If it were otherwise, the
knowledge
of the mind of another would bear on rupa, etc.
AbhidharmakosabhasyamVol-4VasubandhuPoussinPruden1991
So too the Knowledge of Non-Arising.
How are the knowledges, which are twofold (pure and impure) distributed into ten knowledges?
8. The knowledges are ten in number; the distinction is established by reason of their nature, their opposition, their aspect, their aspect and their object, their preparatory exercises, the achievement of their task, and the extension of their cause.
1. By reason of its nature, there is conventional knowledge,
36 because it is not absolute knowledge.
? _ The Knowledges 1097 2. By reason of their opposition, there is knowledge of the
dharmas and inferential knowledge: the first is opposed to 37
Kamadhatu, and the second is opposed to the higher spheres.
3. By reason of their aspect (dkdratas, vii. 13), there is a
knowledge of Suffering and a knowledge of Origin: these two
knowledges have the same object (i. e. , the pancopdddnaskandhas, 38
vi. English trans, p. 898 and 908), but differ in their aspects.
4. By reason of their aspect and their object (dlambana), there is a knowledge of Extinction and a knowledge of the Path which differ in their aspects as well as in their objects.
5. By reason of their preparatory exercises, there is the knowledge of the mind of another. Without doubt this knowledge extends also to the mental states {caittas) of another, but the preparatory exercise bears on the mind {citta)\ also, even though it may know the caittas, it is termed paracittajnana (the knowledge of the mind of another) by reason of its preparatory exercise.
6. Because "that which should have been done has been done/' there is the Knowledge of Destruction: this knowledge is the first knowledge to arise in a series in which "that which should have been done has been done. " [The Knowledge of Non-Arising arises in a similar series, but later. ]
7. By reason of the extension of its causes, there is the Knowledge of Non-Arising, for it has for its causes (=sabhd- gahetu) all the pure knowledges, up to and including the Knowledge of Destruction.
***
We have said that the knowledge of the dharmas [that is to say: a. bearing on the Four Truths, b. in the Path of Seeing and in the Path of Meditation] is opposed to all of Kamadhatu [that is to say it "opposes" the five categories of defilements, those abandoned through the Seeing of the Four Truths and through Meditation, of Kamadhatu]. Furthermore
? 1098 Chapter Seven
9a-c. The knowledge of dharmas, in the Pathway of Meditation, when it bears on Extinction and the Path, is opposed to the three spheres.
A knowledge of dharmas with respect to Extinction and the Path, realized in the course of the Path of Meditation is opposed to the three spheres--that is to say, these two knowledges oppose the defilements of the higher spheres which are abandoned through Meditation. 39
9d. Inferential knowledge is not opposed to Kumadhatu. In none of its branches (Suffering, etc. ) is inferential knowl-
edge opposed ? the defilements of Kamadhatu. What are the aspects of the ten knowledges?
lOa-b. A knowledge of dharmas and inferential knowledge have sixteen aspects.
The sixteen aspects which will be explained later (vii. 13a).
lOb-c. Conventional knowledge is the same and otherwise.
Conventional knowledge has the sixteen aspects; it also takes up others, for it grasps unique characteristics, common characteris- tics, etc. 40
? ? -d. Four, because of the aspect of their Truth. 41
A knowledge of Suffering, Origin, Extinction, and the Path, bearing on the aspects of their Truths, each have four aspects.
lla-b. So too, when it is pure, the knowledge of the mind of another. 42
? The knowledge of the mind of another, in its impure part (vii. 5b-6, note 16), bears on the aspects of its Truth; it therefore has four aspects. This part of the knowledge of the mind of another is, in fact, made up of the knowledge of the Path.
llb-c. When it is impure, it has for its aspects the unique
43 characteristics of its object.
When the knowledge of the mind of another is impure, it grasps the unique characteristics of its object (jneya), namely the mind and the mental states of another. Its aspects are in conformity with these unique characteristics; therefore they are not included in the sixteen.
Pure or impure
44 Ud. It has for its sphere an individual object.
When it bears on a mind, it does not bear on a mental state (caitta); when it bears on a certain mental state (vedand for example), it does not bear on any other one (samjnd, for example).
If this is the case, why did the Blessed One say, "He knows in truth the mind which is sardga (possesses craving) as being
45
sardga", since the knowledge of the mind of another does not
know minds and mental states (craving, etc. ) at one and the same
time, in the same way that one does not grasp the cloth and its
46 stain at one and the same time?
The expression sardga, possessing craving, has two meanings. 47
A mind is sardga because it is "mixed" with craving, or because it 48
is "united" to craving.
The mind associated with craving (ii. 53c), that is to say, which is presently in the prey of craving, is sardga for two reasons; it is mixed with craving, and it is united to craving.
The Knowledges 1Q99
? 1100 Chapter Seven
49
Certain masters
sardgacitta solely designates a mind mixed with craving, that is to say, a mind associated with craving. As for the vigatardga mind, a mind without craving, this is, according to these masters, the mind opposed to craving. In fact, they say, if the mind not associated with craving were called vigataraga, the mind associated with the other defilements (hatred, etc. ) would be also termed vigataraga, for they are not associated with craving.
Objection: In this hypothesis a non-defiled, indeterminate mind (ii. 71b) is not sardga, since it is not associated with craving; it is not vigataraga, since it is not opposed to craving. As a consequence we must admit that what the other masters (the Abhidharmikas) say, that the mind is sardga through the fact of being united to craving, without it necessarily being mixed with craving. In this same way we must explain the other expressions of the Sutra up to "possessing delusion'' (samoha) and "not possessing delusion" (vigatamoha). [See above, note 45. ]
***
[The Vaibhasikas say:] A good mind is called concentrated
51
because it is not turned away from its object. A defiled mind is
distracted, because it is associated with distraction.
The Westerners, or Masters of Gandhara, say: A mind
52
Any other impure mind united to craving.
50
is solely sardga to the extent that it is
associated with laziness is concentrated; other defiled mind.
a distracted mind is any
think that the Sutra, by the expression
[The Vaibhasikas] do not admit this definition. They say: In this system, the same mind, namely a defiled mind associated with laziness, will be at one and the same time concentrated and distracted. Further, this system contradicts the Mulasdstra (according to the Japanese editor, Jndnaprasthana, 15. 9), which
? says, "He knows in truth the concentrated (samksipta) mind, endowed with the four knowledges, a knowledge of dharmas, inferential knowledge, worldly conventional knowledge, and a knowledge of the Path" (Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 950c8). [See below, p. 1102 - 3. ]
###
A defiled mind is sunken down, because it is associated with
53 indolence.
A good mind is "well in hand", because it is associated with
54 correct effort.
