No More Learning

cxxx, 11). The words, "Thy will be done rightly signify, 'May Thy
commandments be obeyed' on earth as in heaven, i. e. by men as well as
by angels" (De Serm. Dom. in Monte ii, 6). Hence these three petitions
will be perfectly fulfilled in the life to come; while the other four,
according to Augustine (Enchiridion cxv), belong to the needs of the
present life

Reply to Objection 2: Since prayer is the interpreter of desire, the
order of the petitions corresponds with the order, not of execution,
but of desire or intention, where the end precedes the things that are
directed to the end, and attainment of good precedes removal of evil.

Reply to Objection 3: Augustine (De Serm. Dom. in Monte ii, 11) adapts
the seven petitions to the gifts and beatitudes. He says: "If it is
fear God whereby blessed are the poor in spirit, let us ask that God's
name be hallowed among men with a chaste fear. If it is piety whereby
blessed are the meek, let us ask that His kingdom may come, so that we
become meek and no longer resist Him. If it is knowledge whereby
blessed are they that mourn, let us pray that His will be done, for
thus we shall mourn no more. If it is fortitude whereby blessed ere
they that hunger, let us pray that our daily bread be given to us. If
it is counsel whereby blessed are the merciful, let us forgive the
trespasses of others that our own may be forgiven. If it is
understanding whereby blessed are the pure in heart, let us pray lest
we have a double heart by seeking after worldly things which ere the
occasion of our temptations. If it is wisdom whereby blessed are the
peacemakers for they shall be called the children of God, let us pray
to be delivered from evil: for if we be delivered we shall by that very
fact become the free children of God. "

Reply to Objection 4: According to Augustine (Enchiridion cxvi), "Luke
included not seven but five petitions in the Lord's Prayer, for by
omitting it, he shows that the third petition is a kind of repetition
of the two that precede, and thus helps us to understand it"; because,
to wit, the will of God tends chiefly to this---that we come to the
knowledge of His holiness and to reign together with Him. Again the
last petition mentioned by Matthew, "Deliver us from evil," is omitted
by Luke, so that each one may know himself to be delivered from evil if
he be not led into temptation.

Reply to Objection 5: Prayer is offered up to God, not that we may bend
Him, but that we may excite in ourselves the confidence to ask: which
confidence is excited in us chiefly by the consideration of His charity
in our regard, whereby he wills our good---wherefore we say: "Our
Father"; and of His excellence, whereby He is able to fulfil
it---wherefore we say: "Who art in heaven. "
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Whether prayer is proper to the rational creature?

Objection 1: It would seem that prayer is not proper to the rational
creature. Asking and receiving apparently belong to the same subject.
But receiving is becoming also to uncreated Persons, viz. the Son and
Holy Ghost. Therefore it is competent to them to pray: for the Son said
(Jn. 14:16): "I will ask My [Vulg. : 'the'] Father," and the Apostle
says of the Holy Ghost (Rom. 8:26): "The Spirit . . . asketh for us. "

Objection 2: Angels are above rational creatures, since they are
intellectual substances. Now prayer is becoming to the angels,
wherefore we read in the Ps. 96:7: "Adore Him, all you His angels. "
Therefore prayer is not proper to the rational creature.

Objection 3: Further, the same subject is fitted to pray as is fitted
to call upon God, since this consists chiefly in prayer. But dumb
animals are fitted to call upon God, according to Ps. 146:9, "Who
giveth to beasts their food and to the young ravens that call upon
Him. " Therefore prayer is not proper to the rational creatures.

On the contrary, Prayer is an act of reason, as stated above
[3021](A[1]). But the rational creature is so called from his reason.
Therefore prayer is proper to the rational creature.

I answer that, As stated above [3022](A[1]) prayer is an act of reason,
and consists in beseeching a superior; just as command is an act of
reason, whereby an inferior is directed to something. Accordingly
prayer is properly competent to one to whom it is competent to have
reason, and a superior whom he may beseech. Now nothing is above the
Divine Persons; and dumb animals are devoid of reason. Therefore prayer
is unbecoming both the Divine Persons and dumb animals, and it is
proper to the rational creature.

Reply to Objection 1: Receiving belongs to the Divine Persons in
respect of their nature, whereas prayer belongs to one who receives
through grace. The Son is said to ask or pray in respect of His
assumed, i. e. His human, nature and not in respect of His Godhead: and
the Holy Ghost is said to ask, because He makes us ask.

