18:2) that he "feared not God, nor
regarded
man.
Summa Theologica
Now hope is a theological virtue having God for
its object. Since therefore it is neither in the memory, nor in the
intellect, which belong to the cognitive faculty, it follows that it is
in the will as its subject.
I answer that, As shown above ([2449]FP, Q[87], A[2]), habits are known
by their acts. Now the act of hope is a movement of the appetitive
faculty, since its object is a good. And, since there is a twofold
appetite in man, namely, the sensitive which is divided into irascible
and concupiscible, and the intellective appetite, called the will, as
stated in the [2450]FP, Q[82], A[5], those movements which occur in the
lower appetite, are with passion, while those in the higher appetite
are without passion, as shown above ([2451]FP, Q[87], A[2], ad 1;
[2452]FS, Q[22], A[3], ad 3). Now the act of the virtue of hope cannot
belong to the sensitive appetite, since the good which is the principal
object of this virtue, is not a sensible but a Divine good. Therefore
hope resides in the higher appetite called the will, and not in the
lower appetite, of which the irascible is a part.
Reply to Objection 1: The object of the irascible is an arduous
sensible: whereas the object of the virtue of hope is an arduous
intelligible, or rather superintelligible.
Reply to Objection 2: Charity perfects the will sufficiently with
regard to one act, which is the act of loving: but another virtue is
required in order to perfect it with regard to its other act, which is
that of hoping.
Reply to Objection 3: The movement of hope and the movement of charity
are mutually related, as was shown above (Q[17], A[8]). Hence there is
no reason why both movements should not belong at the same time to the
same power: even as the intellect can understand many things at the
same time if they be related to one another, as stated in the [2453]FP,
Q[85], A[4].
__________________________________________________________________
Whether in the blessed there is hope?
Objection 1: It would seem that in the blessed there is hope. For
Christ was a perfect comprehensor from the first moment of His
conception. Now He had hope, since, according to a gloss, the words of
Ps. 30:2, "In Thee, O Lord, have I hoped," are said in His person.
Therefore in the blessed there can be hope.
Objection 2: Further, even as the obtaining of happiness is an arduous
good, so is its continuation. Now, before they obtain happiness, men
hope to obtain it. Therefore, after they have obtained it, they can
hope to continue in its possession.
Objection 3: Further, by the virtue of hope, a man can hope for
happiness, not only for himself, but also for others, as stated above
([2454]Q[17], A[3]). But the blessed who are in heaven hope for the
happiness of others, else they would not pray for them. Therefore there
can be hope in them.
Objection 4: Further, the happiness of the saints implies not only
glory of the soul but also glory of the body. Now the souls of the
saints in heaven, look yet for the glory of their bodies (Apoc. 6:10;
Augustine, Gen. ad lit. xii, 35). Therefore in the blessed there can be
hope.
On the contrary, The Apostle says (Rom. 8:24): "What a man seeth, why
doth he hope for? " Now the blessed enjoy the sight of God. Therefore
hope has no place in them.
I answer that, If what gives a thing its species be removed, the
species is destroyed, and that thing cannot remain the same; just as
when a natural body loses its form, it does not remain the same
specifically. Now hope takes its species from its principal object,
even as the other virtues do, as was shown above (Q[17], AA[5],6;
[2455]FS, Q[54], A[2]): and its principal object is eternal happiness
as being possible to obtain by the assistance of God, as stated above
(Q[17], A[2]).
Since then the arduous possible good cannot be an object of hope except
in so far as it is something future, it follows that when happiness is
no longer future, but present, it is incompatible with the virtue of
hope. Consequently hope, like faith, is voided in heaven, and neither
of them can be in the blessed.
Reply to Objection 1: Although Christ was a comprehensor and therefore
blessed as to the enjoyment of God, nevertheless He was, at the same
time, a wayfarer, as regards the passibility of nature, to which He was
still subject. Hence it was possible for Him to hope for the glory of
impassibility and immortality, yet not so as to the virtue of hope, the
principal object of which is not the glory of the body but the
enjoyment of God.
Reply to Objection 2: The happiness of the saints is called eternal
life, because through enjoying God they become partakers, as it were,
of God's eternity which surpasses all time: so that the continuation of
happiness does not differ in respect of present, past and future. Hence
the blessed do not hope for the continuation of their happiness (for as
regards this there is no future), but are in actual possession thereof.
Reply to Objection 3: So long as the virtue of hope lasts, it is by the
same hope that one hopes for one's own happiness, and for that of
others. But when hope is voided in the blessed, whereby they hoped for
their own happiness, they hope for the happiness of others indeed, yet
not by the virtue of hope, but rather by the love of charity. Even so,
he that has Divine charity, by that same charity loves his neighbor,
without having the virtue of charity, but by some other love.
Reply to Objection 4: Since hope is a theological virtue having God for
its object, its principal object is the glory of the soul, which
consists in the enjoyment of God, and not the glory of the body.
Moreover, although the glory of the body is something arduous in
comparison with human nature, yet it is not so for one who has the
glory of the soul; both because the glory of the body is a very small
thing as compared with the glory of the soul, and because one who has
the glory of the soul has already the sufficient cause of the glory of
the body.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether hope is in the damned?
Objection 1: It would seem that there is hope in the damned. For the
devil is damned and prince of the damned, according to Mat. 25:41:
"Depart . . . you cursed, into everlasting fire, which was prepared for
the devil and his angels. " But the devil has hope, according to Job
40:28, "Behold his hope shall fail him. " Therefore it seems that the
damned have hope.
Objection 2: Further, just as faith is either living or dead, so is
hope. But lifeless faith can be in the devils and the damned, according
to James 2:19: "The devils . . . believe and tremble. " Therefore it
seems that lifeless hope also can be in the damned.
Objection 3: Further, after death there accrues to man no merit or
demerit that he had not before, according to Eccles. 11:3, "If the tree
fall to the south, or to the north, in what place soever it shall fall,
there shall it be. " Now many who are damned, in this life hoped and
never despaired. Therefore they will hope in the future life also.
On the contrary, Hope causes joy, according to Rom. 12:12, "Rejoicing
in hope. " Now the damned have no joy, but sorrow and grief, according
to Is. 65:14, "My servants shall praise for joyfulness of heart, and
you shall cry for sorrow of heart, and shall howl for grief of spirit. "
Therefore no hope is in the damned.
I answer that, Just as it is a condition of happiness that the will
should find rest therein, so is it a condition of punishment, that what
is inflicted in punishment, should go against the will. Now that which
is not known can neither be restful nor repugnant to the will:
wherefore Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xi, 17) that the angels could
not be perfectly happy in their first state before their confirmation,
or unhappy before their fall, since they had no foreknowledge of what
would happen to them. For perfect and true happiness requires that one
should be certain of being happy for ever, else the will would not
rest.
In like manner, since the everlastingness of damnation is a necessary
condition of the punishment of the damned, it would not be truly penal
unless it went against the will; and this would be impossible if they
were ignorant of the everlastingness of their damnation. Hence it
belongs to the unhappy state of the damned, that they should know that
they cannot by any means escape from damnation and obtain happiness.
Wherefore it is written (Job 15:22): "He believeth not that he may
return from darkness to light. " It is, therefore, evident that they
cannot apprehend happiness as a possible good, as neither can the
blessed apprehend it as a future good. Consequently there is no hope
either in the blessed or in the damned. On the other hand, hope can be
in wayfarers, whether of this life or in purgatory, because in either
case they apprehend happiness as a future possible thing.
Reply to Objection 1: As Gregory says (Moral. xxxiii, 20) this is said
of the devil as regards his members, whose hope will fail utterly: or,
if it be understood of the devil himself, it may refer to the hope
whereby he expects to vanquish the saints, in which sense we read just
before (Job 40:18): "He trusteth that the Jordan may run into his
mouth": this is not, however, the hope of which we are speaking.
Reply to Objection 2: As Augustine says (Enchiridion viii), "faith is
about things, bad or good, past, present, or future, one's own or
another's; whereas hope is only about good things, future and
concerning oneself. " Hence it is possible for lifeless faith to be in
the damned, but not hope, since the Divine goods are not for them
future possible things, but far removed from them.
Reply to Objection 3: Lack of hope in the damned does not change their
demerit, as neither does the voiding of hope in the blessed increase
their merit: but both these things are due to the change in their
respective states.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether there is certainty in the hope of a wayfarer?
Objection 1: It would seem that there is no certainty in the hope of a
wayfarer. For hope resides in the will. But certainty pertains not to
the will but to the intellect. Therefore there is no certainty in hope.
