Yet we cannot shut our eyes
to her impending doom.
to her impending doom.
Treitschke - 1915 - Germany, France, Russia, and Islam
Turkey and the Great Nations 59
It is also simply a learned fallacy to gloomily
maintain, in a free version of Alexander I's
notorious phrase, that the Bosphorus is the key to
the Russian house, the Czar's Government must
aim at its possession. After all, the Sound is the
second key to the Russian house, and when has
Russia ever tried to conquer Copenhagen, the
Byzantium of the North? Just as the Petersburg
Court is able to feel quite at ease, now that the
Sound is in the hands of two harmless Middle
Powers, it is likewise naturally only so far interested
in the Bosphorus, viz. , that it should be ruled
by a friendly Orthodox Power. Russia does not
wish to conquer the Bosphorus for itself, because
it has not the necessary power. No European
State, Germany least of all, can tolerate a per-
manent Russian settlement in Stamboul, if only
because of the feverish excitement which would be
bound to flame through all Slav races at such a
movement; and how is it thinkable that they
could maintain themselves there, if a German army
entered Poland, Austria's troops marched over
the Balkans, and an English fleet lay before
SeragHo Point? Who has a right to attribute
such gasconading tricks to the Russian Court?
Emperor Alexander has already proved, since
the beginning of his reign, by the conclusion of the
Paris Treaty how remote such visions are from
him. He was certainly unable to remain per-
manently content with that transaction, and for
good reasons. The plan of the Western Powers, to
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? 6o Turkey and the Great Nations
carry out the reforming of Turkey without and
against Russia, was, as the outcome showed, a sin
against nature and history. Seldom was a victory
less magnanimously and more stupidly exploited
than the truly modest success of Sebastopol.
It is impossible to forbid a mighty Empire to
sail the sea before its coast with warships, and it
is as immoral as was formerly the treaty for the
closing of the Scheldt, and similar products of
the older commercial policy. So shameful a con-
dition is observed by a proud State only so long
as it must be. With regard to such obligations the
mot holds good: "The breach of faith is then more
honourable than the observance. " The blame for
the announcement of that clause of the Paris
Treaty falls solely on the shoulders of the silly
conquerors, who in the intoxication of success
fancied they could impose the impossible on the
conquered; the indignant EngHsh cry about
Russian "breach of faith" found the less echo in
the right feeling of the European world, since
everybody knew the Paris Treaty had already a
long time before been broken in another respect.
Contrary to the Paris Treaty, the union of the
Danubian Principalities had been achieved, and
the Porte positively trampled under foot the
Humayum hat, the preamble of that Treaty.
The aim of Petersburg policy has lately been to
enhance the privileges of the Christian races and
Churches of the Balkan Peninsula and, where
possible, to raise those countries to semi-sovereign
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? Turkey and the Great Nations 6i
States. This was already transparently indicated
in that Gortchakof memorandum of 1867, which
demands the "co-existence par allele'' of the
Rayah peoples, and is still clearer in Russia's
attitude during the Bulgarian Church dispute.
The Russian Court kept formerly always on
terms of good friendship with the Patriarch of
Byzantium; it has now eagerly encouraged the
separation of the Bulgarian National Church from
the Patriarchate. It no longer makes a formal
claim of solely representing the Orthodox in
Turkey, but it is now, as it was formerly, the only
Power that can do anything for the Rayahs. Of
course the people in Petersburg have their arriere-
pensee: they desire, if possible, a powerless group
of small States in the Balkans, so that Russian
influence may alone be dominant there. On that
account, Russia formerly opposed the creation of
the independent Kingdom of Greece, and hoped
far more for the formation of three semi-sovereign
Principalities at the Southern point of the Penin-
sula; therefore, also, the union of Moldavia
and Wallachia ran counter to Petersburg views.
The root idea of Russian policy is, however, quite
justified ; apart from the autonomy of the territories,
there is in very truth no longer any way of secur-
ing the rights of the Rayahs. And as Russia is
certainly not in a position to arrange Eastern
affairs solely according to her will and pleasure,
the task is laid upon her Western allies to remove
the sting from the Russian plans.
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? 62 Turkey and the Great Nations
Just as the Petersburg Court long ago agreed
to acknowledge the Kingdom of Greece and the
Unified Rumanian State, it will also some time or
other, if Europe requires it, be obliged to allow the
enlargement of the Kingdom of Greece. Even
the collapse of Osman rule in Stamboul, which at
the moment is still quite out of sight, yet will
assuredly take place presently, cannot fill us with
blind fright if we calmly weigh the relations of
the Powers to-day. United Germany, honourably
reconciled to Austria, is very well able to see that
this catastrophe, if it must occur, shall occur under
circumstances which the West can accept. How,
pray, do the Anglo-maniacs know that a Greco-
Slav State on the Bosphorus must necessarily fall
under Russia's influence? That decayed, sucked-
out Byzantine Society altogether affords within a
conceivable future no soil for a menacing develop-
ment of might ; the natural opposition of interests,
the Greeks' deep hatred for the Russians, would
be bound to crop up very soon, and European
diplomacy would assuredly not be disposed to leave
the field to the Russians alone, there on the Golden
Horn, where it has contended for many decades
and devised schemes and played the master. No
tenable reason is at the root of the theory that the
destruction of the Osman State must needs level
the path for that Russian world-empire of which
the Anglo-maniacs dream. But the great idea
which Russia represents, in accordance with her
historic position in the Orient, the re-introduction
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? Turkey and the Great Nations 63
of the Greco-Slav States into the European com-
munity, may certainly rely upon the future. The
Nature of things is working for it. Every bloody
deed in the Sultan's Palace, and every prosperous
voyage of daring Greek shipowners, works into
the hands of that idea. The Turkish apple of the
Hesperides is already beginning to plague Europe
with its odour ; the day must come when the rotten
fruit shall fall to earth. The Petersburg Court
has no occasion to endanger an assured future
by premature steps; it may quietly say: We can
wait.
England, however, cannot wait. A policy which
tries, after the manner of Prince Metternich, to up-
hold only what exists, because it exists, lives from
hand to mouth ; it requires loud comedy from time
to time in order to show the world that it is really
still alive and knows how to defend threatened
Europe from imaginary dangers. Four points of
view in especial seem to guide this wretched policy.
People living in the lucky aloofness of the wealthy
island have still preserved an obsolete conception
of European balance, and torment their brains with
nightmares which have lost all raison d'etre since
the Italian and the German revolutions. They
worry themselves about the Mediterranean sea-
fortresses, and do not perceive that England's
incomparable merchant service is bound to main-
tain the upper hand in the Mediterranean even if
those positions return to their natural masters -- a
trend of events which, moreover, is still at a mea-
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? 64 Turkey and the Great Nations
sureless distance from us. They want to uphold
the Osman Empire at any cost, because the Turks*
ludicrous trade-policy has opened a boundless
hunting-ground to the English merchant. Us-
ing some foresight, they could surely say to them-
selves that the restoration of tolerable political
conditions in the Balkan Peninsula is bound
necessarily to revive the commerce of those
countries, and consequently to confer advantage
on the chief commercial people in the world.
Monopolists, however, have ever preferred a small
capital with big gains to moderate gains with
bigger capital. Glad of the momentary benefit,
they swear again to Palmerston's expression:
*'I talk with no statesman who does not regard
the maintenance of Turkey as a European neces-
sity," and they forget that the same Palmerston
declared in his last years: "We shall not draw
the sword for a corpse a second time. "
They are afraid in London that Russia might
dominate the Suez Canal from Stamboul, and
they want, by means of favour shown to the
Caliph, to keep the Moslems of Hindustan in a
good humour and protect them against Muscovite
wiles. He who does not regard the Russian
campaign in Central Asia through the pessimistic
glasses of M. Vambery, but with independent
judgment, will indeed ask why England should
worry about it at all. That Russia should casually
pocket the 200,000,000 heads of the Anglo-Indian
Empire is surely but a bad joke, which finds only
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? Turkey and the Great Nations 65
a few believers in Europe because the boundless
distances of Asia appear so insignificant on our
maps. Both Governments have, rather, much to
fear, yonder in the East, a common foe, the fanatic-
ism of Islam, and even fifteen years ago, had there
been good- will on both sides, an understanding as
to the boundaries of their dominions was not
unthinkable. To-day it is hardly still possible.