Reply to Objection 2: As stated in the [3023]FP, Q[79], A[8], intellect
and reason are not distinct powers in us: but they differ as the
perfect from the imperfect. Hence intellectual creatures which are the
angels are distinct from rational creatures, and sometimes are included
under them. In this sense prayer is said to be proper to the rational
creature.

Reply to Objection 3: The young ravens are said to call upon God, on
account of the natural desire whereby all things, each in its own way,
desire to attain the Divine goodness. Thus too dumb animals are said to
obey God, on account of the natural instinct whereby they are moved by
God.
__________________________________________________________________

Whether the saints in heaven pray for us?

Objection 1: It would seem that the saints in heaven do not pray for
us. A man's action is more meritorious for himself than for others. But
the saints in heaven do not merit for themselves, neither do they pray
for themselves, since they are already established in the term. Neither
therefore do they pray for us.

Objection 2: Further, the saints conform their will to God perfectly,
so that they will only what God wills. Now what God wills is always
fulfilled. Therefore it would be useless for the saints to pray for us.

Objection 3: Further, just as the saints in heaven are above, so are
those in Purgatory, for they can no longer sin. Now those in Purgatory
do not pray for us, on the contrary we pray for them. Therefore neither
do the saints in heaven pray for us.

Objection 4: Further, if the saints in heaven pray for us, the prayers
of the higher saints would be more efficacious; and so we ought not to
implore the help of the lower saints' prayers but only of those of the
higher saints.

Objection 5: Further, the soul of Peter is not Peter. If therefore the
souls of the saints pray for us, so long as they are separated from
their bodies, we ought not to call upon Saint Peter, but on his soul,
to pray for us: yet the Church does the contrary. The saints therefore
do not pray for us, at least before the resurrection.

On the contrary, It is written (2 Macc. 15:14): "This is . . . he that
prayeth much for the people, and for all the holy city, Jeremias the
prophet of God. "

I answer that, As Jerome says (Cont. Vigilant. 6), the error of
Vigilantius consisted in saying that "while we live, we can pray one
for another; but that after we are dead, none of our prayers for others
can be heard, seeing that not even the martyrs' prayers are granted
when they pray for their blood to be avenged. " But this is absolutely
false, because, since prayers offered for others proceed from charity,
as stated above ([3024]AA[7],8), the greater the charity of the saints
in heaven, the more they pray for wayfarers, since the latter can be
helped by prayers: and the more closely they are united to God, the
more are their prayers efficacious: for the Divine order is such that
lower beings receive an overflow of the excellence of the higher, even
as the air receives the brightness of the sun. Wherefore it is said of
Christ (Heb. 7:25): "Going to God by His own power . . . to make
intercession for us" [*Vulg. : 'He is able to save for ever them that
come to God by Him, always living to make intercession for us. ']. Hence
Jerome says (Cont. Vigilant. 6): "If the apostles and martyrs while yet
in the body and having to be solicitous for themselves, can pray for
others, how much more now that they have the crown of victory and
triumph. "

Reply to Objection 1: The saints in heaven, since they are blessed,
have no lack of bliss, save that of the body's glory, and for this they
pray. But they pray for us who lack the ultimate perfection of bliss:
and their prayers are efficacious in impetrating through their previous
merits and through God's acceptance.

Reply to Objection 2: The saints impetrate what ever God wishes to take
place through their prayers: and they pray for that which they deem
will be granted through their prayers according to God's will.

Reply to Objection 3: Those who are in Purgatory though they are above
us on account of their impeccability, yet they are below us as to the
pains which they suffer: and in this respect they are not in a
condition to pray, but rather in a condition that requires us to pray
for them.

Reply to Objection 4: It is God's will that inferior beings should be
helped by all those that are above them, wherefore we ought to pray not
only to the higher but also to the lower saints; else we should have to
implore the mercy of God alone. Nevertheless it happens sometime that
prayers addressed to a saint of lower degree are more efficacious,
either because he is implored with greater devotion, or because God
wishes to make known his sanctity.

Reply to Objection 5: It is because the saints while living merited to
pray for us, that we invoke them under the names by which they were
known in this life, and by which they are better known to us: and also
in order to indicate our belief in the resurrection, according to the
saying of Ex. 3:6, "I am the God of Abraham," etc.
__________________________________________________________________

Whether prayer should be vocal?

Objection 1: It would seem that prayer ought not to be vocal. As stated
above [3025](A[4]), prayer is addressed chiefly to God. Now God knows
the language of the heart. Therefore it is useless to employ vocal
prayer.

Objection 2: Further, prayer should lift man's mind to God, as stated
above (A[1], ad 2). But words, like other sensible objects, prevent man
from ascending to God by contemplation. Therefore we should not use
words in our prayers.

