I can very truly
say, that I have not found, by observation, or inquiry,
that any sense of the evils produced by their projects
has produced in them, or any one of them, the smallest degree of repentance.
say, that I have not found, by observation, or inquiry,
that any sense of the evils produced by their projects
has produced in them, or any one of them, the smallest degree of repentance.
Edmund Burke
?
ON THE POLICY OF THE ALLIES.
425
in that cause which we seem to make our own t9
come freely into any place in which the allies obtain
ally footing.
If we wish to gain upon any people, it is right to
see what it is they expect. We have had a proposal
from the Royalists of Poitou. They are well entitled,
after a bloody war maintained for eight months against
all the powers of anarchy, to speak the sentiments of
the Royalists of France. Do they desire us to exclude
their princes, their clergy, their nobility? The direct
contrary. They earnestly solicit that men of every
one of these descriptions should be sent to them.
They do not callfor English, Austrian, or Prussian
officers. They call for French emigrant officers.
They call for the exiled priests. They have demanded the Comte d'Artois to appear at their head.
These are the demands (quite natural demands) of
those who are ready to follow the standard of monarchy.
The great means, therefore, of restoring the monarchy, which we have made the main object of the war, is, to assist the dignity, the religion, and the property
of France to repossess themselves of the means of
their natural influence. This ought to be the primary object of all our politics and all our military operations. Otherwise everything will move in a
preposterous order, and nothing but confusion and
destruction will follow.
I know that misfortune is not made to win respect
from ordinary minds. I know that there is a leaning to prosperity, however obtained, and a prejudice
in its favor. I know there is a disposition to hope
something from the variety and inconstancy of villany, rather than from the tiresome uniformity of fixed
? ? ? ? 426 ON THE POLICY OF THE ALLIES.
principle. There have been, I admit, situations in
which a guiding person or party might be gained
over, and through him or them the whole body of a
nation. For the hope of such a conversion, and of
deriving advantage from enemies, it might be politic
for a while to throw your friends into the shade.
But examples drawn from history in occasions like
the present will be found dangerously to mislead us.
France has no resemblance to other countries which
have undergone troubles and been purified by them.
If France, Jacobinized as it has been for four full
years, did contain any bodies of authority and disposition to treat with you, (most assuredly she does not,) such is the levity of those who have expelled
everything respectable in their country, such their
ferocity, their arrogance, their mutinous spirit, their
habits of defying everything human and divine, that
no engagement would hold with them for three
months; nor, indeed, could they cohere together for
any purpose of civilized society, if left as they now
are. There must be a means, not only of breaking
their strength within themselves, but of civiliziny
them; and these two things must go together, before
we can possibly treat with them, not only as a nation,
but with any division of them. Descriptions of men
of their own race, but better in rank, superior in
property and decorum, of honorable, decent, and orderly habits, are absolutely necessary to bring them to such a frame as to qualify them so much as to
come into contact with a civilized nation. A set of
those ferocious savages with arms in their hands, left
to themselves in one part of the country whilst you
proceed to another, would break forth into outrages
at least as bad as their former. They must, as fast
? ? ? ? ON THE POLICY OF THE ALLIES. 427
as gained, (if ever they are gained,) be put under the
guide, direction, and government of better Frenchmen than themselves, or they will instantly relapse
into a fever of aggravated Jacobinism.
We must not judge of other parts of France by the
temporary submission of Toulon, with two vast fleets
in its harbor, and a garrison far more numerous than
all the inhabitants able to bear arms. If they were
left to themselves, I am quite sure they would not retain their attachment to monarchy of any name for
a single week.
To administer the only cure for the unheard-of disorders of that undone country, I think it infinitely
happy for us that God has given into our hands
more effectual remedies than human contrivance
could point out. We have in our bosom, and in
the bosom of other civilized states, nearer forty than
thirty thousand persons, providentially preserved, not
only from the crueltv and violence, but from the contagion of the horrid practices, sentiments, and language of the Jacobins, and even sacredly guarded from the view of such abominable scenes. If we
should obtain, in any considerable district, a footing
in France, we possess an immense body of physicians
and magistrates of the mind, whom we now know to
be the most discreet, gentle, well-tempered, conciliatory, virtuous, and pious persons who in any order
probably existed in the world. You will have a missioner of peace and order in every parish. Never
was a wiser national economy than in the charity
of the English and of other countries. Never was
money better expended than in the maintenance of
this body of civil troops for reestablishing order in
France, and for thus securing its civilization to Eu
? ? ? ? 428 ON THE POLICY OF THE ALLIES.
rope. This means, if properly used, is of value inestimable.
Nor is this corps of instruments of civilization confined to the first order of that state, -- I mean the clergy. The allied powers possess also an exceedingly numerous, well-informed, sensible, ingenious, high-principled, and spirited body of cavaliers in the
expatriated landed interest of France, as well qualified, at least, as I (who have been taught by time and experience to moderate my calculation of the expectancy of human abilities) ever expected to see in the body of any landed gentlemen and soldiers by their
birth. France is well winnowed and sifted. Its virtuous men are, I believe, amongst the most virtuous,
as its wicked are amongst the most abandoned upon
earth. Whatever in the territory of France may be
found to be in the middle between these must be attracted to the better part. This will be compassed, when every gentleman, everywhere being restored to
his landed estate, each on his patrimonial ground,
may join the clergy in reanimating the loyalty, fidelity, and religion of the people, - that these gentlemen proprietors of land may sort that people according to
the trust they severally merit, that they may arm the
honest and well-affected, and disarm and disable the
factious and ill-disposed. No foreigner can make
this discrimination nor these arrangements. The
ancient corporations of burghers according to their
several modes should be restored, and placed (as
they ought to be) in the hands of men of gravity
and property in the cities or bailliages, according to
the proper constitutions of the commons or third estate of France. They will restrain and regulate the seditious rabble there, as the gentlemen will on their
? ? ? ? ON THE POLICY OF THE ALLIES. 429
own estates. In this way, and in this way alone, the
country (once broken in upon by foreign force well
directed) may be gained and settled. It must be
gained and settled by itself, anild through the medium
of its own native dignity and property. It is not
honest, it is not decent, still less is it politic, for
foreign powers themselves to attempt anything in
this minute, internal, local detail, in which they could
show nothing but ignorance, imbecility, confusion,
and oppression. As to the prince who has a just
claim to exercise the regency of France, like other
men he is not without his faults and his defects.
But faults or defects (always supposing them faults
of common human infirmity) are not what in anly
country destroy a legal title to government. These
princes are kept in a poor, obscure, country town of
the king of Prussia's. Their reputation is entirely
at the mercy of every calumniator. They cannot
show themselves, they cannot explain themselves,
as princes ought to do. After being well informed
as any man here can be, I do not find that these
blemishes in this eminent person are at all considerable, or that they at all affect a character which is full of probity, honor, generosity, and real goodness.
In some points he has but too much resemblance
to his unfortunate brother, who, with all his weaknesses, had a good understanding, and many parts of an excellent man and a good king. But Monsieur, without supposing the other deficient, (as he
was not,) excels him in general knowledge, and in
a sharp and keen observation, with somnething of
a better address, and an happier mode of speaking
and of writing. His conversation is open, agreeable,
and informed; his manners gracious and princely.
? ? ? ? 130 ON THE POLICY OF THE ALLIES.
His brother, the Comte d'Artois, sustains still better the representation of his place. He is eloquent, lively, engaging in the highest degree, of a decided
character, full of energy and activity. In a word,
he is a brave, honorable, and accomplished cavalier.
Their brethren of royalty, if they were true to their
own cause and interest, instead of relegating these
illustrious persons to an obscure town, would bring
them forward in their courts and camps, and exhibit
them to (what they would speedily obtain) the esteem,
respect, and affection of mankind.
Objection As to their knocking at every door, (which
made to the
regent's en- seems to give offence,) can anything be more
deavor to go
to Spain. natural? Abandoned, despised, rendered in
a manner outlaws by all the powers of Europe, who
have treated their unfortunate brethren with all the
giddy pride and improvident insolence of blind, unfeeling prosperity, who did not even send them a compliment of condolence on the murder of their
brother and sister, in such a state is it to be wondered at, or blamed, that they tried every way, likely or unlikely, well or ill chosen, to get out of the horrible pit into which they are fallen, and that in particular they tried whether the princes of their
own blood might at length be brought to think the
cause of kings, and of kings of their race, wounded
in the murder and exile of the branch of France, of
as much importance as the killing of a brace of partridges? If they were absolutely idle, and only eat in sloth their bread of sorrow and dependence, they
would be forgotten, or at best thought of as wretches
unworthy of their pretensions, which they had done
nothing to support. If they err from our interests,
what care has been taken to keep them in those in
? ? ? ? ON THE POLICY OF THE ALLIES. 431
terests? or what desire has ever been shown to employ them in any other way than as instruments of their own degradation, shame, and ruin?
