During this period the policy of Manuel in the West had yielded
no striking results.
no striking results.
Cambridge Medieval History - v4 - Eastern Roman Empire
In the
second place, the Zupans of Rascia come to play a more and more im-
portant part. After Bolkan we find Uroš Zupan of this region. One
of his daughters married Béla II the Blind, a future King of Hungary.
The other, Mary, became the wife of the Moravian prince Conrad, while
a son, Béla, took up his abode at the Hungarian court, where later he
was to become prominent, and married his daughter to the Russian Prince,
Vladímir Mstilavich. These alliances were to prove extremely useful to
the sons of Uroš when, under Manuel, they were to attempt to cast off
the suzerainty of Constantinople.
## p. 357 (#399) ############################################
John Comnenus in Asia Minor
357
About 1130 John Comnenus was again able to turn his arms
against the Musulmans of Asia Minor. The fruits of the previous
campaigns had not been lost. As far as Iconium was concerned, the
position had remained satisfactory. Masóūd, being dethroned by his
brother, 'Arab, had even come to Constantinople to ask help of the
Emperor, who had supplied him with subsidies to oppose the usurper.
These disputes among the Musulman rulers had lessened their strength,
and for a time the principality of Iconium was less formidable to the
Empire. Far different was the position of the Emir Ghāzī. In 1124 he
had seized upon the principality of Melitene, and then conquered Ancyra
and Comana, and occupied some of the Byzantine strongholds on the
coast of the Black Sea. In 1129, on the death of the Armenian prince
Thoros, he had turned towards Cilicia, and there was every sign that he
was about to contend with his co-religionist, the Atābeg of Mosul, for
his share of the spoils of the Latin princes of Syria. Thus a new enemy
threatened Antioch, and from this time we may discern the reasons which
urged John Comnenus to attempt the overthrow of the Dānishmandite
ruler.
The first expedition of John Comnenus proved abortive; the Em-
peror had hardly crossed into Asia when he learned that a conspiracy
against him had been hatched by his brother Isaac. On receiving this
news he resolved to return to Constantinople. Isaac the Sebastocrator
succeeded in avoiding punishment and escaped into Asia, where he
attempted to draw into the struggle against his brother not only the
Musulman princes, but also the Armenian Thoros and Gabras, Duke
of Trebizond, who had shortly before secured his independence. Isaac
met with but partial success, and only the Emir Ghāzi lent him support.
Even at a distance the Sebastocrator continued his intrigues; he main-
tained communications with various personages at the Court of Constanti-
nople; and when in 1132 John entered upon a campaign against the Emir
Ghāzī, he was soon forced to return to his capital, where a fresh plot, the
result of Isaac's intrigues, had been discovered. As soon as order was
restored the Emperor renewed the campaign, and during the winter of
1132–1133 he took from the Emir Ghāzī the important fortress of Cas-
tamona, which, however, was soon afterwards recovered by the Muslims.
On the death of Ghāzī, which took place next year (1134), the
Emperor decided to profit by the quarrels which immediately arose among
the Mohammedan princes to try his fortune in the field. An expedition
was set on foot against Mahomet, son and heir of Ghāzi, to which
Mas-ūd sent a contingent of troops in the hope of having his share in the
dismemberment of the Dānishmandite state. No advantage accrued to
the Empire from this alliance; the Muslim troops played false during
the siege of Gangra, and John was forced to fall back. Next year, how-
ever, he was more fortunate, and Gangra and Castamona fell into his
hands (1135).
--
CH. XII.
## p. 358 (#400) ############################################
358
Italian affairs
This success at last enabled the Emperor to attempt the realisation
of his designs upon Antioch. A series of negotiations with the Western
Emperor and with Pisa prepared the ground for this new campaign.
It was apparently not before 1135 that John Comnenus entered into
diplomatic relations with the Emperor Lothar who, while he was staying
at Merseburg, gave audience to a Byzantine embassy bearing instruc-
tions from the Greek Emperor to request help against Roger II, King of
Sicily. During the last few years the position of the Norman states in
Italy had sensibly altered. Not only had the Count of Sicily, Roger II,
added the duchy of Apulia to his dominions, but he had raised his pos-
sessions to the rank of a kingdom, and since 1130 had, to the great
indignation of the Byzantines, assumed the title of King. The new king,
intensely ambitious and more powerful than any of his predecessors, did
not confine himself to attacking the coasts of the Greek Empire, but
set up claims to the Latin states of the Holy Land, and in particular
to Antioch. Accordingly John Comnenus found it necessary, before his
departure for Syria to try his fortune in arms, to secure himself
against a fresh invasion of his dominions by the Normans of Italy
during his absence. It was with this object in view that he had recourse
to the Emperor Lothar, whom he urged to make a descent upon Italy
in order to oppose the new king, and to whom for the furtherance of
this design he promised considerable subsidies. Lothar responded to the
Byzantine embassy by sending Anselm of Havelberg to Constantinople.
An agreement was arrived at, and Lothar pledged himself to undertake
an expedition into Italy. He proved as good as his word, and we know
that in 1137, while still in Southern Italy, he received a Greek embassy
bringing him gifts from the Emperor. The negotiations of John Com-
nenus with the Pisans were in the same way dictated by a wish to detach
them from the Norman alliance, and ended in 1136 in a renewal of treaty
engagements.
Having thus secured his dominions against a possible attack by the
Normans, John Comnenus could at last undertake the long-meditated
expedition to restore Antioch and its surrounding territory to the Empire
(1137). But before invading the principality the Byzantine army had
another task to accomplish. The territory of the Empire no longer
actually extended as far as the frontier of Antioch, from which it was
now separated by the dominions of the Armenian Leo. This prince (a
descendant of Rupen, one of those Armenian rulers who, fleeing before
the advance of the Muslims, had established themselves in the Taurus
and in the neighbourhood of the Euphrates) had in 1129 succeeded his
brother Thoros. After an open breach with the Empire, he had made
himself master of the chief towns of Cilicia-Tarsus, Adana, and
Mamistra. His possessions thus barred the path of John's army, and
the conquest of Cilicia was the necessary prelude to the siege of Antioch.
In the early part of the campaign the Emperor met with unbroken
## p. 359 (#401) ############################################
John in Syria and Cilicia
359
success. Tarsus, Adana, and Mamistra were quickly captured, and then
came the turn of Anazarbus and the surrounding district. Leo, with his
two sons, Rupen and Thoros, was obliged to seek safety in the mountains.
Without stopping to pursue them, John at once took the road to
Antioch, for at that moment circumstances were eminently favourable to
the Greeks.
When John appeared before the city (end of August 1137) Raymond
of Poitiers, who, by his marriage with Constance daughter of Bohemond
II, had become Prince of Antioch, was absent from his capital. Although
aware of the impending attack by the Byzantines, Raymond had not
hesitated to go to the help of the King of Jerusalem, who had just suffered
a serious defeat at the hands of the Atābeg of Mosul, 'Imād-ad-Dīn
Zangī, at Hārim. When Raymond returned, the siege of Antioch had
already begun. The besieged, owing to the disaster which had just
befallen the Latins in their struggle with the Mohammedans, despaired
of receiving succour, and from the first a considerable party of them had
contemplated negotiations with the Emperor. Certain of the records
make it appear probable that the King of Jerusalem, on being consulted,
had admitted the validity of the Greek Emperor's claims, and had recom-
mended negotiation. Whatever may be the truth about these pourparlers,
it is plain that Raymond, threatened with the loss of his dominions,
preferred treating with John Comnenus. At the moment the Emperor
was bent above all on obtaining a formal recognition of his claims, while
for Raymond the main desideratum was the withdrawal of the Byzantines.
Once this point had been gained, other matters might be arranged as
circumstances should dictate. After some negotiation the Prince of
Antioch consented to take the oath of fealty to John Comnenus, and, as
a sign of his submission, to hoist the imperial banners on the walls of
the city. The Emperor in exchange bound himself to help the Latins the
next year in their struggle with the Muslims, but it was stipulated that
if by the help of the Basileus Raymond should recover Aleppo, Shaizar,
Emesa, and Hamāh, he should restore Antioch to the Greek Empire.
This agreement being concluded John returned to Cilicia. It seems
probable that it was on this occasion that he succeeded in capturing the
Armenian prince, Leo, who with his two sons was sent prisoner to
Constantinople, where not long afterwards he died.
Faithful to his engagements, John opened the campaign in the spring
of 1138. The Byzantine army, swelled by the Latin contingents, took in
succession Balat (between Antioch and Aleppo) and Bizāʻa. The allies,
however, failed to surprise Aleppo, and turned to besiege Shaizar on the
Orontes on 29 April 1138. Before long serious dissensions broke out
between the Latin princes and the Emperor. John, indignant at the
suspicious behaviour of the Prince of Antioch and of Joscelin, Count of
Edessa, seized upon the first pretext he could find to raise the siege and
grant the defenders conditions which they had never hoped for,
CH. XII.
## p. 360 (#402) ############################################
360
John and the Western -Empire
Returning northwards by the valley of the Orontes, the army fell
back upon Antioch, John making a solemn entry into the city. During
his stay there, the Emperor, in virtue of the feudal rule obliging a vassal
to hand over his castle to his suzerain whenever he was required by him
to do so, demanded possession of the citadel. The Latin rulers, not
daring a direct refusal, got out of the difficulty by stirring up a riot
in the city. In the face of the menacing attitude of the populace, John
for the time being ceased to urge his claims and quitted Antioch. The
Emperor once gone, the Latins again offered to treat. The result was a
hollow reconciliation.
The Greek army then set out on its return. While, on its march
towards Constantinople, it was securing the safety of the frontier by
police operations against brigands, Isaac Comnenus came to make sub-
mission to his brother and received his pardon. The sole result of the
campaign was the recognition of the imperial rights over Antioch, whereby
the prestige of the Emperor was strikingly increased, not only in the eyes
of his subjects but also in those of the Musulmans and Latins. No
practical advantage, however, was obtained.
In 1139 the war against the Musulmans was resumed. The Danish-
mandite prince Mahomet had taken several places in Cilicia from the
Byzantines, and then proceeded to ravage the country as far as the
Sangarius. John drove off these invading bands, and during the winter
of 1139-1140 laid siege to Neo-Caesarea. In this campaign John, son
of Isaac Comnenus, deserted to the enemy? On his return to Constanti-
nople (15 January 1141) the Emperor planned a new campaign, the object
of which was Antioch.
A series of diplomatic operations was again undertaken in order to
hold the King of Sicily in check during the Emperor's absence. Lothar
had died on returning from his Italian campaign, and had been succeeded
by Conrad III. In 1140 John asked Conrad to renew the alliance made
with his predecessor, and in order to set a seal upon the friendship
requested the hand of a princess of the imperial house for his youngest
son Manuel. Conrad in reply offered his sister-in-law Bertha, daughter
of the Count of Sulzbach. In 1142 another Byzantine embassy was des-
patched with instructions to treat of the question of a descent upon Italy.
Conrad in return sent his chaplain Albert and Robert, Prince of Capua,
to Constantinople. A Greek embassy carried John's reply, and brought
back the future Empress. These negotiations were disquieting to the
King of Sicily, who, in order to break up the league between his enemies,
sent an embassy at the beginning of 1143 to propose an alliance with
John.
1 He became a Musulman and married a daughter of the Sultan of Iconium.
Bayazid I claimed to be descended from this marriage. Cf. Du Cange, Familiae
byzantinae in the Historia byzantina duplici commentario illustrata, Paris 1680,
p. 190.
