Therefore
a bishop does not lose his episcopal power, if
he has acquired it by simony.
he has acquired it by simony.
Summa Theologica
Therefore it is not always unlawful to buy or sell the
sacraments.
Objection 2: Further, the greatest of the sacraments is the Eucharist,
which is consecrated in the Mass. But some priests receive a prebend or
money for singing masses. Much more therefore is it lawful to buy or
sell the other sacraments.
Objection 3: Further, the sacrament of Penance is a necessary sacrament
consisting chiefly in the absolution. But some persons demand money
when absolving from excommunication. Therefore it is not always
unlawful to buy or sell a sacrament.
Objection 4: Further, custom makes that which otherwise were sinful to
be not sinful; thus Augustine says (Contra Faust. xxii, 47) that "it
was no crime to have several wives, so long as it was the custom. " Now
it is the custom in some places to give something in the consecration
of bishops, blessings of abbots, ordinations of the clergy, in exchange
for the chrism, holy oil, and so forth. Therefore it would seem that it
is not unlawful.
Objection 5: Further, it happens sometimes that someone maliciously
hinders a person from obtaining a bishopric or some like dignity. But
it is lawful for a man to make good his grievance. Therefore it is
lawful, seemingly, in such a case to give money for a bishopric or a
like ecclesiastical dignity.
Objection 6: Further, marriage is a sacrament. But sometimes money is
given for marriage. Therefore it is lawful to sell a sacrament.
On the contrary, It is written (I, qu. i [*Can. Qui per pecunias]):
"Whosoever shall consecrate anyone for money, let him be cut off from
the priesthood. "
I answer that, The sacraments of the New Law are of all things most
spiritual, inasmuch as they are the cause of spiritual grace, on which
no price can be set, and which is essentially incompatible with a
non-gratuitous giving. Now the sacraments are dispensed through the
ministers of the Church, whom the people are bound to support,
according to the words of the Apostle (1 Cor. 9:13), "Know you not,
that they who work in the holy place, eat the things that are of the
holy place; and they that serve the altar, partake with the altar? "
Accordingly we must answer that to receive money for the spiritual
grace of the sacraments, is the sin of simony, which cannot be excused
by any custom whatever, since "custom does not prevail over natural or
divine law" [*Cap. Cum tanto, de Consuetud. ; cf. [3147]FS, Q[97],
A[3]]. Now by money we are to understand anything that has a pecuniary
value, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. iv, 1). On the other hand, to
receive anything for the support of those who administer the
sacraments, in accordance with the statutes of the Church and approved
customs, is not simony, nor is it a sin. For it is received not as a
price of goods, but as a payment for their need. Hence a gloss of
Augustine on 1 Tim. 5:17, "Let the priests that rule well," says: "They
should look to the people for a supply to their need, but to the Lord
for the reward of their ministry. "
Reply to Objection 1: In a case of necessity anyone may baptize. And
since nowise ought one to sin, if the priest be unwilling to baptize
without being paid, one must act as though there were no priest
available for the baptism. Hence the person who is in charge of the
child can, in such a case, lawfully baptize it, or cause it to be
baptized by anyone else. He could, however, lawfully buy the water from
the priest, because it is merely a bodily element. But if it were an
adult in danger of death that wished to be baptized, and the priest
were unwilling to baptize him without being paid, he ought, if
possible, to be baptized by someone else. And if he is unable to have
recourse to another, he must by no means pay a price for Baptism, and
should rather die without being baptized, because for him the baptism
of desire would supply the lack of the sacrament.
Reply to Objection 2: The priest receives money, not as the price for
consecrating the Eucharist, or for singing the Mass (for this would be
simoniacal), but as payment for his livelihood, as stated above.
Reply to Objection 3: The money exacted of the person absolved is not
the price of his absolution (for this would be simoniacal), but a
punishment of a past crime for which he was excommunicated.
Reply to Objection 4: As stated above, "custom does not prevail over
natural or divine law" whereby simony is forbidden. Wherefore the
custom, if such there be, of demanding anything as the price of a
spiritual thing, with the intention of buying or selling it, is
manifestly simoniacal, especially when the demand is made of a person
unwilling to pay. But if the demand be made in payment of a stipend
recognized by custom it is not simoniacal, provided there be no
intention of buying or selling, but only of doing what is customary,
and especially if the demand be acceded to voluntarily. In all these
cases, however, one must beware of anything having an appearance of
simony or avarice, according to the saying of the Apostle (1 Thess.
5:22), "From all appearance of evil restrain yourselves. "
Reply to Objection 5: It would be simoniacal to buy off the opposition
of one's rivals, before acquiring the right to a bishopric or any
dignity or prebend, by election, appointment or presentation, since
this would be to use money as a means of obtaining a spiritual thing.
But it is lawful to use money as a means of removing unjust opposition,
after one has already acquired that right.
Reply to Objection 6: Some [*Innocent IV on Cap. Cum in Ecclesia, de
Simonia] say that it is lawful to give money for Matrimony because no
grace is conferred thereby. But this is not altogether true, as we
shall state in the Third Part of the work [*[3148]XP, Q[42], A[3]].
Wherefore we must reply that Matrimony is not only a sacrament of the
Church, but also an office of nature. Consequently it is lawful to give
money for Matrimony considered as an office of nature, but unlawful if
it be considered as a sacrament of the Church. Hence, according to the
law [*Cap. Cum in Ecclesia, de Simonia], it is forbidden to demand
anything for the Nuptial Blessing.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether it is lawful to give and receive money for spiritual actions?
Objection 1: It seems that it is lawful to give and receive money for
spiritual actions. The use of prophecy is a spiritual action. But
something used to be given of old for the use of prophecy, as appears
from 1 Kings 9:7,8, and 3 Kings 14:3. Therefore it would seem that it
is lawful to give and receive money for a spiritual action.
Objection 2: Further, prayer, preaching, divine praise, are most
spiritual actions. Now money is given to holy persons in order to
obtain the assistance of their prayers, according to Lk. 16:9, "Make
unto you friends of the mammon of iniquity. " To preachers also, who sow
spiritual things, temporal things are due according to the Apostle (1
Cor. 9:14). Moreover, something is given to those who celebrate the
divine praises in the ecclesiastical office, and make processions: and
sometimes an annual income is assigned to them. Therefore it is lawful
to receive something for spiritual actions.
Objection 3: Further, science is no less spiritual than power. Now it
is lawful to receive money for the use of science: thus a lawyer may
sell his just advocacy, a physician his advice for health, and a master
the exercise of his teaching. Therefore in like manner it would seem
lawful for a prelate to receive something for the use of his spiritual
power, for instance, for correction, dispensation, and so forth.
Objection 4: Further, religion is the state of spiritual perfection.
Now in certain monasteries something is demanded from those who are
received there. Therefore it is lawful to demand something for
spiritual things.
On the contrary, It is stated (I, qu. i [*Can. Quidquid invisibilis]):
"It is absolutely forbidden to make a charge for what is acquired by
the consolation of invisible grace, whether by demanding a price or by
seeking any kind of return whatever. " Now all these spiritual things
are acquired through an invisible grace. Therefore it is not lawful to
charge a price or return for them.
I answer that, Just as the sacraments are called spiritual, because
they confer a spiritual grace, so, too, certain other things are called
spiritual, because they flow from spiritual grace and dispose thereto.
And yet these things are obtainable through the ministry of men,
according to 1 Cor. 9:7, "Who serveth as a soldier at any time at his
own charges? Who feedeth the flock, and eateth not of the milk of the
flock? " Hence it is simoniacal to sell or buy that which is spiritual
in such like actions; but to receive or give something for the support
of those who minister spiritual things in accordance with the statutes
of the Church and approved customs is lawful, yet in such wise that
there be no intention of buying or selling, and that no pressure be
brought to bear on those who are unwilling to give, by withholding
spiritual things that ought to be administered, for then there would be
an appearance of simony. But after the spiritual things have been
freely bestowed, then the statutory and customary offerings and other
dues may be exacted from those who are unwilling but able to pay, if
the superior authorize this to be done.
Reply to Objection 1: As Jerome says in his commentary on Mic. 3:9,
certain gifts were freely offered to the good prophets, for their
livelihood, but not as a price for the exercise of their gift of
prophecy. Wicked prophets, however, abused this exercise by demanding
payment for it.
Reply to Objection 2: Those who give alms to the poor in order to
obtain from them the assistance of their prayers do not give with the
intent of buying their prayers; but by their gratuitous beneficence
inspire the poor with the mind to pray for them freely and out of
charity. Temporal things are due to the preacher as means for his
support, not as a price of the words he preaches. Hence a gloss on 1
Tim. 5:11, "Let the priests that rule well," says: "Their need allows
them to receive the wherewithal to live, charity demands that this
should be given to them: yet the Gospel is not for sale, nor is a
livelihood the object of preaching: for if they sell it for this
purpose, they sell a great thing for a contemptible price. " In like
manner temporal things are given to those who praise God by celebrating
the divine office whether for the living or for the dead, not as a
price but as a means of livelihood; and the same purpose is fulfilled
when alms are received for making processions in funerals. Yet it is
simoniacal to do such things by contract, or with the intention of
buying or selling. Hence it would be an unlawful ordinance if it were
decreed in any church that no procession would take place at a funeral
unless a certain sum of money were paid, because such an ordinance
would preclude the free granting of pious offices to any person. The
ordinance would be more in keeping with the law, if it were decreed
that this honor would be accorded to all who gave a certain alms,
because this would not preclude its being granted to others. Moreover,
the former ordinance has the appearance of an exaction, whereas the
latter bears a likeness to a gratuitous remuneration.
Reply to Objection 3: A person to whom a spiritual power is entrusted
is bound by virtue of his office to exercise the power entrusted to him
in dispensing spiritual things. Moreover, he receives a statutory
payment from the funds of the Church as a means of livelihood.
