Reply to Objection 1: That
uplifting
of the soul ensues from the sorrow
which is according to God, because it brings with it the hope of the
forgiveness of sin.
which is according to God, because it brings with it the hope of the
forgiveness of sin.
Summa Theologica
And the reason why torpor
especially is said to deprive one of speech is because of all the
external movements the voice is the best expression of the inward
thought and desire, not only in men, but also in other animals, as is
stated in Polit. i, 1.
Reply to Objection 1: Pleasure is caused by good, which has only one
meaning: and so pleasure is not divided into several species as sorrow
is; for the latter is caused by evil, which "happens in many ways," as
Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv).
Reply to Objection 2: Repentance is for one's own evil, which is the
proper object of sorrow: wherefore it does not belong to these species.
Jealousy and indignation are included in envy, as we shall explain
later ([1310]SS, Q[36], A[2]).
Reply to Objection 3: This division is not according to opposite
species; but according to the diversity of foreign matter to which the
notion of sorrow is applied, as stated above.
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OF THE CAUSES OF SORROW OR PAIN (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider the causes of sorrow: under which head there are
four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether sorrow is caused by the loss of a good or rather by the
presence of an evil?
(2) Whether desire is a cause of sorrow?
(3) Whether the craving for unity is a cause of sorrow?
(4) Whether an irresistible power is a cause of sorrow?
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Whether sorrow is caused by the loss of good or by the presence of evil?
Objection 1: It would seem that sorrow is caused by the loss of a good
rather than by the presence of an evil. For Augustine says (De viii QQ.
Dulcit. qu. 1) that sorrow is caused by the loss of temporal goods.
Therefore, in like manner, every sorrow is caused by the loss of some
good.
Objection 2: Further, it was said above ([1311]Q[35], A[4]) that the
sorrow which is contrary to a pleasure, has the same object as that
pleasure. But the object of pleasure is good, as stated above
([1312]Q[23], A[4];[1313] Q[31], A[1];[1314] Q[35], A[3]). Therefore
sorrow is caused chiefly by the loss of good.
Objection 3: Further, according to Augustine (De Civ. Dei xiv, 7,9),
love is the cause of sorrow, as of the other emotions of the soul. But
the object of love is good. Therefore pain or sorrow is felt for the
loss of good rather than for an evil that is present.
On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 12) that "the
dreaded evil gives rise to fear, the present evil is the cause of
sorrow. "
I answer that, If privations, as considered by the mind, were what they
are in reality, this question would seem to be of no importance. For,
as stated in the [1315]FP, Q[14], A[10] and [1316]FP, Q[48], A[3], evil
is the privation of good: and privation is in reality nothing else than
the lack of the contrary habit; so that, in this respect, to sorrow for
the loss of good, would be the same as to sorrow for the presence of
evil. But sorrow is a movement of the appetite in consequence of an
apprehension: and even a privation, as apprehended, has the aspect of a
being, wherefore it is called "a being of reason. " And in this way
evil, being a privation, is regarded as a "contrary. " Accordingly, so
far as the movement of the appetite is concerned, it makes a difference
which of the two it regards chiefly, the present evil or the good which
is lost.
Again, since the movement of the animal appetite holds the same place
in the actions of the soul, as natural movement in natural things; the
truth of the matter is to be found by considering natural movements.
For if, in natural movements, we observe those of approach and
withdrawal, approach is of itself directed to something suitable to
nature; while withdrawal is of itself directed to something contrary to
nature; thus a heavy body, of itself, withdraws from a higher place,
and approaches naturally to a lower place. But if we consider the cause
of both these movements, viz. gravity, then gravity itself inclines
towards the lower place more than it withdraws from the higher place,
since withdrawal from the latter is the reason for its downward
tendency.
Accordingly, since, in the movements of the appetite, sorrow is a kind
of flight or withdrawal, while pleasure is a kind of pursuit or
approach; just as pleasure regards first the good possessed, as its
proper object, so sorrow regards the evil that is present. On the other
hand love, which is the cause of pleasure and sorrow, regards good
rather than evil: and therefore, forasmuch as the object is the cause
of a passion, the present evil is more properly the cause of sorrow or
pain, than the good which is lost.
Reply to Objection 1: The loss itself of good is apprehended as an
evil, just as the loss of evil is apprehended as a good: and in this
sense Augustine says that pain results from the loss of temporal goods.
Reply to Objection 2: Pleasure and its contrary pain have the same
object, but under contrary aspects: because if the presence of a
particular thin be the object of pleasure, the absence of that same
thing is the object of sorrow. Now one contrary includes the privation
of the other, as stated in Metaph. x, 4: and consequently sorrow in
respect of one contrary is, in a way, directed to the same thing under
a contrary aspect.
Reply to Objection 3: When many movements arise from one cause, it does
not follow that they all regard chiefly that which the cause regards
chiefly, but only the first of them. And each of the others regards
chiefly that which is suitable to it according to its own nature.
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Whether desire is a cause of sorrow?
Objection 1: It would seem that desire is not a cause of pain or
sorrow. Because sorrow of itself regards evil, as stated above
[1317](A[1]): whereas desire is a movement of the appetite towards
good. Now movement towards one contrary is not a cause of movement
towards the other contrary. Therefore desire is not a cause of pain.
Objection 2: Further, pain, according to Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii,
12), is caused by something present; whereas the object of desire is
something future. Therefore desire is not a cause of pain.
Objection 3: Further, that which is pleasant in itself is not a cause
of pain. But desire is pleasant in itself, as the Philosopher says
(Rhet. i, 11). Therefore desire is not a cause of pain or sorrow.
On the contrary, Augustine says (Enchiridion xxiv): "When ignorance of
things necessary to be done, and desire of things hurtful, found their
way in: error and pain stole an entrance in their company. " But
ignorance is the cause of error. Therefore desire is a cause of sorrow.
I answer that, Sorrow is a movement of the animal appetite. Now, as
stated above [1318](A[1]), the appetitive movement is likened to the
natural appetite; a likeness, that may be assigned to a twofold cause;
one, on the part of the end, the other, on the part of the principle of
movement. Thus, on the part of the end, the cause of a heavy body's
downward movement is the lower place; while the principle of that
movement is a natural inclination resulting from gravity.
Now the cause of the appetitive movement, on the part of the end, is
the object of that movement. And thus, it has been said above
[1319](A[1]) that the cause of pain or sorrow is a present evil. On the
other hand, the cause, by way or principle, of that movement, is the
inward inclination of the appetite; which inclination regards, first of
all, the good, and in consequence, the rejection of a contrary evil.
Hence the first principle of this appetitive movement is love, which is
the first inclination of the appetite towards the possession of good:
while the second principle is hatred, which is the first inclination of
the appetite towards the avoidance of evil. But since concupiscence or
desire is the first effect of love, which gives rise to the greatest
pleasure, as stated above (Q[32], A[6]); hence it is that Augustine
often speaks of desire or concupiscence in the sense of love, as was
also stated (Q[30], A[2], ad 2): and in this sense he says that desire
is the universal cause of sorrow. Sometimes, however, desire taken in
its proper sense, is the cause of sorrow. Because whatever hinders a
movement from reaching its end is contrary to that movement. Now that
which is contrary to the movement of the appetite, is a cause of
sorrow. Consequently, desire becomes a cause of sorrow, in so far as we
sorrow for the delay of a desired good, or for its entire removal. But
it cannot be a universal cause of sorrow: since we sorrow more for the
loss of present good, in which we have already taken pleasure, than for
the withdrawal of future good which we desire to have.
Reply to Objection 1: The inclination of the appetite to the possession
of good causes the inclination of the appetite to fly from evil, as
stated above. And hence it is that the appetitive movements that regard
good, are reckoned as causing the appetitive movements that regard
evil.
Reply to Objection 2: That which is desired, though really future, is,
nevertheless, in a way, present, inasmuch as it is hoped for. Or we may
say that although the desired good itself is future, yet the hindrance
is reckoned as present, and so gives rise to sorrow.
Reply to Objection 3: Desire gives pleasure, so long as there is hope
of obtaining that which is desired. But, when hope is removed through
the presence of an obstacle, desire causes sorrow.
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Whether the craving for unity is a cause of sorrow?
Objection 1: It would seem that the craving for unity is not a cause of
sorrow. For the Philosopher says (Ethic. x, 3) that "this opinion,"
which held repletion to be the cause of pleasure, and division
[*Aristotle wrote {endeian}, 'want'; St. Thomas, in the Latin version,
read 'incisionem'; should he have read 'indigentiam'? ], the cause of
sorrow, "seems to have originated in pains and pleasures connected with
food. " But not every pleasure or sorrow is of this kind. Therefore the
craving for unity is not the universal cause of sorrow; since repletion
pertains to unity, and division is the cause of multitude.
Objection 2: Further, every separation is opposed to unity. If
therefore sorrow were caused by a craving for unity, no separation
would be pleasant: and this is clearly untrue as regards the separation
of whatever is superfluous.
Objection 3: Further, for the same reason we desire the conjunction of
good and the removal of evil. But as conjunction regards unity, since
it is a kind of union; so separation is contrary to unity. Therefore
the craving for unity should not be reckoned, rather than the craving
for separation, as causing sorrow.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. iii, 23), that "from the
pain that dumb animals feel, it is quite evident how their souls desire
unity, in ruling and quickening their bodies. For what else is pain but
a feeling of impatience of division or corruption? "
I answer that, Forasmuch as the desire or craving for good is reckoned
as a cause of sorrow, so must a craving for unity, and love, be
accounted as causing sorrow. Because the good of each thing consists in
a certain unity, inasmuch as each thing has, united in itself, the
elements of which its perfection consists: wherefore the Platonists
held that "one" is a principle, just as "good" is. Hence everything
naturally desires unity, just as it desires goodness: and therefore,
just as love or desire for good is a cause of sorrow, so also is the
love or craving for unity.