## p. 361 (#403) ############################################
John and the Principality of Antioch
361
While the negotiations with Conrad were going on, the Emperor
again set out for Antioch. The whole of the early part of the campaign
was devoted to police work in the neighbourhood of Sozopolis. The
army then marched to Attalia, and here a double blow fell upon the
Emperor. Within a short interval he lost, first his son Alexius, whom
he had associated in the government, and then another son Andronicus.
This twofold bereavement did not turn the Emperor from his purpose,
and on leaving Attalia the army took the road to Syria.
Since 1138 the position of the Latin states harassed by the Muslims had
only altered for the worse. During the last few years they had repeatedly
begged help from the Byzantines. Having learned by past experience, John
Comnenus did not trust to the promises which had been made to him, and
above all he resolved to make himself secure of the fidelity of the Latin
rulers by exacting hostages from them. He took pains to conceal the
object of his expedition by giving out that he intended only to put into
a state of defence the towns in Cilicia which he had taken from Leo.
Thanks to these precautions the Emperor was enabled to descend upon
the Latin territory in a totally unexpected manner.
John had not for-
gotten the behaviour of Joscelin during the last campaign; so the first
attack was made on him, the Emperor appearing suddenly in front of
Turbessel. The Count of Edessa, taken by surprise, was obliged to give
up his daughter as a hostage, and from Turbessel the Emperor marched
to the castle of Gastin (1142). There he demanded of Raymond the ful-
filment of his promise to surrender Antioch. Raymond thus driven into
a corner took up a pitiful attitude, sheltering himself behind the wishes
of his vassals. An important part in the matter was played by the
Latin clergy, to whom it was a source of annoyance that the progress of
the Greek clergy proceeded pari passu with that of the Byzantine armies.
The demands of the Basileus were rejected in the name of the Pope and
of the Western Emperor.
John Comnenus had certainly foreseen this refusal and had determined
to take Antioch by force. This siege was in his eyes only a prelude to
the campaign which he intended to wage against the Musulmans—a
campaign which, if his views were realised, would be crowned by the
entrance into Jerusalem of the Byzantine troops. But having been de-
layed, doubtless by the death of his sons, the Emperor reached Antioch
too late in the season to begin a siege which could not fail to be a long
He resolved therefore to postpone the renewal of hostilities, and
led his troops into Cilicia where he intended to winter. It was there that
an accidental wound from a poisoned arrow, received during a hunting
party, carried him off on 8 April 1143, at the moment when he was
looking forward to the attainment of the object which had been the goal
of his entire policy. On his deathbed John named as his successor
Manuel, the youngest of his sons, and procured his recognition by the
army.
one,
CH, XII.
## p. 362 (#404) ############################################
362
Accession of Manuel Comnenus
Manuel when he ascended the throne was about twenty years old.
For the first few years of his reign he continued the confidence which his
father had placed in Axuch and John Puzes, and it was only little
by little that the young Emperor's personality developed and made its
mark by the direction that he gave to his policy. Manuel's disposition
shewed a singular mixture of qualities in the most marked contrast to
one another. While on the one hand he has some of the most char-
acteristic traits of the Byzantine type, other sides of his nature seem to
mark him out as a product of Western civilisation. He is the typical
knight-king, and in courage might compare with Richard Coeur-de-
Lion. Even on the first campaign in which he accompanied his father,
Manuel shewed himself a bold and courageous warrior, ever a lover of
the brilliant bouts and thrusts of single combat. It may be that in
his campaigns he proved himself rather a valiant knight than a great
general, that he sought too eagerly after those successes, rather showy
than permanent, which evoke the plaudits of women and the encomiums
of court poets. He constantly sought opportunity to display his skill in
riding and fencing, hunting and tournaments, and evidently looked upon
it as his vocation to repeat the exploits of the paladins. Hence it is that
Manuel is open to the reproach of having cared less for realities than for
show, of having attempted to carry out simultaneously projects on a
gigantic scale, any single one of which would have taxed the resources of
the Empire. This is the weak side of his policy. Manuel attempted to
get others to carry out the tasks which he could not himself accomplish;
hence arose the failures he met with. It would appear further that
Manuel was fitted only for success, and was incapable of bearing mis-
fortune. At his only defeat, the disaster of Myriocephalum, when he
saw that he was beaten and in danger of being slain by the enemy
with the poor remains of his army, his one idea was to take to flight
without giving a thought to his soldiers. Only the opposition of his
captains prevented him from carrying out this disgraceful intention.
Manuel's devotion to the ideals of chivalry and his two marriages
with Western princesses fostered in him a strong preference for the Latins.
Men of Western race, whether Germans, French, Normans, Italians, or
English, were sure of his eager welcome, and of finding posts about his
court or in his army. Though ignorant of the Greek language, these
foreigners who “spat better than they spoke” contrived, nevertheless, to
fill considerable administrative offices, to the great disgust of the Emperor's
subjects. Nor were they any better pleased to see the Venetians, Pisans,
and Genoese settle down at Constantinople. This policy on the part of
Manuel led to the accumulation of the national hatred against the Latins
which was to burst forth in the reign of Andronicus.
Manuel, like his grandfather Alexius, brought a keen interest to
theological questions. He prided himself on being a theologian and took
pleasure in theological discussions, as the Patriarch Cosmas found, who
## p. 363 (#405) ############################################
His character
363
was deposed in 1147 for his adhesion to the doctrines of Niphon, a
Bogomile monk. Manuel considered himself to possess inspired know-
ledge, and was in the habit of imposing his decisions upon the clergy. In
the cases of Soterichus Panteugenus, of Basilaces, and of Michael of
Thessalonica (the representatives of a little group of priests charged with
holding views inspired by Platonic philosophy), the Emperor's sentence
was decisive (1157). Later on, towards the close of the reign, in the teeth
of the opposition of the clergy and the Patriarch, Manuel imposed his own
view in a discussion which brought up afresh the doctrine promulgated
by the Councils of Nicaea and Constantinople regarding the relation be-
tween the Father and the Son. Manuel decided the question in a sense
opposite to the traditional doctrine. Finally, we must note the attempt
made by Manuel in 1170 to bring about the re-union of the Armenian
and Greek Churches. Despite the skill of Theorianus, who was entrusted
by the Emperor with the duty of carrying on the negotiation with the
Katholikos Nerses, the discussions led to no result.
In contrast to Manuel the theologian there was another Manuel, a
dabbler in astrology. Astrologers enjoyed great prestige at the imperial
court. The Basileus consulted them upon all important expeditions, and
forbade his generals to give battle unless the stars were propitious. Manuel
was a believer in magic and in spells. Even on his deathbed his confidence
in all the charlatans who surrounded him remained unskaken.
Theological and scientific questions, however, did not engross the
Emperor's interest. Manuel, and following his example the whole court,
took a pride in shewing a taste for letters; the literary revival initiated
in the preceding century in the time of Psellus was continued during
this reign. The princesses of the imperial family encouraged authors;
the Empress Irene accepted the dedication of the Chiliads of Tzetzes,
and another Irene, wife of Andronicus, Manuel's brother, was the ac-
knowledged patroness of literary men. A little court of the learned
gathered round her, among the ornaments of which were Tzetzes, Con-
stantine Manasses, and one of the Prodromoi. Manuel's niece and mistress,
Theodora, was the correspondent of Glycas. Other court ladies took to
writing themselves, and it was at this time that Anna Comnena finished
her Aleriad, the continuation of Bryennius' work in honour of Alexius.
Her example was followed by Zonaras and Glycas, the compilers of
chronicles, and at the same time Cinnamus and Nicetas Acominatus
collected the materials for their works.
Rhetoric also had its representatives, and one of the best judges of
classical antiquity, Eustathius, Archbishop of Thessalonica, pronounced
some of his orations during this reign. He was one of the most distin-
guished members of the learned and scholarly group of clergy, devoted
to philosophical speculation, several of whom have already been men-
tioned in dealing with the theological controversies of the day.
The arts were not neglected at Manuel's court. If he took pleasure
CH. XII.
## p. 364 (#406) ############################################
364
Manuel's administration
in re-building the palace of the Blachernae, which he decorated with
mosaics commemorating his exploits, and in erecting sumptuous villas
on the coast of Asia Minor and on the islands in the neighbour-
hood of Constantinople where he could go for relaxation after his
military exertions, he did not forget public edifices. He had the
walls of Constantinople repaired, spent money freely on constructing
aqueducts, and undertook operations to make the closing of the harbour
possible. On the other hand he did little in the way of ecclesiastical
building. He used to rally his courtiers on the vanity which urged them
to build monasteries or churches on purpose to erect their tombs there,
and used to declare that he only approved of monks in solitary places,
and looked with horror on the turbulent monks dwelling in towns and
devoting themselves solely to increasing the possessions of their monas-
teries. By way of setting an example he built a monastery near the
entrance to the strait of the Bosphorus, to which he made no donation
of lands, confining himself to a yearly grant out of the public treasury
sufficient for the maintenance of the monks. Manuel's legislation as to
ecclesiastical property is inspired by the same spirit. The imperial
Novels forbid churches and monasteries to add to the lands already
in their possession, but on the other hand legalise the ownership of those
actually held, even when the title could not be shewn or was defective.
In this way a general settlement was arrived at, but at the expense of the
lay owners, who now saw a legal sanction given to all the usurpations of
which they had been victims.
The foreign policy of Manuel was carried out at enormous expense,
and was extremely burdensome to the imperial treasury. In order to fill
it the Emperor was forced to use great severity in the collection of the
taxes and to have recourse to all kinds of financial expedients. The
most important seems to have been the converting of the obligation to
maintain the navy, which was laid upon certain themes, into a tax-
measure analogous to that formerly resorted to by Constantine IX
with regard to service in the army. In conjunction with this measure
should be noted the novel distributions of land on condition of mili-
tary service, grants made for the most part to prisoners of war or to
barbarian tribes. These ineasures caused great disturbances in the
provinces and brought about a strained situation there, chiefly known
to us through the efforts made later by Andronicus Comnenus to find a
remedy.
John Comnenus, in choosing his youngest son to succeed him, had
set aside the rights of the elder, the Sebastocrator Isaac. If the young
Emperor had the army on his side his brother had the advantage
of being in the capital. In order that a conflict might be avoided,
Manuel must at all costs make himself master of Constantinople before
the news of John's death was known there. The business was entrusted
to Axuch, who successfully carried out the task confided to him. He
## p. 365 (#407) ############################################
Turkish attacks
365
contrived to seize both Isaacs, uncle and nephew, and with no great
difficulty defeated a plot to set the crown on the head of the Caesar
John-Roger, Manuel's brother-in-law. When the Emperor appeared
before his capital, peace was already established; he reached his palace
easily enough, and largess, distributed on a lavish scale to clergy and
people, secured his popularity.
On the death of John Comnenus the Latins of Antioch had again
taken the offensive, and even while Manuel was still in the East had
begun hostilities and occupied several places in Cilicia. This provocation
had been keenly resented by Manuel, who made it his first care to send
troops to Cilicia to deal with the Latins. The Greek arms were victorious,
and in 1145 Raymond of Poitiers had to submit to the humiliation of
coming to Constantinople to ask mercy of Manuel; he was compelled
to visit the church of the Pantokrator and make the amende at the dead
Emperor's tomb.