A defiled mind is called small, because it is beloved by small
persons. A good mind is called large, because it is beloved by great
55 persons.
Or rather the two minds, a defiled mind and a good mind, are called small and great because their roots, their worth, their followings, their entourage, and their forces, are respectively, small or great.
In fact, 1. a defiled mind is of small roots, having two roots, delusion, plus anger or greed: a good mind is always associated with three roots of good; 2. a defiled mind is of small worth, being obtained without effort: a good mind is of great worth, being realized at the cost of great effort; 3. a defiled mind has a small following, for a defiled mind is not accompanied by the acquisition
56
of a future mind of the same type;
following, being accompanied by the acquisition of future mind
of the same type; 4. a defiled mind has a small following, being surrounded only by three skandhas, vedand, samjnd, and samskdras; a good mind has a great following, for it always includes rupa {dhydndndsmvasamvara, iv. 4a, 26); 5. a defiled mind is of small
a good mind has a great 57
? 1102 Chapter Seven .
force, for the roots of good, cut off, are reborn (ii, 36, English trans, p. 210 iv. 80c); a good mind is of great force, for the Patience of the Knowledge of the dharmas concerned with Suffering definitively cuts off ten latent defilements {anusayas vi. English trans, p. 943).
This is why a defiled mind is called small, and a good mind, great.
***
The defiled mind is sa-uttara, because it is associated with frivolity {auddhatya)\ the good mind is anuttara, because it is
58 opposed to frivolity.
Calm and not calm minds are explained in the same way.
***
A defiled mind is non-absorbed, because it is associated with distraction; a good mind is absorbed, because it is opposed to distraction.
A defiled mind is uncultivated, because the two cultivations (vii. 27) are absent. A good mind is cultivated, for the contrary reason.
A defiled mind is undelivered, not being delivered in and of
59 itself, nor delivered with regard to the series in which it arises. A
good mind can be delivered in and of itself and from the point of view of the series in which it arises.
Such is the explanation of the Vaibhasikas.
This explanation, [say the Sautrantikas,] does not conform to the Sutra and it does not take into account the meaning of the terms.
? i. How does it not conform to the Sutra?
The Sutra says, "What is a mind internally concentrated? A mind which is accompanied by torpor and laziness, or a mind internally accompanied by calm but not insight. "
"What is a mind externally distracted? A mind which is
dispersed towards the five objects of pleasure, or which is
60
externally accompanied by insight, but not by calm. " [It, results
from this text that a mind associated with laziness can be concentrated. ]
But, [the Vaibhasikas answer,] we have said (p. 1100, line 21) that if a mind associated with laziness is concentrated, a defiled (and consequently distracted) mind, when it is associated with laziness, will be at one and the same time concentrated and distracted.
Yes, you have said this, but it does not hold. In fact, we can only
affirm that a defiled mind, when it is associated with laziness, is
61 distracted.
But, [answer the Vaibhasikas,] your thesis contradicts the Sastra!
62 It may. But it is better to contradict a Sastra than a Sutra.
ii. How does this explanation lack the proper meaning of the different terms?
Because it gives the characteristics of different minds--dis- tracted, sunken-down, small, not calm, non-absorbed, uncultivated, and undelivered on the one hand, and concentrated, well in hand,
63 etc. , on the other hand--without noting their differences.
[The Vaibhasikas answer:] It is false that we do not indicate the special sense of the different terms. The quality of "defiled" of distracted minds, etc. , is the same; but we explain the particular defects of these different defiled minds. In the same way we explain the particular qualities of the different good minds, in which their good qualities are not differentiated.
We answer that the meaning of the different terms is not correctly established because you fail to eliminate the objection of
The Knowledges 1103
? 64
contradiction with the Sutra. [The Sutra, in fact, says that a mind
accompanied by torpor and laziness is concentrated. A mind united with laziness, and defiled through union with torpor, is concen- trated, but it cannot be good, for torpor is a klesamahdbhumika. ]
And if, [as the Vaibhasikas believe], the Sutra designates, by
65
the sunken-down mind,
separately of a sunken-down mind and a small mind. Now it distinguishes them, for it says, "When the mind is sunken down, or fears becoming sunken down, this is not a proper time to cultivate the prasrabdhi, samddhi, and upeksa parts of Bodhi. When the mind is small or fears becoming small, this is not a fitting moment
66 to cultivate the dharmavicaya, virya, and priti parts of Bodhi. "
Objection [of the Vaibhasikas:] Is the cultivation of the parts of
67
Bodhi partial in the case which concerns us? [Must we believe
a small mind, it would not speak
that at a certain moment one cultivates prasrabdhi, samddhi, 69
upeksa, and at another moment dharmavicaya, virya, and priti? ]
No. When the text says "cultivation", it does not signify the fact of actualizing, but the fact of fixing the attention on, or taking as an object.
69
[Answer of the Vaibhasikas:] The mind in which indolence
dominates and in which frivolity is reduced is called "sunken
down" (lina). The mind in which frivolity dominates and in which
indolence is reduced is called "small" {uddhata). These two minds
are therefore distinct, and the Sutra can speak of them separately
without contradicting our system. But, taking into consideration
the fact that these two defilements, indolence and frivolity, coexist
in a single mental heap, we say that the mind which is sunken
70 down is small.
71
We do not pretend to challenge a text of intentional meaning; but such is not the intention of the Sutra [i. e. , to designate a mind in which indolence dominates as sunken down. . . ]
***
? In the thesis presented above (p. 1099, line 23) that all minds "united with craving" (rdgasamyukta) "possess craving" (sardga), what is the meaning of the expression rdgasamyukta, united with craving?
1. If a mind is united with craving, and as a consequence possesses craving, because the possession of craving continues in the series in which this mind is produced, then the mind of an imperfect saint or Saiksa, even when it is pure, will be termed "possessing craving", since the craving has not been completely
72 expelled from the series of the Saiksa.
2. If a mind is both united with craving and possesses craving
through the fact of being the object (dlambana) of the "active 73
craving" ,thentheimpuremindofanArhatwillpossesscraving,
since this mind can be the object of the craving of another
74 person.
If you do not admit that the mind of an Arhat can be grasped as an object through the craving of another person, how can this mind be termed impure?
Would you say that it is impure, not because it is the object of the craving of another, but because it is the object of a "general defilement" (sdmdnyaklesa, v. 12, namely of ignorance or delusion) of another? In this hypothesis, do not say that this mind is sardga, that it "possesses craving"; say rather that it is samoha, that it "possesses moha," since it is the object of the moha or ignorance of another.
But, we would say, none of these proposed explanations is valid. In fact the knowledge of the mind of another does not bear on the "possessions" which can be found in the series of another. Consequently when I know that the mind of another person possesses craving, this mind of another does not possess craving because it is "united with craving" in the sense that it is accompanied by the possession of craving, or in the sense that it is found in the series in which this possession has not been expelled.
