a n d , finditso. Butwhatwassaidnext?
Phed. IfIremember right,afterthey had granted,sySpecies, that the Species of things have a realSubfistance^^T^
and that the things participating of their Nature, Tea" of' taketheirdenominationfromthem; then,Ifay,So-things. , crates interrogated Cebes, as follows : whichfrisist,
If your Principle be true, when you fay Simmiaj 2 * ^ ^ S islarger than Socrates and lesser than Phedon-, doe/<~j? " hot you imply, that both Magnitude and Littleness
are lodged at the fame time in Simmies I
Yes, repliesCebes,
? ? . . But
? ? 154 Phedon : Or, A Dialogue
*Tis only But do not you own, that this Proposition, Sinr
fZZprism ! fniaS 1S toS? er than Socrates, is not absolutely and in ? omparyon. ^ ^ ^ tsue ^ por ^jmmiai jS not bigger because he
isSimmicu, butbecauseheispossessedofmagnitude. Neither is he bigger than Socrates because Socrates is Socrates, but because Socrates has littleness in the comparison withSimmias'smagnitude. NeitherisSim- tnias lesser than Phedon , because Phedon is Phedon, but because Phedon is big, when compared to Sim- mas, who islittle.
That's true.
Thus, contiues Socrates, Simmias is called both big and little, as being between two : By partaking of bigness he is bigger than Socrates, and by parta king likewise of littleness he is lesser than Phedon, Then he smil'd and said, Methinks I have insisted t o o l o n g u p o n t h e s e t h i n g s -, b u t I s h o n l d n o t h a v e
amus'd m y self with these large Strokes, had not it been to convince you more effectually of the truth ofmy Principle:for,asItakeit,notonlymagni t u d e it s e l f c a n n o t b e a t t h e s a m e t i m e b i g a n d s m a l l :
m meamubutbesides,themagnitudethatisinusdoesnotad- VwTcmtL mit ? ^ littlene*"s> and has no mind to be surpassed5 rUicZnt~f? x either the magnitude flees and yields its place
termen i>> when it fees its Enemy approaching, or else it va- tbefame rushesandperishesentirely,and,whenonceithas Suijea.
jtshortk? - Tobeginthen,prayseeifIrememberrightwhat capitulationwasobjected. Simmias,asItakeit,rejectsourbe-
"obth*TM" *'e^> on'v because he fears our Souls, notwithstand- '. """' ing their being Divine and more Excellent , will
die before our Bodies, as being only a fort of Har mony. And Cebes, if I mistake not, granted that the Soul is more durable than the Body, but thinks it possible that the Soul, after having us'd several
(a) Ifthesearetrue, Iam agreatGainerwith littleTrou ble j if false, I lose nothing : O n the contrary, I have gain'd agreatdeal:ForbesidestheHopethatsupportedme through my Afflictions,Infirmitiesand Weaknesses, Ihavebeen faith ful, honest, humble , thankful, charitable, sincere and true,
and have only quitted false and contagious Pleasures in ex change for real. -nd solid ones. M. Tafcal in his\Art. 7. h^s enlarg'd upon this Truth, and back'd it wit! ) << Demonstra tionofinEr. it;force. ' \
Bodies*
? ? of the Immortality of the Soul t
i jj
Bodies,may dieatlastwhenitquitsthelastBody, ind that this death of the Soul is a true Death. Arenotthese the two PointsIam toexamine, my learSimmias and Cebes?
When they had all agteed that the Objections vere justly summ'd up ; he/ continued thus : D o rou absolutely rejectall that I have said, or do you icknowledgepartofittobetrue>They answer'd, Thattheydidnotrejectthewhole. Butwhat,says l e , i s y o u r O p i n i o n o f w h a t I t o l d y o u >? v i s . t h a t learning,isonlyRemembrance,andthatbyaneceC iry Consequence the Soul must have an Existence efbre itsconjunction with the Body.
As for me, replies Cebes, I perceiv'd the evidence fitatfirstview;and donotknow anyPrinciples f more certainty and-Truth. Iam of the fame 4ind, fays Simmias, and should think itvery strange :' e v e r I c h a n g ' d m y O p i n i o n .
.
But, my dear Tbeban, continuesSo- ? ates,youmustneedschangeit,if Somtesmakeso^ttie
onretainyourOpinionthatHarmony ggj %s ^
compounded, and that the Soul is Thoughts.
ilyafortofHarmony arisingfromthe leUnionoftheQualitiesoftheBo- ,^mmy cannotexist
r:For 'tispresum'dyouwouldnot g? * **--*** :lieveyourself,ifyousaidthatHar- * ?
ony has a Being before those Things of which it composU
Sure enough, repliesSimmias,Iwould notbelieve
7 self if I did.
D o not you see then, continues Socrates, that you
inotofapiecewithyourself,whenyousaythe
ulhadaBeingbeforeitcametoanimatetheBo-
,and at thefame time,thatitiscompounded ofForthere's
ings that had not then an Existence ? D o not you d'fi? rdin
nparetheSoultoaHarmony? Andisitnotevi-&J^'
it that the Harp, the Strings, 'and the very dis- 23s! Zd
dant Sounds exist before the Harmony, whichP>theyare
m Effectthatresultsfromallthese<<Things, and^-"^^ ishessooner thanthey? Does thislatterpartof"J, r"
irDiscoursesuitwiththefirst? * Not
? ? j38
Phedon : Or, A Dialogue
Not atall,replies Simmias.
