No More Learning

I conclude with specific predictions and set the stage for the subsequent case studies.
BALANCE-OF-THREAT THEORY
Like all realist theories, balance-of-threat theory begins by recognizing that states dwell in an anarchic environment in which no agency or institu- tion exists to protect them from each other. Security is thus the highest aim of states, and foreign policy decisions will be strongly influenced by how national leaders perceive the external environment and by how different strategies are expected to affect their relative positions. 1
1 See my Origins of Alliances (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987), and "Testing Theories of Alliance Formation: The Case of Southwest Asia," International Organization 42, no. 2 (1988), and "Alliances, Threats, and U. S. Grand Strategy: A Reply to Kaufman and Labs," Se- curity Studies 1, no. 3 (1992).
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Where neorealist balance-of-power theory predicts that states will re- spond primarily to changes in the distribution of capabilities, however, bal- ance-of-threat theory argues that states are actually more sensitive to threats, which are a function of several different components. The first is aggregate power: other things being equal, the greater a state's total resources (such as population, industrial and military capability, raw material endowment, etc. ), the greater the threat it can pose to others. The level of threat is also af- fected by perceptions of intent: if a state is believed to be unusually aggres- sive, potential victims will be more willing to use force to reduce its power, to moderate its aggressive aims, or to eliminate it entirely. Finally, the level
of threat is also affected by the offense-defense balance: states will be less se- cure when it is easy for them to harm one another and when the means for doing so are easy to acquire. Furthermore, incentives to use force increase when the offense has the advantage, because the expected cost to the at- tacker will decline and the expected benefits of aggression will increase. Of- fensive power is usually defined in terms of specific military capabilities (that is, whether the present state of military technology favors attacking or defending), but political factors can be equally important. In particular, the ability to undermine a foreign government through propaganda or subver- sion can be an especially potent form of offensive power, because it allows one state to "conquer" others at little or no cost to itself. In general, the greater a state's offensive power is, the greater the threat it will pose to oth-
ers and the greater their incentive to try to contain or reduce the danger. 2 By incorporating the other factors that will shape a state's estimates of its level of security, balance-of-threat theory provides a more complete and ac- curate account of the forces that influence state behavior. 3 The question, therefore, is whether revolutions affect the balance of threats in ways that increase the intensity of international conflict and raise the danger of war. To begin to answer that question, let us consider the nature of the revolution-
ary process in a bit more detail.
THE REVOLUTIONARY PROCESS
The main object of revolutionary struggle is control of the state. 4 A revo- lutionary situation exists when control of the government becomes "the ob-
2 See George Quester, Offense and Defense in the International System (New York: Wiley, 1977); Robert Jervis, "Cooperation under the Security Dilemma," World Politics 30, no. 2 (1978); Stephen Van Evera, Causes of War, vol. 1: The Structure of Power and the Roots of War (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, forthcoming).
3 In earlier presentations of balance-of-threat theory, I included geographic proximity as another element of threat. Because a state's geographic location is not affected by a revolu- tion, I have omitted it from this discussion, although I would expect states to be more sensi- tive to revolutions near their own borders than to ones at a distance.
4 Lenin once remarked, "The key question of every revolution is undoubtedly the question
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ject of effective, competing, mutually exclusive claims on the part of two or more distinct polities. " A revolutionary outcome occurs when the challengers are able to defeat the old regime and erect a new and fundamentally differ- ent politican order. 5
The specific process by which a revolution occurs will vary, but nearly all revolutions exhibit certain common features. First, revolutions become possi- ble when the administrative and coercive capacities of the state have been weakened by a combination of internal and external challenges. 6 Second, rev- olutions feature an explosion of political activity. In a mass revolution, this ac- tivity is conducted by individuals who were marginalized or excluded under the old regime. In an elite revolution, the movement is led by dissident mem- bers of the old regime (usually military bureaucrats) who become convinced that a revolution is necessary to protect the nation from foreign domination and whose positions grant them access to capabilities (such as the armed forces) that are needed to challenge the old regime? In either type, this explo- sion of participation takes the form of illegal methods and activities, because the institutions and principles of the old regime offer no legitimate outlet for them. 8 Third, revolutions alter the language of political discourse and foster the development of new symbols and social customs. 9 Fourth, revolutions also alter the principles by which leaders are chosen. In most cases, the new rulers will be drawn from groups that were formerly barred from power while excluding prominent members of the old regime. Thus, revolutions in- evitably involve a redefinition of the political community.
Finally, revolutions are usually characterized by violence. Force is often needed in order to oust the old regime, and even when it collapses withoufr
of state power. Which class holds power decides everything. " Selected Works (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 197<r71), 2:276.
