No More Learning

To reconcile the minds of the people to all these movements, principles correspondent to them had been preached up with great zeal. Every one must
remember that the cabal set out with the most as tonishing prudery, both moral and political. Those, who in a few months after soused over head and ears i11to the deepest and dirtiest pits of corruption, cried out violently against the indirect practices in the elect ing and managing of Parliaments, which had for
merly prevailed. _ This marvellous abhorrence which the court had suddenly taken to all influence, was not only circulated in conversation through the king dom, but pompously announced to the public, with
Inany other extraordinary things, in a pamphlet* which had all the appearance of a manifesto pre paratory to some considerable enterprise. Through out it was a satire, though in terms managed and
* Sentiments of an Honest Man.
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decent enough, on the politics of the former reign. It was indeed written with no small art and address. In this piece appeared the first dawning of the new
system: there first appeared the idea (then only in speculation) of separating the court from the adminis tration; of carrying everything from national connec tion to personal regards; and of forming a regular party for that purpose, under the name of king's men.
To recommend this system to the people, a per spective view of the court, gorgeously painted, and finely illuminated from within, was exhibited to the gaping multitude. Party was to be totally done away, with all its evil works. Corruption was to be cast down from court, as Ate' was from heaven. Power was thenceforward to be the chosen residence of public spirit; and no one was to be supposed un der any sinister influence, except those who had the misfortune to be in disgrace at court, which was to stand in lieu of all vices and all corruptions. A scheme of perfection to be realized in a monarchy far
the visionary republic of Plato. The whole scenery was exactly disposed to captivate those good souls, whose credulous morality is so invaluable a treasure to crafty politicians. Indeed there was wherewithal to charm everybody, except those few who are not much pleased with professions of super natural virtue, who know of what stuif such profes sions are made, for what purposes they are designed, and in what they are sure constantly to end. Many innocent gentlemen, who had been talking prose all their lives without knowing anything of the matter, began at last to open their eyes upon their own mer its, and to attribute their not having been lords of the treasury and lords of trade many years before,
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merely to the prevalence of party, and to the minis terial power, which had frustrated the good inten tions of the court in favor of their abilities. Now was the time to unlock the sealed fountain of royal bounty, which had been infamously monopolized and huckstered, and to let it flow at large upon the whole
The time was come, to restore royalty to its original splendor. Jlfettre le Roy hora de page, be came a sort of watchword. And it was constantly in the mouths of all the rumiers of the court, that noth ing could preserve the balance of the constitution from being overturned by the rabble, or by a faction of the nobility, but to free the sovereign effectually from that ministerial tyranny under which the royal dignity had been oppressed in the person of his Ma jesty's grandfather.
These were some of the many artifices used to rec oncile the people to the great change which was made in the persons who composed the ministry, and the still greater which was made and avowed in its con stitution. As to individuals, other methods were employed with them ; in order so thoroughly to disu nite every party, and even every family, that no con cert, order, or qfiect, might appear in any future opposi tion. And in this manner an administration without
connection with the people, or with one another, was first put in possession of government. What good consequences followed from we have all seen; whether with regard to virtue, public or private; to the ease and happiness of the sovereign or to the real strength of government. But as so much stress was then laid on the necessity of this new project, will not be amiss to take view of the effects of this royal servitude and vile durance, which was so de
people.
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plored in the reign of the late monarch, and was so carefully to be avoided in the reign of his successor.
crown connected with the liberty of his people, not only unimpaired, but improved, for the space of thir ty-three years. He overcame a dangerous rebellion, abetted by foreign force, and raging in the heart of his kingdoms; and thereby destroyed the seeds of all future rebellion that could arise upon the same prin ciple. He carried the glory, the power, the com merce of England, to a height unknown even to this renowned nation in the times of its greatest prosperi ty: and he left his succession resting on the true and only true foundations of all national and all regal greatness; affection at home, reputation abroad, trust in allies, terror in rival nations. The most ardent lover of his country cannot wish for Great Britain a happier fate than to continue as she was then left. A people, emulous as we are in affection to our present sovereign, know not how to form a prayer to heaven for a greater blessing upon his vir tues, or a higher state of felicity and glory, than that
he should live, and should reign, and when Provi dence ordains should die, exactly like his illustri ous predecessor.
A great prince may be obliged (though such thing cannot happen very often) sacrifice his pri vate inclination to his public interest. A wise prince will not think that such restraint implies condi tion of servility; and truly, such was the condition of the last reign, and the effects were also such as we have described, we ought, no less for the sake of the
The effects were these.