Reply to Objection 1: Not every kind of union causes perfect goodness,
but only that on which the perfect being of a thing depends. Hence
neither does the desire of any kind of unity cause pain or sorrow, as
some have maintained: whose opinion is refuted by the Philosopher from
the fact that repletion is not always pleasant; for instance, when a
man has eaten to repletion, he takes no further pleasure in eating;
because repletion or union of this kind, is repugnant rather than
conducive to perfect being. Consequently sorrow is caused by the
craving, not for any kind of unity, but for that unity in which the
perfection of nature consists.
Reply to Objection 2: Separation can be pleasant, either because it
removes something contrary to a thing's perfection, or because it has
some union connected with it, such as union of the sense to its object.
Reply to Objection 3: Separation from things hurtful and corruptive is
desired, in so far as they destroy the unity which is due. Wherefore
the desire for such like separation is not the first cause of sorrow,
whereas the craving for unity is.
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Whether an irresistible power is a cause of sorrow?
Objection 1: It would seem that a greater power should not be reckoned
a cause of sorrow. For that which is in the power of the agent is not
present but future. But sorrow is for present evil. Therefore a greater
power is not a cause of sorrow.
Objection 2: Further, hurt inflicted is the cause of sorrow. But hurt
can be inflicted even by a lesser power. Therefore a greater power
should not be reckoned as a cause of sorrow.
Objection 3: Further, the interior inclinations of the soul are the
causes of the movements of appetite. But a greater power is something
external. Therefore it should not be reckoned as a cause of sorrow.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Nat. Boni xx): "Sorrow in the soul
is caused by the will resisting a stronger power: while pain in the
body is caused by sense resisting a stronger body. "
I answer that, As stated above [1320](A[1]), a present evil, is cause
of sorrow or pain, by way of object. Therefore that which is the cause
of the evil being present, should be reckoned as causing pain or
sorrow. Now it is evident that it is contrary to the inclination of the
appetite to be united with a present evil: and whatever is contrary to
a thing's inclination does not happen to it save by the action of
something stronger. Wherefore Augustine reckons a greater power as
being the cause of sorrow.
But it must be noted that if the stronger power goes so far as to
transform the contrary inclination into its own inclination there will
be no longer repugnance or violence: thus if a stronger agent, by its
action on a heavy body, deprives it of its downward tendency, its
consequent upward tendency is not violent but natural to it.
Accordingly if some greater power prevail so far as to take away from
the will or the sensitive appetite, their respective inclinations, pain
or sorrow will not result therefrom; such is the result only when the
contrary inclination of the appetite remains. And hence Augustine says
(De Nat. Boni xx) that sorrow is caused by the will "resisting a
stronger power": for were it not to resist, but to yield by consenting,
the result would be not sorrow but pleasure.
Reply to Objection 1: A greater power causes sorrow, as acting not
potentially but actually, i. e. by causing the actual presence of the
corruptive evil.
Reply to Objection 2: Nothing hinders a power which is not simply
greater, from being greater in some respect: and accordingly it is able
to inflict some harm. But if it be nowise stronger, it can do no harm
at all: wherefore it cannot bring about that which causes sorrow.
Reply to Objection 3: External agents can be the causes of appetitive
movements, in so far as they cause the presence of the object: and it
is thus that a greater power is reckoned to be the cause of sorrow.
__________________________________________________________________
OF THE EFFECTS OF PAIN OR SORROW (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider the effects of pain or of sorrow: under which head
there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether pain deprives one of the power to learn?
(2) Whether the effect of sorrow or pain is to burden the soul?
(3) Whether sorrow or pain weakens all activity?
(4) Whether sorrow is more harmful to the body than all the other
passions of the soul?
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Whether pain deprives one of the power to learn?
Objection 1: It would seem that pain does not deprive one of the power
to learn. For it is written (Is. 26:9): "When Thou shalt do Thy
judgments on the earth, the inhabitants of the world shall learn
justice": and further on (verse 16): "In the tribulation of murmuring
Thy instruction was with them. " But the judgments of God and
tribulation cause sorrow in men's hearts. Therefore pain or sorrow, far
from destroying, increases the power of learning.
Objection 2: Further, it is written (Is. 28:9): "Whom shall He teach
knowledge? And whom shall He make to understand the hearing? Them that
are weaned from the milk, that are drawn away from the breasts," i. e.
from pleasures. But pain and sorrow are most destructive of pleasure;
since sorrow hinders all pleasure, as stated in Ethic. vii, 14: and
(Ecclus. 11:29) it is stated that "the affliction of an hour maketh one
forget great delights. " Therefore pain, instead of taking away,
increases the faculty of learning.
Objection 3: Further, inward sorrow surpasses outward pain, as stated
above ([1321]Q[35], A[7]). But man can learn while sorrowful. Much
more, therefore, can he learn while in bodily pain.
On the contrary, Augustine says (Soliloq. i, 12): "Although during
those days I was tormented with a violent tooth-ache, I was not able to
turn over in my mind other things than those I had already learnt; and
as to learning anything, I was quite unequal to it, because it required
undivided attention. "
I answer that, Since all the powers of the soul are rooted in the one
essence of the soul, it must needs happen, when the intention of the
soul is strongly drawn towards the action of one power, that it is
withdrawn from the action of another power: because the soul, being
one, can only have one intention. The result is that if one thing draws
upon itself the entire intention of the soul, or a great portion
thereof, anything else requiring considerable attention is incompatible
therewith.
Now it is evident that sensible pain above all draws the soul's
attention to itself; because it is natural for each thing to tend
wholly to repel whatever is contrary to it, as may be observed even in
natural things. It is likewise evident that in order to learn anything
new, we require study and effort with a strong intention, as is clearly
stated in Prov. 2:4,5: "If thou shalt seek wisdom as money, and shall
dig for her as for a treasure, then shalt thou understand learning"
[Vulg: 'the fear of the Lord']. Consequently if the pain be acute, man
is prevented at the time from learning anything: indeed it can be so
acute, that, as long as it lasts, a man is unable to give his attention
even to that which he knew already. However a difference is to be
observed according to the difference of love that a man has for
learning or for considering: because the greater his love, the more
will he retain the intention of his mind so as to prevent it from
turning entirely to the pain.
Reply to Objection 1: Moderate sorrow, that does not cause the mind to
wander, can conduce to the acquisition of learning especially in regard
to those things by which a man hopes to be freed from sorrow. And thus,
"in the tribulation of murmuring," men are more apt to be taught by
God.
Reply to Objection 2: Both pleasure and pain, in so far as they draw
upon themselves the soul's intention, hinder the reason from the act of
consideration, wherefore it is stated in Ethic. vii, 11 that "in the
moment of sexual pleasure, a man cannot understand anything. "
Nevertheless pain attracts the soul's intention more than pleasure
does: thus we observe in natural things that the action of a natural
body is more intense in regard to its contrary; for instance, hot water
is more accessible to the action of cold, and in consequence freezes
harder. If therefore pain or sorrow be moderate, it can conduce
accidentally to the facility of learning, in so far as it takes away an
excess of pleasure. But, of itself, it is a hindrance; and if it be
intense, it prevents it altogether.
Reply to Objection 3: External pain arises from hurt done to the body,
so that it involves bodily transmutation more than inward sorrow does:
and yet the latter is greater in regard to the formal element of pain,
which belongs to the soul. Consequently bodily pain is a greater
hindrance to contemplation which requires complete repose, than inward
sorrow is. Nevertheless if inward sorrow be very intense, it attracts
the intention, so that man is unable to learn anything for the first
time: wherefore on account of sorrow Gregory interrupted his commentary
on Ezechiel (Hom. xxii in Ezechiel).
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the effect of sorrow or pain is to burden the soul?
Objection 1: It would seem that it is not an effect of sorrow to burden
the soul. For the Apostle says (2 Cor. 7:11): "Behold this self-same
thing, that you were made sorrowful according to God, how great
carefulness it worketh in you: yea, defence, yea indignation," etc. Now
carefulness and indignation imply that the soul is uplifted, which is
contrary to being depressed. Therefore depression is not an effect of
sorrow.
Objection 2: Further, sorrow is contrary to pleasure. But the effect of
pleasure is expansion: the opposite of which is not depression but
contraction. Therefore depression should not be reckoned as an effect
of sorrow.
Objection 3: Further, sorrow consumes those who are inflicted
therewith, as may be gathered from the words of the Apostle (2 Cor.
2:7): "Lest perhaps such an one be swallowed up with overmuch sorrow. "
But that which is depressed is not consumed; nay, it is weighed down by
something heavy, whereas that which is consumed enters within the
consumer. Therefore depression should not be reckoned an effect of
sorrow.
On the contrary, Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xix. ] and
Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 14) speak of "depressing sorrow. "
I answer that, The effects of the soul's passions are sometimes named
metaphorically, from a likeness to sensible bodies: for the reason that
the movements of the animal appetite are like the inclinations of the
natural appetite. And in this way fervor is ascribed to love, expansion
to pleasure, and depression to sorrow. For a man is said to be
depressed, through being hindered in his own movement by some weight.