While the Byzantine army was on its way back from Cilicia, the
troops of the Sultan of Iconium had carried off several persons of impor-
tance at court; further invasions had then taken place, the Muslim bands
advancing as far as Pithecas near Nicaea ; the whole of the Byzantine
possessions in Asia Minor were devastated, ruins were heaped up on every
side, and the luckless populations were forced to leave their villages and
seek refuge in the towns along the coast. Thus one of the first tasks
with which Manuel was faced was to secure his frontier in Asia by the
erection of a series of fortified posts, intended to check the invaders. This
was his main work, and he pursued it to the end of his reign. At
the same time he attempted to strike at the heart of the Musulman
power, more than once endeavouring to reduce Iconium. At the opening
of his reign he was aided in his struggle against Masóūd by the divisions
among the Muslim leaders which had followed upon the death of the
Dānishmandite prince Mahomet (1141). His lands were divided be-
tween his son, Dhü'l-Nun, who obtained Caesarea, and his brothers,
Yaʻqūb Arslān and ‘Ain-ad-Daulah, whose shares respectively were Sīwās
and Melitene. Threatened by Masóūd, Yaʻqūb Arslān, the most powerful
of the heirs of Mahomet, treated with Manuel who helped him with
subsidies. During the years 1146-1147 the Greeks fought with no great
measure of success; Manuel got as far as Iconium, but failed to take it.
At the moment when the crusaders appeared before Constantinople,
Manuel had just concluded a truce with Masóūd.
During this period the policy of Manuel in the West had yielded
no striking results. For a short time the Emperor seemed to be meditating
a league with the King of Sicily, but he soon returned to the idea
of a German alliance, and in January 1146 took to wife Bertha of
Sulzbach, sister-in-law of Conrad. But at the very time when this
marriage seemed to have set a seal upon his friendship with Germany,
all that had been gained by it was lost by the opening of the Second
CH. XII.
## p. 366 (#408) ############################################
366
The Second Crusade
Crusade, the Greek Empire being left to confront the Norman
power
in
a state of complete isolation.
Learning of the new Crusade by letters from Louis VII and the Pope,
Eugenius III, Manuel immediately set himself to obtain guarantees
against all eventualities by demanding of the Pope that the crusaders
should bind themselves to him by engagements similar to those taken by
the leaders of the First Crusade to Alexius. In return he promised that
on payment being forthcoming provisions should be supplied. At the
assembly of Étampes (February 1147) Manuel's envoys met those of
Roger II, who had been instructed to bring about the diversion of the
Crusade to their master's profit by promising large advantages. The
influence of Conrad, who had only joined in the project for a Crusade
at the end of 1146, was certainly not without its weight in the decision
to go by Constantinople. The fact that not only the King of France
but also the King of Germany was to take part in the expedition made
the position of Manuel with regard to the crusaders all the more perilous.
He was haunted by the fear that, if the Western troops collected outside
his capital, they might be tempted to an assault upon Constantinople.
He made every effort to avoid this danger, his task being rendered easier
by the ill-feeling of Conrad towards the French.
The measures taken with regard to the crusaders were of the same
kind as those employed by Alexius in the case of the First Crusade. The
Byzantine troops were disposed so as to confinė the streams of pilgrims
in a single channel and to prevent the pillaging bands from wandering
too far from the prescribed route. The elements of which the crusading
army was composed made these precautions necessary. Not only were
there warriors on the march; the bulk of the army consisted of pilgrims
and of a rout of adventurers ready for any mischief.
The Germans were first to pass through the imperial territory. Their
relations with the Greeks were as bad as possible, outrages being committed
on both sides which generated violent excitement. Hadrianople was
especially the scene of bloodshed. Manuel made a last effort to divert
the crusaders from the route through Constantinople and to persuade
them to pass through Sestos, but his suggestions were listened to with
suspicion and were rejected. Many disasters would have been avoided
if his advice had been taken, and it was the route recommended
by him which Louis VII took after the destruction of the German
army.
Little is known of the relations between Manuel and Conrad during
the time that the crusading army remained before Constantinople. It
is probable that the two Emperors did not meet; at the same time they
appear to have come to an agreement. The news of the arrival of Louis
VII decided Conrad upon crossing over into Asia Minor—a step which
all the urgency of Manuel had not availed to secure. The march of the
German army upon Iconium ended in disaster. The crusaders, although
## p. 367 (#409) ############################################
Conrad III and Louis VII
367
aware of the length of the journey, had not brought a sufficient quantity
of provisions ; famine soon made its appearance, whereupon the Greek
guides were alarmed by accusations of treachery, which caused them to
abandon the army and take to flight. The crusaders were forced to fall
back upon Nicomedia, harassed as they marched by the Turks who slew
them in thousands; as many perished by famine. At Nicomedia the
remnants of Conrad's army found the French.
The journey of the French across the Greek territories was equally
accompanied by acts of violence; but a Latin eye-witness admits that
up to their arrival before Constantinople the Franks did as much injury
to the Greeks as they received from them, and that the wrongs were
on both sides. Manuel welcomed Louis VII, but made every effort to in-
duce him to cross at once to the coast of Asia Minor. The apprehension
which the Greek Emperor shewed is justified by the known fact that
there was a regular party in the King of France's council urgent for the
taking of Constantinople.
The French once across the Bosphorus, new difficulties arose. Manuel
demanded that the barons should do homage and swear fealty to him,
and after long parleying Louis ended by yielding. Having joined the
wrecks of the German army, the French gave up the idea of marching
upon Iconium and took the road for Attalia. At Ephesus Conrad fell ill,
and abandoned the Crusade. The march of the crusaders through the
Asiatic provinces of the Byzantine Empire was marked by similar acts of
violence to those committed in Europe; this explains the fighting which
took place between the Greeks and the Latins. The chief accusation
brought against the Greeks is that they did not supply provisions and
that they charged too dear for such as they did supply. The vast numbers
of the crusaders made provisioning a matter of great difficulty, and the
presence of unnumbered multitudes in one place is a sufficient explana-
tion of the dearness of commodities.
The army of Louis VII, thus ill-provided, suffered greatly on the
march from Laodicea to Attalia. The Musulman bands had appeared,
and their unceasing attacks added to the difficulties of the mountain
route. The army reached Attalia in a deplorable state. Here provisions
were still lacking. Louis VII and the chief lords hired ships of the Greeks
and departed, forsaking the mass of the pilgrims. The leaders left in
charge abandoned them in their turn. The wretched people fell a prey to
the Turks, and to the Greeks who were exasperated at the acts of pillage
which the famished multitude had committed.
Manuel has been held responsible for the failure of the Second Crusade.
Such accusations are now to a large extent discredited by historians.
The ill-success of the Crusade was due to defective organisation, to the
want of discipline among the crusaders, and to their obstinate persistence,
in spite of the Emperor's advice, in following the road taken by Godfrey
of Bouillon and his companions.
CH. XII.
## p. 368 (#410) ############################################
368
Manuel and Roger II
Conrad, who had been left behind sick at Ephesus, was received by
Manuel, who brought him to Constantinople and loaded him with
attentions. The fact was that Manuel was just then threatened by a
danger which made the prospect of help from the German King of
great value to him. Profiting by the difficulties into which the Basileus
was thrown by the coming of the crusaders, Roger II of Sicily had
in the autumn of 1147 directed a naval attack upon the coast of the
Empire. Corfù had fallen into his hands; Negropont and Cerigo had
been ravaged. The Normans then sailed up the Gulf of Corinth and
took Thebes and Corinth (centres of the silk-trade and two of the
most important commercial towns in the Empire), their rich warehouses
being given up to pillage. In order to resist this aggression, Manuel, while
the crusaders were still on the Asiatic shore of the Bosphorus, had in
vain begged for help from Conrad and Louis. He was obliged to meet
the Normans with his own forces, for which however he had secured the
support of the Venetian fleet.
Being detained by an invasion of the Cumans (1148), Manuel sent
the Grand Domestic Axuch and the Grand Duke Alexius Contoste-
phanus to occupy the places taken by the Normans and to besiege Corfù.
It was during the winter of 1148–1149 that Manuel received Conrad,
who was returning from the Holy Land, and concluded a treaty with
him, by which the German king bound himself to make a descent upon
Italy in order to attack Roger II (1149).
Corfù having been re-taken (summer of 1149), Manuel resolved to
organise an expedition to punish Roger II. A revolt among the Serbs,
supported by the King of Sicily, prevented him from carrying out his
plan. Roger II, threatened by the Germano-Byzantine alliance, created
difficulties for them both which hindered them from carrying out their
project of an invasion of Italy. While Welf, thanks to supplies furnished
by Roger, fomented an agitation which detained Conrad in Germany, the
Sicilian king was launching the Serbs and Hungarians against the Greek
Empire. Hungary and Constantinople were at that time on very bad terms
owing to their pursuing a diametrically opposite policy in Russia. While
Géza, King of Hungary, maintained the claims of his brother-in-law
Izyaslav to the throne of Kiev, Manuel gave his support to George Dolgo-
ruki, son of Vladímir Monomachus, who was also favoured by Vladimirko,
Prince of Halicz. At the instigation of the King of Sicily, Géza en-
couraged the Župan of Rascia, Pervoslav Uroš, to revolt, and the
disturbance which broke out in Serbia in the autumn of 1149 kept
Manuel occupied until 1150. The Serbs having been subdued, Manuel,
eager to punish their Hungarian supporters, took advantage in 1151 of
the absence of Géza, who was maintaining Izyaslav's cause in Russia against
Vladimirko, to take Semlin and ravage the country between the Save and
the Danube. Peace was signed the same year, but in 1152 hostilities broke
out again, and Géza formed a connexion with Manuel's cousin, Andronicus
## p. 369 (#411) ############################################
The Greeks in Italy
369
Comnenus, the future Emperor. This treason was discovered and An-
dronicus was arrested. The struggle lasted until 1155, when peace was
signed. The only appreciable result of the campaigns seems to have been
the conquest of Semlin.
Roger II had not been satisfied with stirring up the Serbs and Hun-
garians against Manuel; he had at the same time made use of the failure
of the Crusade to attempt the organisation of a European coalition
against him. Louis VII sympathised with these projects, but Conrad's
fidelity to the Byzantine alliance, and the rupture which took place in
1150 between Pope Eugenius III and Roger, prevented the latter's designs
from taking effect. Finally in 1152 the death of Conrad delivered the
Norman King from the peril of a Germano-Byzantine alliance.
With Conrad's successor,
Frederick Barbarossa, Manuel was never able
to come to an understanding. From the beginning of his reign Bar-
barossa refused to countenance any territorial advantage which might be
gained by the Basileus in Italy—a concession which Conrad had made.
From 1152 to 1158 numerous embassies came and went between the two
Emperors, but it was found impossible to arrange an alliance. Wishing
to take advantage of the death of Roger II in 1154, Frederick Barbarossa
made a descent upon Italy. Manuel, fearing that this expedition having
been made without reference to him might prove to have been made against
him, decided to try his fortune single-handed and to make his profit out of
the unsettled conditions which had followed on the death of Roger II. He
dispatched to Italy Michael Palaeologus, who in the course of 1155, thanks
to the support of Robert of Loritello, a revolted vassal of the Norman
King William I, and his fellow-rebels, achieved unlooked-for success. In
a few months the Greek Emperor's authority was recognised from Ancona
to Taranto. This success turned Manuel's head, and was chiefly instru-
mental in giving a new direction to his policy. At the very time when
in 1155 the German Emperor, forced to own himself unable to maintain
order in Italy and to play the part he had assumed of protector of the
Papacy, abandoned the idea of invading the Norman Kingdom, the
Basileus was enforcing the recognition of his own imperial authority in
all that part of Italy which had formerly been in the possession of the
Greek Emperors. Hence arose in Manuel the desire to restore the Eastern
Empire to what it had been in the time of Justinian, and to obtain from
the Pope the re-establishment of imperial unity in exchange for the re-
union of the Greek Church with the Church of Rome. The first nego-
tiations with this object were begun with Hadrian IV, and the rupture
which took place at this time between the Papacy and the Western
Emperor seemned to Manuel likely to further the accomplishment of his
dream.
