No More Learning

***
The position of the Vatslputriyas is moreover more inadmissa-
ble since their sect reads a Sutra which says, "The dharmas are not 57
[The Vatslputriyas:] Without doubt we read this Sutra. But the pudgala is neither the dharmas which serve as its support, nor is it different from these dharmas; that is why it says that "no dharma is a soul. "
Very well; but it is taught that the pudgala cannot be discerned
by the mental consciousness, since the Sutra establishes clearly that
the mental consciousness is produced by reason of two condi-
58
tions,
the mental organ (manas) and the dharmas. Besides how
Also, when you embolden yourself to brutally reject them
soul and do not contain a soul. "
would you explain the Sutra which says, "To recognize a soul in
what is not soul is a mistake of ideas, of mind, and of view"?
59
and because
? [The Vatslputriyas:] This Sutra says that it is a mistake to recognize a soul in that which is not a soul; it does not say that it is a mistake to recognize a soul in what is a soul.
What is understood by "that which is not a soul"? Would you
say that it concerns the skandhas, ayatanas and dhatusl This
contradicts your theory that the pudgala is not identical to physical
matter, etc.
60 61
Further, a Sutra says, "Oh Bhiksus, know that all
the Brahmins and monks that contemplate a soul, contemplate
only the five skandhas-of-ztt&chment. " Then this (contemplation)
is not a soul, because the self that one recognizes as a soul is solely
the dharmas that are not a soul but which one falsely imagines to
attachment. " Then there is no pudgala in any of this.
[The Vatslputriyas:] But the same Sutra says, "In the past, I
64
This declaration is for the purpose of indicating that the saint
capable of recollecting his past lives remembers the variety of
characteristics of his series of these existences. But the Buddha
does not mean that he sees a real pudgala possessing, in a past life,
such physical matter, etc. : for to think such is to fall into
satkayadrsti. Or rather, if such is the meaning of this sentence,
65
62 63 be a soul. Another Sutra
says, "All those that have remembered, do remember, or shall remember their various past existences-- their remembrance is solely with regard to the five skandha$-oi-
was handsome (literally: I possessed physical matter)/'
then its sole purpose is to reject it as non-authentic.
that the Sutra, insofar as it attributes the possession of physical matter, etc. , to a soul, has in view "a self of designation", as one speaks of a pile which, being only an accumulation, has no unity; or of a current of water which being only an accumulation, has no unity; or of a current of water which, being only a succession (of
66
***
waters), has no permanence.
[The Vatslputriyas:
67
] The Blessed One would then not be
Refutation of the pudgala 1327
We conclude
? 1328 Chapter Nine
omniscient, since the mind and mental states are not capable of knowing all the dharmas, seeing that mind and mental states change, arising and perishing from moment to moment. Omnis- cience can belong only to a soul, a pudgala.
We would reply that the pudgala would be eternal if it does not
perish when the mind perishes: a thesis which contradicts your
theory of a pudgala about which one can only say that it is eternal
or non-eternal. We do not say (as do the Mahasamghikas) that the
Buddha is omniscient in the sense that he knows all the dharmas at 68
one and the same time: "Buddha** designates a certain series: to
this series there belongs this unique ability that, by a single act of
modulating his mind, he immediately produces an exact conscious-
ness of the object relative to which a desire for knowing has arisen:
one then calls this series "Omniscient. '* One moment of thought is
not capable of knowing everything. On this point, there is a verse:
"As fire, by the capacity of its series, burns all, so too does the
Omniscient One--but not by a universal, simultaneous knowl-
69 edge. "
[The Vatslputrlyas:] How do you prove that (the word "Omniscient"should be understood as a series, and not as a particular self of universal knowledge)?
It is spoken of in the Scriptures, on the subject of the Buddhas of the past, present and future. For example the verse: "Buddhas of the past, Buddhas of the future, and Buddhas of the present destroy
70
the sorrows of many. '* But, in your system, the skandhas of
existence belong to the three periods of time, but not the pudgala. ***
[The Vatslputrlyas:] If the term pudgala only designates the
five skandhas-oi-btt&chment, how can the Blessed One say, "Oh
Bhiksus, I shall explain to you the burden, the taking up of the
burden, the laying down of the burden, and the bearer of the
71 burden. "
? Why may it not be explained in these terms?
[The Vatslputrlyas:] Because, if the pudgala is only a name
given to the skandhas, it cannot be the bearer of a burden. Why not?
Simply because it is unheard of.
Do not speak then of an ineffable pudgala. No one has ever ascertained the existence of an ineffable thing. And moreover you will have to account for the other statements of the Sutra that thirst (or desire) is the taking up of the burden: as thirst is a skandha, the "burden" (is too), and it is unheard of that a burden takes itself up. The "taking up of the burden" is included within the skandhasy and so too the bearer of the burden. These are the skandhas that the Blessed One designated by the name of ''pudgala, the bearer of the burden," as one sees in the explanation given a little farther on in the same Sutra.