Now it is evident from what has been said above ([1322]Q[23],
A[4];[1323] Q[25], A[4];[1324] Q[36], A[1]) that sorrow is caused by a
present evil: and this evil, from the very fact that it is repugnant to
the movement of the will, depresses the soul, inasmuch as it hinders it
from enjoying that which it wishes to enjoy. And if the evil which is
the cause of sorrow be not so strong as to deprive one of the hope of
avoiding it, although the soul be depressed in so far as, for the
present, it fails to grasp that which it craves for; yet it retains the
movement whereby to repulse that evil. If, on the other hand, the
strength of the evil be such as to exclude the hope of evasion, then
even the interior movement of the afflicted soul is absolutely
hindered, so that it cannot turn aside either this way or that.
Sometimes even the external movement of the body is paralyzed, so that
a man becomes completely stupefied.
Reply to Objection 1: That uplifting of the soul ensues from the sorrow
which is according to God, because it brings with it the hope of the
forgiveness of sin.
Reply to Objection 2: As far as the movement of the appetite is
concerned, contraction and depression amount to the same: because the
soul, through being depressed so as to be unable to attend freely to
outward things, withdraws to itself, closing itself up as it were.
Reply to Objection 3: Sorrow is said to consume man, when the force of
the afflicting evil is such as to shut out all hope of evasion: and
thus also it both depresses and consumes at the same time. For certain
things, taken metaphorically, imply one another, which taken literally,
appear to exclude one another.
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Whether sorrow or pain weakens all activity?
Objection 1: It would seem that sorrow does not weaken all activity.
Because carefulness is caused by sorrow, as is clear from the passage
of the Apostle quoted above (A[2], OBJ[1]). But carefulness conduces to
good work: wherefore the Apostle says (2 Tim. 2:15): "Carefully study
to present thyself . . . a workman that needeth not to be ashamed. "
Therefore sorrow is not a hindrance to work, but helps one to work
well.
Objection 2: Further, sorrow causes desire in many cases, as stated in
Ethic. vii, 14. But desire causes intensity of action. Therefore sorrow
does too.
Objection 3: Further, as some actions are proper to the joyful, so are
others proper to the sorrowful; for instance, to mourn. Now a thing is
improved by that which is suitable to it. Therefore certain actions are
not hindered but improved by reason of sorrow.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. x, 4) that "pleasure
perfects action," whereas on the other hand, "sorrow hinders it"
(Ethic. x, 5).
I answer that, As stated above [1325](A[2]), sorrow at times does not
depress or consume the soul, so as to shut out all movement, internal
or external; but certain movements are sometimes caused by sorrow
itself. Accordingly action stands in a twofold relation to sorrow.
First, as being the object of sorrow: and thus sorrow hinders any
action: for we never do that which we do with sorrow, so well as that
which we do with pleasure, or without sorrow. The reason for this is
that the will is the cause of human actions: and consequently when we
do something that gives pain, the action must of necessity be weakened
in consequence. Secondly, action stands in relation to sorrow, as to
its principle and cause: and such action must needs be improved by
sorrow: thus the more one sorrows on account of a certain thing, the
more one strives to shake off sorrow, provided there is a hope of
shaking it off: otherwise no movement or action would result from that
sorrow.
From what has been said the replies to the objections are evident.
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Whether sorrow is more harmful to the body than the other passions of the
soul?
Objection 1: It would seem that sorrow is not most harmful to the body.
For sorrow has a spiritual existence in the soul. But those things
which have only a spiritual existence do not cause a transmutation in
the body: as is evident with regard to the images of colors, which
images are in the air and do not give color to bodies. Therefore sorrow
is not harmful to the body.
Objection 2: Further if it be harmful to the body, this can only be due
to its having a bodily transmutation in conjunction with it. But bodily
transmutation takes place in all the passions of the soul, as stated
above ([1326]Q[22], AA[1],3). Therefore sorrow is not more harmful to
the body than the other passions of the soul.
Objection 3: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 3) that "anger
and desire drive some to madness": which seems to be a very great harm,
since reason is the most excellent thing in man. Moreover, despair
seems to be more harmful than sorrow; for it is the cause of sorrow.
Therefore sorrow is not more harmful to the body than the other
passions of the soul.
On the contrary, It is written (Prov. 17:22): "A joyful mind maketh age
flourishing: a sorrowful spirit drieth up the bones": and (Prov.
25:20): "As a moth doth by a garment, and a worm by the wood: so the
sadness of a man consumeth the heart": and (Ecclus. 38:19): "Of sadness
cometh death. "
I answer that, Of all the soul's passions, sorrow is most harmful to
the body. The reason of this is because sorrow is repugnant to man's
life in respect of the species of its movement, and not merely in
respect of its measure or quantity, as is the case with the other
passions of the soul. For man's life consists in a certain movement,
which flows from the heart to the other parts of the body: and this
movement is befitting to human nature according to a certain fixed
measure. Consequently if this movement goes beyond the right measure,
it will be repugnant to man's life in respect of the measure of
quantity; but not in respect of its specific character: whereas if this
movement be hindered in its progress, it will be repugnant to life in
respect of its species.
Now it must be noted that, in all the passions of the soul, the bodily
transmutation which is their material element, is in conformity with
and in proportion to the appetitive movement, which is the formal
element: just as in everything matter is proportionate to form.
Consequently those passions that imply a movement of the appetite in
pursuit of something, are not repugnant to the vital movement as
regards its species, but they may be repugnant thereto as regards its
measure: such are love, joy, desire and the like; wherefore these
passions conduce to the well-being of the body; though, if they be
excessive, they may be harmful to it. On the other hand, those passions
which denote in the appetite a movement of flight or contraction, are
repugnant to the vital movement, not only as regards its measure, but
also as regards its species; wherefore they are simply harmful: such
are fear and despair, and above all sorrow which depresses the soul by
reason of a present evil, which makes a stronger impression than future
evil.
Reply to Objection 1: Since the soul naturally moves the body, the
spiritual movement of the soul is naturally the cause of bodily
transmutation. Nor is there any parallel with spiritual images, because
they are not naturally ordained to move such other bodies as are not
naturally moved by the soul.
Reply to Objection 2: Other passions imply a bodily transmutation which
is specifically in conformity with the vital movement: whereas sorrow
implies a transmutation that is repugnant thereto, as stated above.
Reply to Objection 3: A lesser cause suffices to hinder the use of
reason, than to destroy life: since we observe that many ailments
deprive one of the use of reason, before depriving one of life.
Nevertheless fear and anger cause very great harm to the body, by
reason of the sorrow which they imply, and which arises from the
absence of the thing desired. Moreover sorrow too sometimes deprives
man of the use of reason: as may be seen in those who through sorrow
become a prey to melancholy or madness.
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OF THE REMEDIES OF SORROW OR PAIN (FIVE ARTICLES)
We must now consider the remedies of pain or sorrow: under which head
there are five points of inquiry:
(1) Whether pain or sorrow is assuaged by every pleasure?
(2) Whether it is assuaged by weeping?
(3) Whether it is assuaged by the sympathy of friends?
(4) Whether it is assuaged by contemplating the truth?
(5) Whether it is assuaged by sleep and baths?
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Whether pain or sorrow is assuaged by every pleasure?
Objection 1: It would seem that not every pleasure assuages every pain
or sorrow. For pleasure does not assuage sorrow, save in so far as it
is contrary to it: for "remedies work by contraries" (Ethic. ii, 3).
But not every pleasure is contrary to every sorrow; as stated above
([1327]Q[35], A[4] ). Therefore not every pleasure assuages every
sorrow.
Objection 2: Further, that which causes sorrow does not assuage it. But
some pleasures cause sorrow; since, as stated in Ethic. ix, 4, "the
wicked man feels pain at having been pleased. " Therefore not every
pleasure assuages sorrow.
Objection 3: Further, Augustine says (Confess. iv, 7) that he fled from
his country, where he had been wont to associate with his friend, now
dead: "for so should his eyes look for him less, where they were not
wont to see him. " Hence we may gather that those things which united us
to our dead or absent friends, become burdensome to us when we mourn
their death or absence. But nothing united us more than the pleasures
we enjoyed in common. Therefore these very pleasures become burdensome
to us when we mourn. Therefore not every pleasure assuages every
sorrow.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 14) that "sorrow is
driven forth by pleasure, both by a contrary pleasure and by any other,
provided it be intense. "
I answer that, As is evident from what has been said above
([1328]Q[23], A[4] ), pleasure is a kind of repose of the appetite in a
suitable good; while sorrow arises from something unsuited to the
appetite. Consequently in movements of the appetite pleasure is to
sorrow, what, in bodies, repose is to weariness, which is due to a
non-natural transmutation; for sorrow itself implies a certain
weariness or ailing of the appetitive faculty. Therefore just as all
repose of the body brings relief to any kind of weariness, ensuing from
any non-natural cause; so every pleasure brings relief by assuaging any
kind of sorrow, due to any cause whatever.
Reply to Objection 1: Although not every pleasure is specifically
contrary to every sorrow, yet it is generically, as stated above
([1329]Q[35], A[4]). And consequently, on the part of the disposition
of the subject, any sorrow can be assuaged by any pleasure.
Reply to Objection 2: The pleasures of wicked men are not a cause of
sorrow while they are enjoyed, but afterwards: that is to say, in so
far as wicked men repent of those things in which they took pleasure.
This sorrow is healed by contrary pleasures.
Reply to Objection 3: When there are two causes inclining to contrary
movements, each hinders the other; yet the one which is stronger and
more persistent, prevails in the end. Now when a man is made sorrowful
by those things in which he took pleasure in common with a deceased or
absent friend, there are two causes producing contrary movements. For
the thought of the friend's death or absence, inclines him to sorrow:
whereas the present good inclines him to pleasure. Consequently each is
modified by the other. And yet, since the perception of the present
moves more strongly than the memory of the past, and since love of self
is more persistent than love of another; hence it is that, in the end,
the pleasure drives out the sorrow. Wherefore a little further on
(Confess. iv, 8) Augustine says that his "sorrow gave way to his former
pleasures. "
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Whether pain or sorrow is assuaged by tears?