Objection 2: Further, hope is based on grace and merits, as stated
above (Q[17], A[1]). Now it is impossible in this life to know for
certain that we are in a state of grace, as stated above ([2456]FS,
Q[112], A[5]). Therefore there is no certainty in the hope of a
wayfarer.
Objection 3: Further, there can be no certainty about that which may
fail. Now many a hopeful wayfarer fails to obtain happiness. Therefore
wayfarer's hope has no certainty.
On the contrary, "Hope is the certain expectation of future happiness,"
as the Master states (Sent. iii, D, 26): and this may be gathered from
2 Tim. 1:12, "I know Whom I have believed, and I am certain that He is
able to keep that which I have committed to Him. "
I answer that, Certainty is found in a thing in two ways, essentially
and by participation. It is found essentially in the cognitive power;
by participation in whatever is moved infallibly to its end by the
cognitive power. In this way we say that nature works with certainty,
since it is moved by the Divine intellect which moves everything with
certainty to its end. In this way too, the moral virtues are said to
work with greater certainty than art, in as much as, like a second
nature, they are moved to their acts by the reason: and thus too, hope
tends to its end with certainty, as though sharing in the certainty of
faith which is in the cognitive faculty.
This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.
Reply to Objection 2: Hope does not trust chiefly in grace already
received, but on God's omnipotence and mercy, whereby even he that has
not grace, can obtain it, so as to come to eternal life. Now whoever
has faith is certain of God's omnipotence and mercy.
Reply to Objection 3: That some who have hope fail to obtain happiness,
is due to a fault of the free will in placing the obstacle of sin, but
not to any deficiency in God's power or mercy, in which hope places its
trust. Hence this does not prejudice the certainty of hope.
__________________________________________________________________
OF THE GIFT OF FEAR (TWELVE ARTICLES)
We must now consider the gift of fear, about which there are twelve
points of inquiry:
(1) Whether God is to be feared?
(2) Of the division of fear into filial, initial, servile and worldly;
(3) Whether worldly fear is always evil?
(4) Whether servile fear is good?
(5) Whether it is substantially the same as filial fear?
(6) Whether servile fear departs when charity comes?
(7) Whether fear is the beginning of wisdom?
(8) Whether initial fear is substantially the same as filial fear?
(9) Whether fear is a gift of the Holy Ghost?
(10) Whether it grows when charity grows?
(11) Whether it remains in heaven?
(12) Which of the beatitudes and fruits correspond to it?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether God can be feared?
Objection 1: It would seem that God cannot be feared. For the object of
fear is a future evil, as stated above ([2457]FS, Q[41], AA[2],3). But
God is free of all evil, since He is goodness itself. Therefore God
cannot be feared.
Objection 2: Further, fear is opposed to hope. Now we hope in God.
Therefore we cannot fear Him at the same time.
Objection 3: Further, as the Philosopher states (Rhet. ii, 5), "we fear
those things whence evil comes to us. " But evil comes to us, not from
God, but from ourselves, according to Osee 13:9: "Destruction is thy
own, O Israel: thy help is . . . in Me. " Therefore God is not to be
feared.
On the contrary, It is written (Jer. 10:7): "Who shall not fear Thee, O
King of nations? " and (Malachi 1:6): "If I be a master, where is My
fear? "
I answer that, Just as hope has two objects, one of which is the future
good itself, that one expects to obtain, while the other is someone's
help, through whom one expects to obtain what one hopes for, so, too,
fear may have two objects, one of which is the very evil which a man
shrinks from, while the other is that from which the evil may come.
Accordingly, in the first way God, Who is goodness itself, cannot be an
object of fear; but He can be an object of fear in the second way, in
so far as there may come to us some evil either from Him or in relation
to Him.
From Him there comes the evil of punishment, but this is evil not
absolutely but relatively, and, absolutely speaking, is a good.
Because, since a thing is said to be good through being ordered to an
end, while evil implies lack of this order, that which excludes the
order to the last end is altogether evil, and such is the evil of
fault. On the other hand the evil of punishment is indeed an evil, in
so far as it is the privation of some particular good, yet absolutely
speaking, it is a good, in so far as it is ordained to the last end.
In relation to God the evil of fault can come to us, if we be separated
from Him: and in this way God can and ought to be feared.
Reply to Objection 1: This objection considers the object of fear as
being the evil which a man shuns.
Reply to Objection 2: In God, we may consider both His justice, in
respect of which He punishes those who sin, and His mercy, in respect
of which He sets us free: in us the consideration of His justice gives
rise to fear, but the consideration of His mercy gives rise to hope, so
that, accordingly, God is the object of both hope and fear, but under
different aspects.
Reply to Objection 3: The evil of fault is not from God as its author
but from us, in for far as we forsake God: while the evil of punishment
is from God as its author, in so far as it has character of a good,
since it is something just, through being inflicted on us justly;
although originally this is due to the demerit of sin: thus it is
written (Wis. 1:13, 16): "God made not death . . . but the wicked with
works and words have called it to them. "
__________________________________________________________________
Whether fear is fittingly divided into filial, initial, servile and worldly
fear?
Objection 1: It would seem that fear is unfittingly divided into
filial, initial, servile and worldly fear. For Damascene says (De Fide
Orth. ii, 15) that there are six kinds of fear, viz. "laziness,
shamefacedness," etc. of which we have treated above ([2458]FS, Q[41],
A[4]), and which are not mentioned in the division in question.
Therefore this division of fear seems unfitting.
Objection 2: Further, each of these fears is either good or evil. But
there is a fear, viz. natural fear, which is neither morally good,
since it is in the demons, according to James 2:19, "The devils . . .
believe and tremble," nor evil, since it is in Christ, according to Mk.
14:33, Jesus "began to fear and be heavy. " Therefore the aforesaid
division of fear is insufficient.
Objection 3: Further, the relation of son to father differs from that
of wife to husband, and this again from that of servant to master. Now
filial fear, which is that of the son in comparison with his father, is
distinct from servile fear, which is that of the servant in comparison
with his master. Therefore chaste fear, which seems to be that of the
wife in comparison with her husband, ought to be distinguished from all
these other fears.
Objection 4: Further, even as servile fear fears punishment, so do
initial and worldly fear. Therefore no distinction should be made
between them.
Objection 5: Further, even as concupiscence is about some good, so is
fear about some evil. Now "concupiscence of the eyes," which is the
desire for things of this world, is distinct from "concupiscence of the
flesh," which is the desire for one's own pleasure. Therefore "worldly
fear," whereby one fears to lose external goods, is distinct from
"human fear," whereby one fears harm to one's own person.
On the contrary stands the authority of the Master (Sent. iii, D, 34).
I answer that, We are speaking of fear now, in so far as it makes us
turn, so to speak, to God or away from Him. For, since the object of
fear is an evil, sometimes, on account of the evils he fears, man
withdraws from God, and this is called human fear; while sometimes, on
account of the evils he fears, he turns to God and adheres to Him. This
latter evil is twofold, viz. evil of punishment, and evil of fault.
Accordingly if a man turn to God and adhere to Him, through fear of
punishment, it will be servile fear; but if it be on account of fear of
committing a fault, it will be filial fear, for it becomes a child to
fear offending its father. If, however, it be on account of both, it
will be initial fear, which is between both these fears. As to whether
it is possible to fear the evil of fault, the question has been treated
above ([2459]FS, Q[42], A[3]) when we were considering the passion of
fear.
Reply to Objection 1: Damascene divides fear as a passion of the soul:
whereas this division of fear is taken from its relation to God, as
explained above.
Reply to Objection 2: Moral good consists chiefly in turning to God,
while moral evil consists chiefly in turning away from Him: wherefore
all the fears mentioned above imply either moral evil or moral good.
Now natural fear is presupposed to moral good and evil, and so it is
not numbered among these kinds of fear.
Reply to Objection 3: The relation of servant to master is based on the
power which the master exercises over the servant; whereas, on the
contrary, the relation of a son to his father or of a wife to her
husband is based on the son's affection towards his father to whom he
submits himself, or on the wife's affection towards her husband to whom
she binds herself in the union of love. Hence filial and chaste fear
amount to the same, because by the love of charity God becomes our
Father, according to Rom. 8:15, "You have received the spirit of
adoption of sons, whereby we cry: Abba [Father]"; and by this same
charity He is called our spouse, according to 2 Cor. 11:2, "I have
espoused you to one husband, that I may present you as a chaste virgin
to Christ": whereas servile fear has no connection with these, since it
does not include charity in its definition.
Reply to Objection 4: These three fears regard punishment but in
different ways. For worldly or human fear regards a punishment which
turns man away from God, and which God's enemies sometimes inflict or
threaten: whereas servile and initial fear regard a punishment whereby
men are drawn to God, and which is inflicted or threatened by God.
