No More Learning

262.
The necessity of false values. --A judgment may be refuted when it is shown that it was
217
? ? ? ? 218 THE WILL TO POWER.
conditioned: but the necessity of retaining it is not thereby cancelled. Reasons can no more eradicate false values than they can alter astig matism in a man's eyes.
The need of their existence must be understood :
they are the result of causes which have nothing to do with reasoning.
263.
To see and reveal the problem of morality seems to me to be the new task and the principal thing of all. I deny that this has been done by moral philosophies heretofore.
264.
How false and deceptive men have always
been concerning the fundamental facts of their
inner world ! Here to have no eye; here to
hold one's tongue, and here to open one's mouth.
265.
There seems to be no knowledge or conscious
ness of the many revolutions that have taken
place in moral judgments, and of the number
of times that "evil" has really and seriously
been christened "good" and vice versa? , I myself
pointed to one of these transformations with the words "Sittlichkeit der Sitte. " * Even conscience
* The morality of custom.
? ? ? ? \
A. Morality as the work of Immorality.
I. In order that moral values may attain to supremacy, a host of immoral forces and
passions must assist them.
2. The establishment of moral values is the
work of immoral passions and considera tions.
B. Morality as the work of error.
C. Morality gradually contradicts itself.
Requital--Truthfulness, Doubt, e? roxi, Judging. --The "Immorality" of belief in morality.
The steps:-- -
1. Absolute dominion of morality: bio logical phenomena measured and judged
. . . --> A CRITICISM OF MORALITY. A 219
-" a thing as a gregarious pang of conscience.
has changed its sphere: formerly there was
266.
? according
The attempt identify Life with morality
(symptom awakened scepticism: mor |ality must no longer be regarded
the opposite Life); many means are
its values.
sought--even
The opposition of Life and Morality.
Morality condemned and sentenced by Life.
D. To what extent was morality dangerous Life?
(a) depreciated the joy living and the gratitude felt towards Life, etc.
transcendental one.
? ? It
of
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2.
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? 22O
THE WILL TO POWER.
(b) It checked the tendency to beautify and to ennoble Life.
(c) It checked the knowledge of Life.
(d) It checked the unfolding of Life, because it tried to set the highest phenomena thereof at variance with itself.
E. Contra-account: the usefulness of morality to Life.
(1) Morality may be a preservative measure for the general whole, it may be a pro
cess of uniting dispersed members: it
is useful as an agent in the production of the man who is a "tool. "
(2) Morality may be a preservative measure mitigating the inner danger threatening
man from the direction of his passions:
it is useful to "mediocre people. "
(3) Morality may be a preservative measure
resisting the life-poisoning influences of
profound sorrow and bitterness: it is
useful to the "sufferers. "
(4) Morality may be a preservative measure
opposed to the terrible outbursts of the mighty: it is useful to the "lowly. "
267.
It is an excellent thing when one can use the expressions "right" and "wrong" in a definite,
narrow, and "bourgeois" sense, as for instance in the sentence: "Do right and fear no one''; *
* "Thue Recht und scheue Niemand. "
? ? ? ? A CRITICISM OF MORALITY. 22I
--that is to say, to do one's duty, according to the rough scheme of life within the limit of which a community exists. --Let us not think meanly of what a few thousand years of morality have inculcated upon our minds,
268.
Two types of morality must not be confounded:
the morality with which the instinct that has
remained healthy defends itself from incipient decadence, and the other morality by means of
which this decadence asserts itself, justifies itself, and leads downwards.
The first-named is usually stoical, hard, tyran
nical (Stoicism itself was an example of the sort of "drag-chain" morality we speak of); the
other is gushing, sentimental, full of secrets, it
has the women and "beautiful feelings" on its
side (Primitive Christianity was an example of this morality).
269.
I shall try to regard all moralising, with one glance, as a phenomenon--also as a riddle. Moral phenomena have preoccupied me like
riddles. To-day I should be able to give a reply to the question: why should my neighbour's
welfare be of greater value to me than my own P and why is it that my neighbour himself should value his welfare differently from the way in which
? ? ? ? 222 THE WILL TO POWER.