Therefore, if he were to accept anything for the exercise of his
spiritual power, this would imply, not a hiring of his labor (which he
is bound to give, as a duty arising out of the office he has accepted),
but a sale of the very use of a spiritual grace. For this reason it is
unlawful for him to receive anything for any dispensing whatever, or
for allowing someone else to take his duty, or for correcting his
subjects, or for omitting to correct them. On the other hand it is
lawful for him to receive "procurations," when he visits his subjects,
not as a price for correcting them, but as a means of livelihood. He
that is possessed of science, without having taken upon himself the
obligation of using it for the benefit of others can lawfully receive a
price for his learning or advice, since this is not a sale of truth or
science, but a hiring of labor. If, on the other hand, he be so bound
by virtue of his office, this would amount to a sale of the truth, and
consequently he would sin grievously. For instance, those who in
certain churches are appointed to instruct the clerics of that church
and other poor persons, and are in receipt of an ecclesiastical
benefice for so doing, are not allowed to receive anything in return,
either for teaching, or for celebrating or omitting any feasts.
Reply to Objection 4: It is unlawful to exact or receive anything as
price for entering a monastery: but, in the case of small monasteries,
that are unable to support so many persons, it is lawful, while
entrance to the monastery is free, to accept something for the support
of those who are about to be received into the monastery, if its
revenues are insufficient. In like manner it is lawful to be easier in
admitting to a monastery a person who has proved his regard for that
monastery by the generosity of his alms: just as, on the other hand, it
is lawful to incite a person's regard for a monastery by means of
temporal benefits, in order that he may thereby be induced to enter the
monastery; although it is unlawful to agree to give or receive
something for entrance into a monastery (I, qu. ii, cap. Quam pio).
__________________________________________________________________
Whether it is lawful to receive money for things annexed to spiritual
things?
Objection 1: It would seem lawful to receive money for things annexed
to spiritual things. Seemingly all temporal things are annexed to
spiritual things, since temporal things ought to be sought for the sake
of spiritual things. If, therefore, it is unlawful to sell what is
annexed to spiritual things, it will be unlawful to sell anything
temporal, and this is clearly false.
Objection 2: Further, nothing would seem to be more annexed to
spiritual things than consecrated vessels. Yet it is lawful to sell a
chalice for the ransom of prisoners, according to Ambrose (De Offic.
ii, 28). Therefore it is lawful to sell things annexed to spiritual
things.
Objection 3: Further, things annexed to spiritual things include right
of burial, right of patronage, and, according to ancient writers, right
of the first-born (because before the Lord the first-born exercised the
priestly office), and the right to receive tithes. Now Abraham bought
from Ephron a double cave for a burying-place (Gn. 23:8, sqq. ), and
Jacob bought from Esau the right of the first-born (Gn. 25:31, sqq. ).
Again the right of patronage is transferred with the property sold, and
is granted "in fee. " Tithes are granted to certain soldiers, and can be
redeemed. Prelates also at times retain for themselves the revenues of
prebends of which they have the presentation, although a prebend is
something annexed to a spiritual thing. Therefore it is lawful to sell
things annexed to spiritual things.
On the contrary, Pope Paschal [*Paschal II] says (cf. I, qu. iii, cap.
Si quis objecerit): "Whoever sells one of two such things, that the one
is unproductive without the other, leaves neither unsold. Wherefore let
no person sell a church, or a prebend, or anything ecclesiastical. "
I answer that, A thing may be annexed to spiritual things in two ways.
First, as being dependent on spiritual things. Thus to have to
spiritual things, because it is not competent save to those who hold a
clerical office. Hence such things can by no means exist apart from
spiritual things. Consequently it is altogether unlawful to sell such
things, because the sale thereof implies the sale of things spiritual.
Other things are annexed to spiritual things through being directed
thereto, for instance the right of patronage, which is directed to the
presentation of clerics to ecclesiastical benefices; and sacred
vessels, which are directed to the use of the sacraments. Wherefore
such things as these do not presuppose spiritual things, but precede
them in the order of time. Hence in a way they can be sold, but not as
annexed to spiritual things.
Reply to Objection 1: All things temporal are annexed to spiritual
things, as to their end, wherefore it is lawful to sell temporal
things, but their relation to spiritual things cannot be the matter of
a lawful sale.
Reply to Objection 2: Sacred vessels also are annexed to spiritual
things as to their end, wherefore their consecration cannot be sold.
Yet their material can be sold for the needs of the Church or of the
poor provided they first be broken, after prayer has been said over
them, since when once broken, they are considered to be no longer
sacred vessels but mere metal: so that if like vessels were to be made
out of the same material they would have to be consecrated again.
Reply to Objection 3: We have no authority for supposing that the
double cave which Abraham bought for a burial place was consecrated for
that purpose: wherefore Abraham could lawfully buy that site to be used
for burial, in order to turn it into a sepulchre: even so it would be
lawful now to buy an ordinary field as a site for a cemetery or even a
church. Nevertheless because even among the Gentiles burial places are
looked upon as religious, if Ephron intended to accept the price as
payment for a burial place, he sinned in selling, though Abraham did
not sin in buying, because he intended merely to buy an ordinary plot
of ground. Even now, it is lawful in a case of necessity to sell or buy
land on which there has previously been a church, as we have also said
with regard to sacred vessels (Reply OBJ[2]). Or again, Abraham is to
be excused because he thus freed himself of a grievance. For although
Ephron offered him the burial place for nothing, Abraham deemed that he
could not accept it gratis without prejudice to himself.
The right of the first-born was due to Jacob by reason of God's choice,
according to Malach. 1:2,3, "I have loved Jacob, but have hated Esau. "
Wherefore Esau sinned by selling his birthright, yet Jacob sinned not
in buying, because he is understood to have freed himself of his
grievance.
The right of patronage cannot be the matter of a direct sale, nor can
it be granted "in fee," but is transferred with the property sold or
granted.
The spiritual right of receiving tithes is not granted to layfolk, but
merely the temporal commodities which are granted in the name of tithe,
as stated above ([3149]Q[87], A[3]).
With regard to the granting of benefices it must, however, be observed,
that it is not unlawful for a bishop, before presenting a person to a
benefice, to decide, for some reason, to retain part of the revenues of
the benefice in question, and to spend it on some pious object. But, on
the other hand, if he were to require part of the revenues of that
benefice to be given to him by the beneficiary, it would be the same as
though he demanded payment from him, and he would not escape the guilt
of simony.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether it is lawful to grant spiritual things in return for an equivalent
of service, or for an oral remuneration?
Objection 1: It would seem that it is lawful to grant spiritual things
in return for an equivalent of service, or an oral remuneration.
Gregory says (Regist. iii, ep. 18): "It is right that those who serve
the interests of the Church should be rewarded. " Now an equivalent of
service denotes serving the interests of the Church. Therefore it seems
lawful to confer ecclesiastical benefices for services received.
Objection 2: Further, to confer an ecclesiastical benefice for service
received seems to indicate a carnal intention, no less than to do so on
account of kinship. Yet the latter seemingly is not simoniacal since it
implies no buying or selling. Therefore neither is the former
simoniacal.
Objection 3: Further, that which is done only at another's request
would seem to be done gratis: so that apparently it does not involve
simony, which consists in buying or selling. Now oral remuneration
denotes the conferring of an ecclesiastical benefice at some person's
request. Therefore this is not simoniacal.
Objection 4: Further, hypocrites perform spiritual deeds in order that
they may receive human praise, which seems to imply oral remuneration:
and yet hypocrites are not said to be guilty of simony. Therefore oral
remuneration does not entail simony.
On the contrary, Pope Urban [*Urban II, Ep. xvii ad Lucium] says:
"Whoever grants or acquires ecclesiastical things, not for the purpose
for which they were instituted but for his own profit, in consideration
of an oral remuneration or of an equivalent in service rendered or
money received, is guilty of simony. "
I answer that, As stated above [3150](A[2]), the term "money" denotes
"anything that can have a pecuniary value. " Now it is evident that a
man's service is directed to some kind of usefulness, which has a
pecuniary value, wherefore servants are hired for a money wage.
Therefore to grant a spiritual thing for a service rendered or to be
rendered is the same as to grant it for the money, received or
promised, at which that service could be valued. If likewise, to grant
a person's request for the bestowal of a temporary favor is directed to
some kind of usefulness which has a pecuniary value. Wherefore just as
a man contracts the guilt of simony by accepting money or any eternal
thing which comes under the head of "real remuneration," so too does he
contract it, by receiving "oral remuneration" or an "equivalent in
service rendered. "
Reply to Objection 1: If a cleric renders a prelate a lawful service,
directed to spiritual things (e. g. to the good of the Church, or
benefit of her ministers), he becomes worthy of an ecclesiastical
benefice by reason of the devotion that led him to render the service,
as he would by reason of any other good deed. Hence this is not a case
of remuneration for service rendered, such as Gregory has in mind. But
if the service be unlawful, or directed to carnal things (e. g. a
service rendered to the prelate for the profit of his kindred, or the
increase of his patrimony, or the like), it will be a case of
remuneration for service rendered, and this will be simony.
Reply to Objection 2: The bestowal of a spiritual thing gratis on a
person by reason of kinship or of any carnal affection is unlawful and
carnal, but not simoniacal: since nothing is received in return,
wherefore it does not imply a contract of buying and selling, on which
simony is based. But to present a person to an ecclesiastical benefice
with the understanding or intention that he provide for one's kindred
from the revenue is manifest simony.
Reply to Objection 3: Oral remuneration denotes either praise that
pertains to human favor, which has its price, or a request whereby
man's favor is obtained or the contrary avoided. Hence if one intend
this chiefly one commits simony. Now to grant a request made for an
unworthy person implies, seemingly, that this is one's chief intention
wherefore the deed itself is simoniacal. But if the request be made for
a worthy person, the deed itself is not simoniacal, because it is based
on a worthy cause, on account of which a spiritual thing is granted to
the person for whom the request is made. Nevertheless there may be
simony in the intention, if one look, not to the worthiness of the
person, but to human favor. If, however, a person asks for himself,
that he may obtain the cure of souls, his very presumption renders him
unworthy, and so his request is made for an unworthy person. But, if
one be in need, one may lawfully seek for oneself an ecclesiastical
benefice without the cure of souls.
