Nine reason are
enumerated
in Vibhdsd, TD 27, p.
Abhidharmakosabhasyam-Vol-1-Vasubandhu-Poussin-Pruden-1991
126. See Karanaprajnaptisdstra, analyzed in Cosmologie bouddhique, p. 339.
127. Compare Samyutta, iv. 201: puthujjano cakkhusmim hanh^i mandpdmandpehi rupehi.
128. This means that the consciousness which arises having blue for its object (visaya) and the eye for its support (dsraya), can be hindered from arising through the interposition of a foreign body between the eye and the blue object: the eye and the blue are thus sapratigha. But neither the manodhdtu, which functions as the organ of the mental consciousness (manovijndna), nor the dharmadhdtu, which is the object proper of the mental consciousness (for example sensation), are not sapratigha: nothing can hinder, by making an "obstacle" or a "screen" (avarana), the mental consciousness from arising from the mental organ (manodhdtu) with respect to the dharmadhdtu.
129. See ii. 9a; Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 263cl2, p. 740b8.
130. The Mahisasakas believe that the first four consciousnesses are always neutral; the
consciousness of touch and the mental consciousness are of the three types.
131. The dharmas which do not belong to any sphere of existence, which are transcendent to
existence (adhdtupatita, adhdtvdpta, apariydpanna) are unconditioned things. 132. The examination of this problem is taken up again ii. 12.
Compare Kathdvatthu, viii. 7.
133. Compare Digba, i. 34, 186.
134. Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 746a4: "Do the male and female organs exist in Rupadhatu? Neither of the sexual organs exist there. First opinion: it is because one desires to abandon these organs that one cultivates the dhyanas and is reborn in Rupadhatu. If beings in Rupadhatu were to possess these organs, they would not desire to be reborn in this sphere. Second opinion: these organs are created by gross food (iii. 39); the Sutra (iii. 98c) says in faa that human beings at the beginning of the cosmic age do not possess these organs, that they all have the same form; later, when they eat of the juice of the earth, the two organs arise, and the difference of male and female appear; in the absence of gross food, the two organs will be missing. Third opinion: the two organs have a use in Kamadhatu, but they do not have a use in Rupadhatu: thus they are missing in Rupadhatu . . .
On the gods of Kamadhatu, see iii. 70.
135. The Mahasamghikas and the Sautrantikas maintain that the body of the Buddha is pure (anasrava) (see iv. 4a-b, discussion of avijnapti) (Compare Kathdvatthu, iv. 3, xiv. 4). Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 229al7, p. 391c27: "Certain masters, the Mahasamghikas, maintain that the body of the Buddha is pure. They say, 'Scripture says that the Tathagata remains above the world, that he is not mundane, that he is not defiled; thus we know that the body of the Buddha is pure. ' In order
to refute this opinion, we show that the body of the Buddha is impure. To say that it is pure is to contradict the Sutra. "
The body of the Buddha is not pure (anasrava), because it can be the occasion of the
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defilement of another. Vibhasa, TD 27, p. 871cll: The body of the Buddha is the result of ignorance and thirst; it is thus not pure. The Sutra says that ten complete dyatanas (organ of sight. . . ,visibles . . . ), and two partial ayatanas (manadyatana dhannas) are impure . . . If the body of the Buddha were pure, women would not have affection for him; he would not produce, among others, any desire, hatred, confusion, or pride . . .
Compare Vydkhyd, p. 14; above p. 58.
136. Same question in Vibhaga, 97,435. Vitarka and vicdra are defined ii. 28, 33.
137. These are called avikalapaka by reason of the text: caksurvi/ndnasamanginilarh vijdndti no tu nilam iti (See above note 75).
138. Kila: this is an opinion of the Vaibhasikas without support in the Sutras.
The opinion of Vasubandhu is explained later, ii. 33. For him as for the Sautrantikas, vitarka
and vicdra are citta, manovijndna.
139. Vibhasa, TD 27, p. 219b7: svabhdvavikalpa is vitarka-vicdra; anusmaranavikalpa is the memory associated with mental consciousness; nirupandvikalpa is non-absorbed prajnd of the sphere of the mental consciousness. In Kamadhatu, the five consciousnesses have only the first
type of vikalpa: they, include memory, but not anusmaranavikalpa, for they are not capable of recognition; they include prajnd, but not nirupandvikalpa, for they are not capable of examination.
