No More Learning

(9) Whether the goodness of the will depends on its conformity to the
Divine Will?

(10) Whether it is necessary for the human will, in order to be good,
to be conformed to the Divine Will, as regards the thing willed?
__________________________________________________________________

Whether the goodness of the will depends on the object?

Objection 1: It would seem that the goodness of the will does not
depend on the object. For the will cannot be directed otherwise than to
what is good: since "evil is outside the scope of the will," as
Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv). If therefore the goodness of the will
depended on the object, it would follow that every act of the will is
good, and none bad.

Objection 2: Further, good is first of all in the end: wherefore the
goodness of the end, as such, does not depend on any other. But,
according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 5), "goodness of action is the
end, but goodness of making is never the end": because the latter is
always ordained to the thing made, as to its end. Therefore the
goodness of the act of the will does not depend on any object.

Objection 3: Further, such as a thing is, such does it make a thing to
be. But the object of the will is good, by reason of the goodness of
nature. Therefore it cannot give moral goodness to the will. Therefore
the moral goodness of the will does not depend on the object.

On the contrary, the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 1) that justice is
that habit "from which men wish for just things": and accordingly,
virtue is a habit from which men wish for good things. But a good will
is one which is in accordance with virtue. Therefore the goodness of
the will is from the fact that a man wills that which is good.

I answer that, Good and evil are essential differences of the act of
the will. Because good and evil of themselves regard the will; just as
truth and falsehood regard reason; the act of which is divided
essentially by the difference of truth and falsehood, for as much as an
opinion is said to be true or false. Consequently good and evil will
are acts differing in species. Now the specific difference in acts is
according to objects, as stated above ([1159]Q[18], A[5]). Therefore
good and evil in the acts of the will is derived properly from the
objects.

Reply to Objection 1: The will is not always directed to what is truly
good, but sometimes to the apparent good; which has indeed some measure
of good, but not of a good that is simply suitable to be desired. Hence
it is that the act of the will is not always good, but sometimes evil.

Reply to Objection 2: Although an action can, in a certain way, be
man's last end; nevertheless such action is not an act of the will, as
stated above ([1160]Q[1], A[1], ad 2).

Reply to Objection 3: Good is presented to the will as its object by
the reason: and in so far as it is in accord with reason, it enters the
moral order, and causes moral goodness in the act of the will: because
the reason is the principle of human and moral acts, as stated above
([1161]Q[18], A[5]).
__________________________________________________________________

Whether the goodness of the will depends on the object alone?

Objection 1: It would seem that the goodness of the will does not
depend on the object alone. For the end has a closer relationship to
the will than to any other power. But the acts of the other powers
derive goodness not only from the object but also from the end, as we
have shown above ([1162]Q[18] , A[4]). Therefore the act also of the
will derives goodness not only from the object but also from the end.

Objection 2: Further, the goodness of an action is derived not only
from the object but also from the circumstances, as stated above
([1163]Q[18], A[3]). But according to the diversity of circumstances
there may be diversity of goodness and malice in the act of the will:
for instance, if a man will, when he ought, where he ought, as much as
he ought, and how he ought, or if he will as he ought not. Therefore
the goodness of the will depends not only on the object, but also on
the circumstances.

Objection 3: Further, ignorance of circumstances excuses malice of the
will, as stated above ([1164]Q[6], A[8]). But it would not be so,
unless the goodness or malice of the will depended on the
circumstances. Therefore the goodness and malice of the will depend on
the circumstances, and not only on the object.

On the contrary, An action does not take its species from the
circumstances as such, as stated above (Q[18], A[10], ad 2). But good
and evil are specific differences of the act of the will, as stated
above [1165](A[1]). Therefore the goodness and malice of the will
depend, not on the circumstances, but on the object alone.

I answer that, In every genus, the more a thing is first, the more
simple it is, and the fewer the principles of which it consists: thus
primary bodies are simple. Hence it is to be observed that the first
things in every genus, are, in some way, simple and consist of one
principle. Now the principle of the goodness and malice of human
actions is taken from the act of the will. Consequently the goodness
and malice of the act of the will depend on some one thing; while the
goodness and malice of other acts may depend on several things.

Now that one thing which is the principle in each genus, is not
something accidental to that genus, but something essential thereto:
because whatever is accidental is reduced to something essential, as to
its principle. Therefore the goodness of the will's act depends on that
one thing alone, which of itself causes goodness in the act; and that
one thing is the object, and not the circumstances, which are
accidents, as it were, of the act.

Reply to Objection 1: The end is the object of the will, but not of the
other powers. Hence, in regard to the act of the will, the goodness
derived from the object, does not differ from that which is derived
from the end, as they differ in the acts of the other powers; except
perhaps accidentally, in so far as one end depends on another, and one
act of the will on another.

