No More Learning



## p. 268 (#314) ############################################

268
Leadership of the Pope
were influenced chiefly by the hope of realising their far-reaching vision
of a universal Church. In the ninth century and in the early part of the
tenth century, Rome was within the territory threatened by the Muslim
invaders of Italy, and local circumstances drove the Popes to concert
measures against them. Gregory IV (827-844), Leo IV (847–855),
John VIII (872–882), and John X (914–928), all took an active part in
the Muslim war. Their successors in the eleventh century were not, in
all probability, the actual instigators of the Norman and Italian enter-
prises of the period, as some of the chroniclers assert, but at least they
gave them every countenance and support. Benedict VIII (1012-1024),
an Italian count and successful soldier before his consecration, approved
and assisted the expeditions against the Muslim conquerors of Sardinia
in 1015-1016. Gregory VII (1073–1085), by his advocacy of the cause
of the Greek Empire, prepared the way for more distant enterprises.
Victor III blessed the standard of the expedition against Mahdiyah (1087)
and declared remission of sin to all who took part in it. From the middle
of the century, under the guidance of the great Hildebrand, both before!
and after he became Pope Gregory VII, the Papacy asserted and in a
measure secured its claim to be the ecclesiastical “emperor” of Christen-
dom. Granted that all secular power was subject to the control of the
Church for ecclesiastical ends, the Pope became the predestined head of
any great united enterprise against the Muslims. The part played by
Pope Urban in rousing Europe to the First Crusade was suggested from
the outside, and actually became a means of realising the papal claims.
Still, the suggestion that he should take action was made because he
actually represented the unity of Christendom and alone could issue an
appeal which would be listened to with general respect. The Pope was
an international power much more truly than the Emperor. He con-
trolled an organisation through which he could exert influence upon
every country from within. He best could maintain the “truce of God,”
which secured peace at home while the crusaders were absent on their
enterprise. It is not clear that the Pope's initiative was essential to the
starting of the First Crusade, but his intervention at some point was
inevitable and his authority was one of the great forces which maintained
the movement.
The date at which Europe became ready for a united attack on the
Muslim East cannot be put earlier than the last quarter of the eleventh
century. The enemy were then at last driven out of the home lands,
excepting Spain, and the Western Mediterranean was again a Christian
sea. As long as the struggle in the West was proceeding, schemes for the
conquest of Palestine were impracticable. These facts must be kept in
mind in any consideration of the alleged bull of Sergius JV (1009-1012),
in which he announces the recent destruction of the Holy Sepulchre in
Jerusalem (September 1009) and declares his wish to overthrow the
1 For a different view on this point see supra, Chapter 11, pp. 52–53.


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Pilgrimages to Jerusalem
269
Muslims and restore the Sepulchre. His intention is to equip a thousand
ships for the purpose of his expedition, and he says that word has
already come from the Italian coast towns to the effect that preparations
there have been begun. Assuming the genuineness of the document,
which is seriously disputed, it may be noted that the preparations
reported may not really have been carried very far, nor indeed even
commenced, and that the circumstances which suggested the expedition
were very transitory. The reported destruction of the Holy Sepulchre
was indeed an event likely to awaken the resentment of Christendom,
and it may possibly have originated the earliest formulation of the
crusading idea that has been preserved. But nothing came of Pope
Sergius' intention; the Italian cities were not yet able to fit out the
armada he proposed, and the Sepulchre, only partially injured, was soon
restored without Western intervention! Neither the alleged destruction
of the Sepulchre nor the Pope's daring thought, if it actually was his,
had any direct influence on the origin of the First Crusade. At most
they may have increased the animosity of war in the West and stirred
the Christians there to renewed exertions.
The feature of the First Crusade that most struck the imagination
and stirred the fervour of its supporters was its declared purpose of
delivering Jerusalem from the hands of the infidels. Extreme veneration
for Jerusalem and its sacred sites was fostered by the whole system of
Latin Christianity, and especially by its encouragement of pilgrimages.
Frequent pilgrimages to local and national shrines were crowned by the
necessarily less frequent pilgrimage to Palestine. In the eleventh century
pilgrimages en masse, in which hundreds journeyed together to Jerusalem,
led by some bishop or noble, were not unknown. One such notable
pilgrimage was from Normandy in 1064; another was headed by Count
Robert I of Flanders (1088-1089). Individual pilgrimages also grew
more frequent as the century advanced and the way became easier.
The Cluniac revival gave fresh life to this part also of the Church's
ancient practice. Devotion to the cradle of Christianity was nurtured
and stimulated even amongst those who never adventured on the distant
journey. The indignities which Christians suffered in Jerusalem at the
hands of the Muslims thus became familiar in Western Europe. It is
not likely that the occupation of Jerusalem by the Turks (1071) stirred
feeling in any special manner. But the capture of Antioch from the
Greeks (1085) may have done so. Some part of its former population
seems to have reached Europe, and to have roused animosity against the
Turks by a recital of its misfortunes. In this and other ways the
victories of the Turks over the Greek Empire influenced popular feeling
and at the same time the policy of those at the helm of state. It was
the situation of the Greek Empire and the advance of the Turks in
Asia Minor which finally called Europe to arms on behalf of Jerusalem
1 See supra, Chapter vi, p. 254.
CH. VII.