I value it--that is to say, why should precisely
my welfare be paramount in his mind? What
is the meaning of this "Thou shalt," which is regarded as "given" even by philosophers them selves?
The seemingly insane idea that a man should esteem the act he performs for a fellow-creature,
higher than the one he performs for himself, and that the same fellow-creature should do so too
(that only those acts should be held to be good which are performed with an eye to the neighbour
reasons--namely, as the result of the social instinct which rests
and for his welfare) has its
? upon the valuation, that single individuals are of little importance although collectively their
importance is very great. This, of course, pre supposes that they constitute a community with
one feeling and one conscience pervading the whole. It is therefore a sort of exercise for
keeping one's eyes in a certain direction; it is the will to a kind of optics which renders a view of one's self impossible.
My idea: goals are wanting, and these must be individuals. We see the general drift: every individual gets sacrificed and serves as a tool. Let any one keep his eyes open in the streets-- is not every one he sees a slave? Whither? What is the purpose of it all?
27O.
How is it possible that a man can respect himself only in regard to moral values, that he
? ? ? A CRITICISM OF MORALITY,
subordinates and despises everything in favour of good, evil, improvement, spiritual salvation,
etc. ? as, for instance, Henri Fre? d. Amiel. What is the meaning of the moral idiosyncrasy P--I
mean this both in the psychological and physio logical sense, as it was, for instance, in Pascal. In cases, then, in which other great qualities are
not wanting; and even in the case of Schopen
hauer, who obviously valued what he did not and could have . . . --is it not the result of
a merely mechanical moral interpretation of real states of pain and displeasure ? is it not a par ticular form of sensibility which does not happen to understand the cause of its many unpleasurable feelings, but thinks to explain them with moral hypotheses? In this way an occasional feeling of well-being and strength always appears under
the optics of a "clean conscience," flooded with light through the proximity of God and the consciousness of salvation. . . . Thus the moral idiosyncratist has (1) either acquired his real
worth in approximating to the virtuous type of society: "the good fellow," "the upright man"-- a sort of medium state of high respectability: mediocre in all his abilities, but honest, conscien tious, firm, respected, and tried, in all his aspira tions; (2) or, he imagines he has acquired that
worth, simply because he cannot otherwise under
stand all his states--he is unknown to himself;
he therefore interprets himself in this fashion. -- Morality is the only scheme of interpretation by
means of which this type of man can tolerate himself:--is it a form of pride?
223
? ? ? ? 2. 24
THE WILL TO POWER.
271.
The predominance of moral values. --The con quence of this predominance: the corruption of psychology, etc. ; the fatality which is associated
with it everywhere. What is the meaning of this predominance? What does it point to?
To a certain greater urgency of saying nay or
yea definitely in this domain. All sorts of im peratives have been used in order to make moral values appear as if they were for ever fixed:--they
have been enjoined for the longest period of time: they almost appear to be instinctive, like inner
commands. They are the expression of society's
Preservative measures, for they are felt to be almost beyond question. The practice--that is to say, the utility of being agreed concerning superior
values, has attained in this respect to a sort of
sanction. We observe that every care is taken
to paralyse reflection and criticism in this depart
ment:--look at Kant's attitude! not to speak of those who believe that it is immoral even to
prosecute "research" in these matters.
272.
My desire is to show the absolute homogeneity of all phenomena, and to ascribe to moral differ entiations but the value of perspective ; to show that all that which is praised as moral is essentially the same as that which is immoral, and was only
? ? ? ? Europeans
are the invalid: what an amount
A CRITICISM OF MORALITY.
225
made possible, according to the law of all moral development--that is to say, by means of immoral
artifices and with a view to immoral ends--just as all that which has been decried as immoral from the standpoint economics, both superior and essential; and how development leading
greater abundance life necessarily involves progress the realm immorality. "Truth," that the extent to which we allow ourselves to
comprehend this fact.
273.
But do not let fear: matter fact, we require great deal morality, order
? immoral parable:--
this subtle way; let me speak
physiologist interested certain illness, and an invalid who wishes to be cured of that
same illness, have not the same interests. Let suppose that the illness happens morality, --for morality an illness,--and that we
subtle torment and difficulty would arise supposing we Europeans were, once, our own inquisitive
spectators and the physiologist above-mentioned
earnestly desire rid ourselves morality? Should we want to? This course irrespective the
question whether we should able do so-- whether we can be cured at all
VOL.
