No More Learning

*9* THE SUBJECT COUNTRIES book iv
and abroad, by land and by sea; the island became the recruiting ground for the surrounding kingdoms, after that evil was no longer tolerated in the Peloponnesus, and above all the true seat of piracy ; about this period, for instance, the island of Siphnus was thoroughly pillaged by a fleet of Cretan corsairs. Rhodes —which, besides, was unable to recover from the loss of its possessions on the mainland and from the blows inflicted on its commerce
— expended its last energies in the wars which found itself compelled to wage against the Cretans for the suppression of piracy
160. (about 600), and which the Romans sought to mediate, but without earnestness and apparently without success.
CIHda. ,^p Along with Crete, Cilicia soon began to become second home for this buccaneering system. Piracy there not only gained ground owing to the impotence of the Syrian rulers, but the usurper Diodotus Tryphon, who had
146-189. risen from slave to be king of Syria (608-615), encouraged by all means in his chief seat, the rugged or western
Cilicia, with view to strengthen his throne the aid of the corsairs. The uncommonly lucrative character of the traffic with the pirates, who were at once the principal captors of, and dealers in, slaves, procured for them among the mercantile public, even in Alexandria, Rhodes, and Delos, a certain toleration, which the very govern ments shared at least inaction. The evil was so serious
143. that the senate, about 611, sent its best man Scipio Aemilianus to Alexandria and Syria, in order to ascertain on the spot what could be done in the matter. But diplomatic representations of the Romans did not make weak governments strong there was no other remedy but that of directly maintaining fleet in these waters, and for this the Roman government lacked energy and persever ance. So all things just remained on the old footing the piratic fleet was the only considerable naval power in the Mediterranean the capture of men was the only trade
;
;
; a
by
in
it
by
5)
it
a a
a
in
(ii.
5 1
chap, i THE SUBJECT COUNTRIES 293
that flourished there. The Roman government was an onlooker ; but the Roman merchants, as the best customers in the slave market, kept up an active and friendly traffic with the pirate captains, as the most important wholesale dealers in that commodity, at Delos and elsewhere.
^| C
I '
We have followed the transformation of the outward General relations of Rome and the Romano-Hellenic world generally result- in its leading outlines, from the battle of Pydna to the period
of the Gracchi, from the Tagus and the Bagradas to the
Nile and the Euphrates. It was a great and difficult problem which Rome undertook, when she undertook to
govern this Romano-Hellenic world; it was not wholly misunderstood, but it was by no means solved. The \ untenableness of the idea of Cato's time — that the state
should be limited to Italy, and that its rule beyond Italy
should be only over clients—was doubtless discerned by
the leading men of the following generation ; and the necessity of substituting for this ruling by clientship a direct sovereignty of Rome, that should preserve the liberties of
the communities, was doubtless recognized. But instead
of carrying out this new arrangement firmly, speedily, and uniformly, they annexed isolated provinces just as con venience, caprice, collateral advantage, or accident led them
to do so; whereas the greater portion of the territory
under clientship either remained in the intolerable uncer
tainty of its former position, or even, as was the case with
Syria especially, withdrew entirely from the influence of . Rome. And even the government itself degenerated more
and more into a feeble and short-sighted selfishness. They were content with governing from one day to another, and merely transacting the current business as exigency required. They were stern masters towards the weak. When the
city of Mylasa in Caria sent to Publius Crassus, consul in 623, a beam for the construction of a battering-ram different 181. from what he had asked, the chief magistrate of the town
I
was scourged for it ; and Crassus was not a bad man, and a strictly upright magistrate. On the other hand sternness was wanting in those cases where it would have been in place, as in dealing with the barbarians on the frontiers and with the pirates. When the central
( '
provinces to confine itself to the part of a mere onlooker, the law of nations was directly trampled under foot by the Roman governors ; and the honour of Rome was perma nently dragged in the mire by a faithlessness and treachery without parallel, by the most wanton trifling with capitula tions and treaties, by massacring people who had submitted and instigating the assassination of the generals of the enemy. Nor was this all ; war was even waged and peace concluded against the expressed will of the
294 THE SUBJECT COUNTRIES book iv
government renounced all superintendence and all oversight of pro
vincial affairs, it entirely abandoned not only the interests of the subjects, but also those of the state, to the governor of the day. The events which occurred in Spain, unimpor tant in themselves, are instructive in this respect. In that
/ country, where the government was less able than in other
supreme authority in Rome, and unimportant incidents, such as the disobedience of the Numantines, were developed by a
rare combination of perversity and folly into a crisis of fatal
moment for the state. And all this took place without any / effort to visit it with even a serious penalty in Rome. Not only did the sympathies and rivalries of the different coteries in the senate contribute to decide the filling up of the most important places and the treatment of the most
momentous political questions; but even thus early the money of foreign dynasts found its way to the senators of Rome. Timarchus, the envoy of Antiochus Epiphanes
ISA. king of Syria (t 590), is mentioned as the first who attempted with success to bribe the Roman senate; the bestowal >f presents from foreign kings on influential senators on became so common, that surprise was excited
/
chap, I THE SUBJECT COUNTRIES 195
when Scipio Aemilianus cast into the military chest the gifts from the king of Syria which reached him in camp before Numantia. The ancient principle, that rule was its own sole reward and that such rule was as much a duty and a burden as a privilege and a benefit, was allowed to
fall wholly into abeyance. Thus there arose the new state- economy, which turned its eyes away from the taxation of the burgesses, but regarded the body of subjects, on the other hand, as a profitable possession of the community, which it partly worked out for the public benefit, partly handed over to be worked out by the burgesses. Not only was
free scope allowed with criminal indulgence to the un scrupulous greed of the Roman merchant in the provincial administration, but even the commercial rivals who were disagreeable to him were cleared away by the armies of the state, and the most glorious cities of neighbouring lands were sacrificed, not to the barbarism of the lust of power,
but to the far more horrible barbarism of speculation. By ,. , the ruin of the earlier military organization, which certainly imposed heavy burdens on the burgesses, the state, which
was solely dependent in the last resort on its military superiority, undermined its own support. The fleet was allowed to go to ruin ; the system of land warfare fell into the most incredible decay. The duty of guarding the Asiatic and African frontiers was devolved on the subjects ;
and what could not be so devolved, such as the defence of
the frontier in Italy, Macedonia, and Spain, was managed after the most wretched fashion. The better classes began
to disappear so much from the army, that it was already difficult to raise the necessary number of officers for the Spanish armies. The daily increasing aversion to the Spanish war-service in particular, combined with the par tiality shown by the magistrates in the levy, rendered it necessary in 602 to abandon the old practice of leaving the 168. selection of the requisite number of soldiers from the men
161. 136.