After having said that the burden is the five skandhas-oi-2? -
tachment, that the taking up of the burden is thirst, and that the
laying down of the burden is the abandoning of thirst, it is said that
the bearer of the burden is the pudgala; but fearing that one
understands the pudgala inexactly, as an eternal, ineffable, real
entity, he explains, "(It is only to conform to the use of this world
that one says:) This venerable one, of such a name, of such a
gotra," and the rest (as in the Sutra on Man, above), in order that
one might well know that the pudgala is effable, impermanent,
72
and without a unique nature.
The five j^W^y-of-attachment
are painful in their nature: they receive then the name of
"burden"; each of the former moments of the series attract each of
the latter moments: it receives then the name of "bearer of the
73
burden. "
The pudgala is then not an entity.
***
[The Vatslputrlyas:] The pudgala exists [as an entity,] as the
Refutation of the pudgala 1329
? 1330 Chapter Nine
Sutra says, ' T o say that apparitional beings
75 view. "
Who denies the existence of apparitional beings? We admit the existence of these beings in the sense that the Blessed One understands them. For him, "apparitional beings" designates a series of skandhas (the series of five skandhas of an intermediary being), susceptible of going to another world without the intervention of a womb, an egg, or of moisture forms of birth. To negate the existence of an apparitional being so defined, is a false view, because this type of series of skandhas truly exists.
If you maintain that the negation of the pudgala is false, you wil have to say how this false view is given up. It cannot be given up by Seeing, nor by Meditation, for on the one hand, the pudgala is not included within the Truths, and, on the other hand, false
76 views are not given up by Meditation but by Seeing.
***
[The Vatslputrlyas:] But a Sutra says, "A pudgala arises
Now this does not refer to the five
Such is not the meaning of the Sutra that only metaphorically
designates as a unit that which exists only as a complex; as the
world speaks of a grain of hemp, or a grain of rice, or of a heap, or
[The Vatslputrlyas:] When it refers to the pudgala, the word
"to arise" does not have the same meaning as when one speaks of
the skandhas arising. For the skandhas, to arise means to exist
77 skandhas\ but to an entity.
(utpadyate) in this world. . . "
78
pudgala, it is therefore conditioned {samskrta).
a word.
Further, since the Sutra attributes an arising to the
after having been non-existent. One says that the pudgala arises 19
because, at that moment, it takes on different skandhas (for example the manas of a human instead of the manas of an animal). As one says in the world, when a certain person acquires a certain knowledge, that a sacrificer, or a grammarian is born; when a
74
do not exist is a false
? layman takes on certain characteristics, one says that a bhiksu, a monk of a certain sect is born: one does not mean by these expressions that there has really been a birth of a sacrificer, or a monk. And again in the same way, through the acquisition of a certain trait, one says: an old man is born, a sick person comes into being.
This explanation of the phrase, "A pudgala arises in this
world" has been condemned by the Blessed One. In the Paramar-
thasiinyata-siitraTM the Blessed One said, "There is action; there is 81
result; but, besides the causal production of the dharmas (which
give the impression of a permanent agent), one does not maintain
the existence of an agent which abandons these skandhas and 82
which takes up other skandhas" And in the Phalguna-sutra: "I 83
do not say that there has been one who takes. " There is then no pudgala that gives up or takes up the skandhas.
Nevertheless, let us examine your examples: "A sacrificer is born/' What is the nature of that which became a sacrificer? Would you say that a "soul" became a sacrificer? But you have to precisely prove the existence of a "soul. " Would you say that it is a series of minds and mental states? But minds and mental states
84 appear from instant to instant after having been non-existent
and they are not capable of abandoning and grasping. Would you
say that it is the body (the organ of sense)? The same difficulty
holds. Notice then that the knowledge the acquisition of which by
a so-called person makes him a sacrificer, differs from this person:
it would be then, by a legitimate comparison, that the skandhas
acquired by a pudgala differ from the pudgala; and this goes
against your definition of a pudgala. As for the example of an old
man and a sick person, there is a succession of different bodies: to
hold that an old man is the transformation of a young man is the
refuted. Then your examples are without value. And if you say that the skandhas arise, but that the pudgala does not arise, it follows that the latter differs from the skandhas and is eternal. You maintain again that the skandhas are five in number, but that the pudgala is one: this is to again recognize that the pudgala
Samkhya thesis of transformation (parindma), a thesis already 85
Refutation of the pudgala 1331
? 1332 Chapter Nine
differs from the skandhas.
[The Vatslputrlyas:] Your position is totally parallel (to ours), since you say that the primary elements, earth, etc. , are four; but that secondary matter (updddyarupa)--color, for example--is one; but that, nevertheless, secondary matter does not differ from the
86
primary elements.
This objection does not go against us, but only against the
87
teachers who say that secondary matter is the four elements.
to adopt the opinion that you wrongly attribute to us, we say that in the manner that secondary matter is made up of the four elements, in that way the five skandhas constitute the pudgala.
***
[The Vatslputrlyas:] If the pudgala is only a word serving to designate the five skandhas, why did the Buddha not declare that
88 the vital principal (jiva) is the body?