## p. 270 (#316) ############################################

270
Peril of the Eastern Empire
and the Eastern Churches. A sense of obligation to the Holy City and
to Christians in the East, long expressed in other ways, now took the
form of the First Crusade.
The long history of warfare between the Muslims and the Byzantine
Empire has been told in another volume of this work. In the crisis
which followed the fatal battle of Manzikert (26 August 1071), the
Emperor Michael VII conceived the idea of calling to his assistance his
Christian brethren of the West. His appeal was directed to Pope
Gregory VII, as the supreme representative of Western Christianity and
more truly its common head than the greatest of its secular potentates.
The Emperor's petition fell on willing ears, for Gregory saw in it an
opportunity of restoring the East to the Roman obedience, and at the
same time of practically realising his great principle that the kings of
Christendom are the liege servants of the Church. For several months
the Pope was full of the project of a mighty expedition to the East, in
which he thought of personally taking part, and for which his letters
claim that he received substantial promises of support (1074). But pre-
occupations in Italy made it impossible for him to carry out his intention.
The Greek Emperor was left to wage an unequal war with the Turkish
invaders of his dominions. They overran Asia Minor and came within
striking distance of Constantinople itself. The Emperor Alexius (1081-
1118) saved a part of his Asiatic territory by acknowledging defeat and
making what terms of peace he could. His position was weakened by
the frequent wars he had to wage with the vassals of the Empire in
Europe. When at length these wars were ended (1094) and the recovery
of lost Byzantine territory in Asia became again feasible, it is not sur-
prising that Alexius bethought himself of the powerful help which had
once been so nearly granted to his predecessor. In 1090 he had been
assisted against the Turks by Count Robert of Flanders. Such another
expedition, but on a considerably larger scale, was no doubt what he
desired and hoped for. His appeal was directed to Pope Urban II,
Gregory's successor in spirit as well as in office (1088-1099). Once more
the Byzantine proposal was favourably received, and on this occasion
nothing intervened to prevent the Pope from executing his resolve. At
his summons Western Europe eagerly prepared to make war with the
Muslim East.
The First Crusade by proceeding through Constantinople and Asia
Minor accomplished for Alexius even more than he can originally have
expected to obtain from his Western allies. Not the least achievement
of the crusading movement, considered in its ultimate results, was that
it postponed the Turkish capture of Constantinople for 300 years. But
the crusaders never regarded themselves as the mere auxiliaries of the
Greek Empire, nor was their chief purpose to aid the Emperor against
his Muslim enemies. Pope Urban's official utterance declared the general
purpose of the Crusade to be the deliverance of the Christians of the
1


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Purpose of the First Crusade
271
East. The danger of the Greek Empire is therefore one motive to
action, explicitly stated, but much more stress is laid on the situation in
Palestine. There and not in Asia Minor lay the supreme object of the
enterprise for the peoples of the West. Their conception of the Crusade
may be said to differ from that of the Emperor only in the emphasis
which they laid on one part of a complex whole. Alexius' appeal,
in general terms indeed, was also doubtless on behalf of the Christians
of the East, and possibly his ambassadors spoke of the deliverance of
Jerusalem as something to be aimed at ultimately by the allied forces.
But the mere change of emphasis exercised a transforming influence.
Very quickly it appeared that all the Latin interests, religious, com-
mercial, and political, lay in these remoter achievements in which the
Emperor had no direct concern. Thus the Crusade had one aspect for
the Latins and another for the Greeks. The two parties were engaged
in appearance in a common enterprise. Each quickly found the other
disloyal to the common cause, because their conception of that cause
was not the same. All the history of the relations between the Greeks
and the Latins, in the First Crusade and afterwards, must be read in the
light of this fundamental discrepancy.
Assuming now that a proposed expedition on behalf of the Greek
Empire and the Eastern Churches could thus become one for the de-
liverance of Jerusalem and the Holy Land, we can better estimate the
significance of Pope Gregory VII's scheme in 1074. It has been argued
that his intention was quite different from that of the crusaders of 1096,
and that if his project had been realised there would have been an
expedition to the assistance of the Greeks but no crusade. In reality
the comparison in these words does not lie between two quite discon-
nected schemes, and it seems more than probable that, if events had
progressed further in Gregory's time, they would have taken the course
they did afterwards in Urban's. It is significant that one of Gregory's
letters shews that Palestine was thought of as the goal of his enter-
prise'. It is true that this goal is not yet the chief object which he has in
view. But neither was it so at first in the time of Urban. It was only
after consideration, and when it had been decided to inaugurate a great
international enterprise (i. e. between the dates of the Councils of Piacenza
and Clermont), that Pope Urban and his councillors began to define the
issue in a specially Latin sense. It is not extravagant to suppose that
Gregory would also finally have done the same. Still, it remains to the
credit of Urban and his advisers that they saw there was a distinctive
Latin view which it was for them to enunciate, and that this was done in
the Pope's great speech at Clermont.
It must be added that the part played by Alexius in the inception
of the Crusade has been variously estimated, and that recent writers of
1 “Iam ultra quinquaginta milia. . . contra inimicos Dei volunt insurgere et usque
ad sepulcrum Domini, ipso ducente, pervenire. ” Gregorii VII Reg. 11, 31.
CH, VII.


