No More Learning

First, as regards the practice of perfection a man is required to
remove from himself whatever may hinder his affections from tending
wholly to God, for it is in this that the perfection of charity
consists. Such hindrances are of three kinds. First, the attachment to
external goods, which is removed by the vow of poverty; secondly, the
concupiscence of sensible pleasures, chief among which are venereal
pleasures, and these are removed by the vow of continence; thirdly, the
inordinateness of the human will, and this is removed by the vow of
obedience. In like manner the disquiet of worldly solicitude is aroused
in man in reference especially to three things. First, as regards the
dispensing of external things, and this solicitude is removed from man
by the vow of poverty; secondly, as regards the control of wife and
children, which is cut away by the vow of continence; thirdly, as
regards the disposal of one's own actions, which is eliminated by the
vow of obedience, whereby a man commits himself to the disposal of
another.

Again, "a holocaust is the offering to God of all that one has,"
according to Gregory (Hom. xx in Ezech. ). Now man has a threefold good,
according to the Philosopher (Ethic. i, 8). First, the good of external
things, which he wholly offers to God by the vow of voluntary poverty:
secondly, the good of his own body, and this good he offers to God
especially by the vow of continence, whereby he renounces the greatest
bodily pleasures. the third is the good of the soul, which man wholly
offers to God by the vow of obedience, whereby he offers God his own
will by which he makes use of all the powers and habits of the soul.
Therefore the religious state is fittingly constituted by the three
vows.

Reply to Objection 1: As stated above [3798](A[1]), the end whereunto
the religious vow is directed is the perfection of charity, since all
the interior acts of virtue belong to charity as to their mother,
according to 1 Cor. 13:4, "Charity is patient, is kind," etc. Hence the
interior acts of virtue, for instance humility, patience, and so forth,
do not come under the religious vow, but this is directed to them as
its end.

Reply to Objection 2: All other religious observances are directed to
the three aforesaid principal vows; for if any of them are ordained for
the purpose of procuring a livelihood, such as labor, questing, and so
on, they are to be referred to poverty; for the safeguarding of which
religious seek a livelihood by these means. Other observances whereby
the body is chastised, such as watching, fasting, and the like, are
directly ordained for the observance of the vow of continence. And such
religious observances as regard human actions whereby a man is directed
to the end of religion, namely the love of God and his neighbor (such
as reading, prayer, visiting the sick, and the like), are comprised
under the vow of obedience that applies to the will, which directs its
actions to the end according to the ordering of another person. The
distinction of habit belongs to all three vows, as a sign of being
bound by them: wherefore the religious habit is given or blessed at the
time of profession.

Reply to Objection 3: By obedience a man offers to God his will, to
which though all human affairs are subject, yet some are subject to it
alone in a special manner, namely human actions, since passions belong
also to the sensitive appetite. Wherefore in order to restrain the
passions of carnal pleasures and of external objects of appetite, which
hinder the perfection of life, there was need for the vows of
continence and poverty; but for the ordering of one's own actions
accordingly as the state of perfection requires, there was need for the
vow of obedience.

Reply to Objection 4: As the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 3), strictly
and truly speaking honor is not due save to virtue. Since, however,
external goods serve instrumentally for certain acts of virtue, the
consequence is that a certain honor is given to their excellence
especially by the common people who acknowledge none but outward
excellence. Therefore since religious tend to the perfection of virtue
it becomes them not to renounce the honor which God and all holy men
accord to virtue, according to Ps. 138:17, "But to me Thy friends, O
God, are made exceedingly honorable. " On the other hand, they renounce
the honor that is given to outward excellence, by the very fact that
they withdraw from a worldly life: hence no special vow is needed for
this.
__________________________________________________________________

Whether the vow of obedience is the chief of the three religious vows?

Objection 1: It would seem that the vow of obedience is not the chief
of the three religious vows. For the perfection of the religious life
was inaugurated by Christ. Now Christ gave a special counsel of
poverty; whereas He is not stated to have given a special counsel of
obedience. Therefore the vow of poverty is greater than the vow of
obedience.

Objection 2: Further, it is written (Ecclus. 26:20) that "no price is
worthy of a continent soul. " Now the vow of that which is more worthy
is itself more excellent. Therefore the vow of continence is more
excellent than the vow of obedience.

Objection 3: Further, the greater a vow the more indispensable it would
seem to be. Now the vows of poverty and continence "are so inseparable
from the monastic rule, that not even the Sovereign Pontiff can allow
them to be broken," according to a Decretal (De Statu Monach. , cap. Cum
ad monasterium): yet he can dispense a religious from obeying his
superior. Therefore it would seem that the vow of obedience is less
than the vow of poverty and continence.

On the contrary, Gregory says (Moral. xxxv, 14): "Obedience is rightly
placed before victims, since by victims another's flesh, but by
obedience one's own will, is sacrificed. " Now the religious vows are
holocausts, as stated above ([3799]AA[1],3, ad 6). Therefore the vow of
obedience is the chief of all religious vows.

I answer that, The vow of obedience is the chief of the three religious
vows, and this for three reasons.

