No More Learning

3
It is not surprising that men revolted from such a monstrous position.
The defence, on the other hand, did their best to build a golden
bridge for the retreat of the managers, and perhaps showed, by the
reasonableness of their attitude in this respect, that they recognised
that there was a case to meet and to defend.
"The Commons”, they said, "have well exercised their honour by preferring
a charge and bringing it here to be discussed, to know whether it is true or
not; and it is no dishonour or disgrace to the House of Commons to say, ulti-
mately, that upon that inquiry, it turns out that the charge is not well founded.
Their object is not the individual, but the crime. If the crime does not
exist, they have no resentment against Mr. Hastings the House of Commons
and every individual member of it has no other wish but that the charge should
be fairly sifted and examined, to see whether their suspicions are well or ill
founded; and every member of the House of Commons , will rejoice if it
should turn out, in the event, that Mr. Hastings is able to exonerate himself
from these imputations that have been cast upon him and upon the nation. " +
But the sentiments thus described had no place in the heart of
the leading manager. Burke would have none of it:
. . .
. . . ?
p. 11.
1 Debates of the House of Lords on the Evidence
Bond, Speeches in the Trial of Warren Hastings, 1, 6-7.
2 Idem, p. 13.
4 Idem, II, 692-3.
3


## p. 312 (#340) ############################################

312
IMPEACHMENT OF WARREN HASTINGS
"No", he cried in answer to Plumer, "we never would, nor can we conceive
that we should, do other than pass from this bar with indignation, with rage and
despair, if the House of Commons should, upon such a defence as has here been
made against such a charge as they have produced-if they should be foiled,
baffled and defeated in it. No, my Lords, we never should forget it. A long,
lasting, deep, bitter memory of it would sink into our minds; for we have not
come here to you in the rash heat of a day, with that fervour which sometimes
prevails in popular assemblies and frequently misleads them. No; if we have
been guilty of error, it is a long deliberate error; an error the fruit, of long
laborious inquiry. We are not come here to compromise matters at all.
We do admit that our fame, our honours, nay, the very being of the inquisi-
torial power of the House of Commons are gone, if this man is not guilty. We
are not come here to solve a problem, but to call for justice. I, for myself
and for others, make this deliberate determination, I nuncupate this solemn an:
serious vow—that we do glow with an immortal hatred against all this
corruption. " 1
It is not surprising that when a motion of thanks was made to the
managers of the impeachment, one member declared that he would
be willing to agree, if the leading manager were excepted, “who had
by his conduct disgraced and degraded the House of Commons".
But Burke's errors were the errors of a noble if utterly misguided
soul. He never recovered from the verdict. The day after it was given
he left the House of Commons for ever.
Throughout the trial—in the darkest hour of his fate-Hastings
had borne himself with the same dauntless courage which had enabled
him to hold his head high under the cruel "bludgeonings of chance"
in scenes far distant from Westminster Hall. Nothing, not even the
scorching invective of his accusers, nor the long mental agony of the
seven years' ordeal, had been able to break that indomitable spirit.
As in the council chamber at Calcutta, so at the bar of the House of
Lords, treatment that would have crushed most men to the earth
seemed only to brace him to a stubborn, heroic and provocative
defiance. For his most questionable acts he claimed not pardon or
indulgence but full justification and unmeasured praise. In facing
his accusers he showed in every gesture and every inflection of his
voice that icy yet burning scorn which sprang from his unconquer-
able belief in his own rectitude and which drove his adversary,
Burke, into frenzies of impotent anger.
And so perhaps the greatest Englishman who ever ruled India,
a man who with some ethical defects possessed in superabundant
measure the mobile and fertile brain, the tireless energy and the lofty
fortitude which distinguishes only the supreme statesman, was left
with his name cleared but his fortunes ruined, and every hope of
future distinction and even employment taken from him. The East
India Company came not ungenerously to his assistance, and Hastings
passed from the purview of history to spend the long-drawn evening
of his arduo’s life, surrounded by a circle of devoted friends, in the
peaceful seclusion of his recovered ancestral home at Daylesford.
1 Bond, Speeches in the Trial of Warren Hastings, IV, 332, 334, 345.


## p. 313 (#341) ############################################

CHAPTER XVIII
LEGISLATION AND GOVERNMENTS, 1786-1818
THE legislation of 1784-6 was developed and in some respects
extended when the Company's privileges were reviewed by parlia-
ment in 1793 and 1813. On each occasion the principal object of
attack was the commercial monopoly of the eastern trade, and on
each occasion the Company had to give up something of its rights.
In 1793 it was obliged to allow a certain amount of tonnage for
private merchants' goods both outward and homeward; in 1813 it
lost its monopoly of the Indian though not of the China trade. In
this respect legislative action merely anticipated by a few years
the consequences of economic developments. The application of
machinery and power to the cotton manufacture and calico printing
would in any case have soon brought to an end its main commercial
activity in India—the export to Europe of cotton piece-goods. After
a period of abnormal activity during the wars with France, this
rapidly declined, and expired about the end of the third decade of
the nineteenth century, just before the commercial powers of the
Company were finally abolished by the act of 1833.
In the field of general policy the main tendency was to develop
and emphasise that consciousness of moral obligation in administering
the Company's possessions which had marked the act of 1784. In
1793 Wilberforce had striven, though in vain, to procure the insertion
in the act of provisions for the admission and encouragement of
missionaries in India. In that he had been defeated; but in 1813
section 33 declared that “it is the duty of this country to promote
the interest and happiness of the native inhabitants of the British
dominions in India", and section 43 empowered the government to
expend not less than a lakh of rupees on the revival and encourage-
ment of learning. At the same time, although missionaries were not
specifically named, a section, which clearly had them in view, em-
powered the Board of Control to give licences of residence in India
to persons improperly refused them by the court of directors; and
another section set up a bishop and archdeacons in India.
So far as political institutions went, Pitt's India Act and the sup-
plementary acts of 1786 had already defined the outlines of the
Anglo-Indian constitution, which, though developed by subsequent
legislation, was not fundamentally altered so long as the Company
continued to exist. However, a good many changes in detail took
place, and the actual working of the superior institutions then set up
demands statement and illustration. This is particularly necessary as
regards the Home Government, although the only formal changes of