The knowledge of the mind of another no longer knows the craving which would be the object of the mind of another.
? 1106 Chapter Seven
Therefore a mind is not termed saraga through the fact of ragasamyoga, through the fact of being "united with raga" in the proposed twofold sense.
[Objection:]
75
***
If this is the case, what is a saraga mind?
[Vasubandhu:] One should determine the intention of the Sutra. A saraga mind or one "possessing craving" is not a ragasarhyukta mind, a mind "united to craving", but a ragasarh- prayukta mind, a mind "associated with craving," a mind in which craving presently exists. Vigataraga, "without craving" is a mind which is not associated with craving, even when this mind will be accompanied by the possession of craving.
[Objection:] The expression vigataraga cannot have this meaning; for another Sutra says that a mind which is without craving {vigataraga), without anger (vigatadvesa), and without ignorance (vigatamoha), does not fall back into threefold existence. Now if this mind is accompanied by the possession of craving, etc. , it will fall back again.
[Vasubandhu:] In this other Sutra, "a mind without craving" (vigataraga citta) signifies "a mind which is not accompanied by the possession of craving" (vigatardgaprdpti citta).
[Objection:] Have you not refuted your own opinion? We said in fact (page 1100, line 5) that if one calls a mind without craving vigataraga, that is, a mind in which craving is not presently active, then one should term all minds associated with another defilement vigataraga. But one does not say that a mind associated with hatred is vigataraga, "without craving. "
[Vasubandhu:] There is nothing wrong with saying that a mind without craving is vigataraga. But one does not consider a mind without craving but associated with hatred as being vigataraga, but rather as "possessing hatred" (sadvesa), distin- guishing it through its specific characteristic which is one of being
? "associated with hatred. "
When the knowledge of the mind of another attains its object, namely the mind of another person, does it attain this mind of another as this latter knows it?
No. When one knows the mind of another, one does not see the object of this mind; one does not see this mind as it itself knows something: one knows only that it is defiled, etc. ; one does not know the object, color, etc. , by reason of which it is defiled.
If it were otherwise, the knowledge of the mind of another would bear on rupa, etc. , and would no longer be the knowledge of the mind of another; the knowledge of the mind of another would bear on itself: for the person whose mind I know can at the same moment know my mind.
The characteristics of the knowledge of the mind of another are set: it knows the individual characteristics of a thing (the dravya-svalaksana) but not its general, conventionally true characteristics (its samvrtisat-sdmdnyalaksana)\ it knows mind and mental states but not physical matter, the present but not the past or future, of another but not of oneself, of the sphere of Kamadhatu and Rupadhatu, but not of Ampyadhatu; or rather the pure mind and mental states, of the category to which he himself belongs: pure, he knows a pure mind and mental states; impure, he knows an impure mind and mental states. The knowledge of the mind of another is incompatible with the Path of Seeing and the Uninterrupted Path (dnantaryamdrga), with the Samadhi of Emptiness and the Samadhi of No-Marks, and with the Knowl- edge of Destruction and the Knowledge of Non-Arising. Other conditions are not excluded: the knowledge of the mind of another is compatible with the Path of Meditation (the Path of Liberation, vimuktimdrga, and the Path of Distinction, visesamdrga), with the Uncommitted Samadhi (apranihitasamddhi), etc.
The teaching of the knowledge of the mind of another is ended.
? 1108 Chapter Seven
12a-b. The other has fourteen aspects by excluding the aspect of emptiness and the aspect of non-self.
The "others" are the Knowledge of Destruction and the Knowledge of Non-Arising.
Both have fourteen aspects (vii. 13a), excluding the aspect of
emptiness and the aspect of non-self. In fact, these two Knowl-
76
edges, even though they are of the absolute level of truth, are also
77
included in the conventional level of truth (vi. 4);
therefore foreign to the aspects of emptiness and non-self. When an ascetic departs from the contemplation in which the knowl- edges of the absolute truth are realized, through the force of these
78
knowledges, later knowledges
conventional level of truth: "my births are cut off, the religious life has been fully cultivated, I have done what should have been done,
79
and I do not know of any more existences for me. " The two
knowledges, the Knowledge of Destruction and the Knowledge of Non-Arising, therefore participate in the conventional level of truth, not in and of themselves or through definition, but through their outflowing.
Are there any pure aspects outside of these sixteen aspects?
12c. There are no pure aspects outside of the sixteen.
The Masters of Kasmir say that there are no pure aspects outside of the sixteen.
12d. Some others, according to the Sustra, affirm that there are.
are produced which are of the
they are
? _ The Knowledges 1109
The Foreign Masters maintain the opposite opinion. [For the opinion of "the other masters," see p. 1094, line 27].
80
The Mulasdstra says,
belonging to Kamadhatu through a mind not included among the Dhutus (that is to say, pure)? One can distinguish them as they are, as impermanent, suffering, empty, impersonal, cause, proximate cause, near cause, specificing cause; there is this characteristic (sthdna), there is this cause (vastu). "
One should thus consider the specific aspects through the expressions asty etat sthdnam, asty etad vastu, as two pure aspects which are added to the eight aspects of suffering and origin.
According to the Masters of Kasmir, the Sastra does not teach the existence of these two additional aspects. One should understand, ". . . it is fitting (asty ayarh yogah) that a pure mind distinguish these dharmas as impermanent. . . "
The Foreign Masters answer that this interpretation is not
admissible. For, if the Sastra employs the terms asty etat sthdnam. . .
without referring to the pure aspects, but only through simple
phraseology, it would also employ them in a parallel passage,
namely when it explains, "Can one distinguish the dharmas
belonging to Kamadhatu by a mind susceptible of being abandoned
by Seeing the Truths? Yes, one can distinguish them, namely, one
becomes attached to, one hates, one prides oneself, one errs, one
erroneously distinguishes these dharmas as self, mine (-kdyadrsti),
as eternal or perishable (-antagrdhadrsti), as non-cause, non-ac-
tion, nonexistent (-mithyddrsti), as supreme, excellent, distin-
guished, superior (=drstipardmarsa), as purification, deliverance,
"Can one distinguish the dharmas
salvation (-stlavratapardmarsa), with anxiety, disagreement, or 81
doubt. " This text should have the expressions asty etat sthd- nam. . . , if they solely signify asty ayam yogah, in the sense that it is fatal that a mind susceptible of being abandoned through the Seeing of the Truths considers the dharmas as self, mine. . .
#**
? 1110 Chapter Seven
How many things constitute the sixteen aspects?