496 THE SUBJECT COUNTRIES book iv
liable to serve to the free discretion of the officers, and to substitute for it the drawing lots on the part of all the men liable to service — certainly not to the advantage of the military esprit de corps, or of the warlike efficiency of the individual divisions. The authorities, instead of acting with vigour and sternness, extended their pitiful flattery of the people even to this field ; whenever a consul in the discharge of his duty instituted rigorous levies for the Spanish service, the tribunes made use of their constitu- tional right to arrest him (603, 616); and it has been already observed, that Scipio's request that he should be allowed a levy for the Numantine war was directly rejected by the senate. Accordingly the Roman armies before Carthage or Numantia already remind one of those Syrian armies, in which the number of bakers, cooks, actors, and other non-combatants exceeded fourfold that of the so-called
soldiers ; already the Roman generals are little behind their Carthaginian colleagues in the art of ruining armies, and the wars in Africa as in Spain, in Macedonia as in Asia, are regularly opened with defeats ; the murder of Gnaeus Octavius is now passed over in silence ; the assassination of Viriathus is now a masterpiece of Roman diplomacy ; the conquest of Numantia is now a great achievement How completely the idea of national and manly honour was already lost among the Romans, was shown with epigrammatic point by the statue of the stripped and bound Mancinus, which he himself, proud of his patriotic devoted- ness, caused to be erected in Rome. Wherever we turn our eyes, we find the internal energy as well as the external power of Rome rapidly on the decline. The ground won in gigantic struggles is not extended, nor in fact even maintained, in this period of peace. The government of the world, which it was difficult to achieve, it was still more difficult to preserve ; the Roman senate had mastered the former task, but it broke down under the latter.
CHAP. II THE REFORM MOVEMENT
atf
CHAPTER n
THE REFORM MOVEMENT AND TIBERIUS GRACCHUS
For a whole generation after the battle of Pydna the The Roman state enjoyed a profound calm, scarcely varied by Rom,B
a ripple here and there on the surface. Its dominion ment extended over the three continents ; the lustre of the before th«
v^
Roman power and the glory of the Roman name were con- stantly on the increase ; all eyes rested on Italy, all talents and all riches flowed thither ; it seemed as if a golden age of peaceful prosperity and intellectual enjoyment of life could not but there begin. The Orientals of this period told each other with astonishment of the mighty republic of the west, "which subdued kingdoms far and near, and whoever heard its name trembled; but it kept good faith with its friends and clients. Such was the glory of the Romans, and yet no one usurped the crown and no one paraded in purple dress ; but they obeyed whomsoever from year to year they made their master, and there was among them neither envy nor discord. "
period of the GraccTM"
So it seemed at a distance ; matters wore a different aspect on a closer view. The government of the aristocracy
was in full train to destroy its own work. Not that the sons and grandsons of the vanquished at Cannae and of the victors at Zama had so utterly degenerated from their fathers and grandfathers; the difference was not so much / in the men who now sat in the senate, as in the times,
Spread of ecay'
998
THE REFORM MOVEMENT BOOK r»
Where a limited number of old families of established wealth and hereditary political importance conducts the government, it will display in seasons of danger an incom parable tenacity of purpose and power of heroic self- sacrifice, just as in seasons of tranquillity it will be short sighted, selfish, and negligent —the germs of both results are essentially involved in its hereditary and collegiate character. The morbid matter had been long in existence, but it needed the sun of prosperity to develop it There was a profound meaning in the question of Cato, "What was to become of Rome, when she should no longer have any state to fear? " That point had now been reached. Every neighbour whom she might have feared was politic ally annihilated; and of the men who had been reared
under the old order of things in the severe school of the Hannibalic war, and whose words still sounded as echoes of that mighty epoch so long as they survived, death called one after another away, till at length even the voice of the last of them, the veteran Cato, ceased to be heard in the senate-house and in the Forum. A younger generation
came to the helm, and their policy was a sorry answer to that question of the old patriot We have already spoken of the shape which the government of the subjects and the external policy of Rome assumed in their hands. In in ternal affairs they were, if possible, still more disposed to let the ship drive before the wind : if we understand by internal government more than the transaction of current business, there was at this period no government in Rome at alL The single leading thought of the governing cor poration was the maintenance and, if possible, the increase of their usurped privileges. It was not the state that had a title to get the right and best man for its supreme magis tracy ; but every member of the coterie had an inborn title to the highest office of the state—a title not to be pre judiced either by the unfair rivalry of men of his own class
chap, ii AND TIBERIUS GRACCHUS
399
or by the encroachments of the excluded. Accordingly \ the clique proposed to itself, as its most important political
aim, the restriction of re-election to the consulship and the exclusion of " new men " ; and in fact it succeeded in obtaining the legal prohibition of the former about 603,1 151. and in sufficing with a government of aristocratic nobodies. Even the inaction of the government in its outwardN relations was doubtless connected with this policy of the nobility, exclusive towards commoners, and distrustful towards the individual members of their own order. By
no surer means could they keep commoners, whose deeds were their patent of nobility, aloof from the pure circles of the aristocracy than by giving no opportunity to any one to perform deeds at all; to the existing government of general mediocrity even an aristocratic conqueror of
> I
Syria or Egypt would have proved extremely inconvenient.
It is true that now also there was no want of opposition, Attempts
and it was even to a certain extent effectual. The p^^,, administration of justice was improved. The administrative criminal jurisdiction, which the senate exercised either of itself or, ^^
on occasion, by extraordinary commissions, over the
provincial magistrates, was confessedly inadequate. It was
an innovation with a momentous bearing on the whole public life of the Roman community, when in 605, on the 149. proposal of Lucius Calpurnius Piso, a standing senatorial
1 1° 537 the 'aw restricting re-election to the consulship was suspended 217, during the continuance of the war in Italy, that is, down to 551 (p. 14 ; 203. Ijv. xxvii. 6). But after the death of Marcellus in 546 re-elections to the 208. consulship, if we do not include the abdicating consuls of 59a, only occurred in the years 547, 534, 560, 579, 585, 586, 591, 596, 599, 60a j consequently not oftener in those fifty-six years than, for instance, in the
ten years 401-410. Only one of these, and that the very last, took place in violation of the ten years' interval 402) and beyond doubt the singular election of Marcus Marcellus who was consul in 588 and 599 to third consulship in 602, with the special circumstances of which we are not acquainted, gave occasion to the law prohibiting re-election to the consulship altogether (Liv. Ep. 56) especially as this proposal must have been introduced before 605, seeing that was supported by Cato (p. 55,
Jordan).
858-844.
188, 155. 152.
149.
; it
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THE REFORM MOVEMENT BOOK IV
commission (quaestio ordinarid) was instituted to try in judicial form the complaints of the provincials against the Roman magistrates placed over them on the score of extortion. An effort was made to emancipate the comitia from the predominant influence of the aristocracy. The panacea of Roman democracy was secret voting in the assemblies of the burgesses,' which was introduced first for 189. the elections of magistrates by the Gabinian law (615), then 187. for the public tribunals by the Cassian law (617), lastly for the voting on legislative proposals by the Papirian law
181. 129. (623). In a similar way soon afterwards (about 625) the
Exclusion senators were by decree of the people enjoined on ad
Vote by ballot.
of the senators from the equestrian centuries.
mission to the senate to surrender their public horse, and thereby to renounce their privileged place in the voting of the eighteen equestrian centuries These measures, directed to the emancipation of the electors from the ruling aristocratic order, may perhaps have seemed to the party which suggested them the first steps towards re generation of the state in fact they made not the slightest change in the nullity and want of freedom of the legally supreme organ of the Roman community that nullity indeed was only the more palpably evinced to all whom
did or did not concern. Equally ostentatious and equally empty was the formal recognition accorded to
the independence and sovereignty of the burgesses
The public elections.