The Parliament of Paris, by whom the title of the
regent is to be recognized, (not made,) according to
the laws of the kingdom, is ready to recognize it, and
to register it, if a place of meeting was given to them,
which might be within their own jurisdiction, supposing that only locality was required for the exercise of their functions: for it is one of the advantages of
monarchy to have no local seat. It may maintain
its rights out of the sphere of its territorial jurisdiction, if other powers will suffer it.
I am well apprised that the little intriguers, and
whisperers, and self-conceited, thoughtless babblers,
worse than either, run about to depreciate the fallen
virtue of a great nation. But whilst they talk, we
must make our choice, - they or the Jacobins. We
have no other option. As to those who in the pride
of a prosperity not obtained by their wisdom, valor,
or industry, think so well of themselves, and of their
own abilities and virtues, and so ill of other men,
truth obliges me to say that they are not founded
in their presumption concerning themselves, nor in
their contempt of the French princes, magistrates,
nobility, and clergy. Instead of inspiring me with
dislike and distrust of the unfortuLnate, engaged with
us in a common cause against our Jacobin enemy,
they take away all my esteem for their own characters, and all my deference to their judgment.
There are some few French gentlemen, indeed, who
talk a language not wholly different from this jargon.
Those whom I have in my eye I respect as gallant
soldiers, as much as any one can do; but on their
? ? ? ? 432 ON THE POLICY OF THE ALLIES.
political judgment and prudence I have not the
Slightest reliance, nor on their knowledge of their
own country, or of its laws and Constitution. They
are, if not enemies, at least not friends, to the orders
of their own state, - not to the princes, the clergy, or
the nobility; they possess only an attachment to the
monarchy, or rather to the persons of the late king
and queen. In all other respects their conversation
is Jacobin. I am afraid they, or some of them, go
into the closets of ministers, and tell them that the
affairs of France will be better arranged by the allied
powers than by the landed proprietors of the kingdom, or by the princes who have a right to govern; and that, if any French are at all to be employed in
the settlement of their country, it ought to be only
those who have never declared any decided opinion,
or taken any active part in the Revolution. *
I suspect that the authors of this opinion are mere
soldiers of fortune, who, though men of integrity and
honor, would as gladly receive military rank from
Russia, or Austria, or Prussia, as from the regent of
France. Perhaps their not having as much importance at his court as they could wish may incline themn to this strange imagination. Perhaps, having
no property in old France, they are more indifferent
about its restoration. Their language is certainly
flattering to all ministers in all courts. We all are
meln; we all love to be told of the extent of our own
power and our own faculties. If we love glory, we
are jealous of partners, and afraid even of our own
instruments. It is of all modes of flattery the most
effectual, to be told that you can regulate the affairs
of another kingdom better than its hereditary proprie3 This was the language of the Ministerialists.
? ? ? ? ON THE POLICY OF THE ALLIES. 433
tors. It is formed to flatter the principle of conquest
so natural to all men. It is this principle which is
now making the partition of Poland. The powers
concerned have been told by some perfidious Poles,
and perhaps they believe, that their usurpation is a
great benefit to the people, especially to the common
people. However this may turn out with regard to
Poland, I am quite sure that France could not be so
well under a foreign direction as under that of the
representatives of its own king and its own ancient
estates.
I think I have myself studied France as much as
most of those whom the allied courts are likely to
employ in such a work. I have likewise of myself
as partial and as vain an opinion as men commonly
have of themselves. But if I could command the
whole military arm of Europe, I am sure that a
bribe of the best province in that kingdom would not
tempt me to intermeddle in their affairs, except in
perfect concurrence and concert with the natural,
legal interests of the country, composed of the ecclesiastical, the military, the several corporate bodies of justice and of burghership, making under a monarch (I repeat it again and again) the _French nation according to its fundamental Constitution. No considerate statesman would undertake to meddle with it upon any other condition.
The government of that kingdom is fundamentally
monarchical. The public law of Europe has never
recognized in it-any other form of government. The
potentates of Europe have, by that law, a right, an
interest, and a duty to know with what government
they are to treat, and what they are to admit into the
federative society, - or, in other words, into the diploVOL. IV. 28
? ? ? ? 434 ON THIE POLICY OF THE ALLIES.
matic republic of Europe. This right is clear and
indisputable.
What other and further interference they have a
right to in the interior of the concerns of another people is a matter on which, as on every political subject, no very definite or positive rule can well be laid
down. Our neighbors are men; and who will attempt to dictate the laws under which it is allowable
or forbidden to take a part in the concerns of men,
whether they are considered individually or in a collective capacity, whenever charity to them, or a care
of my own safety, calls forth my activity? Circumstances perpetually variable, directing a moral prudence and discretion, the general principles of which
never vary, must alone prescribe a conduct fitting on
such occasions. The latest casuists of public law are
rather of a republican cast, and, in my mind, by no
means so averse as they ought to be to a right in the
people (a word which, ill defined, is of the most
dangerous use) to make changes at their pleasure in
the fundamental laws of their country. These writers, however, when a country is divided, leave abundant liberty for a neighbor to support any of the parties according to his choice. * This interference must, indeed, always be a right, whilst the privilege of doing good to others, and of averting from them every
sort of evil, I. s a right: circumstances may render
that right a duty. It depends wholly on this, whether it be a bona fide charity to a party, and a prudent
precaution with regard to yourself, or whether, under
the pretence of aiding one of the parties in a nation,
you act in such a manner as to aggravate its calami.
ties and accomplish its final destruction. In truth,
* Vattel.
? ? ? ? ON THE POLICY OF THE ALLIES. 435
It is not the interfering or keeping aloof, but iniquitous intermeddling, or treacherous inaction, which is praised or blamed by the decision of an equitable
judge.
It will be a just and irresistible presumption against
the fairness of the interposing power, that he takes
with him no party or description of men in the divided state. It is not probable that these parties should all, and all alike, be more adverse to the true interests of their country, and less capable of forming a judgment upon them, than those who are absolute
strangers to their affairs, and to the character of the
actors in them, and have but a remote, feeble, and
secondary sympathy with their interest. Sormetimes
a calm and healing arbiter may be necessary; but he
is to compose differences, not to give laws. It is impossible that any one should not feel the full force of that presumption. Even people, whose politics for
the supposed good of their own country lead them to
take advantage of the dissensions of a neighboring
nation in order to ruin it, will not directly propose to
exclude the natives, but they will take that mode of
consulting and employing them which most nearly
approaches to an exclusion. In some particulars they
propose what amounts to that exclusion, in others
they do much worse. They recommend to ministry,
"that no Frenchman who has given a decided opinion or acted a decided part in this great Revolution, for or against it, should be countenanced, brought
forward, trusted, or employed, even in the strictest
subordination to the ministers of the allied powers. "
Although one would think that this advice would
stand condemned on the first proposition, yet, as it
has been made popular, and has been proceeded upon
? ? ? ? 436 ON THE POLICY OF THE ALLIES.
practically, I think it right to give it - full consideration.
And first, I have asked myself who these Frenchmen are, that, in the state their own country has been in for these last five years, of all the people of Europe, have alone not been able to form a decided opinion, or have been unwilling to act a decided
part?
Looking over all the names I have heard of in this
great revolution in all human affairs, I find no man
of any distinction who has remained in that more
than Stoical apathy, but the Prince de Conti. This
mean, stupid, selfish, swinish, and cowardly animal,
universally known and despised as such, has indeed,
except in one abortive attempt to elope, been perfectly neutral. However, his neutrality, which it seems would qualify him for trust, and on a competition must set aside the Prince de Conde, can
be of no sort of service. His moderation has not
been able to keep him from a jail. The allied powers must draw him from that jail, before they can have the full advantage of the exertions of this great
neutralist.
Except him, I do not recollect a man of rank or
talents, who by his speeches or his votes, by his pen
or by his sword, has not been active on this scene.