## p. 314 (#342) ############################################

314
LEGISLATION AND GOVERNMENTS, 1786-1818
any moment were the establishment of a paid board by the Charter
Act of 1793 in lieu of the unpaid board set up in 1784, and the decla-
ration of British sovereignty over the Company's eastern possessions
in the Charter Act of 1813—which continued the administration in the
Company "without prejudice to the undoubted sovereignty of the
Crown of the United Kingdom . . . in and over the same".
Meanwhile the board rapidly lost its powers, which were concen-
trated in the hands of a single person, the president. This change was
not effected without some ill-feeling. Henry Dundas had from the
first been the moving spirit, to the great indignation of some of his
colleagues, especially Lord Sydney, who protested against the way
in which Dundas pushed the interest of Scotsmen in India. In 1786
it was intended to make the change formal; “In which case”, wrote
Dundas, “I suppose your humble servant not only in reality but
declaredly will be understood as the cabinet minister for India". 2
But although this idea was ultimately carried out by the withdrawal
of the ex-officio members from attending at the board, to the last the
president required the formal assent, first of two and then of one of
his colleagues to legalise his proceedings. The position of the presi-
dent as regards the cabinet varied. It depended on the position of the
person holding the office. So long as Dundas continued to hold it, his
intimacy with Pitt ensured his inclusion in the cabinet; but others,
Minto for example, held it without a seat in the cabinet. 3 Relations
with the court of directors also varied. Dundas almost invariably
took a high hand with the court. At one time he had even contem-
plated taking all the administration out of the hands of the Company
and leaving it with nothing but the conduct of the East India trade.
But this probably seemed to Pitt too near an imitation of the bills of
Fox, and even the hints which Dundas had let fall revived something
of the language which had resounded through the country in 1783.
When the negotiations for the renewal of the charter in 1793 had
been completed, a member of the Company, in moving a vote of
thanks to the directors and the ministry,
hoped by Englishmen it would be long remembered that an administration in
the meridian of power, well knowing that the patronage of India would render
that power immortal, and almost urged by the people to grasp it, . . . had had
the magnanimity to refuse it and assign as reason to the House of Commons
that such an accession of power to the executive government was not compati-
ble with the safety of the British constitution. 5
But though in this project Dundas was foiled, in lesser matters he
had his own way. When, for instance, in 1788 the Company protested
against the dispatch to India of four royal regiments, and declined
1 Sydney to Pitt, 24 September, 1784, ap. Stanhope, Life of Pitt, 1, 227.
2 Cornwallis Correspondence, I, 244.
3 Minto in India, p. 3.
4 Cornwallis Correspondence, II, 13.
8 Debates at the East India House in 1793, p. 120.


## p. 315 (#343) ############################################

BOARD AND COMPANY
315
to provide the funds for their payment, a Declaratory Act was
promptly passed, legalising the ministerial view of the question. In
the appointment of governors to the subordinate presidencies, too,
he used the power of the board relentlessly to enforce his own wishes
on the directors. But later presidents certainly exercised a less
complete control. Castlereagh, for instance, wrote to Wellesley :
Your lordship is aware how difficult and delicate a task it is for the person
who fills my situation (particularly when strong feelings have been excited)
to manage such a body as the court of directors so as to shield the person in
yours from any unpleasant interference on their part. 2
The fact was that each part of the Home Government could make the
position of the governor-general intolerable if it pleased; so that
despite the superiority of the Board of Control and its access to the
cabinet, and despite its power of sending orders through the Secret
Committee of the directors, whcih the latter could neither discuss
nor disclose, policy in general was determined, when disputes arose,
on a basis of compromise; just as in the matter of appointments both
sides had in effect a power of veto, so also, in discussions about policy,
neither body cared to provoke the other overmuch save in exceptional
circumstances. There were two recognised methods by which the
orders to be transmitted to the governments in India might be
prepared. In matters of urgency the president himself might cause
a dispatch to be prepared, which was then sent to the Secret Com-
mittee, which could only sign it and send it off. Dispatches from India
in like manner might be addressed to the Secret Committee, in which
case they would only be laid before the court of directors if and when
the president desired. But this was not the procedure generally
adopted. Usually the chairman of the court would informally propose
a course of action to the president; and the matter would be discussed
between them, either in conversation or by private letters. The chair-
man would then informally propose a dispatch, which would be
prepared at the India House, and sent to the Board of Control
together with a mass of documentary information on which the
dispatch was founded. This was technically called a Previous Com-
munication. It was returned with approval or correction to the
Company, and after reconsideration sent a second time to Westminster
-the document on this second submission being called a Draft. This
double submission-informal and formal-resulted from the clause
in the act of 1784 by which amendments had to be completed by the
board within fourteen days. After 1813 the term was extended to
two months. If the court concurred with the amendments, the
dispatch would then be sent off; but if they did not, the discussions
might continue, in the last resort the board securing obedience by a
mandamus from the Court of King's Bench. The procedure renders
1 28 Geo. III, c. 8, Cf. Cornwallis Correspondence, I, 349, 354.
. ? Wellesley Despatches, III, 92.