And yet,continuesSocrates,ifeveraDiscourse beallofapiece,itoughttobesuchwhenHarmo ny isitsSubject.
That's right, fays Simmias.
But yours is not so,continues Socrates. Let's hear then which of these two Opinions you side with : Whether is Learning only Remembrance, or istheSoulafortofHarmony?
I fide with the first, replies Simmias.
tcmfarifom (a)AndthatOpinionIhaveexplain'dtoyou, and similes without having any recourse to Demonstrations full ftfJsKU~ of Similes and Examples, which are rather colours
dml*' oftheTruth,andthereforepleasethePeoplebest; but as for me ,I am of Opinion that all Di scourses proving their Point by Similes, are full of vanity, and apt to seduce and deceive, unless one be very cautious, whether it relate to Geometry or any other Science : Whereas the Discourse I made for proving that Knowledge is Remembrance, isground ed upon a very creditable Hypothesis :For I told you that the Soul exists as well as its Essence before
itcomestoanimatetheBody. ByEssence1mean
(a) Marfilius Vicinal and de Serrts have strangely misunder stood this Passage, not only in making Simmiat speak all this ;
. -bnt what is more considerable, in putting a favourable Con struction on those words, v&ni <<xoV(C)- tivU x) 'eurpzWnf, which the one. renders, veristmitittantum-venustiqueexempli in-
*dicatione;andtheOther,txveristmiliquadam convenientiajand in separating the words Ivch Sro/^'/fsa*;whereas they are joyn'd;for'Socratesfays,/made thisDiscourse,withouthaving recourse to Demonfirations cramm'd with Similes and Colours' that t. dn:somuchwiththeTevfle. IneffectScordusdidnotibmuch as make life of one Comparison in makiroe good the Opinion
? ofRemembrance, WhereasSimmiashadbroughtintheCom parisonofa Harp to prove that theSoil}isa Harmony. N o w there's nothing misleads the Ignorant more than Simi litudes, for the Imagination is so feduc'd by the representa tion, that it blindly embraces all that presents it self to it. And by thatmeansthisOpinionofSimmias'sdidalwaysmeet withafavourablereception,anddoestothisdayamongthe Ignorant. ThisisaveryimportantPassage,anddefery'da larger Explication.
the
? ? of the Immortality os the Soul. 139
the Principle from which it derives its Being, which has no other name, but that whichts. And this Proof I take to be good and sufficient,
By that reason, lays Simmias, I must not listen ei therto my selfor others, who assertthe Soulto be a fort'of Harmony.
? In earnest Simmias, replies Socrates, do you think #***<<>>> that a Harmony, or any other Composure, can be %fijfij*j^ any thing different from the Parts of which it issratien? ilt
compounded ? fa composi- By no means, Socrates'. **>>>>j <<*?
Or can it do or suffer, what those Parts do not ? *jfcl"' not.
Simmias answefd, It could not. Then, says So
crates, a Harmony does not precede, but follows Harmmy "
theThings itiscomposedof. AnditcannothaveTMZ7y"Tits Sounds, Motions, or any thing else contrary tovans? ,hut itsParts. '? ' theSouiu
No sure, replies Simmias. But what, continuest0the* ^
Socrates, is not all Harmony only such in propor tion to the Concord of itsParts ?
I do not well understand you, fays Simmias.
I mean, according as the Parts have more or less ofConcord,theHarmonyismoreorleftaHarmo ny. Isitnot?
Yes, sure.
CanwelayoftheSoul,atthesamerate,thataj-st smalldifference makes aSoul tobemore orlessasJb,lmT Soul ? capableof
No, sure,Socrates. receiving Howisitthen,intheNameofGod? Do notleI'ormr''
w e fay, for Example, that such a Soul endow'd with Understanding and Vertue, is good -, and another filFd with Folly and Mischief, is wicked ? Is not thistight? .
Yes, sure, cjuoth Simmias.
But those who hokl. the Soul to be a Harmony, what willtheycalltheseQpalitiesoftheSoul,that Vice and that Vertue? Will they fay, the one's Harmony, and the other Discord ? That a vertuous
and good Soul,being Harmony initsNature, isen- ;' "- titled
? ? v.
titled to another Harmony ; and that a vicious wick ed Soul wants that additional Harmony.
I c a n n o t b e p o s i t i v e , r e p l i e s S i m m i a s t, b u t i n d e e d 'sisveryprobablethePatronsofthatOpinion may advancesome such thing.
But we concluded, that one Soul is not more or less a Soul than another ; that is, that it is not more or less a Harmony, than another Harmony.
I o w n it, fays Simmias.
Andsinceitisnotmore orlessaHarmonythen, ithasnotmoreorlessConcord. Isitnotso?
Yes, sure, Socrates.