Reply to Objection 4: A hypocrite does not give a spiritual thing for
the sake of praise, he only makes a show of it, and under false
pretenses stealthily purloins rather than buys human praise: so that
seemingly the hypocrite is not guilty of simony.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether those who are guilty of simony are fittingly punished by being
deprived of what they have acquired by simony?
Objection 1: It would seem that those who are guilty of simony are not
fittingly punished by being deprived of what they have acquired by
simony. Simony is committed by acquiring spiritual things in return for
a remuneration. Now certain spiritual things cannot be lost when once
acquired, such as all characters that are imprinted by a consecration.
Therefore it is not a fitting punishment for a person to be deprived of
what he has acquired simoniacally.
Objection 2: Further, it sometimes happens that one who has obtained
the episcopate by simony commands a subject of his to receive orders
from him: and apparently the subject should obey, so long as the Church
tolerates him. Yet no one ought to receive from him that has not the
power to give.
Therefore a bishop does not lose his episcopal power, if
he has acquired it by simony.
Objection 3: Further, no one should be punished for what was done
without his knowledge and consent, since punishment is due for sin
which is voluntary, as was shown above ([3151]FS, Q[74], AA[1],2;
[3152]FS, Q[77], A[7]). Now it happens sometimes that a person acquires
something spiritual, which others have procured for him without his
knowledge and consent. Therefore he should not be punished by being
deprived of what has been bestowed on him.
Objection 4: Further, no one should profit by his own sin. Yet, if a
person who has acquired an ecclesiastical benefice by simony, were to
restore what he has received, this would sometimes turn to the profit
of those who had a share in his simony; for instance, when a prelate
and his entire chapter have consented to the simony. Therefore that
which has been acquired by simony ought not always to be restored.
Objection 5: Further, sometimes a person obtains admission to a
monastery by simony, and there takes the solemn vow of profession. But
no one should be freed from the obligation of a vow on account of a
fault he has committed. Therefore he should not be expelled from the
monastic state which he has acquired by simony.
Objection 6: Further, in this world external punishment is not
inflicted for the internal movements of the heart, whereof God alone is
the judge. Now simony is committed in the mere intention or will,
wherefore it is defined in reference to the will, as stated above
(A[1], ad 2). Therefore a person should not always be deprived of what
he has acquired by simony.
Objection 7: Further, to be promoted to greater dignity is much less
than to retain that which one has already received. Now sometimes those
who are guilty of simony are, by dispensation, promoted to greater
dignity. Therefore they should not always be deprived of what they have
received.
On the contrary, It is written (I, qu. i, cap. Si quis Episcopus): "He
that has been ordained shall profit nothing from his ordination or
promotion that he has acquired by the bargain, but shall forfeit the
dignity or cure that he has acquired with his money. "
I answer that, No one can lawfully retain that which he has acquired
against the owner's will. For instance, if a steward were to give some
of his lord's property to a person, against his lord's will and orders,
the recipient could not lawfully retain what he received. Now Our Lord,
Whose stewards and ministers are the prelates of churches, ordered
spiritual things to be given gratis, according to Mat. 10:8, "Freely
have you received, freely give. " Wherefore whosoever acquires spiritual
things in return for a remuneration cannot lawfully retain them.
Moreover, those who are guilty of simony, by either selling or buying
spiritual things, as well as those who act as go-between, are sentenced
to other punishments, namely, infamy and deposition, if they be
clerics, and excommunication if they be laymen, as stated qu. i, cap.
Si quis Episcopus [*Qu. iii, can. Si quis praebendas].
Reply to Objection 1: He that has received a sacred Order simoniacally,
receives the character of the Order on account of the efficacy of the
sacrament: but he does not receive the grace nor the exercise of the
Order, because he has received the character by stealth as it were, and
against the will of the Supreme Lord. Wherefore he is suspended, by
virtue of the law, both as regards himself, namely, that he should not
busy himself about exercising his Order, and as regards others, namely,
that no one may communicate with him in the exercise of his Order,
whether his sin be public or secret. Nor may he reclaim the money which
he basely gave, although the other party unjustly retains it.
Again, a man who is guilty of simony, through having conferred Orders
simoniacally, or through having simoniacally granted or received a
benefice, or through having been a go-between in a simoniacal
transaction, if he has done so publicly, is suspended by virtue of the
law, as regards both himself and others; but if he has acted in secret
he is suspended by virtue of the law, as regards himself alone, and not
as regards others.
Reply to Objection 2: One ought not to receive Orders from a bishop one
knows to have been promoted simoniacally, either on account of his
command or for fear of his excommunication: and such as receive Orders
from him do not receive the exercise of their Orders, even though they
are ignorant of his being guilty of simony; and they need to receive a
dispensation. Some, however, maintain that one ought to receive Orders
in obedience to his command unless one can prove him to be guilty of
simony, but that one ought not to exercise the Order without a
dispensation. But this is an unreasonable statement, because no one
should obey a man to the extent of communicating with him in an
unlawful action. Now he that is, by virtue of the law, suspended as
regards both himself and others, confers Orders unlawfully: wherefore
no one should communicate with him, by receiving Orders from him for
any cause whatever. If, however, one be not certain on the point, one
ought not to give credence to another's sin, and so one ought with a
good conscience to receive Orders from him. And if the bishop has been
guilty of simony otherwise than by a simoniacal promotion, and the fact
be a secret, one can receive Orders from him because he is not
suspended as regards others, but only as regards himself, as stated
above (ad 1).
Reply to Objection 3: To be deprived of what one has received is not
only the punishment of a sin, but is also sometimes the effect of
acquiring unjustly, as when one buys a thing of a person who cannot
sell it. Wherefore if a man, knowingly and spontaneously, receives
Orders or an ecclesiastical benefice simoniacally, not only is he
deprived of what he has received, by forfeiting the exercise of his
order, and resigning the benefice and the fruits acquired therefrom,
but also in addition to this he is punished by being marked with
infamy. Moreover, he is bound to restore not only the fruit actually
acquired, but also such as could have been acquired by a careful
possessor (which, however, is to be understood of the net fruits,
allowance being made for expenses incurred on account of the fruits),
excepting those fruits that have been expended for the good of the
Church.
On the other hand, if a man's promotion be procured simoniacally by
others, without his knowledge and consent, he forfeits the exercise of
his Order, and is bound to resign the benefice obtained together with
fruits still extant; but he is not bound to restore the fruits which he
has consumed, since he possessed them in good faith. Exception must be
made in the case when his promotion has been deceitfully procured by an
enemy of his; or when he expressly opposes the transaction, for then he
is not bound to resign, unless subsequently he agree to the
transaction, by paying what was promised.
Reply to Objection 4: Money, property, or fruits simoniacally received,
must be restored to the Church that has incurred loss by their
transfer, notwithstanding the fact that the prelate or a member of the
chapter of that church was at fault, since others ought not to be the
losers by his sin: in suchwise, however, that, as far as possible, the
guilty parties be not the gainers. But if the prelate and the entire
chapter be at fault, restitution must be made, with the consent of
superior authority, either to the poor or to some other church.
Reply to Objection 5: If there are any persons who have been
simoniacally admitted into a monastery, they must quit: and if the
simony was committed with their knowledge since the holding of the
General Council [*Fourth Lateran Council, A. D. 1215, held by Innocent
III], they must be expelled from their monastery without hope of
return, and do perpetual penance under a stricter rule, or in some
house of the same order, if a stricter one be not found. If, however,
this took place before the Council, they must be placed in other houses
of the same order. If this cannot be done, they must be received into
monasteries of the same order, by way of compensation, lest they wander
about the world, but they must not be admitted to their former rank,
and must be assigned a lower place.
On the other hand, if they were received simoniacally, without their
knowledge, whether before or after the Council, then after quitting
they may be received again, their rank being changed as stated.
Reply to Objection 6: In God's sight the mere will makes a man guilty
of simony; but as regards the external ecclesiastical punishment he is
not punished as a simoniac, by being obliged to resign, but is bound to
repent of his evil intention.
Reply to Objection 7: The Pope alone can grant a dispensation to one
who has knowingly received a benefice (simoniacally). In other cases
the bishop also can dispense, provided the beneficiary first of all
renounce what he has received simoniacally, so that he will receive
either the lesser dispensation allowing him to communicate with the
laity, or a greater dispensation, allowing him after doing penance to
retain his order in some other Church; or again a greater dispensation,
allowing him to remain in the same Church, but in minor orders; or a
full dispensation allowing him to exercise even the major orders in the
same Church, but not to accept a prelacy.
__________________________________________________________________
OF PIETY (FOUR ARTICLES)
After religion we must consider piety, the consideration of which will
render the opposite vices manifest. Accordingly four points of inquiry
arise with regard to piety:
(1) To whom does piety extend?
(2) What does piety make one offer a person?
(3) Whether piety is a special virtue?
(4) Whether the duties of piety should be omitted for the sake of
religion?
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Whether piety extends to particular human individuals?
Objection 1: It seems that piety does not extend to particular human
individuals. For Augustine says (De Civ. Dei x) that piety denotes,
properly speaking, the worship of God, which the Greeks designate by
the term {eusebeia}. But the worship of God does not denote relation to
man, but only to God. Therefore piety does not extend definitely to
certain human individuals.
Objection 2: Further, Gregory says (Moral. i): "Piety, on her day,
provides a banquet, because she fills the inmost recesses of the heart
with works of mercy. " Now the works of mercy are to be done to all,
according to Augustine (De Doctr. Christ. i). Therefore piety does not
extend definitely to certain special persons.
Objection 3: Further, in human affairs there are many other mutual
relations besides those of kindred and citizenship, as the Philosopher
states (Ethic. viii, 11,12), and on each of them is founded a kind of
friendship, which would seem to be the virtue of piety, according to a
gloss on 2 Tim. 3:5, "Having an appearance indeed of piety [Douay:
'godliness']. " Therefore piety extends not only to one's kindred and
fellow-citizens.