It was for England to suggest such an understand-
ing, since her position in Asia is incomparably more
severely threatened than Russia's new possessions.
What would a defeat in that barbarous country
matter to the Russians? They would lose a few
hundred square miles and win them back a few
years later from the safe back-blocks. For
England, on the contrary, a successful revolt in
the East Indies might have fearful consequences.
It would indeed not break Old England's might --
the power of the Sea- Queen would remain even
then respect- worthy -- but it would deal her a hard
blow and cause a heavy loss to human civilization,
because the Indian countries would be sacrificed
to unknowable civil wars. The task of controlling
hundreds of millions of natives with a few thou-
sand Europeans is immeasurably difficult; the
most important interests imposed it upon the
English Government fearlessly to seek good re-
lations with its inconvenient Northern neighbour.
But England's statesmen and people, obsessed
by the fixed idea of a Russian world-empire,
have outrivalled each other in making this under-
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? 66 Turkey and the Great Nations
standing difficult. Every fresh conquest of the
Russians was greeted by the English Press with
the bitterness of hate. If England sent an agent
to Kashgar, where, rightly speaking, he had no
business to be, it was quite correct; but if Russia
sent an agent to China, where he likewise had no
business to be, the whole of England would cry
out about the unscrupulousness of the Muscovites.
Not only the independent Press, but also more
influential circles indulged in these laments,
which were little suited to the ancient manliness
of the English character. General Rawlinson^s
well-known book, which could hardly have ap-
peared without the silent consent of the Supreme
Indian authority, positively wallows in the art of
painting the devil on the wall. So they kept
continually shouting out to the world that the
Russians were to be feared as enemies, and the
perils of the position were increased thereby.
England's rule in India depends entirely on her
moral prestige; as soon as the inhabitants of the
East Indies begin to suspect that a dreaded foe of
their British masters is approaching the Indus with
superior forces, the bonds of obedience may easily
be loosened. The fear of Russia, openly shown by
the Britons, compelled the Petersburg Court itself
to an unfriendly and occasionally treacherous
policy. It went its way unmoved, and now and
then consoled the anxious neighbouring Power with
dishonest declarations. Without unfair suspicion,
one may to-day venture the theory that the Asiatic
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? Turkey and the Great Nations 67
conquests are not merely an end in themselves
for the Russian Government, but also the means
towards another end: it proposes to make un-
pleasantness for the English in the East Indies
if the fall of the Turkish Empire should lead to a
world-war.
Thus do English statesmen wobble between
obsolete prejudices and anxious cares; self-interest
and a feeling of inward elective affinity make
them seem to the Turks their only true friends.
Their latest deed, the deposition of the Sultan, was
a very clever chess-move, nothing more; it only
proved that England is seriously minded to
maintain her influence on the Bosphorus -- for who
could genuinely believe the edifying fairy-tale
that Czar Alexander wanted to break the union of
the three Emperors, and was only prevented from
conquering Byzantium by England's vigilance?
But we seek in vain for a creative idea in the Tory
Government. It hardly puts the question to
itself, whether the existing status is worthy and
capable of support; it feels ashamed how low
England's renown has sunk during the last decades,
and bestirs itself to call a halt to history by loud-
shouting demonstrations. Can so sterile a policy
expect alHes among the Great Powers. ?
Only once did France really carry out a clear,
definite, good French policy in the Orient: at the
time of its fights against the House of Austria.
The Turks then served her as natural allies.
Since the end of the seventeenth century another
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? 68 Turkey and the Great Nations
path was entered on : France desired a protectorate
over the Latins in the Osman Empire, and eagerly
favoured the Jesuits' propaganda. This ill-
starred policy could only slightly enhance the
prestige of the French Court, considering the small
number of Catholics in Turkey, and entangle it in
incessant quarrels with Russia, which has always
followed the zeal of the Latins for conversion in the
East with vigilant suspicion. After much waver-
ing, Napoleon III then exercised for some years
a guardianship over the Sublime Porte. After his
fall, the Marquis de Vogiie tried yet again to carry
on a Catholic policy at Pera, and found his master
in Prince Bismarck. Since then France has taken
little part in the great diplomatic struggle on the
Bosphorus. We all know what hope slumbers in
every Frenchman's deepest heart, but we also
know that France does not desire the war of
revenge at the present moment. Marshal Mac-
Mahon admits that the reformation of the army
is not yet quite complete, Duke Decazes has given
many proofs of cautious moderation, but the
nation longs to enjoy yet a few years of economic
splendour, which, shaming their conqueror, they
have newly won by marvellous activity. For those
purposes which alone are valuable to the French,
for the conquest of Belgium or a piece of the left
bank of the Rhine, the English fleet can be of little
use to them ; without Austria or Russia as an ally
they do not wish to venture upon the war of re-
venge. France is, besides, a Mediterranean Power,
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? Turkey and the Great Nations 69
and cannot desire the excessive growth of English
influence in the south-east. This latter considera-
tion is also decisive of Italy's attitude. The
reasons which once led Count Cavour into the war
against Russia have long vanished with the
unification of Italy. The young kingdom is on
good terms with the three Eastern Powers, and
will take care not to give up that assured position
for the love of a few English pessimists.
So long as the Alliance of the three Emperors
lasts, there is nothing to fear as to European
peace, and the prospects of the Alliance are still,
as ever, without a shadow. It is of course intelli-
gible that Vienna is visited by a confusion of the
most diverse endeavours ; all the numberless contra-
dictions of parties and races which are embraced
in the Imperial State are being stirred up by the
Eastern Question. The Poles, and a portion of
the Ultramontanes with them, desire war with
Russia; Dictator Langiewicz is intriguing in Con-
stantinople, and Cardinal Ledochowsky is airing
racial hatred at the Holy Seat. In the same
direction are the operations of those Old Conser-
vatives, who even now preach the ancient Metter-
nich maxim that Austria and the Porte are united
in solidarity. But a dense mass of moderate
German Liberals are blowing the same horn;
these people think they are showing their freedom
of thought by the well-known and brilliant remarks
about free England and the barbarians of the
East. On the other hand, at least four parties
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? ^o Turkey and the Great Nations
demand the support of the rebellion and conquests
to the south of the Danube. The Czechs, Serbs,
and Croatians wish to aid their brethren in the
South; an ambitious military party demands,
amid the applause of zealous Great-Austrians, a
consolation prize for the losses of recent years;
a fraction of the Ultramontanes wishes to conquer
Slav country in order to drive the hated Magyars
into a corner; finally, there are imfortunately also
a few blinded German enthusiasts who would like
to enlarge the Imperial State in the East, so that
its western half might fall to the German Empire.
Those, however, who, like us Germans in the
outer Empire, earnestly desire the maintenance of
the Austrian Monarchy and its dual constitution,
must perceive also that Austria to-day neither
can nor may annex anything in Turkey. There is
only conquest yonder in the south-east which
would in itself be advantageous to the Danubian
Empire: Rumania. That precious conquest was
once attainable in Prince Eugene's great days; it
might perhaps even have been achieved by a bold
policy during the Crimean War; to-day it is quite
impossible, owing to the unanimous refusal of
the newly-unified Rumanian people, which can
always lean on Russia for support. The great
hour has unfortunately passed, as once passed the
right moment for the Germanizing of Bohemia,
and so many other alluring opportunities in
Austrian history. The estuary of the Danube
is now as unattainable for Austria as the delta
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? Turkey and the Great Nations 71
of the Rhine for Germany. Any other section of
the Tiirkish dominion, however, would be a
*' Greek gift" for modern Austria. The bound-
aries of the Monarchy towards the south-east
are, even though inconvenient, yet tenable, and
by no means so unnatural as they appear on a
map. The Dalmatian coast looks towards the
West, has belonged for thousands of years to the
Adriatic- Italian world, and has hardly any inter-
course with the pathless mountain-chain of the
back-blocks. The annexation of Bosnia would
strengthen the centrifugal Slavic elements, and
expose the Empire to the danger of dismember-
ment; the crude masses could not be allowed
to take any part either in the Vienna or the
Pesth Reichstag, and the fantastic experiment of
a triad-policy would have to be tried, although
it has been quite sufficiently shown how difficult
it is to maintain even dualism after ten years*
experience.