But this hostility between the formal sovereignty of the people and the practically subsisting constitution was in great part semblance. Party phrases were in free circula tion of the parties themselves there was little trace in matters really and directly practical. Throughout the whole seventh century the annual public elections to the civil magistracies, especially to the consulship and censorship, formed the real standing question of the day and the focus
the transference of their place of assembly from the old 145. Comitium below the senate-house to the Forum (about 609).
:
a
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it
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a
(p. 8).
chap, II AND TIBERIUS GRACCHUS
901
of political agitation ; but it was only in isolated and rare instances that the different candidates represented opposite political principles; ordinarily the question related purely to persons, and it was for the course of affairs a matter of indifference whether the majority of the votes fell to a Caeci- lian or to a Cornelian. The Romans thus lacked that which outweighs and compensates all the evils of party-life —the free and common movement of the masses towards what they discern as a befitting aim—and yet endured all those evils solely for the benefit of the paltry game of the ruling coteries.
It was comparatively easy for the Roman noble to enter on the career of office as quaestor or tribune of the people ; but the consulship and the censorship were attainable by him only through great exertions prolonged for years. The prizes were many, but those really worth having were few ; the competitors ran, as a Roman poet once said, as it were over a racecourse wide at the starting-point but gradually narrowing its dimensions. This was right, so long as the magistracy was —what it was called —an "honour" and men of military, political, or juristic ability were rival com- petitors for the rare chaplets ; but now the practical close
ness of the nobility did away with the benefit of competition, and left only its disadvantages. With few exceptions the young men belonging to the ruling families crowded into the political career, and hasty and premature ambition soon caught at means more effective than was useful action for the common good. The first requisite for a public career came to be powerful connections ; and therefore that career / began, not as formerly in the camp, but in the ante-chambers
of influential men. A new and genteel body of clients now undertook —what had formerly been done only by depend ents and freedmen — to come and wait on their patron early in the morning, and to appear publicly in his train. But the mob also is a great lord, and desires as such to receive
'
. I }
ya THE REFORM MOVEMENT book iv
attention. The rabble began to demand as its right that the future consul should recognize and honour the sovereign people in every ragged idler of the street, and that every candidate should in his " going round " (ambitus) salute every individual voter by name and press his hand. The world of quality readily entered into this degrading canvass. The true candidate cringed not only in the palace, but also on the street, and recommended himself to the multitude by flattering attentions, indulgences, and civilities more or less refined. Demagogism and the cry for reforms were sedulously employed to attract the notice and favour of the public ; and they were the more effective, the more they attacked not things but persons. It became the custom
for beardless youths of genteel birth to introduce themselves with eclat into public life by playing afresh the part of Cato with the immature passion of their boyish eloquence, and by constituting and proclaiming themselves state-attorneys, if possible, against some man of very high standing and very great unpopularity; the Romans suffered the grave
institutions of criminal justice and of political police to become a means of soliciting office. The provision or, what was still worse, the promise of magnificent popular amusements had long been the, as it were legal, prerequisite to the obtaining of the consulship (p. 40) ; now the votes of the electors began to be directly purchased with money, as is shown by the prohibition issued against this about
169. 595. Perhaps the worst consequence of the continual courting of the favour of the multitude by the ruling aris tocracy was the incompatibility of such a begging and fawning part with the position which the government should right fully occupy in relation to the governed. The government was thus converted from a blessing into a curse for the people. They no longer ventured to dispose of the property and blood of the burgesses, as exigency required, for the
good of their country. They allowed the burgesses to
chap. II AND TIBERIUS GRACCHUS
303
become habituated to the dangerous idea that they were legally exempt from the payment of direct taxes even by way of advance—after the war with Perseus no further ad- vance had been asked from the community. They allowed their military system to decay rather than compel the bur gesses to enter the odious transmarine service ; how it fared with the individual magistrates who attempted to carry out the conscription according to the strict letter of the law, has already been related
oligarchy and democracy still undeveloped but already pL,,,! ,^ cankered in the bud were interwoven in manner pregnant
with fatal results. According to their party names, which
were first heard during this period, the " Optimates " wished
to give effect to the will of the best, the " Populares to that
296).
In the Rome of this epoch the two evils of degenerate
* V
/
Optimata
but in fact there was in the Rome of true aristocracy nor truly self-determin
of the community
that day neither
ing community.
and numbered in their ranks none but enthusiasts or
hypocrites.
Both parties contended alike for shadows,
Both were equally affected by political corrup tion, and both were in fact equally worthless. Both were necessarily tied down to the status quo, for neither on the one side nor on the other was there found any political idea —to say nothing of any political plan—reaching beyond the existing state of things; and accordingly the two parties were so entirely in agreement that they met at every step as respected both means and ends, and change of party was
change of political tactics more than of political sentiments. The commonwealth would beyond doubt have been gainer, either the aristocracy had directly introduced hereditary rotation instead of election by the burgesses, or the democracy had produced from within real dema gogic government. But these Optimates and these Popu lares of the beginning of the seventh century were far too indispensable for each other to wage such internecine war
if
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a
;
a
"
a
(p.
Social crisis.
they not only could not destroy each other, but, even if they had been able to do so, they would not have been willing. Meanwhile the commonwealth was politically and morally more and more unhinged, and was verging towards utter disorganization.
The crisis with which the Roman revolution was opened arose not out of this paltry political conflict, but out of the economic and social relations which the Roman government allowed, like everything else, simply to take their course, and which thus found opportunity to bring the morbid matter, that had been long fermenting, without hindrance and with fearful rapidity and violence to maturity. From a very early period the Roman economy was based on the two factors — always in quest of each other, and always at variance —the husbandry of the small farmer and the money of the capitalist. The latter in the closest alliance with landholding on a great scale had already for centuries waged against the farmer-class a war, which seemed as though it could not but terminate in the destruction first of the farmers and thereafter of the whole commonwealth, but was broken off without being properly decided in consequence of the successful wars and the comprehensive and ample distribu tion of domains for which these wars gave facilities. It has already been shown (pp. 75-82) that in the same age, which renewed the distinction between patricians and plebeians under altered names, the disproportionate accumulation of capital was preparing a second assault on the farming system. It is true that the method was different. Formerly the small farmer had been ruined by advances of money, which practically reduced him to be the steward of his creditor ; now he was crushed by the competition of transmarine, and especially of slave-grown, corn. The capitalists kept pace with the times ; capital, while waging war against labour or in other words against the liberty of the person, of course, as it had always done, under the strictest form of law, waged
304
THE REFORM MOVEMENT book iv
chap. II AND TIBERIUS GRACCHUS
305
it no longer in the unseemly fashion which converted the free man on account of debt into a slave, but, throughout, with slaves legitimately bought and paid ; the former usurer of the capital appeared in a shape conformable to the times as the owner of industrial plantations. But the ultimate result was in both cases the same —the depreciation of the Italian farms ; the supplanting of the petty husbandry, first in a part of the provinces and then in Italy, by the farming of large estates ; the prevailing tendency to devote the latter in Italy to the rearing of cattle and the culture of the olive and vine ; finally, the replacing of the free labourers in the provinces as in Italy by slaves. Just as the nobility was more dangerous than the patriciate, because the former could not, like the latter, be set aside by a change of the
constitution ; so this new power of capital was more dan gerous than that of the fourth and fifth centuries, because nothing was to be done against it by changes in the law of the land.