## p. 272 (#318) ############################################

272
Pope Urban II's appeal
גיי
authority have denied it altogether. These writers are entirely justified
when they insist that the number of the crusaders was a cause of
surprise and of serious trouble and anxiety to the Emperor, and that he
did not propose a crusade in the sense of the actual movement, if that
be defined as “a religious war, properly so called, induced by the assurance
of spiritual privilege and undertaken for the recovery of the holy places.
Admitting this, however, it may still be asserted that letters of the
Emperor to the Pope formulated the first draft, as it were, of a scheme
for which the West had long been ripening, and which came into being
in the shape of the First Crusade. Ekkehard and Bernold of St Blaise
supply the necessary proof so far. If so, the Turkish advance and the
need of the Greek Empire must be included amongst the determining
causes of the crusading movement. The expedition of Robert of Flanders,
recorded by Anna Comnena and already referred to, then also becomes a
precursor of the First Crusade. The alleged letter of the Emperor to
Robert, asking for help, may or may not be genuine in its present form.
The supposition to which recent critics incline, that it is a modified
edition of the original letter, seems best to account for its conflicting
features. But that some such letter was written by the Emperor to
Robert is both credible and probable.
Pope Urban's first public appeal on behalf of the Christians in the
East was made at the Council of Piacenza in March 1095. The humilia-
tion of the Eastern Church and the danger of Constantinople were
described to the Pope and the Council by ambassadors from the Greek
Emperor. Urban espoused their cause so warmly that some pledged
themselves at once to go to the rescue of the imperial city. There is no
allusion to the Holy Land in the one report (that of Bernold) which we
have of these events. The decision to rouse Christendom to a united
attack on Islām must have been arrived at in the summer months which
followed the Council of Piacenza. The direction of such an enterprise,
its prospects of success, and the motives to which it might appeal for sup-
port, must all have been considered. In this interval, we may suppose,
Jerusalem became the hoped-for prize of the Muslim war and the chief
incentive to it. There are indications that even certain details had been
arranged before the Council of Clermont, e. g. the time of starting, the
declaration of a three years' truce for the security of the crusaders' homes
and property, and their solemn pledge, marked by the assumption of a
cross on the cloak or tunic. It can hardly be doubted that the Pope had
assurance of influential support before he delivered his speech at Cler-
mont. The circumstances of the adhesion of Raymond of Toulouse
imply that he was previously aware of the Pope's intention and had
been invited to join the movement. Thus prepared for, Pope Urban's
eloquent speech on 27 November 1095 met with an enthusiastic recep-
tion and definitely committed the Church to a movement in full accord
1 This is substantially Riant's view.


## p. 273 (#319) ############################################

Leaders of the Crusade
273
with its genius and history. On the following day, in a council of the
bishops, Ademar of Puy was chosen to be the papal representative
during the Crusade. Other matters connected with its organisation
were doubtless at the same time provided for. During the next six
months a host of preachers, both official and voluntary, carried the
Pope's appeal into every part of France and even beyond its borders.
Urban's personal share in this missionary work cannot be too highly
estimated. His association with the Cluniac movement, his French
nationality, his eloquence and energy and organising power, were all of
conspicuous influence in determining the result. For nine months he
travelled from place to place with the special purpose of stirring enthu-
siasm for the Crusade. He traversed Western France as far as Le Mans.
At Tours he held a synod from 16 to 23 March 1096. From there he
turned southward to Bordeaux and then eastward through Toulouse,
Montpellier, and Nîmes. He did not return to Italy until the month of
Septeinber 1096. The first proclamation of the Crusade at Clermont,
the ensuing journey of the Pope through France, and the enthusiasm
with which he was received, account in large measure for the extent to
which the Crusades became and continued to be a French national
movement.
Neither King Philip of France nor the Emperor Henry IV was on
such terms with the papal court as to make it possible for them to join
the First Crusade. None of the great nobles who therefore became its
chiefs had any good claim to authority over the others. Ademar of Puy
was the principal ecclesiastic in the army but not its military com-
mander. As a Provençal bishop he was in fact a vassal of Raymond of
Toulouse. The composite character of the Crusade, its association of
men of different nationalities, naturally suspicious of and hostile to one
another and without any supreme leader, thus provided sure causes of
disunion and discord. Even the common purpose of the national chiefs,
their intention to conquer and occupy Syria or Palestine, was a further
cause of separation. Those at least who intended to settle in the East
were prospective rivals in the apportionment of the conquered territory.
Thus when the crusaders assembled at Constantinople they did not become
one united army, but remained a loose confederation of forces, whose
individual characters and rivalries did much to determine the subse-
quent failures of the First Crusade, and indeed of the whole crusading
movement.
A brief notice of each of the more important leaders will therefore
suitably clear the way to an understanding of the events of the Crusade.
Hugh, Count of Vermandois, brother of the French king, was in some
degree his royal brother's representative. But neither his army nor his
war-chest were commensurate with his apparent rank, and he did not play
a distinguished part during the Crusade. He intended to settle in
Palestine, although he did not carry out his intention. The oldest and
C. MED. H. VOL. V. CH. VII.
18