Objection 3: Further, prayer should be offered to God in secret,
according to Mat. 6:6, "But thou, when thou shalt pray, enter into thy
chamber, and having shut the door, pray to thy Father in secret. " But
prayer loses its secrecy by being expressed vocally. Therefore prayer
should not be vocal.

On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 141:2): "I cried to the Lord with
my voice, with my voice I made supplication to the Lord. "

I answer that, Prayer is twofold, common and individual. Common prayer
is that which is offered to God by the ministers of the Church
representing the body of the faithful: wherefore such like prayer
should come to the knowledge of the whole people for whom it is
offered: and this would not be possible unless it were vocal prayer.
Therefore it is reasonably ordained that the ministers of the Church
should say these prayers even in a loud voice, so that they may come to
the knowledge of all.

On the other hand individual prayer is that which is offered by any
single person, whether he pray for himself or for others; and it is not
essential to such a prayer as this that it be vocal. And yet the voice
is employed in such like prayers for three reasons. First, in order to
excite interior devotion, whereby the mind of the person praying is
raised to God, because by means of external signs, whether of words or
of deeds, the human mind is moved as regards apprehension, and
consequently also as regards the affections. Hence Augustine says (ad
Probam. Ep. cxxx, 9) that "by means of words and other signs we arouse
ourselves more effectively to an increase of holy desires. " Hence then
alone should we use words and such like signs when they help to excite
the mind internally. But if they distract or in any way impede the mind
we should abstain from them; and this happens chiefly to those whose
mind is sufficiently prepared for devotion without having recourse to
those signs. Wherefore the Psalmist (Ps. 26:8) said: "My heart hath
said to Thee: 'My face hath sought Thee,'" and we read of Anna (1 Kings
1:13) that "she spoke in her heart. " Secondly, the voice is used in
praying as though to pay a debt, so that man may serve God with all
that he has from God, that is to say, not only with his mind, but also
with his body: and this applies to prayer considered especially as
satisfactory. Hence it is written (Osee 14:3): "Take away all iniquity,
and receive the good: and we will render the calves of our lips. "
Thirdly, we have recourse to vocal prayer, through a certain overflow
from the soul into the body, through excess of feeling, according to
Ps. 15:9, "My heart hath been glad, and my tongue hath rejoiced. "

Reply to Objection 1: Vocal prayer is employed, not in order to tell
God something He does not know, but in order to lift up the mind of the
person praying or of other persons to God.

Reply to Objection 2: Words about other matters distract the mind and
hinder the devotion of those who pray: but words signifying some object
of devotion lift up the mind, especially one that is less devout.

Reply to Objection 3: As Chrysostom says [*Hom. xiii in the Opus
Imperfectum falsely ascribed to St. John Chrysostom], "Our Lord forbids
one to pray in presence of others in order that one may be seen by
others. Hence when you pray, do nothing strange to draw men's
attention, either by shouting so as to be heard by others, or by openly
striking the heart, or extending the hands, so as to be seen by many.
And yet, "according to Augustine (De Serm. Dom. in Monte ii, 3), "it is
not wrong to be seen by men, but to do this or that in order to be seen
by men. "
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Whether attention is a necessary condition of prayer?

Objection 1: It would seem that attention is a necessary condition of
prayer. It is written (Jn. 4:24): "God is a spirit, and they that adore
Him must adore Him in spirit and in truth. " But prayer is not in spirit
unless it be attentive. Therefore attention is a necessary condition of
prayer.

Objection 2: Further, prayer is "the ascent of the mind to God"
[*Damascene, De Fide Orth. iii, 24]. But the mind does not ascend to
God if the prayer is inattentive. Therefore attention is a necessary
condition of prayer.

Objection 3: Further, it is a necessary condition of prayer that it
should be altogether sinless. Now if a man allows his mind to wander
while praying he is not free of sin, for he seems to make light of God;
even as if he were to speak to another man without attending to what he
was saying. Hence Basil says [*De Constit. Monach. i] that the "Divine
assistance is to be implored, not lightly, nor with a mind wandering
hither and thither: because he that prays thus not only will not obtain
what he asks, nay rather will he provoke God to anger. " Therefore it
would seem a necessary condition of prayer that it should be attentive.