5 See Charles Tilly, From Mobilization to Revolution (New York: Random House, 1978), esp. 191;andPeterAman,n "Revolution:ARedefinition,"inWhyRevolution? TheoriesandAnaly- ses, ed. Clifford Paynton and Robert Blackey (Cambridge, Mass. : Schenkman, 1971), 58-59.
6 Thus, Theda Skocpol refers to prerevolutionary governments as "old regime states in cri- sis. " States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia and China (Cam- bridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979). State power may decline for a variety of reasons. The demand for resources may exceed the ability of existing institutions to provide them (as in France), the coercive apparatus may dissolve after a military defeat (as in Russia), or the le- gitimacy of the existing order may be challenged on moral grounds (as in Iran).
7 See Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven: Yale Univer- sity Press, 1968), 266; and Ellen Kay Trimberger, Revolution from Above: Military Bureaucrats and Development in Japan, Turkey, Egypt, and Peru (New Brunswick, N. J. : Transaction Books, 1978).
8 A. S. Cohan writes that "in a revolution, one system of legality is substituted for another. " Theories of Revolution: An Introduction (New York: Wiley, 1975), 25; see also Lyford P. Edwards, The Natural History of Revolution (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970), 107-12.
9 Thus, revolutionary states ordinarily adopt new names, flags, anthems, and social practices, such as the French revolutionary calendar or the reimposition of the women's chador in Iran.
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a fight, there are likely to be violent struggles among competing revolution- ary factions. 10 The issues at stake are enormous, because the process of re- defining a political community places everyone at risk. Until a new order is in place, no one is safe from exclusion, and the temptation to use force to en- hance's one's position is difficult to resist. The possibility that winners will take all and losers will lose everything heightens the level of suspicion and insecurity. Fears of plots and conspiracies abound. Disagreements over spe- cific policies can become. life-or-death struggles, if they are seen as reflecting an inadequate commitment to the revolutionary cause.
In sum, revolutions are deadly serious contests for extremely high stakes.
The collapse of the old regime places all members of society on shaky ground. Conflicts can be resolved only by tests of strength, and no one's in- terests or safety are assured. As a result, revolutions are usually violent and destructive, especially when they involve the replacement of the existing elite by previously excluded members of society. 1 1
Capabilities
Owing to the features just described, revolution usually reduces a state's capabilities in the short term. The demise of the old regime hinders any ef- forts to mobilize resources for war (at least until the new regime acquires the institutional capacity to tax and allocate resources), and the armed forces will be severely disrupted if they have not collapsed completely. In the ab- sence of a viable central authority, previously suppressed groups may assert new claims, and certain regions or groups may try to gain their indepen- dence, thereby adding to the new regime's burdens and reducing its overall capabilities.
In addition, many revolutionary elites will be poorly prepared for run- ning a government or managing its diplomacy, and key members of the old regime are likely to flee the country or to be purged by the new
10 The estimated death tolls confirm the ubiquity of violence in modern revolutions: France, at least 35,000 dead; Russia, 500,00;0 China, 1 million; Cuba, 5,000; Iran, 17,00;0 Mex- ico 250,000; Nicaragua, between JO,ooo and 50,000. These estimates are based on Melvin Small and J. David Singer, Resort to Arms: International and Civil Wars, 1816-1980 (Beverly Hills, Calif. : Sage, 1986); and Donald Greer, The Incidence of the Terror in the French Revolution
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1935).
11 As noted in chapter 1, these characteristics are most apparent in mass revolutions. The level of violence is usually lower in an elite revolution, because the revolutionaries typically seek less radical goals, the old regime usually collapses more rapidly, and the new leaders al- ready control elements of a new state apparatus and can establish their authority more easily. See Ellen Kay Trimberger, "A Theory of Elite Revolutions," Studies in Comparative International Development 7, no. 3 ( 1972); and Erik Allardt, "Revolutionary Ideologies as Agents of Structural and Cultural Change," in Social Science and the New Societies, ed. Nancy Hammond (East Lans- ing: Social Science Research Bureau, Michigan State University, 1973), 154.
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regime. 12Thus, the new regime may lack experienced diplomats, trainedl commanders, and disciplined armies, unless it has also fought a civil war and therefore controls a military establishment of its own. In the latter case, however, its strength will be sapped by the destruction caused by the civil war. Uncertainty about the future cripples economic activity and en- courages the flight of capital and expertise, reducing the capabilities of the new state even more.