Because the Buddha takes into consideration the intention (asaya) of whomever asks him questions. The person who asks this question of the Buddha understood by jiva, not a being, a simple designation of the skandhas, but a person, a real living entity; and he was thinking of this person when he asked if the jiva is identical to the body or different from the body. Now this jiva does not absolutely exist; and so the Buddha only maintained that it is neither identical to nor different from the body, and then the Blessed One condemned the two answers. In like manner one
89 cannot say that the hairs of a tortoise are hard or soft.
The ancient masters have already explained this difficulty. There was once a venerable one named Nagasena, possessor of the three knowledges (vidyas), the six higher knowledges (abhijnas), and the eight liberations (vimoksas). At that time, the King of
Kalinga went up to him and said, "I have come with the intention
of clearing up my doubts. But monks are verbose:
90
shall we agree
But,
? that you answer plainly to the questions that I ask? " Nagasena accepted his request and the King asked, "Is the vital principal identical to the body or different from the body? " "To this question/' said Nagasena, "there are no grounds for answer. " "Haven't we agreed that you shall answer plainly? Why speak off the point and not answer? " "I wish to ask the King concerning a doubt. But kings are verbose: shall we agree that the King answers plainly to the question that I shall ask? " The King consented and Nagasena asked, "Do the mangos in the King's palace give sweet fruit or bitter fruit? " And the King answered him, "There are no mango trees within my palace. " Nagasena protested as the King had protested, saying, "Haven't we made an agreement? Why speak off the point and not answer? " "But," said the King, "as there are no mangos in my palace, how could there be any sweet or bitter fruits? " "In the same way, Oh King, the vital principal does not exist: one cannot then answer your question and say that it is
91 identical to the body or different from the body. "
[The Vatslputrlyas:] But, if the pudgala does not exist, why didn't the Blessed One answer that the jtva absolutely does not exist?
Because he took into consideration the intention of the questioner, that questioning on the jtva may be with the idea that the jtva is a series of skandhas. If the Blessed One answered that thejtva absolutely does not exist, the questioner would have fallen into false views. Furthermore, as the questioner was not capable of understanding "dependent origination" (pratityasamutpada), he was not a fit receptacle for the Good Law: the Blessed One then did not tell him that the jtva exists except by way of designation.
The explanation that we have given here is the same that the Blessed One formulated: "Ananda, the wandering monk Vatsago- tra came to me to ask a question thusly: Is there, or is there not a soul (atmari\Y I did not answer him. In fact, to answer that there is a soul is to contradict the truth of things, because no dharma is a soul nor has any relationship with a soul; and if I had answered that there is no soul, I would have increased the folly of Vatsagotra,
Refutation of the pudgala 1333
? 1334 Chapter Nine
for he would have thought: 1 had a soul, but this soul does not now
92
exist/
of a soul, this second folly is graver. Whoever believes in the soul falls into the extreme view of eternity; whoever believes that the soul does not exist falls into the extreme view of annihilation.
For, in comparison to the folly of the belief in the existence
Thoughtless error, heavy error
93 94 . . . ", and so on. It has been said:
1. Taking into consideration the injury that heresy does and,
also, the falling off of good deeds, the Buddhas teach the Law in the
95 manner in which a tigress carries its young.
2. Those who believe in the reality of the soul are torn by the teeth of heresy; those who do not recognize the conventional self
96
1. Since a real jiva does not exist, the Buddha does not say that
the jiva is identical or non-identical; he does not say any more than
that the jiva does not really exist, fearing that one would only 91
2. Series of skandhas, actions, and the results of actions are what are termed jiva: if the Buddha were to negate the jtva, he would negate actions and their results.
3. And if the Buddha does not say that the so-called jtva is in the skandhas, it is because he sees that the questioner is not capable of tolerating the teaching of emptiness.
4. It is then because of the state of mind of Vatsa that the
Buddha, asked if there was a soul, yes or no, did not answer. But if
the soul were to exist, why wouldn't he have answered that it
98
exists?
The Buddha did not answer four questions relative to the
99
eternity of the world (loka): again this is because he took into
consideration the intention of the questioner. If such a person understands loka to be a soul (dtman), the four alternatives are incorrect, since the soul does not absolutely exist. If he understands loka to be transmigration or samsdra, the four alternatives are
let their good actions fall away, and perish. And again:
negate the conventional jtva.
? incorrect: if transmigration is eternal, no one could obtain Nirvana; if it is not eternal, all would obtain Nirvana by spontaneous annihilation, and not through effort: if it is both eternal and non-eternal, some would never obtain Nirvana, whereas others would obtain it spontaneously; finally, to say that loka, in the sense of samsdra, is neither eternal nor non-eternal, is to say that beings both would and would not obtain Nirvana: a contradiction in terms. In fact, Nirvana is possible through the Way; then no categorical response is acceptable. In the same way the Buddha did not answer the Nirgranthasravaka who held a bird
100 in his hand and asked if this bird was dead or sdive.
The four questions as to whether the world is infinite, namely if it has an end or not, has the same sense as the questions relative
101
to the eternity of the world,
How do we know that "the infinity of the world" should be
102
understood in this sense? The wandering monk Uktika,
having asked the Buddha about infinity, resorted to a ruse in order to repeat his question and asked, "Does the whole world obtain
103
deliverance through the Way, or only a part of the world? "
elder Ananda then said to him, "You have already posed this question, Uktika. Why do you repeat it by changing the terms? "
If the Blessed One did not explain concerning the four questions relative to the existence of the Tathagata after death, this is again because he took into account the intentions of the questioner. Such a person understood the Tathagata to be a "soul" liberated from the defilements.