_ In times full of doubt and danger to his person and family, George II. maintained the dignity of his
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sovereign whom we love, than for our own, to hear arguments convincing indeed, before we depart from the maxims of that reign, or fly in the face of this great body of strong and recent experience.
One of the principal topics which was then, and has been since, much employed by that political"' school, is an affected terror of the growth of an aris tocratic power, prejudicial to the rights of the crown, and the balance of the constitution. Any new pow ers exercised in the House of Lords, or in the House of Commons, or by the crown, ought certainly to ex cite the vigilant and anxious jealousy of a free people. Even a new and unprecedented course of action in the whole legislature, without great and evident reason, may be a subject of just uneasiness. I will not affirm, that there may not havelately appeared in the House of Lords, a disposition to some attempts derogatory to the legal rights of the subject. If any such have really appeared, they have arisen, not from
a power properly aristocratic, but from the same in fluence which is charged with having excited at tempts of a similar nature in the House of Commons; which House, if it should have been betrayed into an unfortunate quarrel with its constituents, and in volved in a charge of the very same nature, could
have neither power nor inclination to repel such at tempts in others. Those attempts in the House of Lords can no more be called aristocratic proceedings, than the proceedings with regard to the county of Middlesex in the House of Commons can with any
sense be called democratical.
It is true, that the peers have a great influence in
" * See the political Writings of the late Dr. Brown, and many others.
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the kingdom, and in every part of the public concerns. While they are men of property, it is impossible to prevent except by such means as must prevent all property from its natural operation: an event not easily to be compassed, while property power nor by any means to be wished, while the least notion ex ists of the method by which the spirit of liberty acts, and of the means by which preserved. If any particular peers, by their uniform, upright, constitu
tional conduct, by their public and their private vir tues, have acquired an influence in the country; the people, on whose favor that influence depends, and from whom arose, will never be duped into an opin ion, that such greatness in peer the despotism of an aristocracy, when they know and feel to be the effect and pledge of their own importance.
am no friend to aristocracy, in the sense at least in which that word usually understood. If were not bad habit to moot cases on the supposed ruin of the constitution, should be free to declare, that if
must perish, would rather by far see resolved into any other form, than lost in that austere and in solent domination. But, whatever my dislikes may be, my fears are not upon that quarter. The ques tion, on the influence of court, and of peerage, not, which of the two dangers the more eligible, but which the more imminent. He but observer, who has not seen, that the generality of peers, far from supporting themselves in state of in dependent greatness, are but too apt to fall into an oblivion of their proper dignity, and to run headlong
into an abject servitude. Would to God were true, that the fault of _our peers were too much spirit. It worthy of some observation that these gentlemen,
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so jealous of aristocracy, make no complaints of the
power of those peers (neither few nor inconsiderable) who are always in the train of court, and whose
whole weight must be considered as portion of the settled influence of the crown. This all safe and right; but some peers am very sorry they are not as many as they ought to be) set themselves, in the great concern of peers and commons, against back-stairs influence and clandestine government, then the alarm begins then the constitution in danger of being forced into an aristocracy.
rest little the longer on this court topic, because was much insisted upon at the time of the great change, and has been since frequently revived by
many of the agents of that party for, whilst they are terrifying the great and opulent with the horrors of mob-government, they are by other managers attempt ing (though hithertowith little success) to alarm the people with phantom of tyranny in the nobles. All this done upon their favorite principle of disunion, of sowing jealousies amongst the different orders of the state, and of disjointing the natural strength of the kingdom; that may be rendered incapable of resisting the sinister designs of wicked men, who have engrossed the royal power. '
Thus much of the topics chosen by the courtiers to recommend their system will be necessary to open little more at large the nature of that party which
was formed for its support. Without this, the whole would have been no better than visionary amuse ment, like the scheme of Harrington's political club, and not business in which the nation had real concern. As powerful party, and party con
structed on new principle, very inviting ob ject of curiosity.
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It must be remembered, that since the revolution, until the period we are speaking of, the influence of the crown had been always employed in supporting the ministers of state, and in carrying on the public business according to their opinions. But the party now in question is formed upon a very different idea. It is to intercept the favor, protection, and confidence of the crown in the passage to its ministers ; it is to come between them and their importance in Parlia ment; it is to separate them from all their natural and acquired dependencies ; it is intended as the con-P trol, not the support, of administration. The ma chinery of this system is perplexed in its movements, and false in its principle. It is formed on a supposi tion that the king is something external to his gov ernment; and that he may be honored and aggran dized, even by its debility and disgrace. The plan proceeds expressly on the idea of enfeebling the reg ular executory power. It proceeds on the idea of weakening the state in order to strengthen the court. The scheme depending entirely on distrust, on dis connection, on mutability by principle, on systematic weakness in every particular member; it is impossi ble that the total result should be substantial strength
? ofany kind.