Servile fear regards this punishment chiefly, while initial fear
regards it secondarily.
Reply to Objection 5: It amounts to the same whether man turns away
from God through fear of losing his worldly goods, or through fear of
forfeiting the well-being of his body, since external goods belong to
the body. Hence both these fears are reckoned as one here, although
they fear different evils, even as they correspond to the desire of
different goods. This diversity causes a specific diversity of sins,
all of which alike however lead man away from God.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether worldly fear is always evil?
Objection 1: It would seem that worldly fear is not always evil.
Because regard for men seems to be a kind of human fear. Now some are
blamed for having no regard for man, for instance, the unjust judge of
whom we read (Lk.
18:2) that he "feared not God, nor regarded man. "
Therefore it seems that worldly fear is not always evil.
Objection 2: Further, worldly fear seems to have reference to the
punishments inflicted by the secular power. Now such like punishments
incite us to good actions, according to Rom. 13:3, "Wilt thou not be
afraid of the power? Do that which is good, and thou shalt have praise
from the same. " Therefore worldly fear is not always evil.
Objection 3: Further, it seems that what is in us naturally, is not
evil, since our natural gifts are from God. Now it is natural to man to
fear detriment to his body, and loss of his worldly goods, whereby the
present life is supported. Therefore it seems that worldly fear is not
always evil.
On the contrary, Our Lord said (Mat. 10:28): "Fear ye not them that
kill the body," thus forbidding worldly fear. Now nothing but what is
evil is forbidden by God. Therefore worldly fear is evil.
I answer that, As shown above ([2460]FS, Q[1], A[3]; [2461]FS, Q[18],
A[1]; [2462]FS, Q[54], A[2]) moral acts and habits take their name and
species from their objects. Now the proper object of the appetite's
movement is the final good: so that, in consequence, every appetitive
movement is both specified and named from its proper end. For if anyone
were to describe covetousness as love of work because men work on
account of covetousness, this description would be incorrect, since the
covetous man seeks work not as end but as a means: the end that he
seeks is wealth, wherefore covetousness is rightly described as the
desire or the love of wealth, and this is evil. Accordingly worldly
love is, properly speaking, the love whereby a man trusts in the world
as his end, so that worldly love is always evil. Now fear is born of
love, since man fears the loss of what he loves, as Augustine states
(Qq. lxxxiii, qu. 33). Now worldly fear is that which arises from
worldly love as from an evil root, for which reason worldly fear is
always evil.
Reply to Objection 1: One may have regard for men in two ways. First in
so far as there is in them something divine, for instance, the good of
grace or of virtue, or at least of the natural image of God: and in
this way those are blamed who have no regard for man. Secondly, one may
have regard for men as being in opposition to God, and thus it is
praiseworthy to have no regard for men, according as we read of Elias
or Eliseus (Ecclus. 48:13): "In his days he feared not the prince. "
Reply to Objection 2: When the secular power inflicts punishment in
order to withdraw men from sin, it is acting as God's minister,
according to Rom. 13:4, "For he is God's minister, an avenger to
execute wrath upon him that doth evil. " To fear the secular power in
this way is part, not of worldly fear, but of servile or initial fear.
Reply to Objection 3: It is natural for man to shrink from detriment to
his own body and loss of worldly goods, but to forsake justice on that
account is contrary to natural reason. Hence the Philosopher says
(Ethic. iii, 1) that there are certain things, viz. sinful deeds, which
no fear should drive us to do, since to do such things is worse than to
suffer any punishment whatever.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether servile fear is good?
Objection 1: It would seem that servile fear is not good. For if the
use of a thing is evil, the thing itself is evil. Now the use of
servile fear is evil, for according to a gloss on Rom. 8:15, "if a man
do anything through fear, although the deed be good, it is not well
done. " Therefore servile fear is not good.
Objection 2: Further, no good grows from a sinful root. Now servile
fear grows from a sinful root, because when commenting on Job 3:11,
"Why did I not die in the womb? " Gregory says (Moral. iv, 25): "When a
man dreads the punishment which confronts him for his sin and no longer
loves the friendship of God which he has lost, his fear is born of
pride, not of humility. " Therefore servile fear is evil.
Objection 3: Further, just as mercenary love is opposed to the love of
charity, so is servile fear, apparently, opposed to chaste fear. But
mercenary love is always evil. Therefore servile fear is also.
On the contrary, Nothing evil is from the Holy Ghost. But servile fear
is from the Holy Ghost, since a gloss on Rom. 8:15, "You have not
received the spirit of bondage," etc. says: "It is the one same spirit
that bestows two fears, viz. servile and chaste fear. " Therefore
servile fear is not evil.
I answer that, It is owing to its servility that servile fear may be
evil. For servitude is opposed to freedom. Since, then, "what is free
is cause of itself" (Metaph. i, 2), a slave is one who does not act as
cause of his own action, but as though moved from without. Now whoever
does a thing through love, does it of himself so to speak, because it
is by his own inclination that he is moved to act: so that it is
contrary to the very notion of servility that one should act from love.
Consequently servile fear as such is contrary to charity: so that if
servility were essential to fear, servile fear would be evil simply,
even as adultery is evil simply, because that which makes it contrary
to charity belongs to its very species.
This servility, however, does not belong to the species of servile
fear, even as neither does lifelessness to the species of lifeless
faith. For the species of a moral habit or act is taken from the
object. Now the object of servile fear is punishment, and it is by
accident that, either the good to which the punishment is contrary, is
loved as the last end, and that consequently the punishment is feared
as the greatest evil, which is the case with one who is devoid of
charity, or that the punishment is directed to God as its end, and
that, consequently, it is not feared as the greatest evil, which is the
case with one who has charity. For the species of a habit is not
destroyed through its object or end being directed to a further end.
Consequently servile fear is substantially good, but is servility is
evil.
Reply to Objection 1: This saying of Augustine is to be applied to a
man who does something through servile fear as such, so that he loves
not justice, and fears nothing but the punishment.
Reply to Objection 2: Servile fear as to its substance is not born of
pride, but its servility is, inasmuch as man is unwilling, by love, to
subject his affections to the yoke of justice.
Reply to Objection 3: Mercenary love is that whereby God is loved for
the sake of worldly goods, and this is, of itself, contrary to charity,
so that mercenary love is always evil. But servile fear, as to its
substance, implies merely fear of punishment, whether or not this be
feared as the principal evil.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether servile fear is substantially the same as filial fear?
Objection 1: It would seem that servile fear is substantially the same
as filial fear. For filial fear is to servile fear the same apparently
as living faith is to lifeless faith, since the one is accompanied by
mortal sin and the other not. Now living faith and lifeless faith are
substantially the same. Therefore servile and filial fear are
substantially the same.
Objection 2: Further, habits are diversified by their objects. Now the
same thing is the object of servile and of filial fear, since they both
fear God. Therefore servile and filial fear are substantially the same.
Objection 3: Further, just as man hopes to enjoy God and to obtain
favors from Him, so does he fear to be separated from God and to be
punished by Him. Now it is the same hope whereby we hope to enjoy God,
and to receive other favors from Him, as stated above ([2463]Q[17],
A[2], ad 2). Therefore filial fear, whereby we fear separation from
God, is the same as servile fear whereby we fear His punishments.
On the contrary, Augustine (In prim. canon. Joan. Tract. ix) says that
there are two fears, one servile, another filial or chaste fear.
I answer that, The proper object of fear is evil. And since acts and
habits are diversified by their objects, as shown above ([2464]FS,
Q[54], A[2] ), it follows of necessity that different kinds of fear
correspond to different kinds of evil.
Now the evil of punishment, from which servile fear shrinks, differs
specifically from evil of fault, which filial fear shuns, as shown
above [2465](A[2]). Hence it is evident that servile and filial fear
are not the same substantially but differ specifically.
Reply to Objection 1: Living and lifeless faith differ, not as regards
the object, since each of them believes God and believes in a God, but
in respect of something extrinsic, viz. the presence or absence of
charity, and so they do not differ substantially. On the other hand,
servile and filial fear differ as to their objects: and hence the
comparison fails.
Reply to Objection 2: Servile fear and filial fear do not regard God in
the same light. For servile fear looks upon God as the cause of the
infliction of punishment, whereas filial fear looks upon Him, not as
the active cause of guilt, but rather as the term wherefrom it shrinks
to be separated by guilt. Consequently the identity of object, viz.
God, does not prove a specific identity of fear, since also natural
movements differ specifically according to their different
relationships to some one term, for movement from whiteness is not
specifically the same as movement towards whiteness.