We ask in our turn those who hold to a "soul:" The Blessed One, according to you, declared that the pudgala exists, indescriba- ble: why did he not declare that the Tathagata exists after death?
If [the Vatslputriyas] answer that the Buddha kept silent on this point because he feared that the disciple, by admitting the survival of a pudgala named Tathagata, would fall into the view of eternity, we would then ask why the Blessed One predicted to Maitreya, "In the ages to come, you will be a Tathagata, an Arhat, a
. Refutation of the pudgala 1335
and present the same defect.
after
The
? 1336 Chapter Nine
104
and speaking of one of his deceased 105
Samyaksambuddha;"
disciples, he said, "He is at present reborn in such a place. " Are not these discourses defiled by the opinion of permanence?
If [the Vatsiputrlyas] answer that the Blessed One does not say anything concerning the deceased Tathagata because, seeing at first the pudgala, he now no longer sees the pudgala once it has attained Nirvana; it is then through ignorance that the Tathagata does not make any declaration concerning the deceased Tathagata, and to speak thus is to deny the omniscience of the Master. Rather one should believe that if the Blessed One abstains from all declarations, it is because the "soul" that the questioner alluded to in speaking of the Tathagata does not absolutely exist. If [the Vatsiputrlyas] say that the Blessed One sees the pudgala, which is in Nirvana, but that he still does not make a statement on this subject; and that the pudgala exists but is not, at the same time, an object of a statement of the Blessed One, we then conclude that [the Vatsiputrlyas] admit that the pudgala is permanent.
If [the Vatsiputrlyas] say that "whether the Blessed One does
1
or does not see the pudgala is indescribable, they then proceed to
say that all is indescribable, and that one can only say that the Blessed One is omniscient or non-omniscient.
***
[The Vatsiputrlyas:] The pudgala really exists, as it is said, that 106
"To say that I really, truly do not have an atman is an incorrect opinion. "
This is not a proof, for it is also said that it is an incorrect
101
opinion to affirm the existence of an atman. Scholars of the
Abhidharma think that a belief in the existence of an atman and a belief in its non-existence are two extreme opinions, as they identify them with the two branches of "the opinion that consists in believing in extremes/' This doctrine is certain, as it is formulated in the Vatsagotra-sutra, "Ananda, those who affirm a
? soul fall into the extreme of the belief in permanence; those who
108
[The Vatsiputrlyas]: If the pudgala does not exist, what is it
that wanders in samsdra? In fact, one can only allow that samsdra
itself wanders. Further the Blessed One has said, "Beings misled by
ignorance, bound by thirst, wander here and there, either among
deny a soul fall into the extreme of the belief in annihilation. . . "
***
beings in hell, among animals, among pretas, humans, or the gods; 109
thus for a long time they experience all suffering. "
How does the pudgala wander in samsdra? Would you say that this wandering consists in abandoning old skandhas and in taking up new skandhas? But we have shown that this explanation is inadmissable. A good explanation is simple: one says that when a flame burns a field it travels, although they be only moments of flame, because it constitutes a series; in the same way the harmony of the skandhas which is constantly repeated receives, metaphori- cally, the name of being; supported by thirst, the series of skandhas travels in samsdra.
***
[The Vatsiputrlyas]: If only the skandhas exist, we do not see how one can explain these words of the Blessed One, "In the past, I
110
was the teacher Sunetra. "
existence of the individual skandhas metaphorically termed "soul," past skandhas are not the same as present skandhas, and so the Blessed One cannot express himself in this manner.
But what is the thing that the Blessed One calls "soul"? The pudgala, you would say: then, since the "soul" is permanent, a past "soul" is identical with a present "soul". For us, when the Blessed One said, "I was the teacher Sunetra/' he teaches us that the skandhas that constitute his present "soul" formed part of the
Refutation of the pudgala 1337
In fact, in the hypothesis of the
? 1338 Chapter Nine
same series as the skandhas that constituted Sunetra. In the same way one says, "This fire has been burning here/'
***
You affirm the existence of a real soul: we hold that only the Buddhas, Tathagatas would see it (because it is subtle). But if the Buddhas see a soul, they would produce a firm belief in a soul; from this belief in a soul there would be produced among them a belief in things pertaining to a soul; from these two beliefs there would be produced among them affection for the soul and for things pertaining to a soul. The Blessed One said in fact that "whosoever believes in a soul, believes in things pertaining to a soul; believing in things pertaining to a soul, they become attached to the skandhas as they form a soul and things pertaining to a soul/' There would be then satkayadrsti among the Buddhas; they would be bound by affection for a soul and for things pertaining to a soul; and they would be very far from liberation.
[The Vatslputrlyas]: Affection is not produced with regard to a soul. We explain: when one recognizes a soul in what is not the soul, as do the non-Buddhists, one feels affection for this pretended soul; but, when one sees the soul in that which is truly the soul, namely the ineffable pudgala, as do the Buddhas, no affection is produced with regard to the soul.