And since it has not more or less of Concord ;
can one have more Harmony than another, or must
theHarmony of'emallbeequal? Questionless it must be equal.
s}nce one soui cannot be more or less a Soul
149
Phedon : Or, A Dialogue
1 ? 'M Souls
^">>m? t*iananother,bythelamereasonitcannothave w t h is * >> r << P r e ? r l e f t o f C o n c o r d t h a n a n o t h e r .
absurdity. "That'strue.
Then it follows necessarily that one Soul cannot have' either more Harmony or more Discord than another ?
I agree to it.
And by consequence, since the Soul is of that Nature, it cannot have more Vertue or Vice than another -,if so be that Vice is Discord, and Vertue Harmony ?
That's a standing Truth, faysSimmias.
ifAtSoul Or,wouldnotrightReasonrathersaythatVice w e r e a H a r - c o u $ & f i n d n o p l a c e i n t h e S o u l , i f s o b e t h e S o u l is
ZZulZl Harmony ; for Harmony, continuing in its perfect, suchthmg'Nature, isnotcapableofDiscord?
asaVuious There'snoquestionofthat.
w- InlikemannertheSoul,whileperfectlya Soul,
is not capable of Vice.
According to the Principles we agreed upon, i
cannot fee how itfhou'd.
Froir
? ? of she Immortality of the Soil. 14 i
From the same very Principles, it will follow Tj*s<nd,0f that the Souls of all Animals are equally good, since *r*m
theyareequallySouls. J * ^
So I think, fays SimnHas. tJe ? it1* But do you think that it stands with right Rea- those <</?
son, if the Hypothesis of the Souls being a Harmo- Mn>
nybetrue?
No, sure, Socrates. ThenIaskyou,Simmias,ifofallthePartsof/? m**the
aMan, the Soulisnot bestentitledtoCommand,So>>icam- eipeciallywhen (heisPrudentandWise>>> m4ndsthe
There's no other Part can pretend to it. ? ? ? r
DoesitCommandby givingwaytothePassionsy^/^^ of the Body; or by resisting them > As for Exam- commands
pie, when the Body is seiz'd with Thirst in the cold tbe Har- Fit of a Fever, does not the Soul restrain it from mm>
drinking ? Or, when 'tis hungry, does it not re strain it from eating ? As well as in a thousand other Instances,which manifestly shew that the Soul curbsthePassionsoftheBody. Isitnotso?
Without question.
ButweagreedabovethattheSoulbeing asortofTi>eSoul Harmony , can never found contrary to the sound th^ts th'
ofthosethings which raise,orlower,ormoveitj^bX- nor have other Passions, different from those of its^uid, it
Parts-,and thatitisnecessarilyoblig'dtofollowcouldnot them, as being uncapable to guide them. do, ifit
'Tis certain we agreed upon that, fays Simmias :^ * How couldwe avoidit?
But,faysSocrate. iyisitnot evidentthattheCon duct of the Soul is the downright contrary ? That it governs and rules those very Things which are alledg'd for Ingredients in its Composition ; that it thwarts and attack's 'em almost all its life-time ;that is every way their Mistress, punishing and repres sing some by the harder measures of Pain, School- Exercises and Physick-, and treating others more gently, as contenting it-self with threatning or in filltingoveritsLusts,PassionandFear. In aword, w e iee the Soul speaks to the Body as something
of
? ? 14,2 Phedon : Or, A Dialogue
ofadifferent Nature from itself;which Homer was sensible of, when, in his Odyjses he HomerlTMwthatthe tellsthatUlyssesbeatinghisBreastsre-
HatureoftheSoulisdis- fatfj fa Hgart and said to z>, sup-
19thB>>okofhisOdyS- gainst harder and more difficultthings than these.
Do you think the Poet spoke that, under the
apprehensions of the Souls being a Harmony to be managed and conducted by the Body ? Or, do not
you rather believe that he knew, 'twas the Souls partto Command, andthatitisofa more Divine Nature than Harmony ?
Yes,Socrates;IswearIam persuadedHomer knew that Truth.
And by Consequence, my dear Simmias,continues
Socrates, there isnot the least Colour of Reason for t h e S o u l s b e i n g a H a r m o n y ? , s h o u l d w e a s s e r t i t t o
besuch,we shouldcontradictboth Homer,thatdi vinePoet,andlikewiseourselves. Simmiasyielded; and Socrates proceeded thus.
I think w e have sufficiently tempet'd and m o d e
rated this (a) Theban Harmony, so that itwill do
IvhyCebesusnoharm- ButCebes,howshallwedotoap- wascall'dpeafeand disarmthis(b)Cadmm? How shallwe
fieitem. hitonaDiscourse,dulyqualifiedwithapersuasive 1force ?
If you'll be at the pains, Socrates, you can easily ( find such a Discourse. The last you had against' the Harmony of the Soul, mov'd me mightily, and
(a)HecallsSimmias'sOpinionaTheban Harmony,alluding to the Fable of ^imfhion, who by the Harmony ot"his Harp built the Walls of Thebes. In like manner Simmias with his pretended Harmony rear'd up the humane Body.