Nyaydnusdra (TD 29, p. 350bll): The nature of svabhdvavikalpa is vitarka.
140. Sarhghabhadra: Prajnd and memory are associated with the five sense consciousnesses, but
their functions are reduced therein (TD 29, p. 350bl7).
141. Prajnd which is mental (mdnast), that is to say manasi bhavd, proceeds either from the hearing of Scripture or from reflection (irutacintdmayt), or is innate (upapattipratilambhikd)', is dispersed (vyagrd), that is, non-concentrated prajrid, having different objects (agra), or "dis- crowned" (vigatapradhdnd) by the fact that it successively grasps after different object.
Why give the name of abhinirupandvikalpa to this prajnd?
Because it applies to a certain object in respect to its name (ndmdpeksayd) and examines (abhinirupand): "this is rupa, vedand, anitya, duhkha," etc However, concentrated (samdhitd)
prajrid, proceeding from absorption (bhdvandmayt), is applied to an object without taking into consideration its name. Thus it is not abhinirupandvikalpa.
All mental memory (smrti), that is to say, the mental memory, is or is not concentrated. For, according to the School, the mental memory uniquely has for its object the thing previously experienced and does not take into consideration its name, according to the definition: "What is memory? Expression of the mind (cetaso'bhildpah). " The mode of existence of memory connected to the five consciousnesses is not an expression {abhilapa) of a thing previously experienced. It is thus not anusmaranavikalpa (Vydkhyd). See ii. 24.
142. On the meaning of dlambana, i. 29b. Compare Vibhanga, p. 95.
143. The Abhidhamma (Vibhanga, p. 96, Dhammasanganni, 653, 1211, 1534) understands upddinna in the same sense. The modern commentators of the Abhidhamma translate upddinna as "issue of grasping;" they do not see the upddd = updddyarUpa, bhautika, and so create a great confusion.
Moreover the Vibhanga does not classify the dhdtus as does the Abhidharma. (See also Suttavibhanga, p. 113; Mahdvyutpatti, 101. 56; Divydvadana, p. 54; Bodhicarydvatdra, viii. 97,101). And there is some fluctuation even in Sanskrit sources. For example, Majjhima iii. 240, reproduced
in the Pitdputrasamdgama (see above p. 54, a 1), gives the hair . . . excrements as ajjhattam paccattam kakkhalam upddinnam. Now hair is not upddinna. A description of corporeal matter
? (ddhydtmikd, see Majjhima, iii. 90) has been confused with a description of organic matter (updtta)
Updtta matter, plus the manas, is called dsraya (see ii. 5). This is the subtle bodies of the non-Buddhists.
144. Bhuta, mahdbhuta; updddya rupa, bhautika; see i. 22, 23-24, ii. 12, 50a, 65. bhautika = bhuta bhava = derived from the bhutas.
145. Compare Vibhanga, p. 96.
146. Vibhasa, TD 27, p. 66lcl4. There are two masters in this school, Buddhadeva and Dharmatrata. Buddhadeva says: "Rupa is solely the primary elements; the mental states (caitta) are solely mind (citta)" He says that updddyarupa, secondary matter, is a species of the primary elements (mahdbhutavis'esa), and that the mental states are a species of mind . . . " (Compare Kathdvatthu, vii. 3). Vibhasa, TD 27, p. 383c24. The Sutra says: "Rupa is the four primary elements and that which derives from the four primary elements. " Which opinion does the Sutra intend to refute? It intends to refute the opinion of Buddhadeva. The Buddha sees that, in the future, there will be a master, Buddhadeva, who will say: "There is no derived, distinct rupa apart from the primary elements. " In order to refute this opinion, the Buddha says: "Rupa is the four primary elements . . . " Vibhasa, TD 27, p. 730b26: "All conditioned things are either mahdbhuta or citta; there is no updddyarupa apart from the mahdbhittas\ and there is no caitta (mental states) apart from the citta (the mind).