I
As a foundation of their scheme, the cabal have established a sort of rota in the court. All sorts of parties, by this means, have been brought into admin istration; from whence few have had the good for tune to escape without disgrace ; none at all without considerable losses. In the beginning of each ar rangement no professions of confidence and support are wanting, to induce the leading men to engage. But while the ministers of the day appear in all the
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pomp and pride of power, while they have all their canvas spread out to the wind, and every sail filled with the fair and prosperous gale of royal favor, in a short time they find, they know not how, a current, which sets directly against them : which prevents all progress; and even drives them backwards. They grow ashamed and mortified in a situation, which, by its vicinity to power, only serves to remind them the more strongly of their insignificance. They are obliged either to execute the orders of their inferiors, or to see themselves opposed by the natural instru ments of their office. With the loss of their dignity they lose their temper. In their turn they grow
to that cabal which, whether it supports or opposes, equally disgraces and equally betrays them. It is soon found necessary to get rid of the heads of administration ; but it is of the heads only. As there always are many rotten members belonging to the best connections, it is not hard to persuade several to continue in office without their leaders. By this means the party goes out much thinner than it came in; and is only reduced in strength by its temporary possession of power. Besides, if by acci dent, or in course of changes, that power should be recovered, the junto have thrown up a retrenchment
of these carcasses, which may serve to cover them selves in a day of danger. They conclude, not un wisely, that such rotten members will become the first objects of disgust and resentment to their ancient connections.
They contrive to form in the outward administra tion two parties at the least; which, whilst they are tearing one another to pieces, are both competitors for the favor and protection of the cabal; and, by
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their emulation, contribute to throw everything more and more into the hands of the interior managers.
A minister of state will sometimes keep himself totally estranged from all his colleagues; will differ from them in their councils, will privately traverse, and publicly oppose, their measures. He will, how ever, continue in his employment. Instead of suffer ing any mark of displeasure, he will be distinguished by an unbounded profusion of court rewards and ca resses; because he does what is expected, and all that is expected, from men in office. He helps to keep some form of administration in being, and keeps it at the same time as weak and divided as possible.
However, we must take care not to be mistaken, or to imagine that such persons have any weight in their opposition. When, by them, administration is convinced of its insignificancy, they are soon to be convinced of their own. They never are suffered to succeed in their opposition. They and the world are to be satisfied, that neither office, nor authority, nor property, nor ability, eloquence, counsel, skill, or union, are of the least importance ;_ but that the mere influence of the court, naked of all support, and des titute of all management, is abundantly sufficient for all its own purposes.
When any adverse connection is to be destroyed, the cabal seldom appear in the work themselves. They find out some person of whom the party enter tains a high opinion. Such a person they endeavor to delude with various pretences. They teach him first to distrust, and then to quarrel with his friends ; among whom, by the same arts, they excite a similar diffidence of him ; so that in this mutual fear and dis trust, he may suffer himself to be employed as the
? ? ? ? OI-' THE PRESENT DISCONTENTS. 463
instrument in the change which is brought about. Afterwards they are sure to destroy him in his turn, by setting up in his place some person in whom he had himself reposed the greatest confidence, and who serves to carry off a considerable part of his adher ents.
When such a person has broke in this manner with his connections, he is soon compelled to commit some flagrant act of iniquitous, personal hostility against some of them (such as an attempt to strip a partic ular friend of his family estate), by which the cabal hope to render the parties utterly irreconcilable. In truth, they have so contrived matters, that people have a greater hatred to the subordinate instruments than to the principal movers.
As in destroying their enemies they make use of instruments not immediately belonging to their corps,
so in advancing their own friends they pursue exactly the same method. To promote any of them to con siderable rank or emolument, they commonly take care that the recommendation shall pass through the hands of the ostensible ministry: such a recommen dation might however appear to the world, as some proof of the credit of ministers, and some means of increasing their strength. To prevent this, the per sons so advanced are directed, in all companies, indus triously to declare, that they are under no obligations whatsoever to administration ; that they have received their office from another quarter; that they are to tally free and independent.