The time, indeed, could admit no neutrality in any
person worthy of the name of man. There were
originally two great divisions in France: the one is
that which overturned the whole of the government
in Church and State, and erected a republic on the
basis of atheism. Their grand engine was the Jacobin Club, a sort of secession from which, but exactly on the same principles, begat another short-lived one,
? ? ? ? ON THE POLICY OF THE ALLIES. 437
called the Club of Eighty-Nine,* which was chiefly
guided by the court rebels, who, in addition to the
crimes of which they were guilty in common with the
others, had the merit of betraying a gracious master
and a kind benefactor. Subdivisions of this faction,
which since we have seen, do not in the least differ
from each other in their principles, their dispositions,
or the means they have employed. Their only quarrel has been about power: in that quarrel, like wave
succeeding wave, one faction has got the better and
expelled the other. Thus, La Fayette for a while got
the better of Orleans; and Orleans afterwards prevailed over La Fayette. Brissot overpowered OrlMans; Barere and Robespierre, and their faction,
mastered them both, and cut off their heads. All
who were not Royalists have been listed in some or
other of these divisions. If it were of any use to settle a precedence, the elder ought to have his rank.
The first authors, plotters, and contrivers of this monstrous scheme seem to me entitled to the first place in
our distrust and abhorrence. I have seen some of
those who are thought the best amongst the original
rebels, and I have not neglected the means of being
informed concerning the others.
I can very truly
say, that I have not found, by observation, or inquiry,
that any sense of the evils produced by their projects
has produced in them, or any one of them, the smallest degree of repentance. Disappointment and mortification undoubtedly they feel; but to them repentance is a thing impossible. They are atheists. This wretched opinion, by which they are possessed even
to the height of fanaticism, leading them to exclude
* The first object of this club was the propagation of Jacobin
principles.
? ? ? ? 438 ON THE POLICY OF THE ALLIES.
from their ideas of a commonwealth the vital principle of the physical, the moral, and the political world engages them in a thousand absurd contrivances to
fill up this dreadful void. Incapable of innoxious
repose or honorable action or wise speculation in
the lurking-holes of a foreign land, into which (in a
common ruin) they are driven to hide their heads
amongst the innocent victims of their madness, they
are at this very hour as busy in the confection of the
dirt-pies of their imaginary constitutions as if they
had not been quite fresh from destroying, by their
impious and desperate vagaries, the finest country
upon earth.
It is, however, out of these, or of such as these,
guilty and impenitent, despising the experience of
others, and their own, that some people talk of
choosing their negotiators with those Jacobins who
they suppose may be recovered to a sounder mind.
They flatter themselves, it seems, that the friendly
habits formed during their original partnership of
iniquity, a similarity of character, and a conformity
in the groundwork of their principles, might facilitate their conversion, and gain them over to some recognition of royalty. But surely this is to read
human nature very ill. The several sectaries in
this schism of the Jacobins are the very last men
in the world to trust each other. Fellowship in
treason is a bad ground of confidence. The last
quarrels are the sorest; and the injuries received
or offered by your own associates are ever the most
bitterly resented. The people of France, of every
name and description, would a thousand times sooner
listen to the Prince de Cond6, or to the Archbishop
of Aix, or the Bishop of St. Pol, or to Monsieur de
? ? ? ? ON THE POLICY OF THE ALLIES. 439
Cazales, than to La Fayette, or Dumouriez, or the
Vicomte de Noailles, or the Bishop of Auturi, or
Necker, or his disciple Lally Tollendal. Against
the first description they have not the smallest animosity, beyond that of a merely political dissension. The others they regard as traitors.
The first description is that of the Christian Royalists, men who as earnestly wished for reformation
as they opposed innovation in the fundamental parts
of their Church and State. Their part has been very
decided. Accordingly, they are to be set aside in the
restoration of Church and State. It is an odd kind
of disqualification, where the restoration of religion
and monarchy is the question. If England should
(God forbid it should! ) fall into the same misfortune
with France, and that the court. of Vienna should
undertake the restoration of our monarchy, I think
it would be extraordinary to object to the admission
of Mr. Pitt or Lord Grenville or Mr. Dundas into
any share in the management of that business, because in a day of trial they have stood up firmly and manfully, as I trust they always will do, and with
distinguished powers, for the monarchy and the legitimate Constitution of their country. I am sure, if I were to suppose myself at Vienna at such a time, I
should, as a man, as an Englishman, and as a Royalist, protest in that case, as I do in this, against a weak and ruinous principle of proceeding, which
can have no other tendency than to make those
who wish to support the crown meditate too profoundly on the consequences of the part they take, and consider whether for their open and forward
zeal in the royal cause they may not be thrust out
from any sort of confidence and employment, where
the interest of crowned heads is concerned.
? ? ? ? 440 ON THE POLICY OF THE ALLIES.
These are the parties. I have said, and said truly,
that I know of no neutrals. But, as a general observation on this general principle of choosing neutra4s
on such occasions as the present, I have this to
say, that it amounts to neither more nor less than
this shocking proposition, - that we ought to exclude
men of honor and ability from. serving theirs and
our cause, and to put the dearest interests of ourselves and our posterity into the hands of men of
no decided character, without judgment to choose
and without courage to profess ally principle whatsoever.
Such men can serve no cause, for this plain reason,
-they have no cause at heart. They can, at best,
work only as mere mercenaries. They have not
been guilty of great crimes; but it is only because
they have not energy of mind to rise to any height
of wickedness. They are not hawks or kites: they
are only miserable fowls whose flight is not above
their dunghill or hen-roost. But they tremble before
the authors of these horrors. They admire them at
a safe and respectful distance. There never was a
mean and abject mind that did not admire an intrepid and dexterous villain. In the bottom of their
hearts they believe such hardy miscreants to be the
only men qualified for great affairs. If you set them
to transact with such persons, they are instantly subdued. They dare not so much as look their antagonist in the face. They are made to be their subjects. not to be their arbiters or controllers.
These men, to be sure, can look at atrocious acts
without indignation, and can behold suffering virtue
without sympathy. Therefore they are considered as
sober, dispassionate men. But they have their pas
? ? ? ? ON THE POLICY OF THE ALLIES. 441
sions, though of another kind, and which are infinitely more likely to carry them out of the path
of their duty. They are of a tame, timid, languid, inert temper, wherever the welfare of others
is concerned. In such causes, as they have no motives to action, they never possess any real ability,
and are totally destitute of all resource.
Believe a man who has seen much and observed
something. I have seen, in the course of my life, a
great many of that family of men. They are generally chosen because they have no opinion of their
own; and as far as they can be got in good earnest to embrace any opinion, it is that of whoever
happens to employ them, (neither longer nor shorter,
narrower nor broader,) with whom they have no discussion or consultation. The only thing which occurs to such a man, when he has got a business for others into his hands, is, how to make his own fortune out of it. The person he is to treat with is not,
with him, an adversary over whom he is to prevail,
but a new friend he is to gain; therefore he always
systematically betrays some part of his trust. Instead of thinking how he shall defend his ground
to the last, and, if forced to retreat, how little he
shall give up, this kind of man considers how much
of the interest of his employer he is to sacrifice to his
adversary. Having nothing but himself in view, he
knows, that, in serving his principal with zeal, he
must probably incur some resentment from the opposite party. His object is, to obtain the good-will of
the person with whom he contends, that, when an
agreement is made, he may join in rewarding him.
I would not take one of these as my arbitrator in
a dispute for so much as a fish-pond; for, if he re
? ? ? ? 442 ON THE POLICY OF THE ALLIES.
served the mud to me, he would be sure to give the
water that fed the pool to my adversary. In a great
cause, I should certainly wish that my agent should
possess conciliating qualities: that he should be of a
frank, open, and candid disposition, soft in his nature, and of a temper to soften animosities and to
win confidence. He ought not to be a man odious
to the person he treats with, by personal injury, by
violence, or by deceit, or, above all, by the dereliction of his cause in any former transactions. But I
would be sure that my negotiator should be mine,that he should be as earnest in the cause as myself, and known to be so, -- that he should not be looked upon as a stipendiary advocate, but as a,
principled partisan. In all treaty it is a great
point that all idea of gaining your agent is hopeless. I would not trust the cause of royalty with
a man who, professing neutrality, is half a republican. The enemy has already a great part of his
suit without a struggle, --and he contends with advantage for all the rest. The common principle allowed between your adversary and your agent gives your adversary the advantage in every discussion.
Before I shut up this discourse about neutral agency, (which I conceive is not to be found, or, if found,
ought not to be used,) I have a few other remarks to
make on the cause which I conceive gives rise to it.