This statement has no support. The Vatslputrlyas, without any
shadow of reason, introduce the sickness of heresy into the
teachings of the Master. Whereas there are those who admit an
111 ineffable pudgala, others deny the existence of all the dharmas;
non-Buddhists imagine a soul apart from all other substances. All these doctrines are wrong and present the same flaw in that they do not lead to liberation.
***
? Refutation of the pudgala 1339 112
If the soul does not absolutely exist, how can a mind--which perishes as soon as it is generated--be capable of remembering an object perceived a long time before? How is it able to recognize an object similar to what it has formerly perceived?
Memory and recognition are generated immediately, in a series, from a certain type of mind, when this type of mind arises from the idea of object already perceived and which one calls "object of the memory. "
[Now then, let us first examine memory. ]
What is the type of mind from whence memory immediately shoots up?
We answer: It's a certain mind (citta-visesa), bent towards the object of memory, a mind in which one finds ideas related to that thing or resembling that thing, or even "resolutions" of a certain nature, etc. ; with the condition however that the power that this mind possesses to produce memory is not paralysed by a psycho- somatic change arising from sickness, from grief, from mental
113 trouble, or the disturbing influence of magic formulas, etc.
1. It is necessary that a bending of the mind be produced, an act of attention, towards the object; 2. it is necessary that the mind involves an idea resembling the object, in the case where one remembers by reason of resemblance (for example, I remember fire perceived a long time ago because the idea of fire is placed in my mind by the sight of present fire); 3. or it is necessary that the mind involves an idea in relation to the object, in the case where one remembers without there being resemblance (for example, I remember fire because the idea of smoke is placed in my mind by the sight of smoke); 4. or it is necessary that the mind involves a pranidhdna, or resolution, an abhydsa, or habit (for example, the resolution has been placed in the mental series, "I shall remember this at such a time"); 5. also when it is of this nature--that is to say, when it presents the characteristic 1. and one of the characteristics 2 - 4--if the thought does not proceed from the idea of the object of memory--that is to say, if the mind so envisaged is
? 1340 Chapter Nine
not produced in a series where the idea of a certain object has been placed by perception, if this mind does not proceed from this idea--the mind cannot produce memory; 6. when it is not of this nature, even though it proceeds from an idea of the object of memory, it cannot produce memory.
[The Vatsiputrlyas:] How can one mind see and another mind remember?
It is contrary that Yajnadatta remembers an object that Devadatta has seen.
That is right. There is no connection between Devadatta and Yajnadatta: Their minds are not in the relationship of cause and effect, as is the case for minds which form series. Indeed, we do not say that one mind sees an object and that another mind remembers this object, because these two minds belong to the same series. We say that one past mind, bearing a certain object, brings about the existence of another mind, the present mind, capable of remem- bering this object. In other words, a mind of memory is generated from a mind of seeing, as fruit is generated from the seed through the force of the last stage of the transformation of the series. This point has been clarified. Memory is generated after recognition.
114
[The Vatsiputrlyas:] In the absence of a soul, who remembers? [Vasubandhu:] What do you understand by "to remember"? [The Vatsiputrlyas:] To grasp an object by the memory. [Vasubandhu:] Does "to grasp" differ from memory? [The
115
[Vasubandhu:] We have explained what is the agent of this action: it is the cause of memory, namely a certain type of mind.
[The Vatsiputrlyas:] But, if it is only a certain type of mind that is the cause of memory, how can one say that Caitra remembers?
[Vasubandhu:] One gives the name Caitra to a series; a mind of memory is generated, in this series, from a mind of seeing, and by reason of this fact one says that Caitra remembers.
Vatsiputrlyas:] Memory is the agent of the action "to grasp. "
[The Vatsiputrlyas:] In the absence of a soul, whose is the
? memory?
[Vasubandhu:] What is the sense of the genitive "whose"? [The Vatsiputriyas:] This genitive designates its master.
[Vasubandhu:] Explain by an example how you understand that someone is the master of memory. [The Vatsiputriyas:] As Caitra is the master of the cow.
[Vasubandhu:] In what is Caitra the master of the cow?
[The Vatsiputriyas:] In that he directs and employs the cow as he pleases.
[Vasubandhu:] To what then is the memory directed and employed by a master, for whom you search with great pains.
[The Vatsiputriyas:] It is directed and employed on the object that one wants to remember (that is to say, it is employed on remembering).
[Vasubandhu:] To what purpose?
[The Vatsiputriyas:] For the purpose of memory.
[Vasubandhu:] What idle talk! I direct and employ a certain thing with a view to the same thing! Explain to me then how memory is employed: do you want to say that one transmits it to a certain place? Do you want to say that one causes it to be produced?
[The Vatsiputriyas:] Memory does not die out; it is then not transmitted. One causes it to be produced.