The task is imposed upon us Germans to uphold
the Three Emperors' Alliance by conciliation and
mediation. We once honestly tried to gain a
respite for the life of the Turkish Empire; the
only reform in Turkey which has been something
of a success, the rebuilding of the army, is the work
of Prussian officers.
Yet we cannot shut our eyes
to her impending doom. We find no reason to
accelerate the catastrophe at all. A nation
which has just suffered so severely for its unity
may well say without selfishness: Non omnia
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? ^2 Turkey and the Great Nations
possumus omnes; it is not for us, but for the
South Slavs, to set the ball rolling. But we, too,
dare not remain inactive, and, least of all, console
ourselves with the dull, pessimistic comfort that
the Czar's Empire may, in God's name, grow till it
bursts. We want lasting, endurable conditions in
the Peninsula, which may pacify that part of the
world, and so we want no new foreign domination,
certainly no annexations, either Austrian or
Russian. All good Germans are united in this
resolution, because what may in any way en-
danger Austria's existence, is a blow at our own
Empire.
Our Government has first pledged itself to
guarantee Count Andrassy's Reform proposals.
There is no change in them, even though, owing
to the new Sultan on the Bosphorus, the Three
Emperors' Alliance has been obliged to grant a
longer respite to the new Government. The
Andrassy programme touches with a sure hand
the rawest spots in the Rayah's circumstances.
Germany's prestige is also concerned that the
Porte may not again, as in the case of so many
other proposals, get rid of these well-considered
and moderate ones with empty phrases. If she
does this, or if she proves incapable of fulfilling
her promises, the three Eastern Powers, if they do
not wish to seem ludicrous to the whole world, can
hardly avoid going further and demanding serious
pledges for the abolition of an anarchic state of
affairs which is gradually becoming intolerable to
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? Turkey and the Great Nations 73
all her neighbours, and particularly to Austria.
That they can thus act with an honourable
unanimity seems almost certain ; the quiet hope of
the French, of EngHsh Russophobes, and of the
Ultramontanes for the break-up of the Three
Emperors' Alliance has poor prospects so long as
the Republic exists in France and the Magyars
guide Austria's foreign policy.
Only a seer could determine beforehand the
course of events during the next months. The
growing agitation in Servia, and the energetic
preparations in the Mediterranean, point indeed
to serious events. On the other hand, all the
Powers, especially Russia, are filled with a lively
desire for peace; the Czar's Empire shrinks from
the incalculable disorders which an outburst of
Mohammedan fanaticism threatens to create
everywhere in Asia; the Powers' profound mutual
suspicion disables each force by an opposing force
yonder in the East. It therefore seems possible
that Turkish affairs will still, for a time, drag along
sluggishly and deplorably, and highly probable
that the fate of the capital will not be decided in the
nearest future, because this question is in fact
regarded by all the Powers as not yet ripe for
settlement. We have had very unpleasant experi-
ences of England's friendship since the Seven
Years' War; Russian policy would have to commit
unheard-of follies for Germany to think of drop-
ping the hand of her tried friend in order to throw
herself into the arms of a faithless ally, dominated
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? 74 Turkey and the Great Nations
by obsolete opinions. In the Eastern Question
Russia needs us more than we her; therefore
an astute, strong German policy has nothing to
fear from the Russian alliance.
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? GERMANY AND THE ORIENTAL
QUESTION
BERLIN,
J 5th Dec, i8y6,
"HP HAT changed aspect" of Oriental complica-
1 tions, about which Prince Bismarck did not
wish to pronounce an opinion in the Imperial Diet,
seems to all appearances to be arising very rapidly.
The mobilization of the Army of the South is com-
pleted, the Turkish army is ready to hold the line of
the Danube, and perhaps to cross it. Optimists
still place reliance upon the incontestable per-
sonal love for peace of Czar Alexander, or upon
the arts of mediation of the European Conference ;
and, truly, in the chaos of the Oriental Question
the imexpected has often become possible. But
probability far rather presages the near outbreak
of war. Russia cannot abandon the demand for
serious reforms in favour of the Rayah people
without a humiliation which a healthy State
accepts only from the sword of the victor. The
Porte will not grant those reforms, as, after all the
horrors of the past summer, they can only be
carried through under the protection of Christian
75
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? 76 Germany and the East
weapons. It is impossible that the God-inspired
Bashi-bazoiik, after having ripped open the Bul-
garian mother and sold her children as slaves,
should now of his own accord live with the survivors
of his victims as a peaceful citizen on the footing
of equal rights. But an occupation of the rebel-
lious provinces, be it through the Moscow "Gia-
our" or through another Christian Power, appears
an unbearable disgrace to the dignity of valiant
Islam, the last moral power of the Ottoman
State. The differences have become irreconcilable,
and, however much the West of Europe wishes for
peace, the mediation proposals of the Conference
can, after all that has happened, only delay the
inevitable catastrophe for a short time, and render
intolerable the paralysing tension which oppresses
that part of the world.
The worst of all political sins -- the hesitation
between wishing and not wishing to do a thing --
has come out in an ugly manner in every one of
the periodical explosions of the Oriental Question,
but never in worse form than last year. All
Powers immediately concerned in the heritage
of the "Sick Man" stood helplessly between the
appreciation of the fact that the present state of
affairs was impossible and the fear of the incalcu-
lable consequences of a firm decision. Compared
with the hesitation of the neighbouring Powers the
simple barbarity of Ottoman politics seems almost
worthy of respect. By the atrocities in Bulgaria,
as well as by the dismal proceedings which accom-
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? Germany and the East 77
panied the two changes of dynasty, the Porte has
only proved afresh that, in spite of the Peace of
Paris, she can never become a European Power.
She has carried on a pitiful war with a superiority
of excellent regular troops, yet she had the
worst in the fight with the brave little nation of
Montenegro, and defeated the Servian militia only
after a resistance of many months. On the whole,
however, she succeeded in maintaining her posses-
sions, and with prouder feelings, and greater con-
fidence than for a long time past, the Turks look
to-day upon the undefeated standard of the Half-
Moon. But once again, and not without success,
the old Turkish adage Vv^as applied to the Prankish
Courts: *'To hurry is the work of the devil, to
delay is the work of God ; " the well-known cheerful
promises of coming constitutional splendour for
the happy grande famille ottomane sufficed to
once more keep the Cabinets in suspense for a
time. It was a hand-to-mouth life, without the
slightest vestige of a fruitful statesmanlike thought.
The Porte, however, always knew what she
wanted. Not the same boast applies to the
attitude of the most closely-interested European
Powers. When defending the rights of the Ra-
yah the Russian Court did only what its historic
position demanded. Its original proposals were
just and temperate, and its firm adhesion to the
Triple AlHance proved that in Petersburg a lesson
had been learned from the experiences of the
Crimean War. But with a disturbance of the
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? 78 Germany and the East
general policy of the Great Powers, through the with-
drawal of England and the complications caused
by the change of Turkish dynasty, Russian diplo-
macy for a time lost its firm grip. Those who
hear the grass grow may, of course, presume that
the restless little Piedmont of the South Slavs,
which always was a thorn in the eye of the Russian
Cabinet, has intentionally been forced into war
for its own destruction. Far nearer the truth
is the assumption that two parties fought an
indecisive battle at the Court of St. Petersburg.
The Government shrank from war, yet did not
dare oppose the mighty Pan-Slavist movement
which swept the country; it warned the Serbs of
the outbreak, yet did not morally support it --
nay, even permitted, contrary to international
law, the massing of Russian officers and soldiers.