## p. 274 (#320) ############################################

274
Leaders of the Crusade
the wealthiest of the crusading leaders was Raymond of Saint Gilles,
Count of Toulouse since 1093. His army was from the first probably the
most considerable and his wealth enabled him to maintain its strength.
He had fought with the Muslims in Spain, and his third wife was Elvira
of Castile. During the Crusade he claimed a foremost place, and doubt-
less expected to become a prince in the Latin East. With him went
Ademar of Puy. Robert of Normandy, son of the Conqueror, was fitted
for leadership neither by character nor by military capacity, but was of
importance because of the number of Norman nobles who followed him.
Godfrey of Bouillon, Duke of Lower Lorraine, had similar resources to
those of Robert, but in character and capacity he stood much higher.
His dukedom was a barren title, and he sold his small estates to provide
himself with means for the Crusade. He is described as being equally fit
to be the light of a monastery or the leader of an army. During the
Crusade he distinguished himself as a brave soldier, although in no sense,
of course, its supreme commander. His brothers Baldwin and Eustace
gave added strength to his position. The latter had already been an ally
of Robert of Normandy against William Rufus. Robert II of Flanders
(1093-1111) was pre-eminent for his soldierly qualities and had greater
monetary resources than either Robert or Godfrey ; but as a leader of
the Crusade he stood in the second rank. By far the most able of the
crusading chiefs and the best fitted to establish a Latin princedom in
Syria was Bohemond of Taranto. The Norman knights from Southern
Italy who accompanied him, including his bold nephew Tancred, were
sufficient in numbers to make his force important apart even from his
own capacity. There is strong reason to suspect that he was resolved
from the first, by one means or another, to make himself lord of Antioch.
He had Muslim troops in his army, and Tancred, if not Bohemond also,
could speak Arabic. Having experience already in Muslim warfare, he
displayed during the Crusade a resourcefulness and a military capacity in
which he had no equa
Three chief ways to Constantinople were open to the crusaders. One
starting from the Rhine passed by Nuremberg and Ratisbon, down the
valley of the Danube, and through Hungary. It was already a pilgrim
road familiar to many. Another passed through Dalmatia, and was
accessible from the north of Italy and the south of France. The third
was the ancient Appian Way through the centre of Italy, and involved a
short sea passage from Bari or some other Italian coast town. Each of
these was used by some of the numerous bands and armies which marched
to Constantinople from the spring of 1096 to the spring of 1097. None of
the leaders whose names have been enumerated started before 15 August
1096. This was the date fixed for the departure of Ademar of Puy, and had
been announced to others as an indication of the time when they should
be ready. But the spring of 1096 may have been named by some of the
earlier preachers, and by that date a popular movement, for which little


## p. 275 (#321) ############################################

First arrivals in Constantinople
275
preparation was required, was already afoot. The first crusaders whose
start can be dated were Frenchmen from districts visited by Peter the
Hermit. They left home in March, and seem to have included only
eight who could be ranked as knights. Five of these were of one family,
Walter Sansavoir (the Penniless) of Poissy on the Seine, with his uncle
and three brothers. They are said by Orderic Vitalis to have been a
part of Peter's own expedition as far as Cologne and to have separated
from him there. In Christian Hungary they were well received by King
Koloman and passed through his territories without any special incident.
At Belgrade, which lay just on the Bulgarian frontier, the account that
they gave of themselves was disbelieved and they were refused provisions.
This led to a general plundering of the district by the crusaders and to
severe retaliation by the Bulgarians. Walter hurriedly fled as far as
Niš, where the Greek governor of the province was stationed and where
he was recompensed for his losses and given a safe-conduct for the re-
mainder of the journey. It is calculated that he arrived in Constanti-
nople soon after the middle of July.
Peter the Hermit was one of the most successful of the preachers
who stirred enthusiasm after the Council of Clermont. He preached at
first in Berry in central France, and afterwards, perhaps, chiefly in the
districts to the north and north-east of his starting-point. He, like
Walter, made his way to Constantinople through Germany and Hungary.
He is known to have passed Trèves on 10 April 1096, but before he
finally turned eastwards he preached the Crusade for a week at Cologne
(12-19 April). In South Germany he and his French followers were
joined by considerable numbers of Germans gathered from those districts
which favoured the Pope in his quarrel with the Emperor. Walter of
Teck and Hugh of Tübingen, Count-Palatine of Swabia, are two of some
twenty knights who were their leaders. Whatever authority Peter may
have enjoyed among the French peasantry whom he had stirred by his
preaching, it cannot be supposed that he was in any way recognised as
a leader by this German contingent. Possibly the Germans followed at
some distance, even some days' march, behind Peter's Frenchmen. Albert
of Aix's history, our only source, refers chiefly to the latter.
Hungary
was traversed peacefully and uneventfully as far as Semlin (Malevilla),
just on the Bulgarian border. Here the French crusaders stormed and
plundered the town, on the alleged ground of injuries recently done to
stragglers in Walter's army. In Bulgaria, which they now entered, they were
beyond the reach of Hungarian retaliation, and having given hostages to
Nikita, its governor, they were permitted to purchase provisions in Niš.
Here again, however, trouble arose, owing, it is said, to the burning of
some mills and houses by a party of Germans. Peter's baggage train,
including his money-box, was completely plundered by the Bulgarians,
numbers of women and children were taken captive, and Peter himself
and his followers were driven in headlong flight into the woods. In
CH. VII.
18-2