Before we attempt to describe the course of this second Slavery
*** H
great conflict between labour and capital, it is necessary to
give here some indication of the nature and extent of the quence*. system of slavery. We have not now to do with the old,
in some measure innocent, rural slavery, under which the
farmer either tilled the field along with his slave, or, if he possessed more land than he could manage, placed the slave—either as steward or as a sort of lessee obliged to
render up a portion of the produce —over a detached farm
Such relations no doubt existed at all times— around Comum, for instance, they were still the rule in the time of the empire—but as exceptional features in privileged districts and on humanely-managed estates. What we now refer to the system of slavery on great scale, which in the Roman state, as formerly the Carthaginian, grew out of the ascendency of capital. While the captives taken in war and the hereditary transmission of slavery sufficed to
245).
vol. ui
85
in
a
is
(i.
306
THE REFORM MOVEMENT book iv
keep up the stock of slaves during the earlier period, this system of slavery was, just like that of America, based on the methodically-prosecuted hunting of man ; for, owing to the manner in which slaves were used with little regard to their life or propagation, the slave population was constantly on the wane, and even the wars which were always fur nishing fresh masses to the slave-market were not sufficient to cover the deficit. No country where this species of game could be hunted remained exempt from visitation ; even in Italy it was a thing by no means unheard of, that the poor freeman was placed by his employer among the slaves. But the Negroland of that period was western Asia,1 where the Cretan and Cilician corsairs, the real pro fessional slave-hunters and slave-dealers, robbed the coasts of Syria and the Greek islands ; and where, emulating their feats, the Roman revenue-farmers instituted human hunts in the client states and incorporated those whom they captured among their slaves. This was done to such an extent, that
100. about 650 the king of Bithynia declared himself unable to furnish the required contingent, because all the people cap able of labour had been dragged off from his kingdom by the revenue-farmers. At the great slave-market in Delos, where the slave-dealers of Asia Minor disposed of their wares to Italian speculators, on one day as many as 10,000 slaves are said to have been disembarked in the morning and to have been all sold before evening—a proof at once how
enormous was the number of slaves delivered, and how, notwithstanding, the demand still exceeded the supply. It was no wonder. Already in describing the Roman economy of the sixth century we have explained that it was based, like all the large undertakings of antiquity generally, on the employment of slaves (pp. 68/, 82). In whatever direction
1 It was asserted even then, that the human race in that quarter was pre-eminently fitted for slavery by its especial power of endurance. Plautus ( Trin. 54a) commends the Syrians : gtnus qtad fatuntiaimum at kominum.
chap, ii AND TIBERIUS GRACCHUS
307
speculation applied itself, its instrument was without excep
tion man reduced in law to a beast of burden. Trades
were in great part carried on by slaves, so that the proceeds
fell to the master. The levying of the public revenues in
the lower grades was regularly conducted by the slaves of
the associations that leased them. Servile hands performed
the operations of mining, making pitch, and others of a similar kind ; it became early the custom to send herds of slaves to the Spanish mines, whose superintendents readily received them and paid a high rent for them. The vine
and olive harvest in Italy was not conducted by the people
on the estate, but was contracted for by a slave-owner.
The tending of cattle was universally performed by slaves.
We have already mentioned the armed, and frequently mounted, slave-herdsmen in the great pastoral ranges of Italy (p. 74); and the same sort of pastoral husbandry soon became in the provinces also a favourite object of Roman speculation —Dalmatia, for instance, was hardly acquired (599) when the Roman capitalists began to prosecute the 168. rearing of cattle there on a great scale after the Italian fashion. But far worse in every respect was the plantation- system proper—the cultivation of the fields by a band of slaves not unfrequently branded with iron, who with shackles on their legs performed the labours of the field under overseers during the day, and were locked up together by night in the common, frequently subterranean, labourers' prison. This plantation- system had migrated from the east to Carthage 138), and seems to have been brought by the Carthaginians to Sicily, where, probably for this reason, appears developed earlier and more completely than in any other part of the Roman dominions. 1 We find
The hybrid Greek name for the workhouse (ergastulum,ftom (pydfofuu, after the analogy of stabulum, operculum) an indication that this mode of management came to the Romans from region where the Greek language was used, but at a period when a thorough Hellenic culture was not yet attained.
is a
1
it
(ii.
308
THE REFORM MOVEMENT book iv
the territory of Leontini, about 30,000 jugera of arable land, which was let on lease as Roman domain (ii. 313) by the censors, divided some decades after the time of the Gracchi among not more than 84 lessees, to each of whom there thus fell on an average 360 jugera, and among whom only
one was a Leontine ; the rest were foreign, mostly Roman, speculators. We see from this instance with what zeal the Roman speculators there walked in the footsteps of their predecessors, and what extensive dealings in Sicilian cattle and Sicilian slave-corn must have been carried on by the
Roman and non-Roman speculators who covered the fair island with their pastures and plantations. Italy however still remained for the present substantially exempt from this worst form of slave-husbandry. Although in Etruria, where the plantation-system seems to have first emerged in Italy, and where it existed most extensively at least forty years afterwards, it is extremely probable that even now ergastula were not wanting ; yet Italian agriculture at this epoch was still chiefly carried on by free persons or at any rate by non-fettered slaves, while the greater tasks were frequently let out to contractors. The difference between Italian and Sicilian slavery is very clearly apparent from the fact, that the slaves of the Mamertine community, which lived after the Italian fashion, were the only slaves who did not take
186-132. part in the Sicilian servile revolt of 619-622.
The abyss of misery and woe, which opens before our
eyes in this most miserable of all proletariates, may be fathomed by those who venture to gaze into such depths ; it is very possible that, compared with the sufferings of the Roman slaves, the sum of all Negro sufferings is but a drop. Here we are not so much concerned with the hardships of the slaves themselves as with the perils which they brought upon the Roman state, and with the conduct of the govern ment in confronting them. It is plain that this proletariate was not called into existence by the government and could
char H AND TIBERIUS GRACCHUS
309
not be directly set aside by it ; this could only have been accomplished by remedies which would have been still worse than the disease. The duty of the government was simply, on the one hand, to avert the direct danger to
and life, with which the slave -proletariate threatened the members of the state, by an earnest system of police for securing order ; and on the other hand, to aim at the restriction of the proletariate, as far as possible, by the elevation of free labour. Let us see how the Roman aristocracy executed these two tasks.
property
The servile conspiracies and servile wars, breaking out everywhere, illustrate their management as respects police. Jj^j^— In Italy the scenes of disorder, which were among the immediate painful consequences of the Hannibalic war
102), seemed now to be renewed; all at once the Romans were obliged to seize and execute in the capital
150, in Minturnae 450, in Sinuessa even 4000 slaves (621). 133. Still worse, as may be conceived, was the state of the
Insurreo-
At the great slave-market at Delos and in the
Attic silver-mines about the same period the revolted slaves
had to be put down by force of arms. The war against Aristonicus and his " Heliopolites " in Asia Minor was in substance war of the landholders against the revolted
slaves 278).