The temptation was truly very great; in face of
a wild popular effervescence an absolute despot
is often less powerful than a constitutional king,
who can rely upon an intelligent parliamentary
majority. How angry we Germans once were with
the Crown of Prussia when peace had been con-
cluded with Denmark, and subsequently, in
accordance with treaties, her officers were recalled
from the Schleswig-Holstein Army! But what-
ever may be said as an excuse, Russia's policy was
unworthy of a Great Power ; it resembled more the
art of evasion forced upon Count Cavour by the
weakness of his country than the conscious straight-
forwardness of Prussian policy during our battles
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? Germany and the East 79
for unity. Even in the circles of unbiassed people,
the concealed war in Servia has severely shaken
their confidence in Russia's honest intentions,
and it was lucky for the Russians themselves
that the Servian enterprise ended in failure.
Since then the Court at Petersburg resorted to
simpler and therefore more effective measures.
By its ultimatum the Turks were forced to immedi-
ately arrest their triumphal march. Thousands
of beheaded Servians lay on the battle-field around
Alexinatz; the whole country vibrated in terror
of Turkish arms; the more wonderful appeared to
the people the power of the White Czar, who by
one word called "halt" to the terrible foe. The
prestige of Russia amongst the Rayahs is to-day
firmer established than ever. For a time, the
Russian Crown seemed to disappear behind the
revolutionary powers of Pan-Slavism; now it
apparently makes efforts to expiate the fault it has
committed and to keep in check those elementary
forces. The emphatic declaration of Czar Alex-
ander that he did not wish for conquests is more
deserving of credence than the assurances of his
ancestress Catherine. After a glorious reign he
may well expect that the world places confidence
in his word, especially as he did not indulge in
vague wishes for peace, but frankly declared that
the necessity for war to secure the rights of the
Rayah might possibly arise. For the moment,
the labours of St. Petersburg diplomacy are di-
rected towards securing the assent of all Powers,
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? 8o Germany and the East
including England, to the reform proposals, and to
secure for Russian policy in case of war incontest-
able legal rights, so that Russia either should
appear as executor of European will, or could
not be accused of arbitrary action; and to all
appearances the old faithful ally of the Russians
-- the infatuated conceit of the Porte -- will grant
them at least the latter advantage. For, how-
ever mildly the Conference may decide, and it
may even abandon the idea of occupation, the
actual removal of Ottoman suzerainty in Bosnia
and Bulgaria is inevitable if the whole reform work
is not again to be mere jugglery, and the conceit
of the Mohammedans will not admit such imputa-
tions. So Russia, after many waverings and mis-
takes, has returned to a clear and logical policy;
and to-day it still appears to us laymen that two
utterly different efforts of Russian diplomacy
worked side by side. Pan-Slavism is beaten pro
tern, by the moderate policy of the Czar, but he
reserves to himself to again come forward with its
covetous wishes as soon as fortune of war favours
the Russian flag. Of English politics, however,
not the cleverest brain can say what its object
has really been during the whole course of proceed-
ings. The Tory party was very minutely in-
formed as to the hopeless situation of the Rayahs.
If, therefore, according to national superstition,
we considered the existence of Turkey a European
? -- or, better, a British -- necessity, it should not
have left the representation of South Slav interests
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? Germany and the East 8i
to the Russian Court; it should have exerted its
great influence on the Bosphorus in order to
enforce at the right time the adoption of vigorous
reforms. Instead, it tumbled from one contra-
diction into the other. Reluctantly it consented to
Count Andrassy's memorial, only to break away,
four months later, from the Berlin Convention,
which, after all, was simply supposed to carry on
the plans of the memorial. It never occurred to
the Tory party to come forward with a counter-
proposal. England's attitude was the final cause
of the Servian War, because, without evident
discord between the Great Powers, the Petersburg
Court could undoubtedly have kept in check the
Pan-Slavist agitation.
To posterity alone it will become apparent what
part the British Ambassador has played at both
dynasty changes at the Golden Horn; but it is
certain that confidence in England's friendship has
encouraged the Turks to carry on their frivolous
game with the Powers. As a champion of Allah,
Admiral Drummond was greeted in the Mosque
of Stamboul by the enthusiastic softas] the men
of war in the Bay of Besika gave encouragement
to the Porte to direct all their might against the
South Slavs. Meanwhile, a peculiarly vague
movement started amongst the British pubHc.
Here and there the conviction gained ground that
the strictly conservative Oriental policy of Old
England was played out; it was noticed with deep
regret that the fanaticism of Islam, under the pro-
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? 82 Germany and the East
tection of bigoted England, tortured its Christian
victims; added to which were the party hatred
of the Whigs, the reHgious zeal of High-Church
theologians, the philanthropic talk of weak-minded
individuals, and the ardent desire for peace of
those Manchester men who, already in the time of
Richard Cobden, favoured the good-natured view
that Constantinople as a Russian provincial town
would enjoy a considerable cotton importation,
and consequently unmixed happiness. Alarmed by
this wave of public opinion, the Cabinet, after
four months, again gave way, and in September
expressed its adherence to the principles of the An-
drassy memorial, which previously had been aban-
doned in May. Then, however, Benjamin Disraeli,
boasting and threatening, extolled the inexhaust-
ible expedients of Great Britain, and, as we are
credibly assured. Lord SaHsbury to-day makes
the most emphatic appeals to the stubbornness
of the Porte, whilst he, at the same time, in equally
decided manner declares himself opposed to the
occupation of Bulgaria, and thereby renders void
all his admonitions. The Porte believes that it
can count upon England's friendship under all
circumstances, and that is why she does not desire
an agreement with Russia. The diplomacy of
the Tory party reveals a type of complete help-
lessness; hence also their reluctance to convene
Parliament. Should, however, war break out in
the East it would soon become apparent that the
majority of the British public does not endorse the
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? Germany and the East 83
demobilization meetings of the Whigs. The na-
tion has not yet got over the experiences in the
Crimean War; it beHeves that it defends the East
Indies on the Bosphorus, and we might easily find
that England is following the bad example given in
Servia, and, by secretly supporting the Turkish
forces, commencing a hidden war against Russia.
Who can say where this may lead to? The fertile
mind of Benjamin Disraeli, however, apparently
thinks of yet another possibility: the faithful
friend of the Turks is ever ready to stick the key of
the Suez Canal in his pouch should the house
of the "Sick Man" collapse, and in this way would
strengthen for all time British supremacy in the
Mediterranean. The only thing that is clear in
this peculiar policy is that it is incalculable.
Nor, unfortunately, has Austria's Oriental policy
so far had fruitful results. True, the two leading
nations of the monarchy -- Germans and Magyars
-- have a presentiment that the Triple Alliance
alone can save the country from the dangers of the
Pan-Slavist propaganda; but intelligent judgment
is always being upset either by greedy desire for
conquests or by passionate outbursts of blind Slav
hatred. A great number of Vienna newspapers
play the sad part of Imperial Turkish Court
journals. When the Cisleithanian Parliament
discussed the Oriental Question, political dilettant-
ism celebrated its Saturnalia. A whole pattern-
card of invertebrate plans was displayed, and Mr.
Giskra, Ofenheim's patron, gave proof of his dar-
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? S4 Germany and the East
ing genius by sweetly suggesting putting up the
yellow-black boundary posts on the coast of the
-^gean Sea. An outspoken popular opinion exists
only in one German race of the Monarchy, i. e. ,
among the Transylvania Saxons. These, the best
German Austrians, who at the same time are the
most faithful adherents to the country as a whole,
are at heart completely on the side of the Rayah
people, because they see in advance that the
creation of small South Slav States on Hungary's
boundaries would tame the coarse insolence of
the Magyar Chauvinists, and would compel the
Hungarian nobility to behave fairer than hitherto
towards their German and Slav citizens. Fanatics
of Magyardom, on the other hand, do the impos-
sible in the adoration of their Turkish cousins.
The Budapest youth hurl their rhetorical thunder-
bolts against the venomous pestilential breath of
the Muscovite Colossus, and the enlightened ad-
mirers of general public liberty pilgrimage to Ofen
to the grave of Guel-Baba, the holy father of the
Mohammedans. It is as if at any price they
wished to prove to us Europeans of the West that
the Magyars consider themselves Asiatics of the
North. In spite of blustering and threatening
from all directions, nobody has either the courage
or the real intention of overthrowing Count An-
drassy . That in the midst of all these complications
the Count has, at any rate, firmly maintained the
Triple Alliance is a fresh proof of his diplomatic
cleverness.