## p. 316 (#344) ############################################

316
LEGISLATION AND ĠOVERNMENTS, 1786-1818
1
1
it exceedingly difficult without the information afforded by private
correspondence to define the actual part played by the various pre-
sidents of the board in the determination of policy; the Previous
Communications have seldom been preserved; and so one seldom
knows to what extent a Draft was influenced by the preliminary
discussions between the president and the chair. The system was
certainly slow and clumsy. But the importance of such a defeet
was largely neutralised by the length of time that communications
took to reach India, and the large degree of discretion which the
Indian governments necessarily enjoyed. With all its defects it was
a vast improvement over the ruinous system which had preceded it,
when the ministry was seeking to control Indian policy by a system
of influence, and when there was no certain link between the cabinet
and the head of the Indian administration such as was now provided
by the ministry's share in the appointment of the governor-general,
and the possibility of sending direct orders from the ministry to the
governor-general through the president of the board and the Secret
Committee of the court of directors. In the last resort and in matters
of real importance the ministry could enforce its will on the most
factious court of directors or on the most independent of governors-
general; while no governor-general was now exposed to the shocking
danger which had confronted Warren Hastings of having to determine
policy without even a probability of support from either side of the
House of Commons.
In other ways, too, the government of Bengal had been streng-
thened. Previous chapters have illustrated the fatal manner in which
the limited powers of the governor-general and the limited control of
the Bengal Government over the subordinate presidencies had worked.
Under the new system the governor-general could enforce his will
over refractory councillor if he were convinced of the need of doing
so. Nor was he longer exposed to the opposition of Madras or Bombay
without adequate powers of repressing it. The act of 1773 only gave
a superintending power, and that with exceptions and limitations,
with regard to the declaration of war and the making of peace; so
that it still lay within the powers of the subordinate governments by
their previous conduct of policy to render war or peace inevitable.
But Pitt's India Act gave power of control over "all transactions with
the country powers or the application of the revenues or forces
time of war, or any such other points as shall be referred by the
court of directors to their control". And, further, to prevent disputes
regarding the extent of the powers of the government of Bengal,
orders from the latter were to be obeyed in every case except only
where contrary orders had been received from England and were
still unknown to the superintending government. The supplementary
. . . in
2
1 Foster, John Company, pp. 246 sqq.
2 Sections 31 and 32.


## p. 317 (#345) ############################################

THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL
317
2
act of 1786 had permitted the union in the same hands of the offices
of governor-general and commander-in-chief; so that no effective
opposition was now to be expected from the military as distinct from
the civil power. But in spite of all these extensions, one serious limi-
tation still remained—that imposed by the distances and the slow
communications of India. Calcutta was a long way from Madras
and Bombay; and what would be the position of the governor-general
if he quitted Bengal and went to one of the subordinate presidencies
to supervise or conduct affairs in person? The question emerged
during the government of Cornwallis, when he went down to Madras
to assume the command against Tipu Sultan. He was formally
granted separate powers by his council; but as it was held in England
that the council had no authority so to do, an act was passed 1
validating what had been done under such defective authority; and
in the Charter Act of 1793 ? provision was made for the appointment
of a vice-president during the governor-general's absence from
Bengal, and the Governor-general himself was empowered (1) to act
with a local council in all things as with the council of Bengal, and
(2) to issue orders to any of the Company's servants without previ-
ously communicating them to the local council. By virtue of these
alterations the governor-general was enabled to proceed to either of
tl:e subordinate provinces and assume the full control of affairs there.
The result was seen in the swift overthrow of Ti, 1, when Wellesley,
following Cornwallis's example, proceeded to Madras in 1798 in order
to control the preparations for the war with Mysore. Thus the later
governors-general were freed from the restraints which had so dis-
astrously hampered the action of Warren Hastings, and which he
had vainly tried to overcome by the futile expedient of nominating
residents on behalf of the Supreme Government at Madras and
Bombay.
Nor were these statutory provisions more than was actually
needed to keep the control of policy under one hand. Even Cornwallis
had had to meet counteraction on the part of the governor of Madras,
the unworthy John Hollond, who, mainly, it appears, owing to his
concern in the nawab's debt, not only dispatched military expedi-
tions without informing the Bengal Government, but also, when
ordered to afford assistance to the raja of Travancore against Tipu,
tried to bargain with the raja for the assistance it was his duty to
give. Lord Hobart, governor of Madras, would order the naval squad-
ron about without reference to the governor-general, Sir John Shore,
and at last quarrelled so violently with his official superior that he
preferred to return to England and forfeit his ultimate succession to
the post of governor-general rather than continue under Shore's
orders. 3 Even Wellesley was, or thought he was, opposed in the
131 Geo. III, c. 40.
2 Sections 52-54.
3 Teignmouth, Life of Shore, 1, 372; Cornwallis Correspondence, a, 307.


## p. 318 (#346) ############################################

318
LEGISLATION AND GOVERNMENTS, 1786-1818
>
991
preparations which he ordered for the war against Tipu, and used
very direct language on the subject of his superior powers not only
to the subordinate officers of the government of Bengal, but also to
the subordinate presidencies. “The main-spring of the government
of India”, said he, "can never be safely touched by any other hand
than that of the principal mover. '
In another way also a great change for the better was made.
Before the act of 1784 patronage was exercised in a peculiarly demo-
ralising way. The home authorities, not content with having the
nomination of the persons who were to enter the Company's civil and
military services, had also sought to control their promotion. Cove-
nanted servants and military officers would take a trip to England
in order to gain admission to council, appointment to some lucrative
office, or the command of a regiment or an army out of their turn.
The relatives of directors expected special promotion without regard
to their seniority or talents. Laurence Sulivan, for example, looked to
restoring the fallen fortunes of his family by employing his influence
in favour of his son. Men with powerful connections were constantly
appearing in India—the illegitimate half-brother of Charles Fox, fcr
instance expecting to be provided for. The necessary result was that
the government in India lacked that most salutary power of reward-
ing merit by promotion. Hastings in particular had found this a most
grievous tax. But Dundas's legislation cut at the root of these per-
nicious practices. In the first place the India Act forbade vacancies
in the councils to be filled by other than covenanted servants except
in the case of the governor-general, the governors, and the com-
manders-in-chief, and confined promotion to due order of seniority
except in special cases when full details were immediately to be sent
to the court of directors. Then the act of 1786 2 limited the nomina-
tion to vacancies to the Company's servants on the spot and pres-
cribed terms of service as the minima for offices carrying more than
certain rates of pay. The Charter Act of 1793 went a step further and
decreed that
all vacancies happening in any of the offices, places, or employments in the
civil line of the Company's service in India (being under the degree of coun-
cillor) shall be from time to time filled up and supplied from amongst the civil
servants of the said company belonging to the presidency wherein such vacan-
cies shall respectively happen. . . . No office, place or employment, the salary,
perquisites, and emoluments whereof shall exceed £500 per annum 'shall be
conferred upon or granted to any of the said servants who shall not have been
actually resident in India as a covenanted servant of the said company for the
space of three years at the least in the whole. . . .
Six years' service was the minimum for posts of £1500 a year, nine
years for those of £. 3000, and twelve years for those of £4000. The
net results of these enactments were (1) that the flood of adventurers
into India was checked; (2) that the jobs of the directors were cur-
1 Wellesley Despatches, 1, 290, 528,
2 26 Geo. III, c. 16, Sections 13-14.