Objection 1: It would seem that tears do not assuage sorrow. Because no
effect diminishes its cause. But tears or groans are an effect of
sorrow. Therefore they do not diminish sorrow.
Objection 2: Further, just as tears or groans are an effect of sorrow,
so laughter is an effect of joy. But laughter does not lessen joy.
Therefore tears do not lessen sorrow.
Objection 3: Further, when we weep, the evil that saddens us is present
to the imagination. But the image of that which saddens us increases
sorrow, just as the image of a pleasant thing adds to joy. Therefore it
seems that tears do not assuage sorrow.
On the contrary, Augustine says (Confess. iv, 7) that when he mourned
the death of his friend, "in groans and in tears alone did he find some
little refreshment. "
I answer that, Tears and groans naturally assuage sorrow: and this for
two reasons. First, because a hurtful thing hurts yet more if we keep
it shut up, because the soul is more intent on it: whereas if it be
allowed to escape, the soul's intention is dispersed as it were on
outward things, so that the inward sorrow is lessened. This is why men,
burdened with sorrow, make outward show of their sorrow, by tears or
groans or even by words, their sorrow is assuaged. Secondly, because an
action, that befits a man according to his actual disposition, is
always pleasant to him. Now tears and groans are actions befitting a
man who is in sorrow or pain; and consequently they become pleasant to
him. Since then, as stated above [1330](A[1]), every pleasure assuages
sorrow or pain somewhat, it follows that sorrow is assuaged by weeping
and groans.
Reply to Objection 1: This relation of the cause to effect is opposed
to the relation existing between the cause of sorrow and the sorrowing
man. For every effect is suited to its cause, and consequently is
pleasant to it; but the cause of sorrow is disagreeable to him that
sorrows. Hence the effect of sorrow is not related to him that sorrows
in the same way as the cause of sorrow is. For this reason sorrow is
assuaged by its effect, on account of the aforesaid contrariety.
Reply to Objection 2: The relation of effect to cause is like the
relation of the object of pleasure to him that takes pleasure in it:
because in each case the one agrees with the other. Now every like
thing increases its like. Therefore joy is increased by laughter and
the other effects of joy: except they be excessive, in which case,
accidentally, they lessen it.
Reply to Objection 3: The image of that which saddens us, considered in
itself, has a natural tendency to increase sorrow: yet from the very
fact that a man imagines himself to be doing that which is fitting
according to his actual state, he feels a certain amount of pleasure.
For the same reason if laughter escapes a man when he is so disposed
that he thinks he ought to weep, he is sorry for it, as having done
something unbecoming to him, as Cicero says (De Tusc. Quaest. iii, 27).
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Whether pain or sorrow are assuaged by the sympathy of friends?
Objection 1: It would seem that the sorrow of sympathizing friends does
not assuage our own sorrow. For contraries have contrary effects. Now
as Augustine says (Confess. viii, 4), "when many rejoice together, each
one has more exuberant joy, for they are kindled and inflamed one by
the other. " Therefore, in like manner, when many are sorrowful, it
seems that their sorrow is greater.
Objection 2: Further, friendship demands mutual love, as Augustine
declares (Confess. iv, 9). But a sympathizing friend is pained at the
sorrow of his friend with whom he sympathizes. Consequently the pain of
a sympathizing friend becomes, to the friend in sorrow, a further cause
of sorrow: so that, his pain being doubled his sorrow seems to
increase.
Objection 3: Further, sorrow arises from every evil affecting a friend,
as though it affected oneself: since "a friend is one's other self"
(Ethic. ix, 4,9). But sorrow is an evil. Therefore the sorrow of the
sympathizing friend increases the sorrow of the friend with whom he
sympathizes.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. ix, 11) that those who
are in pain are consoled when their friends sympathize with them.
I answer that, When one is in pain, it is natural that the sympathy of
a friend should afford consolation: whereof the Philosopher indicates a
twofold reason (Ethic. ix, 11). The first is because, since sorrow has
a depressing effect, it is like a weight whereof we strive to unburden
ourselves: so that when a man sees others saddened by his own sorrow,
it seems as though others were bearing the burden with him, striving,
as it were, to lessen its weight; wherefore the load of sorrow becomes
lighter for him: something like what occurs in the carrying of bodily
burdens. The second and better reason is because when a man's friends
condole with him, he sees that he is loved by them, and this affords
him pleasure, as stated above (Q[32], A[5]). Consequently, since every
pleasure assuages sorrow, as stated above [1331](A[1]), it follows that
sorrow is mitigated by a sympathizing friend.
Reply to Objection 1: In either case there is a proof of friendship,
viz. when a man rejoices with the joyful, and when he sorrows with the
sorrowful. Consequently each becomes an object of pleasure by reason of
its cause.
Reply to Objection 2: The friend's sorrow itself would be a cause of
sorrow: but consideration of its cause, viz. his love, gives rise
rather to pleasure.
And this suffices for the reply to the Third Objection.
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Whether pain and sorrow are assuaged by the contemplation of truth?
Objection 1: It would seem that the contemplation of truth does not
assuage sorrow. For it is written (Eccles. 1:18): "He that addeth
knowledge addeth also sorrow" [Vulg. : 'labor']. But knowledge pertains
to the contemplation of truth. Therefore the contemplation of truth
does not assuage sorrow.
Objection 2: Further, the contemplation of truth belongs to the
speculative intellect. But "the speculative intellect is not a
principle of movement"; as stated in De Anima iii, 11. Therefore, since
joy and sorrow are movements of the soul, it seems that the
contemplation of truth does not help to assuage sorrow.
Objection 3: Further, the remedy for an ailment should be applied to
the part which ails. But contemplation of truth is in the intellect.
Therefore it does not assuage bodily pain, which is in the senses.
On the contrary, Augustine says (Soliloq. i, 12): "It seemed to me that
if the light of that truth were to dawn on our minds, either I should
not feel that pain, or at least that pain would seem nothing to me. "
I answer that, As stated above (Q[3], A[5]), the greatest of all
pleasures consists in the contemplation of truth. Now every pleasure
assuages pain as stated above [1332](A[1]): hence the contemplation of
truth assuages pain or sorrow, and the more so, the more perfectly one
is a lover of wisdom. And therefore in the midst of tribulations men
rejoice in the contemplation of Divine things and of future Happiness,
according to James 1:2: "My brethren, count it all joy, when you shall
fall into divers temptations": and, what is more, even in the midst of
bodily tortures this joy is found; as the "martyr Tiburtius, when he
was walking barefoot on the burning coals, said: Methinks, I walk on
roses, in the name of Jesus Christ. " [*Cf. Dominican Breviary, August
11th, commemoration of St. Tiburtius. ]
Reply to Objection 1: "He that addeth knowledge, addeth sorrow," either
on account of the difficulty and disappointment in the search for
truth; or because knowledge makes man acquainted with many things that
are contrary to his will. Accordingly, on the part of the things known,
knowledge causes sorrow: but on the part of the contemplation of truth,
it causes pleasure.
Reply to Objection 2: The speculative intellect does not move the mind
on the part of the thing contemplated: but on the part of contemplation
itself, which is man's good and naturally pleasant to him.
Reply to Objection 3: In the powers of the soul there is an overflow
from the higher to the lower powers: and accordingly, the pleasure of
contemplation, which is in the higher part, overflows so as to mitigate
even that pain which is in the senses.
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Whether pain and sorrow are assuaged by sleep and baths?
Objection 1: It would seem that sleep and baths do not assuage sorrow.
For sorrow is in the soul: whereas sleep and baths regard the body.
Therefore they do not conduce to the assuaging of sorrow.
Objection 2: Further, the same effect does not seem to ensue from
contrary causes. But these, being bodily things, are incompatible with
the contemplation of truth which is a cause of the assuaging of sorrow,
as stated above [1333](A[4]). Therefore sorrow is not mitigated by the
like.
Objection 3: Further, sorrow and pain, in so far as they affect the
body, denote a certain transmutation of the heart. But such remedies as
these seem to pertain to the outward senses and limbs, rather than to
the interior disposition of the heart. Therefore they do not assuage
sorrow.
On the contrary, Augustine says (Confess. ix, 12): "I had heard that
the bath had its name [*Balneum, from the Greek {balaneion}] . . . from
the fact of its driving sadness from the mind. " And further on, he
says: "I slept, and woke up again, and found my grief not a little
assuaged": and quotes the words from the hymn of Ambrose [*Cf. Sarum
Breviary: First Sunday after the octave of the Epiphany, Hymn for first
Vespers], in which it is said that "Sleep restores the tired limbs to
labor, refreshes the weary mind, and banishes sorrow. "
I answer that, As stated above ([1334]Q[37], A[4]), sorrow, by reason
of its specific nature, is repugnant to the vital movement of the body;
and consequently whatever restores the bodily nature to its due state
of vital movement, is opposed to sorrow and assuages it. Moreover such
remedies, from the very fact that they bring nature back to its normal
state, are causes of pleasure; for this is precisely in what pleasure
consists, as stated above ([1335]Q[31], A[1]). Therefore, since every
pleasure assuages sorrow, sorrow is assuaged by such like bodily
remedies.
Reply to Objection 1: The normal disposition of the body, so far as it
is felt, is itself a cause of pleasure, and consequently assuages
sorrow.
Reply to Objection 2: As stated above ([1336]Q[31], A[8]), one pleasure
hinders another; and yet every pleasure assuages sorrow. Consequently
it is not unreasonable that sorrow should be assuaged by causes which
hinder one another.