It is also simply a learned fallacy to gloomily
maintain, in a free version of Alexander I's
notorious phrase, that the Bosphorus is the key to
the Russian house, the Czar's Government must
aim at its possession. After all, the Sound is the
second key to the Russian house, and when has
Russia ever tried to conquer Copenhagen, the
Byzantium of the North? Just as the Petersburg
Court is able to feel quite at ease, now that the
Sound is in the hands of two harmless Middle
Powers, it is likewise naturally only so far interested
in the Bosphorus, viz. , that it should be ruled
by a friendly Orthodox Power. Russia does not
wish to conquer the Bosphorus for itself, because
it has not the necessary power. No European
State, Germany least of all, can tolerate a per-
manent Russian settlement in Stamboul, if only
because of the feverish excitement which would be
bound to flame through all Slav races at such a
movement; and how is it thinkable that they
could maintain themselves there, if a German army
entered Poland, Austria's troops marched over
the Balkans, and an English fleet lay before
SeragHo Point? Who has a right to attribute
such gasconading tricks to the Russian Court?
Emperor Alexander has already proved, since
the beginning of his reign, by the conclusion of the
Paris Treaty how remote such visions are from
him. He was certainly unable to remain per-
manently content with that transaction, and for
good reasons. The plan of the Western Powers, to
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? 6o Turkey and the Great Nations
carry out the reforming of Turkey without and
against Russia, was, as the outcome showed, a sin
against nature and history. Seldom was a victory
less magnanimously and more stupidly exploited
than the truly modest success of Sebastopol.
It is impossible to forbid a mighty Empire to
sail the sea before its coast with warships, and it
is as immoral as was formerly the treaty for the
closing of the Scheldt, and similar products of
the older commercial policy. So shameful a con-
dition is observed by a proud State only so long
as it must be. With regard to such obligations the
mot holds good: "The breach of faith is then more
honourable than the observance. " The blame for
the announcement of that clause of the Paris
Treaty falls solely on the shoulders of the silly
conquerors, who in the intoxication of success
fancied they could impose the impossible on the
conquered; the indignant EngHsh cry about
Russian "breach of faith" found the less echo in
the right feeling of the European world, since
everybody knew the Paris Treaty had already a
long time before been broken in another respect.
Contrary to the Paris Treaty, the union of the
Danubian Principalities had been achieved, and
the Porte positively trampled under foot the
Humayum hat, the preamble of that Treaty.
The aim of Petersburg policy has lately been to
enhance the privileges of the Christian races and
Churches of the Balkan Peninsula and, where
possible, to raise those countries to semi-sovereign
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? Turkey and the Great Nations 6i
States. This was already transparently indicated
in that Gortchakof memorandum of 1867, which
demands the "co-existence par allele'' of the
Rayah peoples, and is still clearer in Russia's
attitude during the Bulgarian Church dispute.
The Russian Court kept formerly always on
terms of good friendship with the Patriarch of
Byzantium; it has now eagerly encouraged the
separation of the Bulgarian National Church from
the Patriarchate. It no longer makes a formal
claim of solely representing the Orthodox in
Turkey, but it is now, as it was formerly, the only
Power that can do anything for the Rayahs. Of
course the people in Petersburg have their arriere-
pensee: they desire, if possible, a powerless group
of small States in the Balkans, so that Russian
influence may alone be dominant there. On that
account, Russia formerly opposed the creation of
the independent Kingdom of Greece, and hoped
far more for the formation of three semi-sovereign
Principalities at the Southern point of the Penin-
sula; therefore, also, the union of Moldavia
and Wallachia ran counter to Petersburg views.
The root idea of Russian policy is, however, quite
justified ; apart from the autonomy of the territories,
there is in very truth no longer any way of secur-
ing the rights of the Rayahs. And as Russia is
certainly not in a position to arrange Eastern
affairs solely according to her will and pleasure,
the task is laid upon her Western allies to remove
the sting from the Russian plans.
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? 62 Turkey and the Great Nations
Just as the Petersburg Court long ago agreed
to acknowledge the Kingdom of Greece and the
Unified Rumanian State, it will also some time or
other, if Europe requires it, be obliged to allow the
enlargement of the Kingdom of Greece. Even
the collapse of Osman rule in Stamboul, which at
the moment is still quite out of sight, yet will
assuredly take place presently, cannot fill us with
blind fright if we calmly weigh the relations of
the Powers to-day. United Germany, honourably
reconciled to Austria, is very well able to see that
this catastrophe, if it must occur, shall occur under
circumstances which the West can accept. How,
pray, do the Anglo-maniacs know that a Greco-
Slav State on the Bosphorus must necessarily fall
under Russia's influence? That decayed, sucked-
out Byzantine Society altogether affords within a
conceivable future no soil for a menacing develop-
ment of might ; the natural opposition of interests,
the Greeks' deep hatred for the Russians, would
be bound to crop up very soon, and European
diplomacy would assuredly not be disposed to leave
the field to the Russians alone, there on the Golden
Horn, where it has contended for many decades
and devised schemes and played the master. No
tenable reason is at the root of the theory that the
destruction of the Osman State must needs level
the path for that Russian world-empire of which
the Anglo-maniacs dream. But the great idea
which Russia represents, in accordance with her
historic position in the Orient, the re-introduction
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? Turkey and the Great Nations 63
of the Greco-Slav States into the European com-
munity, may certainly rely upon the future. The
Nature of things is working for it. Every bloody
deed in the Sultan's Palace, and every prosperous
voyage of daring Greek shipowners, works into
the hands of that idea. The Turkish apple of the
Hesperides is already beginning to plague Europe
with its odour ; the day must come when the rotten
fruit shall fall to earth. The Petersburg Court
has no occasion to endanger an assured future
by premature steps; it may quietly say: We can
wait.
England, however, cannot wait. A policy which
tries, after the manner of Prince Metternich, to up-
hold only what exists, because it exists, lives from
hand to mouth ; it requires loud comedy from time
to time in order to show the world that it is really
still alive and knows how to defend threatened
Europe from imaginary dangers. Four points of
view in especial seem to guide this wretched policy.
People living in the lucky aloofness of the wealthy
island have still preserved an obsolete conception
of European balance, and torment their brains with
nightmares which have lost all raison d'etre since
the Italian and the German revolutions. They
worry themselves about the Mediterranean sea-
fortresses, and do not perceive that England's
incomparable merchant service is bound to main-
tain the upper hand in the Mediterranean even if
those positions return to their natural masters -- a
trend of events which, moreover, is still at a mea-
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? 64 Turkey and the Great Nations
sureless distance from us. They want to uphold
the Osman Empire at any cost, because the Turks*
ludicrous trade-policy has opened a boundless
hunting-ground to the English merchant. Us-
ing some foresight, they could surely say to them-
selves that the restoration of tolerable political
conditions in the Balkan Peninsula is bound
necessarily to revive the commerce of those
countries, and consequently to confer advantage
on the chief commercial people in the world.
Monopolists, however, have ever preferred a small
capital with big gains to moderate gains with
bigger capital. Glad of the momentary benefit,
they swear again to Palmerston's expression:
*'I talk with no statesman who does not regard
the maintenance of Turkey as a European neces-
sity," and they forget that the same Palmerston
declared in his last years: "We shall not draw
the sword for a corpse a second time. "
They are afraid in London that Russia might
dominate the Suez Canal from Stamboul, and
they want, by means of favour shown to the
Caliph, to keep the Moslems of Hindustan in a
good humour and protect them against Muscovite
wiles. He who does not regard the Russian
campaign in Central Asia through the pessimistic
glasses of M. Vambery, but with independent
judgment, will indeed ask why England should
worry about it at all. That Russia should casually
pocket the 200,000,000 heads of the Anglo-Indian
Empire is surely but a bad joke, which finds only
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? Turkey and the Great Nations 65
a few believers in Europe because the boundless
distances of Asia appear so insignificant on our
maps. Both Governments have, rather, much to
fear, yonder in the East, a common foe, the fanatic-
ism of Islam, and even fifteen years ago, had there
been good- will on both sides, an understanding as
to the boundaries of their dominions was not
unthinkable. To-day it is hardly still possible.