## p. 276 (#322) ############################################

276
Disaster in Asia Minor
Sofia the fugitives found a harbour of refuge, and were overjoyed to
receive a message from the Emperor to the effect that they had already
suffered sufficiently for their wantonness and that they might be assured
of his protection during their further journey. They reached Constanti-
nople and encamped alongside of Walter's followers on 1 August 1096.
The trans-shipment, five days later, to the coast of Asia Minor of all
the crusaders who had now reached Constantinople, was no doubt at the
instance of the Emperor Alexius. He may already, in this short time,
have had experience of conflicts arising between the Greeks and the
Latins. At least he foresaw that they were sure to arise. There is no
ground for the suspicion that the Emperor shewed unfriendliness by his
action and deliberately sent the crusaders to meet their doom on the
other side. Provisions were regularly supplied to their camp at Cibotus,
and if the pilgrims had remained quietly there until reinforcements
arrived, as they were advised to do, they would have been undisturbed by
the Muslims. About the middle of September, however, first a party of
Frenchmen ravaged the neighbourhood of Nicaea, and then an expedition
of Germans followed and captured a castle close at hand (Xerigordon).
Dā'īd Qilij-Arslān, Sultan of Rūm, after a week's siege recaptured the
castle (7 October), and then, having made the necessary preparations, led
an army against the Latins at Cibotus. The crusaders marched out
against him as he approached and were utterly defeated (21 October).
More than half the Latin knights were slain. Hugh of Tübingen,
Walter of Teck, Walter Sansavoir and two of his brothers, were amongst
the number. Most of those who escaped took refuge in the citadel at
Cibotus, from which they were rescued by Greek ships. The more im-
portant of the survivors afterwards joined the forces of Godfrey of
Bouillon. Many sold their weapons and gave up the crusade altogether.
Following Peter's expedition came several bands which did not reach
their destination at all. One passed through Saxony and Bohemia,
headed by a priest named Volkmar. It may be identified with those
crusaders who persecuted the Jewish colony at Prague (30 May).
Further on, at Nyitra (Neutra) in Hungary, most probably owing to
their own excesses, they were attacked by the Hungarians and completely
dispersed. The survivors probably returned home. The identification of
Volkmar with Fulcher of Orleans, afterwards referred to as one of Peter's
companions, is too precarious to be relied on.
Another German expedition from the Rhine had been stirred by
Peter's preaching and by that of a priest, Gottschalk by name, who
marched with it. Inspired no doubt by what had already taken place, as
we shall see, in the cities on the Rhine, they commenced a persecution of
the Jews at Ratisbon (23 May). They were well treated by the Hungarians
in Wieselburg (Meseburg), but behaved so badly there that they were
attacked some distance farther on by the orders of the Hungarian king
and utterly cut to pieces. Very few of them escaped.


## p. 277 (#323) ############################################

Persecution of Jews on the Rhine
277
From the valley of the Rhine also, somewhat later, came an expedition
whose chief leader was Emico, Count of Leiningen, between Worms and
Spires. He made himself notorious by commencing a persecution of the
Jews in the Rhine cities. Previous to the crusades the Jews had been
living on quite friendly terms with their Christian neighbours, and
although the new movement had stirred religious animosity against them
they had not hitherto been molested. Count Emico was most likely
chiefly influenced by the hopes of the plunder which he secured in the
Jewish quarters of Spires (3 May), Worms (18–20 May), and Mayence
(27 May). He initiated a persecution which extended to other cities.
That in Trèves (1 June) is attributed by the Jewish contemporary
account to the agency of visitors from the towns just mentioned. The
synagogues and Jewish houses in Cologne were plundered by crusaders
chiefly from Lorraine, on their way up the Rhine to join Emico (early in
June). The Jews of Cologne took refuge in the country villages round
about and it was in them that the worst massacres took place (end of
June). The crusaders whose evil work this was may have come from
France or from Flanders and Lorraine, and they must ultimately have
joined Emico on the borders of Hungary. Emico's army included finally
a considerable number of Frenchmen, in addition to his own German
followers. Amongst these were Clarebold of Vendeuil, Drogo of Nesle,
and perhaps William of Melun, known as Charpentier, “ the carpenter,”
because of his fighting prowess. This expedition found its progress barred
at the Hungarian frontier by King Koloman, who was posted with an
army in the strongly fortified city of Wieselburg (middle of June). The
king's hostile attitude is fully explained by his recent experiences, not to
mention the reputation of Emico's followers which had probably been
reported to him. The crusaders besieged Wieselburg for six weeks with
an increasing prospect of success, until one day, as they pressed their
attack, a sudden sally of the besieged threw them into a panic. They
were quickly routed and completely dispersed (beginning of August).
Emico escaped and returned home. Others joined the army of Godfrey,
which was now advancing. Some of the French knights made their way
into Italy and there joined the forces of Hugh of Vermandois.
The incredible estimates of the numbers of those who joined in the
First Crusade still given in modern histories of deserved repute make it
necessary to discuss this subject specially and somewhat fully. At this
point it will be sufficient to indicate the nature of the evidence in the
case of the disastrous expeditions of which an account has just been given.
The statements of our sources to the effect that Walter had 15,000 followers
and Peter 40,000, or that the crusaders when encamped at Cibotus
numbered 25,000, are to be regarded as possessing no evidential value at
all. Such numbers in medieval sources when they can be brought to a
definite test are invariably proved to be unreliable. Albert of Aix is
our chief authority for the events in question, and his use of numbers
CII. VII.