[Vasubandhu:] What you call "master" is then simply the cause, and what you call "subject" is simply the result. In fact the cause, by its command, operates the result; it is then "master"; and the result, in that it is subordinate to the cause at the moment of its arising, is called "subject. " Since the cause suffices as master, why require a self to which you could attribute memory? Memory belongs to whatever causes memory. Complexes of samskdras, or the five skandhas forming a homogeneous series, are called
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"Caitra" and "cow. " One says that the Caitra-series possesses the cow-series, because the Caitra-series is the cause of the geographic displacement and the various changes of the cow-series. There is not there any one, real entity "Caitra," nor another entity called "cow;" there is not, for the Caitra-series, any quality of owner or master outside of its quality of cause.
[As with memory, so too with recognition. ]
We would answer, mutatis mutandis, to the questions: "Who knows? To whom do we attribute consciousness? " and to other similar questions, "What feels, what makes ideas? " as we have responded to the questions, "What remembers? To whom do we attribute memory and recognition? "
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Certain scholars
(bhava) depends on an existing being (bhavitar), as the walking of Devadatta depends on Devadatta. Walking is an action, and Devadatta is the active being. In the same way consciousness {vijnana) and all action depends on a "base of support" {asraya), "one who knows {vijnatar)** the agent.
say that the soul (dtman) exists, as existence
We would ask what it is that they understand by "Devadatta. " If they regard Devadatta as a real individual, we have discussed and refuted this theory. Devadatta is an imaginary individual and not an individual entity; Devadatta is only the name that one gives to the series of samskaras. In the sense that one could say that such a Devadatta walks, in the same sense we can say that Devadatta knows.
How does Devadatta walk? "Devadatta" is only a homogene- ous series of samskaras, moments of existence replaced without interruption and roughly similar one to another. The foolish see within this series an entity which would be the cause of the action that this series generates in a different place, the cause by the efficacy of which the successive moments of the existence of the
? body of Devadatta is produced in different places. In fact, the walking of Devadatta is simply the act of the generation of the series which is the body in different locations; the cause of this action--that is to say, the previous moment of the series--receives the name of "walker. "
It is in this sense that we say that Devadatta walks, in order to designate a walk totally similar to that of fire or sound: the fire walks, the sound walks, that is to say, the fire-series and the
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sound-series go being generated from one place to another.
the same way the world says that Devadatta knows (vijdndti) because the complex which is Devadatta is the cause of conscious- ness (vijndna); and, in order to conform to received usage, the Aryans also express themselves in this manner, which is inexact.
Nevertheless, a Sutra says that the consciousness knows the object. What does the vijndna do with regard to the object?
Nothing: It is simply produced resembling the object. In the
118 correspond to the seed, to reproduce the seed, because it is
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same way that fruit, although it does nothing,
is said to
produced resembling the seed;
the vijndna also, although it
accomplishes no action with regard to the object, is said to know
the object because it is produced resembling the object. This
resemblance of the vijndna consists in that it has the appearance of
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the object.
By reason of this appearance one says that the
vijudna knows the object which is only one of its causes; the organ
is also a cause of the vijndna, but one does not say that the vijndna
knows the organ because the vijndna does not take the aspect of
the organ. This manner of speaking, "The vijndna knows," is again
justified from another point of view. Several successive moments
of vijndna are produced with regard to the object: the previous
moment is the cause of the later moment; the vijndna is then a
cause of vijndna; it is then called the agent (kartr) since it is the
One says that the lamp moves: here is what the moving of the lamp consists of: "lamp" is the name metaphorically attributed to
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the action of ringing to a bell or the action of moving to a lamp.
cause:
one attributes the action of knowing to it as one attributes
In
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the uninterrupted series of moments of the flame that one sees,
wrongly, as a "unity. " When one of these successive moments is
produced in place other than that of the preceeding moment, one
says that the lamp moves. But there does not exist a "mover" apart
from and distinct from the moment of the fire. In the same way,
one metaphorically designates a series of minds by vijnana, or
consciousness: when one moment of mind is produced relative to a
new object, one says that the consciousness knows this object. One
says that the consciousness knows: the same way that one says that
"physical matter" exists (bhavati), is produced, lasts, without there
being an "exister" {bhavitr), a "producer," "anything that lasts,"
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distinct from what is called its existence, etc.
[The Samkhya]:
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If the later consciousness (vijnana) is
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produced from the previous consciousness and not from a soul
(atmari)y why is not the later consciousness always similar to the
previous consciousness? Why do not consciousnesses succeed
themselves in a determined order, as do shoots, stems, leaves,
124 etc?
Answer to the first question: Because everything that is produced through causes, i. e. , conditioned things, presents the character of "transformation" (sthityanyathdtva)\ this is the nature of conditioned things: in the series which they form, the latter should differ from the former. If it were otherwise, the ascetics who had entered into meditation--in which the body and the consciousness are always produced in the same way, the successive moments of the series being identical--would not
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As for the second difficulty: The production of consciousness is subject to a certain order. If a certain mind should be produced
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after a certain mind, it will be produced after this mind.
other hand, certain consciousnesses present a partial similarity that obliges them to produce one another by reason of the
spontaneously get out of meditation.
On the
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particular character of their gotra. For example, upon the idea of
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"woman"
detesting the body of a woman, but (among non-ascetics) there immediately arises the idea of a wife or daughter. Later, following upon the differing development of the succession of ideas, the idea
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there immediately arises the idea (among ascetics) of
of a woman reproduces itself.