Should we under these circumstances
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226 THE WILL TO POWER.
2. THE HERD.
274.
Whose will to power is morality? --The common factor of all European history since the time of Socrates is the attempt to make the moral values
dominate all other values, in order that they
should not be only the leader and judge of life, but also of: (1) knowledge, (2) Art, (3) political
and social aspirations. "Amelioration" regarded as the only duty, everything else used as a means thereto (or as a force distributing, hindering, and endangering its realisation, and therefore to be
opposed and annihilated . . . ). --A similar move ment to be observed in China and India.
What is the meaning of this will to power on the part of moral values, which has played such a part in the world's prodigious evolutions?
Answer:-Three powers lie concealed behind it :
(1) The instinct of the herd opposed to the strong
and the independent; (2) the instinct of all
sufferers and abortions opposed the happy
and well-constituted; (3) the instinct the mediocre opposed the exceptions. --Enormous
advantage this movement, despite the cruelty,
falseness, and narrow-mindedness which has helped along (for the history the struggle morality
with the fundamental instincts life itself the greatest piece immorality that has ever
yet been witnessed earth
? ? on of
to
. .
. ).
of
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? A CRITICISM OF MORALITY,
275.
227
The fewest succeed in discovering a problem behind all that which constitutes our daily life, and
"Every man should be the preoccupation of his fellows"; he who thinks in this way deserves honour: no one ought to think of himself.
"Thou shalt": an impulse which, like the
sexual impulse, cannot fathom itself, is set apart and is not condemned as all the other instincts
are--on the contrary, it is made to be their standard and their judge!
The problem of "equality," in the face of the
fact that we all thirst for distinction: here, on the
contrary, we should demand of ourselves what we demand of others. That is so tasteless and
obviously insane; but--it is felt to be holy and
of a higher order. The fact that it is opposed to common sense is not even noticed.
Self-sacrifice and self-abnegation are considered distinguishing, as are also the attempt to obey
morality implicitly, and the belief that one should be every one's equal in its presence.
The neglect and the surrender of Life and of well-being is held to be distinguished, as are also
the complete renunciation of individual valuations
and the severe exaction from every one of the same sacrifice. "The value of an action is once
to which we have become accustomed
the ages--our eye does not seem focussed for such things: at least, this seems to me to be the case in so far as our morality is concerned.
throughout
? ? ? ? 228 THE WILL TO POWER.
and for all fixed: every individual must submit to this valuation. "
We see: an authority speaks--who speaks? --
We must condone it in human pride, if man tried to make this authority as high as possible, for he
wanted to feel as humble as he possibly could by the side of Thus--God speaks!
God was necessary an unconditional sanction which has no superior, "Categorical Imperator":
or, far people believed the authority
of reason, what was needed was "unitarian
metaphysics" by means which this view could be made logical.
Now, admitting that faith God dead: the question arises once more: "who speaks? " My answer, which take from biology and not from metaphysics, is: "the gregarious instinct speaks. " This what desires to be master: hence its "thou
shalt! "--it will allow the individual exist only part whole, only favour the whole,
hates those who detach themselves from every
thing--it turns the hatred all individuals against him.
276.
The whole the morality Europe based
upon the values which are useful the herd: the sorrow all higher and exceptional men
explained by the fact that everything which distinguishes them from others reaches their con sciousness the form feeling their own
smallness and egregiousness. the virtues of
? modern men which are the causes
pessimistic
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? A CRITICISM OF MORALITY.
229
gloominess; the mediocre, like the herd, are not
troubled much with questions or with conscience --they are cheerful. (Among the gloomy strong
men, Pascal and Schopenhauer are noted examples. ) The more dangerous a quality seems to the herd,
the more completely it is condemned.
277.
>**
The morality of truthfulness in the herd.