## p. 278 (#324) ############################################

278
Pictorial numbers
may be illustrated from one chapter' in his history. There we read that
Peter's host of 40,000 was dispersed by the Bulgarians, that only a
party of 500 remained with Peter and the other leaders, that these by
making signals and blowing horns reassembled 3000 more by evening, and
that after three days 30,000 men, shewing a loss of 10,000, resumed their
march together. Such an account only tells us that the crusaders were
routed and scattered and gradually reassembled, and that they lost a
large part (one quarter) of their total number. Even in this form the
narrative may not be reliable history. But in any case the numbers are
not records based on observation or tradition, nor even of the nature of
statistical estimates. They are a mere fashion of speech intended to
express proportions and relations, and may be called illustrative or
pictorial numbers. In another chapter there is a good illustration
of the merely pictorial use of a number. Instead of relating how a
band of hot-headed youths made an unjustified attack on Niš and
were immediately joined in their attack by another similar band, the
writer states that the attack was made by 1000 men (“mille insensa-
torum hominum iuventus"), and that these were immediately followed by
another thousand like them (“mille eiusdem levitatis"). Here 1000 is
used where another writer would consider 500 or 300 appropriate. Almost
everything depends on the numerical scale in use, almost nothing on the
actual figures. These may be quite unknown to the writer, and then of
course cannot influence his choice of a number. Those who recognise that
such numbers are unreliable often say that they are “exaggerated. ” This
criticism does not go far enough if it implies or is understood to imply
that the numbers bear some proportion to reality and may be taken as a
starting-point for an estimate of the actual numbers. Pictorial numbers
in most writers are essentially fictitious, and are only at best of occasional
use to the historian by setting an upper limit to the figures which he is
in search of.
Any estimate given of the numbers, say of Walter's followers or of
Peter's, must start from another kind of evidence. Some of the experiences
of the crusaders indicate their relatively small numbers. Walter's followers
were put to flight by a force of which the greater part seems to have
consisted of the garrison of Belgrade; Peter's host was easily dispersed by
the troops assembled in Niš. Both expeditions seem to have obtained
sufficient supplies of food without difficulty from the markets of the
towns they passed through. Even allowing in the one case for the
presence of undisciplined peasant pilgrims, with some proportion of
women and children, and in the other for provisions carried with them,
these facts are significant. If the first narrative summarised above
be historical at all, it cannot describe what happened to 40,000 people,
nor even to 10,000. Only by making it refer to Peter's own French
i Book 1, Chap. 13.
2 Book 1, Chap. 12.


## p. 279 (#325) ############################################

Policy of the Emperor Alexius
279
followers and by numbering these in hundreds instead of in thou-
sands do the difficulties disappear. If the number of knights be
taken, as it usually may, to be an indication of the number of efficient
soldiers in the two expeditions, we reach a total of a very few thousands
as our maximum. The defeat of the crusaders at Cibotus by an army
such as that of Qilij-Arslān is also an evidence of numerical weakness.
In conclusion, however, we can only guess at the numbers who marched
through Hungary with Peter and Walter. If the guess be made of 4000
to 5000 for Walter and 6000 to 7000 for Peter, these figures are
maxima which may still be much too high. They are large in pro-
portion to the numbers of the disciplined armies which followed, under
Godfrey and the other leaders, of which a better estimate can be given.
By the end of October Alexius was fully informed of the magnitude
of the crusading movement and had decided what policy to follow. His
first aim was to minimise the disturbance and loss of property which the
march of the crusaders through his European territories necessarily in-
volved. This he sought to do by giving a friendly reception on the
borders to each fresh arrival, and by provision of supplies to the various
armies on the march. At the same time he posted troops along every
line of approach to Constantinople with instructions to deal severely with
plunderers and to repel force by force. Alexius had also reason to fear
that the leaders of the Crusade might not respect his claims to the
countries they were about to reconquer from the Muslims. Bohemond,
at least, who had been a recent invader of his territory, was certainly not
to be trusted. If the Latins chose to act in combination they were
formidable enemies and perhaps irresistible. But they came professedly
as friends. The circumstances thus pointed to a definite agreement with
them as a solution of this part of the Emperor's difficulties. It may be
supposed that he was indifferent regarding the future government of
Palestine. But Asia Minor and Northern Syria were, in virtue of tradition
and long association, essential parts of the Empire and could not be
alienated voluntarily. On the other hand, guidance through an unknown
country, abundance of provisions up to a certain point, subsidies of
money, the use of Constantinople as a starting-point for the march
through Asia Minor, possibly the assistance of Greek troops and ships
and a free hand in Palestine, were all substantial advantages which could
be offered in exchange for a recognition of imperial claims. Taking
advantage of Western feudal customs, Alexius decided to demand from
each crusadling chief an oath of allegiance and a promise that the ancient
possessions of the Empire which might be reconquered should be restored
to him. Of course the oath of allegiance could only apply to the crusaders
as holders of land in the East, which they were to occupy as the Emperor's
vassals. So understood, it was a reasonable settlement of the future
relations between the Latin settlers and the Greek Empire, assuming,
1 See infra, pp. 297-8.
OH. VII.