First, because by the vow of obedience man offers God something
greater, namely his own will; for this is of more account than his own
body, which he offers God by continence, and than external things,
which he offers God by the vow of poverty. Wherefore that which is done
out of obedience is more acceptable to God than that which is done of
one's own will, according to the saying of Jerome (Ep. cxxv ad Rustic
Monach. ): "My words are intended to teach you not to rely on your own
judgment": and a little further on he says: "You may not do what you
will; you must eat what you are bidden to eat, you may possess as much
as you receive, clothe yourself with what is given to you. " Hence
fasting is not acceptable to God if it is done of one's own will,
according to Is. 58:3, "Behold in the day of your fast your own will is
found. "

Secondly, because the vow of obedience includes the other vows, but not
vice versa: for a religious, though bound by vow to observe continence
and poverty, yet these also come under obedience, as well as many other
things besides the keeping of continence and poverty.

Thirdly, because the vow of obedience extends properly to those acts
that are closely connected with the end of religion; and the more
closely a thing is connected with the end, the better it is.

It follows from this that the vow of obedience is more essential to the
religious life. For if a man without taking a vow of obedience were to
observe, even by vow, voluntary poverty and continence, he would not
therefore belong to the religious state, which is to be preferred to
virginity observed even by vow; for Augustine says (De Virgin. xlvi):
"No one, methinks, would prefer virginity to the monastic life. " [*St.
Augustine wrote not 'monasterio' but 'martyrio'---to 'martyrdom'; and
St. Thomas quotes the passage correctly above[3800], Q[124], A[3]
and[3801] Q[152], A[5]].

Reply to Objection 1: The counsel of obedience was included in the very
following of Christ, since to obey is to follow another's will.
Consequently it is more pertinent to perfection than the vow of
poverty, because as Jerome, commenting on Mat. 19:27, "Behold we have
left all things," observes, "Peter added that which is perfect when he
said: And have followed Thee. "

Reply to Objection 2: The words quoted mean that continence is to be
preferred, not to all other acts of virtue, but to conjugal chastity,
or to external riches of gold and silver which are measured by weight
[*'Pondere,' referring to the Latin 'ponderatio' in the Vulgate, which
the Douay version renders 'price. ']. Or again continence is taken in a
general sense for abstinence from ali evil, as stated above
([3802]Q[155], A[4], ad 1).

Reply to Objection 3: The Pope cannot dispense a religious from his vow
of obedience so as to release him from obedience to every superior in
matters relating to the perfection of life, for he cannot exempt him
from obedience to himself. He can, however, exempt him from subjection
to a lower superior, but this is not to dispense him from his vow of
obedience.
__________________________________________________________________

Whether a religious sins mortally whenever he transgresses the things
contained in his rule?

Objection 1: It would seem that a religious sins mortally whenever he
transgresses the things contained in his rule. For to break a vow is a
sin worthy of condemnation, as appears from 1 Tim. 5:11,12, where the
Apostle says that widows who "will marry have [Vulg. : 'having']
damnation, because they have made void their first faith. " But
religious are bound to a rule by the vows of their profession.
Therefore they sin mortally by transgressing the things contained in
their rule.

Objection 2: Further, the rule is enjoined upon a religious in the same
way as a law. Now he who transgresses a precept of law sins mortally.
Therefore it would seem that a monk sins mortally if he transgresses
the things contained in his rule.

Objection 3: Further, contempt involves a mortal sin. Now whoever
repeatedly does what he ought not to do seems to sin from contempt.
Therefore it would seem that a religious sins mortally by frequently
transgressing the things contained in his rule.

On the contrary, The religious state is safer than the secular state;
wherefore Gregory at the beginning of his Morals [*Epist. Missoria, ad
Leand. Episc. i] compares the secular life to the stormy sea, and the
religious life to the calm port. But if every transgression of the
things contained in his rule were to involve a religious in mortal sin,
the religious life would be fraught with danger of account of its
multitude of observances. Therefore not every transgression of the
things contained in the rule is a mortal sin.

I answer that, As stated above (A[1], ad 1,2), a thing is contained in
the rule in two ways. First, as the end of the rule, for instance
things that pertain to the acts of the virtues; and the transgression
of these, as regards those which come under a common precept, involves
a mortal sin; but as regards those which are not included in the common
obligation of a precept, the transgression thereof does not involve a
mortal sin, except by reason of contempt, because, as stated above
[3803](A[2]), a religious is not bound to be perfect, but to tend to
perfection, to which the contempt of perfection is opposed.

Secondly, a thing is contained in the rule through pertaining to the
outward practice, such as all external observances, to some of which a
religious is bound by the vow of his profession. Now the vow of
profession regards chiefly the three things aforesaid, namely poverty,
continence, and obedience, while all others are directed to these.
Consequently the transgression of these three involves a mortal sin,
while the transgression of the others does not involve a mortal sin,
except either by reason of contempt of the rule (since this is directly
contrary to the profession whereby a man vows to live according to the
rule), or by reason of a precept, whether given orally by a superior,
or expressed in the rule, since this would be to act contrary to the
vow of obedience.