Reply to Objection 3: Every good disposition of the body reacts
somewhat on the heart, which is the beginning and end of bodily
movements, as stated in De Causa Mot.
especially is said to deprive one of speech is because of all the
external movements the voice is the best expression of the inward
thought and desire, not only in men, but also in other animals, as is
stated in Polit. i, 1.
Reply to Objection 1: Pleasure is caused by good, which has only one
meaning: and so pleasure is not divided into several species as sorrow
is; for the latter is caused by evil, which "happens in many ways," as
Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv).
Reply to Objection 2: Repentance is for one's own evil, which is the
proper object of sorrow: wherefore it does not belong to these species.
Jealousy and indignation are included in envy, as we shall explain
later ([1310]SS, Q[36], A[2]).
Reply to Objection 3: This division is not according to opposite
species; but according to the diversity of foreign matter to which the
notion of sorrow is applied, as stated above.
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OF THE CAUSES OF SORROW OR PAIN (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider the causes of sorrow: under which head there are
four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether sorrow is caused by the loss of a good or rather by the
presence of an evil?
(2) Whether desire is a cause of sorrow?
(3) Whether the craving for unity is a cause of sorrow?
(4) Whether an irresistible power is a cause of sorrow?
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Whether sorrow is caused by the loss of good or by the presence of evil?
Objection 1: It would seem that sorrow is caused by the loss of a good
rather than by the presence of an evil. For Augustine says (De viii QQ.
Dulcit. qu. 1) that sorrow is caused by the loss of temporal goods.
Therefore, in like manner, every sorrow is caused by the loss of some
good.
Objection 2: Further, it was said above ([1311]Q[35], A[4]) that the
sorrow which is contrary to a pleasure, has the same object as that
pleasure. But the object of pleasure is good, as stated above
([1312]Q[23], A[4];[1313] Q[31], A[1];[1314] Q[35], A[3]). Therefore
sorrow is caused chiefly by the loss of good.
Objection 3: Further, according to Augustine (De Civ. Dei xiv, 7,9),
love is the cause of sorrow, as of the other emotions of the soul. But
the object of love is good. Therefore pain or sorrow is felt for the
loss of good rather than for an evil that is present.
On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 12) that "the
dreaded evil gives rise to fear, the present evil is the cause of
sorrow. "
I answer that, If privations, as considered by the mind, were what they
are in reality, this question would seem to be of no importance. For,
as stated in the [1315]FP, Q[14], A[10] and [1316]FP, Q[48], A[3], evil
is the privation of good: and privation is in reality nothing else than
the lack of the contrary habit; so that, in this respect, to sorrow for
the loss of good, would be the same as to sorrow for the presence of
evil. But sorrow is a movement of the appetite in consequence of an
apprehension: and even a privation, as apprehended, has the aspect of a
being, wherefore it is called "a being of reason. " And in this way
evil, being a privation, is regarded as a "contrary. " Accordingly, so
far as the movement of the appetite is concerned, it makes a difference
which of the two it regards chiefly, the present evil or the good which
is lost.
Again, since the movement of the animal appetite holds the same place
in the actions of the soul, as natural movement in natural things; the
truth of the matter is to be found by considering natural movements.
For if, in natural movements, we observe those of approach and
withdrawal, approach is of itself directed to something suitable to
nature; while withdrawal is of itself directed to something contrary to
nature; thus a heavy body, of itself, withdraws from a higher place,
and approaches naturally to a lower place. But if we consider the cause
of both these movements, viz. gravity, then gravity itself inclines
towards the lower place more than it withdraws from the higher place,
since withdrawal from the latter is the reason for its downward
tendency.
Accordingly, since, in the movements of the appetite, sorrow is a kind
of flight or withdrawal, while pleasure is a kind of pursuit or
approach; just as pleasure regards first the good possessed, as its
proper object, so sorrow regards the evil that is present. On the other
hand love, which is the cause of pleasure and sorrow, regards good
rather than evil: and therefore, forasmuch as the object is the cause
of a passion, the present evil is more properly the cause of sorrow or
pain, than the good which is lost.
Reply to Objection 1: The loss itself of good is apprehended as an
evil, just as the loss of evil is apprehended as a good: and in this
sense Augustine says that pain results from the loss of temporal goods.
Reply to Objection 2: Pleasure and its contrary pain have the same
object, but under contrary aspects: because if the presence of a
particular thin be the object of pleasure, the absence of that same
thing is the object of sorrow. Now one contrary includes the privation
of the other, as stated in Metaph. x, 4: and consequently sorrow in
respect of one contrary is, in a way, directed to the same thing under
a contrary aspect.
Reply to Objection 3: When many movements arise from one cause, it does
not follow that they all regard chiefly that which the cause regards
chiefly, but only the first of them. And each of the others regards
chiefly that which is suitable to it according to its own nature.
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Whether desire is a cause of sorrow?
Objection 1: It would seem that desire is not a cause of pain or
sorrow. Because sorrow of itself regards evil, as stated above
[1317](A[1]): whereas desire is a movement of the appetite towards
good. Now movement towards one contrary is not a cause of movement
towards the other contrary. Therefore desire is not a cause of pain.
Objection 2: Further, pain, according to Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii,
12), is caused by something present; whereas the object of desire is
something future. Therefore desire is not a cause of pain.
Objection 3: Further, that which is pleasant in itself is not a cause
of pain. But desire is pleasant in itself, as the Philosopher says
(Rhet. i, 11). Therefore desire is not a cause of pain or sorrow.
On the contrary, Augustine says (Enchiridion xxiv): "When ignorance of
things necessary to be done, and desire of things hurtful, found their
way in: error and pain stole an entrance in their company. " But
ignorance is the cause of error. Therefore desire is a cause of sorrow.
I answer that, Sorrow is a movement of the animal appetite. Now, as
stated above [1318](A[1]), the appetitive movement is likened to the
natural appetite; a likeness, that may be assigned to a twofold cause;
one, on the part of the end, the other, on the part of the principle of
movement. Thus, on the part of the end, the cause of a heavy body's
downward movement is the lower place; while the principle of that
movement is a natural inclination resulting from gravity.
Now the cause of the appetitive movement, on the part of the end, is
the object of that movement. And thus, it has been said above
[1319](A[1]) that the cause of pain or sorrow is a present evil. On the
other hand, the cause, by way or principle, of that movement, is the
inward inclination of the appetite; which inclination regards, first of
all, the good, and in consequence, the rejection of a contrary evil.
Hence the first principle of this appetitive movement is love, which is
the first inclination of the appetite towards the possession of good:
while the second principle is hatred, which is the first inclination of
the appetite towards the avoidance of evil. But since concupiscence or
desire is the first effect of love, which gives rise to the greatest
pleasure, as stated above (Q[32], A[6]); hence it is that Augustine
often speaks of desire or concupiscence in the sense of love, as was
also stated (Q[30], A[2], ad 2): and in this sense he says that desire
is the universal cause of sorrow. Sometimes, however, desire taken in
its proper sense, is the cause of sorrow. Because whatever hinders a
movement from reaching its end is contrary to that movement. Now that
which is contrary to the movement of the appetite, is a cause of
sorrow. Consequently, desire becomes a cause of sorrow, in so far as we
sorrow for the delay of a desired good, or for its entire removal. But
it cannot be a universal cause of sorrow: since we sorrow more for the
loss of present good, in which we have already taken pleasure, than for
the withdrawal of future good which we desire to have.
Reply to Objection 1: The inclination of the appetite to the possession
of good causes the inclination of the appetite to fly from evil, as
stated above. And hence it is that the appetitive movements that regard
good, are reckoned as causing the appetitive movements that regard
evil.
Reply to Objection 2: That which is desired, though really future, is,
nevertheless, in a way, present, inasmuch as it is hoped for. Or we may
say that although the desired good itself is future, yet the hindrance
is reckoned as present, and so gives rise to sorrow.
Reply to Objection 3: Desire gives pleasure, so long as there is hope
of obtaining that which is desired. But, when hope is removed through
the presence of an obstacle, desire causes sorrow.
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Whether the craving for unity is a cause of sorrow?
Objection 1: It would seem that the craving for unity is not a cause of
sorrow. For the Philosopher says (Ethic. x, 3) that "this opinion,"
which held repletion to be the cause of pleasure, and division
[*Aristotle wrote {endeian}, 'want'; St. Thomas, in the Latin version,
read 'incisionem'; should he have read 'indigentiam'? ], the cause of
sorrow, "seems to have originated in pains and pleasures connected with
food. " But not every pleasure or sorrow is of this kind. Therefore the
craving for unity is not the universal cause of sorrow; since repletion
pertains to unity, and division is the cause of multitude.
Objection 2: Further, every separation is opposed to unity. If
therefore sorrow were caused by a craving for unity, no separation
would be pleasant: and this is clearly untrue as regards the separation
of whatever is superfluous.
Objection 3: Further, for the same reason we desire the conjunction of
good and the removal of evil. But as conjunction regards unity, since
it is a kind of union; so separation is contrary to unity. Therefore
the craving for unity should not be reckoned, rather than the craving
for separation, as causing sorrow.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. iii, 23), that "from the
pain that dumb animals feel, it is quite evident how their souls desire
unity, in ruling and quickening their bodies. For what else is pain but
a feeling of impatience of division or corruption? "
I answer that, Forasmuch as the desire or craving for good is reckoned
as a cause of sorrow, so must a craving for unity, and love, be
accounted as causing sorrow. Because the good of each thing consists in
a certain unity, inasmuch as each thing has, united in itself, the
elements of which its perfection consists: wherefore the Platonists
held that "one" is a principle, just as "good" is. Hence everything
naturally desires unity, just as it desires goodness: and therefore,
just as love or desire for good is a cause of sorrow, so also is the
love or craving for unity.