The damage produced by a revolution is often temporary, and its mag- nitude is difficult to estimate in any case. By definition, successful revolu- tionary organizations are good at mobilizing social power and directing it toward specific political ends. Although a revolution harms a state's power in the short term, therefore, it is likely to improve it in the long run. 13 Measuring the precise impact of a revolution on the balance of power will be especially difficult, however, if the new order is based on a radically different model of social and political organization. Thus, while a revolution may appear to create an inviting window of opportunity, afr the time it is unclear how large the window is and how long it is going to remain open.
Revolutionary Ideologies, State Preferences, and Elite Perceptions
In a revolution, the old ruling elite is replaced by individuals committed to different goals and infused with a radically different worldview. W hen a revolutionary movement takes power, therefore, its ideology shapes both the preferences of the new regime and its perceptions of the external erwi- ronment. Unfortunately, most revolutionary ideologies contain ideas and themes that can create (or exacerbate) conflicts of interest and magnify per- ceptions of threat.
Successful revolutions are rare, because even weak and corrupt states usually control far greater resources than their internal opponents. States have better access to the means of violence and can use these tools to moni- tor, suppress; or coopt potential challengers. 14 lt is not surprising, therefore,
12 As Lenin once admitted, the Bolsheviks "really did not know how to rule. " Quoted in John Dunn, Modern Revolutions: An Introduction to the Analysis ofa Political Phenomenon (Cam- bridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972), 18-19, 47; see also William Henry Chamberlin, The Russian Revolution 1917-1921 (1935; reprint, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987), 1:)51.
13 See Theda Skocpol, "Social Revolutions and Mass Military Mobilization," World Politics 40, no. 2 (1988), and Ted Robert Gurr, "War, Revolution, and the Growth of the Coercive State," Comparative Political Studies 21, no. 1 (1988).
14 Indeed, some writers assert that revolution is impossible so long as the armed forces re- tain their loyalty and cohesion. See Katherine C. Chorley, Armies and the Art ofRevolution (London: Faber and Faber, 1943); Jonathan R. Adelman, Revolution, Armies, and War: A Politi-
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? A Theory ofRevolution and War
that most revolutionary movements are rapidly extinguished, and would- be revolutionaries often end up in prison, in exile, or dead. Indeed, it is per- haps more surprising that revolutions ever succeed.
The inherent difficulty of overthrowing an existing state is compounded by the familiar problems of collective action. 15 Because some of the benefits from a revolution are indivisible (once provided, they are available to all), individual citizens can profit from a revolution even if they do nothing to help bring it about. Moreover, each individual's contribution is too small to determine the outcome, so a rational actor would inevitably choose a "free ride" rather than incur the risks and costs of joining a revolutionary move- ment. Indeed, if people were motivated solely by self-interest and guided by an accurate assessment of costs and benefits, then the lack of willing partic- ipants would make revolutions impossible. 16
A number of scholars have suggested that revolutionary movements can overcome the free-rider problem by offering positive inducements or threatening negative sanctions. 17 Yet this explanation is only partly satis- fying. Although specific incentives such as food or protection may help convince uncommitted individuals to support a revolutionary move- ment, they do not explain either why individuals will risk their lives to expand the movement or how an organization gets started in the first place, before it was able to provide these benefits. Given the high proba- bility of failure and the risks that revolutionaries face, the payoffs would have to be enormous for joining a revolutionary movement to be a ratio-
? cal History (Boulder, Colo. : Lynne Rienner, 1985); Anthony James Joes, From the Barrel of a Gun: Armies and Revolutions (Washington, D. C. : Pergamon-Brassey's, 1986); and John Ellis, Armies in Revolution (New York: Oxford University Press, 1974).
15 See Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods lind the Theory of Groups (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971); and Russell Hardin, Collective Action (Wash- ington, D. C. : Johns Hopkins University Press / Resources for the Future, 1982).
16 Applicationsofcollective-goodstheorytotheproblemofrevolutionincludeGordonTul- lock, "The Paradox of Revolution," Public Choice 11 (fall 1971); Philip G. Roeder, "Rational Revolution: Extensions of the 'By-Product' Model of Revolutionary Involvement," Western Political Quarterly 35, no. 1 (1982); Morris Silver, "Political Revolution and Repression: An Economic Approach," Public Choice 17 (spring 1974); Samuel L. Popkin, The Rational Peasant: The Political Economy of Revolution in Vietnam (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979); Michael Taylor, "RaJtionality and Revolutionary Collective Action," in Rationality and Revolu- tion, ed. Michael Taylor (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988); James DeNardo, Power in Numbers: The Political Strategy of Protest and Rebellion (Princeton: Princeton Univer- sity Press, 1985); Edward N. Muller and Karl-Dieter Opp, "Rational Choice and Rebellious Collective Action," AmericanPoliticalScienceReviewSo, no. 2 (1986); and Mark I. Lichbach, The Rebel's Dilemma (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1995).