## p. 280 (#326) ############################################

280
Latins as allies of the Eastern Empire
that is, that they really came to deliver the Christians of the East and
therefore the recently enslaved lands of the Empire. Of course if the
crusaders fought merely for their own gain and recognised no obligation
to the Emperor, they might well regard Alexius' proposal as unwarrantably
to his own advantage. But this was not the footing on which they
presented themselves. They were permitted to enter Greek territory
only as allies, already bound implicitly to render assistance to the Greeks
against their Turkish enemies. The Emperor's proposal when it was put
before them was received with dislike by some; but most seem to have
recognised that it was a proper way of making definite the understanding
created by their presence and of regulating their future relationship. If
the Emperor continued the support he had already commenced to give,
they were prepared to regard their conquests as ultimately a part of the
Greek Empire. It was indispensable that many of the Latin knights
should settle in the East, and it was agreed that they should do so as
vassals of the Empire and not as independent Latin rulers. The special
promise to restore the lost lands of the Empire to Alexius was no doubt
intended to be realised in large measure by the establishment of Latin
fiefs, and thus was not an irreconcilable alternative to the Latin occupation
of Syria.
Obviously the foregoing interpretation and estimate of Alexius'
policy depend to a considerable extent on the view taken of the origin
and purpose of the Crusade. It has been argued by some modern writers
that the Emperor should have welcomed the establishment of the Latins
in Syria on any terms, that he tried to impose impossible conditions
upon them, and that he roused their enmity by his jealous and suspicious
conduct. Such criticism assumes that the Crusade was not organised
even in part on behalf of the Empire, and ignores the almost complete
certainty of friction and discord arising in any case. It also, in particular,
undervalues the importance of Antioch for the Empire, and underestimates
the danger arising from the establishment there of an independent Norman
state.
Hugh of Vermandois was the first crusader of the highest rank to
reach Constantinople. He came through Italy, and crossed from Bari to
Durazzo probably before the end of October 1096. Many of the French
knights who might have accompanied him marched through Germany
and Hungary. Others were lost in a storm during the crossing from Italy,
and those who remained were few in number. Hugh received, nevertheless,
a cordial reception from the Emperor and gifts in due proportion to his
rank. In return he took the oath of allegiance which Alexius desired.
Some sources suggest that he was practically compelled to take the oath.
But such compulsion, however small Hugh's following, was neither politic
nor possible.
The next arrival was Godfrey of Bouillon. He left home about the
middle of August and reached Tuln, near Vienna, soon after Emico's


## p. 281 (#327) ############################################

Godfrey of Bouillon
281
defeat. There he spent three weeks negotiating with the Hungarian king
regarding his further progress. Koloman agreed to allow him to proceed
if he gave sufficient hostages for the good behaviour of his troops. Godfrey's
brother Baldwin and his family having been accepted as hostages, the
crusaders marched through Hungary under strict discipline and closely
watched by the king in person. Provisions were abundantly supplied, and
at the frontier Baldwin and his family were released. At Belgrade Godfrey
received assurances from Alexius that the crusaders would find abundant
markets open to them on their route if they refrained from ravaging his
country. The Emperor kept his word and all went well as far as Silivri
(Selymbria), two days' march from Constantinople. There the Latins en-
camped for a week, and the country was laid waste by Godfrey's orders. The
explanation of the Latin historian Albert is that Hugh of Vermandois was a
prisoner and that the Emperor had given no satisfaction to an embassy
which Godfrey sent to him from Philippopolis. He further states that
Godfrey's action secured Hugh's release. Evidently, as Godfrey approached
Constantinople he became suspicious of the Emperor's good faith, and
possibly he made some demand which Alexius refused. When he encamped
outside the gates of the Greek capital and was met by Hugh and repre-
sentatives of the Emperor (23 December), his suspicions remained and he
refused the Emperor's invitation to an interview. Anna's narrative suggests
that the cause was his unwillingness to take the oath of allegiance required
of him. Albert indicates rather a general suspicion of the Emperor's
good faith. Reading between the lines, in the light of the final issue,
we may conjecture that Godfrey at this stage asked for hostages as a
guarantee of his safety, and that the Emperor considered this demand
an insult to his dignity'. Rather than have the surrounding country
plundered by the Latins, Alexius continued his permission to them to
purchase provisions, and four days after Christmas he invited them to
leave their tents and take shelter in a suburb of the city. As the weather
was inclement, this proposal of the Emperor was accepted. An inter-
change of messages went on until the middle of January 1097, Greek
soldiers all the time keeping strict watch to see that the Latins did not
issue out to plunder. The conflict which ensued was inevitable in the
circumstances and is not to be attributed to a deliberate act of policy on
either side. The sources disagree, of course, as to which party was the
aggressor. The Latins burned the suburb in which they were quartered
and took up their position under the walls of the city. From there they
plundered the country round for a week. But both sides had reason to desire
peace, and quickly came to terms. The view we take of the cause of this
dispute decides the question of which side now yielded most to the other.
The Emperor sent his son John as a hostage, and at the interview which
1 It is not impossible that Godfrey feared to trust himself in the Emperor's power
because the ravaging of the country round Silivri had no sufficient justification (being
due perhaps to false information regarding Hugh's position).
CH. VII.