When the faction has any job of lucre to obtain, or of vengeance to perpetrate, their way to select, for the execution, those very persons to whose habits, friendships, principles, and declarations, such pro
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ceedings are publicly known to be the most adverse; at once to render the instruments the more odious, and therefore the more dependent, and to prevent the people from ever reposing a confidence in any appear ance of private friendship or public principle.
If the administration seem now and then, from re missness, or from fear of making themselves disagree able, to suffer any popular excesses to go unpunished, the cabal immediately sets up some creature of theirs to raise a clamor against the ministers, as having shamefully betrayed the dignity of government. Then they compel the ministry to become active in confer ring rewards and honors on the persons who have been the instruments of their disgrace; and, after having first vilified them with the higher orders for suffer ing the laws to sleep over the licentiousness of the
populace, they drive them (in order to make amends for their former inactivity) to some act of atrocious violence, which renders them completely abhorred by the people. They, who remember the riots which at tended the Middlesex election, the opening of the present Parliament, and the transactions relative to Saint George's Fields, will not be at a loss for an ap plication of these remarks.
That this body may be enabled to compass all the ends of its institution, its members are scarcely ever to aim at the high and responsible offices of the state.
They are distributed with art and judgment through all the secondary, but efficient, departments of office, and through the households of all the branches of the royal family: so as on one hand to occupy all the avenues to the throne ; and on the other to forward or frustrate the execution of any measure, according to their own interests. For with the credit and sup
? ? ? ? or THE PRESENT n1scomnnrs. 465
port which they are known to have, though for the greater part in places which are only a genteel excuse for salary, they possess all the influence of the high est posts ; and they dictate publicly in almost every thing, even with a parade of superiority. Whenever they dissent (as it often happens) from their nominal leaders, the trained part of the senate, instinctively in the secret, is sure to follow them: provided the leaders, sensible of their situation, do not of them selves recede in time from their most declared opin ions. This latter is generally the case. It will not be conceivable to any one who has not seen what pleasure taken by the cabal in rendering these heads of office thoroughly contemptible and ridicu lous. And when they are become so, they have then the best chance for being well supported.
The members of the court faction are fully indom nified for not holding places on the slippery heights of the kingdom, not only by the lead in all affairs, but also by the perfect security in which they enjoy less conspicuous, but very advantageous situations. Their places are in express legal tenure, or, in effect, all of them for life. Whilst the first and most respec table persons in the kingdom are tossed about like tennis-balls, the sport of blind and insolent caprice, no minister dares even to cast an oblique glance at the lowest of their body. If an attempt be made
upon one of this corps, immediately he flies to sanctu ary, and pretends to the most inviolable of all prom ises. conveniency of public arrangement avail able to remove any one of them from the specific situation he holds; and the slightest attempt upon one of them, the most powerful minister, cer
tain preliminary to his own destruction. von. 1. 30
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Conscious of their independence, they bear them selves with a lofty air to the exterior ministers. Like janissaries, they derive a kind of freedom from the very condition of their servitude. They may act just as they please; provided they are true to the great ruling principle of their institution. It is, therefore, not at all wonderful, that people should be so desir ous of adding themselves to that body, in which they may possess and reconcile satisfactions the most allur ing, and seemingly the most contradictory ; enjoying at once all the spirited pleasure of independence, and all the gross lucre and fat emoluments of servitude.
Here is a sketch, though a slight one, of the consti tution, laws, and policy of this new court corporation. The name by which they choose to distinguish them selves, is that of king's men or the king's friends, by an invidious exclusion of the rest of his Majesty's most loyal and affectionate subjects. The whole sys tem, comprehending the exterior and interior admin istrations, is commonly called, in the technical lan guage of the court, double cabinet ; in French or English, as you choose to pronounce it.
Whether all this be a vision of a distracted brain, or the invention of a malicious heart, or. a real faction in the country, must be judged by the appearances which things have worn for eight years past. Thus far I am certain, that there is not a single public man, in or out of office, who has not, at some time or other, borne testimony to the truth of what I have now related. In particular, no persons have been more strong in their assertions, and louder and more indecent in their complaints, than those who compose all the exterior part of the present administration; in whose time that faction has arrived at such an
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neight of power, and of boldness in the use of as may, in the end, perhaps bring about its total destruc tion. _
It true, that about four years ago, during the administration of the Marquis of Rockingham, an at
was made to carry on government without their concurrence. However, this was only tran sient cloud; they were hid but for moment; and their constellation blazed out with greater brightness, and far more vigorous influence, some time after was blown over. An attempt was at that time made (but without any idea of proscription) to break their
corps, to discountenance their doctrines, to revive connections of different kind, to restore the princi ples and policy of the Whigs, to reanimate the cause of liberty by ministerial countenance; and then for the first time were men seen attached in office to every principle they had maintained in opposition. No one will doubt, that such men were abhorred and violently opposed by the court faction, and that such
system could have but short duration.