Reply to Objection 2: Given that the act of the will is fixed on some
good, no circumstances can make that act bad. Consequently when it is
said that a man wills a good when he ought not, or where he ought not,
this can be understood in two ways. First, so that this circumstance is
referred to the thing willed. And thus the act of the will is not fixed
on something good: since to will to do something when it ought not to
be done, is not to will something good. Secondly, so that the
circumstance is referred to the act of willing. And thus, it is
impossible to will something good when one ought not to, because one
ought always to will what is good: except, perhaps, accidentally, in so
far as a man by willing some particular good, is prevented from willing
at the same time another good which he ought to will at that time. And
then evil results, not from his willing that particular good, but from
his not willing the other. The same applies to the other circumstances.

Reply to Objection 3: Ignorance of circumstances excuses malice of the
will, in so far as the circumstance affects the thing willed: that is
to say, in so far as a man ignores the circumstances of the act which
he wills.
__________________________________________________________________

Whether the goodness of the will depends on reason?

Objection 1: It would seem that the goodness of the will does not
depend on reason. For what comes first does not depend on what follows.
But the good belongs to the will before it belongs to reason, as is
clear from what has been said above ([1166]Q[9], A[1]). Therefore the
goodness of the will does not depend on reason.

Objection 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 2) that the
goodness of the practical intellect is "a truth that is in conformity
with right desire. " But right desire is a good will. Therefore the
goodness of the practical reason depends on the goodness of the will,
rather than conversely.

Objection 3: Further, the mover does not depend on that which is moved,
but vice versa. But the will moves the reason and the other powers, as
stated above ([1167]Q[9], A[1]). Therefore the goodness of the will
does not depend on reason.

On the contrary, Hilary says (De Trin. x): "It is an unruly will that
persists in its desires in opposition to reason. " But the goodness of
the will consists in not being unruly. Therefore the goodness of the
will depends on its being subject to reason.

I answer that, As stated above ([1168]AA[1],2), the goodness of the
will depends properly on the object. Now the will's object is proposed
to it by reason. Because the good understood is the proportionate
object of the will; while sensitive or imaginary good is proportionate
not to the will but to the sensitive appetite: since the will can tend
to the universal good, which reason apprehends; whereas the sensitive
appetite tends only to the particular good, apprehended by the
sensitive power. Therefore the goodness of the will depends on reason,
in the same way as it depends on the object.

Reply to Objection 1: The good considered as such, i. e. as appetible,
pertains to the will before pertaining to the reason. But considered as
true it pertains to the reason, before, under the aspect of goodness,
pertaining to the will: because the will cannot desire a good that is
not previously apprehended by reason.

Reply to Objection 2: The Philosopher speaks here of the practical
intellect, in so far as it counsels and reasons about the means: for in
this respect it is perfected by prudence. Now in regard to the means,
the rectitude of the reason depends on its conformity with the desire
of a due end: nevertheless the very desire of the due end presupposes
on the part of reason a right apprehension of the end.

Reply to Objection 3: The will moves the reason in one way: the reason
moves the will in another, viz. on the part of the object, as stated
above ([1169]Q[9], A[1]).
__________________________________________________________________

Whether the goodness of the will depends on the eternal law?

Objection 1: It would seem that the goodness of the human will does not
depend on the eternal law. Because to one thing there is one rule and
one measure. But the rule of the human will, on which its goodness
depends, is right reason. Therefore the goodness of the will does not
depend on the eternal law.

Objection 2: Further, "a measure is homogeneous with the thing
measured" (Metaph. x, 1). But the eternal law is not homogeneous with
the human will. Therefore the eternal law cannot be the measure on
which the goodness of the human will depends.

Objection 3: Further, a measure should be most certain. But the eternal
law is unknown to us. Therefore it cannot be the measure on which the
goodness of our will depends.

On the contrary, Augustine says (Contra Faust. xxii, 27) that "sin is a
deed, word or desire against the eternal law. " But malice of the will
is the root of sin. Therefore, since malice is contrary to goodness,
the goodness of the will depends on the eternal law.

I answer that, Wherever a number of causes are subordinate to one
another, the effect depends more on the first than on the second cause:
since the second cause acts only in virtue of the first. Now it is from
the eternal law, which is the Divine Reason, that human reason is the
rule of the human will, from which the human derives its goodness.
Hence it is written (Ps. 4:6,7): "Many say: Who showeth us good things?
The light of Thy countenance, O Lord, is signed upon us": as though to
say: "The light of our reason is able to show us good things, and guide
our will, in so far as it is the light (i. e. derived from) Thy
countenance. " It is therefore evident that the goodness of the human
will depends on the eternal law much more than on human reason: and
when human reason fails we must have recourse to the Eternal Reason.

Reply to Objection 1: To one thing there are not several proximate
measures; but there can be several measures if one is subordinate to
the other.

Reply to Objection 2: A proximate measure is homogeneous with the thing
measured; a remote measure is not.