82
Certain masters said that the aspects, sixteen in name, are only seven in fact. The four aspects of the Truth of Suffering are in fact distinct from one another. The aspects of the other Truths, in their fourfold name, only constitute one thing for each Truth: hetu (material cause), samudaya (arising or origin), prabhava (appear- ance), and pratyaya (efficient condition) are synonyms and are only one aspect; in the same way that Sakra, Indra, and Purariidara are different names for one and the same personage. Ascetics contemplate, separately, the four aspects of the Truth of Suffering, and any one of the aspects, material cause, etc. , of the three other Truths.
But [the Vaibhasikas] maintain that the sixteen aspects exist in
83
1. Impermanence, because it arises dependent upon efficient causes.
2. Suffering, because it is painful by nature (vi. 3).
3. Empty, as it opposes the belief in the view of things pertaining to self.
4. No soul, as it opposes the belief in a self.
II. For the Truth of Origin:
1. Cause {hetu), because it has the characteristic of a seed (bijadharmayogena). The hetu is a distant or material cause. The word yoga signifies nydya or truth.
2. Arising, as it produces. This is the near cause, that from which a dharma immediately arises or originates.
13a. The aspects are sixteen things.
fact, [for they should be contemplated one by one].
I. For the Truth of Suffering:
3. Successive appearance, which constitutes the series: seed,
? shoot, stalk. . .
4. Efficient conditions (pratyaya), as realizing an effect in joint causation; for example, the coming together of efficient condition- s--earth, stick, wheel, twine, water, etc. --produces a jug (see ii. 64).
III. For the Truth of Extinction:
1. Extinction, by reason of the destruction of the [impure]
skandhas.
2. Calm, by reason of the extinction of the three fires, craving, anger, and delusion (viii. 26c).
3. Excellent, by reason of the absence of all pain.
4. Salvation, because it is disassociated from all causes of pain. IV. For the Truth of the Path:
1. Path, because one traverses it (towards Nirvana. )84
2. Truth, because it is yogayukta, that is to say, endowed with proofs, endowed with resources or means.
3. Obtaining, because it brings about correct obtaining, that is to say one obtains (Nirvana through it. )
4. Definitive release, because it causes one to pass beyond in a definitive manner.
There is a second exegesis:
I. For the Truth of Suffering:
1. Impermanent (anitya), because it is not definitive {anatyan- tika).
2. Suffering, because it resembles a burden.
3. Empty, because it is empty of purusa (agent, etc. ). 4. No-soul, because it does not obey the will. 85
II. For the Truth of Origin:
The Knowledges ? ?
? 1112 Chapter Seven
1. Cause (hetu), because it comes about from that (the root hi
signifies gati; hetu signifies hinoty asmdt).
2. Arising (samudaya), because there is emergence: (the
86 dharma emerges from the future).
3. Appearance (prabhava), as it is a procession (prasarana).
4. Condition {pratyaya) or foundation, that is, the essential
element from the action of generation.
III. For the Truth of Extinction:
1. Extinction, because of the cessation of the former suffering and of the non-continuation of subsequent suffering.
2. Calm, because it is delivered from the three conditioned characteristics {samskrtalaksanas. ii. 45c).
3. Excellent, because it is absolutely good (pdramdrthasubha, iv. 8c).
87 4. Salvation, because it supremely strengthens (9v. 8b).
IV. For the Truth of the Path:
1. Path, because it is opposed to the wrong path.
2. Truth, because it is opposed to non-truth.
3. Obtaining, because it is not in contradiction with the city of
88 Nirvana.
4. Definitive release, because it abandons existence in the Three Dhatus.
***
Since ancient explanations differ, we are permitted to present a third explanation:
I. For the Truth of Suffering:
1. Impermanent, because it arises and perishes.
? 2. Suffering, because it is repugnant to the mind of Aryans (vi. English trans, p. 898).
3. Empty, because no dtman is found in it.
4. No soul, because this is not an dtman.
II. For the Truth of Origin: the four aspects of the Second
Truth, cause (hetu), arising (samudaya), appearance (prabhava),
and condition (pratyaya), are: explained according to the Sutra,
"The five upddanaskandhas (impure skandhas, i. 8a) are chandamu-
laka, chandasamudaya, chandajatiya, chandaprabhava," that is to
say they have chanda (=desire=frJr>>^=thirst) for their root (mula)
or hetu, which brings about their arising (samudaya), for their
condition (chandajatiya-chandapraty aya), for their appearance 9
(prabhava)* The only difference between the Sutra and the Sastra is that the latter places the condition (pratyaya) aspect in first
90 place, and not the appearance (prabhava) aspect.
***
What is the difference between these four types of "proces- sions"?
A. One should distinguish four states (avasthd) of desire (chanda): 1. the affection that one experiences for oneself when one thinks, "I am", without otherwise distinguishing an actual "self," without thinking of a past or future self; 2. the desire for re-existence without any other specification; 3. the desire for a certain re-existence; 4. the desire for reincarnation, a desire which makes one accomplish a certain action.
The first desire is the initial cause of suffering--as the seed is
91 the initial cause of the fruit--; it is called hetu.
The second desire is that which brings about re-existence--as the production of the shoot, stalk, etc. , is a casual process or arising (samudaya) which brings about fruit; it is therefore called samudaya, a cause which brings forth.
? The third desire is the cause which determines the quality of suffering,--as the field, the water, the fertilizer, etc. , determine the virility, the ripening, the appearance of the fruit; it is therefore called pratyaya, or condition. 92
The fourth desire is the cause from whence the fruit appears-- as the flower is the cause of the fruit; it is therefore called prabhdva, or appearance.
The fourth desire is the immediate or direct cause; the other three are the mediate or indirect causes.
B. And again, according to the Sutra,93 there are two groups of five "modes of desire" (trsndvicdritas), and two groups of four, which are, respectively, the four desires studied above. The first two desires are of five aspects, and the last two are of four.
a. When one thinks asmi, "I am,'* general affection for one's own person without determination is produced, which is fivefold: I am such; I am the same [as formerly]; I am different; I am something that is; I am something that is not.
b. When one thinks bhavisydmi, "I shall be," there is produced a general desire for re-existence without determination, which is also fivefold: "I shall be such, I shall be thus, I shall be different, I shall exist, and I shall not exist. "
? There is produced particularized desire for re-existence, which is fourfold: "May I be; may I be such; may I be the same; may I be different. "
d. There is produced a desire for reincarnation, which is fourfold: "It is absolutely necessary that I may be, that I may be such, the same, different. 94
The first desires are the initial cause of suffering; they are therefore the hetu. . . The rest as above.
III. For the Truth of Extinction:
1. Extinction, because it cuts off transmigration. 95
2. Calm, because it is cessationof all suffering; thus it is said,
? "All the samskdras, Oh Bhiksus, are suffering; only Nirvana alone 96
is absolute calm. "
3. Excellent, because it is the highest.
How are the knowledges, which are twofold (pure and impure) distributed into ten knowledges?
