Catilina
especially
was one of the most wicked men in that wicked age.
The history of Rome; tr. with the sanction of the ... v.4. Mommsen, Theodor, 1817-1903
iv POMPEIUS AND THE EAST
4. 49
the Jewish land was broken up, as Macedonia had formerly been, into five independent districts administered by governing colleges with an Optimate organization ; Samaria and other townships razed by the Jews were re-established, to form a counterpoise to Jerusalem ; and lastly a heavier tribute was imposed on the Jews than on the other Syrian
subjects of Rome
It still remains that we should glance at the kingdom of The
Egypt along with the last dependency that remained to it of ‘Si-“Egg; the extensive acquisitions of the Lagids, the fair island of
Cyprus. Egypt was now the only state of the Hellenic cast
that was still at least nominally independent ; just as formerly, when the Persians established themselves along
the eastern half of the Mediterranean, Egypt was their last conquest, so now the mighty conquerors from the west long delayed the annexation of that opulent and peculiar country. The reason lay, as was already indicated, neither in any fear of the resistance of Egypt nor in the want of a fitting occasion. Egypt was just about as powerless as Syria, and had already in 673 fallen in all due form of law to the ar. Roman community (p. 318). The control exercised over
the court of Alexandria by the royal guard—which appointed and deposed ministers and occasionally kings, took for itself what it pleased, and, if it was refused a rise of pay, besieged the king in his palace—was by no means liked in the country or rather in the capital (for the country with its population of agricultural slaves was hardly taken into account); and at least a party there wished for the annexa tion of Egypt by Rome, and even took steps to procure it. But the less the kings of Egypt could think of contending in arms against Rome, the more energetically Egyptian gold set itself to resist the Roman plans of union ; and in con sequence ofthe peculiar despotico-communistic centralization of the Egyptian finances the revenues of the court of
Alexandria were still nearly equal to the public income of
von iv
I29
450
POMPEIUS AND THE EAST 800! v
Cyprus armored.
58,
Rome even after its augmentation by Pompeius. The suspicious jealousy of the oligarchy, which was chary of allowing any individual either to conquer or to administer Egypt, operated in the same direction. So the d: fade rulers of Egypt and Cyprus were enabled by bribing the leading men in the senate not merely to respite their totter ing crowns, but even to fortify them afresh and to purchase from the senate the confirmation of their royal title. But with this they had not yet obtained their object. Formal state-law required a decree of the Roman burgesses; until this was issued, the Ptolemies were dependent on the caprice of every democratic holder of power, and they had thus to commence the warfare of bribery also against the
other Roman party, which as the more powerful stipulated for far higher prices.
The result in the two cases was different. The annexa tion of Cyprus was decreed in 696 by the people, that
by the leaders of the democracy, the support given to piracy the Cypriots being alleged as the official reason why that course should now be adopted. Marcus Cato, entrusted by his opponents with the execution of this measure, came to the island without an army but he had no need of one. The king took poison; the inhabitants submitted without offering resistance to their inevitable fate, and were placed under the governor of Cilicia. The ample treasure of nearly 7000 talents (£1,700,000), which the
covetous and miserly king could not prevail on himself to apply for the bribes requisite to save his crown, fell along with the latter to the Romans, and filled after desirable fashion the empty vaults of their treasury.
On the other hand the brother who reigned in Egypt
decree of the the purchase
said to have amounted to 6000 talents
exasperated
equally
Ptolemaeus
25553;,’ succeeded in purchasing his recognition but [59. people from the new masters of Rome in 69
money
subjects, (£1,460,000). The citizens indeed, long
gpglsed
is
by
5 ;
by
;
a
is,
cr-rn. rv POMPEIUS AND THE EAST
451
against their good flute-player and bad ruler, and now reduced to extremities by the definitive loss of Cyprus and the pressure of the taxes which were raised to an intolerable degree in consequence of the transactions with the Romans (696), chased him on that account out of the country. us. When the king thereupon applied, as if on account of his eviction from the estate which he had purchased, to those who sold these were reasonable enough to see that
was their duty as honest men of business to get back his kingdom for Ptolemaeus only the parties could not agree as to the person to whom the important charge of occupying
Egypt by force along with the perquisites thence to be
should be assigned. It was only when the triumvirate was confirmed anew at the conference of Luca, that this afl‘air was also arranged, after Ptolemaeus had agreed to further payment of 10,000 talents (£2,400,000) the governor of Syria, Aulus Gabinius, now obtained orders from those in power to take the necessary steps immediately for bringing back the king. The citizens of Alexandria had meanwhile placed the crown on the head of Berenice the eldest daughter of the ejected king, and given to her a husband in the person of one of the spiritual princes of Roman Asia, Archelaus the high-priest of Comana
expected
439), who possessed ambition enough to hazard his secure and
respectable position in the hope of mounting the throne of the Lagids. His attempts to gain the Roman regents to his interests remained without success; but he did not recoil before the idea of being obliged to maintain his new kingdom with arms in hand even against the Romans.
Gabinius, without ostensible powers to undertake war and
against Egypt but directed to do so by the regents, made
pretext out of the alleged furtherance of piracy the Gabinlu Egyptians and the ‘building of fleet Archelaus, and
started without delay for the Egyptian frontier (699). 55,
The march through the sandy desert between Gaza and
gags;
a
by
by
(p.
a ; it
a
it,
;
A Roman garrison remains in Alexandria.
country
45: POMPEIUS AND THE EAST BOOK V
Pelusium, in which so many invasions
against Egypt had broken down, was on this occasion successfully accomplished—a result especially due to the quick and skilful leader of the cavalry Marcus Antonius. The frontier fortress of Pelusium also was surrendered without resistance by the Jewish garrison stationed there.
In front of this city the Romans met the Egyptians, defeated them—on which occasion Antonius again distinguished himself—and arrived, as the first Roman army, at the Nile. Here the fleet and army of the Egyptians were drawn up for the last decisive struggle; but the Romans once more conquered, and Archelaus himself with many of his followers perished in the combat. Immediately after this battle the capital surrendered, and therewith all resistance was at an
end The unhappy land was handed over to its legitimate oppressor ; the hanging and beheading, with which, but for the intervention of the chivalrous Antonius, Ptolemaeus would have already in Pelusium begun to celebrate the restoration of the legitimate government, now took its course unhindered, and first of all the innocent daughter was sent by her father to the scaffold. The payment of the reward
with the regents broke down through the absolute impossibility of exacting from the exhausted land the enormous sums required, although they took from the
poor people the last penny; but care was taken that the
should at least be kept quiet by the garrison of Roman infantry and Celtic and German cavalry left in the capital, which took the place of the native praetorians and otherwise emulated them not unsuccessfully. The previous hegemony of Rome over Egypt was thus converted into a direct military occupation, and the nominal continuance of the native monarchy was not so much a privilege granted to the land as a double burden imposed on it.
agreed upon
previously directed
CHAP. v PARTIES DURING ABSENCE OF POMPEIUS
453
CHAPTER V
THE STRUGGLE OF PARTIES DURING THE ABSENCE OF POMPEIUS.
WITH the passing of the Gabinian law the parties in the The
capital changed positions. From the time that the elected defeated
' general of the democracy held in his hand the sword, his aristocracy.
party, or what was reckoned such, had the preponderance in the capital. The nobility doubtless still stood in compact array, and still as before there issued from the comitial machinery none but consuls, who according to the ex pression of the democrats were already designated to the consulate in their cradles ; to command the elections and break down the influence of the old families over them was beyond the power even of the holders of power. But unfortunately the consulate, at the very moment when they
had got the length of virtually excluding the “new men” from began itself to grow pale before the newly-risen star of the exceptional military power. The aristocracy
felt this, though they did not exactly confess it; they gave themselves up as lost. Except Quintus Catulus, who with honourable firmness persevered at his far from pleasant post as champion of vanquished party down to his death (694), no Optimate could be named from the highest ranks 60 of the nobility, who would have sustained the interests of the aristocracy with courage and steadfastness. Their very men of most talent and fame, such as Quintus Metellus
a
it,
Cato.
95.
Pius and Lucius Lucullus, practically abdicated and retired, so far as they could at all do so with propriety, to their villas, in order to forget as much as possible the Forum and the senate-house amidst their gardens and libraries, their aviaries and fish-ponds. Still more, of course, was this the case with the younger generation of the aristocracy, which was either wholly absorbed in luxury and literature or turning towards the rising sun.
There was among the younger men a single exception ; it was Marcus Porcius Cato (born in 6 5 man of the best intentions and of rare devotedness, and yet one of the most Quixotic and one of the most cheerless phenomena in this age so abounding in political caricatures. Honourable and steadfast, earnest in purpose and in action, full of attach ment to his country and to its hereditary constitution, but dull in intellect and sensuously as well as morally destitute of passion, he might certainly have made tolerable state accountant. But unfortunately he fell early under the power of formalism, and swayed partly the phrases of the
toa, which in their abstract baldness and spiritless isolation were current among the genteel world of that day, partly by the example of his great-grandfather whom he deemed
his especial task to reproduce, he began to walk about in the sinful capital as model burgess and mirror of virtue, to scold at the times like the old Cato, to travel on foot instead of riding, to take no interest, to decline badges of distinction as soldier, and to introduce the restoration of the good old days by going after the precedent of king Romulus without shirt. A strange caricature of his ancestor—the gray-haired farmer whom hatred and anger made an orator, who wielded in masterly style the plough as well as the sword, who with his narrow, but original and sound common sense ordinarily hit the nail on the head— was this young unimpassioned pedant from whose
454
THE STRUGGLE OF PARTIES BOOK . V
lips dropped scholastic wisdom and who was everywhere seen
a a
a
it
by
a
9), a
CHAP. v DURING THE ABSENCE OF POMPEIUS
sitting book in hand, this philosopher who understood neither the art of war nor any other art whatever, this cloud-walker in the realm of abstract morals. Yet he attained to moral and thereby even to political importance. In an utterly wretched and cowardly age his courage and his negative virtues told powerfully on the multitude; he
even formed a school, and there were individuals—it is true they were but few—who in their turn copied and caricatured afresh the living pattern of a philosopher. On the same cause depended also his political influence. As he was the only conservative of note who possessed if not talent and insight, at any rate integrity and courage, and was always ready to throw himself into the breach whether it was necessary to do so or not, he soon became the
recognized champion of the Optimate party, although neither his age nor his rank nor his intellect entitled him to be so. Where the perseverance of a single resolute man could decide, he no doubt sometimes achieved a success, and in questions of detail, more particularly of a financial character, he often judiciously interfered, as indeed he was absent from no meeting of the senate; his quaestorship in fact formed an epoch, and as long as he lived he checked the details of the public budget, regarding which he maintained of course a constant warfare with the farmers of the taxes.
For the rest, he lacked simply every ingredient of a states man. He was incapable of even comprehending a political aim and of surveying political relations; his whole tactics consisted in setting his face against every one who deviated or seemed to him to deviate from the traditionary moral and political catechism of the aristocracy, and thus of course he worked as often into the hands of his opponents as into those of his own party. The Don Quixote of the aristocracy, he
proved by his character and his actions that at this time, while there was certainly still an aristocracy in existence, the aristocratic policy was nothing more than a chimera.
4'J5
456 Democra
tic attacks.
THE STRUGGLE OF PARTIES BOOK v
To continue the conflict with this aristocracy brought little honour. Of course the attacks of the democracy on the vanquished foe did not on that account cease. The pack of the Populares threw themselves on the broken ranks of the nobility like the sutlers on a conquered camp, and the surface at least of politics was by this agitation ruffled into high waves of foam. The multitude entered into the matter the more readily, as Gaius Caesar especially kept them in good humour by the extravagant magnificence of his games (689)—in which all the equipments, even the cages of the wild beasts, appeared of massive silver—and generally by a liberality which was all the more princely that it was based solely on the contraction of debt. The attacks on the nobility were of the most varied kind. The abuses of aristocratic rule afforded copious materials; magistrates and advocates who were liberal or assumed a
iberal hue, like Gaius Cornelius, Aulus Gabinius, Marcus Cicero, continued systematically to unveil the most offensive and scandalous aspects of the Optimate doings and to propose laws against them. The senate was directed to give access to foreign envoys on set days, with the view of preventing the usual postponement of audiences. Loans raised by foreign ambassadors in Rome were declared non actionable, as this was the only means of seriously checking the corruptions which formed the order of the day in the
07. senate (68 The right of the senate to give dispensation 67. in particular cases from the laws was restricted (687) as was also the abuse whereby every Roman of rank, who had private business to attend to in the provinces, got
himself invested by the senate with the character of 68. Roman envoy thither (691). They heightened the penalties against the purchase of votes and electioneering intrigues
57, es. (687, 691); which latter were especially increased in scandalous fashion by the attempts of the individuals ejected from the senate 380) to get back to through re-election.
(p.
it
aa
;
7).