In all that we do, whether in the struggle or after
it, it is necessary that we should constantly have in
our eye the nature and character of the enemy we
have to contend with. The Jacobin Revolution is
carried on by men of no rank, of no consideration,
of wild, savage minds, full of levity, arrogance, and
presumption, without morals, without probity, with
? ? ? ? ON THE POLICY OF THE ALLIES. 443
out prudence. What have they, then, to supply their
innumerable defects, and to make them terrible even
to the firmest minds? One thing, and one thing only,
-but that one thing is worth a thousand; --they
have energy. In France, all things being put into
an universal ferment, in the decomposition of society,
no man comes forward but by his spirit of enterprise
and the vigor of his mind. If we meet this dreadful
and portentous energy, restrained by no consideration of God or man, that is always vigilant, always
on the attack, that allows itself no repose, and suffers
none to rest an hour with impunity, - if we meet this
energy with poor commonplace proceeding, with trivial maxims, paltry old saws, with doubts, fears, and suspicions, with a languid, uncertain hesitation, with
a formal, official spirit, which is turned aside by
every obstacle from its purpose, and which never sees
a difficulty but to yield to it, or at best to evade it, -
down we go to the bottom of the abyss, and nothing short of Omnipotence can save us. We must
meet a vicious and distempered energy with a manly
and rational vigor. As virtue is limited in its resources, we are doubly bound to use all that in
the circle drawn about us by our morals we are
able to command.
I do not contend against the advantages of distrust.
In the world we live in it is but too necessary.
Some of old called it the very sinews of discretion.
But what signify commonplaces that always run
parallel and equal? Distrust is good, or it is bad,
according to our position and our purpose. Distrust
is a defensive principle. They who have much to
lose have much to fear. But in France we hold
nothing. We are to break in upon a power in pos
? ? ? ? 444 ON THE POLICY OF THE ALLIES.
session; we are to carry everything by storm, or by
surprise, or by intelligence, or by all. Adventure,
therefore, and not caution, is our policy. HIere to
be too presuming is the better error.
The world will judge of the spirit of our proceeding in those places of France which may fall into our
power by our conduct in those that are already in
our hands. Our wisdom should not be vulgar. Other
times, perhaps other measures; but in this awful hour
our politics ought to be made up of nothing but courage, decision, manliness, and rectitude. We should
have all the magnanimity of good faith. This is a
royal and commanding policy; and as long as we
are true to it, we may give the law. Never canll we
assume this command, if we will not risk the consequences. For which reason we ought to be bottomed
enough in principle not to be carried away upon the
first prospect of any sinister advantage. For depend
upon it, that, if we once give way to a sinister dealing, we shall teach others the game, and we shall be
outwitted and overborne; the Spaniards, the Prussians, God knows who, will put us under contribution
at their pleasure; and instead of being at the head
of a great confederacy, and the arbiters of Europe,
we shall, by our mistakes, break up a great design
into a thousand little selfish quarrels, the enemy will
triumph, and we shall sit down under the terms of
unsafe and dependent peace, weakened, mortified, and
disgraced, whilst all Europe, England included, is
left open and defenceless on every part, to Jacobin
principles, intrigues, and arms. In the case of the
king of France, declared to be our friend and ally, we will still be considering ourselves in the contradictory character of an enemy. This contradic
? ? ? ? ON THE POLICY OF THE ALLIES. 445
tion, I am afraid, will, in spite of us, give a color
of fraud to all our transactions, or at least will so
complicate our politics that we shall ourselves be
iniextricably entangled in them.
I have Toulon in my eye. It was with infinite
sorrow I heard, that, in taking the king of France's
fleet in trust, we instantly unrigged and dismasted
the ships, instead of keeping them in a condition to
escape in case of disaster, and in order to fulfil our
trust, -- that is, to hold them for the use of the
owner, and in the mean time to employ them for our
common service. These ships are now so circumstanced, that, if we are forced to evacuate Toulon, they must fall into the hands of the enemy or be
burnt by ourselves. I know this is by some considered as a fine thing for us. But the Athenians ought not to be better than the English, or Mr. Pitt less
virtuous than Aristides.
Are we, then, so poor in resources that we can do
no better with eighteen or twenty ships of the line
than to burn them? Had we sent for French Royalist naval officers, of which some hundreds are to be had, and made them select such seamen as they
could trust, and filled the rest with our own and
Mediterranean seamen, which are all over Italy to
be had by thousands, and put them under judicious
English commanders-in-chief, and with a judicious
mixture of our own subordinates, the West Indies
would at this day have been ours. It may be said
that these French officers would take them for the
king of France, and that they would not be in our
power. Be it so. The islands would not be ours,
but they would not be Jacobinized. This is, however, a thing impossible. They must in effect and
? ? ? ? 446 ON THE POLICY OF THE ALLIES.
substance be ours. But all is upon that false principle of distrust, which, not confiding in strength, can
never have the full use of it. They that pay, and
feed, and equip, must direct. But I must speak
plain upon this subject. The French islands, if
they were all our own, ought not to be all kept.
A fair partition only ought to be made of those territories. This is a subject of policy very serious,
which has many relations and aspects. Just here
I only hint at it as answering an objection, whilst
I state the mischievous consequences which suffer
us to be surprised into a virtual breach of faith by
confounding our ally with our enemy, because they
both belong to the same geographical territory.
My clear opinion is, that Toulon ought to be made,
what we set out with, a royal French city. By the
necessity of the case, it must be under the influence,
civil and military, of the allies. But the only way
of keeping that jealous and discordant mass fiom
tearing its component parts to pieces, and hazarding
the loss of the whole, is, to put the place into the
nominal government of the regent, his officers being
approved by us. This, I say, is absolutely necessary
for a poise amongst ourselves. Otherwise is it to
be believed that the Spaniards, who hold that place
with us in a sort of partnership, contrary to our mutual interest, will see us absolute masters of the Mediterranean, with Gibraltar on one side and Toulon on the other, with a quiet and composed mind, whilst
we do little less than declare that we are to take the
whole West Indies into our hands, leaving the vast,
unwieldy, and feeble body of the Spanish dominions
in that part of the world absolutely at our mercy,
without any power to balance us in the smallest de
? ? ? ? ON THE POLICY OF THE ALLIES. 447
gree? Nothing is so fatal to a nation as an extreme
of self-partiality, and the total want of consideration
of what others will naturally hope or fear. Spain
must think she sees that we are taking advantage
of the confusions which reign in France to disable
that country, and of course every country, from affording her protection, and in the end to turn the
Spanish monarchy into a province. If she saw things
in a proper point of light, to be sure, she would not
consider any other plan of politics as of the least
moment in comparison of the extinction of Jacobinism. But her ministers (to say the best of them) are
vulgar politicians. It is no wonder that they should
postpone this great point, or balance it by considerations of the common politics, that is, the questions
of power between state and state. If we manifestly
endeavor to destroy the balance, especially the maritime and commercial balance, both in Europe and
the West Indies, (the latter their sore and vulnerable
part,) from fear of what France may do for Spain
hereafter, is it to be wondered that Spain, infinitely
weaker than we are, (weaker, indeed, than such a
mass of empire ever was,) should feel the same fears
from our uncontrolled power that we give way to
ourselves from a supposed resurrection of the ancient power of France under a monarchy? It signifies nothing whether we are wrong or right in the abstract; but in respect to our relation to Spain, with
such principles followed up in practice, it is absolutely impossible that any cordial alliance can subsist between the two nations. If Spain goes, Naples will speedily follow. Prussia is quite certain, and
thinks of nothing but making a market of the present
confusions. Italy is broken and divided. Switzer
? ? ? ? 448 ON THE POLICY OF THE ALLIES.
land is Jacobinized, I am afraid, completely. I have
long seen with pain the progress of French principles
in that country. Things cannot go on upon the present bottom. The possession of Toulon, which, well
managed, might be of the greatest advantage, will be
the greatest misfortune that ever happened to this
nation. The more we multiply troops there, the
more we shall multiply causes and means of quarrel
amongst ourselves. I know but one way of avoiding it, which is, to give a greater degree of simplicity
to our politics. Our situation does necessarily render them a good deal involved. And to this evil,
instead of increasing it, we ought to apply all the
remedies in our power.
See what is in that place the consequence (to say
nothing of every other) of this complexity. Toulon
has, as it were, two gates, - an English and a Spanish.
The English gate is by our policy fast barred against
the entrance of any Royalists. The Spaniards open
theirs, I fear, upon no fixed principle, and with very
little judgment. By means, however, of this foolish,
mean, and jealous policy on our side, all the Royalists
whom the English might select as most practicable,
and most subservient to honest views, are totally excluded. Of those admitted the Spaniards are mlasters. As to the inhabitants, they are a nest of Jacobins, which is delivered into our hands, not from
principle, but from fear. The inhabitants of Toulon
may be described in a few words. It is differturn
nautis, cauponibus atque malignis. The rest of the
seaports are of the same description.
in that cause which we seem to make our own t9
come freely into any place in which the allies obtain
ally footing.