Reply to Objection 1: Not every kind of union causes perfect goodness,
but only that on which the perfect being of a thing depends. Hence
neither does the desire of any kind of unity cause pain or sorrow, as
some have maintained: whose opinion is refuted by the Philosopher from
the fact that repletion is not always pleasant; for instance, when a
man has eaten to repletion, he takes no further pleasure in eating;
because repletion or union of this kind, is repugnant rather than
conducive to perfect being. Consequently sorrow is caused by the
craving, not for any kind of unity, but for that unity in which the
perfection of nature consists.
Reply to Objection 2: Separation can be pleasant, either because it
removes something contrary to a thing's perfection, or because it has
some union connected with it, such as union of the sense to its object.
Reply to Objection 3: Separation from things hurtful and corruptive is
desired, in so far as they destroy the unity which is due. Wherefore
the desire for such like separation is not the first cause of sorrow,
whereas the craving for unity is.
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Whether an irresistible power is a cause of sorrow?
Objection 1: It would seem that a greater power should not be reckoned
a cause of sorrow. For that which is in the power of the agent is not
present but future. But sorrow is for present evil. Therefore a greater
power is not a cause of sorrow.
Objection 2: Further, hurt inflicted is the cause of sorrow. But hurt
can be inflicted even by a lesser power. Therefore a greater power
should not be reckoned as a cause of sorrow.
Objection 3: Further, the interior inclinations of the soul are the
causes of the movements of appetite. But a greater power is something
external. Therefore it should not be reckoned as a cause of sorrow.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Nat. Boni xx): "Sorrow in the soul
is caused by the will resisting a stronger power: while pain in the
body is caused by sense resisting a stronger body. "
I answer that, As stated above [1320](A[1]), a present evil, is cause
of sorrow or pain, by way of object. Therefore that which is the cause
of the evil being present, should be reckoned as causing pain or
sorrow. Now it is evident that it is contrary to the inclination of the
appetite to be united with a present evil: and whatever is contrary to
a thing's inclination does not happen to it save by the action of
something stronger. Wherefore Augustine reckons a greater power as
being the cause of sorrow.
But it must be noted that if the stronger power goes so far as to
transform the contrary inclination into its own inclination there will
be no longer repugnance or violence: thus if a stronger agent, by its
action on a heavy body, deprives it of its downward tendency, its
consequent upward tendency is not violent but natural to it.
Accordingly if some greater power prevail so far as to take away from
the will or the sensitive appetite, their respective inclinations, pain
or sorrow will not result therefrom; such is the result only when the
contrary inclination of the appetite remains. And hence Augustine says
(De Nat. Boni xx) that sorrow is caused by the will "resisting a
stronger power": for were it not to resist, but to yield by consenting,
the result would be not sorrow but pleasure.
Reply to Objection 1: A greater power causes sorrow, as acting not
potentially but actually, i. e. by causing the actual presence of the
corruptive evil.
Reply to Objection 2: Nothing hinders a power which is not simply
greater, from being greater in some respect: and accordingly it is able
to inflict some harm. But if it be nowise stronger, it can do no harm
at all: wherefore it cannot bring about that which causes sorrow.
Reply to Objection 3: External agents can be the causes of appetitive
movements, in so far as they cause the presence of the object: and it
is thus that a greater power is reckoned to be the cause of sorrow.
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OF THE EFFECTS OF PAIN OR SORROW (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider the effects of pain or of sorrow: under which head
there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether pain deprives one of the power to learn?
(2) Whether the effect of sorrow or pain is to burden the soul?
(3) Whether sorrow or pain weakens all activity?
(4) Whether sorrow is more harmful to the body than all the other
passions of the soul?
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Whether pain deprives one of the power to learn?
Objection 1: It would seem that pain does not deprive one of the power
to learn. For it is written (Is. 26:9): "When Thou shalt do Thy
judgments on the earth, the inhabitants of the world shall learn
justice": and further on (verse 16): "In the tribulation of murmuring
Thy instruction was with them. " But the judgments of God and
tribulation cause sorrow in men's hearts. Therefore pain or sorrow, far
from destroying, increases the power of learning.
Objection 2: Further, it is written (Is. 28:9): "Whom shall He teach
knowledge? And whom shall He make to understand the hearing? Them that
are weaned from the milk, that are drawn away from the breasts," i. e.
from pleasures. But pain and sorrow are most destructive of pleasure;
since sorrow hinders all pleasure, as stated in Ethic. vii, 14: and
(Ecclus. 11:29) it is stated that "the affliction of an hour maketh one
forget great delights. " Therefore pain, instead of taking away,
increases the faculty of learning.
Objection 3: Further, inward sorrow surpasses outward pain, as stated
above ([1321]Q[35], A[7]). But man can learn while sorrowful. Much
more, therefore, can he learn while in bodily pain.
On the contrary, Augustine says (Soliloq. i, 12): "Although during
those days I was tormented with a violent tooth-ache, I was not able to
turn over in my mind other things than those I had already learnt; and
as to learning anything, I was quite unequal to it, because it required
undivided attention. "
I answer that, Since all the powers of the soul are rooted in the one
essence of the soul, it must needs happen, when the intention of the
soul is strongly drawn towards the action of one power, that it is
withdrawn from the action of another power: because the soul, being
one, can only have one intention. The result is that if one thing draws
upon itself the entire intention of the soul, or a great portion
thereof, anything else requiring considerable attention is incompatible
therewith.
Now it is evident that sensible pain above all draws the soul's
attention to itself; because it is natural for each thing to tend
wholly to repel whatever is contrary to it, as may be observed even in
natural things. It is likewise evident that in order to learn anything
new, we require study and effort with a strong intention, as is clearly
stated in Prov. 2:4,5: "If thou shalt seek wisdom as money, and shall
dig for her as for a treasure, then shalt thou understand learning"
[Vulg: 'the fear of the Lord']. Consequently if the pain be acute, man
is prevented at the time from learning anything: indeed it can be so
acute, that, as long as it lasts, a man is unable to give his attention
even to that which he knew already. However a difference is to be
observed according to the difference of love that a man has for
learning or for considering: because the greater his love, the more
will he retain the intention of his mind so as to prevent it from
turning entirely to the pain.
Reply to Objection 1: Moderate sorrow, that does not cause the mind to
wander, can conduce to the acquisition of learning especially in regard
to those things by which a man hopes to be freed from sorrow. And thus,
"in the tribulation of murmuring," men are more apt to be taught by
God.
Reply to Objection 2: Both pleasure and pain, in so far as they draw
upon themselves the soul's intention, hinder the reason from the act of
consideration, wherefore it is stated in Ethic. vii, 11 that "in the
moment of sexual pleasure, a man cannot understand anything. "
Nevertheless pain attracts the soul's intention more than pleasure
does: thus we observe in natural things that the action of a natural
body is more intense in regard to its contrary; for instance, hot water
is more accessible to the action of cold, and in consequence freezes
harder. If therefore pain or sorrow be moderate, it can conduce
accidentally to the facility of learning, in so far as it takes away an
excess of pleasure. But, of itself, it is a hindrance; and if it be
intense, it prevents it altogether.
Reply to Objection 3: External pain arises from hurt done to the body,
so that it involves bodily transmutation more than inward sorrow does:
and yet the latter is greater in regard to the formal element of pain,
which belongs to the soul. Consequently bodily pain is a greater
hindrance to contemplation which requires complete repose, than inward
sorrow is. Nevertheless if inward sorrow be very intense, it attracts
the intention, so that man is unable to learn anything for the first
time: wherefore on account of sorrow Gregory interrupted his commentary
on Ezechiel (Hom. xxii in Ezechiel).
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Whether the effect of sorrow or pain is to burden the soul?
Objection 1: It would seem that it is not an effect of sorrow to burden
the soul. For the Apostle says (2 Cor. 7:11): "Behold this self-same
thing, that you were made sorrowful according to God, how great
carefulness it worketh in you: yea, defence, yea indignation," etc. Now
carefulness and indignation imply that the soul is uplifted, which is
contrary to being depressed. Therefore depression is not an effect of
sorrow.
Objection 2: Further, sorrow is contrary to pleasure. But the effect of
pleasure is expansion: the opposite of which is not depression but
contraction. Therefore depression should not be reckoned as an effect
of sorrow.
Objection 3: Further, sorrow consumes those who are inflicted
therewith, as may be gathered from the words of the Apostle (2 Cor.
2:7): "Lest perhaps such an one be swallowed up with overmuch sorrow. "
But that which is depressed is not consumed; nay, it is weighed down by
something heavy, whereas that which is consumed enters within the
consumer. Therefore depression should not be reckoned an effect of
sorrow.
On the contrary, Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xix. ] and
Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 14) speak of "depressing sorrow. "
I answer that, The effects of the soul's passions are sometimes named
metaphorically, from a likeness to sensible bodies: for the reason that
the movements of the animal appetite are like the inclinations of the
natural appetite. And in this way fervor is ascribed to love, expansion
to pleasure, and depression to sorrow. For a man is said to be
depressed, through being hindered in his own movement by some weight.
Now it is evident from what has been said above ([1322]Q[23],
A[4];[1323] Q[25], A[4];[1324] Q[36], A[1]) that sorrow is caused by a
present evil: and this evil, from the very fact that it is repugnant to
the movement of the will, depresses the soul, inasmuch as it hinders it
from enjoying that which it wishes to enjoy. And if the evil which is
the cause of sorrow be not so strong as to deprive one of the hope of
avoiding it, although the soul be depressed in so far as, for the
present, it fails to grasp that which it craves for; yet it retains the
movement whereby to repulse that evil. If, on the other hand, the
strength of the evil be such as to exclude the hope of evasion, then
even the interior movement of the afflicted soul is absolutely
hindered, so that it cannot turn aside either this way or that.