Reply to Objection 3: Although the eternal law is unknown to us
according as it is in the Divine Mind: nevertheless, it becomes known
to us somewhat, either by natural reason which is derived therefrom as
its proper image; or by some sort of additional revelation.
__________________________________________________________________

Whether the will is evil when it is at variance with erring reason?

Objection 1: It would seem that the will is not evil when it is at
variance with erring reason. Because the reason is the rule of the
human will, in so far as it is derived from the eternal law, as stated
above [1170](A[4]). But erring reason is not derived from the eternal
law. Therefore erring reason is not the rule of the human will.
Therefore the will is not evil, if it be at variance with erring
reason.

Objection 2: Further, according to Augustine, the command of a lower
authority does not bind if it be contrary to the command of a higher
authority: for instance, if a provincial governor command something
that is forbidden by the emperor. But erring reason sometimes proposes
what is against the command of a higher power, namely, God Whose power
is supreme. Therefore the decision of an erring reason does not bind.
Consequently the will is not evil if it be at variance with erring
reason.

Objection 3: Further, every evil will is reducible to some species of
malice. But the will that is at variance with erring reason is not
reducible to some species of malice. For instance, if a man's reason
err in telling him to commit fornication, his will in not willing to do
so, cannot be reduced to any species of malice. Therefore the will is
not evil when it is at variance with erring reason.

On the contrary, As stated in the [1171]FP, Q[79], A[13], conscience is
nothing else than the application of knowledge to some action. Now
knowledge is in the reason. Therefore when the will is at variance with
erring reason, it is against conscience. But every such will is evil;
for it is written (Rom. 14:23): "All that is not of faith"---i. e. all
that is against conscience---"is sin. " Therefore the will is evil when
it is at variance with erring reason.

I answer that, Since conscience is a kind of dictate of the reason (for
it is an application of knowledge to action, as was stated in the FP,
Q[19], A[13]), to inquire whether the will is evil when it is at
variance with erring reason, is the same as to inquire "whether an
erring conscience binds. " On this matter, some distinguished three
kinds of actions: for some are good generically; some are indifferent;
some are evil generically. And they say that if reason or conscience
tell us to do something which is good generically, there is no error:
and in like manner if it tell us not to do something which is evil
generically; since it is the same reason that prescribes what is good
and forbids what is evil. On the other hand if a man's reason or
conscience tells him that he is bound by precept to do what is evil in
itself; or that what is good in itself, is forbidden, then his reason
or conscience errs. In like manner if a man's reason or conscience tell
him, that what is indifferent in itself, for instance to raise a straw
from the ground, is forbidden or commanded, his reason or conscience
errs. They say, therefore, that reason or conscience when erring in
matters of indifference, either by commanding or by forbidding them,
binds: so that the will which is at variance with that erring reason is
evil and sinful. But they say that when reason or conscience errs in
commanding what is evil in itself, or in forbidding what is good in
itself and necessary for salvation, it does not bind; wherefore in such
cases the will which is at variance with erring reason or conscience is
not evil.

But this is unreasonable. For in matters of indifference, the will that
is at variance with erring reason or conscience, is evil in some way on
account of the object, on which the goodness or malice of the will
depends; not indeed on account of the object according as it is in its
own nature; but according as it is accidentally apprehended by reason
as something evil to do or to avoid. And since the object of the will
is that which is proposed by the reason, as stated above [1172](A[3]),
from the very fact that a thing is proposed by the reason as being
evil, the will by tending thereto becomes evil. And this is the case
not only in indifferent matters, but also in those that are good or
evil in themselves. For not only indifferent matters can received the
character of goodness or malice accidentally; but also that which is
good, can receive the character of evil, or that which is evil, can
receive the character of goodness, on account of the reason
apprehending it as such. For instance, to refrain from fornication is
good: yet the will does not tend to this good except in so far as it is
proposed by the reason. If, therefore, the erring reason propose it as
an evil, the will tends to it as to something evil. Consequently the
will is evil, because it wills evil, not indeed that which is evil in
itself, but that which is evil accidentally, through being apprehended
as such by the reason. In like manner, to believe in Christ is good in
itself, and necessary for salvation: but the will does not tend
thereto, except inasmuch as it is proposed by the reason. Consequently
if it be proposed by the reason as something evil, the will tends to it
as to something evil: not as if it were evil in itself, but because it
is evil accidentally, through the apprehension of the reason. Hence the
Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 9) that "properly speaking the
incontinent man is one who does not follow right reason; but
accidentally, he is also one who does not follow false reason. " We must
therefore conclude that, absolutely speaking, every will at variance
with reason, whether right or erring, is always evil.

Reply to Objection 1: Although the judgment of an erring reason is not
derived from God, yet the erring reason puts forward its judgment as
being true, and consequently as being derived from God, from Whom is
all truth.