8. The knowledges are ten in number; the distinction is established by reason of their nature, their opposition, their aspect, their aspect and their object, their preparatory exercises, the achievement of their task, and the extension of their cause.
1. By reason of its nature, there is conventional knowledge,
36 because it is not absolute knowledge.
? _ The Knowledges 1097 2. By reason of their opposition, there is knowledge of the
dharmas and inferential knowledge: the first is opposed to 37
Kamadhatu, and the second is opposed to the higher spheres.
3. By reason of their aspect (dkdratas, vii. 13), there is a
knowledge of Suffering and a knowledge of Origin: these two
knowledges have the same object (i. e. , the pancopdddnaskandhas, 38
vi. English trans, p. 898 and 908), but differ in their aspects.
4. By reason of their aspect and their object (dlambana), there is a knowledge of Extinction and a knowledge of the Path which differ in their aspects as well as in their objects.
5. By reason of their preparatory exercises, there is the knowledge of the mind of another. Without doubt this knowledge extends also to the mental states {caittas) of another, but the preparatory exercise bears on the mind {citta)\ also, even though it may know the caittas, it is termed paracittajnana (the knowledge of the mind of another) by reason of its preparatory exercise.
6. Because "that which should have been done has been done/' there is the Knowledge of Destruction: this knowledge is the first knowledge to arise in a series in which "that which should have been done has been done. " [The Knowledge of Non-Arising arises in a similar series, but later. ]
7. By reason of the extension of its causes, there is the Knowledge of Non-Arising, for it has for its causes (=sabhd- gahetu) all the pure knowledges, up to and including the Knowledge of Destruction.
***
We have said that the knowledge of the dharmas [that is to say: a. bearing on the Four Truths, b. in the Path of Seeing and in the Path of Meditation] is opposed to all of Kamadhatu [that is to say it "opposes" the five categories of defilements, those abandoned through the Seeing of the Four Truths and through Meditation, of Kamadhatu]. Furthermore
? 1098 Chapter Seven
9a-c. The knowledge of dharmas, in the Pathway of Meditation, when it bears on Extinction and the Path, is opposed to the three spheres.
A knowledge of dharmas with respect to Extinction and the Path, realized in the course of the Path of Meditation is opposed to the three spheres--that is to say, these two knowledges oppose the defilements of the higher spheres which are abandoned through Meditation. 39
9d. Inferential knowledge is not opposed to Kumadhatu. In none of its branches (Suffering, etc. ) is inferential knowl-
edge opposed ? the defilements of Kamadhatu. What are the aspects of the ten knowledges?
lOa-b. A knowledge of dharmas and inferential knowledge have sixteen aspects.
The sixteen aspects which will be explained later (vii. 13a).
lOb-c. Conventional knowledge is the same and otherwise.
Conventional knowledge has the sixteen aspects; it also takes up others, for it grasps unique characteristics, common characteris- tics, etc. 40
? ? -d. Four, because of the aspect of their Truth. 41
A knowledge of Suffering, Origin, Extinction, and the Path, bearing on the aspects of their Truths, each have four aspects.
lla-b. So too, when it is pure, the knowledge of the mind of another. 42
? The knowledge of the mind of another, in its impure part (vii. 5b-6, note 16), bears on the aspects of its Truth; it therefore has four aspects. This part of the knowledge of the mind of another is, in fact, made up of the knowledge of the Path.
llb-c. When it is impure, it has for its aspects the unique
43 characteristics of its object.
When the knowledge of the mind of another is impure, it grasps the unique characteristics of its object (jneya), namely the mind and the mental states of another. Its aspects are in conformity with these unique characteristics; therefore they are not included in the sixteen.
Pure or impure
44 Ud. It has for its sphere an individual object.
When it bears on a mind, it does not bear on a mental state (caitta); when it bears on a certain mental state (vedand for example), it does not bear on any other one (samjnd, for example).
If this is the case, why did the Blessed One say, "He knows in truth the mind which is sardga (possesses craving) as being
45
sardga", since the knowledge of the mind of another does not
know minds and mental states (craving, etc. ) at one and the same
time, in the same way that one does not grasp the cloth and its
46 stain at one and the same time?
The expression sardga, possessing craving, has two meanings. 47
A mind is sardga because it is "mixed" with craving, or because it 48
is "united" to craving.
The mind associated with craving (ii. 53c), that is to say, which is presently in the prey of craving, is sardga for two reasons; it is mixed with craving, and it is united to craving.
The Knowledges 1Q99
? 1100 Chapter Seven
49
Certain masters
sardgacitta solely designates a mind mixed with craving, that is to say, a mind associated with craving. As for the vigatardga mind, a mind without craving, this is, according to these masters, the mind opposed to craving. In fact, they say, if the mind not associated with craving were called vigataraga, the mind associated with the other defilements (hatred, etc. ) would be also termed vigataraga, for they are not associated with craving.
Objection: In this hypothesis a non-defiled, indeterminate mind (ii. 71b) is not sardga, since it is not associated with craving; it is not vigataraga, since it is not opposed to craving. As a consequence we must admit that what the other masters (the Abhidharmikas) say, that the mind is sardga through the fact of being united to craving, without it necessarily being mixed with craving. In this same way we must explain the other expressions of the Sutra up to "possessing delusion'' (samoha) and "not possessing delusion" (vigatamoha). [See above, note 45. ]
***
[The Vaibhasikas say:] A good mind is called concentrated
51
because it is not turned away from its object. A defiled mind is
distracted, because it is associated with distraction.
The Westerners, or Masters of Gandhara, say: A mind
52
Any other impure mind united to craving.
50
is solely sardga to the extent that it is
associated with laziness is concentrated; other defiled mind.
a distracted mind is any
think that the Sutra, by the expression
[The Vaibhasikas] do not admit this definition. They say: In this system, the same mind, namely a defiled mind associated with laziness, will be at one and the same time concentrated and distracted. Further, this system contradicts the Mulasdstra (according to the Japanese editor, Jndnaprasthana, 15. 9), which
? says, "He knows in truth the concentrated (samksipta) mind, endowed with the four knowledges, a knowledge of dharmas, inferential knowledge, worldly conventional knowledge, and a knowledge of the Path" (Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 950c8). [See below, p. 1102 - 3. ]
###
A defiled mind is sunken down, because it is associated with
53 indolence.
A good mind is "well in hand", because it is associated with
54 correct effort.
A defiled mind is called small, because it is beloved by small
persons. A good mind is called large, because it is beloved by great
55 persons.