(b) H e calls Cebes another Cadmus, because as Cadmus b y s o w ing the Teeth of the Dragon he had kill'd, fetch'd out of the Bosom or the Earth a Race of fierce Men that liv'd but one Minute : So Cebes by the Opinion os the Mortality of the Soul, a thing more poysonous than the Teeth of a Dragon, made allMen earthly and beastly,and left'embut a very short Life.
indeed
? ? of the Immortality of the Soul. 145
indeed beyond my expectation :For when Simmlas propos'd his Doubts, I thought nothing short of a Prodigy or Miracle could solve 'em :And I was mightily surpris'd when I saw he could not stand yourfirstAttack. Sothatnowitwillbenosur- prisal to me to see Cadmus undergo the same fate.
M y dear Cebes, replies Socrates? 0 not you speak too big upon the matter, lest Envy should overturn all I have said, and render it useless and ineffectual* Butthat'sintheHandsofGod. Asforus,letus approach one another, as Homer fays, and try our StrengthandArms. Whatyouwantcomesallto this Point ; you would have the Immortality and Incorruptibility of the Soul demonstrated, to the end that a Philosopher, w h o dies bravely in the hopes of being infinitelymore happy in the other World than inthis,maynothopeinvain. Youfay,theSoul's being a durable and divine Substance, existing before
its joyning with the Body, does not conclude its Immortality-, and the only Inference that it will bear,is,thatitlastsagreat whilelonger,andwas inbeingmany Agesbeforeus,duringwhichitknew
and did several things ; but without Immortality :
For on the contrary, the first Minute of its descent intotheBody,istheCommencementofitsDeath;
or, as it were a Disease to it : For it passes this Life
in Anguish and Trouble, and at last is quite swal- low'dupandannihilatedby whatwecallDeath. You
add, that 'tis the fame thing, whether itanimatesThorewlii a Body only once, or returns to itseveral times,bdieyethe since that does not alter the occasion of our Fears, Mortality forasmuchasallwifeMen oughtstilltofearDeath,*? ***Smi>
while they are uncertain of the Immortality of|"fr'^? t/j
theirSouls. This,Itakeit,istheSummofwhatitsannibi-
you saidjand Irepeat itsooften,onpurpose,'<<*'*>><*<* that nothing may escape my view, and that yovlutikJ"*
,'7_? cjj- -? ? canstoffeat m a y h a v e t h e o p p o r t u n i t y o r a d d i n g , o r i m p a i r i n g t0 Jal l 'w\rt
as you please. Mi>>. At present, says Cebes, I have nothing to alter :
That
? ? |44
Phedoft : 0ry A Dthlogm
That is the just Summ of all I have yet . said.
Socrates was silent, a pretty while , as being
drown'd in profound Meditation : At last, Cebes,
lays he, 'tis truly not a small matter that you de>
mand ; for in order to a just satisfaction, there's a
. necessityof making a narrow Enquiryintothecause
of Generation and Corruption. If you please I'l
tellyouwhat happen'dtomeuponthislamevery matter ? and if what I fay seem useful to you, you
shall be at liberty to make use of it to support your Sentiments.
With allmy heart,faysSimmias. <Praygweearthen,faysSocrates:InmyyouthI
SocratesinhaeLan insatiable desire to learn that Science, which tisyouth, iS caii'd Natural. Historyh for I thought it was
iWe/ *somethingGreatandDivinetoknowtheCausesof vhysicks. everything,oftheirGeneration,Death,andExistence. And I fpar'd no Pains, nor omitted any Means, for trying in the first place, if (a) a certain corruption ofhotand cold,will,assome pretend,,giveBeing and Nourishmentto Animals;ifthe. Bloodmakes
theThought;ifAiror Fire,,orthe Brain alone is
the cause of our Senses, of Seeing, Hearing, Smel
ling, &c. ifMemory and Opinion take their rise
from these Senses, and if Knowledge be the result
ofMemoryandOpinion. Then Iwantedtoknow the
causesoftheirCorruption,andextendedmy curiosity
both to the Heavens and the cavities ofthe Earth,and
would fain have known the Cause ofall thePhenome
nawemeetwith. Atlast,afteragreatdealoftrou\
ble,! foundmy selfstrangelyunqualifiedforsuchEn- ' q u i r i e s ? , a n d o f t h i s I a m a b o u t t o g i v e y o u a s e n s i
ble Proof (b) This tine study made me ib blind in
(a) Socrates said he was ignorant of all these Things, be causehe knew nothingbutSecondCauses. Nowtoknow them justly, one ought to know God, and the Vertue he di splays in Nature.
(b) Its utmost reach amounts to no more than an imper fectKnowledgeofSecondCauses. Now theseSecondCauses do not lead us into the knowledge of the Essence of Things.
A
? ? of the Immortality of the Soul. 145; intheThingsIknew more evidently before^accord-~*strange
ingtomyown and otherPersonsThoughts, that iffif'i'1"
q u i t e f o r g o t a l l t h a t I h a d k n o w n u p o n s e v e r a l S u b - - p h y f y L . - jects,particularlythatofaMan'sgrowth, {"thoughtitblind,
twas evident to the whole World , that a Man '>>st'*dof grows only by eating and drinking : For Flesh jjJjJS*
beingaddedtoFlesh^BonestoBones,and allthestanding"' other Parts joyn'd to their similar Parts by Nourish- v
m e n t , ,m a k e a s m a l l B u l k t o s w e l l a n d g r o w , s o t h a t alittleManbecomeslarge. ThiswasmyThought. x Do notyouthink'twasjust?