Reply to Objection 2: The saying of Augustine holds good when it is
known that the inferior authority prescribes something contrary to the
command of the higher authority. But if a man were to believe the
command of the proconsul to be the command of the emperor, in scorning
the command of the proconsul he would scorn the command of the emperor.
In like manner if a man were to know that human reason was dictating
something contrary to God's commandment, he would not be bound to abide
by reason: but then reason would not be entirely erroneous. But when
erring reason proposes something as being commanded by God, then to
scorn the dictate of reason is to scorn the commandment of God.

Reply to Objection 3: Whenever reason apprehends something as evil, it
apprehends it under some species of evil; for instance, as being
something contrary to a divine precept, or as giving scandal, or for
some such like reason. And then that evil is reduced to that species of
malice.
__________________________________________________________________

Whether the will is good when it abides by erring reason?

Objection 1: It would seem that the will is good when it abides by
erring reason. For just as the will, when at variance with the reason,
tends to that which reason judges to be evil; so, when in accord with
reason, it tends to what reason judges to be good. But the will is evil
when it is at variance with reason, even when erring. Therefore even
when it abides by erring reason, the will is good.

Objection 2: Further, the will is always good, when it abides by the
commandment of God and the eternal law. But the eternal law and God's
commandment are proposed to us by the apprehension of the reason, even
when it errs. Therefore the will is good, even when it abides by erring
reason.

Objection 3: Further, the will is evil when it is at variance with
erring reason. If, therefore, the will is evil also when it abides by
erring reason, it seems that the will is always evil when in
conjunction with erring reason: so that in such a case a man would be
in a dilemma, and, of necessity, would sin: which is unreasonable.
Therefore the will is good when it abides by erring reason.

On the contrary, The will of those who slew the apostles was evil. And
yet it was in accord with the erring reason, according to Jn. 16:2:
"The hour cometh, that whosoever killeth you, will think that he doth a
service to God. " Therefore the will can be evil, when it abides by
erring reason.

I answer that, Whereas the previous question is the same as inquiring
"whether an erring conscience binds"; so this question is the same as
inquiring "whether an erring conscience excuses. " Now this question
depends on what has been said above about ignorance. For it was said
(Q[6], A[8]) that ignorance sometimes causes an act to be involuntary,
and sometimes not. And since moral good and evil consist in action in
so far as it is voluntary, as was stated above [1173](A[2]); it is
evident that when ignorance causes an act to be involuntary, it takes
away the character of moral good and evil; but not, when it does not
cause the act to be involuntary. Again, it has been stated above (Q[6],
A[8]) that when ignorance is in any way willed, either directly or
indirectly, it does not cause the act to be involuntary. And I call
that ignorance "directly" voluntary, to which the act of the will
tends: and that, "indirectly" voluntary, which is due to negligence, by
reason of a man not wishing to know what he ought to know, as stated
above (Q[6], A[8]).

If then reason or conscience err with an error that is involuntary,
either directly, or through negligence, so that one errs about what one
ought to know; then such an error of reason or conscience does not
excuse the will, that abides by that erring reason or conscience, from
being evil. But if the error arise from ignorance of some circumstance,
and without any negligence, so that it cause the act to be involuntary,
then that error of reason or conscience excuses the will, that abides
by that erring reason, from being evil. For instance, if erring reason
tell a man that he should go to another man's wife, the will that
abides by that erring reason is evil; since this error arises from
ignorance of the Divine Law, which he is bound to know. But if a man's
reason, errs in mistaking another for his wife, and if he wish to give
her her right when she asks for it, his will is excused from being
evil: because this error arises from ignorance of a circumstance, which
ignorance excuses, and causes the act to be involuntary.

Reply to Objection 1: As Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv), "good results
from the entire cause, evil from each particular defect. " Consequently
in order that the thing to which the will tends be called evil, it
suffices, either that it be evil in itself, or that it be apprehended
as evil. But in order for it to be good, it must be good in both ways.

Reply to Objection 2: The eternal law cannot err, but human reason can.
Consequently the will that abides by human reason, is not always right,
nor is it always in accord with the eternal law.

Reply to Objection 3: Just as in syllogistic arguments, granted one
absurdity, others must needs follow; so in moral matters, given one
absurdity, others must follow too. Thus suppose a man to seek
vainglory, he will sin, whether he does his duty for vainglory or
whether he omit to do it. Nor is he in a dilemma about the matter:
because he can put aside his evil intention. In like manner, suppose a
man's reason or conscience to err through inexcusable ignorance, then
evil must needs result in the will.
Nor is this man in a dilemma:
because he can lay aside his error, since his ignorance is vincible and
voluntary.
__________________________________________________________________

Whether the goodness of the will, as regards the means, depends on the
intention of the end?

Objection 1: It would seem that the goodness of the will does not
depend on the intention of the end. For it has been stated above
[1174](A[2]) that the goodness of the will depends on the object alone.
But as regards the means, the object of the will is one thing, and the
end intended is another. Therefore in such matters the goodness of the
will does not depend on the intention of the end.