The counter-strokes of William I, which in a short time demolished
the frail edifice of Byzantine conquest, did not avail to dissuade Manuel
from his project. Southern Italian questions became of secondary im-
C. MED. H. VOL. IV. CH. XII.
24
## p. 370 (#412) ############################################
370
Manuel and Alexander III
portance to him in comparison with the schemes he was caressing, and
he made no difficulty in 1158 in complying with the suggestions of the
Papacy, which, leaning as it did on the support of the kingdom of Sicily
and of the Greek Empire, desired to see peace restored between its two
allies.
From 1157 onwards Byzantine policy is governed wholly by the idea
of restoring the unity of the Empire. For the sake of clearness we will
consider in order the relations of Manuel with Italy and Frederick Bar-
barossa, with the Hungarians and Serbs, and finally with the Muslims
and the Latins of the East.
It was natural that Manuel should shew himself favourable to the
Pope, Alexander III. During the years from 1161 to 1163 long nego-
tions went on between the Emperor, Alexander III, and Louis VII con-
cerning a coalition to be formed against the Western Emperor. Three
years later Manuel judged that the Pope was sufficiently in need of his
help to make it safe to acquaint him completely with his desire to re-
establish the unity of the Empire under his sceptre. Negotiations about
this project went on for several years, Manuel remaining the ally of Alex-
ander until the preliminaries of the Peace of Venice (1177). Although his
name does not appear as one of the signatories of the peace, the connexion
between the Papacy and Constantinople lasted as long as Manuel reigned.
If the understanding between the Pope and the Greek Emperor led to
nothing, one of the chief causes of this was the opposition maintained by
the King of Sicily to the Byzantine policy. It will readily be understood
that neither William I nor William II looked with favour on the attempts
of Manuel to gain a footing in Italy, but that both on the contrary
offered a vigorous resistance. Manuel tried every means of overcoming
their opposition; he had recourse to Louis VII, and on two occasions he
endeavoured to arrange for the marriage of his daughter Mary with
William II. But just as matters seemed to be finally settled, the match
was broken off, Barbarossa having made overtures to Manuel which seemed
to him to promise a more brilliant future to his daughter than alliance
with William of Sicily could offer.
Manuel's attitude towards the Italian cities was a natural result of
his policy with regard to Alexander III. He endeavoured by every
possible means to attach to his interest a group of dependent Italian
towns, or at least to be able to rely on the support of a party in the
more important cities. Milan was encouraged by him in her struggle
with Barbarossa, and Byzantine gold helped to rebuild her streets.
Cremona and Pavia had their share of the Greek subsidies. Once already
Ancona had given itself up to Palaeologus, and later on, about 1166, its
population embraced the Greek cause, won over by the gold of Manuel's
emissaries. In 1167 Barbarossa was only able to win a partial advantage
over them.
With Pisa Manuel in 1161 entered into negotiations which lasted
## p. 371 (#413) ############################################
Manuel, Venice, and Barbarossa
371
until 1172. Dragged in different directions by their Ghibelline sym-
pathies and their desire to take advantage of the commercial privileges
offered by the Basileus, the Pisans pursued an indecisive policy. The
Genoese in the same way treated with the Greek Emperor in 1155, but
also with Barbarossa in 1162. Though intercourse between them and
Constantinople was broken off in 1162, it was resumed in 1164, and went
on until 1170. Manuel was never able to bring the Genoese to the
point of breaking with Barbarossa.
The Greek occupation of Ancona and the recapture of the Dalmatian
towns gave some anxiety to the Venetians, who had very nearly come to a
breach with Manuel at the time of the siege of Corfù, as the result of an
unpleasant incident which occurred between the troops of the two nations.
Things reached such a point that in 1167 relations between the two
countries were completely broken off. The doge even recalled all those
of his nation who had settled upon Greek territory. Diplomatic inter-
course, resumed at the request of Manuel who drew the Venetians into a
veritable snare, was again definitively broken off on 12 March 1171. On
this date Manuel ordered the arrest of all Venetians settled in his dominions
and the confiscation of their goods. Enormous damage was thus inflicted
upon Venice. In revenge the republic during the winter of 1171-2
pillaged the coasts of the Empire and ravaged Negropont, Chios, and
Lesbos. In the course of the campaign negotiations were initiated in
which the Venetians were duped. These were continued without result
up to 1175. At this date Venice made an alliance with William II, King
of Sicily. Thus directly threatened, Manuel decided upon concessions.
He set at liberty the prisoners arrested in 1171, restored their goods to
them, and granted to Venice the privileges enjoyed under former treaties
of commerce. In the interval, in 1173, Venice had given help to the
Germans in their attempt to take Ancona from the Greeks.
The policy which Manuel pursued in Italy naturally reacted upon
the relations between the Greek Empire and the Germans. The atti-
tude which he took up there would naturally have as its first consequence
a complete rupture with Barbarossa. This, however, was postponed for
some time owing to the secrecy with which the Greek Emperor con-
trived to cover up his intrigues. It was only when the occupation of
Ancona took place in 1166 that Manuel's hostility to Barbarossa shewed
itself clearly. From 1159 to 1165 several embassies were exchanged
between the two Emperors, and in 1166 Henry, Duke of Austria, made a
useless journey to Manuel's court to attempt to bring about an under-
standing. Just at that time Manuel's occupation of Ancona had opened
Barbarossa's eyes, and he was determined to avenge himself on the earliest
opportunity. However, the progress made by Manuel in Italy, marked
by the treaties with Genoa in 1169 and with Pisa in 1170, decided Bar-
barossa on attempting a reconciliation. From 1170 to 1172 proposals
were discussed for the marriage of Manuel's daughter with Barbarossa's
CB. XII.
24-2
## p. 372 (#414) ############################################
372
Manuel and Hungary
son. They led to nothing, and in 1173 Barbarossa was engaged in the
siege of Ancona (which had given itself up to the Greeks), and was also
trying to negotiate an alliance with William II, evidently directed against
Manuel. At the same time the Western Emperor was attempting in his
turn to create difficulties for his adversary, and was treating with the
Sultan of Iconium. Manuel took no share in the Treaty of Venice (1177)
and, as we shall see, continued the struggle with the Western Emperor
up to the last day of his life.
His Italian policy, being based wholly on diplomacy, always left the
greater part of the military forces of the Empire free, a circumstance
which enabled the Emperor at the same time to pursue a more active
and warlike course in two other quarters, Hungary and Asia. Since the
peace signed with Géza, Manuel had played a waiting game in Hungary,
content with giving a refuge at Constantinople to two of the king's
brothers, the future Stephen IV and Ladislas. At the death of Géza
(1161), Manuel had made use of the pretenders whom he had at hand
in order to interfere in the concerns of the Hungarian succession, calcu-
lating thus to secure some advantage for the Empire. The laws of
succession were not yet fully fixed in Hungary, and Stephen IV could
plead in his favour the ancient usage by which the brother of a dead
king was to be preferred to the son, in order to put forward a claim
to the throne to the prejudice of his nephew Stephen III. Manuel
supported the claims of his protégé by Byzantine troops. A strong party
grew up in Hungary hostile to the claims of Géza's son, but refusing
to admit those of Stephen IV, who was looked upon as too much the
vassal of Constantinople. The Hungarians feared that by giving the
crown to Stephen IV their country might become a mere satellite of
Constantinople, and to avoid this danger made choice of Ladislas, brother
of Stephen IV, whom they regarded as less submissive to the influence of
the Byzantine court. Ladislas was barely seated on the throne when he
died (1162). The struggle between the two Stephens then recommenced,
Manuel still giving support to his candidate. To bring the contest to an
end, the counsellors of the young King Stephen III offered to hand over
to Manuel another son of Géza's named Béla, who was recognised as the
future heir to the crown of Hungary and granted a considerable appanage
which included Dalmatia. As the appanage of Béla, who would be brought
up in Constantinople, Dalmatia practically fell back into the hands of
the Byzantines, and the result of Manuel's Hungarian policy was an im-
portant territorial acquisition. To make his success the surer, Manuel,
who as yet had no son, decided to betroth his daughter Mary to the
Hungarian prince, whom he destined for his successor. By this means
Hungary would have been united to the Greek Empire.
It was not without difficulty that the Greeks entered into possession
of Dalmatia. As the position of Stephen III grew stronger, the Hun-
garians came to regret the sacrifice they had agreed to, and for several
## p. 373 (#415) ############################################
Manuel and Serbia
373
years the war was renewed. Manuel, having become master of Dalmatia
in 1166, remained in the end the victor. The birth of a son to him in
1169 caused him to alter his arrangements. Béla ceased to be heir pre-
sumptive and, his betrothal to Mary having been set aside, he was married
to the Emperor's sister-in-law, a daughter of Constance of Antioch. On
the death of Stephen III, Béla with the aid of Byzantine troops mounted
the throne of Hungary. As the price of his support Manuel kept his
hold on Bela’s appanage. Béla always remained devoted to him, although
it was only after his patron's death that he recovered Dalmatia.
The continual wars which were waged during this period on the
Danube frontier kept up a state of unrest among the Serbs, who were
vassals of the Empire. Manuel was repeatedly obliged to intervene. He
deposed Pervoslav Uroš, replacing him by his brother Béla (1161? ).
Then, Béla having retired from power, Manuel set up as his successor
Dessa, another son of Béla Uroš (c. 1162). Dessa, who a few years
later took the name of Stephen Nemanja, attempted to throw off the
Byzantine suzerainty. More than once Manuel was forced to interfere
to restore order; finally he seized Stephen Nemanja, whom he kept prisoner
for some time in Constantinople. It is not known exactly at what date
Stephen regained his liberty. He took advantage of the disorder which
followed the death of Manuel to secure the independence of his
country.
It was not until about 1150 that the affairs of the East called for the
intervention of Manuel. At that time the situation of the Byzantine
possessions had become critical. Thoros, son of the Armenian prince
Leo, had escaped from captivity, and had succeeded in taking from the
Greeks a large part of Cilicia. At the same time the Muslim conquest had
made a great step in advance by the capture of Edessa, and the position
of the Latin states in Palestine was rendered even more precarious by the
entrance into the contest of the Musulmans of Iconium, who with Qilij
Arslān, son of Mas'ūd, wished to have their share in the dismembering of
the Latin principalities. In the extreme peril in which they stood the
Latins asked for help from the West, but the danger was so threatening
that they had recourse to the Emperor of Constantinople. Manuel
ordered his troops in the East to support the Latins. About the same
time he bought from the wife of Joscelin II, Count of Edessa, all that
remained in her hands of the possessions of her husband. Constance,
Princess of Antioch, having become a widow, also turned to the Emperor
for protection. The position of things thus favoured Greek intervention.
Manuel charged his cousin, Andronicus Comnenus, with the task of re-
ducing Thoros, and sent also his brother-in-law the Caesar John-Roger
whom he proposed to Constance as a husband. This projected marriage
never took place, and Andronicus only succeeded in getting himself de-
feated before Mamistra.
Manuel then changed his policy and attempted to secure the submission
CH. XII.
## p. 374 (#416) ############################################
374
The Latin East
of Thoros by means of Masóūd. The latter accepted Manuel's offers all
the more willingly as he had himself subjects of complaint against Thoros.
The Armenian prince had pillaged Cappadocia, taking advantage of the
struggle between Masóūd and the Dānishmandite rulers, Yaʻqūb Arslān
and Dhū’l-Qarnain, son and heir of 'Ain-ad-Daulah. The result of this
experiment did not correspond to Manuel's hopes. On a first occasion
Masóūd treated with Thoros but at Manuel's expense; on a second the
Musulman troops were thoroughly beaten. Profiting by the inaction of
Manuel, who was detained by affairs in Italy, Thoros approached Reginald
of Chatillon who had become Prince of Antioch through his marriage
with Constance, and the two set on foot an expedition against the island
of Cyprus, where immense booty was obtained (1155 or 1156).
second place, the Zupans of Rascia come to play a more and more im-
portant part. After Bolkan we find Uroš Zupan of this region. One
of his daughters married Béla II the Blind, a future King of Hungary.