"Thou shalt be recognisable, thou shalt express
thy inner nature by means of clear and constant signs--otherwise thou art dangerous: and sup
posing thou art evil, thy power of dissimulation is absolutely the worst thing for the herd. We
despise the secretive and those whom we cannot identify. --Consequently thou must regard thyself
as recognisable, thou mayest not remain concealed from thyself, thou mayest not even believe in the possibility of thy ever changing. " Thus, the in
sistence upon truthfulness has as its main object
the recognisability and the stability of the individual.
As a matter of fact, it is the object of education
to make each gregarious unit believe in a certain
definite dogma concerning the nature of man:
education first creates this dogma and thereupon exacts "truthfulness. "
278.
Within the confines of a herd or of a com
munity--that is to say, inter pares, the over-estima tion of truthfulness is very reasonable. A man
? ? ? ? 230
THE WILL TO POWER.
must not allow himself to be deceived--and con sequently he adopts as his own personal morality that he should deceive no one --a sort of mutual obligation among equals | In his dealings with
the outside world caution and danger demand that he should be on his guard against deception:
the first psychological condition of this attitude
would mean that he is also on his guard against
his inner self. Mistrust thus appears as the source of truthfulness.
2. 79.
A criticism of the virtues of the herd--Inertia
is active: (1) In confidence, because mistrust makes suspense, reflection, and observation necessary.
(2) In veneration, where the gulf that separates power is great and submission necessary: then,
so that fear may cease to exist, everybody tries to love and esteem, while the difference in power
is interpreted as a difference of value: and thus the relationship to the powerful no longer has any
thing revolting in (3) the sense truth.
know one's self on the same level with all, feel
? What truth? Truth that
things which causes the smallest amount mental exertion (apart from this, lying extremely fatiguing). (4) sympathy. relief
all feel, and accept belief which current; something passive
already
beside the activity which appropriates and continually carries
into practice the most individual rights valua tion (the latter process allows no repose). (5)
explanation
? ? a of
is In
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to
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It
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? whether be above something which
beneath its general level, antagonistic and dangerous
dealing with the ex
A CRITICISM OF MORALITY.
231
impartiality and coolness of judgment: people
scout the strain of being moved, and prefer to be detached and "objective. " (6) In uprightness:
people prefer to obey a law which is to hand rather than to create a new one, rather than to command themselves and others: the fear of commanding--it
is better to submit than to
rebel. (7) In toleration: the fear of exercising a right or of enforcing a judgment.
28O.
The instinct of the herd values the juste milieu and the average as the highest and most precious
of all things: the spot where the majority is to be found, and the air that it breathes there. In
this way it is the opponent of order rank; regards climb from the level the heights the same light descent from the majority the minority. The herd regards the exception,
? itself. Their trick
ceptions above them, the strong, the mighty, the
wise, and the fruitful, persuade them be come guardians, herdsmen, and watchmen--in fact,
become their head-servants: thus they convert danger into thing which useful. the
middle,
nothing; here there not much room even for misunderstandings; here there equality; here man's individual existence not felt as reproach, but the right existence; here con
fear ceases: here man alone with
? ? as
a is
a
a to
toas
toinit
is is
is
is
all
In a
to
of
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is
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? THE WILL TO POWER.
232
tentment reigns supreme. Mistrust is active only
towards the exceptions; to be an exception is to be a sinner.
28 I.
compliance with our communal instincts,
we make certain regulations for ourselves and
forbid certain acts, we do not course,
common reason, forbid certain kind of "exist
ence," nor certain attitude mind, but only particular application and development this
"existence" and "attitude of mind. " But then the idealist virtue, the moralist, comes along and
says: "God sees into the human heart! What matters that ye abstain from certain acts: ye
are not any better on that account! " Answer: Mr. Longears and Virtue-Monger, we do not
want be better all, we are quite satisfied
? with ourselves, all we desire
harm one another--and that
certain actions when they take
that we should not
why we forbid particular direction
--that say, when they are against our own
interests: but that does not alter the fact that
when these same actions are directed against the enemies our community -- against you, for
pay them sufficient honour. We educate our children
instance--we are loss know how
up them; we develop them the fullest extent. Did we share that "god-fearing" radicalism which your holy craziness recommends, we were green
horns enough condemn the source those for
bidden "acts" by condemning the "heart" and
them,
the "attitude mind" which recommends
? ? of to
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? A CRITICISM OF MORALITY.