On the contrary, Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii) that "it is by piety
that we do our duty towards our kindred and well-wishers of our country
and render them faithful service. "
I answer that, Man becomes a debtor to other men in various ways,
according to their various excellence and the various benefits received
from them. on both counts God holds first place, for He is supremely
excellent, and is for us the first principle of being and government.
In the second place, the principles of our being and government are our
parents and our country, that have given us birth and nourishment.
Consequently man is debtor chiefly to his parents and his country,
after God. Wherefore just as it belongs to religion to give worship to
God, so does it belong to piety, in the second place, to give worship
to one's parents and one's country.
The worship due to our parents includes the worship given to all our
kindred, since our kinsfolk are those who descend from the same
parents, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 12). The worship
given to our country includes homage to all our fellow-citizens and to
all the friends of our country. Therefore piety extends chiefly to
these.
Reply to Objection 1: The greater includes the lesser: wherefore the
worship due to God includes the worship due to our parents as a
particular. Hence it is written (Malach. 1:6): "If I be a father, where
is My honor? " Consequently the term piety extends also to the divine
worship.
Reply to Objection 2: As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei x), "the term
piety is often used in connection with works of mercy, in the language
of the common people; the reason for which I consider to be the fact
that God Himself has declared that these works are more pleasing to Him
than sacrifices. This custom has led to the application of the word
'pious' to God Himself. "
Reply to Objection 3: The relations of a man with his kindred and
fellow-citizens are more referable to the principles of his being than
other relations: wherefore the term piety is more applicable to them.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether piety provides support for our parents?
Objection 1: It seems that piety does not provide support for our
parents. For, seemingly, the precept of the decalogue, "Honor thy
father and mother," belongs to piety. But this prescribes only the
giving of honor. Therefore it does not belong to piety to provide
support for one's parents.
Objection 2: Further, a man is bound to lay up for those whom he is
bound to support. Now according to the Apostle (2 Cor. 12:14), "neither
ought the children to lay up for the parents. " Therefore piety does not
oblige them to support their parents.
Objection 3: Further, piety extends not only to one's parents, but also
to other kinsmen and to one's fellow-citizens, as stated above
[3153](A[1]). But one is not bound to support all one's kindred and
fellow-citizens. Therefore neither is one bound to support one's
parents.
On the contrary, our Lord (Mat. 15:3-6) reproved the Pharisees for
hindering children from supporting their parents.
I answer that, We owe something to our parents in two ways: that is to
say, both essentially, and accidentally. We owe them essentially that
which is due to a father as such: and since he is his son's superior
through being the principle of his being, the latter owes him reverence
and service. Accidentally, that is due to a father, which it befits him
to receive in respect of something accidental to him, for instance, if
he be ill, it is fitting that his children should visit him and see to
his cure; if he be poor, it is fitting that they should support him;
and so on in like instance, all of which come under the head of service
due. Hence Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii) that "piety gives both duty
and homage": "duty" referring to service, and "homage" to reverence or
honor, because, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei x), "we are said to give
homage to those whose memory or presence we honor. "
Reply to Objection 1: According to our Lord's interpretation (Mat.
15:3-6) the honor due to our parents includes whatever support we owe
them; and the reason for this is that support is given to one's father
because it is due to him as to one greater.
Reply to Objection 2: Since a father stands in the relation of
principle, and his son in the relation of that which is from a
principle, it is essentially fitting for a father to support his son:
and consequently he is bound to support him not only for a time, but
for all his life, and this is to lay by. On the other hand, for the son
to bestow something on his father is accidental, arising from some
momentary necessity, wherein he is bound to support him, but not to lay
by as for a long time beforehand, because naturally parents are not the
successors of their children, but children of their parents.
Reply to Objection 3: As Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii), "we offer
homage and duty to all our kindred and to the well-wishers of our
country"; not, however, equally to all, but chiefly to our parents, and
to others according to our means and their personal claims.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether piety is a special virtue distinct from other virtues?
Objection 1: It seems that piety is not a special virtue distinct from
other virtues. For the giving of service and homage to anyone proceeds
from love. But it belongs to piety. Therefore piety is not a distinct
virtue from charity.
Objection 2: Further, it is proper to religion to give worship to God.
But piety also gives worship to God, according to Augustine (De Civ.
Dei x). Therefore piety is not distinct from religion.
Objection 3: Further, piety, whereby we give our country worship and
duty, seems to be the same as legal justice, which looks to the common
good. But legal justice is a general virtue, according to the
Philosopher (Ethic. v, 1,2). Therefore piety is not a special virtue.
On the contrary, It is accounted by Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii) as a
part of justice.
I answer that, A special virtue is one that regards an object under a
special aspect. Since, then, the nature of justice consists in
rendering another person his due, wherever there is a special aspect of
something due to a person, there is a special virtue. Now a thing is
indebted in a special way to that which is its connatural principle of
being and government. And piety regards this principle, inasmuch as it
pays duty and homage to our parents and country, and to those who are
related thereto. Therefore piety is a special virtue.
Reply to Objection 1: Just as religion is a protestation of faith, hope
and charity, whereby man is primarily directed to God, so again piety
is a protestation of the charity we bear towards our parents and
country.
Reply to Objection 2: God is the principle of our being and government
in a far more excellent manner than one's father or country. Hence
religion, which gives worship to God, is a distinct virtue from piety,
which pays homage to our parents and country. But things relating to
creatures are transferred to God as the summit of excellence and
causality, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. i): wherefore, by way of
excellence, piety designates the worship of God, even as God, by way of
excellence, is called "Our Father. "
Reply to Objection 3: Piety extends to our country in so far as the
latter is for us a principle of being: but legal justice regards the
good of our country, considered as the common good: wherefore legal
justice has more of the character of a general virtue than piety has.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the duties of piety towards one's parents should be omitted for the
sake of religion?
Objection 1: It seems that the duties of piety towards one's parents
should be omitted for the sake of religion. For Our Lord said (Lk.
14:26): "If any man come to Me, and hate not his father, and mother,
and wife, and children, and brethren, and sisters, yea and his own life
also, he cannot be My disciple. " Hence it is said in praise of James
and John (Mat. 4:22) that they left "their nets and father, and
followed" Christ. Again it is said in praise of the Levites (Dt. 33:9):
"Who hath said to his father, and to his mother: I do not know you; and
to his brethren: I know you not; and their own children they have not
known. These have kept Thy word. " Now a man who knows not his parents
and other kinsmen, or who even hates them, must needs omit the duties
of piety. Therefore the duties of piety should be omitted for the sake
of religion.
Objection 2: Further, it is written (Lk. 9:59,60) that in answer to him
who said: "Suffer me first to go and bury my father," Our Lord replied:
"Let the dead bury their dead: but go thou, and preach the kingdom of
God. " Now the latter pertains to religion, while it is a duty of piety
to bury one's father. Therefore a duty of piety should be omitted for
the sake of religion.
Objection 3: Further, God is called "Our Father" by excellence. Now
just as we worship our parents by paying them the duties of piety so do
we worship God by religion. Therefore the duties of piety should be
omitted for the sake of the worship of religion.
Objection 4: Further, religious are bound by a vow which they may not
break to fulfil the observances of religion. Now in accordance with
those observances they are hindered from supporting their parents, both
on the score of poverty, since they have nothing of their own, and on
the score of obedience, since they may not leave the cloister without
the permission of their superior. Therefore the duties of piety towards
one's parents should be omitted for the sake of religion.
On the contrary, Our Lord reproved the Pharisees (Mat. 15:3-6) who
taught that for the sake of religion one ought to refrain from paying
one's parents the honor we owe them.
I answer that, Religion and piety are two virtues. Now no virtue is
opposed to another virtue, since according to the Philosopher, in his
book on the Categories (Cap. De oppos. ), "good is not opposed to good. "
Therefore it is impossible that religion and piety mutually hinder one
another, so that the act of one be excluded by the act of the other.
Now, as stated above ([3154]FS, Q[7], A[2]; [3155]FS, Q[18], A[3]), the
act of every virtue is limited by the circumstances due thereto, and if
it overstep them it will be an act no longer of virtue but of vice.
Hence it belongs to piety to pay duty and homage to one's parents
according to the due mode. But it is not the due mode that man should
tend to worship his father rather than God, but, as Ambrose says on Lk.
12:52, "the piety of divine religion takes precedence of the claims of
kindred. "
Accordingly, if the worship of one's parents take one away from the
worship of God it would no longer be an act of piety to pay worship to
one's parents to the prejudice of God. Hence Jerome says (Ep. ad
Heliod. ): "Though thou trample upon thy father, though thou spurn thy
mother, turn not aside, but with dry eyes hasten to the standard of the
cross; it is the highest degree of piety to be cruel in this matter. "
Therefore in such a case the duties of piety towards one's parents
should be omitted for the sake of the worship religion gives to God.
If, however, by paying the services due to our parents, we are not
withdrawn from the service of God, then will it be an act of piety, and
there will be no need to set piety aside for the sake of religion.
Reply to Objection 1: Gregory expounding this saying of our Lord says
(Hom. xxxvii in Ev. ) that "when we find our parents to be a hindrance
in our way to God, we must ignore them by hating and fleeing from
them. " For if our parents incite us to sin, and withdraw us from the
service of God, we must, as regards this point, abandon and hate them.
It is in this sense that the Levites are said to have not known their
kindred, because they obeyed the Lord's command, and spared not the
idolaters (Ex. 32). James and John are praised for leaving their
parents and following our Lord, not that their father incited them to
evil, but because they deemed it possible for him to find another means
of livelihood, if they followed Christ.
Reply to Objection 2: Our Lord forbade the disciple to bury his father
because, according to Chrysostom (Hom. xxviii in Matth. ), "Our Lord by
so doing saved him from many evils, such as the sorrows and worries and
other things that one anticipates under these circumstances. For after
the burial the will had to be read, the estate had to be divided, and
so forth: but chiefly, because there were others who could see to the
funeral.
sacraments.