On the mind and mental states, see below p. 101 and ii. 23c
Buddhadeva is perhaps the master named on the lion inscription of Mathura.
147. Thus (1) the organs are not primary matter, not being "solid," etc. ; (2) tangible things include primary matter, since a solid is perceived by touch; and (3) secondary matter perceived by the other organs is not perceived by touch.
148. See ii. 5. The first four dhdtus (earth . . . wind) are "radical substances," because the organs arise from these dhdtus; the vijndnadhatu or manodhdtu is a "root," because it gives rise to manahsparsayatana. Or rather the first four dhdtus are roots because they give rise to secondary matter; the vijfidnadhdtu is a root because it gives rise to mental states {caitta, caitasika).
149. Thus the first five "supports of contact," the five organs of sense consciousness, are "secondary matter:" otherwise, they would be included in the definition: "A person is made up of the six dhdtus. "
150. According to the Abhidhamma (Dhammasarigani, 647), derived rupa is not tangible. Samghabhadra (TD 29, p. 352cl) refutes this opinion which he attributes to the Sthavira. On this subject see the Introduction for a discussion of the authenticity of the Sutras.
151. Vibhasa, TD 27, p. 391c6.
151. Vibhasa, TD 27, p. 689c5 and foil
153. This is the etymology vipacyata iti vipdkah; the vipdka is what has become ripe. 154. This is the etymology vipdka = vipakti.
155. It appears that this is the opinion of Dharmatrata 145 (TD 28, number 1552).
156. Let us consider one moment or state of existence of this subtle matter which is the organ of sight. One part of this matter is retribution of a former action; another part proceeds from food: all this matter is the outflowing result of a previous moment or state in the existence of the eye. But this previous moment or state is not, in and of itself, capable of generating the present moment: in faa, at death, the organ of sight ceases producing itself through outflowing. Thus by
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definition the organ of sight is not an outflowing. But consider, on the contrary, the flesh that constitutes the body: it persists after death; it is thus an outflowing, the result, in each of the moments of its existence, of the previous moment.
The Kathavatthu, xii,4, xvi. 8, does not hold that matter is retribution.
157.
Nine reason are enumerated in Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 612c. Vasubandhu quotes the third
158. The Vatslputriyas and the Vibhajyavadins maintain that sound is retribution.
159. Compare Digha, iii. 173, quoted by the Mahasamghikas in the Kathdvatthu, xii. 3: saddo vipdko.
160. See Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 823a20, p. 449al6, and Dharmatrata, TD 29, p. 396c20. These passages are discussed by Fa-pao in his Shu, TD 41, p. 502al8 and following.
161. Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 714a7 and foil. The difference between internal {ddhydtmika) dharmas and external {bdhya) dharmas is threefold: 1. difference from the point of view of the series (samtdna): the dharmas that are to be found in the person himself {svdtmabhdva) are internal; those that are to be found within another, and also those which are not integral to living beings (asattvdkhya, i. l0b), are external; 2. difference from the point of view of the dyatanas: the dyatanas which are the support (dsraya) of the mind and mental states are internal; those which are objects (dlambana) are external; 3. difference from the point of view of living beings: the dharmas integral to living beings are internal; the others are external.
162. See Uddnavarga, xxiii; Madhyamakavrtti, p. 354; Dhammapada, 160.
163. Prakarana, TD 26, p. 699a3-28.
164. Vibhdsd {TD 27, p. 368a21): The organ that has seen, now sees or shall see rupa, and its tatsabhaga (that is to say the organ which resembles this organ) is the caksurdhdtu. The organ which has seen is past caksurdhdtu; the organ which now sees is present caksurdhdtu; and the organ that shall see is future caksurdhdtu. As for tatsabhaga, the masters of this land say that it is of four types: the past, present, and future tatsabhaga eye is the caksurdhdtu which has perished, is now perishing, or shall perish without having seen the rupa; one should add, as a fourth, the caksurdhdtu which absolutely will not arise.
Foreign (bahirdesaka) masters say that it is of five types: past, present, future, as above. Further, future caksurdhdtu which absolutely will not arise, is of two types, accordingly as it is, or is not, associated with the consciousness.
165. Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 368bl3. Three opinions. Can one see rupa by means of the eye of another? Who maintains such an opinion? If one cannot see by means of the eye of another, how can the eye of a certain being be called sabhdga through relationship with other beings? Because the activity of the eye is definite: this activity consists of seeing. When the eye, after having been active, has perished, it is called sabhdga: neither for the person himself, nor for another, does this name sabhdga change. In this same way . . .
166. By explaning bhdga in the passive, bhajyata iti bhdgah.
167. The eye that perishes without having seen is similar to the eye that sees, etc
The Madhyamikas (Vrtti, p. 32 and the note that should be corrected) make the best of this
theory: "In reality, the sabhdga eye does not see visible things, because it is an organ, exactly like tatsabhaga:" na paramdrthatah sabhdgam caksuh pasyati rilpdni, caksurinidriyatvat, tadyathdtatsabhdgam.
168. Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 265cb. The same problem is examined in the Vibhanga, pp. 12, 16, 97, and the Dhammasangani, 1002, 1007,1008.
? 169. On the quality oiprthagjana, ii. 40c, vi. 26a, 28c-d In Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 231cl3-23, divergent explanations of Vasumitra, the Bhadanta, and Ghosaka.
170. See ii. 13, iv. lla-b.
171. We shall see that the first stage is dnantaryamdrga, "the path which destroys the defilements;" the second stage is vimuktimdrga, "the path of deliverence," the path in which the defilements are destroyed (vi. 28).
172. Dhi in place of prajftd, for prosodical reasons (ii. 57d).
173. See Nydyabindutikdfippani, p. 26; Bodhicarydvatdrapanjikd, p. 520; Atthasdlim, p. 400; Warren (Visuddhimagga), p. 207; Buddhist Psychology, p. 351, note; Spence Hardy, Manual, p. 419. Kathdvatthu, sviii. 9, where the thesis "the eye sees" is attributed to the Mahasarhghikas. Compare Samayabheda, Wassilief, p. 262. Wassilief summarizes the discussion of the Kofa, p. 308
(Read: "das Auge nichtdas Mass des Sichtbarensieht," and not "ist").
Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 489bl4: According to another opinion, all the samskrtas are, by their
nature, view (drsti). View means the manifested characteristic of its manner of being (patupracdra). All the samskrtas possess this characteristic. Some others say that the conscious- ness of the supression of the defilements and of non-production (ksaydnutpddajndna, vii. l) is view. Vibhdsd,TD 27. p. 61c and foil. : Dharmatrata says that the visual consciousness {caksurvijfidna) sees visible things. Ghosaka says that the prajnd associated with visual consciousness sees visible things. The Darstantikas say that the "complex" (sdmagrf) sees visible things. The Vatsiputriyas say that one eye alone sees visible things . . . If the visual consciousness sees visible things, then consciousness would have view for its characteristic; now this is not the case: thus this opinion is false. If the prajnd associated with visual consciousness sees visible things, then the prajnd associated with the consciousness of hearing would understand sounds; now prajnd does not have hearing for its characteristic: thus this opinion is false. If the "complex" sees visible things, then one would always see visible things, for the "complex" is always present. If one eye, not the two eyes, sees visible things, then parts of the body would not feel tangibles at one and the same time: in the same way that the two arms, however distant they may be from each other, can simultaneously feel tangible things and produce a single tactile consciousness, in this way what obstacle is there to the two eyes, however distant they may be from each other, simultaneously seeing and producing a single visual consciousness?
174. This is the thesis of the Bhadanta {Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 63b23, cl2).
175. caksusd rupdni drstvd. . . quoted iii. 32d. Samyukta, TD 1, p. 87c26, p. 88a; Vibhanga, p. 381; Madhyamakavrtti, p. 137; Dhammasangani, 597. This is the argument of the Mahasamghikas, Kathdvatthu, xviii. 9-
176. Compare the formula: tasyaivam jdnata evam pasyatah.
111. Vydkhyd: vijndnam tu sdmnidhyamdtrenti nd/rayabhdvayogeneti dariayati / yathd suryo divasakara iti/yathd sdmnidhyamdtrena suryo divasam karotUy ucyate tathd vijndnam vijdnatity ucyate / kasmdt /loke tathd siddhatvdt.