The other, Mary, became the wife of the Moravian prince Conrad, while
a son, Béla, took up his abode at the Hungarian court, where later he
was to become prominent, and married his daughter to the Russian Prince,
Vladímir Mstilavich. These alliances were to prove extremely useful to
the sons of Uroš when, under Manuel, they were to attempt to cast off
the suzerainty of Constantinople.
## p. 357 (#399) ############################################
John Comnenus in Asia Minor
357
About 1130 John Comnenus was again able to turn his arms
against the Musulmans of Asia Minor. The fruits of the previous
campaigns had not been lost. As far as Iconium was concerned, the
position had remained satisfactory. Masóūd, being dethroned by his
brother, 'Arab, had even come to Constantinople to ask help of the
Emperor, who had supplied him with subsidies to oppose the usurper.
These disputes among the Musulman rulers had lessened their strength,
and for a time the principality of Iconium was less formidable to the
Empire. Far different was the position of the Emir Ghāzī. In 1124 he
had seized upon the principality of Melitene, and then conquered Ancyra
and Comana, and occupied some of the Byzantine strongholds on the
coast of the Black Sea. In 1129, on the death of the Armenian prince
Thoros, he had turned towards Cilicia, and there was every sign that he
was about to contend with his co-religionist, the Atābeg of Mosul, for
his share of the spoils of the Latin princes of Syria. Thus a new enemy
threatened Antioch, and from this time we may discern the reasons which
urged John Comnenus to attempt the overthrow of the Dānishmandite
ruler.
The first expedition of John Comnenus proved abortive; the Em-
peror had hardly crossed into Asia when he learned that a conspiracy
against him had been hatched by his brother Isaac. On receiving this
news he resolved to return to Constantinople. Isaac the Sebastocrator
succeeded in avoiding punishment and escaped into Asia, where he
attempted to draw into the struggle against his brother not only the
Musulman princes, but also the Armenian Thoros and Gabras, Duke
of Trebizond, who had shortly before secured his independence. Isaac
met with but partial success, and only the Emir Ghāzi lent him support.
Even at a distance the Sebastocrator continued his intrigues; he main-
tained communications with various personages at the Court of Constanti-
nople; and when in 1132 John entered upon a campaign against the Emir
Ghāzī, he was soon forced to return to his capital, where a fresh plot, the
result of Isaac's intrigues, had been discovered. As soon as order was
restored the Emperor renewed the campaign, and during the winter of
1132–1133 he took from the Emir Ghāzī the important fortress of Cas-
tamona, which, however, was soon afterwards recovered by the Muslims.
On the death of Ghāzī, which took place next year (1134), the
Emperor decided to profit by the quarrels which immediately arose among
the Mohammedan princes to try his fortune in the field. An expedition
was set on foot against Mahomet, son and heir of Ghāzi, to which
Mas-ūd sent a contingent of troops in the hope of having his share in the
dismemberment of the Dānishmandite state. No advantage accrued to
the Empire from this alliance; the Muslim troops played false during
the siege of Gangra, and John was forced to fall back. Next year, how-
ever, he was more fortunate, and Gangra and Castamona fell into his
hands (1135).
--
CH. XII.
## p. 358 (#400) ############################################
358
Italian affairs
This success at last enabled the Emperor to attempt the realisation
of his designs upon Antioch. A series of negotiations with the Western
Emperor and with Pisa prepared the ground for this new campaign.
It was apparently not before 1135 that John Comnenus entered into
diplomatic relations with the Emperor Lothar who, while he was staying
at Merseburg, gave audience to a Byzantine embassy bearing instruc-
tions from the Greek Emperor to request help against Roger II, King of
Sicily. During the last few years the position of the Norman states in
Italy had sensibly altered. Not only had the Count of Sicily, Roger II,
added the duchy of Apulia to his dominions, but he had raised his pos-
sessions to the rank of a kingdom, and since 1130 had, to the great
indignation of the Byzantines, assumed the title of King. The new king,
intensely ambitious and more powerful than any of his predecessors, did
not confine himself to attacking the coasts of the Greek Empire, but
set up claims to the Latin states of the Holy Land, and in particular
to Antioch. Accordingly John Comnenus found it necessary, before his
departure for Syria to try his fortune in arms, to secure himself
against a fresh invasion of his dominions by the Normans of Italy
during his absence. It was with this object in view that he had recourse
to the Emperor Lothar, whom he urged to make a descent upon Italy
in order to oppose the new king, and to whom for the furtherance of
this design he promised considerable subsidies. Lothar responded to the
Byzantine embassy by sending Anselm of Havelberg to Constantinople.
An agreement was arrived at, and Lothar pledged himself to undertake
an expedition into Italy. He proved as good as his word, and we know
that in 1137, while still in Southern Italy, he received a Greek embassy
bringing him gifts from the Emperor. The negotiations of John Com-
nenus with the Pisans were in the same way dictated by a wish to detach
them from the Norman alliance, and ended in 1136 in a renewal of treaty
engagements.
Having thus secured his dominions against a possible attack by the
Normans, John Comnenus could at last undertake the long-meditated
expedition to restore Antioch and its surrounding territory to the Empire
(1137). But before invading the principality the Byzantine army had
another task to accomplish. The territory of the Empire no longer
actually extended as far as the frontier of Antioch, from which it was
now separated by the dominions of the Armenian Leo. This prince (a
descendant of Rupen, one of those Armenian rulers who, fleeing before
the advance of the Muslims, had established themselves in the Taurus
and in the neighbourhood of the Euphrates) had in 1129 succeeded his
brother Thoros. After an open breach with the Empire, he had made
himself master of the chief towns of Cilicia-Tarsus, Adana, and
Mamistra. His possessions thus barred the path of John's army, and
the conquest of Cilicia was the necessary prelude to the siege of Antioch.
In the early part of the campaign the Emperor met with unbroken
## p. 359 (#401) ############################################
John in Syria and Cilicia
359
success. Tarsus, Adana, and Mamistra were quickly captured, and then
came the turn of Anazarbus and the surrounding district. Leo, with his
two sons, Rupen and Thoros, was obliged to seek safety in the mountains.
Without stopping to pursue them, John at once took the road to
Antioch, for at that moment circumstances were eminently favourable to
the Greeks.
When John appeared before the city (end of August 1137) Raymond
of Poitiers, who, by his marriage with Constance daughter of Bohemond
II, had become Prince of Antioch, was absent from his capital. Although
aware of the impending attack by the Byzantines, Raymond had not
hesitated to go to the help of the King of Jerusalem, who had just suffered
a serious defeat at the hands of the Atābeg of Mosul, 'Imād-ad-Dīn
Zangī, at Hārim. When Raymond returned, the siege of Antioch had
already begun. The besieged, owing to the disaster which had just
befallen the Latins in their struggle with the Mohammedans, despaired
of receiving succour, and from the first a considerable party of them had
contemplated negotiations with the Emperor. Certain of the records
make it appear probable that the King of Jerusalem, on being consulted,
had admitted the validity of the Greek Emperor's claims, and had recom-
mended negotiation. Whatever may be the truth about these pourparlers,
it is plain that Raymond, threatened with the loss of his dominions,
preferred treating with John Comnenus. At the moment the Emperor
was bent above all on obtaining a formal recognition of his claims, while
for Raymond the main desideratum was the withdrawal of the Byzantines.
Once this point had been gained, other matters might be arranged as
circumstances should dictate. After some negotiation the Prince of
Antioch consented to take the oath of fealty to John Comnenus, and, as
a sign of his submission, to hoist the imperial banners on the walls of
the city. The Emperor in exchange bound himself to help the Latins the
next year in their struggle with the Muslims, but it was stipulated that
if by the help of the Basileus Raymond should recover Aleppo, Shaizar,
Emesa, and Hamāh, he should restore Antioch to the Greek Empire.
This agreement being concluded John returned to Cilicia. It seems
probable that it was on this occasion that he succeeded in capturing the
Armenian prince, Leo, who with his two sons was sent prisoner to
Constantinople, where not long afterwards he died.
Faithful to his engagements, John opened the campaign in the spring
of 1138. The Byzantine army, swelled by the Latin contingents, took in
succession Balat (between Antioch and Aleppo) and Bizāʻa. The allies,
however, failed to surprise Aleppo, and turned to besiege Shaizar on the
Orontes on 29 April 1138. Before long serious dissensions broke out
between the Latin princes and the Emperor. John, indignant at the
suspicious behaviour of the Prince of Antioch and of Joscelin, Count of
Edessa, seized upon the first pretext he could find to raise the siege and
grant the defenders conditions which they had never hoped for,
CH. XII.
## p. 360 (#402) ############################################
360
John and the Western -Empire
Returning northwards by the valley of the Orontes, the army fell
back upon Antioch, John making a solemn entry into the city. During
his stay there, the Emperor, in virtue of the feudal rule obliging a vassal
to hand over his castle to his suzerain whenever he was required by him
to do so, demanded possession of the citadel. The Latin rulers, not
daring a direct refusal, got out of the difficulty by stirring up a riot
in the city. In the face of the menacing attitude of the populace, John
for the time being ceased to urge his claims and quitted Antioch. The
Emperor once gone, the Latins again offered to treat. The result was a
hollow reconciliation.
The Greek army then set out on its return. While, on its march
towards Constantinople, it was securing the safety of the frontier by
police operations against brigands, Isaac Comnenus came to make sub-
mission to his brother and received his pardon. The sole result of the
campaign was the recognition of the imperial rights over Antioch, whereby
the prestige of the Emperor was strikingly increased, not only in the eyes
of his subjects but also in those of the Musulmans and Latins. No
practical advantage, however, was obtained.
In 1139 the war against the Musulmans was resumed. The Danish-
mandite prince Mahomet had taken several places in Cilicia from the
Byzantines, and then proceeded to ravage the country as far as the
Sangarius. John drove off these invading bands, and during the winter
of 1139-1140 laid siege to Neo-Caesarea. In this campaign John, son
of Isaac Comnenus, deserted to the enemy? On his return to Constanti-
nople (15 January 1141) the Emperor planned a new campaign, the object
of which was Antioch.
A series of diplomatic operations was again undertaken in order to
hold the King of Sicily in check during the Emperor's absence. Lothar
had died on returning from his Italian campaign, and had been succeeded
by Conrad III. In 1140 John asked Conrad to renew the alliance made
with his predecessor, and in order to set a seal upon the friendship
requested the hand of a princess of the imperial house for his youngest
son Manuel. Conrad in reply offered his sister-in-law Bertha, daughter
of the Count of Sulzbach. In 1142 another Byzantine embassy was des-
patched with instructions to treat of the question of a descent upon Italy.
Conrad in return sent his chaplain Albert and Robert, Prince of Capua,
to Constantinople. A Greek embassy carried John's reply, and brought
back the future Empress. These negotiations were disquieting to the
King of Sicily, who, in order to break up the league between his enemies,
sent an embassy at the beginning of 1143 to propose an alliance with
John.
1 He became a Musulman and married a daughter of the Sultan of Iconium.
Bayazid I claimed to be descended from this marriage. Cf. Du Cange, Familiae
byzantinae in the Historia byzantina duplici commentario illustrata, Paris 1680,
p. 190.
## p. 361 (#403) ############################################
John and the Principality of Antioch
361
While the negotiations with Conrad were going on, the Emperor
again set out for Antioch. The whole of the early part of the campaign
was devoted to police work in the neighbourhood of Sozopolis. The
army then marched to Attalia, and here a double blow fell upon the
Emperor. Within a short interval he lost, first his son Alexius, whom
he had associated in the government, and then another son Andronicus.