Objection 2: Further, the greatest of the sacraments is the Eucharist,
which is consecrated in the Mass. But some priests receive a prebend or
money for singing masses. Much more therefore is it lawful to buy or
sell the other sacraments.
Objection 3: Further, the sacrament of Penance is a necessary sacrament
consisting chiefly in the absolution. But some persons demand money
when absolving from excommunication. Therefore it is not always
unlawful to buy or sell a sacrament.
Objection 4: Further, custom makes that which otherwise were sinful to
be not sinful; thus Augustine says (Contra Faust. xxii, 47) that "it
was no crime to have several wives, so long as it was the custom. " Now
it is the custom in some places to give something in the consecration
of bishops, blessings of abbots, ordinations of the clergy, in exchange
for the chrism, holy oil, and so forth. Therefore it would seem that it
is not unlawful.
Objection 5: Further, it happens sometimes that someone maliciously
hinders a person from obtaining a bishopric or some like dignity. But
it is lawful for a man to make good his grievance. Therefore it is
lawful, seemingly, in such a case to give money for a bishopric or a
like ecclesiastical dignity.
Objection 6: Further, marriage is a sacrament. But sometimes money is
given for marriage. Therefore it is lawful to sell a sacrament.
On the contrary, It is written (I, qu. i [*Can. Qui per pecunias]):
"Whosoever shall consecrate anyone for money, let him be cut off from
the priesthood. "
I answer that, The sacraments of the New Law are of all things most
spiritual, inasmuch as they are the cause of spiritual grace, on which
no price can be set, and which is essentially incompatible with a
non-gratuitous giving. Now the sacraments are dispensed through the
ministers of the Church, whom the people are bound to support,
according to the words of the Apostle (1 Cor. 9:13), "Know you not,
that they who work in the holy place, eat the things that are of the
holy place; and they that serve the altar, partake with the altar? "
Accordingly we must answer that to receive money for the spiritual
grace of the sacraments, is the sin of simony, which cannot be excused
by any custom whatever, since "custom does not prevail over natural or
divine law" [*Cap. Cum tanto, de Consuetud. ; cf. [3147]FS, Q[97],
A[3]]. Now by money we are to understand anything that has a pecuniary
value, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. iv, 1). On the other hand, to
receive anything for the support of those who administer the
sacraments, in accordance with the statutes of the Church and approved
customs, is not simony, nor is it a sin. For it is received not as a
price of goods, but as a payment for their need. Hence a gloss of
Augustine on 1 Tim. 5:17, "Let the priests that rule well," says: "They
should look to the people for a supply to their need, but to the Lord
for the reward of their ministry. "
Reply to Objection 1: In a case of necessity anyone may baptize. And
since nowise ought one to sin, if the priest be unwilling to baptize
without being paid, one must act as though there were no priest
available for the baptism. Hence the person who is in charge of the
child can, in such a case, lawfully baptize it, or cause it to be
baptized by anyone else. He could, however, lawfully buy the water from
the priest, because it is merely a bodily element. But if it were an
adult in danger of death that wished to be baptized, and the priest
were unwilling to baptize him without being paid, he ought, if
possible, to be baptized by someone else. And if he is unable to have
recourse to another, he must by no means pay a price for Baptism, and
should rather die without being baptized, because for him the baptism
of desire would supply the lack of the sacrament.
Reply to Objection 2: The priest receives money, not as the price for
consecrating the Eucharist, or for singing the Mass (for this would be
simoniacal), but as payment for his livelihood, as stated above.
Reply to Objection 3: The money exacted of the person absolved is not
the price of his absolution (for this would be simoniacal), but a
punishment of a past crime for which he was excommunicated.
Reply to Objection 4: As stated above, "custom does not prevail over
natural or divine law" whereby simony is forbidden. Wherefore the
custom, if such there be, of demanding anything as the price of a
spiritual thing, with the intention of buying or selling it, is
manifestly simoniacal, especially when the demand is made of a person
unwilling to pay. But if the demand be made in payment of a stipend
recognized by custom it is not simoniacal, provided there be no
intention of buying or selling, but only of doing what is customary,
and especially if the demand be acceded to voluntarily. In all these
cases, however, one must beware of anything having an appearance of
simony or avarice, according to the saying of the Apostle (1 Thess.
5:22), "From all appearance of evil restrain yourselves. "
Reply to Objection 5: It would be simoniacal to buy off the opposition
of one's rivals, before acquiring the right to a bishopric or any
dignity or prebend, by election, appointment or presentation, since
this would be to use money as a means of obtaining a spiritual thing.
But it is lawful to use money as a means of removing unjust opposition,
after one has already acquired that right.
Reply to Objection 6: Some [*Innocent IV on Cap. Cum in Ecclesia, de
Simonia] say that it is lawful to give money for Matrimony because no
grace is conferred thereby. But this is not altogether true, as we
shall state in the Third Part of the work [*[3148]XP, Q[42], A[3]].
Wherefore we must reply that Matrimony is not only a sacrament of the
Church, but also an office of nature. Consequently it is lawful to give
money for Matrimony considered as an office of nature, but unlawful if
it be considered as a sacrament of the Church. Hence, according to the
law [*Cap. Cum in Ecclesia, de Simonia], it is forbidden to demand
anything for the Nuptial Blessing.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether it is lawful to give and receive money for spiritual actions?
Objection 1: It seems that it is lawful to give and receive money for
spiritual actions. The use of prophecy is a spiritual action. But
something used to be given of old for the use of prophecy, as appears
from 1 Kings 9:7,8, and 3 Kings 14:3. Therefore it would seem that it
is lawful to give and receive money for a spiritual action.
Objection 2: Further, prayer, preaching, divine praise, are most
spiritual actions. Now money is given to holy persons in order to
obtain the assistance of their prayers, according to Lk. 16:9, "Make
unto you friends of the mammon of iniquity. " To preachers also, who sow
spiritual things, temporal things are due according to the Apostle (1
Cor. 9:14). Moreover, something is given to those who celebrate the
divine praises in the ecclesiastical office, and make processions: and
sometimes an annual income is assigned to them. Therefore it is lawful
to receive something for spiritual actions.
Objection 3: Further, science is no less spiritual than power. Now it
is lawful to receive money for the use of science: thus a lawyer may
sell his just advocacy, a physician his advice for health, and a master
the exercise of his teaching. Therefore in like manner it would seem
lawful for a prelate to receive something for the use of his spiritual
power, for instance, for correction, dispensation, and so forth.
Objection 4: Further, religion is the state of spiritual perfection.
Now in certain monasteries something is demanded from those who are
received there. Therefore it is lawful to demand something for
spiritual things.
On the contrary, It is stated (I, qu. i [*Can. Quidquid invisibilis]):
"It is absolutely forbidden to make a charge for what is acquired by
the consolation of invisible grace, whether by demanding a price or by
seeking any kind of return whatever. " Now all these spiritual things
are acquired through an invisible grace. Therefore it is not lawful to
charge a price or return for them.
I answer that, Just as the sacraments are called spiritual, because
they confer a spiritual grace, so, too, certain other things are called
spiritual, because they flow from spiritual grace and dispose thereto.
And yet these things are obtainable through the ministry of men,
according to 1 Cor. 9:7, "Who serveth as a soldier at any time at his
own charges? Who feedeth the flock, and eateth not of the milk of the
flock? " Hence it is simoniacal to sell or buy that which is spiritual
in such like actions; but to receive or give something for the support
of those who minister spiritual things in accordance with the statutes
of the Church and approved customs is lawful, yet in such wise that
there be no intention of buying or selling, and that no pressure be
brought to bear on those who are unwilling to give, by withholding
spiritual things that ought to be administered, for then there would be
an appearance of simony. But after the spiritual things have been
freely bestowed, then the statutory and customary offerings and other
dues may be exacted from those who are unwilling but able to pay, if
the superior authorize this to be done.
Reply to Objection 1: As Jerome says in his commentary on Mic. 3:9,
certain gifts were freely offered to the good prophets, for their
livelihood, but not as a price for the exercise of their gift of
prophecy. Wicked prophets, however, abused this exercise by demanding
payment for it.
Reply to Objection 2: Those who give alms to the poor in order to
obtain from them the assistance of their prayers do not give with the
intent of buying their prayers; but by their gratuitous beneficence
inspire the poor with the mind to pray for them freely and out of
charity. Temporal things are due to the preacher as means for his
support, not as a price of the words he preaches. Hence a gloss on 1
Tim. 5:11, "Let the priests that rule well," says: "Their need allows
them to receive the wherewithal to live, charity demands that this
should be given to them: yet the Gospel is not for sale, nor is a
livelihood the object of preaching: for if they sell it for this
purpose, they sell a great thing for a contemptible price. " In like
manner temporal things are given to those who praise God by celebrating
the divine office whether for the living or for the dead, not as a
price but as a means of livelihood; and the same purpose is fulfilled
when alms are received for making processions in funerals. Yet it is
simoniacal to do such things by contract, or with the intention of
buying or selling. Hence it would be an unlawful ordinance if it were
decreed in any church that no procession would take place at a funeral
unless a certain sum of money were paid, because such an ordinance
would preclude the free granting of pious offices to any person. The
ordinance would be more in keeping with the law, if it were decreed
that this honor would be accorded to all who gave a certain alms,
because this would not preclude its being granted to others. Moreover,
the former ordinance has the appearance of an exaction, whereas the
latter bears a likeness to a gratuitous remuneration.
Reply to Objection 3: A person to whom a spiritual power is entrusted
is bound by virtue of his office to exercise the power entrusted to him
in dispensing spiritual things. Moreover, he receives a statutory
payment from the funds of the Church as a means of livelihood.