CHAP. v DURING THE ABSENCE OF POMPEIUS
457
What had hitherto been simply understood as matter of course was now expressly laid down as a law, that the
were bound to administer justice in conformity with the rules set forth by them, after the Roman fashion,
at their entering on office (687). 67.
But, above all, efforts were made to complete the democratic restoration and to realize the leading ideas of the Gracchan period in a form suitable to the times. The
election of the priests by the comitia, which Gnaeus Domitius had introduced (iii. 46 3) and Sulla had again done away 115), was established by law of the tribune of the people Titus Labienus in 69 r. The democrats were fond 68. of pointing out how much was still wanting towards the restoration of the Sempronian corn-laws in their full extent, and at the same time passed over in silence the fact that under the alteredb circumstances—with the straitened condition of the public finances and the great increase in
the number of fully-privileged Roman citizens—that restora
tion was absolutely impracticable. In the country between Trans the Po and the Alps they zealously fostered the agitation padanes. for political equality with the Italians. As early as 686 68. Gaius Caesar travelled from place to place there for this purpose; in 689 Marcus Crassus as censor made arrange 65. ments to enrol the inhabitants directly in the burgess-roll
—which was only frustrated by the resistance of his colleague; in the following censorships this attempt seems
praetors
to have been repeated. As formerly Gracchus and Flaccus had been the patrons of the Latins, so the present leaders of the democracy gave themselves forth as
of the Transpadanes, and Gaius Piso (consul in i
687) had bitterly to regret that he had ventured to outrage 67.
one of these clients of Caesar and Crassus. On the other Freedmen. hand the same leaders appeared no means disposed to
advocate the political equalization of the freedmen the
tribune of the people Gaius Manilius, who thinly
regularly
protectors
in a
;
by
(p.
a
THE STRUGGLE OF PARTIES BOOK V
67. attended assembly had procured the renewal (31 Dec. 687) of the Sulpician law as to the suffrage of freedmen (iii. 53! ), was immediately disavowed by the leading men of the democracy, and with their consent the law was cancelled by the senate on the very day after its passing. In the same spirit all the strangers, who possessed neither Roman nor Latin burgess-rights, were ejected from the capital by decree of the people in 689. It is obvious that the intrinsic inconsistency of the Gracchan policy—in abetting at once the effort of the excluded to obtain admission into the circle of the privileged, and the effort of the privileged to maintain their distinctive rights—had passed over to their successors; while Caesar and his friends on the one hand held forth to the Transpadanes the prospect of the franchise, they on the other hand gave their assent to the continuance of the disabilities of the freedmen, and to the
65.
458
Process against Rabirius.
barbarous setting aside of the rivalry which the industry and trading skill of the Hellenes and Orientals maintained with the Italians in Italy itself.
The mode in which the democracy dealt with the ancient criminal jurisdiction of the comitia was characteristic. It had not been properly abolished by Sulla, but practically the jury-commissions on high treason and murder had superseded it (p. 128), and no rational man could think of seriously re-establishing the old procedure which long before Sulla had been thoroughly unpractical. But as the
idea of the sovereignty of the people appeared to require a recognition at least in principle of the penal jurisdiction of the burgesses, the tribune of the people Titus Labienus
68. in 691 brought the old man, who thirty-eight years before had slain or was alleged to have slain the tribune of the people Lucius Saturninus (iii. 476), before the same high court of criminal jurisdiction, by virtue of which, if the annals reported truly, king Tullus had procured the
acquittal of the Horatius who had killed his sister. The
CHAP. v DURING THE ABSENCE OF POMPEIUS
459
accused was one Gaius Rabirius, who, if he had not killed Saturninus, had at least paraded with his cut-off head at the tables of men of rank, and who moreover was notorious among the Apulian landholders for his kidnapping and his bloody deeds. The object, if not of the accuser himself, at any rate of the more sagacious men who backed him, was not at all to make this pitiful wretch die the death of the cross; they were not unwilling to acquiesce, when first the form of the impeachment was materially modified by the senate, and then the assembly of the people called to pronounce sentence on the guilty was dissolved under some sort of pretext by the opposite party—so that the whole
was set aside. At all events by this process the two palladia of Roman freedom, the right of the citizens to appeal and the inviolability of the tribunes of the people, were once more established as practical rights, and the legal basis on which the democracy rested was adjusted afresh.
procedure
The democratic reaction manifested still greater vehe-
mence in all personal questions, wherever it could and dared. attacks’ Prudence indeed enjoined it not to urge the restoration of
the estates confiscated by Sulla to their former owners, that
it might not quarrel with its own allies and at the same
time fall into a conflict with material interests, for which a
policy with a set purpose is rarely a match; the recall of
the emigrants was too closely connected with this question
of property not to appear quite as unadvisable. On the
other hand great exertions were made to restore to the children of the proscribed the political rights withdrawn
from them (691), and the heads of the senatorial party were 68. incessantly subjected to personal attacks. Thus Gaius Memmius set on foot a process aimed at Marcus Lucullus
in 688. Thus they allowed his more famous brother to 66. wait for three years before the gates of the capital for his well-deserved triumph (688—69r). Quintus Rex and the “-68. conqueror of Crete Quintus Metellus were similarly insulted.
Personal
460
THE STRUGGLE OF PARTIES BOOK v
It produced a still greater sensation, when the young leader . of the democracy Gaius Caesar in 691 not merely presumed to compete with the two most distinguished men of the
nobility, Quintus Catulus and Publius Servilius the victor of Isaura, in the candidature for the supreme pontificate, but even carried the day among the burgesses. The heirs of Sulla, especially his son Faustus, found themselves constantly threatened with an action tor the refunding of the public moneys which, it was alleged, had been embezzled by the regent. They talked even of resuming the demo
90. cratic impeachments suspended in 664 on the basis of the Varian law (iii. 516). The individuals who had taken part in the Sullan executions were, as may readily be conceived, judicially prosecuted with the utmost zeal. When the quaestor Marcus Cato, in his pedantic integrity, himself made a beginning by demanding back from them the rewards which they had received for murder as property
65. illegally alienated from the state (689), it can excite no . surprise that in the following year (690) Gaius Caesar, as president of the commission regarding murder, summarily treated the clause in the Sullan ordinance, which declared that a proscribed person might be killed with impunity, as null and void, and caused the most noted of Sulla’s
Rehabilita tion of Saturninus and Marina.
executioners, Lucius Catilina, Lucius Bellienus, Lucius Luscius to be brought before his jurymen and, partially, to be condemned.
Lastly, they did not hesitate now to name once more in public the long-proscribed names of the heroes and martyrs
of the democracy, and to celebrate their memory. We have already mentioned how Saturninus was rehabilitated by the process directed against his murderer. But a differ ent sound withal had the name of Gaius Marius, at the mention of which all hearts once had throbbed ; and it happened that the man, to whom Italy owed her deliverance
from the northern barbarians, was at the same time the
CHAP. V DURING THE ABSENCE OF POMPEIUS
461
uncle of the present leader of the democracy. Loudly had
the multitude rejoiced, when in 686 Gaius Caesar ventured 68. in spite of the prohibitions publicly to show the honoured features of the hero in the Forum at the interment of the
widow of Marius. But when, three years afterwards (689), the emblems of victory, which Marius had caused to be erected in the Capitol and Sulla had ordered to be thrown down, one morning unexpectedly glittered afresh in gold and marble at the old spot, the veterans from the African
and Cimbrian wars crowded, with tears in their eyes, around the statue of their beloved general ; and in presence of the rejoicing masses the senate did not venture to seize the trophies which the same bold hand had renewed in defiance of the laws.
But all these doings and disputes, however much noise they made, were, politically considered, of but very subor dinate importance. The oligarchy was vanquished; the democracy had attained the helm. That underlings of various grades should hasten to inflict an additional kick on the prostrate foe; that the democrats also should have their basis in law and their worship of principles ; that their
doctrz'naz'rer should not rest till the whole privileges of the community were in all particulars restored, and should in that respect occasionally make themselves ridiculous, as legitimists are wont to do—all this was just as much to be
Wortnlen ness of the democratic successes.
as it was matter of indifference. Taken as a whole, the agitation was aimless; and we discern in it the perplexity of its authors to find an object for their activity, for it turned almost wholly on things already essentially settled or on subordinate matters.
expected
It could not be otherwise. In the struggle with the aristocracy the democrats had remained victors; but they
had not conquered alone, and the fiery trial still awaited the demo
them-——the reckoning not with their former foe, but with cutsand
their too powerful ally, to whom in the struggle with the
Impending collision between
Pompeius.
46:
THE STRUGGLE OF PARTIES BOOK 1
Schemes for ap pointing a.
aristocracy they were substantially indebted for victory, and to whose hands they had now entrusted an unexampled military and political power, because they dared not refuse it to him. The general of the east and of the seas was still employed in appointing and deposing kings. How long time he would take for that work, or when he would declare the business of the war to be ended, no one could tell but himself; since like everything else the time of his return to Italy, or in other words the day of decision, was left in his own hands. The parties in Rome meanwhile sat and waited. The Optimates indeed looked forward to the arrival of the dreaded general with comparative calm
ness ; by the rupture between Pompeius and the democracy, which they saw to be approaching, they could not lose, but could only gain. The democrats on the contrary waited with painful anxiety, and sought, during the interval still allowed to them by the absence of Pompeius, to lay a countermine against the impending explosion.
In this policy they again coincided with Crassus, to
whom no course was left for encountering his envied and
democratic hated rival but that of allying himself afresh, and more
military
dictator
ship. first coalition a special approximation had taken place
closely than before, with the democracy. Already in the
between Caesar and Crassus as the two weaker parties; a common interest and a common danger tightened yet more the bond which joined the richest and the most insolvent of Romans in closest alliance. While in public the demo- crats described the absent general as the head and pride of their party and seemed to direct all their arrows against the aristocracy, preparations were secretly made against Pompeius ; and these attempts of the democracy to escape from the impending military dictatorship have historically a far higher significance than the noisy agitation, for the most part employed only as a mask, against the nobility.
It is true that they were carried on amidst a darkness, upon
CHAP- V DURING THE ABSENCE OF POMPEIUS
463
which our tradition allows only some stray gleams of light to fall; for not the present alone, but the succeeding age also had its reasons for throwing a veil over the matter. But in general both the course and the object of these efforts are completely clear. The military power could only be effectually checkmated by another military power. The design of the democrats was to possess themselves of the reins of government after the example of Marius and Cinna, then to entrust one of their leaders either with the conquest of Egypt or with the governorship of Spain or some similar ordinary or extraordinary office, and thus to find in him and his military force a counterpoise to Pompeius and his army. For this they required a revolution, which was directed immediately against the nominal government, but in reality against Pompeius as the designated monarch ;1 and, to effect this revolution, there was from the passing of the Gabinio-Manilian laws down to the return of Pompeius
perpetual conspiracy in Rome. The capital 686$ was in anxious suspense; the depressed temper of the capitalists, the suspensions of payment, the frequent bank ruptcies were heralds of the fermenting revolution, which seemed as though it must at the same time produce a totally
new position of parties. The project of the democracy,
which pointed beyond the senate at Pompeius, suggested
an approximation between that general and the senate.
But the democracy in attempting to oppose to the dictator
ship of Pompeius that of a man more agreeable to recog
nized, strictly speaking, on its part also the military govern
Any one who surveys the whole state of the political relations of this
period will need no special proofs to help him to see that the ultimate
object of the democratic machinations in 688 et req. was not the overthrow
of the senate, but that of Pompeius. Yet such proofs are not wanting.
Sallust states that the Gabinio-Manilian laws inflicted mortal blow on the democracy (Cat. 39); that the conspiracy of 688-689 and the Servilian 66-65 rogatio were specially directed against Pompeius, likewise attested
(Sallust -. Cal. 19; Val. Max. vi. 2, 4; Cic. d: Leg: Agr. 17, 46).
Besides the attitude of Crassus towards the conspiracy alone shows nrficiently that was directed against Pompeius.
(688—692)
66.
it
is ii.
a
1
it,
of the democrats and the anarchists.
464 THE STRUGGLE OF PARTIES 800K ‘
ment, and in reality drove out Satan by Beelzebub ; the ques tion of principles became in its hands a question of persons. The first step towards the revolution projected by the
leaders of the democracy was thus to be the overthrow of
existing government by means of an insurrection
primarily instigated in Rome by democratic
The moral condition of the lowest as of the highest ranks of society in the capital presented the materials for this purpose in lamentable abundance. We need not here repeat what was the character of the free and the servile proletariate of the capital. The significant saying was already heard, that only the poor man was qualified to represent the poor 5 the idea was thus suggested, that the mass of the poor might constitute itself an independent power as well as the oligarchy of the rich, and instead of allowing itself to be tyrannized over, might perhaps in its own turn play the tyrant. But even in the circles of the young men of rank similar ideas found an echo. The fashionable life of the capital shattered not merely the fortunes of men, but also their vigour of body and mind. That elegant world of fragrant ringlets, of fashionable mustachios and rufi‘les—merry as were its doings in the dance and with the harp, and early and late at the wine cup-—yet concealed in its bosom an alarming abyss of moral and economic ruin, of well or ill concealed despair, and frantic or knavish resolves. These circles sighed without disguise for a return of the time of Cinna with its
the
conspirators.
and confiscations and its annihilation of account-books for debt ; there were people enough, includ ing not a few of no mean descent and unusual abilities, who only waited the signal to fall like a gang of robbers on civil society and to recruit by pillage the fortune which they had squandered. Where a band gathers, leaders are
not wanting; and in this case the men were soonI,‘ found
proscriptions
who were fitted to be captains of banditti.