It may appear somewhat affected, that in so much discourse upon this extraordinary party, should say so little of the Earl of Bute, who the supposed head
of it. But this was neither owing to affectation nor inadvertence. have carefully avoided the introduc tion of personal reflections of any kind. Much the greater part of the topics which have been used to blacken this nobleman are either unjust or frivolous. At best, they have tendency to give the resentment of this bitter calamity wrong direction, and to turn a public grievance into mean, personal, or dan gerous national quarrel.
Where there regular scheme of operations carried on, the system, and
tempt
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not any individual person who acts in that
truly This system has not arisen solely from
dangerous.
the ambition of Lord Bute, but from the circumstan ces which favored and from an indifference to the constitution which had been for some time growing among our gentry. We should have been tried with
the Earl of Bute had never existed and will want neither contriving head nor active members, when the Earl of Bute exists no longer. It not, therefore, to rail at Lord Bute, but firmly to embody against this court party and its practices, which can afford us any prospect of relief in our present condi
tion.
Another motive induces me to put the personal
consideration of Lord Bute wholly out of the ques tion. He communicates very little in direct man ner with the greater part of our men of business. This has never been his custom. It enough for him that he surrounds them with his creatures. Sev eral imagine, therefore, that they have very good excuse for doing all the work of this faction, when they have no personal connection with Lord Bute. But whoever becomes party to an administration, composed of insulated individuals, without faith plighted, tie, or common principle; an administra tion constitutionally impotent, because supported by no party in the nation; he who contributes to de stroy the connections of men and their trust in one another, or in any sort to throw the dependence of public counsels upon private will and favor, possibly may have nothing to do with the Earl of Bute. It matters little whether he be the friend or the enemy of that particular person. But let him be who or what he will, he abets faction that driving hard
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to the ruin of his country. He is sapping the founda tion of its liberty, disturbing the sources of its domes tic tranquillity, weakening its government over its dependencies, degrading it from all its importance in the system of Europe.
It is this unnatural infusion of a system of favor itism into a government which in a great part of its constitution is popular, that has raised the present ferment in the nation. The people, without entering deeply into its principles, could plainly perceive its effects, in much violence, in a great spirit of innova tion, and a general disorder in all the functions of government. I keep my eye solely on this system; if I speak of those measures which have arisen from
will be so far only as they illustrate the general scheme. This the fountain of all those bitter wa ters of which, through an hundred different conduits, we have drunk until we are ready to burst. The discretionary power of the crown in the formation of ministry, abused by bad or weak men, has given rise
to system, which, without directly violating the let ter of any law, operates against the spirit of the
'
essentially at variance with the plan of our legislature. One great end undoubtedly of mixed government like ours, composed of monarchy, and of controls, on the part of the higher people and the lower, that the prince shall not be able to violate the laws. This useful indeed and fundamental. But this, even at first view, no more than negative ad vantage an armor merely defensive. It therefore next in order, and equal in importance, that the dis cretionary powers which are necessarily vested in the
? whole constitution.
A plan of favoritism for our executory government
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monarch, whether for the ercecation of the laws, or for the nomination to magistracg and oflice, or for conduct ing the afairs of peace and war, or for ordering the revenue, should all be exercised upon public principles and national grounds, and not on the lihings or preju dices, the intrigues or policies, of a court. This, I said, is equal in importance to the securing a government according to law. The laws reach but_a very little
way. Constitute government how you please, infi nitely the greater part of it must depend upon the exercise of the powers which are left at large to the prudence and uprightness of ministers of state. Even all the use and potency of the laws depends upon them. Without them, your commonwealth is no better than a scheme upon paper; and not a liv ing, active, effective constitution. It is possible that through negligence, or ignorance, or design artfully conducted, ministers may suffer one part of govern ment to languish, another to be perverted from its
purposes, and every valuable interest of the country to fall into ruin and decay, without possibility of fix
? act on which a criminal prosecution can be justly grounded. The" due arrangement of men in the active part of the state, far from being foreign to the purposes of a wise government, ought
to be among its very first and dearest objects. When, therefore, the abettors of the new system tell us, that between them and their opposers there is nothing but a struggle for power, and that therefore we are no ways concerned in it; we must tell those who have the impudence to insult us in this manner, that, of all things, we ought to be the most concerned who, and what sort of men they are that hold the trust of everything that is dear to us. Nothing can render
ing any single
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471
this a point of indifference to the nation, but what must either render us totally desperate, or soothe us into the security of idiots. We must soften into a credulity below the milkiness of infancy to think all men virtuous. We. must be tainted with a malignity truly diabolical to believe all the world to be equally wicked and corrupt. Men are in public life as in pri vate, some good, some evil. The elevation of the one, and the depression of the other, are the first ob jects of all true policy. But that form of govern ment, which, neither in its direct institutions, nor in their immediate tendency, has contrived to throw its affairs into the most trustworthy hands, but has left its whole executory system to be disposed of agreea
bly to the uncontrolled pleasure of any one man, however excellent or virtuous, is a plan of polity de fective not only in that member, but consequentially erroneous in every part of it.