## p. 319 (#347) ############################################

PATRONAGE
319
tailed; and (3) that after 1786 the civil and military services, and
after 1793 the civil service, secured a monopoly of well-paid admini-
strative employment in the old provinces, though not in new
acquisitions. The policy of Cornwallis in confining employment in the
higher ranks to Europeans had thus a legislative basis which has
often been forgotten. Even had he wished to do so, it would not have
been legal for him to nominate an Indian to any post carrying more
than £500 a year, for no Indian was a Company's servant within the
meaning of the acts.
And while the recruitment to the higher administrative posts was
thus being limited to the members of the Company's service, the
practice of appointment from home to special posts was also curtailed.
“This system of patronage, which you so justly reprobated”, wrote
Shore to Hastings in 1787, “and which you always found so grievous
a tax, has been entirely subverted. " 1 Cornwallis put the matter to
one of the directors very bluntly.
“I must freely acknowledge”, he wrote, “that before I accepted the arduous
task of governing this country, I did understand that the practice of naming
persons from England to succeed to offices of great trust and importance to the
public welfare of this country, without either knowing or regarding whether
such persons were in any way qualified for such offices, was entirely done away.
If unfortunately so pernicious a system should be again revived, I should feel
myself obliged to request that some other person might immediately take from
me the responsibility of governing. . . . "
A little later difficulties arose from the directors' nominations to posts
on the board of revenue at Madras and their refusal to confirm
Wellesley's nomination to the post of Political Secretary. But these
were due rather to the directors' distrust of Wellesley's policy than
to any revival of the old system. Save as regards the highest posts
of all, the tendency was for the directors to be limited to the
recruitment of their services by the nomination of writers and cadets,
while the executive governments in India determined their promo-
tion and employment.
On the whole the covenanted servants benefited by these changes.
The old system had been exceedingly unhealthy, promoting intrigue,
and that most vicious practice of private correspondence between
subordinates and members of the direction in England on matters of
public concern, in which the officials sought to secure favour in
England by communicating news that they had learnt in the dis-
charge of their official duties. This custom was prohibited (though
not suppressed) in 1785. Burke expressed great indignation at the
prohibition, but it was in fact the natural and necessary concomitant
of the introduction of a modern system of administration, under which
it neither is, nor is thought desirable to guard against the misconduct
of the heads of the government by such indirect and devious means.
» 2
3
1 Teignmouth, Life of Shore, I, 136. 2 Cornwallis Correspondence, I, 421.
8 Life and Letters of Sir G. Elliot, I, 100.


## p. 320 (#348) ############################################

320
LEGISLATION AND GOVERNMENTS, 1786-1818
In one direction, however, the covenanted servants lost ground.
With the appointment of Cornwallis they became practically ineligi-
ble for the highest post in India.
It is true that he was immediately
succeeded by Shore, who was a covenanted servant; but his appoint-
ment was already regarded as somewhat exceptional in nature. In
1802, in discussing the selection of Wellesley's successor, Castlereagh,
who inclined strongly to the nomination of another Company's
servant, Barlow, nevertheless wrote, “I am aware that there is the
strongest objection on general grounds to the governments abroad
being filled by the Company's servants, but there is no rule which is
universal". But having heard what Wellesley had to say on this
head, and in view of the renewal of war in Europe, Pitt and Castle-
reagh decided to try to find a suitable man in England. It will be
remembered that Cornwallis was sent out, only to die; and so Barlow
succeeded to the chair. But his succession only proved, even more
strikingly than the government of Shore had done, that under the
new régime the Company's servants were apt to shirk responsibility
and yield too ready a compliance with the wishes, right or wrong,
of their honourable masters, the court of directors. Nor was the ex-
periment repeated until the time of Lawrence, although the directors
made a strong push in favour of Metcalfe in 1834, in opposition to the
president of the board, Charles Grant, who had (it seems) proposed
himself. But on that occasion Melbourne's ministry rejected the
recommendation, founding its opposition on principles which had
been laid down by George Canning during his short tenure of the
presidency of the board. The system of appointing the governor-
general from England must on the whole be considered to have
worked well. The persons selected were in fact of very various
character and talent; two indeed were failures outright; but in general
their rank and standing secured for them a more ready and willing
obedience than the Company's servants would have accorded to one
of themselves; moreover, the English noblemen brought with them
a wider standard of political ethics than were likely to be found in
India; nor should it be forgotten that they carried much more weight,
and that their representations were treated with greater respect by
the home authorities than would have been the case with the
Company's servants.
The same system was extended to the governorships of the two
subordinate presidencies. The earliest example of this was the
appointment of Lord Macartney to the government of Madras in
1780. He was succeeded by a soldier, Sir Archibald Campbell, who
had had experience of administration in the West Indies. Lord
1. Cornwallis Correspondence, 17, 219.
2 Wellesley Despatches, II, 91.
8 Idem, iv, 533.
* Kaye, Life of Tucker, p. 449; Kaye, Life of Metcalfe, u, 237 n. ; and
Wellesley Papers, II, 248, 259.