Reply to Objection 1: He who professes a rule does not vow to observe
all the things contained in the rule, but he vows the regular life
which consists essentially in the three aforesaid things. Hence in
certain religious orders precaution is taken to profess, not the rule,
but to live according to the rule, i. e. to tend to form one's conduct
in accordance with the rule as a kind of model; and this is set aside
by contempt. Yet greater precaution is observed in some religious
orders by professing obedience according to the rule, so that only that
which is contrary to a precept of the rule is contrary to the
profession, while the transgression or omission of other things binds
only under pain of venial sin, because, as stated above (A[7], ad 2),
such things are dispositions to the chief vows. And venial sin is a
disposition to mortal, as stated above ([3804]FS, Q[88], A[3]),
inasmuch as it hinders those things whereby a man is disposed to keep
the chief precepts of Christ's law, namely the precepts of charity.

There is also a religious order, that of the Friars Preachers, where
such like transgressions or omissions do not, by their very nature,
involve sin, either mortal or venial; but they bind one to suffer the
punishment affixed thereto, because it is in this way that they are
bound to observe such things. Nevertheless they may sin venially or
mortally through neglect, concupiscence, or contempt.

Reply to Objection 2: Not all the contents of the law are set forth by
way of precept; for some are expressed under the form of ordinance or
statute binding under pain of a fixed punishment. Accordingly, just as
in the civil law the transgression of a legal statute does not always
render a man deserving of bodily death, so neither in the law of the
Church does every ordinance or statute bind under mortal sin; and the
same applies to the statutes of the rule.

Reply to Objection 3: An action or transgression proceeds from contempt
when a man's will refuses to submit to the ordinance of the law or
rule, and from this he proceeds to act against the law or rule. on the
other hand, he does not sin from contempt, but from some other cause,
when he is led to do something against the ordinance of the law or rule
through some particular cause such as concupiscence or anger, even
though he often repeat the same kind of sin through the same or some
other cause. Thus Augustine says (De Nat. et Grat. xxix) that "not all
sins are committed through proud contempt. " Nevertheless the frequent
repetition of a sin leads dispositively to contempt, according to the
words of Prov. 18:3, "The wicked man, when he is come into the depth of
sins, contemneth. "
__________________________________________________________________

Whether a religious sins more grievously than a secular by the same kind of
sin?

Objection 1: It would seem that a religious does not sin more
grievously than a secular by the same kind of sin. For it is written (2
Paralip 30:18,19): "The Lord Who is good will show mercy to all them
who with their whole heart seek the Lord the God of their fathers, and
will not impute it to them that they are not sanctified. " Now religious
apparently follow the Lord the God of their fathers with their whole
heart rather than seculars, who partly give themselves and their
possessions to God and reserve part for themselves, as Gregory says
(Hom. xx in Ezech. ). Therefore it would seem that it is less imputed to
them if they fall short somewhat of their sanctification.

Objection 2: Further, God is less angered at a man's sins if he does
some good deeds, according to 2 Paralip 19:2,3, "Thou helpest the
ungodly, and thou art joined in friendship with them that hate the
Lord, and therefore thou didst deserve indeed the wrath of the Lord:
but good works are found in thee. " Now religious do more good works
than seculars. Therefore if they commit any sins, God is less angry
with them.

Objection 3: Further, this present life is not carried through without
sin, according to James 3:2, "In many things we all offend. " Therefore
if the sins of religious were more grievous than those of seculars it
would follow that religious are worse off than seculars: and
consequently it would not be a wholesome counsel to enter religion.

On the contrary, The greater the evil the more it would seem to be
deplored. But seemingly the sins of those who are in the state of
holiness and perfection are the most deplorable, for it is written
(Jer. 23:9): "My heart is broken within me," and afterwards (Jer.
23:11): "For the prophet and the priest are defiled; and in My house I
have found their wickedness. " Therefore religious and others who are in
the state of perfection, other things being equal, sin more grievously.

I answer that, A sin committed by a religious may be in three ways more
grievous than a like sin committed by a secular. First, if it be
against his religious vow; for instance if he be guilty of fornication
or theft, because by fornication he acts against the vow of continence,
and by theft against the vow of poverty; and not merely against a
precept of the divine law. Secondly, if he sin out of contempt, because
thereby he would seem to be the more ungrateful for the divine favors
which have raised him to the state of perfection. Thus the Apostle says
(Heb. 10:29) that the believer "deserveth worse punishments" who
through contempt tramples under foot the Son of God. Hence the Lord
complains (Jer. 11:15): "What is the meaning that My beloved hath
wrought much wickedness in My house? " Thirdly, the sin of a religious
may be greater on account of scandal, because many take note of his
manner of life: wherefore it is written (Jer. 23:14): "I have seen the
likeness of adulterers, and the way of lying in the Prophets of
Jerusalem; and they strengthened the hands of the wicked, that no man
should return from his evil doings. "