This twofold bereavement did not turn the Emperor from his purpose,
and on leaving Attalia the army took the road to Syria.
Since 1138 the position of the Latin states harassed by the Muslims had
only altered for the worse. During the last few years they had repeatedly
begged help from the Byzantines. Having learned by past experience, John
Comnenus did not trust to the promises which had been made to him, and
above all he resolved to make himself secure of the fidelity of the Latin
rulers by exacting hostages from them. He took pains to conceal the
object of his expedition by giving out that he intended only to put into
a state of defence the towns in Cilicia which he had taken from Leo.
Thanks to these precautions the Emperor was enabled to descend upon
the Latin territory in a totally unexpected manner.
John had not for-
gotten the behaviour of Joscelin during the last campaign; so the first
attack was made on him, the Emperor appearing suddenly in front of
Turbessel. The Count of Edessa, taken by surprise, was obliged to give
up his daughter as a hostage, and from Turbessel the Emperor marched
to the castle of Gastin (1142). There he demanded of Raymond the ful-
filment of his promise to surrender Antioch. Raymond thus driven into
a corner took up a pitiful attitude, sheltering himself behind the wishes
of his vassals. An important part in the matter was played by the
Latin clergy, to whom it was a source of annoyance that the progress of
the Greek clergy proceeded pari passu with that of the Byzantine armies.
The demands of the Basileus were rejected in the name of the Pope and
of the Western Emperor.
John Comnenus had certainly foreseen this refusal and had determined
to take Antioch by force. This siege was in his eyes only a prelude to
the campaign which he intended to wage against the Musulmans—a
campaign which, if his views were realised, would be crowned by the
entrance into Jerusalem of the Byzantine troops. But having been de-
layed, doubtless by the death of his sons, the Emperor reached Antioch
too late in the season to begin a siege which could not fail to be a long
He resolved therefore to postpone the renewal of hostilities, and
led his troops into Cilicia where he intended to winter. It was there that
an accidental wound from a poisoned arrow, received during a hunting
party, carried him off on 8 April 1143, at the moment when he was
looking forward to the attainment of the object which had been the goal
of his entire policy. On his deathbed John named as his successor
Manuel, the youngest of his sons, and procured his recognition by the
army.
one,
CH, XII.
## p. 362 (#404) ############################################
362
Accession of Manuel Comnenus
Manuel when he ascended the throne was about twenty years old.
For the first few years of his reign he continued the confidence which his
father had placed in Axuch and John Puzes, and it was only little
by little that the young Emperor's personality developed and made its
mark by the direction that he gave to his policy. Manuel's disposition
shewed a singular mixture of qualities in the most marked contrast to
one another. While on the one hand he has some of the most char-
acteristic traits of the Byzantine type, other sides of his nature seem to
mark him out as a product of Western civilisation. He is the typical
knight-king, and in courage might compare with Richard Coeur-de-
Lion. Even on the first campaign in which he accompanied his father,
Manuel shewed himself a bold and courageous warrior, ever a lover of
the brilliant bouts and thrusts of single combat. It may be that in
his campaigns he proved himself rather a valiant knight than a great
general, that he sought too eagerly after those successes, rather showy
than permanent, which evoke the plaudits of women and the encomiums
of court poets. He constantly sought opportunity to display his skill in
riding and fencing, hunting and tournaments, and evidently looked upon
it as his vocation to repeat the exploits of the paladins. Hence it is that
Manuel is open to the reproach of having cared less for realities than for
show, of having attempted to carry out simultaneously projects on a
gigantic scale, any single one of which would have taxed the resources of
the Empire. This is the weak side of his policy. Manuel attempted to
get others to carry out the tasks which he could not himself accomplish;
hence arose the failures he met with. It would appear further that
Manuel was fitted only for success, and was incapable of bearing mis-
fortune. At his only defeat, the disaster of Myriocephalum, when he
saw that he was beaten and in danger of being slain by the enemy
with the poor remains of his army, his one idea was to take to flight
without giving a thought to his soldiers. Only the opposition of his
captains prevented him from carrying out this disgraceful intention.
Manuel's devotion to the ideals of chivalry and his two marriages
with Western princesses fostered in him a strong preference for the Latins.
Men of Western race, whether Germans, French, Normans, Italians, or
English, were sure of his eager welcome, and of finding posts about his
court or in his army. Though ignorant of the Greek language, these
foreigners who “spat better than they spoke” contrived, nevertheless, to
fill considerable administrative offices, to the great disgust of the Emperor's
subjects. Nor were they any better pleased to see the Venetians, Pisans,
and Genoese settle down at Constantinople. This policy on the part of
Manuel led to the accumulation of the national hatred against the Latins
which was to burst forth in the reign of Andronicus.
Manuel, like his grandfather Alexius, brought a keen interest to
theological questions. He prided himself on being a theologian and took
pleasure in theological discussions, as the Patriarch Cosmas found, who
## p. 363 (#405) ############################################
His character
363
was deposed in 1147 for his adhesion to the doctrines of Niphon, a
Bogomile monk. Manuel considered himself to possess inspired know-
ledge, and was in the habit of imposing his decisions upon the clergy. In
the cases of Soterichus Panteugenus, of Basilaces, and of Michael of
Thessalonica (the representatives of a little group of priests charged with
holding views inspired by Platonic philosophy), the Emperor's sentence
was decisive (1157). Later on, towards the close of the reign, in the teeth
of the opposition of the clergy and the Patriarch, Manuel imposed his own
view in a discussion which brought up afresh the doctrine promulgated
by the Councils of Nicaea and Constantinople regarding the relation be-
tween the Father and the Son. Manuel decided the question in a sense
opposite to the traditional doctrine. Finally, we must note the attempt
made by Manuel in 1170 to bring about the re-union of the Armenian
and Greek Churches. Despite the skill of Theorianus, who was entrusted
by the Emperor with the duty of carrying on the negotiation with the
Katholikos Nerses, the discussions led to no result.
In contrast to Manuel the theologian there was another Manuel, a
dabbler in astrology. Astrologers enjoyed great prestige at the imperial
court. The Basileus consulted them upon all important expeditions, and
forbade his generals to give battle unless the stars were propitious. Manuel
was a believer in magic and in spells. Even on his deathbed his confidence
in all the charlatans who surrounded him remained unskaken.
Theological and scientific questions, however, did not engross the
Emperor's interest. Manuel, and following his example the whole court,
took a pride in shewing a taste for letters; the literary revival initiated
in the preceding century in the time of Psellus was continued during
this reign. The princesses of the imperial family encouraged authors;
the Empress Irene accepted the dedication of the Chiliads of Tzetzes,
and another Irene, wife of Andronicus, Manuel's brother, was the ac-
knowledged patroness of literary men. A little court of the learned
gathered round her, among the ornaments of which were Tzetzes, Con-
stantine Manasses, and one of the Prodromoi. Manuel's niece and mistress,
Theodora, was the correspondent of Glycas. Other court ladies took to
writing themselves, and it was at this time that Anna Comnena finished
her Aleriad, the continuation of Bryennius' work in honour of Alexius.
Her example was followed by Zonaras and Glycas, the compilers of
chronicles, and at the same time Cinnamus and Nicetas Acominatus
collected the materials for their works.
Rhetoric also had its representatives, and one of the best judges of
classical antiquity, Eustathius, Archbishop of Thessalonica, pronounced
some of his orations during this reign. He was one of the most distin-
guished members of the learned and scholarly group of clergy, devoted
to philosophical speculation, several of whom have already been men-
tioned in dealing with the theological controversies of the day.
The arts were not neglected at Manuel's court. If he took pleasure
CH. XII.
## p. 364 (#406) ############################################
364
Manuel's administration
in re-building the palace of the Blachernae, which he decorated with
mosaics commemorating his exploits, and in erecting sumptuous villas
on the coast of Asia Minor and on the islands in the neighbour-
hood of Constantinople where he could go for relaxation after his
military exertions, he did not forget public edifices. He had the
walls of Constantinople repaired, spent money freely on constructing
aqueducts, and undertook operations to make the closing of the harbour
possible. On the other hand he did little in the way of ecclesiastical
building. He used to rally his courtiers on the vanity which urged them
to build monasteries or churches on purpose to erect their tombs there,
and used to declare that he only approved of monks in solitary places,
and looked with horror on the turbulent monks dwelling in towns and
devoting themselves solely to increasing the possessions of their monas-
teries. By way of setting an example he built a monastery near the
entrance to the strait of the Bosphorus, to which he made no donation
of lands, confining himself to a yearly grant out of the public treasury
sufficient for the maintenance of the monks. Manuel's legislation as to
ecclesiastical property is inspired by the same spirit. The imperial
Novels forbid churches and monasteries to add to the lands already
in their possession, but on the other hand legalise the ownership of those
actually held, even when the title could not be shewn or was defective.
In this way a general settlement was arrived at, but at the expense of the
lay owners, who now saw a legal sanction given to all the usurpations of
which they had been victims.
The foreign policy of Manuel was carried out at enormous expense,
and was extremely burdensome to the imperial treasury. In order to fill
it the Emperor was forced to use great severity in the collection of the
taxes and to have recourse to all kinds of financial expedients. The
most important seems to have been the converting of the obligation to
maintain the navy, which was laid upon certain themes, into a tax-
measure analogous to that formerly resorted to by Constantine IX
with regard to service in the army. In conjunction with this measure
should be noted the novel distributions of land on condition of mili-
tary service, grants made for the most part to prisoners of war or to
barbarian tribes. These ineasures caused great disturbances in the
provinces and brought about a strained situation there, chiefly known
to us through the efforts made later by Andronicus Comnenus to find a
remedy.
John Comnenus, in choosing his youngest son to succeed him, had
set aside the rights of the elder, the Sebastocrator Isaac. If the young
Emperor had the army on his side his brother had the advantage
of being in the capital. In order that a conflict might be avoided,
Manuel must at all costs make himself master of Constantinople before
the news of John's death was known there. The business was entrusted
to Axuch, who successfully carried out the task confided to him. He
## p. 365 (#407) ############################################
Turkish attacks
365
contrived to seize both Isaacs, uncle and nephew, and with no great
difficulty defeated a plot to set the crown on the head of the Caesar
John-Roger, Manuel's brother-in-law. When the Emperor appeared
before his capital, peace was already established; he reached his palace
easily enough, and largess, distributed on a lavish scale to clergy and
people, secured his popularity.
On the death of John Comnenus the Latins of Antioch had again
taken the offensive, and even while Manuel was still in the East had
begun hostilities and occupied several places in Cilicia. This provocation
had been keenly resented by Manuel, who made it his first care to send
troops to Cilicia to deal with the Latins. The Greek arms were victorious,
and in 1145 Raymond of Poitiers had to submit to the humiliation of
coming to Constantinople to ask mercy of Manuel; he was compelled
to visit the church of the Pantokrator and make the amende at the dead
Emperor's tomb.
While the Byzantine army was on its way back from Cilicia, the
troops of the Sultan of Iconium had carried off several persons of impor-
tance at court; further invasions had then taken place, the Muslim bands
advancing as far as Pithecas near Nicaea ; the whole of the Byzantine
possessions in Asia Minor were devastated, ruins were heaped up on every
side, and the luckless populations were forced to leave their villages and
seek refuge in the towns along the coast. Thus one of the first tasks
with which Manuel was faced was to secure his frontier in Asia by the
erection of a series of fortified posts, intended to check the invaders. This
was his main work, and he pursued it to the end of his reign. At
the same time he attempted to strike at the heart of the Musulman
power, more than once endeavouring to reduce Iconium. At the opening
of his reign he was aided in his struggle against Masóūd by the divisions
among the Muslim leaders which had followed upon the death of the
Dānishmandite prince Mahomet (1141). His lands were divided be-
tween his son, Dhü'l-Nun, who obtained Caesarea, and his brothers,
Yaʻqūb Arslān and ‘Ain-ad-Daulah, whose shares respectively were Sīwās
and Melitene. Threatened by Masóūd, Yaʻqūb Arslān, the most powerful
of the heirs of Mahomet, treated with Manuel who helped him with
subsidies. During the years 1146-1147 the Greeks fought with no great
measure of success; Manuel got as far as Iconium, but failed to take it.