'
CIIAP. v DURING THE ABSENCE OF POMPEIUS
465
The late praetor Lucius Catilina, and the quaestor Catilina. Gnaeus Piso, were distinguished among their fellows not
merely by their genteel birth and their superior rank. They
had broken down the bridge completely behind them, and impressed their accomplices by their dissoluteness quite as
much as by their talents.
Catilina especially was one of the most wicked men in that wicked age. His villanies belong to the records of crime, not to history; but his very outward appearance-—the pale countenance, the wild glance, the gait by turns sluggish and hurried—betrayed his dismal past. He possessed in a high degree the qualities which are required in the leader of such a band— the faculty of enjoying all pleasures and of hearing all privations, courage, military talent, knowledge of men, the energy of a felon, and that horrible mastery of vice, which knows how to bring the weak to fall and how to train the fallen to crime.
To form out of such elements a conspiracy for the overthrow of the existing order of things could not be diflicult to men who possessed money and political influ ence. Catilina, Piso, and their fellows entered readily into any plan which gave the prospect of proscriptions and cancelling of debtor-books ; the former had moreover special hostility to the aristocracy, because it had opposed the candidature of that infamous and dangerous man for the consulship. As he had formerly in the character of
an executioner of Sulla hunted the proscribed at the head of a band of Celts and had killed among others his own aged father-in-law with his own hand, he now readily con sented to promise similar services to the opposite party. A secret league was formed. The number of individuals received into it is said to have exceeded 400; it included associates in all the districts and urban communities of Italy; besides which, as a matter of course, numerous recruits would flock unbidden from the ranks of the dis
voL. w
130
66. Failure of
the first conspiracy.
solute youth to an insurrection, which inscribed or. its banner the seasonable programme of wiping out debts.
In December 688—so we are told—the leaders of the
league thought that they had found the fitting occasion
466
THE STRUGGLE OF PARTIES B001K V
plans [65. for striking a blow. The two consuls chosen for 689,
of Publius Cornelius Sulla and Publius Autronius Paetus, had
recently been judicially convicted of electoral bribery, and therefore had according to legal rule forfeited their expect ancy of the highest oflice. Both thereupon joined the league. The conspirators resolved to procure the consul ship for them by force, and thereby to put themselves in possession of the supreme power in the state. On the day when the new consuls should enter on their office-—
65. the 1st Jan. 689—the senate-house was to be assailed by armed men, the new consuls and the victims otherwise designated were to be put to death, and Sulla and Paetus were to be proclaimed as consuls after the cancelling of the judicial sentence which excluded them. Crassus was then to be invested with the dictatorship and Caesar with the mastership of the horse, doubtless with a view to raise an imposing military force, while Pompeius was employed afar off at the Caucasus. Captains and common soldiers were hired and instructed; Catilina waited on the appointed day in the neighbourhood of the senate-house for the con certed signal, which was to be given him by Caesar on a hint from Crassus. But he waited in vain; Crassus was absent from the decisive sitting of the senate, and for this time the projected insurrection failed. A similar still more comprehensive plan of murder was then concerted for the 5th Feb. ; but this too was frustrated, because Catilina
the signal too early, before the bandits who were
gave
bespoken
divulged. The government did not venture openly to proceed against the conspiracy, but it assigned a guard to the consuls who were primarily threatened, and it opposed
had all arrived. Thereupon the secret was
CHAP. v DURING THE ABSENCE OF POMPEIUS
467
to the band of the conspirators a band paid by the govern ment. To remove Piso, the proposal was made that he should be sent as quaestor with praetorian powers to Hither Spain; to which Crassus consented, in the hope of secur
him the resources of that important province for the insurrection. Proposals going farther were pre vented by the tribunes.
So runs the account that has come down to us, which evidently gives the version current in the government circles, and the credibility of which in detail must, in the absence of any means of checking be left an open question. As to the main matter—the participation of Caesar and Crassus —the testimony of their political opponents certainly cannot be regarded as suflicient evidence of it. But their notorious action at this epoch corresponds with striking exactness to the secret action which this report ascribes to them. The attempt of Crassus, who in this year was censor, ofticially to enrol the Transpadanes in the burgess-list 457) was of itself directly revolutionary enterprise. still more remarkable, that Crassus on the same occasion made preparations to enrol Egypt and Cyprus in the list of Roman domains,1 and that Caesar about the same time (689 or 690) got proposal submitted some tribunes to the burgesses to send him to Egypt, in order to reinstate king
ing through
whom the Alexandrians had expelled. These machinations suspiciously coincide with the charges raised
Plutarch, Crasr. r3; Cicero, a’: Legs agr. 17, 44. To this year (689) belongs Cicero's oration d: reg: Alexandrina, which has been in- correctly assigned to the year 698. In Cicero refutes, as the fragments clearly show, the assertion of Crassus, that Egypt had been rendered Roman property by the testament of king Alexander. This question of law might and must have been discussed in 689 but in 698 had been deprived of its significance through the Julian law of 695. In 698 more- over the discussion related not to the question to whom Egypt belonged, but to the restoration of the king driven out by a revolt, and in this trans action which well known to us Crassus played no part. Lastly, Cicero
after the conference of Luca was not at all in a position seriously to oppose one of the triumvirs.
65. 64.
65, 56,
85, 56. 5,, 66
Ptolemaeus
is a
it ;
by
it
1
ii.
a
It (p. is
it,
Resump
spiracy.
renewing their attempt to get possession of the consulate; which may have been partly owing to the fact that a relative of the leader of the democracy, Lucius Caesar, a weak man who was not unfrequently employed by his kinsman as a tool, was on this occasion a candidate for the consulship. But the reports from Asia urged them to make haste. The affairs of Asia Minor and Armenia were already completely arranged. However clearly democratic strategists showed that the Mithradatic war could only be regarded as ter minated by the capture of the king, and that it was there fore necessary to undertake the pursuit round the Black Sea, and above all things to keep aloof from Syria
64. out in the spring of 690 from Armenia and marched towards
If Egypt was really selected as the headquarters of the democracy, there was no time to be lost; otherwise Pompeius might easily arrive in Egypt sooner than Caesar. The conspiracy of 688, far from being broken up by the lax and timid measures of repression, was again astir when
68. the consular elections for 691 approached. The persons were, may be presumed, substantially the same, and the plan was but little altered. The leaders of the movement again kept in the background. On this occasion they had set up as candidates for the consulship Catilina himself and
468 THE STRUGGLE OF PARTIES BOOK v
by their antagonists. Certainty cannot be attained on the point; but there is a great probability that Crassus and Caesar had projected a plan to possess themselves of the military dictatorship during the absence of Pompeius; that Egypt was selected as the basis of this democratic military power; and that, in fine, the insurrectionary attempt of
65. 689 had been contrived to realize these
Catilina and Piso had thus been tools in the hands of Crassus and Caesar.
For a moment the conspiracy came to a standstill. The
tion of [64. elections for took place without Crassus and Caesar the con 690
projects, and
415) Pompeius, not concerning himself about such talk, had set
Syria.
it
(p.
CHAP. V DURING THE ABSENCE OF POMPEIUS 469
Gaius Antonius, the younger son of the orator and a brother of the general who had an ill repute from Crete. They were sure of Catilina; Antonius, originally a Sullan like Catilina and like the latter brought to trial on that account some years before by the democratic party and ejected from the senate 373, 38o)-—otherwise an indo lent, insignificant man, in no respect called to be leader, and utterly bankrupt—willingly lent himself as tool to the democrats for the prize of the consulship and the advantages attached to Through these consuls the heads of the conspiracy intended to seize the government, to arrest the children of Pompeius, who remained behind in the capital, as hostages, and to take up arms in Italy and the provinces against Pompeius. On the first news of the blow struck in the capital, the governor Gnaeus Piso was to raise the banner of insurrection in Hither Spainv Communication could not be held with him way of the sea, since Pompeius commanded the seas. For this purpose they reckoned on the Transpadanes the old clients of the democracy-—among whom there was great agitation, and who would of course have at once received the franchise-— and, further, on different Celtic tribes. 1 The threads of this combination reached as far as Mauretania. One of the conspirators, the Roman speculator Publius Sittius from Nuceria, compelled by financial embarrassments to keep aloof from Italy, had armed troop of desperadoes there and in Spain, and with these wandered about as leader of free-lances in western Africa, where he had old
commercial connections.
The party put forth all its energies for the struggle of Consular
elections whether their own or borrowed—and their connections to
the election. Crassus and Caesar staked their money
The Ambrani (Suet. Cm. are probably not the Ambrones named along with the Cimbri (Plutarch, zllar. 19), but a slip of the pen for Arverni.
9)
(p.
1
a
a
by
it.
a
a
Cicero elected instead of Catilina.
procure the consulship for Catilina and Antonius ; the comrades of Catilina strained every nerve to bring to the helm the man who promised them the magistracies and priesthoods, the palaces and country-estates of their opponents, and above all deliverance from their debts, and who, they knew, would keep his word. The aristocracy was in great perplexity, chiefly because it was not able even to start counter-candidates. That such a candidate risked his head, was obvious ; and the times were past when the post of danger allured the burgess—now even ambition was hushed in presence of fear. Accordingly the nobility con tented themselves with making a feeble attempt to check electioneering intrigues by issuing a new law respecting the purchase of votes—which, however, was thwarted by the veto of a tribune of the people-—and with turning over their votes to a candidate who, although not acceptable to them, was at least inoffensive. This was Marcus Cicero, notoriously a political trimmer,1 accustomed to flirt at times with the democrats, at times with Pompeius, at times from a somewhat greater distance with the aristocracy, and to lend his services as an advocate to every influential man under impeachment without distinction of person or party (he numbered even Catilina among his clients) ; belonging properly to no party or—which was much the same—to the party of material interests, which was dominant in the courts and was pleased with the eloquent pleader and the courtly and witty companion. He had connections enough in the capital and the country towns to have a chance alongside of the candidates proposed by the democracy; and as the nobility, although with reluctance, and the Pompeians voted
1 This cannot well be expressed more naively than is done in the memorial ascribed to his brother (depcf. com. r, 5; r3, 51, 53 ; in 690); the brother himself would hardly have expressed his mind publicly with so much franknus. In proof of this unprejudiced persons will read not with out interest the second oration against Rullus, where the “ first democratic consul," gulling the friendly public in a very delectable fashion, unfolds to it the "true democracy. "
64.
470
THE STR'UGGLE or PARTIES B001: v
CHAP. V DURING THE ABSENCE OF POMPEIUS
471
for him, he was elected by a great majority. The two candidates of the democracy obtained almost the same number of votes; but a few more fell to Antonius, whose family was of more consideration than that of his fellow candidate. This accident frustrated the election of Catilina and saved Rome from a second Cinna. A little before this Piso had—it was said at the instigation of his political and personal enemy Pompeius—been put to death in Spain by his native escort. 1 With the consul Antonius alone nothing could be done ; Cicero broke the loose bond which attached
him to the conspiracy, even before they entered on their oflices, inasmuch as he renounced his legal privilege of having the consular provinces determined by lot, and handed over to his deeply-embarrassed colleague the lucrative governorship of Macedonia. The essential pre liminary conditions of this project also had therefore mis carried.
Meanwhile the development of Oriental affairs grew daily New more perilous for the democracy. The settlement of Syria $21,522:“ rapidly advanced; already invitations had been addressed spinton. to Pompeius from Egypt to march thither and occupy the
country for Rome ; they could not but be afraid that they
would next hear of Pompeius in person having taken possession of the valley of the Nile. It was by this very apprehension probably that the attempt of Caesar to get
himself sent by the people to Egypt for the purpose of aiding
the king against his rebellious subjects (p. 467) was called
forth; it failed, apparently, through the disinclination of
great and small to undertake anything whatever against the
interest of Pompeius. His return home, and the probable catastrophe which it involved, were always drawing the
nearer; often as the string of the bow had been broken,
it was necessary that there should be a fresh attempt to bend
1 His epitaph still extant runs: Cn. Calpumiur Cu. )1 Pin quarter [70 fr. at . r. c. provinciam Hirpanic»: cileriorenl optinuil.
472
THE STRUGGLE OF PARTIES BOOK v
The city was sullen ferment; frequent conference: of the heads of the movement indicated that some step was again contemplated.