If we wish to gain upon any people, it is right to
see what it is they expect. We have had a proposal
from the Royalists of Poitou. They are well entitled,
after a bloody war maintained for eight months against
all the powers of anarchy, to speak the sentiments of
the Royalists of France. Do they desire us to exclude
their princes, their clergy, their nobility? The direct
contrary. They earnestly solicit that men of every
one of these descriptions should be sent to them.
They do not callfor English, Austrian, or Prussian
officers. They call for French emigrant officers.
They call for the exiled priests. They have demanded the Comte d'Artois to appear at their head.
These are the demands (quite natural demands) of
those who are ready to follow the standard of monarchy.
The great means, therefore, of restoring the monarchy, which we have made the main object of the war, is, to assist the dignity, the religion, and the property
of France to repossess themselves of the means of
their natural influence. This ought to be the primary object of all our politics and all our military operations. Otherwise everything will move in a
preposterous order, and nothing but confusion and
destruction will follow.
I know that misfortune is not made to win respect
from ordinary minds. I know that there is a leaning to prosperity, however obtained, and a prejudice
in its favor. I know there is a disposition to hope
something from the variety and inconstancy of villany, rather than from the tiresome uniformity of fixed
? ? ? ? 426 ON THE POLICY OF THE ALLIES.
principle. There have been, I admit, situations in
which a guiding person or party might be gained
over, and through him or them the whole body of a
nation. For the hope of such a conversion, and of
deriving advantage from enemies, it might be politic
for a while to throw your friends into the shade.
But examples drawn from history in occasions like
the present will be found dangerously to mislead us.
France has no resemblance to other countries which
have undergone troubles and been purified by them.
If France, Jacobinized as it has been for four full
years, did contain any bodies of authority and disposition to treat with you, (most assuredly she does not,) such is the levity of those who have expelled
everything respectable in their country, such their
ferocity, their arrogance, their mutinous spirit, their
habits of defying everything human and divine, that
no engagement would hold with them for three
months; nor, indeed, could they cohere together for
any purpose of civilized society, if left as they now
are. There must be a means, not only of breaking
their strength within themselves, but of civiliziny
them; and these two things must go together, before
we can possibly treat with them, not only as a nation,
but with any division of them. Descriptions of men
of their own race, but better in rank, superior in
property and decorum, of honorable, decent, and orderly habits, are absolutely necessary to bring them to such a frame as to qualify them so much as to
come into contact with a civilized nation. A set of
those ferocious savages with arms in their hands, left
to themselves in one part of the country whilst you
proceed to another, would break forth into outrages
at least as bad as their former. They must, as fast
? ? ? ? ON THE POLICY OF THE ALLIES. 427
as gained, (if ever they are gained,) be put under the
guide, direction, and government of better Frenchmen than themselves, or they will instantly relapse
into a fever of aggravated Jacobinism.
We must not judge of other parts of France by the
temporary submission of Toulon, with two vast fleets
in its harbor, and a garrison far more numerous than
all the inhabitants able to bear arms. If they were
left to themselves, I am quite sure they would not retain their attachment to monarchy of any name for
a single week.
To administer the only cure for the unheard-of disorders of that undone country, I think it infinitely
happy for us that God has given into our hands
more effectual remedies than human contrivance
could point out. We have in our bosom, and in
the bosom of other civilized states, nearer forty than
thirty thousand persons, providentially preserved, not
only from the crueltv and violence, but from the contagion of the horrid practices, sentiments, and language of the Jacobins, and even sacredly guarded from the view of such abominable scenes. If we
should obtain, in any considerable district, a footing
in France, we possess an immense body of physicians
and magistrates of the mind, whom we now know to
be the most discreet, gentle, well-tempered, conciliatory, virtuous, and pious persons who in any order
probably existed in the world. You will have a missioner of peace and order in every parish. Never
was a wiser national economy than in the charity
of the English and of other countries. Never was
money better expended than in the maintenance of
this body of civil troops for reestablishing order in
France, and for thus securing its civilization to Eu
? ? ? ? 428 ON THE POLICY OF THE ALLIES.
rope. This means, if properly used, is of value inestimable.
Nor is this corps of instruments of civilization confined to the first order of that state, -- I mean the clergy. The allied powers possess also an exceedingly numerous, well-informed, sensible, ingenious, high-principled, and spirited body of cavaliers in the
expatriated landed interest of France, as well qualified, at least, as I (who have been taught by time and experience to moderate my calculation of the expectancy of human abilities) ever expected to see in the body of any landed gentlemen and soldiers by their
birth. France is well winnowed and sifted. Its virtuous men are, I believe, amongst the most virtuous,
as its wicked are amongst the most abandoned upon
earth. Whatever in the territory of France may be
found to be in the middle between these must be attracted to the better part. This will be compassed, when every gentleman, everywhere being restored to
his landed estate, each on his patrimonial ground,
may join the clergy in reanimating the loyalty, fidelity, and religion of the people, - that these gentlemen proprietors of land may sort that people according to
the trust they severally merit, that they may arm the
honest and well-affected, and disarm and disable the
factious and ill-disposed. No foreigner can make
this discrimination nor these arrangements. The
ancient corporations of burghers according to their
several modes should be restored, and placed (as
they ought to be) in the hands of men of gravity
and property in the cities or bailliages, according to
the proper constitutions of the commons or third estate of France. They will restrain and regulate the seditious rabble there, as the gentlemen will on their
? ? ? ? ON THE POLICY OF THE ALLIES. 429
own estates. In this way, and in this way alone, the
country (once broken in upon by foreign force well
directed) may be gained and settled. It must be
gained and settled by itself, anild through the medium
of its own native dignity and property. It is not
honest, it is not decent, still less is it politic, for
foreign powers themselves to attempt anything in
this minute, internal, local detail, in which they could
show nothing but ignorance, imbecility, confusion,
and oppression. As to the prince who has a just
claim to exercise the regency of France, like other
men he is not without his faults and his defects.
But faults or defects (always supposing them faults
of common human infirmity) are not what in anly
country destroy a legal title to government. These
princes are kept in a poor, obscure, country town of
the king of Prussia's. Their reputation is entirely
at the mercy of every calumniator. They cannot
show themselves, they cannot explain themselves,
as princes ought to do. After being well informed
as any man here can be, I do not find that these
blemishes in this eminent person are at all considerable, or that they at all affect a character which is full of probity, honor, generosity, and real goodness.
In some points he has but too much resemblance
to his unfortunate brother, who, with all his weaknesses, had a good understanding, and many parts of an excellent man and a good king. But Monsieur, without supposing the other deficient, (as he
was not,) excels him in general knowledge, and in
a sharp and keen observation, with somnething of
a better address, and an happier mode of speaking
and of writing. His conversation is open, agreeable,
and informed; his manners gracious and princely.
? ? ? ? 130 ON THE POLICY OF THE ALLIES.
His brother, the Comte d'Artois, sustains still better the representation of his place. He is eloquent, lively, engaging in the highest degree, of a decided
character, full of energy and activity. In a word,
he is a brave, honorable, and accomplished cavalier.
Their brethren of royalty, if they were true to their
own cause and interest, instead of relegating these
illustrious persons to an obscure town, would bring
them forward in their courts and camps, and exhibit
them to (what they would speedily obtain) the esteem,
respect, and affection of mankind.
Objection As to their knocking at every door, (which
made to the
regent's en- seems to give offence,) can anything be more
deavor to go
to Spain. natural? Abandoned, despised, rendered in
a manner outlaws by all the powers of Europe, who
have treated their unfortunate brethren with all the
giddy pride and improvident insolence of blind, unfeeling prosperity, who did not even send them a compliment of condolence on the murder of their
brother and sister, in such a state is it to be wondered at, or blamed, that they tried every way, likely or unlikely, well or ill chosen, to get out of the horrible pit into which they are fallen, and that in particular they tried whether the princes of their
own blood might at length be brought to think the
cause of kings, and of kings of their race, wounded
in the murder and exile of the branch of France, of
as much importance as the killing of a brace of partridges? If they were absolutely idle, and only eat in sloth their bread of sorrow and dependence, they
would be forgotten, or at best thought of as wretches
unworthy of their pretensions, which they had done
nothing to support. If they err from our interests,
what care has been taken to keep them in those in
? ? ? ? ON THE POLICY OF THE ALLIES. 431
terests? or what desire has ever been shown to employ them in any other way than as instruments of their own degradation, shame, and ruin?