17 See Jeffrey Race, "Toward an Exchange Theory of Revolution," in Peasant Rebellion and Communist Revolution in Asia, ed. John Wilson Lewis (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1974); Joel S. Migdal, Peasants, Politics, and Revolution: Pressures toward Political and Social Change in the Third World (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974); and the references in n. 16 above.
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nal choice. 18 And testimony from several revolutionary leaders suggests that they did not expect to be rewarded at all. 19 According to Che Gue- vara, who lost his life trying to foment revolution in Bolivia, "Each guer- rilla must be prepared to die, not to defend an ideal, but to transform it into reality. " 20 So the puzzle remains: how do revolutionary movements convince potential members to bear the costs and risks of this activity, and how do revolutionaries sustain their commitment through pro- longed, difficult, and uncertain struggles? 21
Part of the answer lies in the possibility that participation in a revolution is motivated as much by moral commitments as by narrow self-interest. For those who believe that abolishing the present order is a moral imperative, individual benefits are secondary or irrelevant. 22More fundamentally, per- ceptions of costs and benefits ultimately rest on subjective beliefs about the consequences of different choices. If individuals believe that a revolution is possible and will bring them great benefits-irrespective of the actual pos- sibilities-they will be more likely to support it, particularly if they are also convinced that success requires their participation. 32 Revolutionary move-
18 As Charles Tilly notes, "why and how . . . the group committed from the start to funda- mental transformation of the structure of power . . . forms remains one of the mysteries of our time. " From Mobilization to Revolu tion, 203.
19 That revolutionaries are often surprised to gain power suggests that they were not mo- tivated by prospects of futUre gain. Lenin told a socialist youth group in January 1917, "We of the older generation may not live to see the decisive battles of this coming revolution," and the Sandinista leader Daniel Ortega admitted that as late as July 1979, he did not expect to see the revolution succeed in Nicaragua. Ayatollah Khomeini was reportedly surprised by the speed with which the shah's regime collapsed as well. Chamberlin, Russian Revolution, 1:131, 323; Robert Pastor, Condemned to Repetition: The United States and Nicaragua (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987), xiv; and Marvin Zonis, "A Theory of Revolution from Ac- counts of the Revolution," World Politics 35, no. 4 (1983), 602.
20 Quoted in Robert Blackey, Revolutions and Revolutionists: A Comprehensive Guide to the Lit- erature (Santa Barbara, Calif. : ABC-Clio, 1982), 405.
21 "How do we account for . . . the willingness of people to engage in immense sacrifice with no evident possible gain (the endless parade of individuals and groups who have in- curred prison or death for abstract causes)? " Douglass C. North, Structure and Change in Eco- nomic History (New York: W. W. Norton, 1981), 1o-11.
22 Chamberlin describes Lenin's "intense faith" in Marxism in Russian Revolution, 1:135, 140. For a general discussion, see James B. Rule, Theories ofCivil Violence (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988), 35-39.
23 Recent sodological research suggests that political organizations encourage collective ac- tion by promoting beliefs about the seriousness of the problem, the locus of causality or blame, the image of the opposition, and the efficacy of collective response. See David A. Snow, E. Burke Rochford, Jr. , Steven K. Worden, and Robert D. Benford, "Frame Alignment Processes, Micromobilization, and Movement Participation," American Sociological Review 51, no. 4 (1986); David A. Snow and Robert Benford, "Ideology, Frame Resonance, and Partici- pant Mobilization," in From Structure to Action: Comparing Soeial Movement Research across Cul- tures, ed. Bert Klandermans, Hanspeter Kriesi, and Sidney Tarrow (Greenwich, Conn. : JAI Press, 1988); and Jeffrey Berejikian, "Revolutionary Collective Action and the Agent-Structure Problem," American Political Science Review 86, no. 3 (1992), 652-55.
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ments therefore try to convince potential members, first, that seeking to overthrow the existing order is the morally correct position; second, that doing so will bring significant benefits; and third, that the probability of success is high ifthey act.
Persuading uncommitted individuals of these "facts" is one of the princi- pal functions of a revolutionary ideology, either as a means of gaining the strength needed to challenge the old regime and overcome rival contenders for power or as an instrument for sustaining popular support and legit- imizing their subsequent right to rule. 24 Let us examine some of the forms that this all-important ideology can take.