What they wished became manifest when the new
The Ser-
$22,“ tribunes of the people entered on their oflice (IO Dec. law. [64. 690), and one of them, Publius Servilius Rullus, immedi
ately proposed an agrarian law, which was designed to procure for the leaders of the democrats position similar to that which Pompeius occupied in consequence of the Gabinio-Manilian proposals. The nominal object was the founding of colonies in Italy. The ground for these, however, was not to be gained by dispossession; on the contrary all existing private rights were guaranteed, and even the illegal occupations of the most recent times
62. from ‘244s
692, and the proceeds of the whole booty not yet
370) were converted into full property. The leased Campanian
domain alone was to be parcelled out and colonized in other cases the government was to acquire the land destined for assignation by ordinary purchase. To procure the sums necessary for this purpose, the remaining Italian, and more especially all the extra-Italian, domain-land was successively to be brought to sale; which was understood to include the former royal hunting domains in Macedonia, the Thracian Chersonese, Bithynia, Pontus, Cyrene, and also the territories of the cities acquired in full property by right of war in Spain, Africa, Sicily, Hellas, and Cilicia. Everything was likewise to be sold which the state had acquired in moveable and immoveable property since the
88. year 666, and of which had not previously disposed; this was aimed chiefly at Egypt and Cyprus. For the same purpose all subject communities, with the exception of the towns with Latin rights and the other free cities, were burdened with very high rates of taxes and tithes. Lastly there was likewise destined for those purchases the produce of the new provincial revenues, to be reckoned
it
;
a
it.
in
CHM‘. v DURING THE ABSENCE OF POMPEIUS
473
legally applied; which regulations had reference to the new sources of taxation opened up by Pompeius in the east and to the public moneys that might be found in the hands of Pompeius and the heirs of Sulla. For the exe cution of this measure decemvirs with a special jurisdiction and special impm'um were to be nominated, who were to remain five years in office and to surround themselves with 200 subalterns from the equestrian order; but in the election of the decemvirs only those candidates who should personally announce themselves were to be taken into account, and, as in the elections of priests 206), only seventeen tribes to be fixed by lot out of the thirty-five were to make the election. It needed no great acuteness to discern that in this decemviral college was intended to create power after the model of that of Pompeius, only with somewhat less of military and more of demo cratic hue. The jurisdiction was especially needed for the sake of deciding the Egyptian question, the military
for the sake of arming against Pompeius the clause, which forbade the choice of an absent person, excluded Pompeius; and the diminution of the tribes entitled to vote as well as the manipulation of the balloting were designed to facilitate the management of the election in accordance with the views of the democracy.
But this attempt totally missed its aim. The multitude, finding more agreeable to have their corn measured out to them under the shade of Roman porticoes from the public magazines than to cultivate for themselves in the sweat of their brow, received even the proposal in itself with complete indifference. They soon came also to feel that Pompeius would never acquiesce in such resolution offensive to him in every respect, and that matters could not stand well with party which in its painful alarm con descended to offers so extravagant. Under ‘such circum stances was not difficult for the government to frustrate
power
it
it
a
a
it
(p.
it
a ;
a
a
l‘l‘rtpalio llunl . anarchists
474
THE STRUGGLE OF PARTIES BOOK Y
the proposal; the new consul Cicero perceived the oppor tunity of exhibiting here too his talent for giving a finishing stroke to the beaten party; even before the tribunes who stood ready exercised their veto, the author himself with
63. drew his proposal (1 Jan. 691). The democracy had gained nothing but the unpleasant lesson, that the great multitude out of love or fear still continued to adhere to Pompeius, and that every proposal was certain to fail which the public perceived to be directed against him.
Wearied by all this vain agitation and scheming with out result, Catilina determined to push the matter to a i! I Eil‘m'll. decision and make an end of it once for all. He took his measures in the course of the summer to open the civil war. Faesulae (Fiesole), a very strong town situated in
Etruria—which swarmed with the impoverished and con spirators—and fifteen years before the centre of the rising of Lepidus, was again selected as the headquarters of the insurrection. Thither were despatched the consignments of money, for which especially the ladies of quality in the capital implicated in the conspiracy furnished the means; there arms and soldiers were collected; and there an old Sullan captain, Gaius Manlius, as brave and as free from scruples of conscience as was ever any soldier of ‘fortune, took temporarily the chief command. Similar though less extensive warlike preparations were made at other points of Italy. The Transpadanes were so excited that they seemed only waiting for the signal to strike. In the Bruttian country, on the east coast of Italy, in Capua— wherever great bodies of slaves were accumulated—a second slave insurrection like that of Spartacus seemed on the eve of arising. Even in the capital there was some thing brewing; those who saw the haughty bearing with which the summoned debtors appeared before the urban
praetor, could not but remember the scenes which had preceded the murder of Asellio (iii. 530). The capitalists
CRAP. V DURING THE ABSENCE OF POMPEIUS
475
were in unutterable anxiety ; it seemed needful to enforce
the prohibition of the export of gold and silver, and to set
a watch over the principal ports. The plan of the con spirators was-—on occasion of the consular election for 69 2, 62, for which Catilina had again announced himself—summarily
to put to death the consul conducting the election as well as the inconvenient rival candidates, and to carry the election of Catilina at any price ; in case of necessity, even to bring armed bands from Faesulae and the other rallying points against the capital, and with their help to crush resistance.
Cicero, who was always quickly and completely informed Election by his agents male and female of the transactions of the conspirators, on the day fixed for the election (20 Oct. ) again denounced the conspiracy in the full senate and in presence “strand of its principal leaders. Catilina did not condescend to
deny it; he answered haughtily that, if the election for consul should fall on him, the great headless party would certainly no longer want a leader against the small party led by wretched heads. But as palpable evidences of the plot were not before them, nothing farther was to be got from the timid senate, except that it gave its previous sanction in the usual way to the exceptional measures which the magistrates might deem suitable
(21 Oct. ). Thus the election battle approached-—-on this occasion
more a battle than an election ; for Cicero too had formed for himself an armed bodyguard out of the younger men, more especially of the mercantile order; and it was his armed force that covered and dominated the Campus Martius on the 28th October, the day to which the election had been postponed by the senate. The conspirators were not successful either in killing the consul conducting the election, or in deciding the elections according to their mind.
But meanwhile the civil war had begun. On the
Outbreak of the insurrec tion in Etruria.
27th Oct. Gaius Manlius had planted at Faesulae the eagle round which the army of the insurrection was to flock—it was one of the Marian eagles from the Cimbrian war—and he had summoned the robbers from the mountains as well as the country people to jcin him. His proclamations, following the old traditions of the popular party, demanded liberation from the oppressive load of debt and modifi cation of the procedure in insolvency, which, the amount of the debt actually exceeded the estate, certainly still involved in law the forfeiture of the debtor’s freedom. It seemed as though the rabble of the capital, in coming forward as were the legitimate successor of the old plebeian farmers and fighting its battles under the glorious eagles of the Cimbrian war, wished to cast stain not only on the present but on the past of Rome. This rising, however, remained isolated; at the other places of rendez vous the conspiracy did not go beyond the collection of arms and the institution of secret conferences, as resolute
measures of the govern
m
the government; for, although the impending civil war had been for considerable time openly announced, its own irresolution and the clumsiness of the rusty machinery of administration had not allowed to make any military
whatever. was only now that the general levy was called out, and superior oflicers were ordered to the several regions of Italy that each might suppress the insurrection in his own district; while at the same time the gladiatorial slaves were ejected from the capital, and patrols were ordered on account of the apprehension of incendiarism.
Catilina was in painful position. According to his design there should have been simultaneous rising in the capital and in Etruria on occasion of the consular elections the failure of the former and the outbreak of the latter movement endangered his person as well as the whole
The con spirators in Rome.
476
THE STRUGGLE OF PARTIES BOOK v
Repressive leaders were everywhere wanting. This was fortunate for
preparations
;
a
It
it
a
t‘.
I! l
a
if it
a
if
a
CHAP. V DURING THE ABSENCE OF POMPEIUS
477
success of his undertaking. Now that his partisans at Faesulae had once risen in arms against the government, he could no longer remain in the capital; and yet not only did everything depend on his inducing the conspirators of the capital now at least to strike quickly, but this had to be done even before he left Rome—for he knew his helpmates too well to rely on them for that matter. The more considerable of the conspirators-—Publius Lentulus Sura consul in 683, afterwards expelled from the senate and 71 now, in order to get back into the senate, praetor for the second time, and the two former praetors Publius Autronius and Lucius Cassius—were incapable men; Lentulus an ordinary aristocrat of big words and great pretensions, but slow in conception and irresolute in action; Autronius
distinguished for nothing but his powerful screaming voice; while as to Lucius Cassius no one comprehended how a man so corpulent and so simple had fallen among the con
But Catilina could not venture to place his abler partisans, such as the young senator Gaius Cethegus and the equites Lucius Statilius and Publius Gabinius Capito, at the head of the movement 5 for even among the
spirators.
the traditional hierarchy of rank held its and the very anarchists thought that they should
conspirators
ground,
be unable to carry the day unless a consular or at least a praetorian were at their head. Therefore, however urgently the army of the insurrection might long for its general, and however perilous it was for the latter to remain longer at the seat of government after the outbreak of the revolt, Catilina nevertheless resolved still to remain for a time in Rome. Accustomed to impose on his cowardly opponents by his audacious insolence, he showed himself publicly in the Forum and in the senate-house and replied to the threats which were there addressed to him, that they should beware of pushing him to extremities; that, if they should set the house on fire, he would be compelled to extinguish
478
THE STRUGGLE OF PARTIES BOOK V
Catilina
the conflagration in ruins. In reality neither private persons nor oflicials ventured to lay hands on the dangerous man ; it was almost a matter of indifference when a young nobleman brought him to trial on account of violence, for long before the process could come to an end, the question could not but be decided elsewhere. But the projects of Catilina failed; chiefly because the agents of the govern ment had made their way into the circle of the conspirators and kept it accurately informed of every detail of the plot. When, for instance, the conspirators appeared before the strong Praeneste (r Nov. ), which they had hoped to surprise by a am} 0'2 main, they found the inhabitants warned and armed; and in a similar way everything miscarried. Catilina with all his temerity now found it advisable to fix his departure for one of the ensuing days ; but previously on his urgent exhortation, at a last conference of the conspirators in the night between the 6th and 7th Nov. it was resolved to assassinate the consul Cicero, who was the principal director of the countermine, before the departure of their leader, and, in order to obviate any treachery, to carry the resolve at once into execution. Early on the morning of the 7th Nov. , accordingly, the selected murderers knocked at the house of the consul; but they found the guard reinforced and themselves repulsed—on this occasion too the spies of the government had outdone the conspirators.
On the following day (8 Nov. ) Cicero convoked the senate. Even now Catilina ventured to appear and to
a defence against the indignant attacks of the consul, who unveiled before his face the events of the last few days; but men no longer listened to him, and in the
attempt
of the place where he sat the benches became empty. He left the sitting, and proceeded, as he would doubtless have done even apart from this incident, in accordance with the agreement, to Etruria. Here he
neighbourhood
CHAP. v DURING THE ABSENCE OF POMPEIUS
479
proclaimed himself consul, and assumed an attitude of waiting, in order to put his troops in motion against the capital on the first announcement of the outbreak of the insurrection there. The government declared the two leaders Catilina and Manlius, as well as those of their comrades who should not have laid down their arms by a certain day, to be outlaws, and called out new levies ; but at the head of the army destined against Catilina was placed the consul Gaius Antonius, who was notoriously implicated in the conspiracy, and with whose character it was wholly a matter of accident whether he would lead his troops against Catilina or over to his side. They seemed to have directly laid their plans towards converting this Antonius into a second Lepidus. As little were steps taken against the leaders of the conspiracy who had remained behind in the capital, although every one pointed the finger at them and the insurrection in the capital was far from being abandoned by the conspirators—on the contrary the plan of it had been settled by Catilina himself before his departure from Rome. A tribune was to give the signal by calling an assembly of the people; in the following night Cethegus was to despatch the consul Cicero; Gabinius and Statilius were to set the city simultaneously on fire at twelve places; and a communication was to be established as speedily as possible with the army of Catilina, which should have meanwhile advanced. Had the
urgent representa tions of Cethegus borne fruit and had Lentulus, who after Catilina’s departure was placed at the head of the
conspirators, resolved on rapidly striking a blow, the con spiracy might even now have been successful. But the conspirators were just as incapable and as cowardly as their opponents; weeks elapsed and the matter came to no decisive issue.
At length the countermine brought about a decision. Lentulus in his tedious fashion, which sought to cover
Conviction and arrest of the con spirators in the capitol.
negligence in regard to what was immediate and necessary by the projection of large and distant plans, had entered into relations with the deputies of a Celtic canton, the Allobroges, now present in Rome; had attempted to implicate these—the representatives of a thoroughly dis organized commonwealth and themselves deeply involved in debt—in the conspiracy; and had given them on their departure messages and letters to his confidants.