The Parliament of Paris, by whom the title of the
regent is to be recognized, (not made,) according to
the laws of the kingdom, is ready to recognize it, and
to register it, if a place of meeting was given to them,
which might be within their own jurisdiction, supposing that only locality was required for the exercise of their functions: for it is one of the advantages of
monarchy to have no local seat. It may maintain
its rights out of the sphere of its territorial jurisdiction, if other powers will suffer it.
I am well apprised that the little intriguers, and
whisperers, and self-conceited, thoughtless babblers,
worse than either, run about to depreciate the fallen
virtue of a great nation. But whilst they talk, we
must make our choice, - they or the Jacobins. We
have no other option. As to those who in the pride
of a prosperity not obtained by their wisdom, valor,
or industry, think so well of themselves, and of their
own abilities and virtues, and so ill of other men,
truth obliges me to say that they are not founded
in their presumption concerning themselves, nor in
their contempt of the French princes, magistrates,
nobility, and clergy. Instead of inspiring me with
dislike and distrust of the unfortuLnate, engaged with
us in a common cause against our Jacobin enemy,
they take away all my esteem for their own characters, and all my deference to their judgment.
There are some few French gentlemen, indeed, who
talk a language not wholly different from this jargon.
Those whom I have in my eye I respect as gallant
soldiers, as much as any one can do; but on their
? ? ? ? 432 ON THE POLICY OF THE ALLIES.
political judgment and prudence I have not the
Slightest reliance, nor on their knowledge of their
own country, or of its laws and Constitution. They
are, if not enemies, at least not friends, to the orders
of their own state, - not to the princes, the clergy, or
the nobility; they possess only an attachment to the
monarchy, or rather to the persons of the late king
and queen. In all other respects their conversation
is Jacobin. I am afraid they, or some of them, go
into the closets of ministers, and tell them that the
affairs of France will be better arranged by the allied
powers than by the landed proprietors of the kingdom, or by the princes who have a right to govern; and that, if any French are at all to be employed in
the settlement of their country, it ought to be only
those who have never declared any decided opinion,
or taken any active part in the Revolution. *
I suspect that the authors of this opinion are mere
soldiers of fortune, who, though men of integrity and
honor, would as gladly receive military rank from
Russia, or Austria, or Prussia, as from the regent of
France. Perhaps their not having as much importance at his court as they could wish may incline themn to this strange imagination. Perhaps, having
no property in old France, they are more indifferent
about its restoration. Their language is certainly
flattering to all ministers in all courts. We all are
meln; we all love to be told of the extent of our own
power and our own faculties. If we love glory, we
are jealous of partners, and afraid even of our own
instruments. It is of all modes of flattery the most
effectual, to be told that you can regulate the affairs
of another kingdom better than its hereditary proprie3 This was the language of the Ministerialists.
? ? ? ? ON THE POLICY OF THE ALLIES. 433
tors. It is formed to flatter the principle of conquest
so natural to all men. It is this principle which is
now making the partition of Poland. The powers
concerned have been told by some perfidious Poles,
and perhaps they believe, that their usurpation is a
great benefit to the people, especially to the common
people. However this may turn out with regard to
Poland, I am quite sure that France could not be so
well under a foreign direction as under that of the
representatives of its own king and its own ancient
estates.
I think I have myself studied France as much as
most of those whom the allied courts are likely to
employ in such a work. I have likewise of myself
as partial and as vain an opinion as men commonly
have of themselves. But if I could command the
whole military arm of Europe, I am sure that a
bribe of the best province in that kingdom would not
tempt me to intermeddle in their affairs, except in
perfect concurrence and concert with the natural,
legal interests of the country, composed of the ecclesiastical, the military, the several corporate bodies of justice and of burghership, making under a monarch (I repeat it again and again) the _French nation according to its fundamental Constitution. No considerate statesman would undertake to meddle with it upon any other condition.
The government of that kingdom is fundamentally
monarchical. The public law of Europe has never
recognized in it-any other form of government. The
potentates of Europe have, by that law, a right, an
interest, and a duty to know with what government
they are to treat, and what they are to admit into the
federative society, - or, in other words, into the diploVOL. IV. 28
? ? ? ? 434 ON THIE POLICY OF THE ALLIES.
matic republic of Europe. This right is clear and
indisputable.
What other and further interference they have a
right to in the interior of the concerns of another people is a matter on which, as on every political subject, no very definite or positive rule can well be laid
down. Our neighbors are men; and who will attempt to dictate the laws under which it is allowable
or forbidden to take a part in the concerns of men,
whether they are considered individually or in a collective capacity, whenever charity to them, or a care
of my own safety, calls forth my activity? Circumstances perpetually variable, directing a moral prudence and discretion, the general principles of which
never vary, must alone prescribe a conduct fitting on
such occasions. The latest casuists of public law are
rather of a republican cast, and, in my mind, by no
means so averse as they ought to be to a right in the
people (a word which, ill defined, is of the most
dangerous use) to make changes at their pleasure in
the fundamental laws of their country. These writers, however, when a country is divided, leave abundant liberty for a neighbor to support any of the parties according to his choice. * This interference must, indeed, always be a right, whilst the privilege of doing good to others, and of averting from them every
sort of evil, I. s a right: circumstances may render
that right a duty. It depends wholly on this, whether it be a bona fide charity to a party, and a prudent
precaution with regard to yourself, or whether, under
the pretence of aiding one of the parties in a nation,
you act in such a manner as to aggravate its calami.
ties and accomplish its final destruction. In truth,
* Vattel.
? ? ? ? ON THE POLICY OF THE ALLIES. 435
It is not the interfering or keeping aloof, but iniquitous intermeddling, or treacherous inaction, which is praised or blamed by the decision of an equitable
judge.
It will be a just and irresistible presumption against
the fairness of the interposing power, that he takes
with him no party or description of men in the divided state. It is not probable that these parties should all, and all alike, be more adverse to the true interests of their country, and less capable of forming a judgment upon them, than those who are absolute
strangers to their affairs, and to the character of the
actors in them, and have but a remote, feeble, and
secondary sympathy with their interest. Sormetimes
a calm and healing arbiter may be necessary; but he
is to compose differences, not to give laws. It is impossible that any one should not feel the full force of that presumption. Even people, whose politics for
the supposed good of their own country lead them to
take advantage of the dissensions of a neighboring
nation in order to ruin it, will not directly propose to
exclude the natives, but they will take that mode of
consulting and employing them which most nearly
approaches to an exclusion. In some particulars they
propose what amounts to that exclusion, in others
they do much worse. They recommend to ministry,
"that no Frenchman who has given a decided opinion or acted a decided part in this great Revolution, for or against it, should be countenanced, brought
forward, trusted, or employed, even in the strictest
subordination to the ministers of the allied powers. "
Although one would think that this advice would
stand condemned on the first proposition, yet, as it
has been made popular, and has been proceeded upon
? ? ? ? 436 ON THE POLICY OF THE ALLIES.
practically, I think it right to give it - full consideration.
And first, I have asked myself who these Frenchmen are, that, in the state their own country has been in for these last five years, of all the people of Europe, have alone not been able to form a decided opinion, or have been unwilling to act a decided
part?
Looking over all the names I have heard of in this
great revolution in all human affairs, I find no man
of any distinction who has remained in that more
than Stoical apathy, but the Prince de Conti. This
mean, stupid, selfish, swinish, and cowardly animal,
universally known and despised as such, has indeed,
except in one abortive attempt to elope, been perfectly neutral. However, his neutrality, which it seems would qualify him for trust, and on a competition must set aside the Prince de Conde, can
be of no sort of service. His moderation has not
been able to keep him from a jail. The allied powers must draw him from that jail, before they can have the full advantage of the exertions of this great
neutralist.
Except him, I do not recollect a man of rank or
talents, who by his speeches or his votes, by his pen
or by his sword, has not been active on this scene.