An ideology is a normative theory of action. Ideologies "explain" prevail- ing social conditions and provide individuals with guidelines for how to react to them. In nonrevolutionary societies, for example, the dominant ide- ology discourages disobedience and free-riding by persuading citizens "to conceive of justice as coextensive with the existing rules, and accordingly, to obey them out of sense of morality," in the words of Douglass North.
By contrast, "the objective of a successful counterideology is to convince peo- ple not only that the observed injustices are an inherent part of the system but also that a just system can come about only by active participation of in- dividuals in the system. " 25 Revolutionary ideologies present a critique of the current system (as Marx's analysis of capitalism did), together with a strat-
egy for replacing it. 26 In addition, North writes, a revolutionary ideology serves to "energize groups to behave contrary to a simple, hedonistic, indi- vidual calculus of costs and benefits. . . . Neither maintenance of the existing order nor its overthrow is possible without such behavior. " 27 To nourish this altruistic behavior, revolutionary ideologies tend to emphasize three key themes.
First, revolutionary groups usually portray opponents as intrinsically evil and incapable of meaningful reform. 28 This theme enhances the moral basis
24 Thus, Sandinista leader Humberto Ortega admitted having exaggerated the feasibility of revolution: "Trying to tell the masses that the cost was very high and that they should seek another way would have meant the defeat of the revolutionary movement. " Quoted in Tomas Borge et al. , Sandinistas Speak (New York: Pathfinder, 1982), 7o-71.
26 According to Mark Hagopian, "There are three structural aspects of revolutionary ideol- ogy: critique, which lays bare the shortcomings of the old regime; affirmation, which suggests or even spells out in detail that a better society is not only desirable but possible; and in re- cent times, strategic guidance, which tells the best way to make a revolution. " The Phenomenon ofRevolution (New York: Dodd, Mead, 1974), 258.
25 North,StructureandChange,53-54.
27 North, Structure and Change, 53-54. According to Ted Robert Gurr, "one of the most po- tent and enduring effects of 'revolutionary appeals' is to persuade men that political violence can provide value gains commensurate to or greater than its cost in risk and guilt. " Why Men Rebel (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970), 215-16.
28 Jack A. Goldstone, "The Comparative and Historical Study of Revolutions," Annual Re- view ofSociology 8 (1982), 203.
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for revolutionary participation: if the current system is unjust and cannot be improved, then efforts at compromise are doomed, and revolution is the only acceptable alternative. It was this issue that ultimately separated Lenin and the Boisheviks from the "Economists" in Russia and from social demo- crats such as Karl Kautsky; where the latter believed that tsarism and capi- talism coulld be reformed, the Bolsheviks denied that compromise was possible and remained committed to overthrowing both. 29 Portraying ene- mies as irredeemably hostile can also strengthen the solidarity of the revo-
lutionary movement and enhance its discipline by making any ideological variations appear treasonous. Indeed, the tendency to view the world in Manichean terms can leave a revolutionary organization prone to fratricidal quarrels in which dissenters are castigated as traitors and blamed for any setbacks that occur. 30
This element of revolutionary ideologies is similar to the popular propa- ganda that emerges within nation-states during wartime, and for many of the same reasons. Revolutions and wars are violent and dangerous; in order to justify the costs that are inherent in both activities, leaders try to portray opponents as evil or subhuman. 31 After all, if one's enemies are truly wicked, then compromising with them would be both risky and immoral, and eliminating them forever may be worth a great sacrifice. In each case, compromise will give way to more radical solutions.
The second theme is that victory is inevitable. Arevolutionary movement will not get very far unless potential supporters believe their sacrifices will eventually bear fruit. Thus, revolutionary ideologies are inherently opti- mistic: they portray victory as inevitable despite what may appear to be overwhelming odds. To reinforce this belief, the ideology may invoke irre? sistible or divine forces to justify faith in victory. For Marxists, for example, the "laws" of history led inexorably toward proletarian revolutions and the establishment of socialism. 32 For Islamic fundamentalists, optimism rests on
faith in God. Revolutionaries may also cite the successes of earlier move- ments to sustain confidence in their own efforts; thus, the Sandinistas saw
29 Edward Hallett Carr, The Bolshevik Revolution, 1917-1923 (New York: Macmillan, 195<>-5J), 1:11.
30 Lewis A. Coser, Greedy Institutions: Patterns of Undivided Commitment (New York: Free Press, 1974), 110.
31 For examples of this tendency, see John Dower, War without Mercy: Race and Power in the Pacific War (New York: Pantheon, 1986); and John MacArthur, Second Front: Censorship and Propaganda in the GulfWar (New York: Hill and Wang, 1992).