4. 49
the Jewish land was broken up, as Macedonia had formerly been, into five independent districts administered by governing colleges with an Optimate organization ; Samaria and other townships razed by the Jews were re-established, to form a counterpoise to Jerusalem ; and lastly a heavier tribute was imposed on the Jews than on the other Syrian
subjects of Rome
It still remains that we should glance at the kingdom of The
Egypt along with the last dependency that remained to it of ‘Si-“Egg; the extensive acquisitions of the Lagids, the fair island of
Cyprus. Egypt was now the only state of the Hellenic cast
that was still at least nominally independent ; just as formerly, when the Persians established themselves along
the eastern half of the Mediterranean, Egypt was their last conquest, so now the mighty conquerors from the west long delayed the annexation of that opulent and peculiar country. The reason lay, as was already indicated, neither in any fear of the resistance of Egypt nor in the want of a fitting occasion. Egypt was just about as powerless as Syria, and had already in 673 fallen in all due form of law to the ar. Roman community (p. 318). The control exercised over
the court of Alexandria by the royal guard—which appointed and deposed ministers and occasionally kings, took for itself what it pleased, and, if it was refused a rise of pay, besieged the king in his palace—was by no means liked in the country or rather in the capital (for the country with its population of agricultural slaves was hardly taken into account); and at least a party there wished for the annexa tion of Egypt by Rome, and even took steps to procure it. But the less the kings of Egypt could think of contending in arms against Rome, the more energetically Egyptian gold set itself to resist the Roman plans of union ; and in con sequence ofthe peculiar despotico-communistic centralization of the Egyptian finances the revenues of the court of
Alexandria were still nearly equal to the public income of
von iv
I29
450
POMPEIUS AND THE EAST 800! v
Cyprus armored.
58,
Rome even after its augmentation by Pompeius. The suspicious jealousy of the oligarchy, which was chary of allowing any individual either to conquer or to administer Egypt, operated in the same direction. So the d: fade rulers of Egypt and Cyprus were enabled by bribing the leading men in the senate not merely to respite their totter ing crowns, but even to fortify them afresh and to purchase from the senate the confirmation of their royal title. But with this they had not yet obtained their object. Formal state-law required a decree of the Roman burgesses; until this was issued, the Ptolemies were dependent on the caprice of every democratic holder of power, and they had thus to commence the warfare of bribery also against the
other Roman party, which as the more powerful stipulated for far higher prices.
The result in the two cases was different. The annexa tion of Cyprus was decreed in 696 by the people, that
by the leaders of the democracy, the support given to piracy the Cypriots being alleged as the official reason why that course should now be adopted. Marcus Cato, entrusted by his opponents with the execution of this measure, came to the island without an army but he had no need of one. The king took poison; the inhabitants submitted without offering resistance to their inevitable fate, and were placed under the governor of Cilicia. The ample treasure of nearly 7000 talents (£1,700,000), which the
covetous and miserly king could not prevail on himself to apply for the bribes requisite to save his crown, fell along with the latter to the Romans, and filled after desirable fashion the empty vaults of their treasury.
On the other hand the brother who reigned in Egypt
decree of the the purchase
said to have amounted to 6000 talents
exasperated
equally
Ptolemaeus
25553;,’ succeeded in purchasing his recognition but [59. people from the new masters of Rome in 69
money
subjects, (£1,460,000). The citizens indeed, long
gpglsed
is
by
5 ;
by
;
a
is,
cr-rn. rv POMPEIUS AND THE EAST
451
against their good flute-player and bad ruler, and now reduced to extremities by the definitive loss of Cyprus and the pressure of the taxes which were raised to an intolerable degree in consequence of the transactions with the Romans (696), chased him on that account out of the country. us. When the king thereupon applied, as if on account of his eviction from the estate which he had purchased, to those who sold these were reasonable enough to see that
was their duty as honest men of business to get back his kingdom for Ptolemaeus only the parties could not agree as to the person to whom the important charge of occupying
Egypt by force along with the perquisites thence to be
should be assigned. It was only when the triumvirate was confirmed anew at the conference of Luca, that this afl‘air was also arranged, after Ptolemaeus had agreed to further payment of 10,000 talents (£2,400,000) the governor of Syria, Aulus Gabinius, now obtained orders from those in power to take the necessary steps immediately for bringing back the king. The citizens of Alexandria had meanwhile placed the crown on the head of Berenice the eldest daughter of the ejected king, and given to her a husband in the person of one of the spiritual princes of Roman Asia, Archelaus the high-priest of Comana
expected
439), who possessed ambition enough to hazard his secure and
respectable position in the hope of mounting the throne of the Lagids. His attempts to gain the Roman regents to his interests remained without success; but he did not recoil before the idea of being obliged to maintain his new kingdom with arms in hand even against the Romans.
Gabinius, without ostensible powers to undertake war and
against Egypt but directed to do so by the regents, made
pretext out of the alleged furtherance of piracy the Gabinlu Egyptians and the ‘building of fleet Archelaus, and
started without delay for the Egyptian frontier (699). 55,
The march through the sandy desert between Gaza and
gags;
a
by
by
(p.
a ; it
a
it,
;
A Roman garrison remains in Alexandria.
country
45: POMPEIUS AND THE EAST BOOK V
Pelusium, in which so many invasions
against Egypt had broken down, was on this occasion successfully accomplished—a result especially due to the quick and skilful leader of the cavalry Marcus Antonius. The frontier fortress of Pelusium also was surrendered without resistance by the Jewish garrison stationed there.
In front of this city the Romans met the Egyptians, defeated them—on which occasion Antonius again distinguished himself—and arrived, as the first Roman army, at the Nile. Here the fleet and army of the Egyptians were drawn up for the last decisive struggle; but the Romans once more conquered, and Archelaus himself with many of his followers perished in the combat. Immediately after this battle the capital surrendered, and therewith all resistance was at an
end The unhappy land was handed over to its legitimate oppressor ; the hanging and beheading, with which, but for the intervention of the chivalrous Antonius, Ptolemaeus would have already in Pelusium begun to celebrate the restoration of the legitimate government, now took its course unhindered, and first of all the innocent daughter was sent by her father to the scaffold. The payment of the reward
with the regents broke down through the absolute impossibility of exacting from the exhausted land the enormous sums required, although they took from the
poor people the last penny; but care was taken that the
should at least be kept quiet by the garrison of Roman infantry and Celtic and German cavalry left in the capital, which took the place of the native praetorians and otherwise emulated them not unsuccessfully. The previous hegemony of Rome over Egypt was thus converted into a direct military occupation, and the nominal continuance of the native monarchy was not so much a privilege granted to the land as a double burden imposed on it.
agreed upon
previously directed
CHAP. v PARTIES DURING ABSENCE OF POMPEIUS
453
CHAPTER V
THE STRUGGLE OF PARTIES DURING THE ABSENCE OF POMPEIUS.
WITH the passing of the Gabinian law the parties in the The
capital changed positions. From the time that the elected defeated
' general of the democracy held in his hand the sword, his aristocracy.
party, or what was reckoned such, had the preponderance in the capital. The nobility doubtless still stood in compact array, and still as before there issued from the comitial machinery none but consuls, who according to the ex pression of the democrats were already designated to the consulate in their cradles ; to command the elections and break down the influence of the old families over them was beyond the power even of the holders of power. But unfortunately the consulate, at the very moment when they
had got the length of virtually excluding the “new men” from began itself to grow pale before the newly-risen star of the exceptional military power. The aristocracy
felt this, though they did not exactly confess it; they gave themselves up as lost. Except Quintus Catulus, who with honourable firmness persevered at his far from pleasant post as champion of vanquished party down to his death (694), no Optimate could be named from the highest ranks 60 of the nobility, who would have sustained the interests of the aristocracy with courage and steadfastness. Their very men of most talent and fame, such as Quintus Metellus
a
it,
Cato.
95.
Pius and Lucius Lucullus, practically abdicated and retired, so far as they could at all do so with propriety, to their villas, in order to forget as much as possible the Forum and the senate-house amidst their gardens and libraries, their aviaries and fish-ponds. Still more, of course, was this the case with the younger generation of the aristocracy, which was either wholly absorbed in luxury and literature or turning towards the rising sun.
There was among the younger men a single exception ; it was Marcus Porcius Cato (born in 6 5 man of the best intentions and of rare devotedness, and yet one of the most Quixotic and one of the most cheerless phenomena in this age so abounding in political caricatures. Honourable and steadfast, earnest in purpose and in action, full of attach ment to his country and to its hereditary constitution, but dull in intellect and sensuously as well as morally destitute of passion, he might certainly have made tolerable state accountant. But unfortunately he fell early under the power of formalism, and swayed partly the phrases of the
toa, which in their abstract baldness and spiritless isolation were current among the genteel world of that day, partly by the example of his great-grandfather whom he deemed
his especial task to reproduce, he began to walk about in the sinful capital as model burgess and mirror of virtue, to scold at the times like the old Cato, to travel on foot instead of riding, to take no interest, to decline badges of distinction as soldier, and to introduce the restoration of the good old days by going after the precedent of king Romulus without shirt. A strange caricature of his ancestor—the gray-haired farmer whom hatred and anger made an orator, who wielded in masterly style the plough as well as the sword, who with his narrow, but original and sound common sense ordinarily hit the nail on the head— was this young unimpassioned pedant from whose
454
THE STRUGGLE OF PARTIES BOOK . V
lips dropped scholastic wisdom and who was everywhere seen
a a
a
it
by
a
9), a
CHAP. v DURING THE ABSENCE OF POMPEIUS
sitting book in hand, this philosopher who understood neither the art of war nor any other art whatever, this cloud-walker in the realm of abstract morals. Yet he attained to moral and thereby even to political importance. In an utterly wretched and cowardly age his courage and his negative virtues told powerfully on the multitude; he
even formed a school, and there were individuals—it is true they were but few—who in their turn copied and caricatured afresh the living pattern of a philosopher. On the same cause depended also his political influence. As he was the only conservative of note who possessed if not talent and insight, at any rate integrity and courage, and was always ready to throw himself into the breach whether it was necessary to do so or not, he soon became the
recognized champion of the Optimate party, although neither his age nor his rank nor his intellect entitled him to be so. Where the perseverance of a single resolute man could decide, he no doubt sometimes achieved a success, and in questions of detail, more particularly of a financial character, he often judiciously interfered, as indeed he was absent from no meeting of the senate; his quaestorship in fact formed an epoch, and as long as he lived he checked the details of the public budget, regarding which he maintained of course a constant warfare with the farmers of the taxes.
For the rest, he lacked simply every ingredient of a states man. He was incapable of even comprehending a political aim and of surveying political relations; his whole tactics consisted in setting his face against every one who deviated or seemed to him to deviate from the traditionary moral and political catechism of the aristocracy, and thus of course he worked as often into the hands of his opponents as into those of his own party. The Don Quixote of the aristocracy, he
proved by his character and his actions that at this time, while there was certainly still an aristocracy in existence, the aristocratic policy was nothing more than a chimera.
4'J5
456 Democra
tic attacks.
THE STRUGGLE OF PARTIES BOOK v
To continue the conflict with this aristocracy brought little honour. Of course the attacks of the democracy on the vanquished foe did not on that account cease. The pack of the Populares threw themselves on the broken ranks of the nobility like the sutlers on a conquered camp, and the surface at least of politics was by this agitation ruffled into high waves of foam. The multitude entered into the matter the more readily, as Gaius Caesar especially kept them in good humour by the extravagant magnificence of his games (689)—in which all the equipments, even the cages of the wild beasts, appeared of massive silver—and generally by a liberality which was all the more princely that it was based solely on the contraction of debt. The attacks on the nobility were of the most varied kind. The abuses of aristocratic rule afforded copious materials; magistrates and advocates who were liberal or assumed a
iberal hue, like Gaius Cornelius, Aulus Gabinius, Marcus Cicero, continued systematically to unveil the most offensive and scandalous aspects of the Optimate doings and to propose laws against them. The senate was directed to give access to foreign envoys on set days, with the view of preventing the usual postponement of audiences. Loans raised by foreign ambassadors in Rome were declared non actionable, as this was the only means of seriously checking the corruptions which formed the order of the day in the
07. senate (68 The right of the senate to give dispensation 67. in particular cases from the laws was restricted (687) as was also the abuse whereby every Roman of rank, who had private business to attend to in the provinces, got
himself invested by the senate with the character of 68. Roman envoy thither (691). They heightened the penalties against the purchase of votes and electioneering intrigues
57, es. (687, 691); which latter were especially increased in scandalous fashion by the attempts of the individuals ejected from the senate 380) to get back to through re-election.
(p.
it
aa
;
7).
CHAP. v DURING THE ABSENCE OF POMPEIUS
457
What had hitherto been simply understood as matter of course was now expressly laid down as a law, that the
were bound to administer justice in conformity with the rules set forth by them, after the Roman fashion,
at their entering on office (687). 67.