In arbitrary governments, the constitution of the ministry follows the constitution of the legislature. Both the law and the magistrate are the creatures of will. It must be so. Nothing, indeed, will appear more certain, on any tolerable consideration of this matter, than that every sort of government ought to have its administration correspondent to its legislature. If it should be otherwise, things must fall into an hideous disorder. The people of a free commonwealth, who have taken such care that their laws should be the re sult of general consent, cannot be so senseless as to
suffer their executory system to be composed of per sons on whom they have no dependence, and whom no
? of the public love and confidence have recom mended to those powers, upon the use of which the very being of the state depends.
proofs
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1
The popular election of magistrates, and popular disposition of rewards and honors, is one of the first advantages of a free state. Without or something equivalent to perhaps the people cannot long enjoy the substance of freedom certainly none of the vivi fying energy of good government. The frame of our commonwealth did not admit of such an actual elec tion: but provided as well, and (while the spirit of the constitution preserved) better for all the effects of than by the method of suffrage in any democratic state whatsoever. It had always, until of late, been held the first duty of Parliament to refuse to support
government, until power was in the hands persons
who were acceptable to the people, or while factions pre dominated in the court in which the nation had no confi
dence. Thus all the good effects of popular election were supposed to be secured to us, without the mis chiefs attending on perpetual intrigue, and distinct canvass for every particular office throughout the body of the people. This was the most noble and refined part of our constitution. The people, by their repre sentatives and grandees, were intrusted with delib erative power in making laws the king with the control of his negative. The king was intrusted with the deliberative choice and the election to oflice the people had the negative in Parliamentary refusal to support. Formerly this power of control was what kept ministers in awe of Parliaments, and Parliaments in reverence with the people. If the use of this pow er of control on the system and persons of adminis tration gone, everything lost, Parliament and all. We may assure ourselves, that Parliament will tamely see evil men take possession of all the strongholds of their country, and allow them time
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and means to fortify themselves, under a pretence of giving them a fair trial, and upon a hope of discover ing, whether they will not be reformed by power, and whether their measures will not be better than their morals ; such a Parliament will give countenance to their measures also, whatever that Parliament may pretend, and whatever those measures may be.
Every good political institution must have a pro ventive operation as well as a remedial. It ought to have a natural tendency to exclude bad men from government, and not to trust for the safety of the state to subsequent punishment alone; punishment, which has ever been tardy and uncertain ; and which, when power is suffered in bad hands, may chance to fall rather on the injured than the criminal.
Before men are put forward into the great trusts of the state, they ought by their conduct to have ob tained such a degree of estimation in their country, as may be some sort of pledge and security to the public, that they will not abuse those trusts. It is no mean security for a proper use of power, that a man has shown by the general tenor of his actions, that the affection, the good opinion, the confidence of his fellow-citizens have been among the principal objects
of his life; and that he has owed none of the gra dations of his power or fortune to a settled contempt, or occasional forfeiture of their esteem.
That man who before he comes into power has no friends, or who coming into power is obliged to de sert his friends, or who losing it has no friends to sympathize with him; he who has no sway among any part of the landed or commercial interest, but whose whole importance has begun with his office, and is sure to end with person who ought
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never to be suffered by a controlling Parliament to continue in any of those situations which confer the lead and direction of all our public affairs; because such a man has no connection with the interest of the
people.
Those knots or cabals of men who have got to
gether, avowedly without any public principle, in or der to sell their conjunct iniquity at the higher rate, and are therefore universally odious, ought never to be suffered to domineer in the state; because they have no connection with the sentiments and opinions of the people.