Or rather the two minds, a defiled mind and a good mind, are called small and great because their roots, their worth, their followings, their entourage, and their forces, are respectively, small or great.
In fact, 1. a defiled mind is of small roots, having two roots, delusion, plus anger or greed: a good mind is always associated with three roots of good; 2. a defiled mind is of small worth, being obtained without effort: a good mind is of great worth, being realized at the cost of great effort; 3. a defiled mind has a small following, for a defiled mind is not accompanied by the acquisition
56
of a future mind of the same type;
following, being accompanied by the acquisition of future mind
of the same type; 4. a defiled mind has a small following, being surrounded only by three skandhas, vedand, samjnd, and samskdras; a good mind has a great following, for it always includes rupa {dhydndndsmvasamvara, iv. 4a, 26); 5. a defiled mind is of small
a good mind has a great 57
? 1102 Chapter Seven .
force, for the roots of good, cut off, are reborn (ii, 36, English trans, p. 210 iv. 80c); a good mind is of great force, for the Patience of the Knowledge of the dharmas concerned with Suffering definitively cuts off ten latent defilements {anusayas vi. English trans, p. 943).
This is why a defiled mind is called small, and a good mind, great.
***
The defiled mind is sa-uttara, because it is associated with frivolity {auddhatya)\ the good mind is anuttara, because it is
58 opposed to frivolity.
Calm and not calm minds are explained in the same way.
***
A defiled mind is non-absorbed, because it is associated with distraction; a good mind is absorbed, because it is opposed to distraction.
A defiled mind is uncultivated, because the two cultivations (vii. 27) are absent. A good mind is cultivated, for the contrary reason.
A defiled mind is undelivered, not being delivered in and of
59 itself, nor delivered with regard to the series in which it arises. A
good mind can be delivered in and of itself and from the point of view of the series in which it arises.
Such is the explanation of the Vaibhasikas.
This explanation, [say the Sautrantikas,] does not conform to the Sutra and it does not take into account the meaning of the terms.
? i. How does it not conform to the Sutra?
The Sutra says, "What is a mind internally concentrated? A mind which is accompanied by torpor and laziness, or a mind internally accompanied by calm but not insight. "
"What is a mind externally distracted? A mind which is
dispersed towards the five objects of pleasure, or which is
60
externally accompanied by insight, but not by calm. " [It, results
from this text that a mind associated with laziness can be concentrated. ]
But, [the Vaibhasikas answer,] we have said (p. 1100, line 21) that if a mind associated with laziness is concentrated, a defiled (and consequently distracted) mind, when it is associated with laziness, will be at one and the same time concentrated and distracted.
Yes, you have said this, but it does not hold. In fact, we can only
affirm that a defiled mind, when it is associated with laziness, is
61 distracted.
But, [answer the Vaibhasikas,] your thesis contradicts the Sastra!
62 It may. But it is better to contradict a Sastra than a Sutra.
ii. How does this explanation lack the proper meaning of the different terms?
Because it gives the characteristics of different minds--dis- tracted, sunken-down, small, not calm, non-absorbed, uncultivated, and undelivered on the one hand, and concentrated, well in hand,
63 etc. , on the other hand--without noting their differences.
[The Vaibhasikas answer:] It is false that we do not indicate the special sense of the different terms. The quality of "defiled" of distracted minds, etc. , is the same; but we explain the particular defects of these different defiled minds. In the same way we explain the particular qualities of the different good minds, in which their good qualities are not differentiated.
We answer that the meaning of the different terms is not correctly established because you fail to eliminate the objection of
The Knowledges 1103
? 64
contradiction with the Sutra. [The Sutra, in fact, says that a mind
accompanied by torpor and laziness is concentrated. A mind united with laziness, and defiled through union with torpor, is concen- trated, but it cannot be good, for torpor is a klesamahdbhumika. ]
And if, [as the Vaibhasikas believe], the Sutra designates, by
65
the sunken-down mind,
separately of a sunken-down mind and a small mind. Now it distinguishes them, for it says, "When the mind is sunken down, or fears becoming sunken down, this is not a proper time to cultivate the prasrabdhi, samddhi, and upeksa parts of Bodhi. When the mind is small or fears becoming small, this is not a fitting moment
66 to cultivate the dharmavicaya, virya, and priti parts of Bodhi. "
Objection [of the Vaibhasikas:] Is the cultivation of the parts of
67
Bodhi partial in the case which concerns us? [Must we believe
a small mind, it would not speak
that at a certain moment one cultivates prasrabdhi, samddhi, 69
upeksa, and at another moment dharmavicaya, virya, and priti? ]
No. When the text says "cultivation", it does not signify the fact of actualizing, but the fact of fixing the attention on, or taking as an object.
69
[Answer of the Vaibhasikas:] The mind in which indolence
dominates and in which frivolity is reduced is called "sunken
down" (lina). The mind in which frivolity dominates and in which
indolence is reduced is called "small" {uddhata). These two minds
are therefore distinct, and the Sutra can speak of them separately
without contradicting our system. But, taking into consideration
the fact that these two defilements, indolence and frivolity, coexist
in a single mental heap, we say that the mind which is sunken
70 down is small.
71
We do not pretend to challenge a text of intentional meaning; but such is not the intention of the Sutra [i. e. , to designate a mind in which indolence dominates as sunken down. . . ]
***
? In the thesis presented above (p. 1099, line 23) that all minds "united with craving" (rdgasamyukta) "possess craving" (sardga), what is the meaning of the expression rdgasamyukta, united with craving?
1. If a mind is united with craving, and as a consequence possesses craving, because the possession of craving continues in the series in which this mind is produced, then the mind of an imperfect saint or Saiksa, even when it is pure, will be termed "possessing craving", since the craving has not been completely
72 expelled from the series of the Saiksa.
2. If a mind is both united with craving and possesses craving
through the fact of being the object (dlambana) of the "active 73
craving" ,thentheimpuremindofanArhatwillpossesscraving,
since this mind can be the object of the craving of another
74 person.
If you do not admit that the mind of an Arhat can be grasped as an object through the craving of another person, how can this mind be termed impure?
Would you say that it is impure, not because it is the object of the craving of another, but because it is the object of a "general defilement" (sdmdnyaklesa, v. 12, namely of ignorance or delusion) of another? In this hypothesis, do not say that this mind is sardga, that it "possesses craving"; say rather that it is samoha, that it "possesses moha," since it is the object of the moha or ignorance of another.
But, we would say, none of these proposed explanations is valid. In fact the knowledge of the mind of another does not bear on the "possessions" which can be found in the series of another. Consequently when I know that the mind of another person possesses craving, this mind of another does not possess craving because it is "united with craving" in the sense that it is accompanied by the possession of craving, or in the sense that it is found in the series in which this possession has not been expelled.