Objection 2: Further, to wish to keep God's commandment, belongs to a
good will. But this can be referred to an evil end, for instance, to
vainglory or covetousness, by willing to obey God for the sake of
temporal gain. Therefore the goodness of the will does not depend on
the intention of the end.

Objection 3: Further, just as good and evil diversify the will, so do
they diversify the end. But malice of the will does not depend on the
malice of the end intended; since a man who wills to steal in order to
give alms, has an evil will, although he intends a good end. Therefore
neither does the goodness of the will depend on the goodness of the end
intended.

On the contrary, Augustine says (Confess. ix, 3) that God rewards the
intention. But God rewards a thing because it is good. Therefore the
goodness of the will depends on the intention of the end.

I answer that, The intention may stand in a twofold relation to the act
of the will; first, as preceding it, secondly as following [*Leonine
edn. : 'accompanying'] it. The intention precedes the act of the will
causally, when we will something because we intend a certain end. And
then the order to the end is considered as the reason of the goodness
of the thing willed: for instance, when a man wills to fast for God's
sake; because the act of fasting is specifically good from the very
fact that it is done for God's sake. Wherefore, since the goodness of
the will depends on the goodness of the thing willed, as stated above
([1175]AA[1],2), it must, of necessity, depend on the intention of the
end.

On the other hand, intention follows the act of the will, when it is
added to a preceding act of the will; for instance, a man may will to
do something, and may afterwards refer it to God. And then the goodness
of the previous act of the will does not depend on the subsequent
intention, except in so far as that act is repeated with the subsequent
intention.

Reply to Objection 1: When the intention is the cause of the act of
willing, the order to the end is considered as the reason of the
goodness of the object, as stated above.

Reply to Objection 2: The act of the will cannot be said to be good, if
an evil intention is the cause of willing. For when a man wills to give
an alms for the sake of vainglory, he wills that which is good in
itself, under a species of evil; and therefore, as willed by him, it is
evil. Wherefore his will is evil. If, however, the intention is
subsequent to the act of the will, then the latter may be good: and the
intention does not spoil that act of the will which preceded, but that
which is repeated.

Reply to Objection 3: As we have already stated (A[6], ad 1), "evil
results from each particular defect, but good from the whole and entire
cause. " Hence, whether the will tend to what is evil in itself, even
under the species of good; or to the good under the species of evil, it
will be evil in either case. But in order for the will to be good, it
must tend to the good under the species of good; in other words, it
must will the good for the sake of the good.
__________________________________________________________________

Whether the degree of goodness or malice in the will depends on the degree
of good or evil in the intention?

Objection 1: It would seem that the degree of goodness in the will
depends on the degree of good in the intention. Because on Mat. 12:35,
"A good man out of the good treasure of his heart bringeth forth that
which is good," a gloss says: "A man does as much good as he intends. "
But the intention gives goodness not only to the external action, but
also to the act of the will, as stated above [1176](A[7]). Therefore
the goodness of a man's will is according to the goodness of his
intention.

Objection 2: Further, if you add to the cause, you add to the effect.
But the goodness of the intention is the cause of the good will.
Therefore a man's will is good, according as his intention is good.

Objection 3: Further, in evil actions, a man sins in proportion to his
intention: for if a man were to throw a stone with a murderous
intention, he would be guilty of murder. Therefore, for the same
reason, in good actions, the will is good in proportion to the good
intended.

On the contrary, The intention can be good, while the will is evil.
Therefore, for the same reason, the intention can be better, and the
will less good.

I answer that, In regard to both the act, and the intention of the end,
we may consider a twofold quantity: one, on the part of the object, by
reason of a man willing or doing a good that is greater; the other,
taken from the intensity of the act, according as a man wills or acts
intensely; and this is more on the part of the agent.

If then we speak of these respective quantities from the point of view
of the object, it is evident that the quantity in the act does not
depend on the quantity in the intention. With regard to the external
act this may happen in two ways. First, through the object that is
ordained to the intended end not being proportionate to that end; for
instance, if a man were to give ten pounds, he could not realize his
intention, if he intended to buy a thing worth a hundred pounds.
Secondly, on account of the obstacles that may supervene in regard to
the exterior action, which obstacles we are unable to remove: for
instance, a man intends to go to Rome, and encounters obstacles, which
prevent him from going. On the other hand, with regard to the interior
act of the will, this happens in only one way: because the interior
acts of the will are in our power, whereas the external actions are
not. But the will can will an object that is not proportionate to the
intended end: and thus the will that tends to that object considered
absolutely, is not so good as the intention. Yet because the intention
also belongs, in a way, to the act of the will, inasmuch, to wit, as it
is the reason thereof; it comes to pass that the quantity of goodness
in the intention redounds upon the act of the will; that is to say, in
so far as the will wills some great good for an end, although that by
which it wills to gain so great a good, is not proportionate to that
good.