On the contrary, Even holy men sometimes suffer from a wandering of the
mind when they pray, according to Ps. 39:13, "My heart hath forsaken
me. "

I answer that, This question applies chiefly to vocal prayer.
Accordingly we must observe that a thing is necessary in two ways.
First, a thing is necessary because thereby the end is better obtained:
and thus attention is absolutely necessary for prayer. Secondly, a
thing is said to be necessary when without it something cannot obtain
its effect. Now the effect of prayer is threefold. The first is an
effect which is common to all acts quickened by charity, and this is
merit. In order to realize this effect, it is not necessary that prayer
should be attentive throughout; because the force of the original
intention with which one sets about praying renders the whole prayer
meritorious, as is the case with other meritorious acts. The second
effect of prayer is proper thereto, and consists in impetration: and
again the original intention, to which God looks chiefly, suffices to
obtain this effect. But if the original intention is lacking, prayer
lacks both merit and impetration: because, as Gregory [*Hugh St.
Victor, Expos. in Reg. S. Aug. iii] says, "God hears not the prayer of
those who pay no attention to their prayer. " The third effect of prayer
is that which it produces at once; this is the spiritual refreshment of
the mind, and for this effect attention is a necessary condition:
wherefore it is written (1 Cor. 14:14): "If I pray in a tongue . . . my
understanding is without fruit. "

It must be observed, however, that there are three kinds of attention
that can be brought to vocal prayer: one which attends to the words,
lest we say them wrong, another which attends to the sense of the
words, and a third, which attends to the end of prayer, namely, God,
and to the thing we are praying for. That last kind of attention is
most necessary, and even idiots are capable of it. Moreover this
attention, whereby the mind is fixed on God, is sometimes so strong
that the mind forgets all other things, as Hugh of St. Victor states
[*De Modo Orandi ii].

Reply to Objection 1: To pray in spirit and in truth is to set about
praying through the instigation of the Spirit, even though afterwards
the mind wander through weakness.

Reply to Objection 2: The human mind is unable to remain aloft for long
on account of the weakness of nature, because human weakness weighs
down the soul to the level of inferior things: and hence it is that
when, while praying, the mind ascends to God by contemplation, of a
sudden it wanders off through weakness.

Reply to Objection 3: Purposely to allow one's mind to wander in prayer
is sinful and hinders the prayer from having fruit. It is against this
that Augustine says in his Rule (Ep. ccxi): "When you pray God with
psalms and hymns, let your mind attend to that which your lips
pronounce. " But to wander in mind unintentionally does not deprive
prayer of its fruit. Hence Basil says (De Constit. Monach. i): "If you
are so truly weakened by sin that you are unable to pray attentively,
strive as much as you can to curb yourself, and God will pardon you,
seeing that you are unable to stand in His presence in a becoming
manner, not through negligence but through frailty. "
__________________________________________________________________

Whether prayer should last a long time?

Objection 1: It would seem that prayer should not be continual. It is
written (Mat. 6:7): "When you are praying, speak not much. " Now one who
prays a long time needs to speak much, especially if his be vocal
prayer. Therefore prayer should not last a long time.

Objection 2: Further, prayer expresses the desire. Now a desire is all
the holier according as it is centered on one thing, according to Ps.
26:4, "One thing I have asked of the Lord, this will I seek after. "
Therefore the shorter prayer is, the more is it acceptable to God.

Objection 3: Further, it seems to be wrong to transgress the limits
fixed by God, especially in matters concerning Divine worship,
according to Ex. 19:21: "Charge the people, lest they should have a
mind to pass the limits to see the Lord, and a very great multitude of
them should perish.
" But God has fixed for us the limits of prayer by
instituting the Lord's Prayer (Mat. 6). Therefore it is not right to
prolong our prayer beyond its limits.

Objection 4: On the contrary, It would seem that we ought to pray
continually. For our Lord said (Lk. 18:1): "We ought always to pray,
and not to faint": and it is written (1 Thess. 5:17): "Pray without
ceasing. "