Reply to Objection 3: Hope looks upon God as the principle not only of
the enjoyment of God, but also of any other favor whatever. This cannot
be said of fear; and so there is no comparison.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether servile fear remains with charity?
Objection 1: It would seem that servile fear does not remain with
charity. For Augustine says (In prim. canon. Joan. Tract. ix) that
"when charity takes up its abode, it drives away fear which had
prepared a place for it. "
Objection 2: Further, "The charity of God is poured forth in our
hearts, by the Holy Ghost, Who is given to us" (Rom. 5:5). Now "where
the Spirit of the Lord is, there is liberty" (2 Cor. 3:17). Since then
freedom excludes servitude, it seems that servile fear is driven away
when charity comes.
Objection 3: Further, servile fear is caused by self-love, in so far as
punishment diminishes one's own good. Now love of God drives away
self-love, for it makes us despise ourselves: thus Augustine testifies
(De Civ. Dei xiv, 28) that "the love of God unto the contempt of self
builds up the city of God. " Therefore it seems that servile fear is
driven out when charity comes.
On the contrary, Servile fear is a gift of the Holy Ghost, as stated
above [2466](A[4]). Now the gifts of the Holy Ghost are not forfeited
through the advent of charity, whereby the Holy Ghost dwells in us.
Therefore servile fear is not driven out when charity comes.
I answer that, Servile fear proceeds from self-love, because it is fear
of punishment which is detrimental to one's own good. Hence the fear of
punishment is consistent with charity, in the same way as self-love is:
because it comes to the same that a man love his own good and that he
fear to be deprived of it.
Now self-love may stand in a threefold relationship to charity. In one
way it is contrary to charity, when a man places his end in the love of
his own good. In another way it is included in charity, when a man
loves himself for the sake of God and in God. In a third way, it is
indeed distinct from charity, but is not contrary thereto, as when a
man loves himself from the point of view of his own good, yet not so as
to place his end in this his own good: even as one may have another
special love for one's neighbor, besides the love of charity which is
founded on God, when we love him by reason of usefulness,
consanguinity, or some other human consideration, which, however, is
referable to charity.
Accordingly fear of punishment is, in one way, included in charity,
because separation from God is a punishment, which charity shuns
exceedingly; so that this belongs to chaste fear. In another way, it is
contrary to charity, when a man shrinks from the punishment that is
opposed to his natural good, as being the principal evil in opposition
to the good which he loves as an end; and in this way fear of
punishment is not consistent with charity. In another way fear of
punishment is indeed substantially distinct from chaste fear, when, to
wit, a man fears a penal evil, not because it separates him from God,
but because it is hurtful to his own good, and yet he does not place
his end in this good, so that neither does he dread this evil as being
the principal evil. Such fear of punishment is consistent with charity;
but it is not called servile, except when punishment is dreaded as a
principal evil, as explained above ([2467]AA[2],4). Hence fear
considered as servile, does not remain with charity, but the substance
of servile fear can remain with charity, even as self-love can remain
with charity.
Reply to Objection 1: Augustine is speaking of fear considered as
servile: and such is the sense of the two other objections.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether fear is the beginning of wisdom?
Objection 1: It would seem that fear is not the beginning of wisdom.
For the beginning of a thing is a part thereof. But fear is not a part
of wisdom, since fear is seated in the appetitive faculty, while wisdom
is in the intellect. Therefore it seems that fear is not the beginning
of wisdom.
Objection 2: Further, nothing is the beginning of itself. "Now fear of
the Lord, that is wisdom," according to Job 28:28. Therefore it seems
that fear of God is not the beginning of wisdom.
Objection 3: Further, nothing is prior to the beginning. But something
is prior to fear, since faith precedes fear. Therefore it seems that
fear is not the beginning of wisdom.
On the contrary, It is written in the Ps. 110:10: "The fear of the Lord
is the beginning of wisdom. "
I answer that, A thing may be called the beginning of wisdom in two
ways: in one way because it is the beginning of wisdom itself as to its
essence; in another way, as to its effect. Thus the beginning of an art
as to its essence consists in the principles from which that art
proceeds, while the beginning of an art as to its effect is that
wherefrom it begins to operate: for instance we might say that the
beginning of the art of building is the foundation because that is
where the builder begins his work.
Now, since wisdom is the knowledge of Divine things, as we shall state
further on ([2468]Q[45], A[1]), it is considered by us in one way, and
in another way by philosophers. For, seeing that our life is ordained
to the enjoyment of God, and is directed thereto according to a
participation of the Divine Nature, conferred on us through grace,
wisdom, as we look at it, is considered not only as being cognizant of
God, as it is with the philosophers, but also as directing human
conduct; since this is directed not only by the human law, but also by
the Divine law, as Augustine shows (De Trin. xii, 14). Accordingly the
beginning of wisdom as to its essence consists in the first principles
of wisdom, i. e. the articles of faith, and in this sense faith is said
to be the beginning of wisdom. But as regards the effect, the beginning
of wisdom is the point where wisdom begins to work, and in this way
fear is the beginning of wisdom, yet servile fear in one way, and
filial fear, in another. For servile fear is like a principle disposing
a man to wisdom from without, in so far as he refrains from sin through
fear of punishment, and is thus fashioned for the effect of wisdom,
according to Ecclus. 1:27, "The fear of the Lord driveth out sin. " On
the other hand, chaste or filial fear is the beginning of wisdom, as
being the first effect of wisdom. For since the regulation of human
conduct by the Divine law belongs to wisdom, in order to make a
beginning, man must first of all fear God and submit himself to Him:
for the result will be that in all things he will be ruled by God.
Reply to Objection 1: This argument proves that fear is not the
beginning of wisdom as to the essence of wisdom.
Reply to Objection 2: The fear of God is compared to a man's whole life
that is ruled by God's wisdom, as the root to the tree: hence it is
written (Ecclus. 1:25): "The root of wisdom is to fear the Lord, for
[Vulg. : 'and'] the branches thereof are longlived. " Consequently, as
the root is said to be virtually the tree, so the fear of God is said
to be wisdom.
Reply to Objection 3: As stated above, faith is the beginning of wisdom
in one way, and fear, in another. Hence it is written (Ecclus. 25:16):
"The fear of God is the beginning of love: and the beginning of faith
is to be fast joined to it. "
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Whether initial fear differs substantially from filial fear?
Objection 1: It would seem that initial fear differs substantially from
filial fear. For filial fear is caused by love. Now initial fear is the
beginning of love, according to Ecclus. 25:16, "The fear of God is the
beginning of love. " Therefore initial fear is distinct from filial
fear.
Objection 2: Further, initial fear dreads punishment, which is the
object of servile fear, so that initial and servile fear would seem to
be the same. But servile fear is distinct from filial fear. Therefore
initial fear also is substantially distinct from initial fear.
Objection 3: Further, a mean differs in the same ratio from both the
extremes. Now initial fear is the mean between servile and filial fear.
Therefore it differs from both filial and servile fear.
On the contrary, Perfect and imperfect do not diversify the substance
of a thing. Now initial and filial fear differ in respect of perfection
and imperfection of charity, as Augustine states (In prim. canon. Joan.
Tract. ix). Therefore initial fear does not differ substantially from
filial fear.
I answer that, Initial fear is so called because it is a beginning
[initium]. Since, however, both servile and filial fear are, in some
way, the beginning of wisdom, each may be called in some way, initial.
It is not in this sense, however, that we are to understand initial
fear in so far as it is distinct from servile and filial fear, but in
the sense according to which it belongs to the state of beginners, in
whom there is a beginning of filial fear resulting from a beginning of
charity, although they do not possess the perfection of filial fear,
because they have not yet attained to the perfection of charity.
Consequently initial fear stands in the same relation to filial fear as
imperfect to perfect charity. Now perfect and imperfect charity differ,
not as to essence but as to state. Therefore we must conclude that
initial fear, as we understand it here, does not differ essentially
from filial fear.
Reply to Objection 1: The fear which is a beginning of love is servile
fear, which is the herald of charity, just as the bristle introduces
the thread, as Augustine states (Tract. ix in Ep. i Joan. ). Or else, if
it be referred to initial fear, this is said to be the beginning of
love, not absolutely, but relatively to the state of perfect charity.
Reply to Objection 2: Initial fear does not dread punishment as its
proper object, but as having something of servile fear connected with
it: for this servile fear, as to its substance, remains indeed, with
charity, its servility being cast aside; whereas its act remains with
imperfect charity in the man who is moved to perform good actions not
only through love of justice, but also through fear of punishment,
though this same act ceases in the man who has perfect charity, which
"casteth out fear," according to 1 Jn. 4:18.