178. Or rather: "One should not reject expressions in worldly use for the reason that they do not correspond to realities. " janapadaniruktim ndbhiniveseta samjnam, ca lokasya ndtidhavet. {Madhyama TD 1, p. 703a2, Samyukta, 13. 12). Compare Majjhima, iii. 230: janapadaniruttim ndbhiniveseyya samannam ndtidhdveyya; Samyutta, iv. 230: yam ca sdmam ndtam ca atidhdvanti,
yam ca loke saccasammatam tarn ca atidhdvanti. Itivuttaka, 49.
179. According to the Jndnaprasthdna, TD 26, p. 919c27; Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 62bL Against the Vatslputrlyas. See above note 173, at the end.
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180. Argument of Vasubandhu, Paficavastuka, i. 10.
181. Compare Atthasdtint, 629.
Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 63bl4 and foil: One says that the object is attained (prdpta) in a twofold
sense: either because it is "grasped as object" or "perceived;" or because there is a juxtaposition (nirantaratva) of the object and the organ. In the first sense, the six organs attain the object. In the second sense, only three organs--the organs of smell, taste and touch,--attain the object; but on the contrary, three organs, the organs of sight and hearing and the mental organ, perceive without attaining.
The organ of sight preceives visible things by reason of light; when a visible thing is close to the organ, it hinders the light: the organ does not see. The organ of hearing perceives sound by reason of space or the void; when a sound is close to the organ, it does not hinder the void: the organ hears . . . The organ of smell perceives by reason of the wind; the organ of taste, by reason of water; the organ of touch, by reason of the earth; and the mental organ, by reason of the aa of attention (manaskdra).
Fa-pao (see TD 41, p. 508al9 and foil) observes that the rupa of the moon does not leave the moon in order to juxtapose itself on the eye.
Compare Aryadeva, Sataka, 288. 182. An objection of the Vaisesikas.
183. This doctrine is refuted by Sarhghabhadra (TD 29, p. 370bl2 and foil); Shen-t'ai attributes it to the Sammitfyas; Fa-pao, to certain masters of the Vibhdsd (TD 41, p. 508bl7).
184. Samghabhadra discusses this thesis (TD 29, p. 370b23 and folL).
185. Here and below (the definition of Bhadanta, p. 106), our Tibetan version translates nirantara by 'dab chags pa. But the Tibetan Siddhantas analyzed by Wassilief (p. 307) oppose the nirantara of the Bhadanta (bar medpa) to the nirantara of the other masters ('dab chags pa).
According to the Bodhicaiyavatara, p. 516, the organ and its object cannot be either separated (savyavadhdna, santara) or contiguous (nirantara).
186. Samghabhadra (TD 29, p. 371c7): What is the meaning of "to attain? " When an object arises in proximity to an organ, this latter grasps it. Thus one can say that smell, taste, and touch grasp the objects that they attain; in the same way one says that the organ of sight does not see eyelids, eye-lashes and the other visible matter that it attains. The eyelid does not touch the organ of sight: one says nevertheless that the organ attains it. From the fact that the eyelid arises in proximity to the organ, one says that this latter attains it. As the organ of sight does not see the visible matter thus attained, one says that the organ of sight grasps without attaining, not by attaining; moreover it does not grasp a very distant object. In this same way, even though smell grasps the object that it attains, it does not grasp what is very close.
187. Compare the Vimsaka of Vasubandhu, 12-14; Bodhicaiyavatara, p. 503; Prafastapdday p. 43, etc.
188. According to Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 683c24: Do the atoms touch one another? They do not touch one another; if they touch one another, they touch one another in either their totality or partially. If they touch one another in their totality, they form but one single thing; if they partially touch one another they would thus have parts. And atoms do not have parts.
How is it that agglomerations, striking against one another, do not fall to pieces? They do not fall to pieces because vdyudhdtu holds them together.
But does not vayudhdtu fall to pieces? Sometimes it falls to pieces, for example at the end of the cosmic period. Sometimes it holds together, for example at the beginning of the cosmic period.
? If atoms do not touch one another, how can striking produce sound?