233
that would mean condemning our very existence, and with it its greatest prerequisite--an attitude
of mind, a heart, a passion which we revere with
all our soul. By our decrees we prevent this
attitude of mind from breaking out and venting
itself in a useless way--we are prudent when we
prescribe such laws for ourselves; we are also
moral in so doing. . . . Have you no idea--how
ever vague--what sacrifices it has cost us, how much self-control, self-subjection, and hardness it
has compelled us to exercise? We are vehement in our desires; there are times when we even feel as if we could devour each other. . . . But the
"communal spirit" is master of us: have you observed that this is almost a definition of
morality?
282.
The weakness of the gregarious animal gives
rise to a morality which is precisely similar to
that resulting from the weakness of the decadent
man: they understand each other; they associate
with each other (the great decadent religions always rely upon the support of the herd). The
gregarious animal, as such, is free from all morbid characteristics, it is in itself an invaluable creature; but it is incapable of taking any initiative; it must have a "leader"--the priests understand this. . . . The state is not subtle, not secret enough; the art of "directing consciences" slips
its grasp. How is the gregarious animal infected with illness by the priest?
? ? ? ? 234
THE WILL TO POWER.
283.
The hatred directed against the privileged in
body and spirit: the revolt of the ugly and bungled souls against the beautiful, the proud, and
the cheerful. The weapons used: contempt of beauty, of pride, of happiness: "There is no such
thing as merit," "The danger is enormous: it is right that one should tremble and feel ease," "Naturalnes-s evil; right oppose all that
even 'reason'" (all that anti
natural elevated the highest place).
again the priests who exploit this condition,
natural
? and who win the "people" over "The sinner" over whom there
heaven than over "the just person. "
struggle against "paganism" (the pang con science, measure for disturbing the harmony
the soul).
The hatred of the mediocre for the exceptions,
and the herd for its independent members. (Custom actually regarded "morality. ") The revulsion feeling against "egotism": that
only worth anything which done "for another. " "We are all equal";--against the love dominion, against "dominion" general; --against privilege;--against sectarians,
free spirits, and sceptics;--against philosophy force
opposing - mechanical and automatic
instincts); categorical morality,
philosophers themselves
imperative," the essential nature
"general
and universal. "
"the
themselves. more joy
This the
? ? in
is
of
(a
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A CRITICISM OF MORALITY
284.
235
The qualities and tendencies which are praised: peacefulness, equity, moderation, modesty, rever
ence, respectfulness, bravery, chastity, honesty, fidelity, credulity, rectitude, confidence, resigna tion, pity, helpfulness, conscientiousness, simplicity, mildness, justice, generosity, leniency, obedience, disinterestedness, freedom from envy, good nature, industry.
We must ascertain to what extent such qualities are conditioned as means to the attainment of
certain desires and ends (often an "evil" end); or as results of dominating passions (for instance,
intellectuality): or as the expressions of certain states of need--that is to say, as preservative measures (as in the case of citizens, slaves, women, etc. ).
In short, every one of them is not considered
? "good" for
approximates
"society"
ends the latter, necessary for their preserva
own sake, but rather because standard prescribed either by by the "herd," means the
tion and enhancement, and also the result
an actual gregarious instinct the individual;
these qualities are thus the service an instinct which fundamentally different from these
antagonistic, selfish, and pitiless the outside world; full
states virtue. For the herd
love dominion and feelings mistrust, etc. the "herdsman" this antagonism comes
the fore: must have qualities which are the reverse those possessed by the herd.
? ? of
of
of
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THE WILL TO POWER.
236
The mortal enmity of the herd towards all
order of rank : its instinct is in favour of the
leveller (Christ). Towards all strong individuals (the sovereigns) it is hostile, unfair, intemperate, arrogant, cheeky, disrespectful, cowardly, false, lying, pitiless, deceitful, envious, revengeful.
285.
My teaching is this, that the herd seeks to maintain and preserve one type of man, and that it defends itself on two sides--that is to say,
against those which are decadents from its ranks (criminals, etc. ), and against those who rise superior to its dead level. The instincts of the herd tend to a stationary state of society; they merely preserve. They have no creative power.