I answer that, We may speak about prayer in two ways: first, by
considering it in itself; secondly, by considering it in its cause. The
not cause of prayer is the desire of charity, from which prayer ought
to arise: and this desire ought to be in us continually, either
actually or virtually, for the virtue of this desire remains in
whatever we do out of charity; and we ought to "do all things to the
glory of God" (1 Cor. 10:31). From this point of view prayer ought to
be continual: wherefore Augustine says (ad Probam, Ep. cxxx, 9):
"Faith, hope and charity are by themselves a prayer of continual
longing. " But prayer, considered in itself, cannot be continual,
because we have to be busy about other works, and, as Augustine says
(ad Probam. Ep. cxxx, 9), "we pray to God with our lips at certain
intervals and seasons, in order to admonish ourselves by means of such
like signs, to take note of the amount of our progress in that desire,
and to arouse ourselves more eagerly to an increase thereof. " Now the
quantity of a thing should be commensurate with its end, for instance
the quantity of the dose should be commensurate with health. And so it
is becoming that prayer should last long enough to arouse the fervor of
the interior desire: and when it exceeds this measure, so that it
cannot be continued any longer without causing weariness, it should be
discontinued. Wherefore Augustine says (ad Probam. Ep. cxxx): "It is
said that the brethren in Egypt make frequent but very short prayers,
rapid ejaculations, as it were, lest that vigilant and erect attention
which is so necessary in prayer slacken and languish, through the
strain being prolonged. By so doing they make it sufficiently clear not
only that this attention must not be forced if we are unable to keep it
up, but also that if we are able to continue, it should not be broken
off too soon. " And just as we must judge of this in private prayers by
considering the attention of the person praying, so too, in public
prayers we must judge of it by considering the devotion of the people.

Reply to Objection 1: As Augustine says (ad Probam. Ep. cxxx), "to pray
with many words is not the same as to pray long; to speak long is one
thing, to be devout long is another. For it is written that our Lord
passed the whole night in prayer, and that He 'prayed the longer' in
order to set us an example. " Further on he says: "When praying say
little, yet pray much so long as your attention is fervent. For to say
much in prayer is to discuss your need in too many words: whereas to
pray much is to knock at the door of Him we pray, by the continuous and
devout clamor of the heart. Indeed this business is frequently done
with groans rather than with words, with tears rather than with
speech. "

Reply to Objection 2: Length of prayer consists, not in praying for
many things, but in the affections persisting in the desire of one
thing.

Reply to Objection 3: Our Lord instituted this prayer, not that we
might use no other words when we pray, but that in our prayers we might
have none but these things in view, no matter how we express them or
think of them.

Reply to Objection 4: One may pray continually, either through having a
continual desire, as stated above; or through praying at certain fixed
times, though interruptedly; or by reason of the effect, whether in the
person who prays---because he remains more devout even after praying,
or in some other person---as when by his kindness a man incites another
to pray for him, even after he himself has ceased praying.
__________________________________________________________________

Whether prayer is meritorious?

Objection 1: It would seem that prayer is not meritorious. All merit
proceeds from grace. But prayer precedes grace, since even grace is
obtained by means of prayer according to Lk. 11:13, "(How much more)
will your Father from heaven give the good Spirit to them that ask
Him! " Therefore prayer is not a meritorious act.

Objection 2: Further, if prayer merits anything, this would seem to be
chiefly that which is besought in prayer. Yet it does not always merit
this, because even the saints' prayers are frequently not heard; thus
Paul was not heard when he besought the sting of the flesh to be
removed from him. Therefore prayer is not a meritorious act.

Objection 3: Further, prayer is based chiefly on faith, according to
James 1:6, "But let him ask in faith, nothing wavering. " Now faith is
not sufficient for merit, as instanced in those who have lifeless
faith. Therefore prayer is not a meritorious act.

On the contrary, A gloss on the words of Ps. 34:13, "My prayer shall be
turned into my bosom," explains them as meaning, "if my prayer does not
profit them, yet shall not I be deprived of my reward. " Now reward is
not due save to merit. Therefore prayer is meritorious.

I answer that, As stated above [3026](A[13]) prayer, besides causing
spiritual consolation at the time of praying, has a twofold efficacy in
respect of a future effect, namely, efficacy in meriting and efficacy
in impetrating. Now prayer, like any other virtuous act, is efficacious
in meriting, because it proceeds from charity as its root, the proper
object of which is the eternal good that we merit to enjoy. Yet prayer
proceeds from charity through the medium of religion, of which prayer
is an act, as stated above [3027](A[3]), and with the concurrence of
other virtues requisite for the goodness of prayer, viz. humility and
faith. For the offering of prayer itself to God belongs to religion,
while the desire for the thing. that we pray to be accomplished belongs
to charity. Faith is necessary in reference to God to Whom we pray;
that is, we need to believe that we can obtain from Him what we seek.
Humility is necessary on the part of the person praying, because he
recognizes his neediness. Devotion too is necessary: but this belongs
to religion, for it is its first act and a necessary condition of all
its secondary acts, as stated above (Q[82], AA[1],2).