32 Thus, the inaugural issue of The American Socialist, published by an obscure Trotskyite splinter group, proclaimed, "We are part of the stream' of history. We are confident of our future because we believe we have the correct understanding and tactic[s) and . . . the grit and tenacity to carry on. Do not anybody despair because of our small numbers. . . . We are like the American abolitionists of a hundred years ago. We are like Garrison and Wendell Phillips and Frederick Douglass and John Brown. " Quoted in Coser, Greedy Institutions,
. 111? 12.
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Castro's victory in Cuba as evidence that their own efforts in Nicaragua could succeed. 33
Optimism can also be encouraged by dismissing an opponent's apparent superiority as illusory; Mao Tse-tung argued that "reactionaries" were "paper tigers," and Lenin described imperialism as containing both the power to dominate the globe and the seeds of its inevitable destruction at the hands of the proletariat. 34 Depicting opponents in this way is an obvious method for sustaining commitment within the movement: no matter how hopeless a situation appears to be, success is assured if the revolutionary forces simply persevere.
At the same time, the real difficulties of the struggle demand that revolu- tionary movements temper their optimism with elements of caution. Even if victory is inevitable, for instance, it may require heroic efforts and re- peated sacrifices. Such beliefs address the free-rider problem directly: if po- tential members are convinced that victory is inevitable regardless of whether they joined or not, then the temptation to let others bear the bur- dens of the struggle would be too strong. Thus, Mao warned his followers to "despise the enemy strategically while taking full acount of him tacti- cally": overcoming the enemy would require careful preparation and re- peated sacrifices, but victory was assured because the enemy was vulnerable. 35 lin the same way, Lenin warned his followers that faith in vic- tory should neither lead to overconfidence nor preclude setbacks and tacti- cal retreats along the path to power. 36
The worldview of most revolutionary movements will thus exhibit a strong tension between optimism and prudence. Two important questions, therefore, are which of these tendencies will exert the greatest influence on the perceptions and behavior of the new state, and how its external situation and the responses of other powers will affect the relative weight given to these competing imperatives.
The third key theme is an insistence that the revolution has universal meaning. Specifically, revolutionary movements often believe that the prin-
33 See the testimony in Dennis Gilbert, Sandinistas: The Party and the Revolution (London: Basil Blackwell, 1988), 5, 56.
34 Lenin "Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism," in his Selected Works, 1:667-768.
35 Peter Van Ness, Revolu tion and Chinese Foreign Policy: Peking's Supportfor Wars ofNational Liberation (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1970), 4o-41. Mao also told his followers that imperialism was "rotten and had no fUture" and "we have reason to despise them. " Yet he cautioned, "We should never take the enemy lightly . . . and concentrate all our strength for battle in order to win victory. " Mao Tse-tung, Selected Works (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1965), 4:181; and Tang Tsou and Morton Halperin, "Mao Tse-tung's Revolutionary Strategy and Peking's International Behavior," American Political Science Review 59, no. 3 (1965), 89.
36 In 1919, Lenin warned, "We may suffer grave and sometimes even decisive defeats. . . . If, however, we use all the methods of struggle, victory will be certain. " Selected Works, J:41o-11.
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ciples of the revolution are relevant for other societies and should not be confined within the boundaries of a single state. In extreme cases, the ideol- ogy may go so far as to reject the nation-state as a legitimate political unit and call for the eventual elimination of the state system itself.
That revolutionary ideologies contain universalist elements should not surprise us. If the failures of an old regime are the result of external forces such as tlhe "tyranny of kings," "capitalist exploitation," or "Western inter- ference," then action beyond the state's own borders may be necessary to eliminate these evils once and for all. Such views promise adherents an ad- ditional reward for their sacrifices: the revolution will not only be good for one's own society but will ultimately benefit others as well. Moreover, in order to attract popular support, revolutionary ideologists tend to portray their new political ideas as self-evident truths-creating a strong bias to- ward universalism. After all, how can a self-evident political principle be valid for one group but not others? Could the Jacobins argue that the "Rights of Man" applied only to the French? Could Marx's disciples claim that his inexorable "laws of history" were valid in Russia alone? Could the Iranian revolutionaries think that an Islamic republic was essential for Per- sians but not for other Muslims?