On the other hand, if a religious, not out of contempt, but out of
weakness or ignorance, commit a sin that is not against the vow of his
profession, without giving scandal (for instance if he commit it in
secret) he sins less grievously in the same kind of sin than a secular,
because his sin if slight is absorbed as it were by his many good
works, and if it be mortal, he more easily recovers from it. First,
because he has a right intention towards God, and though it be
intercepted for the moment, it is easily restored to its former object.
Hence Origen commenting on Ps. 36:24, "When he shall fall he shall not
be bruised," says (Hom. iv in Ps. 36): "The wicked man, if he sin,
repents not, and fails to make amends for his sin. But the just man
knows how to make amends and recover himself; even as he who had said:
'I know not the man,' shortly afterwards when the Lord had looked on
him, knew to shed most bitter tears, and he who from the roof had seen
a woman and desired her knew to say: 'I have sinned and done evil
before Thee. '" Secondly, he is assisted by his fellow-religious to rise
again, according to Eccles. 4:10, "If one fall he shall be supported by
the other: woe to him that is alone, for when he falleth he hath none
to lift him up. "

Reply to Objection 1: The words quoted refer to things done through
weakness or ignorance, but not to those that are done out of contempt.

Reply to Objection 2: Josaphat also, to whom these words were
addressed, sinned not out of contempt, but out of a certain weakness of
human affection.

Reply to Objection 3: The just sin not easily out of contempt; but
sometimes they fall into a sin through ignorance or weakness from which
they easily arise. If, however, they go so far as to sin out of
contempt, they become most wicked and incorrigible, according to the
word of Jer. 2:20: "Thou hast broken My yoke, thou hast burst My bands,
and thou hast said: 'I will not serve. ' For on every high hill and
under every green tree thou didst prostitute thyself. " Hence Augustine
says (Ep. lxxviii ad Pleb. Hippon. ): "From the time I began to serve
God, even as I scarcely found better men than those who made progress
in monasteries, so have I not found worse than those who in the
monastery have fallen. "
__________________________________________________________________

OF THOSE THINGS THAT ARE COMPETENT TO RELIGIOUS (SIX ARTICLES)

We must now consider the things that are competent to religious; and
under this head there are six points of inquiry:

(1) Whether it is lawful for them to teach, preach, and do like things?

(2) Whether it is lawful for them to meddle in secular business?

(3) Whether they are bound to manual labor?

(4) Whether it is lawful for them to live on alms?

(5) Whether it is lawful for them to quest?

(6) Whether it is lawful for them to wear coarser clothes than other
persons?
__________________________________________________________________

Whether it is lawful for religious to teach, preach, and the like?

Objection 1: It would seem unlawful for religious to teach, preach, and
the like. For it is said (VII, qu. i, can. Hoc nequaquam) in an
ordinance of a synod of Constantinople [*Pseudosynod held by Photius in
the year 879]: "The monastic life is one of subjection and
discipleship, not of teaching, authority, or pastoral care. " And Jerome
says (ad Ripar. et Desider. [*Contra Vigilant. xvi]): "A monk's duty is
not to teach but to lament. " Again Pope Leo [*Leo I, Ep. cxx ad
Theodoret. , 6, cf. XVI, qu. i, can. Adjicimus]: says "Let none dare to
preach save the priests of the Lord, be he monk or layman, and no
matter what knowledge he may boast of having. " Now it is not lawful to
exceed the bounds of one's office or transgress the ordinance of the
Church. Therefore seemingly it is unlawful for religious to teach,
preach, and the like.

Objection 2: Further, in an ordinance of the Council of Nicea (cf. XVI,
qu. i, can. Placuit) it is laid down as follows: "It is our absolute
and peremptory command addressed to all that monks shall not hear
confessions except of one another, as is right, that they shall not
bury the dead except those dwelling with them in the monastery, or if
by chance a brother happen to die while on a visit. " But just as the
above belong to the duty of clerics, so also do preaching and teaching.
Therefore since "the business of a monk differs from that of a cleric,"
as Jerome says (Ep. xiv ad Heliod. ), it would seem unlawful for
religious to preach, teach, and the like.

Objection 3: Further, Gregory says (Regist. v, Ep. 1): "No man can
fulfil ecclesiastical duties, and keep consistently to the monastic
rule": and this is quoted XVI, qu. i, can. Nemo potest. Now monks are
bound to keep consistently to the monastic rule. Therefore it would
seem that they cannot fulfil ecclesiastical duties, whereof teaching
and preaching are a part. Therefore seemingly it is unlawful for them
to preach, teach, and do similar things.