Therefore, if he were to accept anything for the exercise of his
spiritual power, this would imply, not a hiring of his labor (which he
is bound to give, as a duty arising out of the office he has accepted),
but a sale of the very use of a spiritual grace. For this reason it is
unlawful for him to receive anything for any dispensing whatever, or
for allowing someone else to take his duty, or for correcting his
subjects, or for omitting to correct them. On the other hand it is
lawful for him to receive "procurations," when he visits his subjects,
not as a price for correcting them, but as a means of livelihood. He
that is possessed of science, without having taken upon himself the
obligation of using it for the benefit of others can lawfully receive a
price for his learning or advice, since this is not a sale of truth or
science, but a hiring of labor. If, on the other hand, he be so bound
by virtue of his office, this would amount to a sale of the truth, and
consequently he would sin grievously. For instance, those who in
certain churches are appointed to instruct the clerics of that church
and other poor persons, and are in receipt of an ecclesiastical
benefice for so doing, are not allowed to receive anything in return,
either for teaching, or for celebrating or omitting any feasts.
Reply to Objection 4: It is unlawful to exact or receive anything as
price for entering a monastery: but, in the case of small monasteries,
that are unable to support so many persons, it is lawful, while
entrance to the monastery is free, to accept something for the support
of those who are about to be received into the monastery, if its
revenues are insufficient. In like manner it is lawful to be easier in
admitting to a monastery a person who has proved his regard for that
monastery by the generosity of his alms: just as, on the other hand, it
is lawful to incite a person's regard for a monastery by means of
temporal benefits, in order that he may thereby be induced to enter the
monastery; although it is unlawful to agree to give or receive
something for entrance into a monastery (I, qu. ii, cap. Quam pio).
__________________________________________________________________
Whether it is lawful to receive money for things annexed to spiritual
things?
Objection 1: It would seem lawful to receive money for things annexed
to spiritual things. Seemingly all temporal things are annexed to
spiritual things, since temporal things ought to be sought for the sake
of spiritual things. If, therefore, it is unlawful to sell what is
annexed to spiritual things, it will be unlawful to sell anything
temporal, and this is clearly false.
Objection 2: Further, nothing would seem to be more annexed to
spiritual things than consecrated vessels. Yet it is lawful to sell a
chalice for the ransom of prisoners, according to Ambrose (De Offic.
ii, 28). Therefore it is lawful to sell things annexed to spiritual
things.
Objection 3: Further, things annexed to spiritual things include right
of burial, right of patronage, and, according to ancient writers, right
of the first-born (because before the Lord the first-born exercised the
priestly office), and the right to receive tithes. Now Abraham bought
from Ephron a double cave for a burying-place (Gn. 23:8, sqq. ), and
Jacob bought from Esau the right of the first-born (Gn. 25:31, sqq. ).
Again the right of patronage is transferred with the property sold, and
is granted "in fee. " Tithes are granted to certain soldiers, and can be
redeemed. Prelates also at times retain for themselves the revenues of
prebends of which they have the presentation, although a prebend is
something annexed to a spiritual thing. Therefore it is lawful to sell
things annexed to spiritual things.
On the contrary, Pope Paschal [*Paschal II] says (cf. I, qu. iii, cap.
Si quis objecerit): "Whoever sells one of two such things, that the one
is unproductive without the other, leaves neither unsold. Wherefore let
no person sell a church, or a prebend, or anything ecclesiastical. "
I answer that, A thing may be annexed to spiritual things in two ways.
First, as being dependent on spiritual things. Thus to have to
spiritual things, because it is not competent save to those who hold a
clerical office. Hence such things can by no means exist apart from
spiritual things. Consequently it is altogether unlawful to sell such
things, because the sale thereof implies the sale of things spiritual.
Other things are annexed to spiritual things through being directed
thereto, for instance the right of patronage, which is directed to the
presentation of clerics to ecclesiastical benefices; and sacred
vessels, which are directed to the use of the sacraments. Wherefore
such things as these do not presuppose spiritual things, but precede
them in the order of time. Hence in a way they can be sold, but not as
annexed to spiritual things.
Reply to Objection 1: All things temporal are annexed to spiritual
things, as to their end, wherefore it is lawful to sell temporal
things, but their relation to spiritual things cannot be the matter of
a lawful sale.
Reply to Objection 2: Sacred vessels also are annexed to spiritual
things as to their end, wherefore their consecration cannot be sold.
Yet their material can be sold for the needs of the Church or of the
poor provided they first be broken, after prayer has been said over
them, since when once broken, they are considered to be no longer
sacred vessels but mere metal: so that if like vessels were to be made
out of the same material they would have to be consecrated again.
Reply to Objection 3: We have no authority for supposing that the
double cave which Abraham bought for a burial place was consecrated for
that purpose: wherefore Abraham could lawfully buy that site to be used
for burial, in order to turn it into a sepulchre: even so it would be
lawful now to buy an ordinary field as a site for a cemetery or even a
church. Nevertheless because even among the Gentiles burial places are
looked upon as religious, if Ephron intended to accept the price as
payment for a burial place, he sinned in selling, though Abraham did
not sin in buying, because he intended merely to buy an ordinary plot
of ground. Even now, it is lawful in a case of necessity to sell or buy
land on which there has previously been a church, as we have also said
with regard to sacred vessels (Reply OBJ[2]). Or again, Abraham is to
be excused because he thus freed himself of a grievance. For although
Ephron offered him the burial place for nothing, Abraham deemed that he
could not accept it gratis without prejudice to himself.
The right of the first-born was due to Jacob by reason of God's choice,
according to Malach. 1:2,3, "I have loved Jacob, but have hated Esau. "
Wherefore Esau sinned by selling his birthright, yet Jacob sinned not
in buying, because he is understood to have freed himself of his
grievance.
The right of patronage cannot be the matter of a direct sale, nor can
it be granted "in fee," but is transferred with the property sold or
granted.
The spiritual right of receiving tithes is not granted to layfolk, but
merely the temporal commodities which are granted in the name of tithe,
as stated above ([3149]Q[87], A[3]).
With regard to the granting of benefices it must, however, be observed,
that it is not unlawful for a bishop, before presenting a person to a
benefice, to decide, for some reason, to retain part of the revenues of
the benefice in question, and to spend it on some pious object. But, on
the other hand, if he were to require part of the revenues of that
benefice to be given to him by the beneficiary, it would be the same as
though he demanded payment from him, and he would not escape the guilt
of simony.
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Whether it is lawful to grant spiritual things in return for an equivalent
of service, or for an oral remuneration?
Objection 1: It would seem that it is lawful to grant spiritual things
in return for an equivalent of service, or an oral remuneration.
Gregory says (Regist. iii, ep. 18): "It is right that those who serve
the interests of the Church should be rewarded. " Now an equivalent of
service denotes serving the interests of the Church. Therefore it seems
lawful to confer ecclesiastical benefices for services received.
Objection 2: Further, to confer an ecclesiastical benefice for service
received seems to indicate a carnal intention, no less than to do so on
account of kinship. Yet the latter seemingly is not simoniacal since it
implies no buying or selling. Therefore neither is the former
simoniacal.
Objection 3: Further, that which is done only at another's request
would seem to be done gratis: so that apparently it does not involve
simony, which consists in buying or selling. Now oral remuneration
denotes the conferring of an ecclesiastical benefice at some person's
request. Therefore this is not simoniacal.
Objection 4: Further, hypocrites perform spiritual deeds in order that
they may receive human praise, which seems to imply oral remuneration:
and yet hypocrites are not said to be guilty of simony. Therefore oral
remuneration does not entail simony.
On the contrary, Pope Urban [*Urban II, Ep. xvii ad Lucium] says:
"Whoever grants or acquires ecclesiastical things, not for the purpose
for which they were instituted but for his own profit, in consideration
of an oral remuneration or of an equivalent in service rendered or
money received, is guilty of simony. "
I answer that, As stated above [3150](A[2]), the term "money" denotes
"anything that can have a pecuniary value. " Now it is evident that a
man's service is directed to some kind of usefulness, which has a
pecuniary value, wherefore servants are hired for a money wage.
Therefore to grant a spiritual thing for a service rendered or to be
rendered is the same as to grant it for the money, received or
promised, at which that service could be valued. If likewise, to grant
a person's request for the bestowal of a temporary favor is directed to
some kind of usefulness which has a pecuniary value. Wherefore just as
a man contracts the guilt of simony by accepting money or any eternal
thing which comes under the head of "real remuneration," so too does he
contract it, by receiving "oral remuneration" or an "equivalent in
service rendered. "
Reply to Objection 1: If a cleric renders a prelate a lawful service,
directed to spiritual things (e. g. to the good of the Church, or
benefit of her ministers), he becomes worthy of an ecclesiastical
benefice by reason of the devotion that led him to render the service,
as he would by reason of any other good deed. Hence this is not a case
of remuneration for service rendered, such as Gregory has in mind. But
if the service be unlawful, or directed to carnal things (e. g. a
service rendered to the prelate for the profit of his kindred, or the
increase of his patrimony, or the like), it will be a case of
remuneration for service rendered, and this will be simony.
Reply to Objection 2: The bestowal of a spiritual thing gratis on a
person by reason of kinship or of any carnal affection is unlawful and
carnal, but not simoniacal: since nothing is received in return,
wherefore it does not imply a contract of buying and selling, on which
simony is based. But to present a person to an ecclesiastical benefice
with the understanding or intention that he provide for one's kindred
from the revenue is manifest simony.
Reply to Objection 3: Oral remuneration denotes either praise that
pertains to human favor, which has its price, or a request whereby
man's favor is obtained or the contrary avoided. Hence if one intend
this chiefly one commits simony. Now to grant a request made for an
unworthy person implies, seemingly, that this is one's chief intention
wherefore the deed itself is simoniacal. But if the request be made for
a worthy person, the deed itself is not simoniacal, because it is based
on a worthy cause, on account of which a spiritual thing is granted to
the person for whom the request is made. Nevertheless there may be
simony in the intention, if one look, not to the worthiness of the
person, but to human favor. If, however, a person asks for himself,
that he may obtain the cure of souls, his very presumption renders him
unworthy, and so his request is made for an unworthy person. But, if
one be in need, one may lawfully seek for oneself an ecclesiastical
benefice without the cure of souls.