Reply to Objection 3: Initial fear is a mean between servile and filial
fear, not as between two things of the same genus, but as the imperfect
is a mean between a perfect being and a non-being, as stated in Metaph.
ii, for it is the same substantially as the perfect being, while it
differs altogether from non-being.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether fear is a gift of the Holy Ghost?
Objection 1: It would seem that fear is not a gift of the Holy Ghost.
For no gift of the Holy Ghost is opposed to a virtue, which is also
from the Holy Ghost; else the Holy Ghost would be in opposition to
Himself. Now fear is opposed to hope, which is a virtue. Therefore fear
is not a gift of the Holy Ghost.
its object. Since therefore it is neither in the memory, nor in the
intellect, which belong to the cognitive faculty, it follows that it is
in the will as its subject.
I answer that, As shown above ([2449]FP, Q[87], A[2]), habits are known
by their acts. Now the act of hope is a movement of the appetitive
faculty, since its object is a good. And, since there is a twofold
appetite in man, namely, the sensitive which is divided into irascible
and concupiscible, and the intellective appetite, called the will, as
stated in the [2450]FP, Q[82], A[5], those movements which occur in the
lower appetite, are with passion, while those in the higher appetite
are without passion, as shown above ([2451]FP, Q[87], A[2], ad 1;
[2452]FS, Q[22], A[3], ad 3). Now the act of the virtue of hope cannot
belong to the sensitive appetite, since the good which is the principal
object of this virtue, is not a sensible but a Divine good. Therefore
hope resides in the higher appetite called the will, and not in the
lower appetite, of which the irascible is a part.
Reply to Objection 1: The object of the irascible is an arduous
sensible: whereas the object of the virtue of hope is an arduous
intelligible, or rather superintelligible.
Reply to Objection 2: Charity perfects the will sufficiently with
regard to one act, which is the act of loving: but another virtue is
required in order to perfect it with regard to its other act, which is
that of hoping.
Reply to Objection 3: The movement of hope and the movement of charity
are mutually related, as was shown above (Q[17], A[8]). Hence there is
no reason why both movements should not belong at the same time to the
same power: even as the intellect can understand many things at the
same time if they be related to one another, as stated in the [2453]FP,
Q[85], A[4].
__________________________________________________________________
Whether in the blessed there is hope?
Objection 1: It would seem that in the blessed there is hope. For
Christ was a perfect comprehensor from the first moment of His
conception. Now He had hope, since, according to a gloss, the words of
Ps. 30:2, "In Thee, O Lord, have I hoped," are said in His person.
Therefore in the blessed there can be hope.
Objection 2: Further, even as the obtaining of happiness is an arduous
good, so is its continuation. Now, before they obtain happiness, men
hope to obtain it. Therefore, after they have obtained it, they can
hope to continue in its possession.
Objection 3: Further, by the virtue of hope, a man can hope for
happiness, not only for himself, but also for others, as stated above
([2454]Q[17], A[3]). But the blessed who are in heaven hope for the
happiness of others, else they would not pray for them. Therefore there
can be hope in them.
Objection 4: Further, the happiness of the saints implies not only
glory of the soul but also glory of the body. Now the souls of the
saints in heaven, look yet for the glory of their bodies (Apoc. 6:10;
Augustine, Gen. ad lit. xii, 35). Therefore in the blessed there can be
hope.
On the contrary, The Apostle says (Rom. 8:24): "What a man seeth, why
doth he hope for? " Now the blessed enjoy the sight of God. Therefore
hope has no place in them.
I answer that, If what gives a thing its species be removed, the
species is destroyed, and that thing cannot remain the same; just as
when a natural body loses its form, it does not remain the same
specifically. Now hope takes its species from its principal object,
even as the other virtues do, as was shown above (Q[17], AA[5],6;
[2455]FS, Q[54], A[2]): and its principal object is eternal happiness
as being possible to obtain by the assistance of God, as stated above
(Q[17], A[2]).
Since then the arduous possible good cannot be an object of hope except
in so far as it is something future, it follows that when happiness is
no longer future, but present, it is incompatible with the virtue of
hope. Consequently hope, like faith, is voided in heaven, and neither
of them can be in the blessed.
Reply to Objection 1: Although Christ was a comprehensor and therefore
blessed as to the enjoyment of God, nevertheless He was, at the same
time, a wayfarer, as regards the passibility of nature, to which He was
still subject. Hence it was possible for Him to hope for the glory of
impassibility and immortality, yet not so as to the virtue of hope, the
principal object of which is not the glory of the body but the
enjoyment of God.
Reply to Objection 2: The happiness of the saints is called eternal
life, because through enjoying God they become partakers, as it were,
of God's eternity which surpasses all time: so that the continuation of
happiness does not differ in respect of present, past and future. Hence
the blessed do not hope for the continuation of their happiness (for as
regards this there is no future), but are in actual possession thereof.
Reply to Objection 3: So long as the virtue of hope lasts, it is by the
same hope that one hopes for one's own happiness, and for that of
others. But when hope is voided in the blessed, whereby they hoped for
their own happiness, they hope for the happiness of others indeed, yet
not by the virtue of hope, but rather by the love of charity. Even so,
he that has Divine charity, by that same charity loves his neighbor,
without having the virtue of charity, but by some other love.
Reply to Objection 4: Since hope is a theological virtue having God for
its object, its principal object is the glory of the soul, which
consists in the enjoyment of God, and not the glory of the body.
Moreover, although the glory of the body is something arduous in
comparison with human nature, yet it is not so for one who has the
glory of the soul; both because the glory of the body is a very small
thing as compared with the glory of the soul, and because one who has
the glory of the soul has already the sufficient cause of the glory of
the body.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether hope is in the damned?
Objection 1: It would seem that there is hope in the damned. For the
devil is damned and prince of the damned, according to Mat. 25:41:
"Depart . . . you cursed, into everlasting fire, which was prepared for
the devil and his angels. " But the devil has hope, according to Job
40:28, "Behold his hope shall fail him. " Therefore it seems that the
damned have hope.
Objection 2: Further, just as faith is either living or dead, so is
hope. But lifeless faith can be in the devils and the damned, according
to James 2:19: "The devils . . . believe and tremble. " Therefore it
seems that lifeless hope also can be in the damned.
Objection 3: Further, after death there accrues to man no merit or
demerit that he had not before, according to Eccles. 11:3, "If the tree
fall to the south, or to the north, in what place soever it shall fall,
there shall it be. " Now many who are damned, in this life hoped and
never despaired. Therefore they will hope in the future life also.
On the contrary, Hope causes joy, according to Rom. 12:12, "Rejoicing
in hope. " Now the damned have no joy, but sorrow and grief, according
to Is. 65:14, "My servants shall praise for joyfulness of heart, and
you shall cry for sorrow of heart, and shall howl for grief of spirit. "
Therefore no hope is in the damned.
I answer that, Just as it is a condition of happiness that the will
should find rest therein, so is it a condition of punishment, that what
is inflicted in punishment, should go against the will. Now that which
is not known can neither be restful nor repugnant to the will:
wherefore Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xi, 17) that the angels could
not be perfectly happy in their first state before their confirmation,
or unhappy before their fall, since they had no foreknowledge of what
would happen to them. For perfect and true happiness requires that one
should be certain of being happy for ever, else the will would not
rest.
In like manner, since the everlastingness of damnation is a necessary
condition of the punishment of the damned, it would not be truly penal
unless it went against the will; and this would be impossible if they
were ignorant of the everlastingness of their damnation. Hence it
belongs to the unhappy state of the damned, that they should know that
they cannot by any means escape from damnation and obtain happiness.
Wherefore it is written (Job 15:22): "He believeth not that he may
return from darkness to light. " It is, therefore, evident that they
cannot apprehend happiness as a possible good, as neither can the
blessed apprehend it as a future good. Consequently there is no hope
either in the blessed or in the damned. On the other hand, hope can be
in wayfarers, whether of this life or in purgatory, because in either
case they apprehend happiness as a future possible thing.
Reply to Objection 1: As Gregory says (Moral. xxxiii, 20) this is said
of the devil as regards his members, whose hope will fail utterly: or,
if it be understood of the devil himself, it may refer to the hope
whereby he expects to vanquish the saints, in which sense we read just
before (Job 40:18): "He trusteth that the Jordan may run into his
mouth": this is not, however, the hope of which we are speaking.
Reply to Objection 2: As Augustine says (Enchiridion viii), "faith is
about things, bad or good, past, present, or future, one's own or
another's; whereas hope is only about good things, future and
concerning oneself. " Hence it is possible for lifeless faith to be in
the damned, but not hope, since the Divine goods are not for them
future possible things, but far removed from them.