On the contrary, Gregory is quoted (XVI, qu. i, can. Ex auctoritate) as
saying: "By authority of this decree framed in virtue of our apostolic
power and the duty of our office, be it lawful to monk priests who are
configured to the apostles, to preach, baptize, give communion, pray
for sinners, impose penance, and absolve from sin. "

I answer that, A thing is declared to be unlawful to a person in two
ways. First, because there is something in him contrary to that which
is declared unlawful to him: thus to no man is it lawful to sin,
because each man has in himself reason and an obligation to God's law,
to which things sin is contrary. And in this way it is said to be
unlawful for a person to preach, teach, or do like things, because
there is in him something incompatible with these things, either by
reason of a precept---thus those who are irregular by ordinance of the
Church may not be raised to the sacred orders---or by reason of sin,
according to Ps.
49:16, "But to the sinner God hath said: Why dost thou
declare My justice? "

In this way it is not unlawful for religious to preach, teach, and do
like things, both because they are bound neither by vow nor by precept
of their rule to abstain from these things, and because they are not
rendered less apt for these things by any sin committed, but on the
contrary they are the more apt through having taken upon themselves the
practice of holiness. For it is foolish to say that a man is rendered
less fit for spiritual duties through advancing himself in holiness;
and consequently it is foolish to declare that the religious state is
an obstacle to the fulfilment of such like duties. This error is
rejected by Pope Boniface [*Boniface IV] for the reasons given above.
His words which are quoted (XVI, qu. i, can. Sunt. nonnulli) are these:
"There are some who without any dogmatic proof, and with extreme
daring, inspired with a zeal rather of bitterness than of love, assert
that monks though they be dead to the world and live to God, are
unworthy of the power of the priestly office, and that they cannot
confer penance, nor christen, nor absolve in virtue of the power
divinely bestowed on them in the priestly office. But they are
altogether wrong. " He proves this first because it is not contrary to
the rule; thus he continues: "For neither did the Blessed Benedict the
saintly teacher of monks forbid this in any way," nor is it forbidden
in other rules. Secondly, he refutes the above error from the
usefulness of the monks, when he adds at the end of the same chapter:
"The more perfect a man is, the more effective is he in these, namely
in spiritual works. "

Secondly, a thing is said to be unlawful for a man, not on account of
there being in him something contrary thereto, but because he lacks
that which enables him to do it: thus it is unlawful for a deacon to
say mass, because he is not in priestly orders; and it is unlawful for
a priest to deliver judgment because he lacks the episcopal authority.
Here, however, a distinction must be made. Because those things which
are a matter of an order, cannot be deputed to one who has not the
order, whereas matters of jurisdiction can be deputed to those who have
not ordinary jurisdiction: thus the delivery of a judgment is deputed
by the bishop to a simple priest. In this sense it is said to be
unlawful for monks and other religious to preach, teach, and so forth,
because the religious state does not give them the power to do these
things. They can, however, do them if they receive orders, or ordinary
jurisdiction, or if matters of jurisdiction be delegated to them.

Reply to Objection 1: It results from the words quoted that the fact of
their being monks does not give monks the power to do these things, yet
it does not involve in them anything contrary to the performance of
these acts.

Reply to Objection 2: Again, this ordinance of the Council of Nicea
forbids monks to claim the power of exercising those acts on the ground
of their being monks, but it does not forbid those acts being delegated
to them.

Reply to Objection 3: These two things are incompatible, namely, the
ordinary cure of ecclesiastical duties, and the observance of the
monastic rule in a monastery. But this does not prevent monks and other
religious from being sometimes occupied with ecclesiastical duties
through being deputed thereto by superiors having ordinary cure;
especially members of religious orders that are especially instituted
for that purpose, as we shall say further on ([3805]Q[188], A[4]).
__________________________________________________________________

Whether it is lawful for religious to occupy themselves with secular
business?

Objection 1: It would seem unlawful for religious to occupy themselves
with secular business. For in the decree quoted above [3806](A[1]) of
Pope Boniface it is said that the "Blessed Benedict bade them to be
altogether free from secular business; and this is most explicitly
prescribed by the apostolic doctrine and the teaching of all the
Fathers, not only to religious, but also to all the canonical clergy,"
according to 2 Tim. 2:4, "No man being a soldier to God, entangleth
himself with secular business. " Now it is the duty of all religious to
be soldiers of God. Therefore it is unlawful for them to occupy
themselves with secular business.

Objection 2: Further, the Apostle says (1 Thess. 4:11): "That you use
your endeavor to be quiet, and that you do your own business," which a
gloss explains thus---"by refraining from other people's affairs, so as
to be the better able to attend to the amendment of your own life. " Now
religious devote themselves in a special way to the amendment of their
life. Therefore they should not occupy themselves with secular
business.

Objection 3: Further, Jerome, commenting on Mat. 11:8, "Behold they
that are clothed in soft garments are in the houses of kings," says:
"Hence we gather that an austere life and severe preaching should avoid
the palaces of kings and the mansions of the voluptuous. " But the needs
of secular business induce men to frequent the palaces of kings.
Therefore it is unlawful for religious to occupy themselves with
secular business.