Sometimes even the external movement of the body is paralyzed, so that
a man becomes completely stupefied.
Reply to Objection 1: That uplifting of the soul ensues from the sorrow
which is according to God, because it brings with it the hope of the
forgiveness of sin.
Reply to Objection 2: As far as the movement of the appetite is
concerned, contraction and depression amount to the same: because the
soul, through being depressed so as to be unable to attend freely to
outward things, withdraws to itself, closing itself up as it were.
Reply to Objection 3: Sorrow is said to consume man, when the force of
the afflicting evil is such as to shut out all hope of evasion: and
thus also it both depresses and consumes at the same time. For certain
things, taken metaphorically, imply one another, which taken literally,
appear to exclude one another.
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Whether sorrow or pain weakens all activity?
Objection 1: It would seem that sorrow does not weaken all activity.
Because carefulness is caused by sorrow, as is clear from the passage
of the Apostle quoted above (A[2], OBJ[1]). But carefulness conduces to
good work: wherefore the Apostle says (2 Tim. 2:15): "Carefully study
to present thyself . . . a workman that needeth not to be ashamed. "
Therefore sorrow is not a hindrance to work, but helps one to work
well.
Objection 2: Further, sorrow causes desire in many cases, as stated in
Ethic. vii, 14. But desire causes intensity of action. Therefore sorrow
does too.
Objection 3: Further, as some actions are proper to the joyful, so are
others proper to the sorrowful; for instance, to mourn. Now a thing is
improved by that which is suitable to it. Therefore certain actions are
not hindered but improved by reason of sorrow.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. x, 4) that "pleasure
perfects action," whereas on the other hand, "sorrow hinders it"
(Ethic. x, 5).
I answer that, As stated above [1325](A[2]), sorrow at times does not
depress or consume the soul, so as to shut out all movement, internal
or external; but certain movements are sometimes caused by sorrow
itself. Accordingly action stands in a twofold relation to sorrow.
First, as being the object of sorrow: and thus sorrow hinders any
action: for we never do that which we do with sorrow, so well as that
which we do with pleasure, or without sorrow. The reason for this is
that the will is the cause of human actions: and consequently when we
do something that gives pain, the action must of necessity be weakened
in consequence. Secondly, action stands in relation to sorrow, as to
its principle and cause: and such action must needs be improved by
sorrow: thus the more one sorrows on account of a certain thing, the
more one strives to shake off sorrow, provided there is a hope of
shaking it off: otherwise no movement or action would result from that
sorrow.
From what has been said the replies to the objections are evident.
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Whether sorrow is more harmful to the body than the other passions of the
soul?
Objection 1: It would seem that sorrow is not most harmful to the body.
For sorrow has a spiritual existence in the soul. But those things
which have only a spiritual existence do not cause a transmutation in
the body: as is evident with regard to the images of colors, which
images are in the air and do not give color to bodies. Therefore sorrow
is not harmful to the body.
Objection 2: Further if it be harmful to the body, this can only be due
to its having a bodily transmutation in conjunction with it. But bodily
transmutation takes place in all the passions of the soul, as stated
above ([1326]Q[22], AA[1],3). Therefore sorrow is not more harmful to
the body than the other passions of the soul.
Objection 3: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 3) that "anger
and desire drive some to madness": which seems to be a very great harm,
since reason is the most excellent thing in man. Moreover, despair
seems to be more harmful than sorrow; for it is the cause of sorrow.
Therefore sorrow is not more harmful to the body than the other
passions of the soul.
On the contrary, It is written (Prov. 17:22): "A joyful mind maketh age
flourishing: a sorrowful spirit drieth up the bones": and (Prov.
25:20): "As a moth doth by a garment, and a worm by the wood: so the
sadness of a man consumeth the heart": and (Ecclus. 38:19): "Of sadness
cometh death. "
I answer that, Of all the soul's passions, sorrow is most harmful to
the body. The reason of this is because sorrow is repugnant to man's
life in respect of the species of its movement, and not merely in
respect of its measure or quantity, as is the case with the other
passions of the soul. For man's life consists in a certain movement,
which flows from the heart to the other parts of the body: and this
movement is befitting to human nature according to a certain fixed
measure. Consequently if this movement goes beyond the right measure,
it will be repugnant to man's life in respect of the measure of
quantity; but not in respect of its specific character: whereas if this
movement be hindered in its progress, it will be repugnant to life in
respect of its species.
Now it must be noted that, in all the passions of the soul, the bodily
transmutation which is their material element, is in conformity with
and in proportion to the appetitive movement, which is the formal
element: just as in everything matter is proportionate to form.
Consequently those passions that imply a movement of the appetite in
pursuit of something, are not repugnant to the vital movement as
regards its species, but they may be repugnant thereto as regards its
measure: such are love, joy, desire and the like; wherefore these
passions conduce to the well-being of the body; though, if they be
excessive, they may be harmful to it. On the other hand, those passions
which denote in the appetite a movement of flight or contraction, are
repugnant to the vital movement, not only as regards its measure, but
also as regards its species; wherefore they are simply harmful: such
are fear and despair, and above all sorrow which depresses the soul by
reason of a present evil, which makes a stronger impression than future
evil.
Reply to Objection 1: Since the soul naturally moves the body, the
spiritual movement of the soul is naturally the cause of bodily
transmutation. Nor is there any parallel with spiritual images, because
they are not naturally ordained to move such other bodies as are not
naturally moved by the soul.
Reply to Objection 2: Other passions imply a bodily transmutation which
is specifically in conformity with the vital movement: whereas sorrow
implies a transmutation that is repugnant thereto, as stated above.
Reply to Objection 3: A lesser cause suffices to hinder the use of
reason, than to destroy life: since we observe that many ailments
deprive one of the use of reason, before depriving one of life.
Nevertheless fear and anger cause very great harm to the body, by
reason of the sorrow which they imply, and which arises from the
absence of the thing desired. Moreover sorrow too sometimes deprives
man of the use of reason: as may be seen in those who through sorrow
become a prey to melancholy or madness.
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OF THE REMEDIES OF SORROW OR PAIN (FIVE ARTICLES)
We must now consider the remedies of pain or sorrow: under which head
there are five points of inquiry:
(1) Whether pain or sorrow is assuaged by every pleasure?
(2) Whether it is assuaged by weeping?
(3) Whether it is assuaged by the sympathy of friends?
(4) Whether it is assuaged by contemplating the truth?
(5) Whether it is assuaged by sleep and baths?
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Whether pain or sorrow is assuaged by every pleasure?
Objection 1: It would seem that not every pleasure assuages every pain
or sorrow. For pleasure does not assuage sorrow, save in so far as it
is contrary to it: for "remedies work by contraries" (Ethic. ii, 3).
But not every pleasure is contrary to every sorrow; as stated above
([1327]Q[35], A[4] ). Therefore not every pleasure assuages every
sorrow.
Objection 2: Further, that which causes sorrow does not assuage it. But
some pleasures cause sorrow; since, as stated in Ethic. ix, 4, "the
wicked man feels pain at having been pleased. " Therefore not every
pleasure assuages sorrow.
Objection 3: Further, Augustine says (Confess. iv, 7) that he fled from
his country, where he had been wont to associate with his friend, now
dead: "for so should his eyes look for him less, where they were not
wont to see him. " Hence we may gather that those things which united us
to our dead or absent friends, become burdensome to us when we mourn
their death or absence. But nothing united us more than the pleasures
we enjoyed in common. Therefore these very pleasures become burdensome
to us when we mourn. Therefore not every pleasure assuages every
sorrow.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 14) that "sorrow is
driven forth by pleasure, both by a contrary pleasure and by any other,
provided it be intense. "
I answer that, As is evident from what has been said above
([1328]Q[23], A[4] ), pleasure is a kind of repose of the appetite in a
suitable good; while sorrow arises from something unsuited to the
appetite. Consequently in movements of the appetite pleasure is to
sorrow, what, in bodies, repose is to weariness, which is due to a
non-natural transmutation; for sorrow itself implies a certain
weariness or ailing of the appetitive faculty. Therefore just as all
repose of the body brings relief to any kind of weariness, ensuing from
any non-natural cause; so every pleasure brings relief by assuaging any
kind of sorrow, due to any cause whatever.
Reply to Objection 1: Although not every pleasure is specifically
contrary to every sorrow, yet it is generically, as stated above
([1329]Q[35], A[4]). And consequently, on the part of the disposition
of the subject, any sorrow can be assuaged by any pleasure.
Reply to Objection 2: The pleasures of wicked men are not a cause of
sorrow while they are enjoyed, but afterwards: that is to say, in so
far as wicked men repent of those things in which they took pleasure.
This sorrow is healed by contrary pleasures.
Reply to Objection 3: When there are two causes inclining to contrary
movements, each hinders the other; yet the one which is stronger and
more persistent, prevails in the end. Now when a man is made sorrowful
by those things in which he took pleasure in common with a deceased or
absent friend, there are two causes producing contrary movements. For
the thought of the friend's death or absence, inclines him to sorrow:
whereas the present good inclines him to pleasure. Consequently each is
modified by the other. And yet, since the perception of the present
moves more strongly than the memory of the past, and since love of self
is more persistent than love of another; hence it is that, in the end,
the pleasure drives out the sorrow. Wherefore a little further on
(Confess. iv, 8) Augustine says that his "sorrow gave way to his former
pleasures. "
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Whether pain or sorrow is assuaged by tears?