Reply to Objection 3: Lack of hope in the damned does not change their
demerit, as neither does the voiding of hope in the blessed increase
their merit: but both these things are due to the change in their
respective states.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether there is certainty in the hope of a wayfarer?
Objection 1: It would seem that there is no certainty in the hope of a
wayfarer. For hope resides in the will. But certainty pertains not to
the will but to the intellect. Therefore there is no certainty in hope.
Objection 2: Further, hope is based on grace and merits, as stated
above (Q[17], A[1]). Now it is impossible in this life to know for
certain that we are in a state of grace, as stated above ([2456]FS,
Q[112], A[5]). Therefore there is no certainty in the hope of a
wayfarer.
Objection 3: Further, there can be no certainty about that which may
fail. Now many a hopeful wayfarer fails to obtain happiness. Therefore
wayfarer's hope has no certainty.
On the contrary, "Hope is the certain expectation of future happiness,"
as the Master states (Sent. iii, D, 26): and this may be gathered from
2 Tim. 1:12, "I know Whom I have believed, and I am certain that He is
able to keep that which I have committed to Him. "
I answer that, Certainty is found in a thing in two ways, essentially
and by participation. It is found essentially in the cognitive power;
by participation in whatever is moved infallibly to its end by the
cognitive power. In this way we say that nature works with certainty,
since it is moved by the Divine intellect which moves everything with
certainty to its end. In this way too, the moral virtues are said to
work with greater certainty than art, in as much as, like a second
nature, they are moved to their acts by the reason: and thus too, hope
tends to its end with certainty, as though sharing in the certainty of
faith which is in the cognitive faculty.
This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.
Reply to Objection 2: Hope does not trust chiefly in grace already
received, but on God's omnipotence and mercy, whereby even he that has
not grace, can obtain it, so as to come to eternal life. Now whoever
has faith is certain of God's omnipotence and mercy.
Reply to Objection 3: That some who have hope fail to obtain happiness,
is due to a fault of the free will in placing the obstacle of sin, but
not to any deficiency in God's power or mercy, in which hope places its
trust. Hence this does not prejudice the certainty of hope.
__________________________________________________________________
OF THE GIFT OF FEAR (TWELVE ARTICLES)
We must now consider the gift of fear, about which there are twelve
points of inquiry:
(1) Whether God is to be feared?
(2) Of the division of fear into filial, initial, servile and worldly;
(3) Whether worldly fear is always evil?
(4) Whether servile fear is good?
(5) Whether it is substantially the same as filial fear?
(6) Whether servile fear departs when charity comes?
(7) Whether fear is the beginning of wisdom?
(8) Whether initial fear is substantially the same as filial fear?
(9) Whether fear is a gift of the Holy Ghost?
(10) Whether it grows when charity grows?
(11) Whether it remains in heaven?
(12) Which of the beatitudes and fruits correspond to it?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether God can be feared?
Objection 1: It would seem that God cannot be feared. For the object of
fear is a future evil, as stated above ([2457]FS, Q[41], AA[2],3). But
God is free of all evil, since He is goodness itself. Therefore God
cannot be feared.
Objection 2: Further, fear is opposed to hope. Now we hope in God.
Therefore we cannot fear Him at the same time.
Objection 3: Further, as the Philosopher states (Rhet. ii, 5), "we fear
those things whence evil comes to us. " But evil comes to us, not from
God, but from ourselves, according to Osee 13:9: "Destruction is thy
own, O Israel: thy help is . . . in Me. " Therefore God is not to be
feared.
On the contrary, It is written (Jer. 10:7): "Who shall not fear Thee, O
King of nations? " and (Malachi 1:6): "If I be a master, where is My
fear? "
I answer that, Just as hope has two objects, one of which is the future
good itself, that one expects to obtain, while the other is someone's
help, through whom one expects to obtain what one hopes for, so, too,
fear may have two objects, one of which is the very evil which a man
shrinks from, while the other is that from which the evil may come.
Accordingly, in the first way God, Who is goodness itself, cannot be an
object of fear; but He can be an object of fear in the second way, in
so far as there may come to us some evil either from Him or in relation
to Him.
From Him there comes the evil of punishment, but this is evil not
absolutely but relatively, and, absolutely speaking, is a good.
Because, since a thing is said to be good through being ordered to an
end, while evil implies lack of this order, that which excludes the
order to the last end is altogether evil, and such is the evil of
fault. On the other hand the evil of punishment is indeed an evil, in
so far as it is the privation of some particular good, yet absolutely
speaking, it is a good, in so far as it is ordained to the last end.
In relation to God the evil of fault can come to us, if we be separated
from Him: and in this way God can and ought to be feared.
Reply to Objection 1: This objection considers the object of fear as
being the evil which a man shuns.
Reply to Objection 2: In God, we may consider both His justice, in
respect of which He punishes those who sin, and His mercy, in respect
of which He sets us free: in us the consideration of His justice gives
rise to fear, but the consideration of His mercy gives rise to hope, so
that, accordingly, God is the object of both hope and fear, but under
different aspects.
Reply to Objection 3: The evil of fault is not from God as its author
but from us, in for far as we forsake God: while the evil of punishment
is from God as its author, in so far as it has character of a good,
since it is something just, through being inflicted on us justly;
although originally this is due to the demerit of sin: thus it is
written (Wis. 1:13, 16): "God made not death . . . but the wicked with
works and words have called it to them. "
__________________________________________________________________
Whether fear is fittingly divided into filial, initial, servile and worldly
fear?
Objection 1: It would seem that fear is unfittingly divided into
filial, initial, servile and worldly fear. For Damascene says (De Fide
Orth. ii, 15) that there are six kinds of fear, viz. "laziness,
shamefacedness," etc. of which we have treated above ([2458]FS, Q[41],
A[4]), and which are not mentioned in the division in question.
Therefore this division of fear seems unfitting.
Objection 2: Further, each of these fears is either good or evil. But
there is a fear, viz. natural fear, which is neither morally good,
since it is in the demons, according to James 2:19, "The devils . . .
believe and tremble," nor evil, since it is in Christ, according to Mk.
14:33, Jesus "began to fear and be heavy. " Therefore the aforesaid
division of fear is insufficient.
Objection 3: Further, the relation of son to father differs from that
of wife to husband, and this again from that of servant to master. Now
filial fear, which is that of the son in comparison with his father, is
distinct from servile fear, which is that of the servant in comparison
with his master. Therefore chaste fear, which seems to be that of the
wife in comparison with her husband, ought to be distinguished from all
these other fears.
Objection 4: Further, even as servile fear fears punishment, so do
initial and worldly fear. Therefore no distinction should be made
between them.
Objection 5: Further, even as concupiscence is about some good, so is
fear about some evil. Now "concupiscence of the eyes," which is the
desire for things of this world, is distinct from "concupiscence of the
flesh," which is the desire for one's own pleasure. Therefore "worldly
fear," whereby one fears to lose external goods, is distinct from
"human fear," whereby one fears harm to one's own person.
On the contrary stands the authority of the Master (Sent. iii, D, 34).
I answer that, We are speaking of fear now, in so far as it makes us
turn, so to speak, to God or away from Him. For, since the object of
fear is an evil, sometimes, on account of the evils he fears, man
withdraws from God, and this is called human fear; while sometimes, on
account of the evils he fears, he turns to God and adheres to Him. This
latter evil is twofold, viz. evil of punishment, and evil of fault.
Accordingly if a man turn to God and adhere to Him, through fear of
punishment, it will be servile fear; but if it be on account of fear of
committing a fault, it will be filial fear, for it becomes a child to
fear offending its father. If, however, it be on account of both, it
will be initial fear, which is between both these fears. As to whether
it is possible to fear the evil of fault, the question has been treated
above ([2459]FS, Q[42], A[3]) when we were considering the passion of
fear.
Reply to Objection 1: Damascene divides fear as a passion of the soul:
whereas this division of fear is taken from its relation to God, as
explained above.
Reply to Objection 2: Moral good consists chiefly in turning to God,
while moral evil consists chiefly in turning away from Him: wherefore
all the fears mentioned above imply either moral evil or moral good.
Now natural fear is presupposed to moral good and evil, and so it is
not numbered among these kinds of fear.