Reply to Objection 4: A hypocrite does not give a spiritual thing for
the sake of praise, he only makes a show of it, and under false
pretenses stealthily purloins rather than buys human praise: so that
seemingly the hypocrite is not guilty of simony.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether those who are guilty of simony are fittingly punished by being
deprived of what they have acquired by simony?
Objection 1: It would seem that those who are guilty of simony are not
fittingly punished by being deprived of what they have acquired by
simony. Simony is committed by acquiring spiritual things in return for
a remuneration. Now certain spiritual things cannot be lost when once
acquired, such as all characters that are imprinted by a consecration.
Therefore it is not a fitting punishment for a person to be deprived of
what he has acquired simoniacally.
Objection 2: Further, it sometimes happens that one who has obtained
the episcopate by simony commands a subject of his to receive orders
from him: and apparently the subject should obey, so long as the Church
tolerates him. Yet no one ought to receive from him that has not the
power to give.
Therefore a bishop does not lose his episcopal power, if
he has acquired it by simony.
Objection 3: Further, no one should be punished for what was done
without his knowledge and consent, since punishment is due for sin
which is voluntary, as was shown above ([3151]FS, Q[74], AA[1],2;
[3152]FS, Q[77], A[7]). Now it happens sometimes that a person acquires
something spiritual, which others have procured for him without his
knowledge and consent. Therefore he should not be punished by being
deprived of what has been bestowed on him.
Objection 4: Further, no one should profit by his own sin. Yet, if a
person who has acquired an ecclesiastical benefice by simony, were to
restore what he has received, this would sometimes turn to the profit
of those who had a share in his simony; for instance, when a prelate
and his entire chapter have consented to the simony. Therefore that
which has been acquired by simony ought not always to be restored.
Objection 5: Further, sometimes a person obtains admission to a
monastery by simony, and there takes the solemn vow of profession. But
no one should be freed from the obligation of a vow on account of a
fault he has committed. Therefore he should not be expelled from the
monastic state which he has acquired by simony.
Objection 6: Further, in this world external punishment is not
inflicted for the internal movements of the heart, whereof God alone is
the judge. Now simony is committed in the mere intention or will,
wherefore it is defined in reference to the will, as stated above
(A[1], ad 2). Therefore a person should not always be deprived of what
he has acquired by simony.
Objection 7: Further, to be promoted to greater dignity is much less
than to retain that which one has already received. Now sometimes those
who are guilty of simony are, by dispensation, promoted to greater
dignity. Therefore they should not always be deprived of what they have
received.
On the contrary, It is written (I, qu. i, cap. Si quis Episcopus): "He
that has been ordained shall profit nothing from his ordination or
promotion that he has acquired by the bargain, but shall forfeit the
dignity or cure that he has acquired with his money. "
I answer that, No one can lawfully retain that which he has acquired
against the owner's will. For instance, if a steward were to give some
of his lord's property to a person, against his lord's will and orders,
the recipient could not lawfully retain what he received. Now Our Lord,
Whose stewards and ministers are the prelates of churches, ordered
spiritual things to be given gratis, according to Mat. 10:8, "Freely
have you received, freely give. " Wherefore whosoever acquires spiritual
things in return for a remuneration cannot lawfully retain them.
Moreover, those who are guilty of simony, by either selling or buying
spiritual things, as well as those who act as go-between, are sentenced
to other punishments, namely, infamy and deposition, if they be
clerics, and excommunication if they be laymen, as stated qu. i, cap.
Si quis Episcopus [*Qu. iii, can. Si quis praebendas].
Reply to Objection 1: He that has received a sacred Order simoniacally,
receives the character of the Order on account of the efficacy of the
sacrament: but he does not receive the grace nor the exercise of the
Order, because he has received the character by stealth as it were, and
against the will of the Supreme Lord. Wherefore he is suspended, by
virtue of the law, both as regards himself, namely, that he should not
busy himself about exercising his Order, and as regards others, namely,
that no one may communicate with him in the exercise of his Order,
whether his sin be public or secret. Nor may he reclaim the money which
he basely gave, although the other party unjustly retains it.
Again, a man who is guilty of simony, through having conferred Orders
simoniacally, or through having simoniacally granted or received a
benefice, or through having been a go-between in a simoniacal
transaction, if he has done so publicly, is suspended by virtue of the
law, as regards both himself and others; but if he has acted in secret
he is suspended by virtue of the law, as regards himself alone, and not
as regards others.
Reply to Objection 2: One ought not to receive Orders from a bishop one
knows to have been promoted simoniacally, either on account of his
command or for fear of his excommunication: and such as receive Orders
from him do not receive the exercise of their Orders, even though they
are ignorant of his being guilty of simony; and they need to receive a
dispensation. Some, however, maintain that one ought to receive Orders
in obedience to his command unless one can prove him to be guilty of
simony, but that one ought not to exercise the Order without a
dispensation. But this is an unreasonable statement, because no one
should obey a man to the extent of communicating with him in an
unlawful action. Now he that is, by virtue of the law, suspended as
regards both himself and others, confers Orders unlawfully: wherefore
no one should communicate with him, by receiving Orders from him for
any cause whatever. If, however, one be not certain on the point, one
ought not to give credence to another's sin, and so one ought with a
good conscience to receive Orders from him. And if the bishop has been
guilty of simony otherwise than by a simoniacal promotion, and the fact
be a secret, one can receive Orders from him because he is not
suspended as regards others, but only as regards himself, as stated
above (ad 1).
Reply to Objection 3: To be deprived of what one has received is not
only the punishment of a sin, but is also sometimes the effect of
acquiring unjustly, as when one buys a thing of a person who cannot
sell it. Wherefore if a man, knowingly and spontaneously, receives
Orders or an ecclesiastical benefice simoniacally, not only is he
deprived of what he has received, by forfeiting the exercise of his
order, and resigning the benefice and the fruits acquired therefrom,
but also in addition to this he is punished by being marked with
infamy. Moreover, he is bound to restore not only the fruit actually
acquired, but also such as could have been acquired by a careful
possessor (which, however, is to be understood of the net fruits,
allowance being made for expenses incurred on account of the fruits),
excepting those fruits that have been expended for the good of the
Church.
On the other hand, if a man's promotion be procured simoniacally by
others, without his knowledge and consent, he forfeits the exercise of
his Order, and is bound to resign the benefice obtained together with
fruits still extant; but he is not bound to restore the fruits which he
has consumed, since he possessed them in good faith. Exception must be
made in the case when his promotion has been deceitfully procured by an
enemy of his; or when he expressly opposes the transaction, for then he
is not bound to resign, unless subsequently he agree to the
transaction, by paying what was promised.
Reply to Objection 4: Money, property, or fruits simoniacally received,
must be restored to the Church that has incurred loss by their
transfer, notwithstanding the fact that the prelate or a member of the
chapter of that church was at fault, since others ought not to be the
losers by his sin: in suchwise, however, that, as far as possible, the
guilty parties be not the gainers. But if the prelate and the entire
chapter be at fault, restitution must be made, with the consent of
superior authority, either to the poor or to some other church.
Reply to Objection 5: If there are any persons who have been
simoniacally admitted into a monastery, they must quit: and if the
simony was committed with their knowledge since the holding of the
General Council [*Fourth Lateran Council, A. D. 1215, held by Innocent
III], they must be expelled from their monastery without hope of
return, and do perpetual penance under a stricter rule, or in some
house of the same order, if a stricter one be not found. If, however,
this took place before the Council, they must be placed in other houses
of the same order. If this cannot be done, they must be received into
monasteries of the same order, by way of compensation, lest they wander
about the world, but they must not be admitted to their former rank,
and must be assigned a lower place.
On the other hand, if they were received simoniacally, without their
knowledge, whether before or after the Council, then after quitting
they may be received again, their rank being changed as stated.
Reply to Objection 6: In God's sight the mere will makes a man guilty
of simony; but as regards the external ecclesiastical punishment he is
not punished as a simoniac, by being obliged to resign, but is bound to
repent of his evil intention.
Reply to Objection 7: The Pope alone can grant a dispensation to one
who has knowingly received a benefice (simoniacally). In other cases
the bishop also can dispense, provided the beneficiary first of all
renounce what he has received simoniacally, so that he will receive
either the lesser dispensation allowing him to communicate with the
laity, or a greater dispensation, allowing him after doing penance to
retain his order in some other Church; or again a greater dispensation,
allowing him to remain in the same Church, but in minor orders; or a
full dispensation allowing him to exercise even the major orders in the
same Church, but not to accept a prelacy.
__________________________________________________________________
OF PIETY (FOUR ARTICLES)
After religion we must consider piety, the consideration of which will
render the opposite vices manifest. Accordingly four points of inquiry
arise with regard to piety:
(1) To whom does piety extend?
(2) What does piety make one offer a person?
(3) Whether piety is a special virtue?
(4) Whether the duties of piety should be omitted for the sake of
religion?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether piety extends to particular human individuals?
Objection 1: It seems that piety does not extend to particular human
individuals. For Augustine says (De Civ. Dei x) that piety denotes,
properly speaking, the worship of God, which the Greeks designate by
the term {eusebeia}. But the worship of God does not denote relation to
man, but only to God. Therefore piety does not extend definitely to
certain human individuals.
Objection 2: Further, Gregory says (Moral. i): "Piety, on her day,
provides a banquet, because she fills the inmost recesses of the heart
with works of mercy. " Now the works of mercy are to be done to all,
according to Augustine (De Doctr. Christ. i). Therefore piety does not
extend definitely to certain special persons.
Objection 3: Further, in human affairs there are many other mutual
relations besides those of kindred and citizenship, as the Philosopher
states (Ethic. viii, 11,12), and on each of them is founded a kind of
friendship, which would seem to be the virtue of piety, according to a
gloss on 2 Tim. 3:5, "Having an appearance indeed of piety [Douay:
'godliness']. " Therefore piety extends not only to one's kindred and
fellow-citizens.