As to its efficacy in impetrating, prayer derives this from the grace
of God to Whom we pray, and Who instigates us to pray. Wherefore
Augustine says (De Verb. Dom. , Serm. cv, 1): "He would not urge us to
ask, unless He were willing to give"; and Chrysostom [*Cf. Catena Aurea
of St. Thomas on Lk. 18. The words as quoted are not to be found in the
words of Chrysostom] says: "He never refuses to grant our prayers,
since in His loving-kindness He urged us not to faint in praying. "

Reply to Objection 1: Neither prayer nor any other virtuous act is
meritorious without sanctifying grace. And yet even that prayer which
impetrates sanctifying grace proceeds from some grace, as from a
gratuitous gift, since the very act of praying is "a gift of God," as
Augustine states (De Persever. xxiii).

Reply to Objection 2: Sometimes the merit of prayer regards chiefly
something distinct from the object of one's petition. For the chief
object of merit is beatitude, whereas the direct object of the petition
of prayer extends sometimes to certain other things, as stated above
([3028]AA[6],7). Accordingly if this other thing that we ask for
ourselves be not useful for our beatitude, we do not merit it; and
sometimes by asking for and desiring such things we lose merit for
instance if we ask of God the accomplishment of some sin, which would
be an impious prayer. And sometimes it is not necessary for salvation,
nor yet manifestly contrary thereto; and then although he who prays may
merit eternal life by praying, yet he does not merit to obtain what he
asks for. Hence Augustine says (Liber. Sentent. Prosperi sent. ccxii):
"He who faithfully prays God for the necessaries of this life, is both
mercifully heard, and mercifully not heard. For the physician knows
better than the sick man what is good for the disease. " For this
reason, too, Paul was not heard when he prayed for the removal of the
sting in his flesh, because this was not expedient. If, however, we
pray for something that is useful for our beatitude, through being
conducive to salvation, we merit it not only by praying, but also by
doing other good deeds: therefore without any doubt we receive what we
ask for, yet when we ought to receive it: "since certain things are not
denied us, but are deferred that they may be granted at a suitable
time," according to Augustine (Tract. cii in Joan. ): and again this may
be hindered if we persevere not in asking for it. Wherefore Basil says
(De Constit. Monast. i): "The reason why sometimes thou hast asked and
not received, is because thou hast asked amiss, either inconsistently,
or lightly, or because thou hast asked for what was not good for thee,
or because thou hast ceased asking. " Since, however, a man cannot
condignly merit eternal life for another, as stated above ([3029]FS,
Q[114], A[6]), it follows that sometimes one cannot condignly merit for
another things that pertain to eternal life. For this reason we are not
always heard when we pray for others, as stated above (A[7], ad 2,3).
Hence it is that four conditions are laid down; namely, to ask---"for
ourselves---things necessary for salvation---piously---perseveringly";
when all these four concur, we always obtain what we ask for.

Reply to Objection 3: Prayer depends chiefly on faith, not for its
efficacy in meriting, because thus it depends chiefly on charity, but
for its efficacy in impetrating, because it is through faith that man
comes to know of God's omnipotence and mercy, which are the source
whence prayer impetrates what it asks for.
__________________________________________________________________

Whether sinners impetrate anything from God by their prayers?

Objection 1: It would seem that sinners impetrate nothing from God by
their prayers. It is written (Jn. 9:31): "We know that God doth not
hear sinners"; and this agrees with the saying of Prov. 28:9, "He that
turneth away his ears from hearing the law, his prayer shall be an
abomination. " Now an abominable prayer impetrates nothing from God.
Therefore sinners impetrate nothing from God.

Objection 2: Further, the just impetrate from God what they merit, as
stated above (A[15], ad 2). But sinners cannot merit anything since
they lack grace and charity which is the "power of godliness,"
according to a gloss on 2 Tim. 3:5, "Having an appearance indeed of
godliness, but denying the power thereof. " and so their prayer is
impious, and yet piety it required in order that prayer may be
impetrative, as stated above (A[15], ad 2). Therefore sinners impetrate
nothing by their prayers.

Objection 3: Further, Chrysostom [*Hom. xiv in the Opus Imperfectum
falsely ascribed to St. John Chrysostom] says: "The Father is unwilling
to hear the prayer which the Son has not inspired. " Now in the prayer
inspired by Christ we say: "Forgive us our trespasses as we forgive
them that trespass against us": and sinners do not fulfil this.
Therefore either they lie in saying this, and so are unworthy to be
heard, or, if they do not say it, they are not heard, because they do
not observe the form of prayer instituted by Christ.