But, above all, efforts were made to complete the democratic restoration and to realize the leading ideas of the Gracchan period in a form suitable to the times. The
election of the priests by the comitia, which Gnaeus Domitius had introduced (iii. 46 3) and Sulla had again done away 115), was established by law of the tribune of the people Titus Labienus in 69 r. The democrats were fond 68. of pointing out how much was still wanting towards the restoration of the Sempronian corn-laws in their full extent, and at the same time passed over in silence the fact that under the alteredb circumstances—with the straitened condition of the public finances and the great increase in
the number of fully-privileged Roman citizens—that restora
tion was absolutely impracticable. In the country between Trans the Po and the Alps they zealously fostered the agitation padanes. for political equality with the Italians. As early as 686 68. Gaius Caesar travelled from place to place there for this purpose; in 689 Marcus Crassus as censor made arrange 65. ments to enrol the inhabitants directly in the burgess-roll
—which was only frustrated by the resistance of his colleague; in the following censorships this attempt seems
praetors
to have been repeated. As formerly Gracchus and Flaccus had been the patrons of the Latins, so the present leaders of the democracy gave themselves forth as
of the Transpadanes, and Gaius Piso (consul in i
687) had bitterly to regret that he had ventured to outrage 67.
one of these clients of Caesar and Crassus. On the other Freedmen. hand the same leaders appeared no means disposed to
advocate the political equalization of the freedmen the
tribune of the people Gaius Manilius, who thinly
regularly
protectors
in a
;
by
(p.
a
THE STRUGGLE OF PARTIES BOOK V
67. attended assembly had procured the renewal (31 Dec. 687) of the Sulpician law as to the suffrage of freedmen (iii. 53! ), was immediately disavowed by the leading men of the democracy, and with their consent the law was cancelled by the senate on the very day after its passing. In the same spirit all the strangers, who possessed neither Roman nor Latin burgess-rights, were ejected from the capital by decree of the people in 689. It is obvious that the intrinsic inconsistency of the Gracchan policy—in abetting at once the effort of the excluded to obtain admission into the circle of the privileged, and the effort of the privileged to maintain their distinctive rights—had passed over to their successors; while Caesar and his friends on the one hand held forth to the Transpadanes the prospect of the franchise, they on the other hand gave their assent to the continuance of the disabilities of the freedmen, and to the
65.
458
Process against Rabirius.
barbarous setting aside of the rivalry which the industry and trading skill of the Hellenes and Orientals maintained with the Italians in Italy itself.
The mode in which the democracy dealt with the ancient criminal jurisdiction of the comitia was characteristic. It had not been properly abolished by Sulla, but practically the jury-commissions on high treason and murder had superseded it (p. 128), and no rational man could think of seriously re-establishing the old procedure which long before Sulla had been thoroughly unpractical. But as the
idea of the sovereignty of the people appeared to require a recognition at least in principle of the penal jurisdiction of the burgesses, the tribune of the people Titus Labienus
68. in 691 brought the old man, who thirty-eight years before had slain or was alleged to have slain the tribune of the people Lucius Saturninus (iii. 476), before the same high court of criminal jurisdiction, by virtue of which, if the annals reported truly, king Tullus had procured the
acquittal of the Horatius who had killed his sister. The
CHAP. v DURING THE ABSENCE OF POMPEIUS
459
accused was one Gaius Rabirius, who, if he had not killed Saturninus, had at least paraded with his cut-off head at the tables of men of rank, and who moreover was notorious among the Apulian landholders for his kidnapping and his bloody deeds. The object, if not of the accuser himself, at any rate of the more sagacious men who backed him, was not at all to make this pitiful wretch die the death of the cross; they were not unwilling to acquiesce, when first the form of the impeachment was materially modified by the senate, and then the assembly of the people called to pronounce sentence on the guilty was dissolved under some sort of pretext by the opposite party—so that the whole
was set aside. At all events by this process the two palladia of Roman freedom, the right of the citizens to appeal and the inviolability of the tribunes of the people, were once more established as practical rights, and the legal basis on which the democracy rested was adjusted afresh.
procedure
The democratic reaction manifested still greater vehe-
mence in all personal questions, wherever it could and dared. attacks’ Prudence indeed enjoined it not to urge the restoration of
the estates confiscated by Sulla to their former owners, that
it might not quarrel with its own allies and at the same
time fall into a conflict with material interests, for which a
policy with a set purpose is rarely a match; the recall of
the emigrants was too closely connected with this question
of property not to appear quite as unadvisable. On the
other hand great exertions were made to restore to the children of the proscribed the political rights withdrawn
from them (691), and the heads of the senatorial party were 68. incessantly subjected to personal attacks. Thus Gaius Memmius set on foot a process aimed at Marcus Lucullus
in 688. Thus they allowed his more famous brother to 66. wait for three years before the gates of the capital for his well-deserved triumph (688—69r). Quintus Rex and the “-68. conqueror of Crete Quintus Metellus were similarly insulted.
Personal
460
THE STRUGGLE OF PARTIES BOOK v
It produced a still greater sensation, when the young leader . of the democracy Gaius Caesar in 691 not merely presumed to compete with the two most distinguished men of the
nobility, Quintus Catulus and Publius Servilius the victor of Isaura, in the candidature for the supreme pontificate, but even carried the day among the burgesses. The heirs of Sulla, especially his son Faustus, found themselves constantly threatened with an action tor the refunding of the public moneys which, it was alleged, had been embezzled by the regent. They talked even of resuming the demo
90. cratic impeachments suspended in 664 on the basis of the Varian law (iii. 516). The individuals who had taken part in the Sullan executions were, as may readily be conceived, judicially prosecuted with the utmost zeal. When the quaestor Marcus Cato, in his pedantic integrity, himself made a beginning by demanding back from them the rewards which they had received for murder as property
65. illegally alienated from the state (689), it can excite no . surprise that in the following year (690) Gaius Caesar, as president of the commission regarding murder, summarily treated the clause in the Sullan ordinance, which declared that a proscribed person might be killed with impunity, as null and void, and caused the most noted of Sulla’s
Rehabilita tion of Saturninus and Marina.
executioners, Lucius Catilina, Lucius Bellienus, Lucius Luscius to be brought before his jurymen and, partially, to be condemned.
Lastly, they did not hesitate now to name once more in public the long-proscribed names of the heroes and martyrs
of the democracy, and to celebrate their memory. We have already mentioned how Saturninus was rehabilitated by the process directed against his murderer. But a differ ent sound withal had the name of Gaius Marius, at the mention of which all hearts once had throbbed ; and it happened that the man, to whom Italy owed her deliverance
from the northern barbarians, was at the same time the
CHAP. V DURING THE ABSENCE OF POMPEIUS
461
uncle of the present leader of the democracy. Loudly had
the multitude rejoiced, when in 686 Gaius Caesar ventured 68. in spite of the prohibitions publicly to show the honoured features of the hero in the Forum at the interment of the
widow of Marius. But when, three years afterwards (689), the emblems of victory, which Marius had caused to be erected in the Capitol and Sulla had ordered to be thrown down, one morning unexpectedly glittered afresh in gold and marble at the old spot, the veterans from the African
and Cimbrian wars crowded, with tears in their eyes, around the statue of their beloved general ; and in presence of the rejoicing masses the senate did not venture to seize the trophies which the same bold hand had renewed in defiance of the laws.
But all these doings and disputes, however much noise they made, were, politically considered, of but very subor dinate importance. The oligarchy was vanquished; the democracy had attained the helm. That underlings of various grades should hasten to inflict an additional kick on the prostrate foe; that the democrats also should have their basis in law and their worship of principles ; that their
doctrz'naz'rer should not rest till the whole privileges of the community were in all particulars restored, and should in that respect occasionally make themselves ridiculous, as legitimists are wont to do—all this was just as much to be
Wortnlen ness of the democratic successes.
as it was matter of indifference. Taken as a whole, the agitation was aimless; and we discern in it the perplexity of its authors to find an object for their activity, for it turned almost wholly on things already essentially settled or on subordinate matters.
expected
It could not be otherwise. In the struggle with the aristocracy the democrats had remained victors; but they
had not conquered alone, and the fiery trial still awaited the demo
them-——the reckoning not with their former foe, but with cutsand
their too powerful ally, to whom in the struggle with the
Impending collision between
Pompeius.
46:
THE STRUGGLE OF PARTIES BOOK 1
Schemes for ap pointing a.
aristocracy they were substantially indebted for victory, and to whose hands they had now entrusted an unexampled military and political power, because they dared not refuse it to him. The general of the east and of the seas was still employed in appointing and deposing kings. How long time he would take for that work, or when he would declare the business of the war to be ended, no one could tell but himself; since like everything else the time of his return to Italy, or in other words the day of decision, was left in his own hands. The parties in Rome meanwhile sat and waited. The Optimates indeed looked forward to the arrival of the dreaded general with comparative calm
ness ; by the rupture between Pompeius and the democracy, which they saw to be approaching, they could not lose, but could only gain. The democrats on the contrary waited with painful anxiety, and sought, during the interval still allowed to them by the absence of Pompeius, to lay a countermine against the impending explosion.
In this policy they again coincided with Crassus, to
whom no course was left for encountering his envied and
democratic hated rival but that of allying himself afresh, and more
military
dictator
ship. first coalition a special approximation had taken place
closely than before, with the democracy. Already in the
between Caesar and Crassus as the two weaker parties; a common interest and a common danger tightened yet more the bond which joined the richest and the most insolvent of Romans in closest alliance. While in public the demo- crats described the absent general as the head and pride of their party and seemed to direct all their arrows against the aristocracy, preparations were secretly made against Pompeius ; and these attempts of the democracy to escape from the impending military dictatorship have historically a far higher significance than the noisy agitation, for the most part employed only as a mask, against the nobility.
It is true that they were carried on amidst a darkness, upon
CHAP- V DURING THE ABSENCE OF POMPEIUS
463
which our tradition allows only some stray gleams of light to fall; for not the present alone, but the succeeding age also had its reasons for throwing a veil over the matter. But in general both the course and the object of these efforts are completely clear. The military power could only be effectually checkmated by another military power. The design of the democrats was to possess themselves of the reins of government after the example of Marius and Cinna, then to entrust one of their leaders either with the conquest of Egypt or with the governorship of Spain or some similar ordinary or extraordinary office, and thus to find in him and his military force a counterpoise to Pompeius and his army. For this they required a revolution, which was directed immediately against the nominal government, but in reality against Pompeius as the designated monarch ;1 and, to effect this revolution, there was from the passing of the Gabinio-Manilian laws down to the return of Pompeius
perpetual conspiracy in Rome. The capital 686$ was in anxious suspense; the depressed temper of the capitalists, the suspensions of payment, the frequent bank ruptcies were heralds of the fermenting revolution, which seemed as though it must at the same time produce a totally
new position of parties. The project of the democracy,
which pointed beyond the senate at Pompeius, suggested
an approximation between that general and the senate.
But the democracy in attempting to oppose to the dictator
ship of Pompeius that of a man more agreeable to recog
nized, strictly speaking, on its part also the military govern
Any one who surveys the whole state of the political relations of this
period will need no special proofs to help him to see that the ultimate
object of the democratic machinations in 688 et req. was not the overthrow
of the senate, but that of Pompeius. Yet such proofs are not wanting.
Sallust states that the Gabinio-Manilian laws inflicted mortal blow on the democracy (Cat. 39); that the conspiracy of 688-689 and the Servilian 66-65 rogatio were specially directed against Pompeius, likewise attested
(Sallust -. Cal. 19; Val. Max. vi. 2, 4; Cic. d: Leg: Agr. 17, 46).
Besides the attitude of Crassus towards the conspiracy alone shows nrficiently that was directed against Pompeius.
(688—692)
66.
it
is ii.
a
1
it,
of the democrats and the anarchists.
464 THE STRUGGLE OF PARTIES 800K ‘
ment, and in reality drove out Satan by Beelzebub ; the ques tion of principles became in its hands a question of persons. The first step towards the revolution projected by the
leaders of the democracy was thus to be the overthrow of
existing government by means of an insurrection
primarily instigated in Rome by democratic
The moral condition of the lowest as of the highest ranks of society in the capital presented the materials for this purpose in lamentable abundance. We need not here repeat what was the character of the free and the servile proletariate of the capital. The significant saying was already heard, that only the poor man was qualified to represent the poor 5 the idea was thus suggested, that the mass of the poor might constitute itself an independent power as well as the oligarchy of the rich, and instead of allowing itself to be tyrannized over, might perhaps in its own turn play the tyrant. But even in the circles of the young men of rank similar ideas found an echo. The fashionable life of the capital shattered not merely the fortunes of men, but also their vigour of body and mind. That elegant world of fragrant ringlets, of fashionable mustachios and rufi‘les—merry as were its doings in the dance and with the harp, and early and late at the wine cup-—yet concealed in its bosom an alarming abyss of moral and economic ruin, of well or ill concealed despair, and frantic or knavish resolves. These circles sighed without disguise for a return of the time of Cinna with its
the
conspirators.
and confiscations and its annihilation of account-books for debt ; there were people enough, includ ing not a few of no mean descent and unusual abilities, who only waited the signal to fall like a gang of robbers on civil society and to recruit by pillage the fortune which they had squandered. Where a band gathers, leaders are
not wanting; and in this case the men were soonI,‘ found
proscriptions
who were fitted to be captains of banditti.