It was for England to suggest such an understand-
ing, since her position in Asia is incomparably more
severely threatened than Russia's new possessions.
What would a defeat in that barbarous country
matter to the Russians? They would lose a few
hundred square miles and win them back a few
years later from the safe back-blocks. For
England, on the contrary, a successful revolt in
the East Indies might have fearful consequences.
It would indeed not break Old England's might --
the power of the Sea- Queen would remain even
then respect- worthy -- but it would deal her a hard
blow and cause a heavy loss to human civilization,
because the Indian countries would be sacrificed
to unknowable civil wars. The task of controlling
hundreds of millions of natives with a few thou-
sand Europeans is immeasurably difficult; the
most important interests imposed it upon the
English Government fearlessly to seek good re-
lations with its inconvenient Northern neighbour.
But England's statesmen and people, obsessed
by the fixed idea of a Russian world-empire,
have outrivalled each other in making this under-
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? 66 Turkey and the Great Nations
standing difficult. Every fresh conquest of the
Russians was greeted by the English Press with
the bitterness of hate. If England sent an agent
to Kashgar, where, rightly speaking, he had no
business to be, it was quite correct; but if Russia
sent an agent to China, where he likewise had no
business to be, the whole of England would cry
out about the unscrupulousness of the Muscovites.
Not only the independent Press, but also more
influential circles indulged in these laments,
which were little suited to the ancient manliness
of the English character. General Rawlinson^s
well-known book, which could hardly have ap-
peared without the silent consent of the Supreme
Indian authority, positively wallows in the art of
painting the devil on the wall. So they kept
continually shouting out to the world that the
Russians were to be feared as enemies, and the
perils of the position were increased thereby.
England's rule in India depends entirely on her
moral prestige; as soon as the inhabitants of the
East Indies begin to suspect that a dreaded foe of
their British masters is approaching the Indus with
superior forces, the bonds of obedience may easily
be loosened. The fear of Russia, openly shown by
the Britons, compelled the Petersburg Court itself
to an unfriendly and occasionally treacherous
policy. It went its way unmoved, and now and
then consoled the anxious neighbouring Power with
dishonest declarations. Without unfair suspicion,
one may to-day venture the theory that the Asiatic
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? Turkey and the Great Nations 67
conquests are not merely an end in themselves
for the Russian Government, but also the means
towards another end: it proposes to make un-
pleasantness for the English in the East Indies
if the fall of the Turkish Empire should lead to a
world-war.
Thus do English statesmen wobble between
obsolete prejudices and anxious cares; self-interest
and a feeling of inward elective affinity make
them seem to the Turks their only true friends.
Their latest deed, the deposition of the Sultan, was
a very clever chess-move, nothing more; it only
proved that England is seriously minded to
maintain her influence on the Bosphorus -- for who
could genuinely believe the edifying fairy-tale
that Czar Alexander wanted to break the union of
the three Emperors, and was only prevented from
conquering Byzantium by England's vigilance?
But we seek in vain for a creative idea in the Tory
Government. It hardly puts the question to
itself, whether the existing status is worthy and
capable of support; it feels ashamed how low
England's renown has sunk during the last decades,
and bestirs itself to call a halt to history by loud-
shouting demonstrations. Can so sterile a policy
expect alHes among the Great Powers. ?
Only once did France really carry out a clear,
definite, good French policy in the Orient: at the
time of its fights against the House of Austria.
The Turks then served her as natural allies.
Since the end of the seventeenth century another
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? 68 Turkey and the Great Nations
path was entered on : France desired a protectorate
over the Latins in the Osman Empire, and eagerly
favoured the Jesuits' propaganda. This ill-
starred policy could only slightly enhance the
prestige of the French Court, considering the small
number of Catholics in Turkey, and entangle it in
incessant quarrels with Russia, which has always
followed the zeal of the Latins for conversion in the
East with vigilant suspicion. After much waver-
ing, Napoleon III then exercised for some years
a guardianship over the Sublime Porte. After his
fall, the Marquis de Vogiie tried yet again to carry
on a Catholic policy at Pera, and found his master
in Prince Bismarck. Since then France has taken
little part in the great diplomatic struggle on the
Bosphorus. We all know what hope slumbers in
every Frenchman's deepest heart, but we also
know that France does not desire the war of
revenge at the present moment. Marshal Mac-
Mahon admits that the reformation of the army
is not yet quite complete, Duke Decazes has given
many proofs of cautious moderation, but the
nation longs to enjoy yet a few years of economic
splendour, which, shaming their conqueror, they
have newly won by marvellous activity. For those
purposes which alone are valuable to the French,
for the conquest of Belgium or a piece of the left
bank of the Rhine, the English fleet can be of little
use to them ; without Austria or Russia as an ally
they do not wish to venture upon the war of re-
venge. France is, besides, a Mediterranean Power,
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? Turkey and the Great Nations 69
and cannot desire the excessive growth of English
influence in the south-east. This latter considera-
tion is also decisive of Italy's attitude. The
reasons which once led Count Cavour into the war
against Russia have long vanished with the
unification of Italy. The young kingdom is on
good terms with the three Eastern Powers, and
will take care not to give up that assured position
for the love of a few English pessimists.
So long as the Alliance of the three Emperors
lasts, there is nothing to fear as to European
peace, and the prospects of the Alliance are still,
as ever, without a shadow. It is of course intelli-
gible that Vienna is visited by a confusion of the
most diverse endeavours ; all the numberless contra-
dictions of parties and races which are embraced
in the Imperial State are being stirred up by the
Eastern Question. The Poles, and a portion of
the Ultramontanes with them, desire war with
Russia; Dictator Langiewicz is intriguing in Con-
stantinople, and Cardinal Ledochowsky is airing
racial hatred at the Holy Seat. In the same
direction are the operations of those Old Conser-
vatives, who even now preach the ancient Metter-
nich maxim that Austria and the Porte are united
in solidarity. But a dense mass of moderate
German Liberals are blowing the same horn;
these people think they are showing their freedom
of thought by the well-known and brilliant remarks
about free England and the barbarians of the
East. On the other hand, at least four parties
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? ^o Turkey and the Great Nations
demand the support of the rebellion and conquests
to the south of the Danube. The Czechs, Serbs,
and Croatians wish to aid their brethren in the
South; an ambitious military party demands,
amid the applause of zealous Great-Austrians, a
consolation prize for the losses of recent years;
a fraction of the Ultramontanes wishes to conquer
Slav country in order to drive the hated Magyars
into a corner; finally, there are imfortunately also
a few blinded German enthusiasts who would like
to enlarge the Imperial State in the East, so that
its western half might fall to the German Empire.
Those, however, who, like us Germans in the
outer Empire, earnestly desire the maintenance of
the Austrian Monarchy and its dual constitution,
must perceive also that Austria to-day neither
can nor may annex anything in Turkey. There is
only conquest yonder in the south-east which
would in itself be advantageous to the Danubian
Empire: Rumania. That precious conquest was
once attainable in Prince Eugene's great days; it
might perhaps even have been achieved by a bold
policy during the Crimean War; to-day it is quite
impossible, owing to the unanimous refusal of
the newly-unified Rumanian people, which can
always lean on Russia for support. The great
hour has unfortunately passed, as once passed the
right moment for the Germanizing of Bohemia,
and so many other alluring opportunities in
Austrian history. The estuary of the Danube
is now as unattainable for Austria as the delta
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? Turkey and the Great Nations 71
of the Rhine for Germany. Any other section of
the Tiirkish dominion, however, would be a
*' Greek gift" for modern Austria. The bound-
aries of the Monarchy towards the south-east
are, even though inconvenient, yet tenable, and
by no means so unnatural as they appear on a
map. The Dalmatian coast looks towards the
West, has belonged for thousands of years to the
Adriatic- Italian world, and has hardly any inter-
course with the pathless mountain-chain of the
back-blocks. The annexation of Bosnia would
strengthen the centrifugal Slavic elements, and
expose the Empire to the danger of dismember-
ment; the crude masses could not be allowed
to take any part either in the Vienna or the
Pesth Reichstag, and the fantastic experiment of
a triad-policy would have to be tried, although
it has been quite sufficiently shown how difficult
it is to maintain even dualism after ten years*
experience.