The knowledge of the mind of another no longer knows the craving which would be the object of the mind of another.
? 1106 Chapter Seven
Therefore a mind is not termed saraga through the fact of ragasamyoga, through the fact of being "united with raga" in the proposed twofold sense.
[Objection:]
75
***
If this is the case, what is a saraga mind?
[Vasubandhu:] One should determine the intention of the Sutra. A saraga mind or one "possessing craving" is not a ragasarhyukta mind, a mind "united to craving", but a ragasarh- prayukta mind, a mind "associated with craving," a mind in which craving presently exists. Vigataraga, "without craving" is a mind which is not associated with craving, even when this mind will be accompanied by the possession of craving.
[Objection:] The expression vigataraga cannot have this meaning; for another Sutra says that a mind which is without craving {vigataraga), without anger (vigatadvesa), and without ignorance (vigatamoha), does not fall back into threefold existence. Now if this mind is accompanied by the possession of craving, etc. , it will fall back again.
[Vasubandhu:] In this other Sutra, "a mind without craving" (vigataraga citta) signifies "a mind which is not accompanied by the possession of craving" (vigatardgaprdpti citta).
[Objection:] Have you not refuted your own opinion? We said in fact (page 1100, line 5) that if one calls a mind without craving vigataraga, that is, a mind in which craving is not presently active, then one should term all minds associated with another defilement vigataraga. But one does not say that a mind associated with hatred is vigataraga, "without craving. "
[Vasubandhu:] There is nothing wrong with saying that a mind without craving is vigataraga. But one does not consider a mind without craving but associated with hatred as being vigataraga, but rather as "possessing hatred" (sadvesa), distin- guishing it through its specific characteristic which is one of being
? "associated with hatred. "
When the knowledge of the mind of another attains its object, namely the mind of another person, does it attain this mind of another as this latter knows it?
No. When one knows the mind of another, one does not see the object of this mind; one does not see this mind as it itself knows something: one knows only that it is defiled, etc. ; one does not know the object, color, etc. , by reason of which it is defiled.
If it were otherwise, the knowledge of the mind of another would bear on rupa, etc. , and would no longer be the knowledge of the mind of another; the knowledge of the mind of another would bear on itself: for the person whose mind I know can at the same moment know my mind.
The characteristics of the knowledge of the mind of another are set: it knows the individual characteristics of a thing (the dravya-svalaksana) but not its general, conventionally true characteristics (its samvrtisat-sdmdnyalaksana)\ it knows mind and mental states but not physical matter, the present but not the past or future, of another but not of oneself, of the sphere of Kamadhatu and Rupadhatu, but not of Ampyadhatu; or rather the pure mind and mental states, of the category to which he himself belongs: pure, he knows a pure mind and mental states; impure, he knows an impure mind and mental states. The knowledge of the mind of another is incompatible with the Path of Seeing and the Uninterrupted Path (dnantaryamdrga), with the Samadhi of Emptiness and the Samadhi of No-Marks, and with the Knowl- edge of Destruction and the Knowledge of Non-Arising. Other conditions are not excluded: the knowledge of the mind of another is compatible with the Path of Meditation (the Path of Liberation, vimuktimdrga, and the Path of Distinction, visesamdrga), with the Uncommitted Samadhi (apranihitasamddhi), etc.
The teaching of the knowledge of the mind of another is ended.
? 1108 Chapter Seven
12a-b. The other has fourteen aspects by excluding the aspect of emptiness and the aspect of non-self.
The "others" are the Knowledge of Destruction and the Knowledge of Non-Arising.
Both have fourteen aspects (vii. 13a), excluding the aspect of
emptiness and the aspect of non-self. In fact, these two Knowl-
76
edges, even though they are of the absolute level of truth, are also
77
included in the conventional level of truth (vi. 4);
therefore foreign to the aspects of emptiness and non-self. When an ascetic departs from the contemplation in which the knowl- edges of the absolute truth are realized, through the force of these
78
knowledges, later knowledges
conventional level of truth: "my births are cut off, the religious life has been fully cultivated, I have done what should have been done,
79
and I do not know of any more existences for me. " The two
knowledges, the Knowledge of Destruction and the Knowledge of Non-Arising, therefore participate in the conventional level of truth, not in and of themselves or through definition, but through their outflowing.
Are there any pure aspects outside of these sixteen aspects?
12c. There are no pure aspects outside of the sixteen.
The Masters of Kasmir say that there are no pure aspects outside of the sixteen.
12d. Some others, according to the Sustra, affirm that there are.
are produced which are of the
they are
? _ The Knowledges 1109
The Foreign Masters maintain the opposite opinion. [For the opinion of "the other masters," see p. 1094, line 27].
80
The Mulasdstra says,
belonging to Kamadhatu through a mind not included among the Dhutus (that is to say, pure)? One can distinguish them as they are, as impermanent, suffering, empty, impersonal, cause, proximate cause, near cause, specificing cause; there is this characteristic (sthdna), there is this cause (vastu). "
One should thus consider the specific aspects through the expressions asty etat sthdnam, asty etad vastu, as two pure aspects which are added to the eight aspects of suffering and origin.
According to the Masters of Kasmir, the Sastra does not teach the existence of these two additional aspects. One should understand, ". . . it is fitting (asty ayarh yogah) that a pure mind distinguish these dharmas as impermanent. . . "
The Foreign Masters answer that this interpretation is not
admissible. For, if the Sastra employs the terms asty etat sthdnam. . .
without referring to the pure aspects, but only through simple
phraseology, it would also employ them in a parallel passage,
namely when it explains, "Can one distinguish the dharmas
belonging to Kamadhatu by a mind susceptible of being abandoned
by Seeing the Truths? Yes, one can distinguish them, namely, one
becomes attached to, one hates, one prides oneself, one errs, one
erroneously distinguishes these dharmas as self, mine (-kdyadrsti),
as eternal or perishable (-antagrdhadrsti), as non-cause, non-ac-
tion, nonexistent (-mithyddrsti), as supreme, excellent, distin-
guished, superior (=drstipardmarsa), as purification, deliverance,
"Can one distinguish the dharmas
salvation (-stlavratapardmarsa), with anxiety, disagreement, or 81
doubt. " This text should have the expressions asty etat sthd- nam. . . , if they solely signify asty ayam yogah, in the sense that it is fatal that a mind susceptible of being abandoned through the Seeing of the Truths considers the dharmas as self, mine. . .
#**
? 1110 Chapter Seven
How many things constitute the sixteen aspects?