A few caveats are in order here. These ideological themes are neither nec- essary nor sufficient conditions for revolutionary success. One or more may be missing in some cases. Nor do revolutions automatically occur whenever some group adopts these ideological formulas. The likelihood of a revolutio:rll is also affected by a number of other conditions and by the old regime's abill- ity to respond to the challenge. 37 But it is striking that, as we shall see, the ide-
37 For macro theories of revolution, see Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions; and Jack A. Goldstone, Revolution and Rebellion in the Early Modern World (Berkeley: University of Califor- nia Press, 1991 ). On the importance of political opportunities, social networks, and mass com- munication in facilitating (revolutionary) collective action, see Tilly, From Mobilization to Revolution, chaps. 3-4; Doug McAdam, "Micromobilization Contexts and Recruitment to Ac- tivism," in Klandersman, Kriesi, and Tarrow, From Structure to Action; and Sidney Tarrow, Power in Movement: Social Movements, Collective Action, and Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994). Susanne Lohmann has recently analyzed the problem of collective action as a signaling game in which decisions to rebel are based on an individual's personal "threshold ? or action" and the information he or she receives about the likelihood that others will act as welL Information indicating that the old regime has weakened will lower the ex- pected costs of protest and allow potential dissidents to send "costly" (i. e. , credible) signals of their own willingness to act. Under certain conditions, seemingly isolated acts of protest can produce a "cascade" of such information and trigger a sudden outburst of revolutionary activity. See her article "Dynamics of Informational Cascades: The Monday Demonstrations in Leipzig, East Germany, 1989-91," World Politics 47, no. 1 (1994); as well as the related works by DeNardo, Power in Numbers; Dennis Chong, Collective Action and the Civil Rights Movement (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991); Mark Granovetter, "Threshold Models of Col- lective Behavior," American Journal ofSociology 83, no. 6 (1978); and Timur Kuran, "Sparks and Prairie Fires: ATheory of Unanticipated Revolution," Public Choice 61, no. 1 (1989). These per-
? ? spectives complement the focus on ideology I have adopted here. In my account, revolution-
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ological programs of revolutionary movements as varied as those of the American Founding Fathers, the Russian and Chinese Communists, and the Iranian fundamentalists all incorporated variations on these three principles. Moreover, even when the social and organizational prerequisites are present, it is hard to imagine a mass revolution succeeding without some kind of ide- ological program that justifies revolt and also gives participants a reason to believe they will win. 38 In short, although the inherent difficulty of revolution and the logic of the free-rider problem do not require that revolutionary movements adopt these ideological formulas, such tenets are likely to give them an advantage over rivals who lack a similar set of ideas.
Revolutionary ideologies should not be seen as wholly different from other forms of political belief. Indeed, often they are simply more extreme versions of the patriotic ideals that established regimes use to encourage individual sacrifice. Just as states in war portray their enemies as evil, victory as certain, and their own goals as pure and idealistic ("to make the world safe for democracy," "to promote a new world order," etc. ), revolutionary movements encourage similar sacrific? s through the three ideological themes described above. Because the risks are great and the odds of success low, however, rev- olutionary movements will try to indoctrinate members even more enthusi-
astically than other states. And whereas states ordinarily abandon wartime propaganda when the conflict is over, revolutionary movements that face continued internal opposition may continue using the ideology as a mobi- lizational device even after the struggle for power has been won.
The elements of revolutionary ideology identified here will be most com- mon in mass revolutions. Because elite revolutions originate within ele- ments of the existing state bureaucracy and are usually less violent, they face less severe collective-action problems than other revolutionary move- ments. And because such revolutions ordinarily arise in response to the threat of foreign domination, elite leaders can rely primarily on nationalism to mobilize their followers and legitimize the seizure of power. As a result, elite revolutions present less fertile ground for the Manichean worldview and universalistic ambitions that mass revolutions often foster.
By definition, revolutions are conducted by movements that oppose the policies of the old regime. If they succeed in taking power, they invariably attempt to implement policies designed to correct the objectionable features of the old order. Thus, all revolutions entail the emergence of a new state
ary ideologies seek to lower the individual threshold for rebellion by portraying the existing regime as evil and doomed to defeat. In other words, revolutionary ideologies try to create conditions in which an "informational cascade" is more likely to occur.
38 According to Franz Borkenau, "if violence is the father of every great upheaval, its mother is illusion. The belief which is always reborn in every great and decisive historical struggle is that this is the last fight, that after this struggle all poverty, all suffering, all op- pression will be a thing of the past. " "State and Revolution," 74-75.
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whose preferences differ in important ways from those of the old regime. The new government is virtually certain to adopt new domestic and foreign policies, even at the risk of provoking both internal and external opposition.