But if we consider the quantity in the intention and in the act,
according to their respective intensity, then the intensity of the
intention redounds upon the interior act and the exterior act of the
will: since the intention stands in relation to them as a kind of form,
as is clear from what has been said above ([1177]Q[12], A[4];[1178]
Q[18], A[6]). And yet considered materially, while the intention is
intense, the interior or exterior act may be not so intense, materially
speaking: for instance, when a man does not will with as much intensity
to take medicine as he wills to regain health. Nevertheless the very
fact of intending health intensely, redounds, as a formal principle,
upon the intense volition of medicine.

We must observe, however, that the intensity of the interior or
exterior act, may be referred to the intention as its object: as when a
man intends to will intensely, or to do something intensely. And yet it
does not follow that he wills or acts intensely; because the quantity
of goodness in the interior or exterior act does not depend on the
quantity of the good intended, as is shown above. And hence it is that
a man does not merit as much as he intends to merit: because the
quantity of merit is measured by the intensity of the act, as we shall
show later on ([1179]Q[20] , A[4];[1180] Q[114], A[4]).

Reply to Objection 1: This gloss speaks of good as in the estimation of
God, Who considers principally the intention of the end. Wherefore
another gloss says on the same passage that "the treasure of the heart
is the intention, according to which God judges our works. " For the
goodness of the intention, as stated above, redounds, so to speak, upon
the goodness of the will, which makes even the external act to be
meritorious in God's sight.

Reply to Objection 2: The goodness of the intention is not the whole
cause of a good will. Hence the argument does not prove.

Reply to Objection 3: The mere malice of the intention suffices to make
the will evil: and therefore too, the will is as evil as the intention
is evil. But the same reasoning does not apply to goodness, as stated
above (ad 2).
__________________________________________________________________

Whether the goodness of the will depends on its conformity to the Divine
will?

Objection 1: It would seem that the goodness of the human will does not
depend on its conformity to the Divine will. Because it is impossible
for man's will to be conformed to the Divine will; as appears from the
word of Isa. 55:9: "As the heavens are exalted above the earth, so are
My ways exalted above your ways, and My thoughts above your thoughts. "
If therefore goodness of the will depended on its conformity to the
Divine will, it would follow that it is impossible for man's will to be
good. Which is inadmissible.

Objection 2: Further, just as our wills arise from the Divine will, so
does our knowledge flow from the Divine knowledge. But our knowledge
does not require to be conformed to God's knowledge; since God knows
many things that we know not. Therefore there is no need for our will
to be conformed to the Divine will.

Objection 3: Further, the will is a principle of action. But our action
cannot be conformed to God's. Therefore neither can our will be
conformed to His.

On the contrary, It is written (Mat. 26:39): "Not as I will, but as
Thou wilt": which words He said, because "He wishes man to be upright
and to tend to God," as Augustine expounds in the Enchiridion [*Enarr.
in Ps. 32, serm. i. ]. But the rectitude of the will is its goodness.
Therefore the goodness of the will depends on its conformity to the
Divine will.

I answer that, As stated above [1181](A[7]), the goodness of the will
depends on the intention of the end. Now the last end of the human will
is the Sovereign Good, namely, God, as stated above (Q[1], A[8]; Q[3],
A[1]). Therefore the goodness of the human will requires it to be
ordained to the Sovereign Good, that is, to God.

Now this Good is primarily and essentially compared to the Divine will,
as its proper object. Again, that which is first in any genus is the
measure and rule of all that belongs to that genus. Moreover,
everything attains to rectitude and goodness, in so far as it is in
accord with its proper measure. Therefore, in order that man's will be
good it needs to be conformed to the Divine will.

Reply to Objection 1: The human will cannot be conformed to the will of
God so as to equal it, but only so as to imitate it. In like manner
human knowledge is conformed to the Divine knowledge, in so far as it
knows truth: and human action is conformed to the Divine, in so far as
it is becoming to the agent: and this by way of imitation, not by way
of equality.

From the above may be gathered the replies to the Second and Third
Objections.
__________________________________________________________________

Whether it is necessary for the human will, in order to be good, to be
conformed to the Divine will, as regards the thing willed?

Objection 1: It would seem that the human will need not always be
conformed to the Divine will, as regards the thing willed. For we
cannot will what we know not: since the apprehended good is the object
of the will. But in many things we know not what God wills. Therefore
the human will cannot be conformed to the Divine will as to the thing
willed.

Objection 2: Further, God wills to damn the man whom He foresees about
to die in mortal sin. If therefore man were bound to conform his will
to the Divine will, in the point of the thing willed, it would follow
that a man is bound to will his own damnation. Which is inadmissible.

Objection 3: Further, no one is bound to will what is against filial
piety. But if man were to will what God wills, this would sometimes be
contrary to filial piety: for instance, when God wills the death of a
father: if his son were to will it also, it would be against filial
piety. Therefore man is not bound to conform his will to the Divine
will, as to the thing willed.