Yes sure, replies Cebes.
Mind what follows,fays Socrates:I thought likewise that I knew the Reason why one Man is taller than another by the Head, and one Horse higherthananother:And withreferencetoplainer and more sensible Things, I thought, for Instance, that ten was more than eight, because two were added to it ; that two Cubits were larger than One, because they contain'd one half more.
And what are your present Thoughts of those Things,fays Cebes?
I am so far, replies Socrates, from
thinking that I know the Causes of all & afterwards givfS thesethings;that,whenoneis. added ***W<<>>? /**>>/<<D<<rf<<,
to one, I do not believe I can tellwhe- theritisthatveryonetowhichthe
, . ,,,,? '.
otheris added thatbecomes twojor
whethertheoneadded,andtheoneto
which the addition was made make
:wo together > For in their separate state, each of em wasoneandnottwo;andaftertheirbeing
\. Man is so far from improving his Knowledge by them, hat he must needs own his Ignorance of the Things he pre- ended to know. All Philosophers at this day know that M o u r i s l i m e n t b y t h e m e a n s o f H e a t is t h e c a u s e o f t h e g r o w t h )fanyAnimal. Butthey'reallatalosstoknowbywhat Virtue it grows or ceases to grow, and what are the limits )fitsgrowth. What;misfortuneisitforaMantoplodall lis life-time for the knowing of nothing !
K k plac'd
JSSv T fa\h tmjmanar d , when they amidnotstewboworwhy
<>>><<andonemaketwo.
? ? 146
Phedon: Or, A Dialogae
plac'donebytheother,theybecametwo. Neither canItellhow, uponthedivisionofanything,what was formerly one becomes two, from the very mi nuteofdivision:Forthat Causeisquitecontrary to that which makes one and ohe become two.
There this ohe, and this one become two, by reason
of their being plac'd near and added, the one to
the other : But, here this one Thing becomes two by
reasonofitsdivisionandseparation. Farlessdo
I pretend to know whence this one Thing comes, and
bythisMethod (i. e. byPhysicalReasons)Ican
not findouthow theleast Thing takes rife or pe- Hemeansrifhes,orhowitexists. ButwithoutsomuchCe-
rTolrfetl remony> I mix another Method ofmy own with thefirst this,forbythisIcanlearnnothing:Havingone
cau. fe,far day heard some Body reading a Book of (b) Anaxa- exhumingg0ras\ whosaidthe DivineIntellectwasthecause
*lytZ? ? L. ? f a^ Beings, and drew 'em up in their proper
ficks. ^ Ranks and Clasies? ,I was ravish'd with Joy. I
7>obUbegin-perceiv'd there was nothing more certain than this <<<>>? /"? a-Principle, that the Intellectisthe cause ofall Be- '
naxaSoras. ifigs> Fq]. jjufllythought thattMsInteUeahaving
methodis'd all Things and rank'd 'em in their Clas ses, (c) planted every Thing in the Place and Con-
( b ) ^ i n a x a g o r a s w a s t h e first t h a t s a i d t h e I n t e l l e c t o r S p i r i t of God rank'd the Parts of Matter, and put 'em in motion. And 'twasthatPrinciplethatusher'dinhisPhysicks. This fair Exordium gave Socrates occasion to think thathe would ex-M plain allthe Secrets ofNature,by unfolding the divine VertueB difplay'duponit,andassigningtheReasonswhy everyThing! wassoandso. ButthatPhilosopherdidnotkeepup'tohis first Principle ; for he wav'd the first Cause, and inhsted on second Causes, and by so doing frustrated the expectation ot hisKeaders. ' ' .
(c) Here Socrates recals us to the first Truth, that G o d cre ated allThingsgood,and intheirbestslate;accordingto Mofcs,who fays,Godsaw allThingsthathehadmade,and be laidtheywereverygood. Now inordertoknowwhy Things arethusgood,wemustenquireintothe'Nature ofthisOri ginal Goodness, and survey the sttate they were created in. What asorrythingisPhysicksthen,thatknows nothing butsecond Causes,or rather,thatdoesnotcertainlyknow tiitfe second Cause; ?
dition
? ? bf the Imhtdrtalit) bfifre Soul 147
dition that was best and most useful for it, in which itcould best do and suffer whatever the Intellect hadallottedto it*and Iapprehended thatthe re sultof this Principle, was, that the only Thing a Man ought to look for, either for himselfor others*
1 isthisbetterandmoreusefulthing:Forhavingonce found what is best and most useful, he'll necessarily know what is worst, since there is but one Know ledge both for the one and the other.
Upon this score I was infinitely glad, that I had
foundsuchaMasterasAnaxagoras^who Ihop'd
would give a satisfactory Account of the Cause of allThings? ,and would not only tellme, for In-^f"*? *. *"<<
stance, that the Earth is broad or round, but like-yftf*fophei wifeassignthe necessaryCauseobligingittobeso:0(^JH Who wouldpointouttomewhatwasbest,andatteach: thefametimegivemetounderstandwhyitwas
so. Inlikemanner, ifheaffirm'dtheSeatofthe
Earth to be in the Centre of the World, I expected -hewould give meaReasonwhyitwasso:And, after Ishould have received sufficient Instruction from him, defign'd never to admit of any other
Causefora Principle.