This second idea of a woman
would have the capacity of producing the idea of the detesting the
body, or the idea of wife or daughter, accordingly as it has either of
these ideas as gotra, that is to say, as a seed; but not when it does
lb0
not have a similar gotra. And again innumerable different ideas
can succeed the idea of a woman, and that by reason of multiple causes. Among all these ideas, those are produced first which are the most "numerous"--having formed a series in the past--the most "alive," the "nearest"--as these ideas have most strongly
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impregnated the mental series:
when other ideas are produced by a certain state of the body or by certain external objects.
But why does the consciousness, which has most strongly impregnated the mental series, not continue to so impregnate it without ceasing?
Because, as we have said, transformation is a characteristic of the mental series; this characteristic is eminently propitious for the production of the result of ideas, having medium or small force.
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Here we have, in an incomplete and summary manner, explained the causes and conditions of the order of the reciprocal generation of different categories of consciousness. Complete knowledge of these causes belongs only to the Buddha. Thus the stanza says, "All the types of causes which go to produce a peacock feather--no one can know them except the Omniscient Ones: this
is the power of knowledge of Omniscience (to know a thing
completely). "
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The causes of the variety of material things are
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except, of course, at the moment
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difficult to know; how much more difficult is it to penetrate the variety of causes and conditions of non-material things, minds and
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A certain non-Buddhist
produced from a soul. One can successfully oppose his objections vainly formulated against us: Why isn't the latter consciousness the same as the former consciousness? Why aren't the conscious- nesses produced in a fixed order?
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This master
absence of a fixed rule to their arising by the diversity that he terms "the conjunction (samyoga) of the soul with the manas or mental organ. " This explanation does not hold. No type of
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On the other hand, reasoning shows that two things in conjunction should be delimited, that is to say, localized in distinct places. Judge if your definition of conjunction, "possession
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succeeding upon non-possession,
as our reasoning, namely that the soul is delimited, localized. (Whence it follows that the soul is not omnipresent: and this
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It also results from your definition of conjunction that, when
the manas moves--it goes to such and such a part of the body--the
soul should also move to make a place for it (and then it is not
niskriya, or exempt from action) or that it should perish (and then
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mental states!
conjunction is proved.
contradicts your system. )
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believes that the consciousnesses are
explains the variety of consciousnesses and the
it is not nitya, or eternal).
that the soul is in partial conjunction
according to you, the soul is an entity without parts.
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Supposing also that there is conjunction between the permanent soul and an always immoveable manas, how does one explain the diversity of the conjunction (necessary for the diversity of consciousness)? Would you say that this diversity results from
admits of the same conclusion 138
On the other hand, you cannot admit
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with the manas, for,
? the diversity of the buddhi, "intelligence," (which is a quality, guna, of the soul)? But the buddhi presents the same difficulty as the manas: if the soul is not diversified, how would buddhi be diversified? Would you say that the diversity of the buddhi results from the diversity of conjunction of the soul and the manas, a variety which results from the samskdras? In this hypothesis, the soul serves no purpose; why not say that the diversity of consciousnesses comes from the consciousness itself which is diversified by the samskdras? The soul does not intervene in the beginning of consciousness, and to say that consciousness comes from a soul is to be as the charlatan who, although drugs suffice for the healing of the sickness, pronounces some magic syllables: Phut! Svaha!
You would say without doubt that consciousness, like the samskdras, exists through conjunction with the soul: but this is merely a statement without proof. But you would insist, saying that the soul is its support {asraya): please explain by an example the nature of the relationship of the support and the supported. The consciousness (that the samskdras influence) and the samskdras themselves are not a picture or a fruit that the soul supports as a wall supports a picture or as a plate supports fruit: in fact, on the one hand, one would have to admit physical contact (between the soul and the thought-samskdras); and, on the other hand, the picture and the fruit exist independently of the wall and the plate.
You say that you do not understand the support that the soul furnishes the thought-samskdras to be thus: the soul supports thought-samskdras as earth supports smell, color, taste, touch. We rejoice in this comparison, for it establishes the non-existence of the soul. In the same way that one cannot perceive the existence of earth independently of smell, etc. --what one designates by the word "earth" is only a collection of smells, etc. --in this same way there is no soul existing apart from the thought-samskdras: the thought-samskdras are what one designates by the word "soul". Who can obtain the idea of "earth" apart from smell, etc. ?
But, if "earth" does not exist apart from smells, etc , how can one qualify certain smells, etc. , as properties of earth: "The smell,
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the taste of earth? "
One expresses oneself thus with a view to distinguishing: in other words, one wants to indicate that certain smells, tastes, etc. , are what is termed "earth," not other smells or tastes which are termed "water. " In the same way, one designates a certain thing as being "the body of a wooden statue" indicating by that that it is of
143 wood, and not of baked clay.
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If the soul produces the consciousnesses by reason of the variety of the samskdras, why doesn't it produce all the conscious- nesses at the same time?