The time, indeed, could admit no neutrality in any
person worthy of the name of man. There were
originally two great divisions in France: the one is
that which overturned the whole of the government
in Church and State, and erected a republic on the
basis of atheism. Their grand engine was the Jacobin Club, a sort of secession from which, but exactly on the same principles, begat another short-lived one,
? ? ? ? ON THE POLICY OF THE ALLIES. 437
called the Club of Eighty-Nine,* which was chiefly
guided by the court rebels, who, in addition to the
crimes of which they were guilty in common with the
others, had the merit of betraying a gracious master
and a kind benefactor. Subdivisions of this faction,
which since we have seen, do not in the least differ
from each other in their principles, their dispositions,
or the means they have employed. Their only quarrel has been about power: in that quarrel, like wave
succeeding wave, one faction has got the better and
expelled the other. Thus, La Fayette for a while got
the better of Orleans; and Orleans afterwards prevailed over La Fayette. Brissot overpowered OrlMans; Barere and Robespierre, and their faction,
mastered them both, and cut off their heads. All
who were not Royalists have been listed in some or
other of these divisions. If it were of any use to settle a precedence, the elder ought to have his rank.
The first authors, plotters, and contrivers of this monstrous scheme seem to me entitled to the first place in
our distrust and abhorrence. I have seen some of
those who are thought the best amongst the original
rebels, and I have not neglected the means of being
informed concerning the others.
I can very truly
say, that I have not found, by observation, or inquiry,
that any sense of the evils produced by their projects
has produced in them, or any one of them, the smallest degree of repentance. Disappointment and mortification undoubtedly they feel; but to them repentance is a thing impossible. They are atheists. This wretched opinion, by which they are possessed even
to the height of fanaticism, leading them to exclude
* The first object of this club was the propagation of Jacobin
principles.
? ? ? ? 438 ON THE POLICY OF THE ALLIES.
from their ideas of a commonwealth the vital principle of the physical, the moral, and the political world engages them in a thousand absurd contrivances to
fill up this dreadful void. Incapable of innoxious
repose or honorable action or wise speculation in
the lurking-holes of a foreign land, into which (in a
common ruin) they are driven to hide their heads
amongst the innocent victims of their madness, they
are at this very hour as busy in the confection of the
dirt-pies of their imaginary constitutions as if they
had not been quite fresh from destroying, by their
impious and desperate vagaries, the finest country
upon earth.
It is, however, out of these, or of such as these,
guilty and impenitent, despising the experience of
others, and their own, that some people talk of
choosing their negotiators with those Jacobins who
they suppose may be recovered to a sounder mind.
They flatter themselves, it seems, that the friendly
habits formed during their original partnership of
iniquity, a similarity of character, and a conformity
in the groundwork of their principles, might facilitate their conversion, and gain them over to some recognition of royalty. But surely this is to read
human nature very ill. The several sectaries in
this schism of the Jacobins are the very last men
in the world to trust each other. Fellowship in
treason is a bad ground of confidence. The last
quarrels are the sorest; and the injuries received
or offered by your own associates are ever the most
bitterly resented. The people of France, of every
name and description, would a thousand times sooner
listen to the Prince de Cond6, or to the Archbishop
of Aix, or the Bishop of St. Pol, or to Monsieur de
? ? ? ? ON THE POLICY OF THE ALLIES. 439
Cazales, than to La Fayette, or Dumouriez, or the
Vicomte de Noailles, or the Bishop of Auturi, or
Necker, or his disciple Lally Tollendal. Against
the first description they have not the smallest animosity, beyond that of a merely political dissension. The others they regard as traitors.
The first description is that of the Christian Royalists, men who as earnestly wished for reformation
as they opposed innovation in the fundamental parts
of their Church and State. Their part has been very
decided. Accordingly, they are to be set aside in the
restoration of Church and State. It is an odd kind
of disqualification, where the restoration of religion
and monarchy is the question. If England should
(God forbid it should! ) fall into the same misfortune
with France, and that the court. of Vienna should
undertake the restoration of our monarchy, I think
it would be extraordinary to object to the admission
of Mr. Pitt or Lord Grenville or Mr. Dundas into
any share in the management of that business, because in a day of trial they have stood up firmly and manfully, as I trust they always will do, and with
distinguished powers, for the monarchy and the legitimate Constitution of their country. I am sure, if I were to suppose myself at Vienna at such a time, I
should, as a man, as an Englishman, and as a Royalist, protest in that case, as I do in this, against a weak and ruinous principle of proceeding, which
can have no other tendency than to make those
who wish to support the crown meditate too profoundly on the consequences of the part they take, and consider whether for their open and forward
zeal in the royal cause they may not be thrust out
from any sort of confidence and employment, where
the interest of crowned heads is concerned.
? ? ? ? 440 ON THE POLICY OF THE ALLIES.
These are the parties. I have said, and said truly,
that I know of no neutrals. But, as a general observation on this general principle of choosing neutra4s
on such occasions as the present, I have this to
say, that it amounts to neither more nor less than
this shocking proposition, - that we ought to exclude
men of honor and ability from. serving theirs and
our cause, and to put the dearest interests of ourselves and our posterity into the hands of men of
no decided character, without judgment to choose
and without courage to profess ally principle whatsoever.
Such men can serve no cause, for this plain reason,
-they have no cause at heart. They can, at best,
work only as mere mercenaries. They have not
been guilty of great crimes; but it is only because
they have not energy of mind to rise to any height
of wickedness. They are not hawks or kites: they
are only miserable fowls whose flight is not above
their dunghill or hen-roost. But they tremble before
the authors of these horrors. They admire them at
a safe and respectful distance. There never was a
mean and abject mind that did not admire an intrepid and dexterous villain. In the bottom of their
hearts they believe such hardy miscreants to be the
only men qualified for great affairs. If you set them
to transact with such persons, they are instantly subdued. They dare not so much as look their antagonist in the face. They are made to be their subjects. not to be their arbiters or controllers.
These men, to be sure, can look at atrocious acts
without indignation, and can behold suffering virtue
without sympathy. Therefore they are considered as
sober, dispassionate men. But they have their pas
? ? ? ? ON THE POLICY OF THE ALLIES. 441
sions, though of another kind, and which are infinitely more likely to carry them out of the path
of their duty. They are of a tame, timid, languid, inert temper, wherever the welfare of others
is concerned. In such causes, as they have no motives to action, they never possess any real ability,
and are totally destitute of all resource.
Believe a man who has seen much and observed
something. I have seen, in the course of my life, a
great many of that family of men. They are generally chosen because they have no opinion of their
own; and as far as they can be got in good earnest to embrace any opinion, it is that of whoever
happens to employ them, (neither longer nor shorter,
narrower nor broader,) with whom they have no discussion or consultation. The only thing which occurs to such a man, when he has got a business for others into his hands, is, how to make his own fortune out of it. The person he is to treat with is not,
with him, an adversary over whom he is to prevail,
but a new friend he is to gain; therefore he always
systematically betrays some part of his trust. Instead of thinking how he shall defend his ground
to the last, and, if forced to retreat, how little he
shall give up, this kind of man considers how much
of the interest of his employer he is to sacrifice to his
adversary. Having nothing but himself in view, he
knows, that, in serving his principal with zeal, he
must probably incur some resentment from the opposite party. His object is, to obtain the good-will of
the person with whom he contends, that, when an
agreement is made, he may join in rewarding him.
I would not take one of these as my arbitrator in
a dispute for so much as a fish-pond; for, if he re
? ? ? ? 442 ON THE POLICY OF THE ALLIES.
served the mud to me, he would be sure to give the
water that fed the pool to my adversary. In a great
cause, I should certainly wish that my agent should
possess conciliating qualities: that he should be of a
frank, open, and candid disposition, soft in his nature, and of a temper to soften animosities and to
win confidence. He ought not to be a man odious
to the person he treats with, by personal injury, by
violence, or by deceit, or, above all, by the dereliction of his cause in any former transactions. But I
would be sure that my negotiator should be mine,that he should be as earnest in the cause as myself, and known to be so, -- that he should not be looked upon as a stipendiary advocate, but as a,
principled partisan. In all treaty it is a great
point that all idea of gaining your agent is hopeless. I would not trust the cause of royalty with
a man who, professing neutrality, is half a republican. The enemy has already a great part of his
suit without a struggle, --and he contends with advantage for all the rest. The common principle allowed between your adversary and your agent gives your adversary the advantage in every discussion.
Before I shut up this discourse about neutral agency, (which I conceive is not to be found, or, if found,
ought not to be used,) I have a few other remarks to
make on the cause which I conceive gives rise to it.