At the moment when the crusaders appeared before Constantinople,
Manuel had just concluded a truce with Masóūd.
During this period the policy of Manuel in the West had yielded
no striking results. For a short time the Emperor seemed to be meditating
a league with the King of Sicily, but he soon returned to the idea
of a German alliance, and in January 1146 took to wife Bertha of
Sulzbach, sister-in-law of Conrad. But at the very time when this
marriage seemed to have set a seal upon his friendship with Germany,
all that had been gained by it was lost by the opening of the Second
CH. XII.
## p. 366 (#408) ############################################
366
The Second Crusade
Crusade, the Greek Empire being left to confront the Norman
power
in
a state of complete isolation.
Learning of the new Crusade by letters from Louis VII and the Pope,
Eugenius III, Manuel immediately set himself to obtain guarantees
against all eventualities by demanding of the Pope that the crusaders
should bind themselves to him by engagements similar to those taken by
the leaders of the First Crusade to Alexius. In return he promised that
on payment being forthcoming provisions should be supplied. At the
assembly of Étampes (February 1147) Manuel's envoys met those of
Roger II, who had been instructed to bring about the diversion of the
Crusade to their master's profit by promising large advantages. The
influence of Conrad, who had only joined in the project for a Crusade
at the end of 1146, was certainly not without its weight in the decision
to go by Constantinople. The fact that not only the King of France
but also the King of Germany was to take part in the expedition made
the position of Manuel with regard to the crusaders all the more perilous.
He was haunted by the fear that, if the Western troops collected outside
his capital, they might be tempted to an assault upon Constantinople.
He made every effort to avoid this danger, his task being rendered easier
by the ill-feeling of Conrad towards the French.
The measures taken with regard to the crusaders were of the same
kind as those employed by Alexius in the case of the First Crusade. The
Byzantine troops were disposed so as to confinė the streams of pilgrims
in a single channel and to prevent the pillaging bands from wandering
too far from the prescribed route. The elements of which the crusading
army was composed made these precautions necessary. Not only were
there warriors on the march; the bulk of the army consisted of pilgrims
and of a rout of adventurers ready for any mischief.
The Germans were first to pass through the imperial territory. Their
relations with the Greeks were as bad as possible, outrages being committed
on both sides which generated violent excitement. Hadrianople was
especially the scene of bloodshed. Manuel made a last effort to divert
the crusaders from the route through Constantinople and to persuade
them to pass through Sestos, but his suggestions were listened to with
suspicion and were rejected. Many disasters would have been avoided
if his advice had been taken, and it was the route recommended
by him which Louis VII took after the destruction of the German
army.
Little is known of the relations between Manuel and Conrad during
the time that the crusading army remained before Constantinople. It
is probable that the two Emperors did not meet; at the same time they
appear to have come to an agreement. The news of the arrival of Louis
VII decided Conrad upon crossing over into Asia Minor—a step which
all the urgency of Manuel had not availed to secure. The march of the
German army upon Iconium ended in disaster. The crusaders, although
## p. 367 (#409) ############################################
Conrad III and Louis VII
367
aware of the length of the journey, had not brought a sufficient quantity
of provisions ; famine soon made its appearance, whereupon the Greek
guides were alarmed by accusations of treachery, which caused them to
abandon the army and take to flight. The crusaders were forced to fall
back upon Nicomedia, harassed as they marched by the Turks who slew
them in thousands; as many perished by famine. At Nicomedia the
remnants of Conrad's army found the French.
The journey of the French across the Greek territories was equally
accompanied by acts of violence; but a Latin eye-witness admits that
up to their arrival before Constantinople the Franks did as much injury
to the Greeks as they received from them, and that the wrongs were
on both sides. Manuel welcomed Louis VII, but made every effort to in-
duce him to cross at once to the coast of Asia Minor. The apprehension
which the Greek Emperor shewed is justified by the known fact that
there was a regular party in the King of France's council urgent for the
taking of Constantinople.
The French once across the Bosphorus, new difficulties arose. Manuel
demanded that the barons should do homage and swear fealty to him,
and after long parleying Louis ended by yielding. Having joined the
wrecks of the German army, the French gave up the idea of marching
upon Iconium and took the road for Attalia. At Ephesus Conrad fell ill,
and abandoned the Crusade. The march of the crusaders through the
Asiatic provinces of the Byzantine Empire was marked by similar acts of
violence to those committed in Europe; this explains the fighting which
took place between the Greeks and the Latins. The chief accusation
brought against the Greeks is that they did not supply provisions and
that they charged too dear for such as they did supply. The vast numbers
of the crusaders made provisioning a matter of great difficulty, and the
presence of unnumbered multitudes in one place is a sufficient explana-
tion of the dearness of commodities.
The army of Louis VII, thus ill-provided, suffered greatly on the
march from Laodicea to Attalia. The Musulman bands had appeared,
and their unceasing attacks added to the difficulties of the mountain
route. The army reached Attalia in a deplorable state. Here provisions
were still lacking. Louis VII and the chief lords hired ships of the Greeks
and departed, forsaking the mass of the pilgrims. The leaders left in
charge abandoned them in their turn. The wretched people fell a prey to
the Turks, and to the Greeks who were exasperated at the acts of pillage
which the famished multitude had committed.
Manuel has been held responsible for the failure of the Second Crusade.
Such accusations are now to a large extent discredited by historians.
The ill-success of the Crusade was due to defective organisation, to the
want of discipline among the crusaders, and to their obstinate persistence,
in spite of the Emperor's advice, in following the road taken by Godfrey
of Bouillon and his companions.
CH. XII.
## p. 368 (#410) ############################################
368
Manuel and Roger II
Conrad, who had been left behind sick at Ephesus, was received by
Manuel, who brought him to Constantinople and loaded him with
attentions. The fact was that Manuel was just then threatened by a
danger which made the prospect of help from the German King of
great value to him. Profiting by the difficulties into which the Basileus
was thrown by the coming of the crusaders, Roger II of Sicily had
in the autumn of 1147 directed a naval attack upon the coast of the
Empire. Corfù had fallen into his hands; Negropont and Cerigo had
been ravaged. The Normans then sailed up the Gulf of Corinth and
took Thebes and Corinth (centres of the silk-trade and two of the
most important commercial towns in the Empire), their rich warehouses
being given up to pillage. In order to resist this aggression, Manuel, while
the crusaders were still on the Asiatic shore of the Bosphorus, had in
vain begged for help from Conrad and Louis. He was obliged to meet
the Normans with his own forces, for which however he had secured the
support of the Venetian fleet.
Being detained by an invasion of the Cumans (1148), Manuel sent
the Grand Domestic Axuch and the Grand Duke Alexius Contoste-
phanus to occupy the places taken by the Normans and to besiege Corfù.
It was during the winter of 1148–1149 that Manuel received Conrad,
who was returning from the Holy Land, and concluded a treaty with
him, by which the German king bound himself to make a descent upon
Italy in order to attack Roger II (1149).
Corfù having been re-taken (summer of 1149), Manuel resolved to
organise an expedition to punish Roger II. A revolt among the Serbs,
supported by the King of Sicily, prevented him from carrying out his
plan. Roger II, threatened by the Germano-Byzantine alliance, created
difficulties for them both which hindered them from carrying out their
project of an invasion of Italy. While Welf, thanks to supplies furnished
by Roger, fomented an agitation which detained Conrad in Germany, the
Sicilian king was launching the Serbs and Hungarians against the Greek
Empire. Hungary and Constantinople were at that time on very bad terms
owing to their pursuing a diametrically opposite policy in Russia. While
Géza, King of Hungary, maintained the claims of his brother-in-law
Izyaslav to the throne of Kiev, Manuel gave his support to George Dolgo-
ruki, son of Vladímir Monomachus, who was also favoured by Vladimirko,
Prince of Halicz. At the instigation of the King of Sicily, Géza en-
couraged the Župan of Rascia, Pervoslav Uroš, to revolt, and the
disturbance which broke out in Serbia in the autumn of 1149 kept
Manuel occupied until 1150. The Serbs having been subdued, Manuel,
eager to punish their Hungarian supporters, took advantage in 1151 of
the absence of Géza, who was maintaining Izyaslav's cause in Russia against
Vladimirko, to take Semlin and ravage the country between the Save and
the Danube. Peace was signed the same year, but in 1152 hostilities broke
out again, and Géza formed a connexion with Manuel's cousin, Andronicus
## p. 369 (#411) ############################################
The Greeks in Italy
369
Comnenus, the future Emperor. This treason was discovered and An-
dronicus was arrested. The struggle lasted until 1155, when peace was
signed. The only appreciable result of the campaigns seems to have been
the conquest of Semlin.
Roger II had not been satisfied with stirring up the Serbs and Hun-
garians against Manuel; he had at the same time made use of the failure
of the Crusade to attempt the organisation of a European coalition
against him. Louis VII sympathised with these projects, but Conrad's
fidelity to the Byzantine alliance, and the rupture which took place in
1150 between Pope Eugenius III and Roger, prevented the latter's designs
from taking effect. Finally in 1152 the death of Conrad delivered the
Norman King from the peril of a Germano-Byzantine alliance.
With Conrad's successor,
Frederick Barbarossa, Manuel was never able
to come to an understanding. From the beginning of his reign Bar-
barossa refused to countenance any territorial advantage which might be
gained by the Basileus in Italy—a concession which Conrad had made.
From 1152 to 1158 numerous embassies came and went between the two
Emperors, but it was found impossible to arrange an alliance. Wishing
to take advantage of the death of Roger II in 1154, Frederick Barbarossa
made a descent upon Italy. Manuel, fearing that this expedition having
been made without reference to him might prove to have been made against
him, decided to try his fortune single-handed and to make his profit out of
the unsettled conditions which had followed on the death of Roger II. He
dispatched to Italy Michael Palaeologus, who in the course of 1155, thanks
to the support of Robert of Loritello, a revolted vassal of the Norman
King William I, and his fellow-rebels, achieved unlooked-for success. In
a few months the Greek Emperor's authority was recognised from Ancona
to Taranto. This success turned Manuel's head, and was chiefly instru-
mental in giving a new direction to his policy. At the very time when
in 1155 the German Emperor, forced to own himself unable to maintain
order in Italy and to play the part he had assumed of protector of the
Papacy, abandoned the idea of invading the Norman Kingdom, the
Basileus was enforcing the recognition of his own imperial authority in
all that part of Italy which had formerly been in the possession of the
Greek Emperors. Hence arose in Manuel the desire to restore the Eastern
Empire to what it had been in the time of Justinian, and to obtain from
the Pope the re-establishment of imperial unity in exchange for the re-
union of the Greek Church with the Church of Rome. The first nego-
tiations with this object were begun with Hadrian IV, and the rupture
which took place at this time between the Papacy and the Western
Emperor seemned to Manuel likely to further the accomplishment of his
dream.