## p. 321 (#349) ############################################

PROVINCIAL GOVERNORS
321
Hobart and Lord Clive (son of the hero of Plassey) filled the same
office before the end of the century. But in the case of the subordinate
presidencies the line was less firmly drawn and exceptions made less
reluctantly. At almost the same time Elphinstone and Munro
received the governments of Bombay and Madras, in recognition of
their services in the last Maratha War.
"The more general practice of the court”, Canning wrote during his short
tenure of the Board of Control, “is to look for their governors rather among
persons of eminence in this country than among the servants of the Company;
and when I profess myself to be of opinion that this practice is generally wiser,
it is, I am confident, unnecessary to assure you that such an opinion is founded
on considerations the very reverse of unfriendly to the Company's real interest;
but the extraordinary zeal and ability which have been displayed by the Com-
pany's servants civil and military in the course of the late brilliant and com-
plicated war, and the peculiar situation in which the results of that war have
placed the affairs of your presidency at Bombay, appear to me to constitute a
case in which any deviation from the general practice in favour of your own
service might be at once becoming and expedient. ” 1
On the whole the system was less advantageous in the case of the
provincial governors than in that of the governor-general. The men
willing to accept these second-rate posts were mostly second-rate men.
Lord William Bentinck is the only man of real eminence who can be
named among them; and Dalhousie was probably justified in ad-
vocating the abandonment of the practice. The main advantage
that can be fairly claimed for this extension of the recruitment from
the English political world is that it multiplied contact between it
and India and increased the number of persons in the British
parliament who really knew what India or a part of it was like.
In form these subordinate governments were framed on the same
plan as that of Bengal. The governor had a council of two civil
members with the commander-in-chief when that post was not joined
to his own. He enjoyed the same power of overruling his council as
the governor-general. Under the Governor in Council were three
boards—the Board of Trade, the Board of Revenue, and the Military
Board—which conducted the detail of the administration, and nor-
mally were presided over by a member of council. Under the Board of
Revenue there was at Madras, where large territories had come under
the Company's control in the decade 1793-1802, a complicated district
system (described in chapter xxv). At Bombay, where the great
accession of territory only came with the peace of 1818, the district
administration was on the whole of later development, and will be
described in the succeeding volume.
The main defect in the organisation thus established under the
legislation of the period was the union of general responsibility for
the whole of British India and the special administration of Bengal
1 Colebrooke, Life of Elphinstone, , 100.
2 Lee-Warner, Life of Dalhousie, o, 252.
21


## p. 322 (#350) ############################################

322
LEGISLATION AND GOVERNMENTS, 1786-1818
in the hands of the governor-general and council. It meant almost
certainly that the whole influence of the supreme government would
be devoted to the imposition of the Bengal system on the other
provinces, irrespective of its suitability, and that the Supreme Gov-
ernment would find itself with much more work to do than could be
done by any one set of men. The first of these evils was that
principally evident in the period here dealt with; the second that of
the period which succeeded.


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CHAPTER XIX
THE EXCLUSION OF MHE FRENCH, 1784-1815
THE French rivalry must be reckoned in that series of lucky events
and fortunate conditions which did so much in the second half of the
eighteenth century to enable the English East India Company to rise
to a position of predominance in India. Without intending it, French
adventurers played the part of agents provocateurs. Indian princes
were encouraged by their sanguine estimates of French co-operation
to entertain designs against the English, while the impossibility of
effective French support, from European considerations in time of
peace and from lack of the necessary naval superiority in time of war,
ensured that they would take up arms without the assistance on
which they had reckoned. Since the previous century there had
always been a certain number of adventurers in the service of the
Indian states; and after the great period of Dupleix various causes
combined to increase their numbers, activity and influence. The career
of Dupleix, like that of Clive, had served to attract great attention
in his country to India. It seemed to Frenchmen, as to Englishmen
of the time, the land of easy wealth, so that the number of those who
sought fortunes there rose. At the same time the decay of the Moghul
Empire, and the rise of the numerous military states on its ruins,
enlarged the demand for military leaders and organisers; while the
resounding victories won by European arms, whether French or
English, raised the value set upon all who could pretend to any
knowledge of European tactics and discipline; so that the adventurers
found themselves no longer mere artillerymen but commanders of
regiments and brigades, personally consulted by the princes whose
pay they drew. Finally the ideas of Dupleix and the Anglo-French
rivalry which had sprung out of them had opened out new possibilities
promising personal gain and national aggrandisement.
The result was that from the government of Warren Hastings
down to that of Wellesley the Indian courts were full of Frenchmen,
commanding large or small bodies of sepoys, and eager for the most
part to serve their country by the exercise of their profession. A
typical example of them is afforded by René Madec, who, after serving
in the ranks under Lally, and then joining the English service for a
while, deserted and passed from court to court, serving now a Jai
chief, now Shah Alam, and now Begam Samru, until in 1778 he
retired and went home to his native Brittany. With him and others
in a like condition Chevalier, head of French affairs in Bengal, was
in constant communication, discussing schemes, now for the march
of Madec into Bengal, now for the cession and occupation of Sind,
4