Reply to Objection 3: The relation of servant to master is based on the
power which the master exercises over the servant; whereas, on the
contrary, the relation of a son to his father or of a wife to her
husband is based on the son's affection towards his father to whom he
submits himself, or on the wife's affection towards her husband to whom
she binds herself in the union of love. Hence filial and chaste fear
amount to the same, because by the love of charity God becomes our
Father, according to Rom. 8:15, "You have received the spirit of
adoption of sons, whereby we cry: Abba [Father]"; and by this same
charity He is called our spouse, according to 2 Cor. 11:2, "I have
espoused you to one husband, that I may present you as a chaste virgin
to Christ": whereas servile fear has no connection with these, since it
does not include charity in its definition.
Reply to Objection 4: These three fears regard punishment but in
different ways. For worldly or human fear regards a punishment which
turns man away from God, and which God's enemies sometimes inflict or
threaten: whereas servile and initial fear regard a punishment whereby
men are drawn to God, and which is inflicted or threatened by God.
Servile fear regards this punishment chiefly, while initial fear
regards it secondarily.
Reply to Objection 5: It amounts to the same whether man turns away
from God through fear of losing his worldly goods, or through fear of
forfeiting the well-being of his body, since external goods belong to
the body. Hence both these fears are reckoned as one here, although
they fear different evils, even as they correspond to the desire of
different goods. This diversity causes a specific diversity of sins,
all of which alike however lead man away from God.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether worldly fear is always evil?
Objection 1: It would seem that worldly fear is not always evil.
Because regard for men seems to be a kind of human fear. Now some are
blamed for having no regard for man, for instance, the unjust judge of
whom we read (Lk.
18:2) that he "feared not God, nor regarded man. "
Therefore it seems that worldly fear is not always evil.
Objection 2: Further, worldly fear seems to have reference to the
punishments inflicted by the secular power. Now such like punishments
incite us to good actions, according to Rom. 13:3, "Wilt thou not be
afraid of the power? Do that which is good, and thou shalt have praise
from the same. " Therefore worldly fear is not always evil.
Objection 3: Further, it seems that what is in us naturally, is not
evil, since our natural gifts are from God. Now it is natural to man to
fear detriment to his body, and loss of his worldly goods, whereby the
present life is supported. Therefore it seems that worldly fear is not
always evil.
On the contrary, Our Lord said (Mat. 10:28): "Fear ye not them that
kill the body," thus forbidding worldly fear. Now nothing but what is
evil is forbidden by God. Therefore worldly fear is evil.
I answer that, As shown above ([2460]FS, Q[1], A[3]; [2461]FS, Q[18],
A[1]; [2462]FS, Q[54], A[2]) moral acts and habits take their name and
species from their objects. Now the proper object of the appetite's
movement is the final good: so that, in consequence, every appetitive
movement is both specified and named from its proper end. For if anyone
were to describe covetousness as love of work because men work on
account of covetousness, this description would be incorrect, since the
covetous man seeks work not as end but as a means: the end that he
seeks is wealth, wherefore covetousness is rightly described as the
desire or the love of wealth, and this is evil. Accordingly worldly
love is, properly speaking, the love whereby a man trusts in the world
as his end, so that worldly love is always evil. Now fear is born of
love, since man fears the loss of what he loves, as Augustine states
(Qq. lxxxiii, qu. 33). Now worldly fear is that which arises from
worldly love as from an evil root, for which reason worldly fear is
always evil.
Reply to Objection 1: One may have regard for men in two ways. First in
so far as there is in them something divine, for instance, the good of
grace or of virtue, or at least of the natural image of God: and in
this way those are blamed who have no regard for man. Secondly, one may
have regard for men as being in opposition to God, and thus it is
praiseworthy to have no regard for men, according as we read of Elias
or Eliseus (Ecclus. 48:13): "In his days he feared not the prince. "
Reply to Objection 2: When the secular power inflicts punishment in
order to withdraw men from sin, it is acting as God's minister,
according to Rom. 13:4, "For he is God's minister, an avenger to
execute wrath upon him that doth evil. " To fear the secular power in
this way is part, not of worldly fear, but of servile or initial fear.
Reply to Objection 3: It is natural for man to shrink from detriment to
his own body and loss of worldly goods, but to forsake justice on that
account is contrary to natural reason. Hence the Philosopher says
(Ethic. iii, 1) that there are certain things, viz. sinful deeds, which
no fear should drive us to do, since to do such things is worse than to
suffer any punishment whatever.
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Whether servile fear is good?
Objection 1: It would seem that servile fear is not good. For if the
use of a thing is evil, the thing itself is evil. Now the use of
servile fear is evil, for according to a gloss on Rom. 8:15, "if a man
do anything through fear, although the deed be good, it is not well
done. " Therefore servile fear is not good.
Objection 2: Further, no good grows from a sinful root. Now servile
fear grows from a sinful root, because when commenting on Job 3:11,
"Why did I not die in the womb? " Gregory says (Moral. iv, 25): "When a
man dreads the punishment which confronts him for his sin and no longer
loves the friendship of God which he has lost, his fear is born of
pride, not of humility. " Therefore servile fear is evil.
Objection 3: Further, just as mercenary love is opposed to the love of
charity, so is servile fear, apparently, opposed to chaste fear. But
mercenary love is always evil. Therefore servile fear is also.
On the contrary, Nothing evil is from the Holy Ghost. But servile fear
is from the Holy Ghost, since a gloss on Rom. 8:15, "You have not
received the spirit of bondage," etc. says: "It is the one same spirit
that bestows two fears, viz. servile and chaste fear. " Therefore
servile fear is not evil.
I answer that, It is owing to its servility that servile fear may be
evil. For servitude is opposed to freedom. Since, then, "what is free
is cause of itself" (Metaph. i, 2), a slave is one who does not act as
cause of his own action, but as though moved from without. Now whoever
does a thing through love, does it of himself so to speak, because it
is by his own inclination that he is moved to act: so that it is
contrary to the very notion of servility that one should act from love.
Consequently servile fear as such is contrary to charity: so that if
servility were essential to fear, servile fear would be evil simply,
even as adultery is evil simply, because that which makes it contrary
to charity belongs to its very species.
This servility, however, does not belong to the species of servile
fear, even as neither does lifelessness to the species of lifeless
faith. For the species of a moral habit or act is taken from the
object. Now the object of servile fear is punishment, and it is by
accident that, either the good to which the punishment is contrary, is
loved as the last end, and that consequently the punishment is feared
as the greatest evil, which is the case with one who is devoid of
charity, or that the punishment is directed to God as its end, and
that, consequently, it is not feared as the greatest evil, which is the
case with one who has charity. For the species of a habit is not
destroyed through its object or end being directed to a further end.
Consequently servile fear is substantially good, but is servility is
evil.
Reply to Objection 1: This saying of Augustine is to be applied to a
man who does something through servile fear as such, so that he loves
not justice, and fears nothing but the punishment.
Reply to Objection 2: Servile fear as to its substance is not born of
pride, but its servility is, inasmuch as man is unwilling, by love, to
subject his affections to the yoke of justice.
Reply to Objection 3: Mercenary love is that whereby God is loved for
the sake of worldly goods, and this is, of itself, contrary to charity,
so that mercenary love is always evil. But servile fear, as to its
substance, implies merely fear of punishment, whether or not this be
feared as the principal evil.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether servile fear is substantially the same as filial fear?
Objection 1: It would seem that servile fear is substantially the same
as filial fear. For filial fear is to servile fear the same apparently
as living faith is to lifeless faith, since the one is accompanied by
mortal sin and the other not. Now living faith and lifeless faith are
substantially the same. Therefore servile and filial fear are
substantially the same.
Objection 2: Further, habits are diversified by their objects. Now the
same thing is the object of servile and of filial fear, since they both
fear God. Therefore servile and filial fear are substantially the same.
Objection 3: Further, just as man hopes to enjoy God and to obtain
favors from Him, so does he fear to be separated from God and to be
punished by Him. Now it is the same hope whereby we hope to enjoy God,
and to receive other favors from Him, as stated above ([2463]Q[17],
A[2], ad 2). Therefore filial fear, whereby we fear separation from
God, is the same as servile fear whereby we fear His punishments.
On the contrary, Augustine (In prim. canon. Joan. Tract. ix) says that
there are two fears, one servile, another filial or chaste fear.
I answer that, The proper object of fear is evil. And since acts and
habits are diversified by their objects, as shown above ([2464]FS,
Q[54], A[2] ), it follows of necessity that different kinds of fear
correspond to different kinds of evil.
Now the evil of punishment, from which servile fear shrinks, differs
specifically from evil of fault, which filial fear shuns, as shown
above [2465](A[2]). Hence it is evident that servile and filial fear
are not the same substantially but differ specifically.
Reply to Objection 1: Living and lifeless faith differ, not as regards
the object, since each of them believes God and believes in a God, but
in respect of something extrinsic, viz. the presence or absence of
charity, and so they do not differ substantially. On the other hand,
servile and filial fear differ as to their objects: and hence the
comparison fails.