But worst of all, naturally, was the con-
dition of Sicily, the chosen land of the plantation system, g^3^. Brigandage had long been standing evil there, especially
in the interior began to swell into insurrection. Damophilus, wealthy planter of Enna (Castrogiovanni),
who vied with the Italian lords in the industrial investment
of his living capital, was attacked and murdered by his exasperated rural slaves whereupon the savage band flocked
into the town of Enna, and there repeated the same process on greater scale. The slaves rose in body against their masters, killed or enslaved them, and summoned to the head of the already considerable insurgent army juggler
provinces.
The first
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from Apamea in Syria who knew how to vomit fire and utter oracles, formerly as a slave named Eunus, now as chief of the insurgents styled Antiochus king of the Syrians. And why not ? A few years before another Syrian slave,
who was not even a prophet, had in Antioch itself worn the royal diadem of the Seleucids 292). The Greek slave Achaeus, the brave " general " of the new king, traversed the island, and not only did the wild herdsmen flock from far and near to the strange standards, but the free labourers also, who bore no goodwill to the planters, made common cause with the revolted slaves. In another district of Sicily Cleon, a Cilician slave, formerly in his native land daring bandit, followed the example which had been set and occupied Agrigentum and, when the leaders came to mutual understanding, after gaining various minor advantages they succeeded in at last totally defeating the praetor Lucius Hypsaeus in person and his army, consisting mostly of Sicilian militia, and in capturing his camp. By this means almost the whole island came into the power of the insurgents, whose numbers, according to the most moderate estimates, are alleged to have amounted to 70,000 men capable of bearing arms. The Romans found themselves compelled for three successive
134-182. years (620-622) to despatch consuls and consular armies to Sicily, till, after several undecided and even some unfavourable conflicts, the revolt was at length subdued by the capture of Tauromenium and of Enna. The most resolute men of the insurgents threw themselves into the latter town, in order to hold their ground in that impreg nable position with the determination of men who despair of deliverance or of pardon the consuls Lucius Calpurnius Piso and Publius Rupilius lay before for two years, and reduced at last more by famine than arms. 1
Even now there are not unfrequently found in front of Castrogiovanni, •t the point where the ascent least abrupt, Roman projectiles with the
188. name of the consul of 6ai L. Pitt L. f. cot.
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These were the results of the police system for securing order, as it was handled by the Roman senate and its officials in Italy and the provinces. While the task of getting quit of the proletariate demands and only too often transcends the whole power and wisdom of a government, its repression by measures of police on the other hand is for any larger commonwealth comparatively easy. It would be well with states, if the unpropertied masses threatened them with no other danger than that with which they are menaced by bears and wolves ; only the timid and those who trade upon the silly fears of the multitude prophesy the destruction of civil order through servile revolts or insurrections of the proletariate. But even to this easier task of restraining the oppressed masses the Roman government was by no means equal, notwithstanding the profound peace and the inexhaust ible resources of the state. This was a sign of its weakness ; but not of its weakness alone. By law the Roman governor was bound to keep the public roads clear and to have the robbers who were caught, if they were slaves, crucified ; and naturally, for slavery is not possible without a reign of terror. At this period in Sicily a razzia was occasionally doubtless set on foot by the governor, when the roads became too insecure ; but, in order not to disoblige the Italian planters,
the captured robbers were ordinarily given up by the authorities to their masters to be punished at their discre tion; and those masters were frugal people who, if their slave-herdsmen asked clothes, replied with stripes and with the inquiry whether travellers journeyed through the land naked. . The consequence of such connivance accordingly was, that on the subjugation of the slave-revolt the consul Publius Rupilius ordered all that came into his hands alive —it is said upwards of 20,000 men—to be crucified. It was in truth no longer possible to spare capital.
The care of the government for the elevation of free The labour, and by consequence for the restriction of the slave-
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THE REFORM MOVEMENT book iv
proletariate, promised fruits far more difficult to be gained
but also far richer. Unfortunately, in this respect there was nothing done at all. In the first social crisis the landlord had been enjoined by law to employ a number of free
labourers proportioned to the number of his slave labourers
Now at the suggestion of the government Punic treatise on agriculture (ii. 151), doubtless giving instructions in the system of plantation after the Carthaginian mode, was translated into Latin for the use and benefit of Italian specu lators — the first and only instance of literary undertaking suggested the Roman senate The same tendency showed itself in more important matter, or to speak more correctly in the vital question for Rome—the system of colonization. It needed no special wisdom, but merely recollection of the course of the first social crisis in Rome, to perceive that the only real remedy against an agricultural proletariate consisted in comprehensive and duly-regulated system of emigration 391); for which the external relations of Rome offered the most favourable opportunity. Until nearly the close of the sixth century, fact, the continuous diminution of the small landholders of Italy was counter
acted by the continuous establishment of new farm-allot ments (p. 48). This, true, was no means done to the extent to which might and should have been done not only was the domain-land occupied from ancient times
private persons 344) not recalled, but further occupa tions of newly-won land were permitted and other very important acquisitions, such as the territory of Capua, while not abandoned to occupation, were yet not brought into distribution, but were let on lease as usufructuary domains. Nevertheless the assignation of land had operated beneficially —giving help to many of the sufferers and hope to all. But
177. after the founding of Luna (577) no trace of further assigna tions of land to be met with for long time, with the exception of the isolated institution of the Picenian colony
381).
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of Auximum (Osimo) in 597. The reason is simple. After 167 the conquest of the Boii and Apuani no new territory was acquired in Italy excepting the far from attractive Ligurian valleys ; therefore no other land existed for distribution there except the leased or occupied domain-land, the laying hands
on which was, as may easily be conceived, just as little agree able to the aristocracy now as it was three hundred years before. The distribution of the territory acquired out of Italy appeared for political reasons inadmissible ; Italy was to remain the ruling country, and the wall of partition between the Italian masters and their provincial servants was not to be broken down. Unless the government were will ing to set aside considerations of higher policy or even the interests of their order, no course was left to them but to remain spectators of the ruin of the Italian farmer-class ; and this result accordingly ensued. The capitalists continued to buy out the small landholders, or indeed, if they remained obstinate, to seize their fields without title of purchase ; in which case, as may be supposed, matters were not always
amicably settled. A peculiarly favourite method was to eject the wife and children of the farmer from the homestead, while he was in the field, and to bring him to compliance by means of the theory of "accomplished fact. " The landlords continued mainly to employ slaves instead of free labourers, because the former could not like the latter be called away to military service ; and thus reduced the free proletariate to the same level of misery with the slaves. They continued to supersede Italian grain in the market of the capital, and to lessen its value over the whole peninsula, by selling Sicilian slave-corn at a mere nominal price. In Etruria the old native aristocracy in league with
the Roman capitalists had as early as 620 brought matters 184. to such a pass, that there was no longer a free farmer there.