On the contrary, (1) On Ps. 32:1, "Praise becometh the upright," a
gloss says: "That man has an upright heart, who wills what God wills. "
But everyone is bound to have an upright heart. Therefore everyone is
bound to will what God wills.

(2) Moreover, the will takes its form from the object, as does every
act. If therefore man is bound to conform his will to the Divine will,
it follows that he is bound to conform it, as to the thing willed.

(3) Moreover, opposition of wills arises from men willing different
things. But whoever has a will in opposition to the Divine will, has an
evil will. Therefore whoever does not conform his will to the Divine
will, as to the thing willed, has an evil will.

I answer that, As is evident from what has been said above
([1182]AA[3],5), the will tends to its object, according as it is
proposed by the reason. Now a thing may be considered in various ways
by the reason, so as to appear good from one point of view, and not
good from another point of view. And therefore if a man's will wills a
thing to be, according as it appears to be good, his will is good: and
the will of another man, who wills that thing not to be, according as
it appears evil, is also good. Thus a judge has a good will, in willing
a thief to be put to death, because this is just: while the will of
another---e. g. the thief's wife or son, who wishes him not to be put to
death, inasmuch as killing is a natural evil, is also good.

Now since the will follows the apprehension of the reason or intellect;
the more universal the aspect of the apprehended good, the more
universal the good to which the will tends. This is evident in the
example given above: because the judge has care of the common good,
which is justice, and therefore he wishes the thief's death, which has
the aspect of good in relation to the common estate; whereas the
thief's wife has to consider the private, the good of the family, and
from this point of view she wishes her husband, the thief, not to be
put to death. Now the good of the whole universe is that which is
apprehended by God, Who is the Maker and Governor of all things: hence
whatever He wills, He wills it under the aspect of the common good;
this is His own Goodness, which is the good of the whole universe. On
the other hand, the apprehension of a creature, according to its
nature, is of some particular good, proportionate to that nature. Now a
thing may happen to be good under a particular aspect, and yet not good
under a universal aspect, or vice versa, as stated above. And therefore
it comes to pass that a certain will is good from willing something
considered under a particular aspect, which thing God wills not, under
a universal aspect, and vice versa. And hence too it is, that various
wills of various men can be good in respect of opposite things, for as
much as, under various aspects, they wish a particular thing to be or
not to be.

But a man's will is not right in willing a particular good, unless he
refer it to the common good as an end: since even the natural appetite
of each part is ordained to the common good of the whole. Now it is the
end that supplies the formal reason, as it were, of willing whatever is
directed to the end. Consequently, in order that a man will some
particular good with a right will, he must will that particular good
materially, and the Divine and universal good, formally. Therefore the
human will is bound to be conformed to the Divine will, as to that
which is willed formally, for it is bound to will the Divine and
universal good; but not as to that which is willed materially, for the
reason given above.

At the same time in both these respects, the human will is conformed to
the Divine, in a certain degree. Because inasmuch as it is conformed to
the Divine will in the common aspect of the thing willed, it is
conformed thereto in the point of the last end. While, inasmuch as it
is not conformed to the Divine will in the thing willed materially, it
is conformed to that will considered as efficient cause; since the
proper inclination consequent to nature, or to the particular
apprehension of some particular thing, comes to a thing from God as its
efficient cause. Hence it is customary to say that a man's will, in
this respect, is conformed to the Divine will, because it wills what
God wishes him to will.

There is yet another kind of conformity in respect of the formal cause,
consisting in man's willing something from charity, as God wills it.
And this conformity is also reduced to the formal conformity, that is
in respect of the last end, which is the proper object of charity.

Reply to Objection 1: We can know in a general way what God wills. For
we know that whatever God wills, He wills it under the aspect of good.
Consequently whoever wills a thing under any aspect of good, has a will
conformed to the Divine will, as to the reason of the thing willed. But
we know not what God wills in particular: and in this respect we are
not bound to conform our will to the Divine will.

But in the state of glory, every one will see in each thing that he
wills, the relation of that thing to what God wills in that particular
matter. Consequently he will conform his will to God in all things not
only formally, but also materially.

Reply to Objection 2: God does not will the damnation of a man,
considered precisely as damnation, nor a man's death, considered
precisely as death, because, "He wills all men to be saved" (1 Tim.
2:4); but He wills such things under the aspect of justice. Wherefore
in regard to such things it suffices for man to will the upholding of
God's justice and of the natural order.

Wherefore the reply to the Third Objection is evident.

To the first argument advanced in a contrary sense, it should be said
that a man who conforms his will to God's, in the aspect of reason of
the thing willed, wills what God wills, more than the man, who conforms
his will to God's, in the point of the very thing willed; because the
will tends more to the end, than to that which is on account of the
end.

To the second, it must be replied that the species and form of an act
are taken from the object considered formally, rather than from the
object considered materially.