The revollutionary process will shape the perceptions of the new ruling elite as well. The ideologies of many revolutionary movements describe op- ponents as incorrigibly evil and destined for the dustbin of history. As we shall see, this trait encourages them to assume the worst about their enemies and intensifies each side's perceptions of threat. This is most true of mass revolutions, but elements of these ideas appear in elite revolutions are well.
Uncertainty and Misinformation
In the wake of revolutions, uncertainty about the balance of power grows, and so does the danger of war via miscalculation. Estimating intentions is harder, and prior commitments and understandings are called into question as soon as the new leaders take power.
Other states are equally uncertain about the new regime's true aims and its willingness to bear costs and run risks; the old regime's reputation for credi- bility, restraint, prudence, and so on is of little or no use. Thus, other states have to start from scratch in gauging how the new regime is likely to behave. The same is also true in reverse: the new regime cannot know exactly how others will respond, although it can use their past behavior as a rough guide to their future conduct. These conditions magnify the importance of ideol- ogy. Lacking direct experience, the revolutionary regime will rely on its ide- ology to predict how others will behave, while the other powers will use the same ideology as a guide to the likely conduct of the new regime.
The problem of uncertainty is not confined to relations between the revo- lutionary state and other powers. In addition, states observing a revolution cannot know how other actors in the system will respond to it. Revolutions thus exert direct and indirect effects on the foreign policies of other states, which must respond both to the new regime and to the uncertain reactions of the entire international community.
Third, revolutions exert unpredictable effects on other societies. As dis- cussed at greater length below, a central issue in the aftermath of a revolu- tion is the likelihood of its spreading to other states. The question of whether (or how easily) it will spread is of tremendous importance to both sides, yet neither side can form a reliable answer. This problem stems partly from sheer ignorance about political conditions in other countries but even more importantly from the fundamental incalculability of a revo- lutionary upheaval. As Timur Kuran has shown, an individual's willing- ness to rebel is a form of private information that cannot be reliably estimated in advance, especially when there is a threat of repression, giving the potential revolutionaries a strong incentive to misrepresent their true
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preferences. 39 As a result, neither the new revolutionary regime nor its po- tential adversaries can obtain an accurate assessment of the odds that the revolution will move beyond its original borders, a situation creating addi- tional room for miscalculation. And because an individual's true level of support (or opposition) to the new regime cannot be directly observed, nei- ther the new regime nor its foreign counterparts can estimate either its own popularity or the likelihood of counterrevolution.
Unfortunately, the available evidence on these issues is virtually certain to be ambiguous. Amass revolution will always attract some adherents in other countries. . ,-thereby supporting the new regime's hopes and its neighbors' worries-but neither side will know if these sympathizers are merely iso- lated extremists or the tip of a subversive iceberg. Similarly, there will almost always be some evidence of internal resistance after a revolution, yet neither the new regime nor its adversaries will know how strong or widespread such sentiments are. Because these appraisals are central to each side's decisions
and yet unreliable at best, the danger of miscalculation is especially severe. To make matters even worse, the information that both sides receive is likely to be biased by the transnational migration of exiles and revolution- ary sympathizers. Revolutions invariably produce a large population of ex- iles who flee abroad to escape its consequences. 40 Many of them are members of the old regime, and therefore hostile to the revolutionary gov- ernment and eager to return to power. They tend to settle in countries that are sympathetic to their plight, where they may try to obtain foreign assis- tance for their counterrevolutionary efforts. To do so, they will portray the new regime as a grave threat to other states and will stress its potential vul- nerability to counterrevolutionary action. Moreover, despite their obvious biases, exiles are often seen as experts on conditions in their home country at a time when other sources of information are scarce, so their testimony is overvalued. 41 In much the same way, revolutionary sympathizers flock to
39 See Timur Kuran, "Sparks and Prairie Fires," and "Now Out of Never: The Element of Surprise in the Revolutions of 1989,'' World Politics 44, no. 3 . (1991); but see also Nikki Keddie, "Can Revolutions Be Predicted; Can Their Causes Be Understood? " Contention 1, no. 2 (1992); and Jack A . Goldstone, "Predicting Revolutions: Why We Could (and Should) Have Foreseen the Revolutions of 1989-91 in the USSR and Eastern Europe," Contention 2, no. 2 (1993).
40 Yossi Shain, The Frontier of Loyalty: Political Exiles in the Age of the Nation-State (Middle- town, Conn. : Wesleyan University Press, 1989).
41 This is not a new phenomenon. As Machiavelli observed: "How vain the faith and promises of men are who are exiles from their own country. . . . Whenever they can return to their country by other means than your assistance, they will abandon you and look to the other means, regardless of their promises to you.