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324
EXCLUSION OF THE FRENCH, 1784-1815
whence a French army was to march to Delhi, and then drive the
English into the sea. Chevalier's policy was to spread great ideas
abroad regarding French power, and he had no hesitation in offering
to the emperor in 1772 the services of two or three thousand French-
men from the Isle of France. [adec in 1775 writes from Agra that
when war breaks out with the English he will march down the
Ganges and ravage the upper provinces of Bengal, holding the towns
to ransom and doing his utmost to destroy the English revenues. A
little later we find St Lubin and Montigny at Poona, making treaties
which neither party attempted to carry out, and venting large promises
which the Marathas were much too astute to trust.
On the whole these political activities were more harmful than
advantageous to the French cause, for they achieved nothing beyond
a reputation for big words. Nor did Bussy's expedition of 1782 add
much to the French position. It arrived too late. Before it had
accomplished anything, it was paralysed by_the news of peace, and
that too of a peace which merely put the French back where they
had been before. It was difficult for their agents to persuade Indian
princes of the great successes they claimed to have won in America
when they still remained in their old position of inferiority in India.
Souillac might write assuring Sindhia that the English had been
driven out of all their American possessions and declare that now the
great object of the king of France was to compel the English to restore
the provinces which they had stolen from the princes of India; 2 but
Sindhia simply did not believe him. Bussy, who viewed the position
with tired and disappointed eyes, wrote nevertheless with great truth
to the minister, de Castries (9 September, 1783), that the terms of
peace had produced an unfavourable impression, and that impossible
hopes of Indian co-operation had been raised in France by the fables
sent home inspired by vanity and self-interest. He actually advised
the recall of the various parties serving with Indian princes, as being
nothing but a lot of brigands-un amas de bandits. 3
As regarded the future, too, the French plans were quite inde-
finite. It was proposed, for instance, to remove the French head-
quarters from Pondichery, as too near the English power at Madras,
and too remote from the possible allies of France—Tipu and the
Marathas. For a while the minister thought of removing it to Mahé
on the other side of India, where perhaps Tipu would cede a suitable
extent of territory, or else to Trinkomali, if it could be obtained from
the Dutch, or to some point on the coast of Burma. But either of
the last two presupposed the maintenance of a large naval force.
Bussy again went to the heart of the matter. All this consideration
of possible allies, he said, was beside the mark. Pondichery was suit-
able enough if the ministry would find the money to fortify it and
1 Barbé, René Madec, passim.
8. Idem, p. 137.
2 Gaudart, Catalogue, I, 321.
4 Idem, p. 183.


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FRENCH PROJECTS
326
garrison it with 1800 Europeans and 2000 sepoys; the French should
do like the English-depend on themselves alone. The only way to
get allies, he says again a year later, is to send out large military and
naval forces with plenty of money, and “everything to the contrary
that you will be told on this point will be derived from that charlatanry
that has so long obscured the facts". 2
As vegards possible allies against the English in India the views
of the ministry were frankly hostile. In 1787 de Castries resolved to
recall one Frenchman, Aumont, who was then with the Nizam, and
to replace the French agent, Montigny, at Poona by a Brahman
vakil, since nothing was to be got out of the first, while with the
second no common interests could be discovered. But Tipu was to be
informed of the French desire to co-operate with him in hindering
the English from remaining the masters of India. The king's intention,
de Castries went on, is to
tacher de conserver les princes de l'Inde dans la tranquillité entre eux jusqu'à ce
qu'il soit en mesure de les secourir, et comme nous parviendrons sans doute à
combiner un jour nos forces avec celles de la Hollande, il faut attendre que cet
arrangement soit fini pour pouvoir poser quelques bases avec cette puissance. :)
Indeed at this moment, when Holland was sharply split into French
and Orangist factions, the French seem to have counted on being
able in a time of war to employ Dutch naval power and naval bases
against the English, as partly came to pass in the Revolutionary and
Napoleonic Wars, though even then the French were to find that the
lukewarm assistance which they received from the Dutch was a poor
counterpoise to the overwhelming force of the English navy and an
incomplete compensation for having to protect the Dutch possessions
as well as their own. In 1787, when these proposals were being
considered, the Orangists were urging the adoption of an exactly
opposite policy, that of an alliance with Great Britain. Neither treaty
was formally concluded; but the eyes of both French and English
seem to have been fixed upon the same points—Dundas declaring that
the only thing which would make the alliance useful to us was the
cession of Trinkomali, while de Castries issued orders that in the
event of war with England Pondichery was to be evacuated and all
troops and munitions of war removed to Trinkomali, which harbour
seems to have been promised them by the French party in Holland.
• It was while these matters were under discussion that Tipu sent
to France the first of the embassies by which he tried in vain to secure
material assistance against the English in the event of war. The
ambassadors proceeded by a French vessel, the Aurore, and were
received with every courtesy; but beyond that they obtained nothing,
for, as has been seen, de Castries did not, and indeed with any degree
4
1 Gaudart, Catalogue, I, 142.
2 Idem, pp. 157 sqq.
3 Idem, p. 361.
4 Cornwallis Correspondence, I, 357; Wilks, Historical Sketches, u, 124.