The counter-strokes of William I, which in a short time demolished
the frail edifice of Byzantine conquest, did not avail to dissuade Manuel
from his project. Southern Italian questions became of secondary im-
C. MED. H. VOL. IV. CH. XII.
24
## p. 370 (#412) ############################################
370
Manuel and Alexander III
portance to him in comparison with the schemes he was caressing, and
he made no difficulty in 1158 in complying with the suggestions of the
Papacy, which, leaning as it did on the support of the kingdom of Sicily
and of the Greek Empire, desired to see peace restored between its two
allies.
From 1157 onwards Byzantine policy is governed wholly by the idea
of restoring the unity of the Empire. For the sake of clearness we will
consider in order the relations of Manuel with Italy and Frederick Bar-
barossa, with the Hungarians and Serbs, and finally with the Muslims
and the Latins of the East.
It was natural that Manuel should shew himself favourable to the
Pope, Alexander III. During the years from 1161 to 1163 long nego-
tions went on between the Emperor, Alexander III, and Louis VII con-
cerning a coalition to be formed against the Western Emperor. Three
years later Manuel judged that the Pope was sufficiently in need of his
help to make it safe to acquaint him completely with his desire to re-
establish the unity of the Empire under his sceptre. Negotiations about
this project went on for several years, Manuel remaining the ally of Alex-
ander until the preliminaries of the Peace of Venice (1177). Although his
name does not appear as one of the signatories of the peace, the connexion
between the Papacy and Constantinople lasted as long as Manuel reigned.
If the understanding between the Pope and the Greek Emperor led to
nothing, one of the chief causes of this was the opposition maintained by
the King of Sicily to the Byzantine policy. It will readily be understood
that neither William I nor William II looked with favour on the attempts
of Manuel to gain a footing in Italy, but that both on the contrary
offered a vigorous resistance. Manuel tried every means of overcoming
their opposition; he had recourse to Louis VII, and on two occasions he
endeavoured to arrange for the marriage of his daughter Mary with
William II. But just as matters seemed to be finally settled, the match
was broken off, Barbarossa having made overtures to Manuel which seemed
to him to promise a more brilliant future to his daughter than alliance
with William of Sicily could offer.
Manuel's attitude towards the Italian cities was a natural result of
his policy with regard to Alexander III. He endeavoured by every
possible means to attach to his interest a group of dependent Italian
towns, or at least to be able to rely on the support of a party in the
more important cities. Milan was encouraged by him in her struggle
with Barbarossa, and Byzantine gold helped to rebuild her streets.
Cremona and Pavia had their share of the Greek subsidies. Once already
Ancona had given itself up to Palaeologus, and later on, about 1166, its
population embraced the Greek cause, won over by the gold of Manuel's
emissaries. In 1167 Barbarossa was only able to win a partial advantage
over them.
With Pisa Manuel in 1161 entered into negotiations which lasted
## p. 371 (#413) ############################################
Manuel, Venice, and Barbarossa
371
until 1172. Dragged in different directions by their Ghibelline sym-
pathies and their desire to take advantage of the commercial privileges
offered by the Basileus, the Pisans pursued an indecisive policy. The
Genoese in the same way treated with the Greek Emperor in 1155, but
also with Barbarossa in 1162. Though intercourse between them and
Constantinople was broken off in 1162, it was resumed in 1164, and went
on until 1170. Manuel was never able to bring the Genoese to the
point of breaking with Barbarossa.
The Greek occupation of Ancona and the recapture of the Dalmatian
towns gave some anxiety to the Venetians, who had very nearly come to a
breach with Manuel at the time of the siege of Corfù, as the result of an
unpleasant incident which occurred between the troops of the two nations.
Things reached such a point that in 1167 relations between the two
countries were completely broken off. The doge even recalled all those
of his nation who had settled upon Greek territory. Diplomatic inter-
course, resumed at the request of Manuel who drew the Venetians into a
veritable snare, was again definitively broken off on 12 March 1171. On
this date Manuel ordered the arrest of all Venetians settled in his dominions
and the confiscation of their goods. Enormous damage was thus inflicted
upon Venice. In revenge the republic during the winter of 1171-2
pillaged the coasts of the Empire and ravaged Negropont, Chios, and
Lesbos. In the course of the campaign negotiations were initiated in
which the Venetians were duped. These were continued without result
up to 1175. At this date Venice made an alliance with William II, King
of Sicily. Thus directly threatened, Manuel decided upon concessions.
He set at liberty the prisoners arrested in 1171, restored their goods to
them, and granted to Venice the privileges enjoyed under former treaties
of commerce. In the interval, in 1173, Venice had given help to the
Germans in their attempt to take Ancona from the Greeks.
The policy which Manuel pursued in Italy naturally reacted upon
the relations between the Greek Empire and the Germans. The atti-
tude which he took up there would naturally have as its first consequence
a complete rupture with Barbarossa. This, however, was postponed for
some time owing to the secrecy with which the Greek Emperor con-
trived to cover up his intrigues. It was only when the occupation of
Ancona took place in 1166 that Manuel's hostility to Barbarossa shewed
itself clearly. From 1159 to 1165 several embassies were exchanged
between the two Emperors, and in 1166 Henry, Duke of Austria, made a
useless journey to Manuel's court to attempt to bring about an under-
standing. Just at that time Manuel's occupation of Ancona had opened
Barbarossa's eyes, and he was determined to avenge himself on the earliest
opportunity. However, the progress made by Manuel in Italy, marked
by the treaties with Genoa in 1169 and with Pisa in 1170, decided Bar-
barossa on attempting a reconciliation. From 1170 to 1172 proposals
were discussed for the marriage of Manuel's daughter with Barbarossa's
CB. XII.
24-2
## p. 372 (#414) ############################################
372
Manuel and Hungary
son. They led to nothing, and in 1173 Barbarossa was engaged in the
siege of Ancona (which had given itself up to the Greeks), and was also
trying to negotiate an alliance with William II, evidently directed against
Manuel. At the same time the Western Emperor was attempting in his
turn to create difficulties for his adversary, and was treating with the
Sultan of Iconium. Manuel took no share in the Treaty of Venice (1177)
and, as we shall see, continued the struggle with the Western Emperor
up to the last day of his life.
His Italian policy, being based wholly on diplomacy, always left the
greater part of the military forces of the Empire free, a circumstance
which enabled the Emperor at the same time to pursue a more active
and warlike course in two other quarters, Hungary and Asia. Since the
peace signed with Géza, Manuel had played a waiting game in Hungary,
content with giving a refuge at Constantinople to two of the king's
brothers, the future Stephen IV and Ladislas. At the death of Géza
(1161), Manuel had made use of the pretenders whom he had at hand
in order to interfere in the concerns of the Hungarian succession, calcu-
lating thus to secure some advantage for the Empire. The laws of
succession were not yet fully fixed in Hungary, and Stephen IV could
plead in his favour the ancient usage by which the brother of a dead
king was to be preferred to the son, in order to put forward a claim
to the throne to the prejudice of his nephew Stephen III. Manuel
supported the claims of his protégé by Byzantine troops. A strong party
grew up in Hungary hostile to the claims of Géza's son, but refusing
to admit those of Stephen IV, who was looked upon as too much the
vassal of Constantinople. The Hungarians feared that by giving the
crown to Stephen IV their country might become a mere satellite of
Constantinople, and to avoid this danger made choice of Ladislas, brother
of Stephen IV, whom they regarded as less submissive to the influence of
the Byzantine court. Ladislas was barely seated on the throne when he
died (1162). The struggle between the two Stephens then recommenced,
Manuel still giving support to his candidate. To bring the contest to an
end, the counsellors of the young King Stephen III offered to hand over
to Manuel another son of Géza's named Béla, who was recognised as the
future heir to the crown of Hungary and granted a considerable appanage
which included Dalmatia. As the appanage of Béla, who would be brought
up in Constantinople, Dalmatia practically fell back into the hands of
the Byzantines, and the result of Manuel's Hungarian policy was an im-
portant territorial acquisition. To make his success the surer, Manuel,
who as yet had no son, decided to betroth his daughter Mary to the
Hungarian prince, whom he destined for his successor. By this means
Hungary would have been united to the Greek Empire.
It was not without difficulty that the Greeks entered into possession
of Dalmatia. As the position of Stephen III grew stronger, the Hun-
garians came to regret the sacrifice they had agreed to, and for several
## p. 373 (#415) ############################################
Manuel and Serbia
373
years the war was renewed. Manuel, having become master of Dalmatia
in 1166, remained in the end the victor. The birth of a son to him in
1169 caused him to alter his arrangements. Béla ceased to be heir pre-
sumptive and, his betrothal to Mary having been set aside, he was married
to the Emperor's sister-in-law, a daughter of Constance of Antioch. On
the death of Stephen III, Béla with the aid of Byzantine troops mounted
the throne of Hungary. As the price of his support Manuel kept his
hold on Bela’s appanage. Béla always remained devoted to him, although
it was only after his patron's death that he recovered Dalmatia.
The continual wars which were waged during this period on the
Danube frontier kept up a state of unrest among the Serbs, who were
vassals of the Empire. Manuel was repeatedly obliged to intervene. He
deposed Pervoslav Uroš, replacing him by his brother Béla (1161? ).
Then, Béla having retired from power, Manuel set up as his successor
Dessa, another son of Béla Uroš (c. 1162). Dessa, who a few years
later took the name of Stephen Nemanja, attempted to throw off the
Byzantine suzerainty. More than once Manuel was forced to interfere
to restore order; finally he seized Stephen Nemanja, whom he kept prisoner
for some time in Constantinople. It is not known exactly at what date
Stephen regained his liberty. He took advantage of the disorder which
followed the death of Manuel to secure the independence of his
country.
It was not until about 1150 that the affairs of the East called for the
intervention of Manuel. At that time the situation of the Byzantine
possessions had become critical. Thoros, son of the Armenian prince
Leo, had escaped from captivity, and had succeeded in taking from the
Greeks a large part of Cilicia. At the same time the Muslim conquest had
made a great step in advance by the capture of Edessa, and the position
of the Latin states in Palestine was rendered even more precarious by the
entrance into the contest of the Musulmans of Iconium, who with Qilij
Arslān, son of Mas'ūd, wished to have their share in the dismembering of
the Latin principalities. In the extreme peril in which they stood the
Latins asked for help from the West, but the danger was so threatening
that they had recourse to the Emperor of Constantinople. Manuel
ordered his troops in the East to support the Latins. About the same
time he bought from the wife of Joscelin II, Count of Edessa, all that
remained in her hands of the possessions of her husband. Constance,
Princess of Antioch, having become a widow, also turned to the Emperor
for protection. The position of things thus favoured Greek intervention.
Manuel charged his cousin, Andronicus Comnenus, with the task of re-
ducing Thoros, and sent also his brother-in-law the Caesar John-Roger
whom he proposed to Constance as a husband. This projected marriage
never took place, and Andronicus only succeeded in getting himself de-
feated before Mamistra.
Manuel then changed his policy and attempted to secure the submission
CH. XII.
## p. 374 (#416) ############################################
374
The Latin East
of Thoros by means of Masóūd. The latter accepted Manuel's offers all
the more willingly as he had himself subjects of complaint against Thoros.
The Armenian prince had pillaged Cappadocia, taking advantage of the
struggle between Masóūd and the Dānishmandite rulers, Yaʻqūb Arslān
and Dhū’l-Qarnain, son and heir of 'Ain-ad-Daulah. The result of this
experiment did not correspond to Manuel's hopes. On a first occasion
Masóūd treated with Thoros but at Manuel's expense; on a second the
Musulman troops were thoroughly beaten. Profiting by the inaction of
Manuel, who was detained by affairs in Italy, Thoros approached Reginald
of Chatillon who had become Prince of Antioch through his marriage
with Constance, and the two set on foot an expedition against the island
of Cyprus, where immense booty was obtained (1155 or 1156).