I prepare some Questions, to be put to him con-
fcerningtheSun,Moon,and otherStars,inorderto know the Reasons of their Revolutions, Motions, and other Accidents, and why what each of them
? d o e s is always the best : For I could not imagine. ,
I that after he had told me, that the Intellect rank'd "them, anddrewthemupinorder,thathecou'dgiveindeed,that
me nootherreasonofthatOrderthanthis,thatitwasXw*fe&e
best. AndIflatter'dmyselfwithhopes,thatafterhe^fj^ hadaffign'dboththegeneraland particularCauses,9mthanad
he would giveme toknow, wherein the particularTnafirest Good ofeveryindividualThing,aswellasthecom-But'fVf0*
monGoodofallThingsconsists. Iwouldnothavefn*TMui;-L ? jbarted with these Hopes for all the Treasures of the
World. SoIboughthisBookswithagreatdealofIm-
? >atience;gridmade itmyBusinesstoperuse'emas Kk i ? fdori
? 148
Phedon : Or, A Dialogue
Socrates
soon as possibly I could, in order to a speedy know ledgeoftheGoodandtheEvilofallThings:But Ifound my selffrustrated ofmy mighty Hopesj for as soon as I had made a small progress in the perusal,IfoundtheAuthormade no useofthisIn tellect, and affign'd no Reason of that fine Order and Disposition ; but affign'd as Causes the Air, Whirlwinds, the Waters, and other Things equally absur'd.
ridiculesth* His whole Performance ieem'd to reach no far- ? pbysieis ther,thanifaManshouldfay,thatSocratesdoes
otfI"si a^tythe*nteHe&>andafterthat,meaningtogive TendclJfis. a Reason for all my Actions, should say, for In-
'stance, to day I am set upon my Bed,because my Body is composed of Bones and Nerves-, theBones being hard and solid, are separated by the Joints;
and the Nerves being capable to bend and unbend. ? uni. trthe themselves, tye the Bones to the Flesh, and the" ? Notionof Skin,which receivesand includesboththeoneand
<<m7<<W*the0t'ier'^at*e Bones beingdisengag'datthe 'jZsiles. 'Joints, the Nerves which bend and unbend, enable m e to fold m y Legs as you fee, and that fotiooth
isthereason thatIsitinthis Posture: Or,ifaMan pretending to assign the Cause of my present Con ferencewithyou, shouldinsistonlyupon thesecond Causes, the Voice, the Air, Hearing, and such other Things , and should take no notice of the true Cause, viz. that the Athenians thought it fit to conl demn me, and that by the same reason I thought it] fittestfor me to behere,and patiently wait the e x e c u t i o n o f - m y S e n t e n c e -, f o r I c a n s a f e l y ( a ) s w e a r that these Nerves and these Bones should long ere now have been translated to Megara, or Bceotia^ if
{a)IntheGreekitruns,ForIswearbytheDog. Lattantitu checkshimforthisOath. ButSt. Augi-stininLib. IV. Os tin trueReligion,justifieshim,asifSocratesmean'dto give thf Athenianstoknow,thatevenaDog,beingtheWorkman shiposGod, deierv'dmore Honourthan alltheIdols the' sworeby. Itmaylikewisebealledg'dthatSocratessworeb aDog, aGoose, &c. inorder to accustom Men to forbea taking the N a m e of G o d so often in vain.
th;
? ? of the Immortality ofthe Soul. 149
that had been fitter for me, and if I had not been still persuaded that it was better and fitter for m e toendurethePunishment Iam doom'd tobymy Country, than to flee like a Slave or a banish'd Person. As I take it, 'tis highly ridiculous to as sign such Causes upon such an Occasion, and to rest satisfiedin them.
If itbe replied,That without Bones and Nerves, andsuchotherThings,IcouldnotdowhatImeanTheum? fi
to do5the Allegation istrue. But itsavours^>fp*jy?
thegreatestAbsurdity, to fanfiethattheseBones ornZTthey
Nerves should be the cause of m y Actions rather are at a than thechoice ofwhat isbest;andthatmy In-fi"nd-
tellect is employed on that score : For that were to sink the Difference between the Cause-, and the Thing without which the Cause could not be such. And yet the vulgar People, who take Things by hearsay, and see by other Peoples Eyes, as if they
walk'd in thick Darkness, take the true Cause of Things to be of that Nature. Pursuant to this
Notion some surround the Earth with a Vortex that _ turns eternally round, and suppose it to be fix'd in ^s0%*fon
the Centre of the Universe : Others conceive it to osAaaxi-
be a broad and large Trough, which has the Air for menes, a- itsBaseandFoundation. AndasforthePowerofntxagoras, himwho rank'danddisposedofeveryThingtoits *? e~
best advantage that is not in their view, and they
don't believe that he's intitled to any Divine Vertjue :p>;s m 1 m They fanfie they know ofa strongerand more Ira-<<theirown mortal Atlas, more capable to support all Things Judgment, And thisgoodaadimmortalTye,thatisonlyca-01T7**, pable to unite and comprehend all Things, they take ! jTML 'ani for a Chimera. ' Weakness.