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326
EXCLUSION OF THE FRENCH, 1784-1815
of financial prudence could not, desire so soon to renew the struggle.
But they must have received a good deal of encouragement in view
of future contingencies, and that must have contributed to stiffen
Tipu's attitude. However, with the usual English good fortune, Tipu
selected as the time for his provocative attack upon Travancore the
time when the French were much too engrossed by their domestic
affairs to spare a thought to India; so that he was left to meet Corn-
wallis's attack alone, and had already been reduced to sign away half
his kingdom and surrender much of his treasure before the year 1793
renewed war in Europe.
Indeed French intrigues had been somewhat interrupted by the
outbreak of the Revolution. In the French settlements in India the
latter produced more excitement than bloodshed; and as soon as war
broke out Pondichery was immediately besieged and quickly taken,
and the other factories could offer no resistance; so that the revolu-
tionary spirits soon found themselves under a foreign and military
control, while of their possible allies Tipu was crippled, and the
Marathas were looking rather to the conquest of their weaker neigh-
bours in the north and south than to the attack of the powerful East
India Company. So the Revolutionary War brought no immediate
troubles on Indian soil. At sea, indeed, French privateers, fitted out
at the Isle of France, captured many prizes; but though these losses
weighed heavily on private merchants, they scarcely affected the
resources of the East India Company, while at the same time the
naval squadron under Rainier accompanied by an expedition equipped
at Madras in 1795 occupied Ceylon, Malacca, Banda and Amboina,
not unassisted by the partisans of the Orangist party, indignant at
the establishment of the republic in Holland. An expedition from
England occupied the Cape. The position in India, however, was
thought too uncertain to launch enterprises against the French islands,
which would have made a stouter resistance and required a
considerable proportion of the English forces in India for their
subjugation.
Although the French settlements in India had all been occupied,
there still remained considerable forces under French control. At
Hyderabad Raymond had built up a body of sepoy troops under
French instruction and leadership; under Sindhia Perron had done
the same; and although these armies were in the pay of Indian
princes, no one could say when they might not be marched against
the Company's possessions, with or without the consent of their
ostensible masters. The appearance of a French expedition would
almost certainly set them in movement. But such an expedition by
the ordinary route was hardly practicable in view of the English
superiority at sea and the absence of stations at which provisions or
protection could be found. In these circumstances the French pressed
into realisation a scheme which had long floated in their minds, that,


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EGYPT
327
namely, of establishing themselves in Egypt, and thence preparing an
attack on India.
A quarter of a century earlier Warren Hastings had attempted to
open a trade with Suez. He had probably been impelled by con-
siderations of imperial policy; the traders whom he supported may
have been influenced by hopes of evading the regulations which
confined the English trade to Europe to the East India Company
itself. At a later time George Baldwin, under the influence of both
motives, for a time succeeded in convincing ministry and Company
of the need of a British consul in Egypt and the advisability of naming
him to the office. But his efforts had come to nothing under the
persistent opposition of the Turks to a policy which would have
placed the half-independent ruling beys in intimate association with
a European power. These ideas of the importance of Egypt had not
been confined to the English. The French had shared them; and from
about 1770 onwards many mémoires had been submitted to the
ministers urging the importance of Egypt upon their attention. The
trade between Alexandria and Marseilles was active; the French had
maintained a consul in Egypt; and after the war of the American
Revolution, de Castries's eastern projects had included the occupation
of Egypt in case Austria and Russia combined to partition Turkey.
In 1785 a French agent succeeded in concluding treaties with the
leading beys; and these would have reopened the Red Sea route for
Indian trade had not the Porte at once resolved to vindicate its
authority and sent an expedition which overthrew the beys and for
the moment re-established Turkish authority. When therefore in
1798 Napoleon decided on the expedition to Egypt as a stroke aimed
against the English, he was carrying into effect plans laid long before.
But though he was locally successful, this partial success did the
French cause more harm than good. Napoleon himself accurately
appreciated the situation when he wrote: La puissance qui est
maîtresse de l'Egypte doit l'être à la longue de l'Inde. Time was needed
to concert measures with Tipu or the Marathas, to prepare and
organise transport, whether by way of the Red Sea or by the route of
Alexander. Establishment in Egypt did not and could not lead at
once to an attack on India; so that while in March, 1800, Napoleon was
still talking of appearing on the Indus, Tipu had fallen and the
French force at Hyderabad had been broken up.
The immediate effect of the French appearance in Egypt was to
set all the English authorities in India on the alert; and at their head
was a man of exceptional energy, of keen insight, of great organising
power, Lord Mornington, better known by his later title of the
Marquess Wellesley. On arriving at Calcutta in May, 1798, he was
>
1 Charles-Roux, Autour d'une route, passim; Brit. Mus. Add. MSS, 29210,
ff. 341 sqq.
2 Charles-Roux, L'Angleterre et l'expédition francaise, I, 227-9.


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EXCLUSION OF THE FRENCH, 1784-1815
a
struck by the diffusion of French influence, and resolved not to allow
it to gather to a head. At almost the same time he learnt that Tipu
had recently sent an embassy to the Isle of France, seeking military
help, that the governor, Malartic, had issued a proclamation calling
for volunteers, and that the embassy had returned to Mangalore with
a small party thus collected. Mornington regarded, and rightly
regarded, this as a sign of Tipu's reviving hopes. Then came news of
Napoleon's success in Egypt, impelling the governor-general to meet
the danger before it grew greater, and inspiring Tipu with the hope
that help was nearer than it really was. As a first measure Mornington
entered into negotiations with the Nizam, who in 1795 had suffered
a severe defeat by the Marathas followed by considerable loss of
territory. He was willing enough to sacrifice his French-led troops
who had been beaten, though not by any fault of theirs, at Kharda,
if thereby he could secure the services of a body of the Company's
forces. Thus was signed the first of that group of treaties which
contributed so much to establish the Company's dominion in India;
and then Mornington demanded of Tipu that he should expel all
Frenchmen from Mysore. Tipu, encouraged by the apparent approach
of the French, could not bring himself to answer these demands till
the English troops had already crossed his frontiers and the last
Mysore war had begun. Once more French attempts had gone far
enough to involve their friends in trouble without going far enougă
to afford them material aid.
As soon as the danger from Mysore had been overcome, Morn-
ington contemplated three further objects. One was the conquest of
the French islands, as the only effective measure that could be taken
to stop the privateers from preying on English vessels; the second was
the capture of Batavia; and the third was an expedition directed
against the French in Egypt. With these alternatives in view, he
assembled troops at Trinkomali. But the last of these was a project
which the governor-general perceived could not be prudently under-
taken except in co-operation with an expedition from England; and
the first was prevented by the refusal of Commodore Rainier to co-
operate, as he had received no specific instructions to that end. At
first, therefore, Mornington's views were limited to his design against
Batavia. But various circumstances deferred the dispatch of the
expedition till at length on 6 February, 1801, dispatches arrived
announcing Abercromby's expedition to Egypt, and desiring the
assistance of a force from India. Mornington's reluctance therefore
to send the expedition so far to the east as Batavia was rewarded by
his now being able to send it to the Red Sea with a minimum of
delay. Baird, to whom the command had been entrusted, landed
at Kosseir, marched across the desert to Thebes, and on 10 August
reached Cairo, six weeks after it had surrendered to Hutchinson,
1 Wellesley Despatches, II, 436.