It could be said aloud in the market of the capital, that
the beasts had their lairs but nothing was left to the bur-
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THE REFORM MOVEMENT book iv
gesses save the air and sunshine, and that those who were styled the masters of the world had no longer a clod that they could call their own. The census lists of the Roman burgesses furnished the commentary on these words. From
189. the end of the Hannibalic war down to 595 the numbers of the burgesses were steadily on the increase, the cause of which is mainly to be sought in the continuous and con-
169- siderable distributions of domain-land 101) after 595 again, when the census yielded 328,000 burgesses capable of bearing arms, there appears regular falling-off, for the
161 147. list in 600 stood at 324,000, that in 607 at 322,000, that
181.
ideas of orm'
Sdpie
nni 184-129.
in 623 at 319,000 burgesses fit for service — an alarming result for time of profound peace at home and abroad. If matters were to go on at this rate, the burgess-body would resolve itself into planters and slaves and the Roman state might at length, as was the case with the Parthians, purchase its soldiers in the slave-market
Such was the external and internal condition of Rome, when the state entered on the seventh century of its ex istence. Wherever the eye turned, encountered abuses and decay the question could not but force itself on every sagacious and well-disposed man, whether this state of things was not capable of remedy or amendment There was no want of such men in Rome but no one seemed more called to the great work of political and social reform than Publius Cornelius Scipio Aemilianus Africanus (570-625), the favourite son of Aemilius Paullus and the adopted grandson of the great Scipio, whose glorious surname of Africanus he bore by virtue not merely of hereditary but of personal right. Like his father, he was man temperate and thoroughly
never ailing in body, and never at loss to resolve on the immediate and necessary course of action. Even in his youth he had kept aloof from the usual proceed ings of political novices — the attending in the ante*
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chambers of prominent senators and the delivery of forensic declamations. On the other hand he loved the chase—when a youth of seventeen, after having served with distinction under his father in the campaign against Perseus, he had asked as his reward the free range of the deer forest of the kings of Macedonia which had been untouched for four years —and he was especially fond of devoting his leisure to scientific and literary en joyment By the care of his father he had been early initiated into that genuine Greek culture, which elevated him above the insipid Hellenizing of the semi- culture commonly in vogue ; by his earnest and apt appreciation of the good and bad qualities in the Greek character, and
by his aristocratic carriage, this Roman made an impression on the courts of the east and even on the scoffing Alex andrians. His Hellenism was especially recognizable in the delicate irony of his discourse and in the classic purity of his Latin. Although not strictly an author, he yet, like Cato, committed to writing his political speeches —they were, like the letters of his adopted sister the mother of the Gracchi, esteemed by the later litteratores as master pieces of model prose — and took pleasure in surrounding himself with the better Greek and Roman litterati, a plebeian society which was doubtless regarded with no small suspicion by those colleagues in the senate whose noble birth was their sole distinction. A man morally steadfast and trustworthy, his word held good with friend and foe ; he avoided buildings and speculations, and lived with simplicity ; while in money matters he acted not merely honourably and disinterestedly, but also with a tenderness and liberality which seemed singular to the mercantile spirit of his contemporaries. He was an able soldier and officer ; he brought home from the African war the honorary wreath which was wont to be conferred on those who saved the lives of citizens in danger at the
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peril of their own, and terminated as general the war which he had begun as an officer ; circumstances gave him no opportunity of trying his skill as a general on tasks really difficult. Scipio was not, any more than his father, a man of brilliant gifts—as is indicated by the very fact of his predilection for Xenophon, the sober soldier and correct author — but he was an honest and true man, who seemed pre-eminently called to stem the incipient decay by organic reforms. All the more significant is the fact that he did not attempt true that he helped, as he had opportunity and means, to redress or prevent abuses, and laboured in particular at the improve ment of the administration of justice. was chiefly by his assistance that Lucius Cassius, an able man of the old Roman austerity and uprightness, was enabled to carry against the most vehement opposition of the Opti-
mates his law as to voting, which introduced vote ballot for those popular tribunals which still embraced the most important part of the criminal jurisdiction
In like manner, although he had not chosen to take part in boyish impeachments, he himself in his mature years put upon their trial several of the guiltiest of the aristocracy. In like spirit, when commanding before Carthage and Numantia, he drove forth the women and priests to the gates of the camp, and subjected the rabble of soldiers once more to the iron yoke of the old
142. military discipline; and when censor (612), he cleared away the smooth -chinned coxcombs among the world of quality and in earnest language urged the citizens to adhere more faithfully to the honest customs of their fathers. But no one, and least of all he himself, could fail to see that increased stringency in the administration of justice and isolated interference were not even first steps towards the healing of the organic evils under which the state laboured. These Scipio did not touch. Gaius Laeliui
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in 614), Scipio's elder friend and his political 140. instructor and confidant, had conceived the plan of pro posing the resumption of the Italian domain-land which
had not been given away but had been temporarily oc cupied, and of giving relief by its distribution to the visibly decaying Italian farmers ; but he desisted from
the project when he saw what a storm he was going to raise, and was thenceforth named the "Judicious. " Scipio
was of the same opinion. He was fully persuaded of the greatness of the evil, and with a courage deserving of honour he without respect of persons remorselessly as sailed it and carried his point, where he risked himself alone ; but he was also persuaded that the country could
only be relieved at the price of a revolution similar to that which in the fourth and fifth centuries had sprung out of
the question of reform, and, rightly or wrongly, the remedy seemed to him worse than the disease. So with the small circle of his friends he held a middle position between the aristocrats, who never forgave him for his advocacy of the Cassian law, and the democrats, whom he neither satisfied
nor wished to satisfy ; solitary during his life, praised after
his death by both parties, now as the champion of the aris tocracy, now as the promoter of reform. Down to his time
(consul
the censors on laying down their office had called upon the gods to grant greater power and glory to the state : the censor Scipio prayed that they might deign to preserve the state. His whole confession of faith lies in that painful exclamation.
But where the man who had twice led the Roman army from deep decline to victory despaired, a youth without achievements had the boldness to give himself forth as the saviour of Italy. He was called Tiberius Sempronius Gracchus (591-621). His father who bore the same name (consul in 577, 591 ; censor in 585), was the true model of a Roman aristocrat The brilliant magnificence of hi*
Tiberius GmscIhh
168-18*.
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THE REFORM MOVEMENT book iv
aedilician games, not produced without oppressing the dependent communities, had drawn upon him the severe and deserved censure of the senate 31) his inter ference in the pitiful process directed against the Scipios who were personally hostile to him 484) gave proof of his chivalrous feeling, and perhaps of his regard for his own order and his energetic action against the freed- men in his censorship (p. 53) evinced his conservative disposition. As governor, moreover, of the province of the Ebro (ii. 391), by his bravery and above all by his integrity he rendered permanent service to his country, and at the same time raised to himself in the hearts of the subject nation an enduring monument of reverence and
affection.