The task is imposed upon us Germans to uphold
the Three Emperors' Alliance by conciliation and
mediation. We once honestly tried to gain a
respite for the life of the Turkish Empire; the
only reform in Turkey which has been something
of a success, the rebuilding of the army, is the work
of Prussian officers.
Yet we cannot shut our eyes
to her impending doom. We find no reason to
accelerate the catastrophe at all. A nation
which has just suffered so severely for its unity
may well say without selfishness: Non omnia
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? ^2 Turkey and the Great Nations
possumus omnes; it is not for us, but for the
South Slavs, to set the ball rolling. But we, too,
dare not remain inactive, and, least of all, console
ourselves with the dull, pessimistic comfort that
the Czar's Empire may, in God's name, grow till it
bursts. We want lasting, endurable conditions in
the Peninsula, which may pacify that part of the
world, and so we want no new foreign domination,
certainly no annexations, either Austrian or
Russian. All good Germans are united in this
resolution, because what may in any way en-
danger Austria's existence, is a blow at our own
Empire.
Our Government has first pledged itself to
guarantee Count Andrassy's Reform proposals.
There is no change in them, even though, owing
to the new Sultan on the Bosphorus, the Three
Emperors' Alliance has been obliged to grant a
longer respite to the new Government. The
Andrassy programme touches with a sure hand
the rawest spots in the Rayah's circumstances.
Germany's prestige is also concerned that the
Porte may not again, as in the case of so many
other proposals, get rid of these well-considered
and moderate ones with empty phrases. If she
does this, or if she proves incapable of fulfilling
her promises, the three Eastern Powers, if they do
not wish to seem ludicrous to the whole world, can
hardly avoid going further and demanding serious
pledges for the abolition of an anarchic state of
affairs which is gradually becoming intolerable to
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? Turkey and the Great Nations 73
all her neighbours, and particularly to Austria.
That they can thus act with an honourable
unanimity seems almost certain ; the quiet hope of
the French, of EngHsh Russophobes, and of the
Ultramontanes for the break-up of the Three
Emperors' Alliance has poor prospects so long as
the Republic exists in France and the Magyars
guide Austria's foreign policy.
Only a seer could determine beforehand the
course of events during the next months. The
growing agitation in Servia, and the energetic
preparations in the Mediterranean, point indeed
to serious events. On the other hand, all the
Powers, especially Russia, are filled with a lively
desire for peace; the Czar's Empire shrinks from
the incalculable disorders which an outburst of
Mohammedan fanaticism threatens to create
everywhere in Asia; the Powers' profound mutual
suspicion disables each force by an opposing force
yonder in the East. It therefore seems possible
that Turkish affairs will still, for a time, drag along
sluggishly and deplorably, and highly probable
that the fate of the capital will not be decided in the
nearest future, because this question is in fact
regarded by all the Powers as not yet ripe for
settlement. We have had very unpleasant experi-
ences of England's friendship since the Seven
Years' War; Russian policy would have to commit
unheard-of follies for Germany to think of drop-
ping the hand of her tried friend in order to throw
herself into the arms of a faithless ally, dominated
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? 74 Turkey and the Great Nations
by obsolete opinions. In the Eastern Question
Russia needs us more than we her; therefore
an astute, strong German policy has nothing to
fear from the Russian alliance.
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? GERMANY AND THE ORIENTAL
QUESTION
BERLIN,
J 5th Dec, i8y6,
"HP HAT changed aspect" of Oriental complica-
1 tions, about which Prince Bismarck did not
wish to pronounce an opinion in the Imperial Diet,
seems to all appearances to be arising very rapidly.
The mobilization of the Army of the South is com-
pleted, the Turkish army is ready to hold the line of
the Danube, and perhaps to cross it. Optimists
still place reliance upon the incontestable per-
sonal love for peace of Czar Alexander, or upon
the arts of mediation of the European Conference ;
and, truly, in the chaos of the Oriental Question
the imexpected has often become possible. But
probability far rather presages the near outbreak
of war. Russia cannot abandon the demand for
serious reforms in favour of the Rayah people
without a humiliation which a healthy State
accepts only from the sword of the victor. The
Porte will not grant those reforms, as, after all the
horrors of the past summer, they can only be
carried through under the protection of Christian
75
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? 76 Germany and the East
weapons. It is impossible that the God-inspired
Bashi-bazoiik, after having ripped open the Bul-
garian mother and sold her children as slaves,
should now of his own accord live with the survivors
of his victims as a peaceful citizen on the footing
of equal rights. But an occupation of the rebel-
lious provinces, be it through the Moscow "Gia-
our" or through another Christian Power, appears
an unbearable disgrace to the dignity of valiant
Islam, the last moral power of the Ottoman
State. The differences have become irreconcilable,
and, however much the West of Europe wishes for
peace, the mediation proposals of the Conference
can, after all that has happened, only delay the
inevitable catastrophe for a short time, and render
intolerable the paralysing tension which oppresses
that part of the world.
The worst of all political sins -- the hesitation
between wishing and not wishing to do a thing --
has come out in an ugly manner in every one of
the periodical explosions of the Oriental Question,
but never in worse form than last year. All
Powers immediately concerned in the heritage
of the "Sick Man" stood helplessly between the
appreciation of the fact that the present state of
affairs was impossible and the fear of the incalcu-
lable consequences of a firm decision. Compared
with the hesitation of the neighbouring Powers the
simple barbarity of Ottoman politics seems almost
worthy of respect. By the atrocities in Bulgaria,
as well as by the dismal proceedings which accom-
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? Germany and the East 77
panied the two changes of dynasty, the Porte has
only proved afresh that, in spite of the Peace of
Paris, she can never become a European Power.
She has carried on a pitiful war with a superiority
of excellent regular troops, yet she had the
worst in the fight with the brave little nation of
Montenegro, and defeated the Servian militia only
after a resistance of many months. On the whole,
however, she succeeded in maintaining her posses-
sions, and with prouder feelings, and greater con-
fidence than for a long time past, the Turks look
to-day upon the undefeated standard of the Half-
Moon. But once again, and not without success,
the old Turkish adage Vv^as applied to the Prankish
Courts: *'To hurry is the work of the devil, to
delay is the work of God ; " the well-known cheerful
promises of coming constitutional splendour for
the happy grande famille ottomane sufficed to
once more keep the Cabinets in suspense for a
time. It was a hand-to-mouth life, without the
slightest vestige of a fruitful statesmanlike thought.
The Porte, however, always knew what she
wanted. Not the same boast applies to the
attitude of the most closely-interested European
Powers. When defending the rights of the Ra-
yah the Russian Court did only what its historic
position demanded. Its original proposals were
just and temperate, and its firm adhesion to the
Triple AlHance proved that in Petersburg a lesson
had been learned from the experiences of the
Crimean War. But with a disturbance of the
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? 78 Germany and the East
general policy of the Great Powers, through the with-
drawal of England and the complications caused
by the change of Turkish dynasty, Russian diplo-
macy for a time lost its firm grip. Those who
hear the grass grow may, of course, presume that
the restless little Piedmont of the South Slavs,
which always was a thorn in the eye of the Russian
Cabinet, has intentionally been forced into war
for its own destruction. Far nearer the truth
is the assumption that two parties fought an
indecisive battle at the Court of St. Petersburg.
The Government shrank from war, yet did not
dare oppose the mighty Pan-Slavist movement
which swept the country; it warned the Serbs of
the outbreak, yet did not morally support it --
nay, even permitted, contrary to international
law, the massing of Russian officers and soldiers.