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RENEWAL OF WAR
1
329
3
Abercromby's successor, but in time to impress Menou at Alexandria
with a full consciousness of his inability to continue the struggle.
The first French attempt to establish themselves on the overland
route to India had been defeated.
The Revolutionary War thus came to an end in 1802 with a marked
advantage to the English in the East. Nor did the brief breathing-
space which followed last long enough to permit the French to regain
a positive foothold in India. The treaty which had closed the war
merely stipulated for the retrocession of the French and Dutch
factories in India and of the Cape and the spice-islands to the Dutch.
Ceylon remained permanently in English hands. But before Decaen,
the newly appointed captain-general of French India, could reach
Pondichery, the English ministry was already doubtful of the dura-
tion of peace. A dispatch (17 October, 1802) received by Wellesley
30 March, 1803, directed him to delay the restitution of the French
factories; and though these instructions were cancelled by later orders
of 16 November (received 8 May), yet even then the Indian govern-
ment was warned against the possibility of French attempts upon the
Portuguese possessions in Asia. Soon after came news of the critical
situation in Europe; and on 6 July the governor-general learnt that
the renewal of war was officially thought very probable. In the first
week of September he learnt that diplomatic relations had been
broken off, and a few days later that war had been declared. It was
what with his usual discernment he had expected. At the close of
the previous year, more than four months before Decaen had sailed
from Brest, Wellesley had directed the governor of Madras not to
deliver up the French possessions without specific orders from Bengal.
On 15 June, 1803, Binot, Decaen's chief of staff, arrived at Pondichery
in the frigate Belle Poule with authority to take over the place. He
was allowed to land, and his dispatches were sent up to Calcutta,
arriving there 4 July. Wellesley resolved at once not to hand over
the French possessions until receiving further orders from Europe;
and accordingly deferred answering the dispatches from Decaen until
that officer should actually arrive in India. This event took place on.
11 July, and was known at Calcutta on the 23rd, together with the
further news that a French packet had come in the day after Decaen's
arrival, and that Decaen's squadron had quitted the Pondichery
roads that night. The packet was the Belier, sent out after Decaen
with orders that if war had broken out by the time of his arrival in
Indian waters, he was to proceed, not to Pondichery, but to the
French islands. Binot and his party, being ashore, were left behind,
and when the news of war arrived, were obliged to surrender. 4
But though the French flag was thus excluded from India,
French intrigue was active. Binot had employed his brief sojourn at
1 Charles-Roux, op. cit. II, 213-4. 2 Wellesley Despatches, ID, 72, 98.
3 Prentout, Dacaen et l'ile de France, p. 437.
4 Gaudart, op. cit. II, 460 sqq. ; Prentout, op. cit. pp. 39 sqq.


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330
EXCLUSION OF THE FRENCH, 1784-1815
11
Pondichery in sounding the rulers who seemed likely to welcome his
overtures. Thus he opened relations with the rajas of Tanjore and
Travancore, and sent to visit the Marathas an officer who obtained
an English passport under the assumed guise of a German painter.
Decaen took up the quest for allies. He had agents at Tranquebar
in the south, and Serampur in the north, until, after the breach
between England and Denmark, these places passed temporarily into
English keeping. These men, with their spies constantly coming and
going, deemed all India ready for revolt against the English. They
represented the Vellore mutiny as having spread to every cantonment
in the south. The lesser southern chiefs were all ready, and only
needed a small sum of money, for a rising. To them the English cause
was maintained (as one of them wrote) by nothing but violence and
corruption. A manifesto, addressed by Decaen to the chiefs of
Hindustan, urged them to attack the Company with their united
force if they would save themselves from the fate of Oudh, Arcot and
Mysore. But all this, as Prentout has justly remarked, served the
English cause better than the French. It assisted the English to recog-
nise their enemies, without providing the latter with anything more
serviceable than encouragement in what was to prove a suicidal
policy.
The fact was that the French, now as in the Revolutionary War,
could not get within reach in India. “It is painful”, wrote Decaen
commenting on the sanguine reports of his agents in India, “to learn
of all these good dispositions and to be unable to support them. " 3
But his military forces were barely enough to garrison the islands;
the French squadron-one ship of the line and three frigates——under
the unenterprising leadership of Admiral Linois was not even able
to take the China convoy under the protection of the Company's
armed vessels (14 February, 1804); and the only serious means of
attack in Decaen's power was the encouragement of the privateers,
which again covered the Indian seas in all directions, capturing a
great number of private merchantmen and even a few Company's
ships. The two Surcoufs, in the Caroline and the Revenant, were
perhaps the boldest and most enterprising of the privateers; and after
Linois' departure from Indian waters in 1805 (to fall in with an
English squadron off the Canaries 13 March, 1806) the frigates which
then came under Decaen's control vigorously seconded the efforts of
the privateers. Obstinate conflicts took place on many occasions
when these met armed English vessels, as when the Psyche was
taken by the English frigate San Fiorenzo. But all these efforts did
nothing beyond inflicting heavy private losses, and left the Company's
position in India untouched, while the reoccupation of the Cape by
the English in 1805 deprived the French islands of their nearest
supplies of foodstuffs.
1 Prentout, op.