On the contrary, Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii) that "it is by piety
that we do our duty towards our kindred and well-wishers of our country
and render them faithful service. "
I answer that, Man becomes a debtor to other men in various ways,
according to their various excellence and the various benefits received
from them. on both counts God holds first place, for He is supremely
excellent, and is for us the first principle of being and government.
In the second place, the principles of our being and government are our
parents and our country, that have given us birth and nourishment.
Consequently man is debtor chiefly to his parents and his country,
after God. Wherefore just as it belongs to religion to give worship to
God, so does it belong to piety, in the second place, to give worship
to one's parents and one's country.
The worship due to our parents includes the worship given to all our
kindred, since our kinsfolk are those who descend from the same
parents, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 12). The worship
given to our country includes homage to all our fellow-citizens and to
all the friends of our country. Therefore piety extends chiefly to
these.
Reply to Objection 1: The greater includes the lesser: wherefore the
worship due to God includes the worship due to our parents as a
particular. Hence it is written (Malach. 1:6): "If I be a father, where
is My honor? " Consequently the term piety extends also to the divine
worship.
Reply to Objection 2: As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei x), "the term
piety is often used in connection with works of mercy, in the language
of the common people; the reason for which I consider to be the fact
that God Himself has declared that these works are more pleasing to Him
than sacrifices. This custom has led to the application of the word
'pious' to God Himself. "
Reply to Objection 3: The relations of a man with his kindred and
fellow-citizens are more referable to the principles of his being than
other relations: wherefore the term piety is more applicable to them.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether piety provides support for our parents?
Objection 1: It seems that piety does not provide support for our
parents. For, seemingly, the precept of the decalogue, "Honor thy
father and mother," belongs to piety. But this prescribes only the
giving of honor. Therefore it does not belong to piety to provide
support for one's parents.
Objection 2: Further, a man is bound to lay up for those whom he is
bound to support. Now according to the Apostle (2 Cor. 12:14), "neither
ought the children to lay up for the parents. " Therefore piety does not
oblige them to support their parents.
Objection 3: Further, piety extends not only to one's parents, but also
to other kinsmen and to one's fellow-citizens, as stated above
[3153](A[1]). But one is not bound to support all one's kindred and
fellow-citizens. Therefore neither is one bound to support one's
parents.
On the contrary, our Lord (Mat. 15:3-6) reproved the Pharisees for
hindering children from supporting their parents.
I answer that, We owe something to our parents in two ways: that is to
say, both essentially, and accidentally. We owe them essentially that
which is due to a father as such: and since he is his son's superior
through being the principle of his being, the latter owes him reverence
and service. Accidentally, that is due to a father, which it befits him
to receive in respect of something accidental to him, for instance, if
he be ill, it is fitting that his children should visit him and see to
his cure; if he be poor, it is fitting that they should support him;
and so on in like instance, all of which come under the head of service
due. Hence Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii) that "piety gives both duty
and homage": "duty" referring to service, and "homage" to reverence or
honor, because, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei x), "we are said to give
homage to those whose memory or presence we honor. "
Reply to Objection 1: According to our Lord's interpretation (Mat.
15:3-6) the honor due to our parents includes whatever support we owe
them; and the reason for this is that support is given to one's father
because it is due to him as to one greater.
Reply to Objection 2: Since a father stands in the relation of
principle, and his son in the relation of that which is from a
principle, it is essentially fitting for a father to support his son:
and consequently he is bound to support him not only for a time, but
for all his life, and this is to lay by. On the other hand, for the son
to bestow something on his father is accidental, arising from some
momentary necessity, wherein he is bound to support him, but not to lay
by as for a long time beforehand, because naturally parents are not the
successors of their children, but children of their parents.
Reply to Objection 3: As Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii), "we offer
homage and duty to all our kindred and to the well-wishers of our
country"; not, however, equally to all, but chiefly to our parents, and
to others according to our means and their personal claims.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether piety is a special virtue distinct from other virtues?
Objection 1: It seems that piety is not a special virtue distinct from
other virtues. For the giving of service and homage to anyone proceeds
from love. But it belongs to piety. Therefore piety is not a distinct
virtue from charity.
Objection 2: Further, it is proper to religion to give worship to God.
But piety also gives worship to God, according to Augustine (De Civ.
Dei x). Therefore piety is not distinct from religion.
Objection 3: Further, piety, whereby we give our country worship and
duty, seems to be the same as legal justice, which looks to the common
good. But legal justice is a general virtue, according to the
Philosopher (Ethic. v, 1,2). Therefore piety is not a special virtue.
On the contrary, It is accounted by Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii) as a
part of justice.
I answer that, A special virtue is one that regards an object under a
special aspect. Since, then, the nature of justice consists in
rendering another person his due, wherever there is a special aspect of
something due to a person, there is a special virtue. Now a thing is
indebted in a special way to that which is its connatural principle of
being and government. And piety regards this principle, inasmuch as it
pays duty and homage to our parents and country, and to those who are
related thereto. Therefore piety is a special virtue.
Reply to Objection 1: Just as religion is a protestation of faith, hope
and charity, whereby man is primarily directed to God, so again piety
is a protestation of the charity we bear towards our parents and
country.
Reply to Objection 2: God is the principle of our being and government
in a far more excellent manner than one's father or country. Hence
religion, which gives worship to God, is a distinct virtue from piety,
which pays homage to our parents and country. But things relating to
creatures are transferred to God as the summit of excellence and
causality, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. i): wherefore, by way of
excellence, piety designates the worship of God, even as God, by way of
excellence, is called "Our Father. "
Reply to Objection 3: Piety extends to our country in so far as the
latter is for us a principle of being: but legal justice regards the
good of our country, considered as the common good: wherefore legal
justice has more of the character of a general virtue than piety has.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the duties of piety towards one's parents should be omitted for the
sake of religion?
Objection 1: It seems that the duties of piety towards one's parents
should be omitted for the sake of religion. For Our Lord said (Lk.
14:26): "If any man come to Me, and hate not his father, and mother,
and wife, and children, and brethren, and sisters, yea and his own life
also, he cannot be My disciple. " Hence it is said in praise of James
and John (Mat. 4:22) that they left "their nets and father, and
followed" Christ. Again it is said in praise of the Levites (Dt. 33:9):
"Who hath said to his father, and to his mother: I do not know you; and
to his brethren: I know you not; and their own children they have not
known. These have kept Thy word. " Now a man who knows not his parents
and other kinsmen, or who even hates them, must needs omit the duties
of piety. Therefore the duties of piety should be omitted for the sake
of religion.
Objection 2: Further, it is written (Lk. 9:59,60) that in answer to him
who said: "Suffer me first to go and bury my father," Our Lord replied:
"Let the dead bury their dead: but go thou, and preach the kingdom of
God. " Now the latter pertains to religion, while it is a duty of piety
to bury one's father. Therefore a duty of piety should be omitted for
the sake of religion.
Objection 3: Further, God is called "Our Father" by excellence. Now
just as we worship our parents by paying them the duties of piety so do
we worship God by religion. Therefore the duties of piety should be
omitted for the sake of the worship of religion.
Objection 4: Further, religious are bound by a vow which they may not
break to fulfil the observances of religion. Now in accordance with
those observances they are hindered from supporting their parents, both
on the score of poverty, since they have nothing of their own, and on
the score of obedience, since they may not leave the cloister without
the permission of their superior. Therefore the duties of piety towards
one's parents should be omitted for the sake of religion.
On the contrary, Our Lord reproved the Pharisees (Mat. 15:3-6) who
taught that for the sake of religion one ought to refrain from paying
one's parents the honor we owe them.
I answer that, Religion and piety are two virtues. Now no virtue is
opposed to another virtue, since according to the Philosopher, in his
book on the Categories (Cap. De oppos. ), "good is not opposed to good. "
Therefore it is impossible that religion and piety mutually hinder one
another, so that the act of one be excluded by the act of the other.
Now, as stated above ([3154]FS, Q[7], A[2]; [3155]FS, Q[18], A[3]), the
act of every virtue is limited by the circumstances due thereto, and if
it overstep them it will be an act no longer of virtue but of vice.
Hence it belongs to piety to pay duty and homage to one's parents
according to the due mode. But it is not the due mode that man should
tend to worship his father rather than God, but, as Ambrose says on Lk.
12:52, "the piety of divine religion takes precedence of the claims of
kindred. "
Accordingly, if the worship of one's parents take one away from the
worship of God it would no longer be an act of piety to pay worship to
one's parents to the prejudice of God. Hence Jerome says (Ep. ad
Heliod. ): "Though thou trample upon thy father, though thou spurn thy
mother, turn not aside, but with dry eyes hasten to the standard of the
cross; it is the highest degree of piety to be cruel in this matter. "
Therefore in such a case the duties of piety towards one's parents
should be omitted for the sake of the worship religion gives to God.
If, however, by paying the services due to our parents, we are not
withdrawn from the service of God, then will it be an act of piety, and
there will be no need to set piety aside for the sake of religion.
Reply to Objection 1: Gregory expounding this saying of our Lord says
(Hom. xxxvii in Ev. ) that "when we find our parents to be a hindrance
in our way to God, we must ignore them by hating and fleeing from
them. " For if our parents incite us to sin, and withdraw us from the
service of God, we must, as regards this point, abandon and hate them.
It is in this sense that the Levites are said to have not known their
kindred, because they obeyed the Lord's command, and spared not the
idolaters (Ex. 32). James and John are praised for leaving their
parents and following our Lord, not that their father incited them to
evil, but because they deemed it possible for him to find another means
of livelihood, if they followed Christ.
Reply to Objection 2: Our Lord forbade the disciple to bury his father
because, according to Chrysostom (Hom. xxviii in Matth. ), "Our Lord by
so doing saved him from many evils, such as the sorrows and worries and
other things that one anticipates under these circumstances. For after
the burial the will had to be read, the estate had to be divided, and
so forth: but chiefly, because there were others who could see to the
funeral.