82
Certain masters said that the aspects, sixteen in name, are only seven in fact. The four aspects of the Truth of Suffering are in fact distinct from one another. The aspects of the other Truths, in their fourfold name, only constitute one thing for each Truth: hetu (material cause), samudaya (arising or origin), prabhava (appear- ance), and pratyaya (efficient condition) are synonyms and are only one aspect; in the same way that Sakra, Indra, and Purariidara are different names for one and the same personage. Ascetics contemplate, separately, the four aspects of the Truth of Suffering, and any one of the aspects, material cause, etc. , of the three other Truths.
But [the Vaibhasikas] maintain that the sixteen aspects exist in
83
1. Impermanence, because it arises dependent upon efficient causes.
2. Suffering, because it is painful by nature (vi. 3).
3. Empty, as it opposes the belief in the view of things pertaining to self.
4. No soul, as it opposes the belief in a self.
II. For the Truth of Origin:
1. Cause {hetu), because it has the characteristic of a seed (bijadharmayogena). The hetu is a distant or material cause. The word yoga signifies nydya or truth.
2. Arising, as it produces. This is the near cause, that from which a dharma immediately arises or originates.
13a. The aspects are sixteen things.
fact, [for they should be contemplated one by one].
I. For the Truth of Suffering:
3. Successive appearance, which constitutes the series: seed,
? shoot, stalk. . .
4. Efficient conditions (pratyaya), as realizing an effect in joint causation; for example, the coming together of efficient condition- s--earth, stick, wheel, twine, water, etc. --produces a jug (see ii. 64).
III. For the Truth of Extinction:
1. Extinction, by reason of the destruction of the [impure]
skandhas.
2. Calm, by reason of the extinction of the three fires, craving, anger, and delusion (viii. 26c).
3. Excellent, by reason of the absence of all pain.
4. Salvation, because it is disassociated from all causes of pain. IV. For the Truth of the Path:
1. Path, because one traverses it (towards Nirvana. )84
2. Truth, because it is yogayukta, that is to say, endowed with proofs, endowed with resources or means.
3. Obtaining, because it brings about correct obtaining, that is to say one obtains (Nirvana through it. )
4. Definitive release, because it causes one to pass beyond in a definitive manner.
There is a second exegesis:
I. For the Truth of Suffering:
1. Impermanent (anitya), because it is not definitive {anatyan- tika).
2. Suffering, because it resembles a burden.
3. Empty, because it is empty of purusa (agent, etc. ). 4. No-soul, because it does not obey the will. 85
II. For the Truth of Origin:
The Knowledges ? ?
? 1112 Chapter Seven
1. Cause (hetu), because it comes about from that (the root hi
signifies gati; hetu signifies hinoty asmdt).
2. Arising (samudaya), because there is emergence: (the
86 dharma emerges from the future).
3. Appearance (prabhava), as it is a procession (prasarana).
4. Condition {pratyaya) or foundation, that is, the essential
element from the action of generation.
III. For the Truth of Extinction:
1. Extinction, because of the cessation of the former suffering and of the non-continuation of subsequent suffering.
2. Calm, because it is delivered from the three conditioned characteristics {samskrtalaksanas. ii. 45c).
3. Excellent, because it is absolutely good (pdramdrthasubha, iv. 8c).
87 4. Salvation, because it supremely strengthens (9v. 8b).
IV. For the Truth of the Path:
1. Path, because it is opposed to the wrong path.
2. Truth, because it is opposed to non-truth.
3. Obtaining, because it is not in contradiction with the city of
88 Nirvana.
4. Definitive release, because it abandons existence in the Three Dhatus.
***
Since ancient explanations differ, we are permitted to present a third explanation:
I. For the Truth of Suffering:
1. Impermanent, because it arises and perishes.
? 2. Suffering, because it is repugnant to the mind of Aryans (vi. English trans, p. 898).
3. Empty, because no dtman is found in it.
4. No soul, because this is not an dtman.
II. For the Truth of Origin: the four aspects of the Second
Truth, cause (hetu), arising (samudaya), appearance (prabhava),
and condition (pratyaya), are: explained according to the Sutra,
"The five upddanaskandhas (impure skandhas, i. 8a) are chandamu-
laka, chandasamudaya, chandajatiya, chandaprabhava," that is to
say they have chanda (=desire=frJr>>^=thirst) for their root (mula)
or hetu, which brings about their arising (samudaya), for their
condition (chandajatiya-chandapraty aya), for their appearance 9
(prabhava)* The only difference between the Sutra and the Sastra is that the latter places the condition (pratyaya) aspect in first
90 place, and not the appearance (prabhava) aspect.
***
What is the difference between these four types of "proces- sions"?
A. One should distinguish four states (avasthd) of desire (chanda): 1. the affection that one experiences for oneself when one thinks, "I am", without otherwise distinguishing an actual "self," without thinking of a past or future self; 2. the desire for re-existence without any other specification; 3. the desire for a certain re-existence; 4. the desire for reincarnation, a desire which makes one accomplish a certain action.
The first desire is the initial cause of suffering--as the seed is
91 the initial cause of the fruit--; it is called hetu.
The second desire is that which brings about re-existence--as the production of the shoot, stalk, etc. , is a casual process or arising (samudaya) which brings about fruit; it is therefore called samudaya, a cause which brings forth.
? The third desire is the cause which determines the quality of suffering,--as the field, the water, the fertilizer, etc. , determine the virility, the ripening, the appearance of the fruit; it is therefore called pratyaya, or condition. 92
The fourth desire is the cause from whence the fruit appears-- as the flower is the cause of the fruit; it is therefore called prabhdva, or appearance.
The fourth desire is the immediate or direct cause; the other three are the mediate or indirect causes.
B. And again, according to the Sutra,93 there are two groups of five "modes of desire" (trsndvicdritas), and two groups of four, which are, respectively, the four desires studied above. The first two desires are of five aspects, and the last two are of four.
a. When one thinks asmi, "I am,'* general affection for one's own person without determination is produced, which is fivefold: I am such; I am the same [as formerly]; I am different; I am something that is; I am something that is not.
b. When one thinks bhavisydmi, "I shall be," there is produced a general desire for re-existence without determination, which is also fivefold: "I shall be such, I shall be thus, I shall be different, I shall exist, and I shall not exist. "
? There is produced particularized desire for re-existence, which is fourfold: "May I be; may I be such; may I be the same; may I be different. "
d. There is produced a desire for reincarnation, which is fourfold: "It is absolutely necessary that I may be, that I may be such, the same, different. 94
The first desires are the initial cause of suffering; they are therefore the hetu. . . The rest as above.
III. For the Truth of Extinction:
1. Extinction, because it cuts off transmigration. 95
2. Calm, because it is cessationof all suffering; thus it is said,
? "All the samskdras, Oh Bhiksus, are suffering; only Nirvana alone 96
is absolute calm. "
3. Excellent, because it is the highest.