'
CIIAP. v DURING THE ABSENCE OF POMPEIUS
465
The late praetor Lucius Catilina, and the quaestor Catilina. Gnaeus Piso, were distinguished among their fellows not
merely by their genteel birth and their superior rank. They
had broken down the bridge completely behind them, and impressed their accomplices by their dissoluteness quite as
much as by their talents.
Catilina especially was one of the most wicked men in that wicked age. His villanies belong to the records of crime, not to history; but his very outward appearance-—the pale countenance, the wild glance, the gait by turns sluggish and hurried—betrayed his dismal past. He possessed in a high degree the qualities which are required in the leader of such a band— the faculty of enjoying all pleasures and of hearing all privations, courage, military talent, knowledge of men, the energy of a felon, and that horrible mastery of vice, which knows how to bring the weak to fall and how to train the fallen to crime.
To form out of such elements a conspiracy for the overthrow of the existing order of things could not be diflicult to men who possessed money and political influ ence. Catilina, Piso, and their fellows entered readily into any plan which gave the prospect of proscriptions and cancelling of debtor-books ; the former had moreover special hostility to the aristocracy, because it had opposed the candidature of that infamous and dangerous man for the consulship. As he had formerly in the character of
an executioner of Sulla hunted the proscribed at the head of a band of Celts and had killed among others his own aged father-in-law with his own hand, he now readily con sented to promise similar services to the opposite party. A secret league was formed. The number of individuals received into it is said to have exceeded 400; it included associates in all the districts and urban communities of Italy; besides which, as a matter of course, numerous recruits would flock unbidden from the ranks of the dis
voL. w
130
66. Failure of
the first conspiracy.
solute youth to an insurrection, which inscribed or. its banner the seasonable programme of wiping out debts.
In December 688—so we are told—the leaders of the
league thought that they had found the fitting occasion
466
THE STRUGGLE OF PARTIES B001K V
plans [65. for striking a blow. The two consuls chosen for 689,
of Publius Cornelius Sulla and Publius Autronius Paetus, had
recently been judicially convicted of electoral bribery, and therefore had according to legal rule forfeited their expect ancy of the highest oflice. Both thereupon joined the league. The conspirators resolved to procure the consul ship for them by force, and thereby to put themselves in possession of the supreme power in the state. On the day when the new consuls should enter on their office-—
65. the 1st Jan. 689—the senate-house was to be assailed by armed men, the new consuls and the victims otherwise designated were to be put to death, and Sulla and Paetus were to be proclaimed as consuls after the cancelling of the judicial sentence which excluded them. Crassus was then to be invested with the dictatorship and Caesar with the mastership of the horse, doubtless with a view to raise an imposing military force, while Pompeius was employed afar off at the Caucasus. Captains and common soldiers were hired and instructed; Catilina waited on the appointed day in the neighbourhood of the senate-house for the con certed signal, which was to be given him by Caesar on a hint from Crassus. But he waited in vain; Crassus was absent from the decisive sitting of the senate, and for this time the projected insurrection failed. A similar still more comprehensive plan of murder was then concerted for the 5th Feb. ; but this too was frustrated, because Catilina
the signal too early, before the bandits who were
gave
bespoken
divulged. The government did not venture openly to proceed against the conspiracy, but it assigned a guard to the consuls who were primarily threatened, and it opposed
had all arrived. Thereupon the secret was
CHAP. v DURING THE ABSENCE OF POMPEIUS
467
to the band of the conspirators a band paid by the govern ment. To remove Piso, the proposal was made that he should be sent as quaestor with praetorian powers to Hither Spain; to which Crassus consented, in the hope of secur
him the resources of that important province for the insurrection. Proposals going farther were pre vented by the tribunes.
So runs the account that has come down to us, which evidently gives the version current in the government circles, and the credibility of which in detail must, in the absence of any means of checking be left an open question. As to the main matter—the participation of Caesar and Crassus —the testimony of their political opponents certainly cannot be regarded as suflicient evidence of it. But their notorious action at this epoch corresponds with striking exactness to the secret action which this report ascribes to them. The attempt of Crassus, who in this year was censor, ofticially to enrol the Transpadanes in the burgess-list 457) was of itself directly revolutionary enterprise. still more remarkable, that Crassus on the same occasion made preparations to enrol Egypt and Cyprus in the list of Roman domains,1 and that Caesar about the same time (689 or 690) got proposal submitted some tribunes to the burgesses to send him to Egypt, in order to reinstate king
ing through
whom the Alexandrians had expelled. These machinations suspiciously coincide with the charges raised
Plutarch, Crasr. r3; Cicero, a’: Legs agr. 17, 44. To this year (689) belongs Cicero's oration d: reg: Alexandrina, which has been in- correctly assigned to the year 698. In Cicero refutes, as the fragments clearly show, the assertion of Crassus, that Egypt had been rendered Roman property by the testament of king Alexander. This question of law might and must have been discussed in 689 but in 698 had been deprived of its significance through the Julian law of 695. In 698 more- over the discussion related not to the question to whom Egypt belonged, but to the restoration of the king driven out by a revolt, and in this trans action which well known to us Crassus played no part. Lastly, Cicero
after the conference of Luca was not at all in a position seriously to oppose one of the triumvirs.
65. 64.
65, 56,
85, 56. 5,, 66
Ptolemaeus
is a
it ;
by
it
1
ii.
a
It (p. is
it,
Resump
spiracy.
renewing their attempt to get possession of the consulate; which may have been partly owing to the fact that a relative of the leader of the democracy, Lucius Caesar, a weak man who was not unfrequently employed by his kinsman as a tool, was on this occasion a candidate for the consulship. But the reports from Asia urged them to make haste. The affairs of Asia Minor and Armenia were already completely arranged. However clearly democratic strategists showed that the Mithradatic war could only be regarded as ter minated by the capture of the king, and that it was there fore necessary to undertake the pursuit round the Black Sea, and above all things to keep aloof from Syria
64. out in the spring of 690 from Armenia and marched towards
If Egypt was really selected as the headquarters of the democracy, there was no time to be lost; otherwise Pompeius might easily arrive in Egypt sooner than Caesar. The conspiracy of 688, far from being broken up by the lax and timid measures of repression, was again astir when
68. the consular elections for 691 approached. The persons were, may be presumed, substantially the same, and the plan was but little altered. The leaders of the movement again kept in the background. On this occasion they had set up as candidates for the consulship Catilina himself and
468 THE STRUGGLE OF PARTIES BOOK v
by their antagonists. Certainty cannot be attained on the point; but there is a great probability that Crassus and Caesar had projected a plan to possess themselves of the military dictatorship during the absence of Pompeius; that Egypt was selected as the basis of this democratic military power; and that, in fine, the insurrectionary attempt of
65. 689 had been contrived to realize these
Catilina and Piso had thus been tools in the hands of Crassus and Caesar.
For a moment the conspiracy came to a standstill. The
tion of [64. elections for took place without Crassus and Caesar the con 690
projects, and
415) Pompeius, not concerning himself about such talk, had set
Syria.
it
(p.
CHAP. V DURING THE ABSENCE OF POMPEIUS 469
Gaius Antonius, the younger son of the orator and a brother of the general who had an ill repute from Crete. They were sure of Catilina; Antonius, originally a Sullan like Catilina and like the latter brought to trial on that account some years before by the democratic party and ejected from the senate 373, 38o)-—otherwise an indo lent, insignificant man, in no respect called to be leader, and utterly bankrupt—willingly lent himself as tool to the democrats for the prize of the consulship and the advantages attached to Through these consuls the heads of the conspiracy intended to seize the government, to arrest the children of Pompeius, who remained behind in the capital, as hostages, and to take up arms in Italy and the provinces against Pompeius. On the first news of the blow struck in the capital, the governor Gnaeus Piso was to raise the banner of insurrection in Hither Spainv Communication could not be held with him way of the sea, since Pompeius commanded the seas. For this purpose they reckoned on the Transpadanes the old clients of the democracy-—among whom there was great agitation, and who would of course have at once received the franchise-— and, further, on different Celtic tribes. 1 The threads of this combination reached as far as Mauretania. One of the conspirators, the Roman speculator Publius Sittius from Nuceria, compelled by financial embarrassments to keep aloof from Italy, had armed troop of desperadoes there and in Spain, and with these wandered about as leader of free-lances in western Africa, where he had old
commercial connections.
The party put forth all its energies for the struggle of Consular
elections whether their own or borrowed—and their connections to
the election. Crassus and Caesar staked their money
The Ambrani (Suet. Cm. are probably not the Ambrones named along with the Cimbri (Plutarch, zllar. 19), but a slip of the pen for Arverni.
9)
(p.
1
a
a
by
it.
a
a
Cicero elected instead of Catilina.
procure the consulship for Catilina and Antonius ; the comrades of Catilina strained every nerve to bring to the helm the man who promised them the magistracies and priesthoods, the palaces and country-estates of their opponents, and above all deliverance from their debts, and who, they knew, would keep his word. The aristocracy was in great perplexity, chiefly because it was not able even to start counter-candidates. That such a candidate risked his head, was obvious ; and the times were past when the post of danger allured the burgess—now even ambition was hushed in presence of fear. Accordingly the nobility con tented themselves with making a feeble attempt to check electioneering intrigues by issuing a new law respecting the purchase of votes—which, however, was thwarted by the veto of a tribune of the people-—and with turning over their votes to a candidate who, although not acceptable to them, was at least inoffensive. This was Marcus Cicero, notoriously a political trimmer,1 accustomed to flirt at times with the democrats, at times with Pompeius, at times from a somewhat greater distance with the aristocracy, and to lend his services as an advocate to every influential man under impeachment without distinction of person or party (he numbered even Catilina among his clients) ; belonging properly to no party or—which was much the same—to the party of material interests, which was dominant in the courts and was pleased with the eloquent pleader and the courtly and witty companion. He had connections enough in the capital and the country towns to have a chance alongside of the candidates proposed by the democracy; and as the nobility, although with reluctance, and the Pompeians voted
1 This cannot well be expressed more naively than is done in the memorial ascribed to his brother (depcf. com. r, 5; r3, 51, 53 ; in 690); the brother himself would hardly have expressed his mind publicly with so much franknus. In proof of this unprejudiced persons will read not with out interest the second oration against Rullus, where the “ first democratic consul," gulling the friendly public in a very delectable fashion, unfolds to it the "true democracy. "
64.
470
THE STR'UGGLE or PARTIES B001: v
CHAP. V DURING THE ABSENCE OF POMPEIUS
471
for him, he was elected by a great majority. The two candidates of the democracy obtained almost the same number of votes; but a few more fell to Antonius, whose family was of more consideration than that of his fellow candidate. This accident frustrated the election of Catilina and saved Rome from a second Cinna. A little before this Piso had—it was said at the instigation of his political and personal enemy Pompeius—been put to death in Spain by his native escort. 1 With the consul Antonius alone nothing could be done ; Cicero broke the loose bond which attached
him to the conspiracy, even before they entered on their oflices, inasmuch as he renounced his legal privilege of having the consular provinces determined by lot, and handed over to his deeply-embarrassed colleague the lucrative governorship of Macedonia. The essential pre liminary conditions of this project also had therefore mis carried.
Meanwhile the development of Oriental affairs grew daily New more perilous for the democracy. The settlement of Syria $21,522:“ rapidly advanced; already invitations had been addressed spinton. to Pompeius from Egypt to march thither and occupy the
country for Rome ; they could not but be afraid that they
would next hear of Pompeius in person having taken possession of the valley of the Nile. It was by this very apprehension probably that the attempt of Caesar to get
himself sent by the people to Egypt for the purpose of aiding
the king against his rebellious subjects (p. 467) was called
forth; it failed, apparently, through the disinclination of
great and small to undertake anything whatever against the
interest of Pompeius. His return home, and the probable catastrophe which it involved, were always drawing the
nearer; often as the string of the bow had been broken,
it was necessary that there should be a fresh attempt to bend
1 His epitaph still extant runs: Cn. Calpumiur Cu. )1 Pin quarter [70 fr. at . r. c. provinciam Hirpanic»: cileriorenl optinuil.
472
THE STRUGGLE OF PARTIES BOOK v
The city was sullen ferment; frequent conference: of the heads of the movement indicated that some step was again contemplated.