His mother Cornelia was the daughter of the conqueror
of Zama, who, simply on account of that generous inter vention, had chosen his former opponent as son-in-law she herself was highly cultivated and notable woman, who after the death of her much older husband had refused the hand of the king of Egypt and reared her three surviving children in memory of her husband and her father. Tiberius, the elder of the two sons, was of good and moral disposition, of gentle aspect and quiet bearing, apparently fitted for anything rather than for an agitator of the masses. In all his relations and views he belonged to the Scipionic circle, whose refined and thorough culture, Greek and national, he and his brother and sister shared. Scipio Aemilianus was at once his cousin and his sister's husband under him Tiberius, at the age of eighteen, had taken part in the storming of Carthage, and had his valour acquired the commendation of the stern general and warlike distinctions. It was natural that the able young man should, with all the vivacity and all the stringent precision of youth, adopt and intensify the views as to the pervading decay of the state which were prevalent in that
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circle, and more especially their ideas as to the elevation of
the Italian farmers, j Nor was it merely to the young men
that the shrinking of Laelius from the execution of his ideas of reform seemed to be not judicious, but weak. Appius Claudius, who had already been consul (611) and 148. censor (618), one of the most respected men in the senate, 136. censured the Scipionic circle for having so soon abandoned
the scheme of distributing the domain-lands with all the passionate vehemence which was the hereditary characteristic of the Claudian house; and with the greater bitterness, apparently because he had come into personal conflict with Scipio Aemilianus in his candidature for the censorship. Similar views were expressed by Publius Crassus Mucianus
279), the pontifex maximus of the day, who was held in universal honour by the senate and the citizens as man
and jurist. Even his brother Publius Mucius Scaevola,
the founder of scientific jurisprudence in Rome, seemed
not averse to the plan of reform and his voice was of the greater weight, as he stood in some measure aloof from the parties. Similar were the sentiments of Quintus Metellus,
the conqueror of Macedonia and of the Achaeans, but respected not so much on account of his warlike deeds as because he was model of the old discipline and manners alike his domestic and his public life. Tiberius Gracchus
was closely connected with these men, particularly with Appius whose daughter he had married, and with Mucianus whose daughter was married to his brother. was no wonder that he cherished the idea of resuming in person the scheme of reform, so soon as he should find himself in position which would constitutionally allow him the initiative. Personal motives may have strengthened this resolution.
The treaty of peace which Mancinus concluded with the Numantines in 617, was in substance the work of Gracchus 187.
the recollection that the senate had cancelled that the general had been on its account surrendered to the
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Tribunate Grac hul^
enemy, and that Gracchus with the other superior officers had only escaped a like fate through the greater favour which he enjoyed among the burgesses, could not put the young, upright, and proud man in better humour with the ruling aristocracy. The Hellenic rhetoricians with whom he was fond ofdiscussing philosophy and politics, Diophanes of Mytilene and Gaius Blossius of Cumae, nourished within his soul the ideals over which he brooded : when his inten tions became known in wider circles, there was no want of approving voices, and many a public placard summoned the grandson of Africanus to think of the poor people and the deliverance of Italy.
Tiberius Gracchus was invested with the tribunate of lhe PeoP'e on the Loth of December, 620. The fearful consequences of the previous misgovernment, the political, military, economic, and moral decay of the burgesses, were just at that time naked and open to the eyes of all. Of the two consuls of this year one fought without success in Sicily against the revolted slaves, and the other, Scipio Aemilianus, was employed for months not in conquering, but in crushing a small Spanish country town. If Gracchus still needed a special summons to carry his resolution into effect, he found it in this state of matters which filled the mind of every patriot with unspeakable anxiety. His father- in-law promised assistance in counsel and action ; fth< support of the jurist Scaevola, who had shortly before beep elected consul for 621, might be hoped for. So Gracchus, immediately after entering on office, proposed the enactment of an agrarian law, which in a certain sense was nothing
Hia
kwr [867. DUt a renewal of the Licinio-Sextian law of 387 380).
Under all the state-lands which were occupied and enjoyed the possessors without remuneration —those that were
let on lease, such as the territory of Capua, were not affected by the law—were to be resumed on behalf of the state but with the restriction, that each occupier should reserve
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for himself 500 jugera and for each son 250 (so as not, how ever, to exceed 1 000 jugera in all) in permanent and guaran teed possession, or should be entitled to claim compensation in land to that extent '3 Indemnification appears to have been granted for any improvements executed by the former holders, such as buildings and plantations. The domain- land thus resumed was to be broken up into lots of 30 jugera; and these were to be distributed partly to burgesses, partly to Italian allies, not as their own free property, but as inalienable heritable leaseholds, whose holders bound themselves to use the land for agriculture and to pay a
moderate rent to the state-chest i A collegium of three men, who were regarded as ordinary and standing magis trates of the state and were annually elected by the assembly of the people, was entrusted with the work of resumption and distribution; to which was afterwards added the important and difficult function of legally settling what was domain-land and what was private property. The distribu tion was accordingly designed to go on for an indefinite period until the Italian domains which were very extensive and difficult of adjustment should be regulated. The new features in the Sempronian agrarian law, as compared with the Licinio-Sextian, were, first, the clause in favour of the hereditary possessors;' Secondly, the leasehold and inalien able tenure proposed for the new allotments; thirdly and
especially, the regulated and permanent executive, the want of which under the older law had been the chief reason why it had remained without lasting practical application.
War was thus declared against the great landholders, who now, as three centuries ago, found substantially their organ in the senate ; and once more, after a long interval, a single magistrate stood forth in earnest opposition to the aristocratic government. It took up the conflict in the •node —sanctioned by use and wont for such cases —of paralyzing the excesses of the magistrates by means of the
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i. A colleague of Gracchus, Marcus Octavius, resolute man who was seriously persuaded of
the objectionable character of the proposed domain law, interposed his veto when was about to be put to the vote
step, the constitutional effect of which was to set aside the proposal. Gracchus in his turn suspended the business of the state and the administration of justice, and placed his seal on the public chest the government acquiesced —
was inconvenient, but the year would draw to an end. Gracchus, perplexity, brought his law to the vote a second time. Octavius of course repeated his veto and to the urgent entreaty of his colleague and former friend, that he would not obstruct the salvation of Italy, he might reply that on that very question, as to how Italy could be
saved, opinions differed, but that his constitutional right to use his veto against the proposal of his colleague was beyond all doubt The senate now made an attempt to open up to Gracchus tolerable retreat two consulars challenged him to discuss the matter further in the senate house, and the tribune entered into the scheme with zeaL He sought to construe this proposal as implying that the senate had conceded the principle of distributing the domain-land; but neither was this implied in nor was the senate at all disposed to yield in the matter the dis cussions ended without any result Constitutional means were exhausted. In earlier times under such circumstances men were not indisposed to let the proposal go to sleep for the current year, and to take up again in each succeed ing one, till the earnestness of the demand and the pressure of public opinion overbore resistance. Now things were carried with higher hand. Gracchus seemed to himself to have reached the point when he must either wholly re nounce his reform or begin revolution. He chose the latter course; for he came before the burgesses with the declaration that either he or Octavius must retire from the
magistracy itself
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college, and suggested to Octavius that a vote of the burgesses should be taken as to which of them they wished to dismiss. Octavius naturally refused to consent to this strange challenge ; the intercessio existed for the very pur pose of giving scope to such differences of opinion among colleagues. Then Gracchus broke off the discussion with his colleague, and turned to the assembled multitude with the question whether a tribune of the people, who acted in opposition to the people, had not forfeited his office ; and the assembly, long accustomed to assent to all proposals presented to and for the most part composed of the agricultural proletariate which had flocked in from the country and was personally interested in the carrying of the law, gave almost unanimously an affirmative answer. Marcus Octavius was at the bidding of Gracchus removed
the lictors from the tribunes' bench and then, amidst universal rejoicing, the agrarian law was carried and the first allotment-commissioners were nominated. The votes fell on the author of the law along with his brother Gaius, who was only twenty years of age, and his father-in-law
Appius Claudius. Such family -selection augmented the exasperation of the aristocracy. When the new magistrates applied as usual to the senate to obtain the moneys for their equipment and for their daily allowance, the former was refused, and daily allowance was assigned to them of 24 asses shilling). The feud spread daily more and more, and became more envenomed and more per sonal. The difficult and intricate task of defining, re suming, and distributing the domains carried strife into every burgess-community, and even into the allied Italian towns.