[The Vaisesikas:] Because the strongest samskdra opposes the weakest samskdra in producing its result. And if the strongest samskdra does not constantly produce its result, it is for the same reason that you have given in explaining the traces (vdsands) abandoned by the consciousness in the series: we think that the samskdras are not permanent and are subject to change.
But then of what use is a soul? Diverse consciousnesses would be generated by the diverse force of the samskdras, since there is
144 no difference in nature between your samskdras and our vdsands.
[The Vaisesikas:] One cannot do without the soul. Memory,
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the samskdras, etc. ,
"attributes" {guna)\ these attributes must of necessity have for their substratum, or support {dsraya), a "substance" {dravya) and, among the nine substances (earth, etc. ), the soul, since it is inadmissable that memory and the other mental qualities would have for their substratum any substance other than the soul (namely earth, etc. ), since the soul alone is intelligent.
But this system of substances and attributes is not proved. [You say that memory, the samskdras, etc. , are things included within the category of "attributes" and are not substances: we do
are things {padarthas) that are termed
? not agree. ] We think that all that exists is "substance. " A Sutra says that "the result of the religious life consists of six substances (namely the five pure skandhas and pratisarhkhyanirodha)" It is false that memory, etc. , has the soul as its substratum: as we have criticized the idea of a substratum.
[The Vaisesikas say:] If the soul does not really exist, what is the result of actions?
The result of actions is that the "soul" experiences pleasure or pain.
[The Vaisesikas:] What do you understand by "soul"?
It is what one speaks of when one says "I," the object of the
idea of self, the skandhas or object.
How do we know this?
It is to the series of skandhas, that is, to the skandhas--to one's body, to one's sensations--that one becomes attached; as the idea of "I" is generated with reference to the idea of white and other similar ideas: in the world does one not say "I am white, black, old, young, thin, fat"? What one regards as white, etc. ,--evidently the skandha of physical matter--is also what one regards as "I. " The "soul" imagined by the Vaisesika is different from white, etc. ; but, in fact, the idea of "I" is relative only to those skandhas and not to any "self" imagined [by the Vaisesikas. ]
[The Vaisesikas:] It is through metaphor that the world designates the body by the word "I" when it says, "I am white. " This metaphor is justified because the body is in the service of the true "I. "
So be it: one metaphorically calls what is used by the "I" by the
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name of "I. " But one cannot explain in this manner the conscious- ness that says "I" (with regard to the body, sensations, conscious-
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[The Vaisesikas:] If the idea of "I" has the body for an object why is not this idea generated with regard to the bodies of others?
Because there is no relationship between the series of skandhas of others and this idea. When the body or mind is in a relationship with the idea of "I"--a cause and effect relationship--this idea is generated with regard to this body and this mind; but not with regard to the skandhas of others. The habit of considering "my" series as "I" exists in "my" series from the very beginning.
[The Vaisesikas:] If there is no "soul," to what do you attribute the idea of "I"?
We have answered this question when we explained what
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[The Vaisesikas:] What is the cause of the idea of "I"? It is a defiled mind, impregnated by this same idea of self, and having for its object the series of minds wherein it is produced.
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[The Vaisesikas:] In the absence of a soul, who has suffering or pleasure? The dsraya within which suffering or pleasure is produced, in the same way that a tree is said to have flowers, a
forest has fruit. And the dsraya in question may belong to any of
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ness, etc. )
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of memory. It is the same for the idea of "I".
memory belongs to.
The master of memory is simply the cause
the six internal ayatanas, the eye-dyatana, etc. explained [in the First Chapter. ]
This has been
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? [The Vaisesikas:] In the absence of a soul, who is it that does a deed? Who is it that tastes the result?
What do you understand by "he who does/* and "he who tastes"?
[The Vaisesikas:] We understand this to be the agent, the
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taster.
Your explanation is merely words and explains nothing. The
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Vaisesikas here invoke the doctrine of the Grammarians.
say that the agent is he who has independent power, that the taster is he who enjoys the result of the deed. Iri the world he who possesses independent power with regard to a certain action is considered as the "agent"; for example, Devadatta, having the power to bathe himself, to seat himself, and to walk, is called "the bather," "the sitter," and "the walker. "
This definition is not admissable. What does one understand by "Devadatta"? If one understands this to be a soul, the example is not proved, and is without value. If one understands a certain coming together or complex of skandhas, then Devadatta is indeed an agent, but he is not "an independent agent and creator of
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Refutation of the pudgala 1351
--body, speech, and mind. That
deeds. " Action is threefold
which produces bodily action is the wind agitating the body; the body and the mind depend again on their causes and conditions; these causes and conditions depend in their turn on their causes and conditions: in all this there is not any simple entity, a "producer" dependent on itself or, in other words, independent. For everything that exists depends on causes and conditions. The soul as you understand it does not depend on causes and condi- tions; furthermore, it does nothing: it is not then an independent agent. Nowhere does anyone maintain the existence of an agent conforming to your definition, "He who possesses independent power is termed an agent. " That which one terms the agent of a certain action, is, amongst all its causes, that which is the principal cause of this action. Now even if we were to define the agent in this manner, your "self" is not an agent.
They
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What is in fact the principal cause of the beginning of bodily
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action?