Iam notoftheirmind,butwouldwillinglylist
m y self a Disciple to any that could tell m e this
Cause,letitbewhatitwill. But,sinceIcould
not compass the knowledge of it, neither by my s e l f n o r o t h e r s ? , i f y o u p l e a s e , I ' l l g i v e y o u a n A c
count of a second Trial 1 made in order to'find it. Kk3 Iam
? ? ijo
Phedon: Or, A Dialogue
Iam verydesiroustohearit,faysCebes.
After I had wearied my self in examining all things,IthoughtitmyDutytobecautiousofal- voiding what happens to those who contemplate an Eclipse of the Sun : For they lose the fight of it, without they be so careful as to view its Reflection
in Water or any other Medium. A Bycontemplatingobjeiii Thought much like to that came into
* X Sr&Vfc m Head andIfearedIwouldlose
Mnd. * rbeyoughttobelook'd
the Eyes of the Soul, it I viewed Ob- jectswiththeEyesoftheBody, orem- pWd any0fmySensesinindeavour-
uponthoughaMedium,
W tfc*Medium>>Jfei- jngtQknQW>em> jthoughtjfbaM
M
have recourse to Reason, and contem plate the Truth of all Things as reflected from it. 'Tispossiblethe Simile I useinexplainingmy self, isnotveryiast (<z);ForImy selfcannotaffirm, that he who beholds Things in the Glass of Reason, sees 'em more by Reflection and Similitude, than he who beholds'emintheirOperations. However,theway I followed was this : From that time forward I
grounded all upon the Reason that seemed to be best, and took all for Truth, that I found confor mable to it, whether in Things or Causes. And what was not conformable I rejected, as being false. I'llexplainmy meaningmoredistinctly$forIfancy
you do not yet understand me.
I'llswear, says Cebes, I do not well understand
you.
But, after all, fays Socrates, I advance no new
thing. This is no more than what I have saida" thousand times, and particularly in the foregoing Dispute : For all that I aim at , is to demonstrate what fort of Cause this is, that I sought after so carefully: Ibegin with his Qualities, which are so much talked or, and which \ take for the Founda-
(a) H e justly checks himself: for Reasons are not like other Mediums: theygiveustoknow theEssenceofThings insome measure,whichtheOperationsdonot. . . . . . ,. 4
tlOTL
? ? of the Immortality of the Soul. i? i
tion. I say then, there is something thatisgood,fine,justandgreatofit ***immaterialande- self. If you grant me this Principle, t<<TMisi>>duush*yea>>e- Z. . *. ? 1 n. i r* r ceffaryrelationtotheIm- IhopebyittodemonstratetheCause, 2rtdityoftheSo>>i-J>>cb
andmakeouttheImmortalityofthe asaCausehutottsEffetis.
jjoul.
I grant it, says Cebes : you cannot be too quick
intersecting your Demonstration.
Mind what follows , and fee if you agree to it as. J. Take it,ifthereisany thing fine,besides fineness it self, it must be such by partaking of that firstgood:andsoofalltheotherQualities. Are
you of this Opinion ?
Iam.
I protest, cotinues Socrates,. I cannot well under- nis * *>> standalltheotherlearnedCauses, thatarecommon-Irm>
Jygivenus. ButifanyManaskmewhatmakesa
thing fine, whether the liveliness of its Colours, or
the just proportion of its Parts and the like ; I wave alltheseplausibleReasons whichserve . w onlytoconfoundme;andwithoutLe- whatcom? unicatesofthe remonyorArt,makeanswer,andper- firstfinebeing,\. e. oe- hapstoosimply,thatitsfinenessisonly cordingtotheproportionof
owingtothepresence,orapproach,or Z s ^ o / ^ X communicationoftheoriginalfineBe- prstCa>>fiosallThing,. ing, whatever be the way of that com
munication. ForIamnotyetcertaininwhatman
ner it is : I only k n o w certainly, that all these fine Things are render'd such by the presence of this fine Being. WhileIstandbythisPrinciple,IreckonI capnot be deceiv'd; and I a m perswaded, that I m a y safely make answer to all Questions whatsoever, that all fine Things owe their Fineness to the presence oftheabove-mentionedBeing. Arenotyouofthe- same mind?
Yes, sure, Soerates.
Are net great and small things render'd such in likemanner? IfOnetoldyou,thatsuchathingis Kk 4 larger
? ? \
iji
Phedon : Or, A Dialogue
larger than another by the Head ; (a) would not you t h i n k t h e E x p r e s s i o n f a r f r o m b e i n g e x a c t ? , a n d w o u l d
not you make answer, that whatever is larger is render'd such by magnitude it self, and what is smal lerowesitslittlenesstolittlenessitself> Forifyou said, that such a thing is greater or smaller than anoi ther by the Head , I fancy you would fear bjjjg
censur'd, for making both the greater and MBer t h i n g t o b e s u c h b y t h e l a m e c a u s e ? , a n d b e a d e s , f o r
using such an Expression as seems to imply, that' the Head, which is a small part, makes the largnels of the greater, which in effect is a Monster ; for what can be more absurd than to lay, that a small Matter makesathinglarge> WouldnotyoufearsuchOb
jections>
. Yes, sure, replies Cebes, smiling.