On the contrary, Augustine says (Tract. xliv, super Joan. ): "If God
were not to hear sinners, the publican would have vainly said: Lord, be
merciful to me a sinner"; and Chrysostom [*Hom. xviii of the same Opus
Imperfectum] says: "Everyone that asketh shall receive, that is to say
whether he be righteous or sinful. "

I answer that, In the sinner, two things are to be considered: his
nature which God loves, and the sin which He hates. Accordingly when a
sinner prays for something as sinner, i. e. in accordance with a sinful
desire, God hears him not through mercy but sometimes through vengeance
when He allows the sinner to fall yet deeper into sin. For "God refuses
in mercy what He grants in anger," as Augustine declares (Tract. lxxiii
in Joan. ). On the other hand God hears the sinner's prayer if it
proceed from a good natural desire, not out of justice, because the
sinner does not merit to be heard, but out of pure mercy [*Cf. A[15],
ad 1], provided however he fulfil the four conditions given above,
namely, that he beseech for himself things necessary for salvation,
piously and perseveringly.

Reply to Objection 1: As Augustine states (Tract. xliv super Joan. ),
these words were spoken by the blind man before being anointed, i. e.
perfectly enlightened, and consequently lack authority. And yet there
is truth in the saying if it refers to a sinner as such, in which sense
also the sinner's prayer is said to be an abomination.

Reply to Objection 2: There can be no godliness in the sinner's prayer
as though his prayer were quickened by a habit of virtue: and yet his
prayer may be godly in so far as he asks for something pertaining to
godliness. Even so a man who has not the habit of justice is able to
will something just, as stated above ([3030]Q[59], A[2]). And though
his prayer is not meritorious, it can be impetrative, because merit
depends on justice, whereas impetration rests on grace.

Reply to Objection 3: As stated above (A[7], ad 1) the Lord's Prayer is
pronounced in the common person of the whole Church: and so if anyone
say the Lord's Prayer while unwilling to forgive his neighbor's
trespasses, he lies not, although his words do not apply to him
personally: for they are true as referred to the person of the Church,
from which he is excluded by merit, and consequently he is deprived of
the fruit of his prayer. Sometimes, however, a sinner is prepared to
forgive those who have trespassed against him, wherefore his prayers
are heard, according to Ecclus. 28:2, "Forgive thy neighbor if he hath
hurt thee, and then shall thy sins be forgiven to thee when thou
prayest. "
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Whether the parts of prayer are fittingly described as supplications,
prayers, intercessions, and thanksgivings?

Objection 1: It would seem that the parts of prayer are unfittingly
described as supplications, prayers, intercessions, and thanksgivings.
Supplication would seem to be a kind of adjuration. Yet, according to
Origen (Super Matth. Tract. xxxv), "a man who wishes to live according
to the gospel need not adjure another, for if it be unlawful to swear,
it is also unlawful to adjure. " Therefore supplication is unfittingly
reckoned a part of prayer.

Objection 2: Further, according to Damascene (De Fide Orth. iii, 24),
"to pray is to ask becoming things of God. " Therefore it is unfitting
to distinguish "prayers" from "intercessions. "

Objection 3: Further, thanksgivings regard the past, while the others
regard the future. But the past precedes the future. Therefore
thanksgivings are unfittingly placed after the others.

On the contrary, suffices the authority of the Apostle (1 Tim. 2:1).

I answer that, Three conditions are requisite for prayer. First, that
the person who prays should approach God Whom he prays: this is
signified in the word "prayer," because prayer is "the raising up of
one's mind to God. " The second is that there should be a petition, and
this is signified in the word "intercession. " In this case sometimes
one asks for something definite, and then some say it is "intercession"
properly so called, or we may ask for some thing indefinitely, for
instance to be helped by God, or we may simply indicate a fact, as in
Jn. 11:3, "Behold, he whom Thou lovest is sick," and then they call it
"insinuation. " The third condition is the reason for impetrating what
we ask for: and this either on the part of God, or on the part of the
person who asks. The reason of impetration on the part of God is His
sanctity, on account of which we ask to be heard, according to Dan.
9:17,18, "For Thy own sake, incline, O God, Thy ear"; and to this
pertains "supplication" [obsecratio] which means a pleading through
sacred things, as when we say, "Through Thy nativity, deliver us, O
Lord. " The reason for impetration on the part of the person who asks is
"thanksgiving"; since "through giving thanks for benefits received we
merit to receive yet greater benefits," as we say in the collect
[*Ember Friday in September and Postcommunion of the common of a
Confessor Bishop]. Hence a gloss on 1 Tim. 2:1 says that "in the Mass,
the consecration is preceded by supplication," in which certain sacred
things are called to mind; that "prayers are in the consecration
itself," in which especially the mind should be raised up to God; and
that "intercessions are in the petitions that follow, and thanksgivings
at the end. "

We may notice these four things in several of the Church's collects.
Thus in the collect of Trinity Sunday the words, "Almighty eternal God"
belong to the offering up of prayer to God; the words, "Who hast given
to Thy servants," etc. belong to thanksgiving; the words, "grant, we
beseech Thee," belong to intercession; and the words at the end,
"Through Our Lord," etc. belong to supplication.