On the contrary, The Apostle says (Rom. 16:1): "I commend to you Phoebe
our Sister," and further on (Rom. 16:2), "that you assist her in
whatsoever business she shall have need of you. "

I answer that, As stated above ([3807]Q[186], AA[1],7, ad 1), the
religious state is directed to the attainment of the perfection of
charity, consisting principally in the love of God and secondarily in
the love of our neighbor. Consequently that which religious intend
chiefly and for its own sake is to give themselves to God. Yet if their
neighbor be in need, they should attend to his affairs out of charity,
according to Gal. 6:2, "Bear ye one another's burthens: and so you
shall fulfil the law of Christ," since through serving their neighbor
for God's sake, they are obedient to the divine love. Hence it is
written (James 1:27): "Religion clean and undefiled before God and the
Father, is this: to visit the fatherless and widows in their
tribulation," which means, according to a gloss, to assist the helpless
in their time of need.

We must conclude therefore that it is unlawful for either monks or
clerics to carry on secular business from motives of avarice; but from
motives of charity, and with their superior's permission, they may
occupy themselves with due moderation in the administration and
direction of secular business. Wherefore it is said in the Decretals
(Dist. xxxviii, can. Decrevit): "The holy synod decrees that henceforth
no cleric shall buy property or occupy himself with secular business,
save with a view to the care of the fatherless, orphans, or widows, or
when the bishop of the city commands him to take charge of the business
connected with the Church. " And the same applies to religious as to
clerics, because they are both debarred from secular business on the
same grounds, as stated above.

Reply to Objection 1: Monks are forbidden to occupy themselves with
secular business from motives of avarice, but not from motives of
charity.

Reply to Objection 2: To occupy oneself with secular business on
account of another's need is not officiousness but charity.

Reply to Objection 3: To haunt the palaces of kings from motives of
pleasure, glory, or avarice is not becoming to religious, but there is
nothing unseemly in their visiting them from motives of piety. Hence it
is written (4 Kings 4:13): "Hast thou any business, and wilt thou that
I speak to the king or to the general of the army? " Likewise it becomes
religious to go to the palaces of kings to rebuke and guide them, even
as John the Baptist rebuked Herod, as related in Mat. 14:4.
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Whether religious are bound to manual labor?

Objection 1: It would seem that religious are bound to manual labor.
For religious are not exempt from the observance of precepts. Now
manual labor is a matter of precept according to 1 Thess. 4:11, "Work
with your own hands as we commanded you"; wherefore Augustine says (De
oper. Monach. xxx): "But who can allow these insolent men," namely
religious that do no work, of whom he is speaking there, "who disregard
the most salutary admonishment of the Apostle, not merely to be borne
with as being weaker than others, but even to preach as though they
were holier than others. " Therefore it would seem that religious are
bound to manual labor.

Objection 2: Further, a gloss [*St. Augustine, (De oper. Monach. xxi)]
on 2 Thess. 3:10, "If any man will not work, neither let him eat,"
says: "Some say that this command of the Apostle refers to spiritual
works, and not to the bodily labor of the farmer or craftsman"; and
further on: "But it is useless for them to try to hide from themselves
and from others the fact that they are unwilling not only to fulfil,
but even to understand the useful admonishments of charity"; and again:
"He wishes God's servants to make a living by working with their
bodies. " Now religious especially are called servants of God, because
they give themselves entirely to the service of God, as Dionysius
asserts (Eccl. Hier. vi). Therefore it would seem that they are bound
to manual labor.

Objection 3: Further, Augustine says (De oper. Monach. xvii): "I would
fain know how they would occupy themselves, who are unwilling to work
with their body. We occupy our time, say they, with prayers, psalms,
reading, and the word of God. " Yet these things are no excuse, and he
proves this, as regards each in particular. For in the first place, as
to prayer, he says: "One prayer of the obedient man is sooner granted
than ten thousand prayers of the contemptuous": meaning that those are
contemptuous and unworthy to be heard who work not with their hands.
Secondly, as to the divine praises he adds: "Even while working with
their hands they can easily sing hymns to God. " Thirdly, with regard to
reading, he goes on to say: "Those who say they are occupied in
reading, do they not find there what the Apostle commanded? What sort
of perverseness is this, to wish to read but not to obey what one
reads? " Fourthly, he adds in reference to preaching [*Cap. xviii]: "If
one has to speak, and is so busy that he cannot spare time for manual
work, can all in the monastery do this? And since all cannot do this,
why should all make this a pretext for being exempt? And even if all
were able, they should do so by turns, not only so that the others may
be occupied in other works, but also because it suffices that one speak
while many listen. " Therefore it would seem that religious should not
desist from manual labor on account of such like spiritual works to
which they devote themselves.

Objection 4: Further, a gloss on Lk. 12:33, "Sell what you possess,"
says: "Not only give your clothes to the poor, but sell what you
possess, that having once for all renounced all your possessions for
the Lord's sake, you may henceforth work with the labor of your hands,
so as to have wherewith to live or to give alms. " Now it belongs
properly to religious to renounce all they have. Therefore it would
seem likewise to belong to them to live and give alms through the labor
of their hands.

Objection 5: Further, religious especially would seem to be bound to
imitate the life of the apostles, since they profess the state of
perfection. Now the apostles worked with their own hands, according to
1 Cor. 4:12: "We labor, working with our own hands. " Therefore it would
seem that religious are bound to manual labor.