The pleasant feelings of goodness and benevol
ence with which the just man fills us (as opposed to the suspense and the fear to which the great innovating man gives rise) are our own sensations of personal security and equality: in this way the gregarious animal glorifies the gregarious
nature, and then begins to feel at ease. This judgment on the part of the "comfortable" ones
rigs itself out in the most beautiful words--and thus "morality" is born. Let any one observe,
the hatred of the herd for all truthful
286.
? Let us not deceive ourselves | When a man hears the whisper of the moral imperative in his
? ? ? man
conscious the opposite feelings,--that
A CRITICISM OF MORALITY.
237
breast, as altruism would have him hear he shows thereby that he belongs the herd. When
say, when he sees his danger and his undoing disinterested and unselfish actions,--then he
does not belong the herd. 287.
the herd should rule within the herd--but not
beyond it: the leaders the herd require fundamentally different valuation for their actions,
do also the independent ones the beasts prey, etc.
GENERAL OBSERVATIONS CONCERNING MORALITY.
My philosophy aims
new order rank: not individualistic morality. " The spirit
? 288.
human pride--The "Free-Will" theory anti
Morality regarded
attempt establishing
religious. Its ultimate object right upon man regard himself
his highest states and actions: growing feeling pride.
bestow the the cause
form the
Man feels his power his "happiness"; they say: there must will behind these states--
*TRANSLATOR'S NOTE. --Here broad distinction be tween Nietzsche and Herbert Spencer.
? ? is a
it
of a
to
to
be
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at an
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is
it,
? 238
THE WILL TO POWER.
otherwise they do not belong to him. Virtue is an attempt at postulating a modicum of will, past or present, as the necessary antecedent to every exalted and strong feeling of happiness: if the
will to certain actions is regularly present in consciousness, a sensation of power may be inter
preted as its result. This is a merely psychological
Point of view, based upon the false assumption
that nothing belongs to us which we have not
consciously willed. The whole of the teaching of responsibility relies upon the ingenuous psycho
logical rule that the will is the only cause, and
that one must have been aware of having willed
in order to be able to regard one's self as a cause. Then comes the counter-movement--that of the
? moral-philosophers.
These men still labour under
the delusion that a man is responsible only for what he has willed. The value of man is then
made a moral value: thus morality becomes a
causa prima; for this there must be some kind of principle in man, and "free will" is posited as
prima causa. The arrie`re pense? e is always this:
If man is not a causa prima through his will, he must be irresponsible,--therefore he does not
come within the jurisdiction of morals,--virtue or vice is automatic and mechanical. . . .
In short: in order that man
may respect himself he must be capable of becoming evil.
289.
Theatricalness regarded as the result of "Free Will" morality. It is a step in the development
? ? ? A CRITICISM OF MORALITY,
239
of the feeling of power itself, to believe one's self to be the author of one's exalted moments (of one's
often the expression of an imperfect and often morbid constitution. Personal perfection regarded as determined by will, as an act of consciousness, as reason with dialectics, is a caricature, a sort of self contradiction. . . . Any degree of consciousness renders perfection impossible. . . . A form of
theatricalness. )
29O.
The moral hypothesis, designed with a view to justifying God, said: evil must be voluntary
(simply in order that the voluntariness of goodness might be believed in); and again, all evil and suffering have an object which is salvation.
The notion "guilt" was considered as some thing which had no connection at all with the ultimate cause of existence, and the notion "punishment" was held to be an educating and beneficent act, consequently- an act proceeding from
a good God.
The absolute dominion of moral valuations over
all others: nobody doubted that God could not
be evil and could do no harm--that is to say,
perfection was understood merely as moral per fection.
29 I.
How false is the supposition that an action must depend upon what has preceded it in
perfection)
and to have willed them. . . . (Criticism: all perfect action is precisely un conscious and not deliberate; consciousness is
? ? ? ? 240
THE WILL TO POWER.
consciousness! And morality has been measured in the light of this supposition, as also crimin ality. . . .
The value of an action must be judged by its
the utilitarians: to measure it knowing that origin.
results, say
according to origin involves the impossibility
ahead, perhaps.