-
The aristocracy made no secret that, while they would Further acquiesce perhaps in the law because they could not do Gracchus, otherwise, the officious legislator should never escape their vengeance and the announcement of Quintus Fompeius.
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that he would impeach Gracchus on the very day of his resigning his tribunate, was far from being the worst of the threats thrown out against the tribune. Gracchus believed,
with reason, that his personal safety was im perilled, and no longer appeared in the Forum without a retinue of 3000 or 4000 men — a step which drew down on him bitter expressions in the senate, even from Metellus who was not averse to reform in itself. ("Altogether, if he had expected to reach the goal by the carrying of his agrarian law, he had now to learn that he was only at the
probably
The "people" owed him gratitude; but he was a lost man, if he had no farther protection than
this gratitude of the people, if he did not continue indis pensable to them and did not constantly attach to himself fresh interests and hopes by means of other and more comprehensive proposals. Just at that time the kingdom and wealth of the Attalids had fallen to the Romans by the testament of the last king of Pergamus 278); Gracchus proposed to the people that the Pergamene treasure should be distributed among the new landholders for the procuring of the requisite implements and stock, and vindicated generally, in opposition to the existing practice, the right of the burgesses to decide definitively as to the new province. He said to have prepared farther popular measures, for shortening the period of service, for extending the right of appeal, for abolishing the prerogative of the senators ex clusively to do duty as civil jurymen, and even for the admission of the Italian allies to Roman citizenship. How far his projects in reality reached, cannot be ascer
tained this alone certain, that Gracchus saw that his only safety lay in inducing the burgesses to confer on him for second year the office which protected him, and that, with view to obtain this unconstitutional prolongation, he held forth prospect of further reforms. Ifat first he had risked himself in order to save the commonwealth, he was
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now obliged to put the commonwealth at stake in order to
his own safety.
The tribes met to elect the tribunes for the ensuing Hesollcto Tfl]
year, and the first divisions gave their votes for Gracchus ; TM'^ on but the opposite party in the end prevailed with their veto, tribunate, so far at least that the assembly broke up without having accomplished its object, and the decision was postponed to
the following day. For this day Gracchus put in motion 9^' all means legitimate and illegitimate ; he appeared to the people dressed in mourning, and commended to them his
son ; anticipating that the election would once more be disturbed by the veto, he made provision for ex pelling the adherents of the aristocracy by force from the place of assembly in front of the Capitoline temple. So the second day of election came on ; the votes fell as on the preceding day, and again the veto was exercised; the tumult began. The burgesses dispersed ; the elective assembly was practically dissolved ; the Capitoline temple was closed ; it was rumoured in the city, now that Tiberius had deposed all the tribunes, now that he had resolved to continue his magistracy without re-election.
youthful
The senate assembled in the temple of Fidelity, close
Death of Y by the temple of Jupiter ; the bitterest opponents of Gracc "*
Gracchus spoke in the sitting; when Tiberius moved his hand towards his forehead to signify to the people, amidst the wild tumult, that his head was in danger, it was said that he was already summoning the people to adorn his brow with the regal chaplet. The consul Scaevola was urged to have the traitor put to death at once. When that temperate man, by no means averse to reform in itself, indignantly refused the equally irrational and bar barous request, the consular Publius Scipio Nasica, a harsh and vehement aristocrat, summoned those who shared his views to arm themselves as they could and to follow him. Almost none of the country people had come into town
3*6
THE REFORM MOVEMENT book r*
for the elections ; the people of the city timidly gave way, when they saw men of quality rushing along with fury in their eyes, and legs of chairs and clubs in their hands. Gracchus attempted with a few attendants to escape. But in his flight he fell on the slope of the Capitol, and was killed by a blow on the temples from the bludgeon of one of his furious pursuers — Publius Satureius and Lucius Rufus afterwards contested the infamous honour —before the statues of the seven kings at the temple of Fidelity; with him three hundred others were slain, not one by weapons of iron. When evening had come on, the bodies
were thrown into the Tiber; Gaius vainly entreated that
the corpse of his brother might be granted to him for
^ burial. Such a day had never before been seen by Rome.
The party-strife lasting for more than a century during the first social crisis had led to no such catastrophe as that with which the second began. The better portion of the aristocracy might shudder, but they could no longer recede. They had no choice save to abandon a great number of their most trusty partisans to the vengeance of the multi tude, or to assume collectively the responsibility of the outrage : the latter course was adopted. They gave official sanction to the assertion that Gracchus had wished to seize the crown, and justified this latest crime by the primitive precedent of Ahala 376); in fact, they even committed the duty of further investigation as to the accomplices of Gracchus to special commission and made its head, the consul Publius Popillius, take care that sort of legal stamp should be supplementarily impressed on the murder of Gracchus bloody sentences directed against large
182. number of inferior persons (622). Nasica, against whom above all others the multitude breathed vengeance, and who had at least the courage openly to avow his deed before the people and to defend was under honourable
ISO. pretexts despatched to Asia, and soon afterwards (624) in
it, .
a by
a
a
(i.
chap, H AND TIBERIUS GRACCHUS
3*7
vested, during his absence, with the office of Pontifex Maximus. Nor did the moderate party dissociate them selves from these proceedings of their colleagues. Gaius Laelius bore a part in the investigations adverse to the partisans of Gracchus ; Publius Scaevola, who had attempted to prevent the murder, afterwards defended it in the senate ; when Scipio Aemilianus, after his return from Spain (62 a), was challenged publicly to declare whether he did or did not approve the killing of his brother-in-law, he gave the at least ambiguous reply that, so far as Tiberius had aspired to the crown, he had been justly put to death.
188.
Let us endeavour to form a judgment regarding these momentous events. The appointment of an official com- mission, which had to counteract the dangerous diminution
of the farmer-class by the comprehensive establishment of Itselt new small holdings from the whole Italian landed property
at the disposal of the state, was doubtless no sign of a healthy condition of the national economy; but it was, under the existing circumstances political and social, suited to its purpose. The distribution of the domains, moreover, was in itself no political party-question ; it might have been carried out to the last sod without changing the existing constitution or at all shaking the government of the aristocracy. As little could there be, in that case, any complaint of a violation of rights. The state was con fessedly the owner of the occupied land ; the holder as a possessor on mere sufferance could not, as a rule, ascribe to himself even a bond fide proprietary tenure, and, in the exceptional instances where he could do so, he was con fronted by the fact that by the Roman law prescription did not run against the state. The distribution of the domains was not an abolition, but an exercise, of the right of property ; all jurists were agreed as to its formal legality. But the attempt now to carry out these legal claims of the state was far from being politically warranted by the
The
d°m^n viewed it
328
THE REFORM MOVEMENT book iv
circumstance that the distribution of the domains neither infringed the existing constitution nor involved a violation of right. Such objections as have been now and then raised in our day, when a great landlord
suddenly begins to assertj in all their' compass^ claims belonging to him in law but suffered for a long period to lie dormant in practice, might with equal and better right be advanced against the
rogation of Gracchus.