Objection 1: It would seem that tears do not assuage sorrow. Because no
effect diminishes its cause. But tears or groans are an effect of
sorrow. Therefore they do not diminish sorrow.
Objection 2: Further, just as tears or groans are an effect of sorrow,
so laughter is an effect of joy. But laughter does not lessen joy.
Therefore tears do not lessen sorrow.
Objection 3: Further, when we weep, the evil that saddens us is present
to the imagination. But the image of that which saddens us increases
sorrow, just as the image of a pleasant thing adds to joy. Therefore it
seems that tears do not assuage sorrow.
On the contrary, Augustine says (Confess. iv, 7) that when he mourned
the death of his friend, "in groans and in tears alone did he find some
little refreshment. "
I answer that, Tears and groans naturally assuage sorrow: and this for
two reasons. First, because a hurtful thing hurts yet more if we keep
it shut up, because the soul is more intent on it: whereas if it be
allowed to escape, the soul's intention is dispersed as it were on
outward things, so that the inward sorrow is lessened. This is why men,
burdened with sorrow, make outward show of their sorrow, by tears or
groans or even by words, their sorrow is assuaged. Secondly, because an
action, that befits a man according to his actual disposition, is
always pleasant to him. Now tears and groans are actions befitting a
man who is in sorrow or pain; and consequently they become pleasant to
him. Since then, as stated above [1330](A[1]), every pleasure assuages
sorrow or pain somewhat, it follows that sorrow is assuaged by weeping
and groans.
Reply to Objection 1: This relation of the cause to effect is opposed
to the relation existing between the cause of sorrow and the sorrowing
man. For every effect is suited to its cause, and consequently is
pleasant to it; but the cause of sorrow is disagreeable to him that
sorrows. Hence the effect of sorrow is not related to him that sorrows
in the same way as the cause of sorrow is. For this reason sorrow is
assuaged by its effect, on account of the aforesaid contrariety.
Reply to Objection 2: The relation of effect to cause is like the
relation of the object of pleasure to him that takes pleasure in it:
because in each case the one agrees with the other. Now every like
thing increases its like. Therefore joy is increased by laughter and
the other effects of joy: except they be excessive, in which case,
accidentally, they lessen it.
Reply to Objection 3: The image of that which saddens us, considered in
itself, has a natural tendency to increase sorrow: yet from the very
fact that a man imagines himself to be doing that which is fitting
according to his actual state, he feels a certain amount of pleasure.
For the same reason if laughter escapes a man when he is so disposed
that he thinks he ought to weep, he is sorry for it, as having done
something unbecoming to him, as Cicero says (De Tusc. Quaest. iii, 27).
__________________________________________________________________
Whether pain or sorrow are assuaged by the sympathy of friends?
Objection 1: It would seem that the sorrow of sympathizing friends does
not assuage our own sorrow. For contraries have contrary effects. Now
as Augustine says (Confess. viii, 4), "when many rejoice together, each
one has more exuberant joy, for they are kindled and inflamed one by
the other. " Therefore, in like manner, when many are sorrowful, it
seems that their sorrow is greater.
Objection 2: Further, friendship demands mutual love, as Augustine
declares (Confess. iv, 9). But a sympathizing friend is pained at the
sorrow of his friend with whom he sympathizes. Consequently the pain of
a sympathizing friend becomes, to the friend in sorrow, a further cause
of sorrow: so that, his pain being doubled his sorrow seems to
increase.
Objection 3: Further, sorrow arises from every evil affecting a friend,
as though it affected oneself: since "a friend is one's other self"
(Ethic. ix, 4,9). But sorrow is an evil. Therefore the sorrow of the
sympathizing friend increases the sorrow of the friend with whom he
sympathizes.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. ix, 11) that those who
are in pain are consoled when their friends sympathize with them.
I answer that, When one is in pain, it is natural that the sympathy of
a friend should afford consolation: whereof the Philosopher indicates a
twofold reason (Ethic. ix, 11). The first is because, since sorrow has
a depressing effect, it is like a weight whereof we strive to unburden
ourselves: so that when a man sees others saddened by his own sorrow,
it seems as though others were bearing the burden with him, striving,
as it were, to lessen its weight; wherefore the load of sorrow becomes
lighter for him: something like what occurs in the carrying of bodily
burdens. The second and better reason is because when a man's friends
condole with him, he sees that he is loved by them, and this affords
him pleasure, as stated above (Q[32], A[5]). Consequently, since every
pleasure assuages sorrow, as stated above [1331](A[1]), it follows that
sorrow is mitigated by a sympathizing friend.
Reply to Objection 1: In either case there is a proof of friendship,
viz. when a man rejoices with the joyful, and when he sorrows with the
sorrowful. Consequently each becomes an object of pleasure by reason of
its cause.
Reply to Objection 2: The friend's sorrow itself would be a cause of
sorrow: but consideration of its cause, viz. his love, gives rise
rather to pleasure.
And this suffices for the reply to the Third Objection.
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Whether pain and sorrow are assuaged by the contemplation of truth?
Objection 1: It would seem that the contemplation of truth does not
assuage sorrow. For it is written (Eccles. 1:18): "He that addeth
knowledge addeth also sorrow" [Vulg. : 'labor']. But knowledge pertains
to the contemplation of truth. Therefore the contemplation of truth
does not assuage sorrow.
Objection 2: Further, the contemplation of truth belongs to the
speculative intellect. But "the speculative intellect is not a
principle of movement"; as stated in De Anima iii, 11. Therefore, since
joy and sorrow are movements of the soul, it seems that the
contemplation of truth does not help to assuage sorrow.
Objection 3: Further, the remedy for an ailment should be applied to
the part which ails. But contemplation of truth is in the intellect.
Therefore it does not assuage bodily pain, which is in the senses.
On the contrary, Augustine says (Soliloq. i, 12): "It seemed to me that
if the light of that truth were to dawn on our minds, either I should
not feel that pain, or at least that pain would seem nothing to me. "
I answer that, As stated above (Q[3], A[5]), the greatest of all
pleasures consists in the contemplation of truth. Now every pleasure
assuages pain as stated above [1332](A[1]): hence the contemplation of
truth assuages pain or sorrow, and the more so, the more perfectly one
is a lover of wisdom. And therefore in the midst of tribulations men
rejoice in the contemplation of Divine things and of future Happiness,
according to James 1:2: "My brethren, count it all joy, when you shall
fall into divers temptations": and, what is more, even in the midst of
bodily tortures this joy is found; as the "martyr Tiburtius, when he
was walking barefoot on the burning coals, said: Methinks, I walk on
roses, in the name of Jesus Christ. " [*Cf. Dominican Breviary, August
11th, commemoration of St. Tiburtius. ]
Reply to Objection 1: "He that addeth knowledge, addeth sorrow," either
on account of the difficulty and disappointment in the search for
truth; or because knowledge makes man acquainted with many things that
are contrary to his will. Accordingly, on the part of the things known,
knowledge causes sorrow: but on the part of the contemplation of truth,
it causes pleasure.
Reply to Objection 2: The speculative intellect does not move the mind
on the part of the thing contemplated: but on the part of contemplation
itself, which is man's good and naturally pleasant to him.
Reply to Objection 3: In the powers of the soul there is an overflow
from the higher to the lower powers: and accordingly, the pleasure of
contemplation, which is in the higher part, overflows so as to mitigate
even that pain which is in the senses.
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Whether pain and sorrow are assuaged by sleep and baths?
Objection 1: It would seem that sleep and baths do not assuage sorrow.
For sorrow is in the soul: whereas sleep and baths regard the body.
Therefore they do not conduce to the assuaging of sorrow.
Objection 2: Further, the same effect does not seem to ensue from
contrary causes. But these, being bodily things, are incompatible with
the contemplation of truth which is a cause of the assuaging of sorrow,
as stated above [1333](A[4]). Therefore sorrow is not mitigated by the
like.
Objection 3: Further, sorrow and pain, in so far as they affect the
body, denote a certain transmutation of the heart. But such remedies as
these seem to pertain to the outward senses and limbs, rather than to
the interior disposition of the heart. Therefore they do not assuage
sorrow.
On the contrary, Augustine says (Confess. ix, 12): "I had heard that
the bath had its name [*Balneum, from the Greek {balaneion}] . . . from
the fact of its driving sadness from the mind. " And further on, he
says: "I slept, and woke up again, and found my grief not a little
assuaged": and quotes the words from the hymn of Ambrose [*Cf. Sarum
Breviary: First Sunday after the octave of the Epiphany, Hymn for first
Vespers], in which it is said that "Sleep restores the tired limbs to
labor, refreshes the weary mind, and banishes sorrow. "
I answer that, As stated above ([1334]Q[37], A[4]), sorrow, by reason
of its specific nature, is repugnant to the vital movement of the body;
and consequently whatever restores the bodily nature to its due state
of vital movement, is opposed to sorrow and assuages it. Moreover such
remedies, from the very fact that they bring nature back to its normal
state, are causes of pleasure; for this is precisely in what pleasure
consists, as stated above ([1335]Q[31], A[1]). Therefore, since every
pleasure assuages sorrow, sorrow is assuaged by such like bodily
remedies.
Reply to Objection 1: The normal disposition of the body, so far as it
is felt, is itself a cause of pleasure, and consequently assuages
sorrow.
Reply to Objection 2: As stated above ([1336]Q[31], A[8]), one pleasure
hinders another; and yet every pleasure assuages sorrow. Consequently
it is not unreasonable that sorrow should be assuaged by causes which
hinder one another.
Reply to Objection 3: Every good disposition of the body reacts
somewhat on the heart, which is the beginning and end of bodily
movements, as stated in De Causa Mot.