## p. 282 (#328) ############################################

1
282
Bohemond of Taranto
followed Godfrey took the required oath of allegiance (latter part of
January 1097). Hugh of Vermandois assisted in bringing matters to this
conclusion, and the royal hostage was released immediately after the
interview. Some weeks later the Latins were transported to a camp on
the opposite coast, no doubt in order to make room for other crusaders,
who were now at hand (end of the third week in February). In their new
quarters they were still supplied with provisions by the Emperor, and the
poor among them were substantially helped by his bounty'
Bohemond was the next to arrive in Constantinople with a few knights
(beginning of April). He seems to have crossed from Italy at the end
of October 1096. But his forces followed slowly in separate bands for
which he waited, and the united army was just at Castoria by Christmas.
They crossed the river Vardar, not much farther on, on 18 February.
Here there was a skirmish with Greek troops, who attacked them pre-
sumably because of their previous depredations. From this point they
were under the guidance of a high official sent from Constantinople, and
by his care obtained abundance of supplies.
Rusa was reached on
1 April, and there Bohemond left his army for Constantinople. Tancred
remained in command, and finally crossed into Asia Minor without
entering Constantinople. Bohemond was an hereditary enemy of the
Greek Empire, and now as at all times ready to take up arms against
Alexius if he saw any advantage in doing so.
He intended to secure a
princedom in the East, and most probably had already fixed his choice
on Antioch. Before taking the oath of allegiance he endeavoured to
obtain a promise from the Emperor to support his scheme. Alexius?
answer no doubt was that such requests were premature, and that every-
thing would depend on the issue of the Crusade. It is unlikely, in spite
of the definite statement of the Gesta Francorum, that Bohemond was
now promised territory in the neighbourhood of Antioch. At most the
Emperor may have indicated that he would afterwards consider favour-
ably such claims as the Norman chief might be able to present.
Robert of Flanders accomplished the first part of his journey through
France and Italy in the company of Robert of Normandy. He crossed
from Apulia in December 1096, and did not advance farther towards
1 The attitude of the modern historian to Anna Comnena's narrative of these
events is decisively important for the view to be taken of them. Her account is inter-
preted by some to mean that Alexius finally compelled Godfrey, by force of arms, to
take the oath of allegiance. This is no doubt the impression she conveys, but in
view of Albert's narrative the Greek account may be regarded as patriotically over-
drawn at this point. The view that the essential matter in dispute between Godfrey
and Alexius was the oath of allegiance is a possible one, but Godfrey's yielding (with-
out defeat) on such a point is more difficult to understand than Alexius' yielding on
the point of the hostages. The very improbable date that Anna gives quite incident-
ally at one point (“Thursday in boly week”= 2 April 1097) has not been satisfactorily
accounted for by those who reject it (cf. Kugler). May there not be a confusion with
Christmas week, in which, according to Albert, there was a cessation of hostilities
out of respect to the season? Christmas Day in 1096 was a Thursday.


## p. 283 (#329) ############################################

Raymond of Toulouse
283
Constantinople until the spring. He arrived later than Bohemond, and
readily took the oath of allegiance.
Raymond of Toulouse, having left home, perhaps, about the end of
October 1096, came by the north of Italy and the eastern shore of the
Adriatic Sea. Passing through Dalmatia in the winter, his army suffered
from the inclemency of the season, from scarcity of food, and from the
attacks of the inhabitants of the country, so that large numbers of the
crusaders lost their lives. At Durazzo messengers from the Emperor
brought assurances of friendship and promised supplies. Beyond this
point, however, there was frequent fighting between the crusaders and the
Greek mercenaries who watched their progress. The Provençals con-
sidered themselves the aggrieved parties, and retaliated by destroying the
suburbs of Rusa and plundering the town. At Rodosto, four days'
journey from Constantinople, Raymond received a request from the Latin
leaders already in Constantinople to hurry on, because they were pre-
paring to start and were making arrangements with the Emperor to
which it was desirable that he should be a party. When he reached
Constantinople (perhaps in the third week of April), he decisively refused
to take the now customary oath of allegiance. If the Emperor put him-
self at the head of the expedition and came with them, he would become
his follower, he said, not otherwise. News of a shameful defeat of his
army, in a conflict in which they were afterwards judged to have been in
the wrong, only increased his determination not to yield. Finally, under
pressure, he only consented to take an oath that he would do nothing
against the life and honour of the Emperor. In consequence of his
attitude he received, as the Provençal historian notes, little of the
Emperor's bounty.
Last of all came Robert of Normandy, with his powerful brother-in-
law, Stephen of Blois, and with Godfrey's brother Eustace, Count of
Boulogne.