On the contrary, Those precepts that are commonly enjoined upon all are
equally binding on religious and seculars. But the precept of manual
labor is enjoined upon all in common, as appears from 2 Thess. 3:6,
"Withdraw yourselves from every brother walking disorderly," etc. (for
by brother he signifies every Christian, according to 1 Cor. 7:12, "If
any brother have a wife that believeth not"). Now it is written in the
same passage (2 Thess. 3:10): "If any man will not work, neither let
him eat. " Therefore religious are not bound to manual labor any more
than seculars are.

I answer that, Manual labor is directed to four things. First and
principally to obtain food; wherefore it was said to the first man (Gn.
3:19): "In the sweat of thy face shalt thou eat bread," and it is
written (Ps. 127:2): "For thou shalt eat the labors of thy hands. "
Secondly, it is directed to the removal of idleness whence arise many
evils; hence it is written (Ecclus. 33:28,29): "Send" thy slave "to
work, that he be not idle, for idleness hath taught much evil. "
Thirdly, it is directed to the curbing of concupiscence, inasmuch as it
is a means of afflicting the body; hence it is written (2 Cor. 6:5,6):
"In labors, in watchings, in fastings, in chastity. " Fourthly, it is
directed to almsgiving, wherefore it is written (Eph. 4:28): "He that
stole, let him now steal no more; but rather let him labor, working
with his hands the thing which is good, that he may have something to
give to him that suffereth need. " Accordingly, in so far as manual
labor is directed to obtaining food, it comes under a necessity of
precept in so far as it is necessary for that end: since that which is
directed to an end derives its necessity from that end, being, in
effect, so far necessary as the end cannot be obtained without it.
Consequently he who has no other means of livelihood is bound to work
with his hands, whatever his condition may be. This is signified by the
words of the Apostle: "If any man will not work, neither let him eat,"
as though to say: "The necessity of manual labor is the necessity of
meat. " So that if one could live without eating, one would not be bound
to work with one's hands. The same applies to those who have no other
lawful means of livelihood: since a man is understood to be unable to
do what he cannot do lawfully. Wherefore we find that the Apostle
prescribed manual labor merely as a remedy for the sin of those who
gained their livelihood by unlawful means. For the Apostle ordered
manual labor first of all in order to avoid theft, as appears from Eph.
4:28, "He that stole, let him now steal no more; but rather let him
labor, working with his hands. " Secondly, to avoid the coveting of
others' property, wherefore it is written (1 Thess. 4:11): "Work with
your own hands, as we commanded you, and that you walk honestly towards
them that are without. " Thirdly, to avoid the discreditable pursuits
whereby some seek a livelihood. Hence he says (2 Thess. 3:10-12): "When
we were with you, this we declared to you: that if any man will not
work, neither let him eat. For we have heard that there are some among
you who walk disorderly, working not at all, but curiously meddling"
(namely, as a gloss explains it, "who make a living by meddling in
unlawful things). Now we charge them that are such, and beseech them .
. . that working with silence, they would eat their own bread. " Hence
Jerome states (Super epist. ad Galat. [*Preface to Bk. ii of
Commentary]) that the Apostle said this "not so much in his capacity of
teacher as on account of the faults of the people. "

It must, however, be observed that under manual labor are comprised all
those human occupations whereby man can lawfully gain a livelihood,
whether by using his hands, his feet, or his tongue. For watchmen,
couriers, and such like who live by their labor, are understood to live
by their handiwork: because, since the hand is "the organ of organs"
[*De Anima iii, 8], handiwork denotes all kinds of work, whereby a man
may lawfully gain a livelihood.

In so far as manual labor is directed to the removal of idleness, or
the affliction of the body, it does not come under a necessity of
precept if we consider it in itself, since there are many other means
besides manual labor of afflicting the body or of removing idleness:
for the flesh is afflicted by fastings and watchings, and idleness is
removed by meditation on the Holy Scriptures and by the divine praises.
Hence a gloss on Ps. 118:82, "My eyes have failed for Thy word," says:
"He is not idle who meditates only on God's word; nor is he who works
abroad any better than he who devotes himself to the study of knowing
the truth. " Consequently for these reasons religious are not bound to
manual labor, as neither are seculars, except when they are so bound by
the statutes of their order. Thus Jerome says (Ep. cxxv ad Rustic
Monach. ): "The Egyptian monasteries are wont to admit none unless they
work or labor, not so much for the necessities of life, as for the
welfare of the soul, lest it be led astray by wicked thoughts. " But in
so far as manual labor is directed to almsgiving, it does not come
under the necessity of precept, save perchance in some particular case,
when a man is under an obligation to give alms, and has no other means
of having the wherewithal to assist the poor: for in such a case
religious would be bound as well as seculars to do manual labor.