These are considerations which in my opinion en force the necessity of having some better reason, in a free country, and a free Parliament, for supporting the ministers of the crown, than that short one, That the king has thought proper to appoint them. There is something very courtly in this. But it is a princi ple pregnant with all sorts of mischief, in a constitu tion like ours, to turn the views of active men from the country to the court. Whatever be the road to power, that is the road which will be trod. If the opinion of the country be of no use as a means of power or consideration, the qualities which usually procure that opinion will be no longer cultivated. And whether it will be right, in a state so popular in its constitution as ours, to leave ambition without popular motives, and to trust all to the operation of pure virtue in the minds of kings, and ministers, and public men, must be submitted to the judgment and good sense of the people of England.
Cunning men are here apt to break in, and, with out dircctly controverting the principle, to raise ob
jections from the difficulty under which the sovereign
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labors, to distinguish the genuine voice and senti ments of his people, from the clamor of a faction, by which it is so easily counterfeited. The nation, they say, is generally divided into parties, with views and passions utterly irreconcilable. If the king should put his affairs into the hands of any one of them, he is sure to disgust the rest; if he select particular men from among them all, it is a hazard that he dis gusts them all. Those who are left out, however di vided before, will soon run into a body of opposition; which, being a collection of many discontents into one focus, will without doubt be hot and violent enough. Faction will make its cries resound through the nation, as if the whole were in an uproar, when by far the majority, and much the better part, will seem for a while as it were annihilated by the quiet in which their virtue and moderation incline them to enjoy the blessings of government. Besides that the opinion of the mere vulgar is a miserable rule even with regard to themselves, on account of their vio lence and instability. So that if you were to gratify them in their humor to-day, that very gratification would be a ground of their dissatisfaction on the next. Now as all these rules of public opinion are to be'collected with great difficulty, and to be applied with equal uncertainty as to the effect, what better can a king of England do, than to employ such men as he finds to have views and inclinations most con formable to his own ; who are least infected with
pride and self-will ; and who are least moved by such popular humors as are perpetually traversing his de signs, and disturbing his service ; trusting that, when he means no ill to his people, he will be supported in his appointments, whether he chooses to keep or to
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change, as his private judgment or his pleasure leads him? He will find a sure resource in the real weight and influence of the crown, when it is not suffered to become an instrument in the hands of a faction.
I will not pretend to say, that there is nothing at all in this mode of reasoning; because I will not as sert that there is no difficulty in the art of govern ment. Undoubtedly the very best administration must encounter a great deal of opposition; and the very worst will find more support than it deserves. Sufficient appearances will never be wanting to those who have a mind to deceive themselves. It is a fal lacy in constant use with those who would level all things, and confound right with wrong, to insist upon the inconveniences which are attached to every choice, without taking into consideration the different weight and consequence of those inconveniences. The ques tion is not concerning absolute discontent or perfect satisfaction in government ; neither of which can be
pure and unmixed at any time, or upon any system. The controversy is about that degree of good humor in the people, which may possibly be attained, and ought certainly to be looked for. While some poli ticians may be waiting to know whether the sense of every individual be against them, accurately distin guishing the vulgar from the better sort, drawing lines between the enterprises of a faction and the efforts
of a people, they may chance to see the government, which they are so nicely weighing, and dividing, and distinguishing, tumble to the ground in the midst of their wise deliberation. Prudent men, when so great an object as the security of government, or even its peace, is at stake, will not run the risk of a decision which may be fatal to it. They who can read the
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political sky will see a hurricane in a cloud no big ger than a hand at the very edge of the horizon, and will run into the first harbor. No lines can be laid down for civil or political wisdom. They are a mat ter incapable of exact definition. But, though no man can draw a stroke between the confines of day and night, yet light and darkness are upon the whole tolerably distinguishable. Nor will it be impossible for a prince to find out such a mode of government, and such persons to administer as will give great degree of content to his people without any curious and anxious research for that abstract, universal, per fect harmony, which while he seeking, he abandons those means of ordinary tranquillity which are in his power without any research at all.
not more the duty than the interest of prince, to aim at giving tranquillity to his govern ment. But those who advise him may have an interest in disorder and confusion. If the opinion of the peo ple against them, they will naturally wish that should have no prevalence. Here that the peo ple must on their part show themselves sensible of their own value. Their whole importance, in the first instance, and afterwards their whole freedom,
at stake. Their freedom cannot long survive their
? Here that the natural strength of the kingdom, the great peers, the leading landed gen
tlemen, the opulent merchants and manufacturers, the substantial yeomanry, must interpose, to rescue their prince, themselves, and their posterity.