By the same reason would not you be afrraid to say,thattenismorethaneight, andsurpassesitby two ? And would not you rather fay, that ten are morethaneightbyquantity> Inlikemanner,of two Cubits would not you fay, they are larger than One by magnitude, rather than by the half? For still there's the fame occasion of fear.
You fay well.
But when one is added to one, or a thing divided
into halfs, would not you avoid saying, that in the
former Case addition makes one and one two, and
In the latter division makes one thing become two?
Andwouldnotyouprotest,thatyouknownoother fat"r'iEf~cause of the existence of things, than the participa-
fZdlnr'up-tl0n? ftne essencethat'speculiar toevery subject'; onthefirst and consequently no other reason why one and one
Truth, viz. makes two, but the participation of duality, as one G"hi)h 1Sonekytneparticipationofunity? Wouldnotyou
"Jhsistl'anddiscard these additions, divisions and all the other
fromwhencetec answers, and leave 'em to those who know more it proceeds.
(a) So;rates does not condemn the receiv'd Expressions, but means tn shew, that they do not reach the Nature and Essence of Thiny j and, being always ty'd to Matter, cannot bear up to the true EiUnce that does all.
ofanim-
than
? ? of the Immortality of the Soul I$j
than you do ? And, for fear of your own Shadow,
as the Proverb goes, or rather of your Ignorance,
would not you confine your self to this Principle >
And, if any one attack'd it, would not you let it
stand without daigning him an answer, tillyou had
surveyed all the consequences , to fee if they are of
a. piece or not ? And if afterwards you should be
obligedtogiveareasonforthem, wouldnotyoudoa trueway
itby havingrecoursetosomeoftheseotherHypotbe-? ffi^s /<<,that should appear to be the best ; and so proceed ? *^/,e
from Hypothesis to Hypothesis, till you lighted upon something that satisfied you, as being a sure and
standing truth ? At the fame time you would be loth FortheEf- toperplexand confound allthings asthoseDilpu-feflsaremt tantsdo,whocallallthingsinquestion. 'Tistrue,{*-^*'\? he these Disputants perhaps are not much cqncern'd for ^J>>rea^4 t h e t r u t h ? , a n d b y t h u s m i n g l i n g a n d p e r p l e x i n g a l l E s s e n c e o f things by an effect of their profound knowledge, Ctutst- theycaresuretopleasethemselves. Butasforyou,
if you are true Philosophers, you'll do as I fay. Simmias and Cebes jointly replied, that he said
well.
Echec, Indeed, Phedon, Ithink it no wonder ; for
to m y mind, Socrates explain'd his Principles with a wonderful neatness, sufficient to make an impression upon any Man ofcommon Sense.
Phed. All the Audience thought the same.
E c h e c . E v e n w e , w h o h a v e it o n l y a t s e c o n d h a n d , finditso. Butwhatwassaidnext?
Phed. IfIremember right,afterthey had granted,sySpecies, that the Species of things have a realSubfistance^^T^
and that the things participating of their Nature, Tea" of' taketheirdenominationfromthem; then,Ifay,So-things. , crates interrogated Cebes, as follows : whichfrisist,
If your Principle be true, when you fay Simmiaj 2 * ^ ^ S islarger than Socrates and lesser than Phedon-, doe/<~j? " hot you imply, that both Magnitude and Littleness
are lodged at the fame time in Simmies I
Yes, repliesCebes,
? ? . . But
? ? 154 Phedon : Or, A Dialogue
*Tis only But do not you own, that this Proposition, Sinr
fZZprism ! fniaS 1S toS? er than Socrates, is not absolutely and in ? omparyon. ^ ^ ^ tsue ^ por ^jmmiai jS not bigger because he
isSimmicu, butbecauseheispossessedofmagnitude. Neither is he bigger than Socrates because Socrates is Socrates, but because Socrates has littleness in the comparison withSimmias'smagnitude. NeitherisSim- tnias lesser than Phedon , because Phedon is Phedon, but because Phedon is big, when compared to Sim- mas, who islittle.
That's true.
Thus, contiues Socrates, Simmias is called both big and little, as being between two : By partaking of bigness he is bigger than Socrates, and by parta king likewise of littleness he is lesser than Phedon, Then he smil'd and said, Methinks I have insisted t o o l o n g u p o n t h e s e t h i n g s -, b u t I s h o n l d n o t h a v e
amus'd m y self with these large Strokes, had not it been to convince you more effectually of the truth ofmy Principle:for,asItakeit,notonlymagni t u d e it s e l f c a n n o t b e a t t h e s a m e t i m e b i g a n d s m a l l :
m meamubutbesides,themagnitudethatisinusdoesnotad- VwTcmtL mit ? ^ littlene*"s> and has no mind to be surpassed5 rUicZnt~f? x either the magnitude flees and yields its place
termen i>> when it fees its Enemy approaching, or else it va- tbefame rushesandperishesentirely,and,whenonceithas Suijea.