Reply to Objection 1: This command of the Apostle is of natural law:
wherefore a gloss on 2 Thess. 3:6, "That you withdraw yourselves from
every brother walking disorderly," says, "otherwise than the natural
order requires," and he is speaking of those who abstained from manual
labor. Hence nature has provided man with hands instead of arms and
clothes, with which she has provided other animals, in order that with
his hands he may obtain these and all other necessaries. Hence it is
clear that this precept, even as all the precepts of the natural law,
is binding on both religious and seculars alike. Yet not everyone sins
that works not with his hands, because those precepts of the natural
law which regard the good of the many are not binding on each
individual, but it suffices that one person apply himself to this
business and another to that; for instance, that some be craftsmen,
others husbandmen, others judges, and others teachers, and so forth,
according to the words of the Apostle (1 Cor. 12:17), "If the whole
body were the eye, where would be the hearing? If the whole were the
hearing, where would be the smelling? "

Reply to Objection 2: This gloss is taken from Augustine's De operibus
Monachorum, cap. 21, where he speaks against certain monks who declared
it to be unlawful for the servants of God to work with their hands, on
account of our Lord's saying (Mat. 6:25): "Be not solicitous for your
life, what you shall eat. " Nevertheless his words do not imply that
religious are bound to work with their hands, if they have other means
of livelihood. This is clear from his adding: "He wishes the servants
of God to make a living by working with their bodies. " Now this does
not apply to religious any more than to seculars, which is evident for
two reasons. First, on account of the way in which the Apostle
expresses himself, by saying: "That you withdraw yourselves from every
brother walking disorderly. " For he calls all Christians brothers,
since at that time religious orders were not as yet founded. Secondly,
because religious have no other obligations than what seculars have,
except as required by the rule they profess: wherefore if their rule
contain nothing about manual labor, religious are not otherwise bound
to manual labor than seculars are.

Reply to Objection 3: A man may devote himself in two ways to all the
spiritual works mentioned by Augustine in the passage quoted: in one
way with a view to the common good, in another with a view to his
private advantage. Accordingly those who devote themselves publicly to
the aforesaid spiritual works are thereby exempt from manual labor for
two reasons: first, because it behooves them to be occupied exclusively
with such like works; secondly, because those who devote themselves to
such works have a claim to be supported by those for whose advantage
they work.

On the other hand, those who devote themselves to such works not
publicly but privately as it were, ought not on that account to be
exempt from manual labor, nor have they a claim to be supported by the
offerings of the faithful, and it is of these that Augustine is
speaking. For when he says: "They can sing hymns to God even while
working with their hands; like the craftsmen who give tongue to fable
telling without withdrawing their hands from their work," it is clear
that he cannot refer to those who sing the canonical hours in the
church, but to those who tell psalms or hymns as private prayers.
Likewise what he says of reading and prayer is to be referred to the
private prayer and reading which even lay people do at times, and not
to those who perform public prayers in the church, or give public
lectures in the schools. Hence he does not say: "Those who say they are
occupied in teaching and instructing," but: "Those who say they are
occupied in reading. " Again he speaks of that preaching which is
addressed, not publicly to the people, but to one or a few in
particular by way of private admonishment. Hence he says expressly: "If
one has to speak. " For according to a gloss on 1 Cor. 2:4, "Speech is
addressed privately, preaching to many. "

Reply to Objection 4: Those who despise all for God's sake are bound to
work with their hands, when they have no other means of livelihood, or
of almsgiving (should the case occur where almsgiving were a matter of
precept), but not otherwise, as stated in the Article. It is in this
sense that the gloss quoted is to be understood.

Reply to Objection 5: That the apostles worked with their hands was
sometimes a matter of necessity, sometimes a work of supererogation. It
was of necessity when they failed to receive a livelihood from others.
Hence a gloss on 1 Cor. 4:12, "We labor, working with our own hands,"
adds, "because no man giveth to us. " It was supererogation, as appears
from 1 Cor. 9:12, where the Apostle says that he did not use the power
he had of living by the Gospel. The Apostle had recourse to this
supererogation for three motives. First, in order to deprive the false
apostles of the pretext for preaching, for they preached merely for a
temporal advantage; hence he says (2 Cor. 11:12): "But what I do, that
I will do that I may cut off the occasion from them," etc. Secondly, in
order to avoid burdening those to whom he preached; hence he says (2
Cor. 12:13): "What is there that you have had less than the other
churches, but that I myself was not burthensome to you? " Thirdly, in
order to give an example of work to the idle; hence he says (2 Thess.
3:8,9): "We worked night and day . . . that we might give ourselves a
pattern unto you, to imitate us. " However, the Apostle did not do this
in places like Athens where he had facilities for preaching daily, as
Augustine observes (De oper. Monach. xviii). Yet religious are not for
this reason bound to imitate the Apostle in this matter, since they are
not bound to all works of supererogation: wherefore neither did the
other apostles work with their hands.
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Whether it is lawful for religious to live on alms?

Objection 1: It would seem unlawful for religious to live on alms. For
the Apostle (1 Tim. 5:16) forbids those widows who have other means of
livelihood to live on the alms of the Church, so that the Church may
have "sufficient for them that are widows indeed. " And Jerome says to
Pope Damasus [*Cf. Cf. Can. Clericos, cause. i, qu. 2; Can. Quoniam,
cause xvi, qu.