In the "Conferences of the Fathers" (ix, cap. 11, seqq. ) we read:
"Supplication is bewailing one's sins; prayer is vowing something to
God; intercession is praying for others; thanksgiving is offered by the
mind to God in ineffable ecstasy. " The first explanation, however, is
the better.

Reply to Objection 1: "Supplication" is an adjuration not for the
purpose of compelling, for this is forbidden, but in order to implore
mercy.

Reply to Objection 2: "Prayer" in the general sense includes all the
things mentioned here; but when distinguished from the others it
denotes properly the ascent to God.

Reply to Objection 3: Among things that are diverse the past precedes
the future; but the one and same thing is future before it is past.
Hence thanksgiving for other benefits precedes intercession: but one
and the same benefit is first sought, and finally, when it has been
received, we give thanks for it. Intercession is preceded by prayer
whereby we approach Him of Whom we ask: and prayer is preceded by
supplication, whereby through the consideration of God's goodness we
dare approach Him.
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OF ADORATION (THREE ARTICLES)

In due sequence we must consider the external acts of latria, and in
the first place, adoration whereby one uses one's body to reverence
God; secondly, those acts whereby some external thing is offered to
God; thirdly, those acts whereby something belonging to God is assumed.

Under the first head there are three points of inquiry:

(1) Whether adoration is an act of latria?

(2) Whether adoration denotes an internal or an external act?

(3) Whether adoration requires a definite place?
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Whether adoration is an act of latria or religion?

Objection 1: It would seem that adoration is not an act of latria or
religion. The worship of religion is due to God alone. But adoration is
not due to God alone: since we read (Gn. 18:2) that Abraham adored the
angels; and (3 Kings 1:23) that the prophet Nathan, when he was come in
to king David, "worshiped him bowing down to the ground. " Therefore
adoration is not an act of religion.

Objection 2: Further, the worship of religion is due to God as the
object of beatitude, according to Augustine (De Civ. Dei x, 3): whereas
adoration is due to Him by reason of His majesty, since a gloss on Ps.
28:2, "Adore ye the Lord in His holy court," says: "We pass from these
courts into the court where we adore His majesty. " Therefore adoration
is not an act of latria.

Objection 3: Further, the worship of one same religion is due to the
three Persons. But we do not adore the three Persons with one
adoration, for we genuflect at each separate invocation of Them [*At
the adoration of the Cross, on Good Friday]. Therefore adoration is nol
an act of latria.

On the contrary, are the words quoted Mat. 4:10: "The Lord thy God
shalt thou adore and Him only shalt thou serve. "

I answer that, Adoration is directed to the reverence of the person
adored. Now it is evident from what we have said ([3031]Q[81], AA[2],4)
that it is proper to religion to show reverence to God. Hence the
adoration whereby we adore God is an act of religion.

Reply to Objection 1: Reverence is due to God on account of His
excellence, which is communicated to certain creatures not in equal
measure, but according to a measure of proportion; and so the reverence
which we pay to God, and which belongs to latria, differs from the
reverence which we pay to certain excellent creatures; this belongs to
dulia, and we shall speak of it further on ([3032]Q[103]). And since
external actions are signs of internal reverence, certain external
tokens significative of reverence are offered to creatures of
excellence, and among these tokens the chief is adoration: yet there is
one thing which is offered to God alone, and that is sacrifice. Hence
Augustine says (De Civ. Dei x, 4): "Many tokens of Divine worship are
employed in doing honor to men, either through excessive humility, or
through pernicious flattery; yet so that those to whom these honors are
given are recognized as being men to whom we owe esteem and reverence
and even adoration if they be far above us. But who ever thought it his
duty to sacrifice to any other than one whom he either knew or deemed
or pretended to be a God? " Accordingly it was with the reverence due to
an excellent creature that Nathan adored David; while it was the
reverence due to God with which Mardochai refused to adore Aman fearing
"lest he should transfer the honor of his God to a man" (Esther 13:14).

Again with the reverence due to an excellent creature Abraham adored
the angels, as did also Josue (Jos. 5:15): though we may understand
them to have adored, with the adoration of latria, God Who appeared and
spoke to them in the guise of an angel. It was with the reverence due
to God that John was forbidden to adore the angel (Apoc.