The temptation was truly very great; in face of
a wild popular effervescence an absolute despot
is often less powerful than a constitutional king,
who can rely upon an intelligent parliamentary
majority. How angry we Germans once were with
the Crown of Prussia when peace had been con-
cluded with Denmark, and subsequently, in
accordance with treaties, her officers were recalled
from the Schleswig-Holstein Army! But what-
ever may be said as an excuse, Russia's policy was
unworthy of a Great Power ; it resembled more the
art of evasion forced upon Count Cavour by the
weakness of his country than the conscious straight-
forwardness of Prussian policy during our battles
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? Germany and the East 79
for unity. Even in the circles of unbiassed people,
the concealed war in Servia has severely shaken
their confidence in Russia's honest intentions,
and it was lucky for the Russians themselves
that the Servian enterprise ended in failure.
Since then the Court at Petersburg resorted to
simpler and therefore more effective measures.
By its ultimatum the Turks were forced to immedi-
ately arrest their triumphal march. Thousands
of beheaded Servians lay on the battle-field around
Alexinatz; the whole country vibrated in terror
of Turkish arms; the more wonderful appeared to
the people the power of the White Czar, who by
one word called "halt" to the terrible foe. The
prestige of Russia amongst the Rayahs is to-day
firmer established than ever. For a time, the
Russian Crown seemed to disappear behind the
revolutionary powers of Pan-Slavism; now it
apparently makes efforts to expiate the fault it has
committed and to keep in check those elementary
forces. The emphatic declaration of Czar Alex-
ander that he did not wish for conquests is more
deserving of credence than the assurances of his
ancestress Catherine. After a glorious reign he
may well expect that the world places confidence
in his word, especially as he did not indulge in
vague wishes for peace, but frankly declared that
the necessity for war to secure the rights of the
Rayah might possibly arise. For the moment,
the labours of St. Petersburg diplomacy are di-
rected towards securing the assent of all Powers,
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? 8o Germany and the East
including England, to the reform proposals, and to
secure for Russian policy in case of war incontest-
able legal rights, so that Russia either should
appear as executor of European will, or could
not be accused of arbitrary action; and to all
appearances the old faithful ally of the Russians
-- the infatuated conceit of the Porte -- will grant
them at least the latter advantage. For, how-
ever mildly the Conference may decide, and it
may even abandon the idea of occupation, the
actual removal of Ottoman suzerainty in Bosnia
and Bulgaria is inevitable if the whole reform work
is not again to be mere jugglery, and the conceit
of the Mohammedans will not admit such imputa-
tions. So Russia, after many waverings and mis-
takes, has returned to a clear and logical policy;
and to-day it still appears to us laymen that two
utterly different efforts of Russian diplomacy
worked side by side. Pan-Slavism is beaten pro
tern, by the moderate policy of the Czar, but he
reserves to himself to again come forward with its
covetous wishes as soon as fortune of war favours
the Russian flag. Of English politics, however,
not the cleverest brain can say what its object
has really been during the whole course of proceed-
ings. The Tory party was very minutely in-
formed as to the hopeless situation of the Rayahs.
If, therefore, according to national superstition,
we considered the existence of Turkey a European
? -- or, better, a British -- necessity, it should not
have left the representation of South Slav interests
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? Germany and the East 8i
to the Russian Court; it should have exerted its
great influence on the Bosphorus in order to
enforce at the right time the adoption of vigorous
reforms. Instead, it tumbled from one contra-
diction into the other. Reluctantly it consented to
Count Andrassy's memorial, only to break away,
four months later, from the Berlin Convention,
which, after all, was simply supposed to carry on
the plans of the memorial. It never occurred to
the Tory party to come forward with a counter-
proposal. England's attitude was the final cause
of the Servian War, because, without evident
discord between the Great Powers, the Petersburg
Court could undoubtedly have kept in check the
Pan-Slavist agitation.
To posterity alone it will become apparent what
part the British Ambassador has played at both
dynasty changes at the Golden Horn; but it is
certain that confidence in England's friendship has
encouraged the Turks to carry on their frivolous
game with the Powers. As a champion of Allah,
Admiral Drummond was greeted in the Mosque
of Stamboul by the enthusiastic softas] the men
of war in the Bay of Besika gave encouragement
to the Porte to direct all their might against the
South Slavs. Meanwhile, a peculiarly vague
movement started amongst the British pubHc.
Here and there the conviction gained ground that
the strictly conservative Oriental policy of Old
England was played out; it was noticed with deep
regret that the fanaticism of Islam, under the pro-
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? 82 Germany and the East
tection of bigoted England, tortured its Christian
victims; added to which were the party hatred
of the Whigs, the reHgious zeal of High-Church
theologians, the philanthropic talk of weak-minded
individuals, and the ardent desire for peace of
those Manchester men who, already in the time of
Richard Cobden, favoured the good-natured view
that Constantinople as a Russian provincial town
would enjoy a considerable cotton importation,
and consequently unmixed happiness. Alarmed by
this wave of public opinion, the Cabinet, after
four months, again gave way, and in September
expressed its adherence to the principles of the An-
drassy memorial, which previously had been aban-
doned in May. Then, however, Benjamin Disraeli,
boasting and threatening, extolled the inexhaust-
ible expedients of Great Britain, and, as we are
credibly assured. Lord SaHsbury to-day makes
the most emphatic appeals to the stubbornness
of the Porte, whilst he, at the same time, in equally
decided manner declares himself opposed to the
occupation of Bulgaria, and thereby renders void
all his admonitions. The Porte believes that it
can count upon England's friendship under all
circumstances, and that is why she does not desire
an agreement with Russia. The diplomacy of
the Tory party reveals a type of complete help-
lessness; hence also their reluctance to convene
Parliament. Should, however, war break out in
the East it would soon become apparent that the
majority of the British public does not endorse the
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? Germany and the East 83
demobilization meetings of the Whigs. The na-
tion has not yet got over the experiences in the
Crimean War; it beHeves that it defends the East
Indies on the Bosphorus, and we might easily find
that England is following the bad example given in
Servia, and, by secretly supporting the Turkish
forces, commencing a hidden war against Russia.
Who can say where this may lead to? The fertile
mind of Benjamin Disraeli, however, apparently
thinks of yet another possibility: the faithful
friend of the Turks is ever ready to stick the key of
the Suez Canal in his pouch should the house
of the "Sick Man" collapse, and in this way would
strengthen for all time British supremacy in the
Mediterranean. The only thing that is clear in
this peculiar policy is that it is incalculable.
Nor, unfortunately, has Austria's Oriental policy
so far had fruitful results. True, the two leading
nations of the monarchy -- Germans and Magyars
-- have a presentiment that the Triple Alliance
alone can save the country from the dangers of the
Pan-Slavist propaganda; but intelligent judgment
is always being upset either by greedy desire for
conquests or by passionate outbursts of blind Slav
hatred. A great number of Vienna newspapers
play the sad part of Imperial Turkish Court
journals. When the Cisleithanian Parliament
discussed the Oriental Question, political dilettant-
ism celebrated its Saturnalia. A whole pattern-
card of invertebrate plans was displayed, and Mr.
Giskra, Ofenheim's patron, gave proof of his dar-
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? S4 Germany and the East
ing genius by sweetly suggesting putting up the
yellow-black boundary posts on the coast of the
-^gean Sea. An outspoken popular opinion exists
only in one German race of the Monarchy, i. e. ,
among the Transylvania Saxons. These, the best
German Austrians, who at the same time are the
most faithful adherents to the country as a whole,
are at heart completely on the side of the Rayah
people, because they see in advance that the
creation of small South Slav States on Hungary's
boundaries would tame the coarse insolence of
the Magyar Chauvinists, and would compel the
Hungarian nobility to behave fairer than hitherto
towards their German and Slav citizens. Fanatics
of Magyardom, on the other hand, do the impos-
sible in the adoration of their Turkish cousins.
The Budapest youth hurl their rhetorical thunder-
bolts against the venomous pestilential breath of
the Muscovite Colossus, and the enlightened ad-
mirers of general public liberty pilgrimage to Ofen
to the grave of Guel-Baba, the holy father of the
Mohammedans. It is as if at any price they
wished to prove to us Europeans of the West that
the Magyars consider themselves Asiatics of the
North. In spite of blustering and threatening
from all directions, nobody has either the courage
or the real intention of overthrowing Count An-
drassy . That in the midst of all these complications
the Count has, at any rate, firmly maintained the
Triple Alliance is a fresh proof of his diplomatic
cleverness.