We are at present at issue upon this point. We are in the great crisis of this contention and the part which men take, one way or other, will serve to discriminate their characters and their principles.
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Until the matter is decided, the country will re main in its present confusion. For while a system of administration is attempted, entirely repugnant to the genius of the people, and not conformable to the plan of their government, everything must necessa rily be disordered for a time, until this system de stroys the constitution, or the constitution gets the better of this system.
There in my opinion, peculiar venom and ma lignity in this political distemper beyond any that have heard or read of. In former times the project ors of arbitrary government attacked only the liber ties of their country; design surely mischievous enough to have satisfied mind of the most unruly ambition. But system unfavorable to freedom may be so formed, as considerably to exalt the grandeur of the state; and men may find, in the pride and splendor of that prosperity, some sort of consolation for the loss of their solid privileges. Indeed the in crease of the power of the state has often been urged by artful men, as pretext for some abridgment of the public liberty. But the scheme of the junto un
der consideration, no_t only strikes palsy into every nerve of our free constitution, but in the same degree benumbs and stupefies the whole executive power: rendering government in all its grand operations lan guid, uncertain, ineffective; making ministers fearful of attempting, and incapable of executing any useful plan of domestic arrangement, or of foreign politics. It tends to produce neither the security of free gov ernment, nor the energy of monarchy that abso lute. Accordingly the crown has dwindled away, in proportion to the unnatural and turgid growth of this excrescence on the court.
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The interior ministry are sensible, that war'is a sit uation which sets in its full light the value of the hearts of a people; and they well know, that the be ginning of the importance of the people must be the end of theirs. For this reason they discover upon all occasions the utmost fear of everything, which by pos sibility may lead to such an event. I do not mean that they manifest any of that pious fear which is backward to commit the safety of the country to the dubious experiment of war. Such a fear, being the tender sensation of virtue, excited, as it is regulated, by reason, frequently shows itself in a seasonable bold
ness, which keeps danger at a distance, by seeming to despise it. Their fear betrays to the first glance of the eye, its true cause, and its real object. Foreign powers, confident in the knowledge of their charac ter, have not scrupled to violate the most_s0lemn treaties; and, in defiance of them, to make conquests in the midst of a general peace, and in the heart of Europe. Such was the conquest of Corsica, by the professed enemies of the freedom of mankind, in de fiance of those who were formerly its professed defend ers. We have had just claims upon the same powers: rights which ought to have been sacred to them as well as to us, as they had their origin in our lenity and generosity towards France and Spain in the day of their great humiliation. Such I call the ransom of Manilla, and the demand on France for the East India prisoners. But these powers put a just confi dence in their resource of the double cabinet. These demands (one of them at least) are hastening fast
towards an acquittal by prescription. Oblivion begins to spread her cobwebs over all our spirited remon st'rances. Some of the most valuable branches of our
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I mean to mark and distinguish the trade of Por
trade are also on the point of perishing from the same cause. I do not mean those branches which bear without the hand of the vine-dresser; I mean those which the policy of treaties had formerly secured to
us ;
tugal, the loss of which, and the power of the cabal, have one and the same era.
If by any chance, the ministers who stand before the curtain possess or affect any spirit, it makes little or no impression. Foreign courts and ministers, who were among the first to discover and to profit by this invention of the doable cabinet, attend very little to their remonstrances. They know that those shad ows of ministers haveJ nothing to do in the ultimate
ealousies and animosities are sedulously nourished in the outward administration, and have been even considered as a causa sine qua
non in its constitution: thence foreign courts have a certainty, that nothing can be done by common coun sel in this nation. If one of those ministers officially takes up a business with spirit, it serves only the bet ter to signalize the meanness of the rest, and the dis cord of them all. His colleagues in office are in haste to shake him off, and to disclaim the whole of his proceedings. Of this nature was that astonishing
transaction, in which Lord Rochford, our ambassador at Paris, remonstrated against the attempt upon Cor sica, in consequence of a direct authority from Lord Shelburne. This remonstrance the French minister treated with the contempt that was natural: as he was assured, from the ambassador of his court to ours, that these orders of Lord Shelburne were not supported by the rest of the (I had like to have said British) administration. Lord Rochford, a man of
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spirit, could not endure this situation. The conse quences were, however, curious. He returns from Paris, and comes home full of anger. Lord Shel burne, who gave the orders, is obliged to give up the seals. Lord Rochford, who obeyed these orders, re ceives them.