What they wished became manifest when the new
The Ser-
$22,“ tribunes of the people entered on their oflice (IO Dec. law. [64. 690), and one of them, Publius Servilius Rullus, immedi
ately proposed an agrarian law, which was designed to procure for the leaders of the democrats position similar to that which Pompeius occupied in consequence of the Gabinio-Manilian proposals. The nominal object was the founding of colonies in Italy. The ground for these, however, was not to be gained by dispossession; on the contrary all existing private rights were guaranteed, and even the illegal occupations of the most recent times
62. from ‘244s
692, and the proceeds of the whole booty not yet
370) were converted into full property. The leased Campanian
domain alone was to be parcelled out and colonized in other cases the government was to acquire the land destined for assignation by ordinary purchase. To procure the sums necessary for this purpose, the remaining Italian, and more especially all the extra-Italian, domain-land was successively to be brought to sale; which was understood to include the former royal hunting domains in Macedonia, the Thracian Chersonese, Bithynia, Pontus, Cyrene, and also the territories of the cities acquired in full property by right of war in Spain, Africa, Sicily, Hellas, and Cilicia. Everything was likewise to be sold which the state had acquired in moveable and immoveable property since the
88. year 666, and of which had not previously disposed; this was aimed chiefly at Egypt and Cyprus. For the same purpose all subject communities, with the exception of the towns with Latin rights and the other free cities, were burdened with very high rates of taxes and tithes. Lastly there was likewise destined for those purchases the produce of the new provincial revenues, to be reckoned
it
;
a
it.
in
CHM‘. v DURING THE ABSENCE OF POMPEIUS
473
legally applied; which regulations had reference to the new sources of taxation opened up by Pompeius in the east and to the public moneys that might be found in the hands of Pompeius and the heirs of Sulla. For the exe cution of this measure decemvirs with a special jurisdiction and special impm'um were to be nominated, who were to remain five years in office and to surround themselves with 200 subalterns from the equestrian order; but in the election of the decemvirs only those candidates who should personally announce themselves were to be taken into account, and, as in the elections of priests 206), only seventeen tribes to be fixed by lot out of the thirty-five were to make the election. It needed no great acuteness to discern that in this decemviral college was intended to create power after the model of that of Pompeius, only with somewhat less of military and more of demo cratic hue. The jurisdiction was especially needed for the sake of deciding the Egyptian question, the military
for the sake of arming against Pompeius the clause, which forbade the choice of an absent person, excluded Pompeius; and the diminution of the tribes entitled to vote as well as the manipulation of the balloting were designed to facilitate the management of the election in accordance with the views of the democracy.
But this attempt totally missed its aim. The multitude, finding more agreeable to have their corn measured out to them under the shade of Roman porticoes from the public magazines than to cultivate for themselves in the sweat of their brow, received even the proposal in itself with complete indifference. They soon came also to feel that Pompeius would never acquiesce in such resolution offensive to him in every respect, and that matters could not stand well with party which in its painful alarm con descended to offers so extravagant. Under ‘such circum stances was not difficult for the government to frustrate
power
it
it
a
a
it
(p.
it
a ;
a
a
l‘l‘rtpalio llunl . anarchists
474
THE STRUGGLE OF PARTIES BOOK Y
the proposal; the new consul Cicero perceived the oppor tunity of exhibiting here too his talent for giving a finishing stroke to the beaten party; even before the tribunes who stood ready exercised their veto, the author himself with
63. drew his proposal (1 Jan. 691). The democracy had gained nothing but the unpleasant lesson, that the great multitude out of love or fear still continued to adhere to Pompeius, and that every proposal was certain to fail which the public perceived to be directed against him.
Wearied by all this vain agitation and scheming with out result, Catilina determined to push the matter to a i! I Eil‘m'll. decision and make an end of it once for all. He took his measures in the course of the summer to open the civil war. Faesulae (Fiesole), a very strong town situated in
Etruria—which swarmed with the impoverished and con spirators—and fifteen years before the centre of the rising of Lepidus, was again selected as the headquarters of the insurrection. Thither were despatched the consignments of money, for which especially the ladies of quality in the capital implicated in the conspiracy furnished the means; there arms and soldiers were collected; and there an old Sullan captain, Gaius Manlius, as brave and as free from scruples of conscience as was ever any soldier of ‘fortune, took temporarily the chief command. Similar though less extensive warlike preparations were made at other points of Italy. The Transpadanes were so excited that they seemed only waiting for the signal to strike. In the Bruttian country, on the east coast of Italy, in Capua— wherever great bodies of slaves were accumulated—a second slave insurrection like that of Spartacus seemed on the eve of arising. Even in the capital there was some thing brewing; those who saw the haughty bearing with which the summoned debtors appeared before the urban
praetor, could not but remember the scenes which had preceded the murder of Asellio (iii. 530). The capitalists
CRAP. V DURING THE ABSENCE OF POMPEIUS
475
were in unutterable anxiety ; it seemed needful to enforce
the prohibition of the export of gold and silver, and to set
a watch over the principal ports. The plan of the con spirators was-—on occasion of the consular election for 69 2, 62, for which Catilina had again announced himself—summarily
to put to death the consul conducting the election as well as the inconvenient rival candidates, and to carry the election of Catilina at any price ; in case of necessity, even to bring armed bands from Faesulae and the other rallying points against the capital, and with their help to crush resistance.
Cicero, who was always quickly and completely informed Election by his agents male and female of the transactions of the conspirators, on the day fixed for the election (20 Oct. ) again denounced the conspiracy in the full senate and in presence “strand of its principal leaders. Catilina did not condescend to
deny it; he answered haughtily that, if the election for consul should fall on him, the great headless party would certainly no longer want a leader against the small party led by wretched heads. But as palpable evidences of the plot were not before them, nothing farther was to be got from the timid senate, except that it gave its previous sanction in the usual way to the exceptional measures which the magistrates might deem suitable
(21 Oct. ). Thus the election battle approached-—-on this occasion
more a battle than an election ; for Cicero too had formed for himself an armed bodyguard out of the younger men, more especially of the mercantile order; and it was his armed force that covered and dominated the Campus Martius on the 28th October, the day to which the election had been postponed by the senate. The conspirators were not successful either in killing the consul conducting the election, or in deciding the elections according to their mind.
But meanwhile the civil war had begun. On the
Outbreak of the insurrec tion in Etruria.
27th Oct. Gaius Manlius had planted at Faesulae the eagle round which the army of the insurrection was to flock—it was one of the Marian eagles from the Cimbrian war—and he had summoned the robbers from the mountains as well as the country people to jcin him. His proclamations, following the old traditions of the popular party, demanded liberation from the oppressive load of debt and modifi cation of the procedure in insolvency, which, the amount of the debt actually exceeded the estate, certainly still involved in law the forfeiture of the debtor’s freedom. It seemed as though the rabble of the capital, in coming forward as were the legitimate successor of the old plebeian farmers and fighting its battles under the glorious eagles of the Cimbrian war, wished to cast stain not only on the present but on the past of Rome. This rising, however, remained isolated; at the other places of rendez vous the conspiracy did not go beyond the collection of arms and the institution of secret conferences, as resolute
measures of the govern
m
the government; for, although the impending civil war had been for considerable time openly announced, its own irresolution and the clumsiness of the rusty machinery of administration had not allowed to make any military
whatever. was only now that the general levy was called out, and superior oflicers were ordered to the several regions of Italy that each might suppress the insurrection in his own district; while at the same time the gladiatorial slaves were ejected from the capital, and patrols were ordered on account of the apprehension of incendiarism.
Catilina was in painful position. According to his design there should have been simultaneous rising in the capital and in Etruria on occasion of the consular elections the failure of the former and the outbreak of the latter movement endangered his person as well as the whole
The con spirators in Rome.
476
THE STRUGGLE OF PARTIES BOOK v
Repressive leaders were everywhere wanting. This was fortunate for
preparations
;
a
It
it
a
t‘.
I! l
a
if it
a
if
a
CHAP. V DURING THE ABSENCE OF POMPEIUS
477
success of his undertaking. Now that his partisans at Faesulae had once risen in arms against the government, he could no longer remain in the capital; and yet not only did everything depend on his inducing the conspirators of the capital now at least to strike quickly, but this had to be done even before he left Rome—for he knew his helpmates too well to rely on them for that matter. The more considerable of the conspirators-—Publius Lentulus Sura consul in 683, afterwards expelled from the senate and 71 now, in order to get back into the senate, praetor for the second time, and the two former praetors Publius Autronius and Lucius Cassius—were incapable men; Lentulus an ordinary aristocrat of big words and great pretensions, but slow in conception and irresolute in action; Autronius
distinguished for nothing but his powerful screaming voice; while as to Lucius Cassius no one comprehended how a man so corpulent and so simple had fallen among the con
But Catilina could not venture to place his abler partisans, such as the young senator Gaius Cethegus and the equites Lucius Statilius and Publius Gabinius Capito, at the head of the movement 5 for even among the
spirators.
the traditional hierarchy of rank held its and the very anarchists thought that they should
conspirators
ground,
be unable to carry the day unless a consular or at least a praetorian were at their head. Therefore, however urgently the army of the insurrection might long for its general, and however perilous it was for the latter to remain longer at the seat of government after the outbreak of the revolt, Catilina nevertheless resolved still to remain for a time in Rome. Accustomed to impose on his cowardly opponents by his audacious insolence, he showed himself publicly in the Forum and in the senate-house and replied to the threats which were there addressed to him, that they should beware of pushing him to extremities; that, if they should set the house on fire, he would be compelled to extinguish
478
THE STRUGGLE OF PARTIES BOOK V
Catilina
the conflagration in ruins. In reality neither private persons nor oflicials ventured to lay hands on the dangerous man ; it was almost a matter of indifference when a young nobleman brought him to trial on account of violence, for long before the process could come to an end, the question could not but be decided elsewhere. But the projects of Catilina failed; chiefly because the agents of the govern ment had made their way into the circle of the conspirators and kept it accurately informed of every detail of the plot. When, for instance, the conspirators appeared before the strong Praeneste (r Nov. ), which they had hoped to surprise by a am} 0'2 main, they found the inhabitants warned and armed; and in a similar way everything miscarried. Catilina with all his temerity now found it advisable to fix his departure for one of the ensuing days ; but previously on his urgent exhortation, at a last conference of the conspirators in the night between the 6th and 7th Nov. it was resolved to assassinate the consul Cicero, who was the principal director of the countermine, before the departure of their leader, and, in order to obviate any treachery, to carry the resolve at once into execution. Early on the morning of the 7th Nov. , accordingly, the selected murderers knocked at the house of the consul; but they found the guard reinforced and themselves repulsed—on this occasion too the spies of the government had outdone the conspirators.
On the following day (8 Nov. ) Cicero convoked the senate. Even now Catilina ventured to appear and to
a defence against the indignant attacks of the consul, who unveiled before his face the events of the last few days; but men no longer listened to him, and in the
attempt
of the place where he sat the benches became empty. He left the sitting, and proceeded, as he would doubtless have done even apart from this incident, in accordance with the agreement, to Etruria. Here he
neighbourhood
CHAP. v DURING THE ABSENCE OF POMPEIUS
479
proclaimed himself consul, and assumed an attitude of waiting, in order to put his troops in motion against the capital on the first announcement of the outbreak of the insurrection there. The government declared the two leaders Catilina and Manlius, as well as those of their comrades who should not have laid down their arms by a certain day, to be outlaws, and called out new levies ; but at the head of the army destined against Catilina was placed the consul Gaius Antonius, who was notoriously implicated in the conspiracy, and with whose character it was wholly a matter of accident whether he would lead his troops against Catilina or over to his side. They seemed to have directly laid their plans towards converting this Antonius into a second Lepidus. As little were steps taken against the leaders of the conspiracy who had remained behind in the capital, although every one pointed the finger at them and the insurrection in the capital was far from being abandoned by the conspirators—on the contrary the plan of it had been settled by Catilina himself before his departure from Rome. A tribune was to give the signal by calling an assembly of the people; in the following night Cethegus was to despatch the consul Cicero; Gabinius and Statilius were to set the city simultaneously on fire at twelve places; and a communication was to be established as speedily as possible with the army of Catilina, which should have meanwhile advanced. Had the
urgent representa tions of Cethegus borne fruit and had Lentulus, who after Catilina’s departure was placed at the head of the
conspirators, resolved on rapidly striking a blow, the con spiracy might even now have been successful. But the conspirators were just as incapable and as cowardly as their opponents; weeks elapsed and the matter came to no decisive issue.
At length the countermine brought about a decision. Lentulus in his tedious fashion, which sought to cover
Conviction and arrest of the con spirators in the capitol.
negligence in regard to what was immediate and necessary by the projection of large and distant plans, had entered into relations with the deputies of a Celtic canton, the Allobroges, now present in Rome; had attempted to implicate these—the representatives of a thoroughly dis organized commonwealth and themselves deeply involved in debt—in the conspiracy; and had given them on their departure messages and letters to his confidants.