To the third, it must be said that there is no opposition of wills when
several people desire different things, but not under the same aspect:
but there is opposition of wills, when under one and the same aspect,
one man wills a thing which another wills not. But there is no question
of this here.
__________________________________________________________________

OF GOODNESS AND MALICE IN EXTERNAL HUMAN AFFAIRS (SIX ARTICLES)

We must next consider goodness and malice as to external actions: under
which head there are six points of inquiry:

(1) Whether goodness and malice is first in the act of the will, or in
the external action?

(2) Whether the whole goodness or malice of the external action depends
on the goodness of the will?

(3) Whether the goodness and malice of the interior act are the same as
those of the external action?

(4) Whether the external action adds any goodness or malice to that of
the interior act?

(5) Whether the consequences of an external action increase its
goodness or malice?

(6) Whether one and the same external action can be both good and evil?
__________________________________________________________________

Whether goodness or malice is first in the action of the will, or in the
external action?

Objection 1: It would seem that good and evil are in the external
action prior to being in the act of the will. For the will derives
goodness from its object, as stated above ([1183]Q[19], AA[1],2). But
the external action is the object of the interior act of the will: for
a man is said to will to commit a theft, or to will to give an alms.
Therefore good and evil are in the external action, prior to being in
the act of the will.

Objection 2: Further, the aspect of good belongs first to the end:
since what is directed to the end receives the aspect of good from its
relation to the end. Now whereas the act of the will cannot be an end,
as stated above ([1184]Q[1], A[1], ad 2), the act of another power can
be an end. Therefore good is in the act of some other power prior to
being in the act of the will.

Objection 3: Further, the act of the will stands in a formal relation
to the external action, as stated above ([1185]Q[18], A[6]). But that
which is formal is subsequent; since form is something added to matter.
Therefore good and evil are in the external action, prior to being in
the act of the will.

On the contrary, Augustine says (Retract. i, 9) that "it is by the will
that we sin, and that we behave aright. " Therefore moral good and evil
are first in the will.

I answer that, External actions may be said to be good or bad in two
ways. First, in regard to their genus, and the circumstances connected
with them: thus the giving of alms, if the required conditions be
observed, is said to be good. Secondly, a thing is said to be good or
evil, from its relation to the end: thus the giving of alms for
vainglory is said to be evil. Now, since the end is the will's proper
object, it is evident that this aspect of good or evil, which the
external action derives from its relation to the end, is to be found
first of all in the act of the will, whence it passes to the external
action. On the other hand, the goodness or malice which the external
action has of itself, on account of its being about due matter and its
being attended by due circumstances, is not derived from the will, but
rather from the reason. Consequently, if we consider the goodness of
the external action, in so far as it comes from reason's ordination and
apprehension, it is prior to the goodness of the act of the will: but
if we consider it in so far as it is in the execution of the action
done, it is subsequent to the goodness of the will, which is its
principle.

Reply to Objection 1: The exterior action is the object of the will,
inasmuch as it is proposed to the will by the reason, as good
apprehended and ordained by the reason: and thus it is prior to the
good in the act of the will. But inasmuch as it is found in the
execution of the action, it is an effect of the will, and is subsequent
to the will.

Reply to Objection 2: The end precedes in the order of intention, but
follows in the order of execution.

Reply to Objection 3: A form as received into matter, is subsequent to
matter in the order of generation, although it precedes it in the order
of nature: but inasmuch as it is in the active cause, it precedes in
every way. Now the will is compared to the exterior action, as its
efficient cause. Wherefore the goodness of the act of the will, as
existing in the active cause, is the form of the exterior action.
__________________________________________________________________

Whether the whole goodness and malice of the external action depends on the
goodness of the will?

Objection 1: It would seem that the whole goodness and malice of the
external action depend on the goodness of the will. For it is written
(Mat. 7:18): "A good tree cannot bring forth evil fruit, neither can an
evil tree bring forth good fruit. " But, according to the gloss, the
tree signifies the will, and fruit signifies works. Therefore, it is
impossible for the interior act of the will to be good, and the
external action evil, or vice versa.

Objection 2: Further, Augustine says (Retract. i, 9) that there is no
sin without the will. If therefore there is no sin in the will, there
will be none in the external action. And so the whole goodness or
malice of the external action depends on the will.

Objection 3: Further, the good and evil of which we are speaking now
are differences of the moral act. Now differences make an essential
division in a genus, according to the Philosopher (Metaph. vii, 12).
Since therefore an act is moral from being voluntary, it seems that
goodness and malice in an act are derived from the will alone.

On the contrary, Augustine says (Contra Mendac. vii), that "there are
some actions which neither a good end nor a good will can make good. "

I answer that, As stated above [1186](A[1]), we may consider a twofold
goodness or malice in the external action: one in respect of due matter
and circumstances; the other in respect of the order to the end.