In all that we do, whether in the struggle or after
it, it is necessary that we should constantly have in
our eye the nature and character of the enemy we
have to contend with. The Jacobin Revolution is
carried on by men of no rank, of no consideration,
of wild, savage minds, full of levity, arrogance, and
presumption, without morals, without probity, with
? ? ? ? ON THE POLICY OF THE ALLIES. 443
out prudence. What have they, then, to supply their
innumerable defects, and to make them terrible even
to the firmest minds? One thing, and one thing only,
-but that one thing is worth a thousand; --they
have energy. In France, all things being put into
an universal ferment, in the decomposition of society,
no man comes forward but by his spirit of enterprise
and the vigor of his mind. If we meet this dreadful
and portentous energy, restrained by no consideration of God or man, that is always vigilant, always
on the attack, that allows itself no repose, and suffers
none to rest an hour with impunity, - if we meet this
energy with poor commonplace proceeding, with trivial maxims, paltry old saws, with doubts, fears, and suspicions, with a languid, uncertain hesitation, with
a formal, official spirit, which is turned aside by
every obstacle from its purpose, and which never sees
a difficulty but to yield to it, or at best to evade it, -
down we go to the bottom of the abyss, and nothing short of Omnipotence can save us. We must
meet a vicious and distempered energy with a manly
and rational vigor. As virtue is limited in its resources, we are doubly bound to use all that in
the circle drawn about us by our morals we are
able to command.
I do not contend against the advantages of distrust.
In the world we live in it is but too necessary.
Some of old called it the very sinews of discretion.
But what signify commonplaces that always run
parallel and equal? Distrust is good, or it is bad,
according to our position and our purpose. Distrust
is a defensive principle. They who have much to
lose have much to fear. But in France we hold
nothing. We are to break in upon a power in pos
? ? ? ? 444 ON THE POLICY OF THE ALLIES.
session; we are to carry everything by storm, or by
surprise, or by intelligence, or by all. Adventure,
therefore, and not caution, is our policy. HIere to
be too presuming is the better error.
The world will judge of the spirit of our proceeding in those places of France which may fall into our
power by our conduct in those that are already in
our hands. Our wisdom should not be vulgar. Other
times, perhaps other measures; but in this awful hour
our politics ought to be made up of nothing but courage, decision, manliness, and rectitude. We should
have all the magnanimity of good faith. This is a
royal and commanding policy; and as long as we
are true to it, we may give the law. Never canll we
assume this command, if we will not risk the consequences. For which reason we ought to be bottomed
enough in principle not to be carried away upon the
first prospect of any sinister advantage. For depend
upon it, that, if we once give way to a sinister dealing, we shall teach others the game, and we shall be
outwitted and overborne; the Spaniards, the Prussians, God knows who, will put us under contribution
at their pleasure; and instead of being at the head
of a great confederacy, and the arbiters of Europe,
we shall, by our mistakes, break up a great design
into a thousand little selfish quarrels, the enemy will
triumph, and we shall sit down under the terms of
unsafe and dependent peace, weakened, mortified, and
disgraced, whilst all Europe, England included, is
left open and defenceless on every part, to Jacobin
principles, intrigues, and arms. In the case of the
king of France, declared to be our friend and ally, we will still be considering ourselves in the contradictory character of an enemy. This contradic
? ? ? ? ON THE POLICY OF THE ALLIES. 445
tion, I am afraid, will, in spite of us, give a color
of fraud to all our transactions, or at least will so
complicate our politics that we shall ourselves be
iniextricably entangled in them.
I have Toulon in my eye. It was with infinite
sorrow I heard, that, in taking the king of France's
fleet in trust, we instantly unrigged and dismasted
the ships, instead of keeping them in a condition to
escape in case of disaster, and in order to fulfil our
trust, -- that is, to hold them for the use of the
owner, and in the mean time to employ them for our
common service. These ships are now so circumstanced, that, if we are forced to evacuate Toulon, they must fall into the hands of the enemy or be
burnt by ourselves. I know this is by some considered as a fine thing for us. But the Athenians ought not to be better than the English, or Mr. Pitt less
virtuous than Aristides.
Are we, then, so poor in resources that we can do
no better with eighteen or twenty ships of the line
than to burn them? Had we sent for French Royalist naval officers, of which some hundreds are to be had, and made them select such seamen as they
could trust, and filled the rest with our own and
Mediterranean seamen, which are all over Italy to
be had by thousands, and put them under judicious
English commanders-in-chief, and with a judicious
mixture of our own subordinates, the West Indies
would at this day have been ours. It may be said
that these French officers would take them for the
king of France, and that they would not be in our
power. Be it so. The islands would not be ours,
but they would not be Jacobinized. This is, however, a thing impossible. They must in effect and
? ? ? ? 446 ON THE POLICY OF THE ALLIES.
substance be ours. But all is upon that false principle of distrust, which, not confiding in strength, can
never have the full use of it. They that pay, and
feed, and equip, must direct. But I must speak
plain upon this subject. The French islands, if
they were all our own, ought not to be all kept.
A fair partition only ought to be made of those territories. This is a subject of policy very serious,
which has many relations and aspects. Just here
I only hint at it as answering an objection, whilst
I state the mischievous consequences which suffer
us to be surprised into a virtual breach of faith by
confounding our ally with our enemy, because they
both belong to the same geographical territory.
My clear opinion is, that Toulon ought to be made,
what we set out with, a royal French city. By the
necessity of the case, it must be under the influence,
civil and military, of the allies. But the only way
of keeping that jealous and discordant mass fiom
tearing its component parts to pieces, and hazarding
the loss of the whole, is, to put the place into the
nominal government of the regent, his officers being
approved by us. This, I say, is absolutely necessary
for a poise amongst ourselves. Otherwise is it to
be believed that the Spaniards, who hold that place
with us in a sort of partnership, contrary to our mutual interest, will see us absolute masters of the Mediterranean, with Gibraltar on one side and Toulon on the other, with a quiet and composed mind, whilst
we do little less than declare that we are to take the
whole West Indies into our hands, leaving the vast,
unwieldy, and feeble body of the Spanish dominions
in that part of the world absolutely at our mercy,
without any power to balance us in the smallest de
? ? ? ? ON THE POLICY OF THE ALLIES. 447
gree? Nothing is so fatal to a nation as an extreme
of self-partiality, and the total want of consideration
of what others will naturally hope or fear. Spain
must think she sees that we are taking advantage
of the confusions which reign in France to disable
that country, and of course every country, from affording her protection, and in the end to turn the
Spanish monarchy into a province. If she saw things
in a proper point of light, to be sure, she would not
consider any other plan of politics as of the least
moment in comparison of the extinction of Jacobinism. But her ministers (to say the best of them) are
vulgar politicians. It is no wonder that they should
postpone this great point, or balance it by considerations of the common politics, that is, the questions
of power between state and state. If we manifestly
endeavor to destroy the balance, especially the maritime and commercial balance, both in Europe and
the West Indies, (the latter their sore and vulnerable
part,) from fear of what France may do for Spain
hereafter, is it to be wondered that Spain, infinitely
weaker than we are, (weaker, indeed, than such a
mass of empire ever was,) should feel the same fears
from our uncontrolled power that we give way to
ourselves from a supposed resurrection of the ancient power of France under a monarchy? It signifies nothing whether we are wrong or right in the abstract; but in respect to our relation to Spain, with
such principles followed up in practice, it is absolutely impossible that any cordial alliance can subsist between the two nations. If Spain goes, Naples will speedily follow. Prussia is quite certain, and
thinks of nothing but making a market of the present
confusions. Italy is broken and divided. Switzer
? ? ? ? 448 ON THE POLICY OF THE ALLIES.
land is Jacobinized, I am afraid, completely. I have
long seen with pain the progress of French principles
in that country. Things cannot go on upon the present bottom. The possession of Toulon, which, well
managed, might be of the greatest advantage, will be
the greatest misfortune that ever happened to this
nation. The more we multiply troops there, the
more we shall multiply causes and means of quarrel
amongst ourselves. I know but one way of avoiding it, which is, to give a greater degree of simplicity
to our politics. Our situation does necessarily render them a good deal involved. And to this evil,
instead of increasing it, we ought to apply all the
remedies in our power.
See what is in that place the consequence (to say
nothing of every other) of this complexity. Toulon
has, as it were, two gates, - an English and a Spanish.
The English gate is by our policy fast barred against
the entrance of any Royalists. The Spaniards open
theirs, I fear, upon no fixed principle, and with very
little judgment. By means, however, of this foolish,
mean, and jealous policy on our side, all the Royalists
whom the English might select as most practicable,
and most subservient to honest views, are totally excluded. Of those admitted the Spaniards are mlasters. As to the inhabitants, they are a nest of Jacobins, which is delivered into our hands, not from
principle, but from fear. The inhabitants of Toulon
may be described in a few words. It is differturn
nautis, cauponibus atque malignis. The rest of the
seaports are of the same description.