Reply to Objection 2: Servile fear and filial fear do not regard God in
the same light. For servile fear looks upon God as the cause of the
infliction of punishment, whereas filial fear looks upon Him, not as
the active cause of guilt, but rather as the term wherefrom it shrinks
to be separated by guilt. Consequently the identity of object, viz.
God, does not prove a specific identity of fear, since also natural
movements differ specifically according to their different
relationships to some one term, for movement from whiteness is not
specifically the same as movement towards whiteness.
Reply to Objection 3: Hope looks upon God as the principle not only of
the enjoyment of God, but also of any other favor whatever. This cannot
be said of fear; and so there is no comparison.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether servile fear remains with charity?
Objection 1: It would seem that servile fear does not remain with
charity. For Augustine says (In prim. canon. Joan. Tract. ix) that
"when charity takes up its abode, it drives away fear which had
prepared a place for it. "
Objection 2: Further, "The charity of God is poured forth in our
hearts, by the Holy Ghost, Who is given to us" (Rom. 5:5). Now "where
the Spirit of the Lord is, there is liberty" (2 Cor. 3:17). Since then
freedom excludes servitude, it seems that servile fear is driven away
when charity comes.
Objection 3: Further, servile fear is caused by self-love, in so far as
punishment diminishes one's own good. Now love of God drives away
self-love, for it makes us despise ourselves: thus Augustine testifies
(De Civ. Dei xiv, 28) that "the love of God unto the contempt of self
builds up the city of God. " Therefore it seems that servile fear is
driven out when charity comes.
On the contrary, Servile fear is a gift of the Holy Ghost, as stated
above [2466](A[4]). Now the gifts of the Holy Ghost are not forfeited
through the advent of charity, whereby the Holy Ghost dwells in us.
Therefore servile fear is not driven out when charity comes.
I answer that, Servile fear proceeds from self-love, because it is fear
of punishment which is detrimental to one's own good. Hence the fear of
punishment is consistent with charity, in the same way as self-love is:
because it comes to the same that a man love his own good and that he
fear to be deprived of it.
Now self-love may stand in a threefold relationship to charity. In one
way it is contrary to charity, when a man places his end in the love of
his own good. In another way it is included in charity, when a man
loves himself for the sake of God and in God. In a third way, it is
indeed distinct from charity, but is not contrary thereto, as when a
man loves himself from the point of view of his own good, yet not so as
to place his end in this his own good: even as one may have another
special love for one's neighbor, besides the love of charity which is
founded on God, when we love him by reason of usefulness,
consanguinity, or some other human consideration, which, however, is
referable to charity.
Accordingly fear of punishment is, in one way, included in charity,
because separation from God is a punishment, which charity shuns
exceedingly; so that this belongs to chaste fear. In another way, it is
contrary to charity, when a man shrinks from the punishment that is
opposed to his natural good, as being the principal evil in opposition
to the good which he loves as an end; and in this way fear of
punishment is not consistent with charity. In another way fear of
punishment is indeed substantially distinct from chaste fear, when, to
wit, a man fears a penal evil, not because it separates him from God,
but because it is hurtful to his own good, and yet he does not place
his end in this good, so that neither does he dread this evil as being
the principal evil. Such fear of punishment is consistent with charity;
but it is not called servile, except when punishment is dreaded as a
principal evil, as explained above ([2467]AA[2],4). Hence fear
considered as servile, does not remain with charity, but the substance
of servile fear can remain with charity, even as self-love can remain
with charity.
Reply to Objection 1: Augustine is speaking of fear considered as
servile: and such is the sense of the two other objections.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether fear is the beginning of wisdom?
Objection 1: It would seem that fear is not the beginning of wisdom.
For the beginning of a thing is a part thereof. But fear is not a part
of wisdom, since fear is seated in the appetitive faculty, while wisdom
is in the intellect. Therefore it seems that fear is not the beginning
of wisdom.
Objection 2: Further, nothing is the beginning of itself. "Now fear of
the Lord, that is wisdom," according to Job 28:28. Therefore it seems
that fear of God is not the beginning of wisdom.
Objection 3: Further, nothing is prior to the beginning. But something
is prior to fear, since faith precedes fear. Therefore it seems that
fear is not the beginning of wisdom.
On the contrary, It is written in the Ps. 110:10: "The fear of the Lord
is the beginning of wisdom. "
I answer that, A thing may be called the beginning of wisdom in two
ways: in one way because it is the beginning of wisdom itself as to its
essence; in another way, as to its effect. Thus the beginning of an art
as to its essence consists in the principles from which that art
proceeds, while the beginning of an art as to its effect is that
wherefrom it begins to operate: for instance we might say that the
beginning of the art of building is the foundation because that is
where the builder begins his work.
Now, since wisdom is the knowledge of Divine things, as we shall state
further on ([2468]Q[45], A[1]), it is considered by us in one way, and
in another way by philosophers. For, seeing that our life is ordained
to the enjoyment of God, and is directed thereto according to a
participation of the Divine Nature, conferred on us through grace,
wisdom, as we look at it, is considered not only as being cognizant of
God, as it is with the philosophers, but also as directing human
conduct; since this is directed not only by the human law, but also by
the Divine law, as Augustine shows (De Trin. xii, 14). Accordingly the
beginning of wisdom as to its essence consists in the first principles
of wisdom, i. e. the articles of faith, and in this sense faith is said
to be the beginning of wisdom. But as regards the effect, the beginning
of wisdom is the point where wisdom begins to work, and in this way
fear is the beginning of wisdom, yet servile fear in one way, and
filial fear, in another. For servile fear is like a principle disposing
a man to wisdom from without, in so far as he refrains from sin through
fear of punishment, and is thus fashioned for the effect of wisdom,
according to Ecclus. 1:27, "The fear of the Lord driveth out sin. " On
the other hand, chaste or filial fear is the beginning of wisdom, as
being the first effect of wisdom. For since the regulation of human
conduct by the Divine law belongs to wisdom, in order to make a
beginning, man must first of all fear God and submit himself to Him:
for the result will be that in all things he will be ruled by God.
Reply to Objection 1: This argument proves that fear is not the
beginning of wisdom as to the essence of wisdom.
Reply to Objection 2: The fear of God is compared to a man's whole life
that is ruled by God's wisdom, as the root to the tree: hence it is
written (Ecclus. 1:25): "The root of wisdom is to fear the Lord, for
[Vulg. : 'and'] the branches thereof are longlived. " Consequently, as
the root is said to be virtually the tree, so the fear of God is said
to be wisdom.
Reply to Objection 3: As stated above, faith is the beginning of wisdom
in one way, and fear, in another. Hence it is written (Ecclus. 25:16):
"The fear of God is the beginning of love: and the beginning of faith
is to be fast joined to it. "
__________________________________________________________________
Whether initial fear differs substantially from filial fear?
Objection 1: It would seem that initial fear differs substantially from
filial fear. For filial fear is caused by love. Now initial fear is the
beginning of love, according to Ecclus. 25:16, "The fear of God is the
beginning of love. " Therefore initial fear is distinct from filial
fear.
Objection 2: Further, initial fear dreads punishment, which is the
object of servile fear, so that initial and servile fear would seem to
be the same. But servile fear is distinct from filial fear. Therefore
initial fear also is substantially distinct from initial fear.
Objection 3: Further, a mean differs in the same ratio from both the
extremes. Now initial fear is the mean between servile and filial fear.
Therefore it differs from both filial and servile fear.
On the contrary, Perfect and imperfect do not diversify the substance
of a thing. Now initial and filial fear differ in respect of perfection
and imperfection of charity, as Augustine states (In prim. canon. Joan.
Tract. ix). Therefore initial fear does not differ substantially from
filial fear.
I answer that, Initial fear is so called because it is a beginning
[initium]. Since, however, both servile and filial fear are, in some
way, the beginning of wisdom, each may be called in some way, initial.
It is not in this sense, however, that we are to understand initial
fear in so far as it is distinct from servile and filial fear, but in
the sense according to which it belongs to the state of beginners, in
whom there is a beginning of filial fear resulting from a beginning of
charity, although they do not possess the perfection of filial fear,
because they have not yet attained to the perfection of charity.
Consequently initial fear stands in the same relation to filial fear as
imperfect to perfect charity. Now perfect and imperfect charity differ,
not as to essence but as to state. Therefore we must conclude that
initial fear, as we understand it here, does not differ essentially
from filial fear.
Reply to Objection 1: The fear which is a beginning of love is servile
fear, which is the herald of charity, just as the bristle introduces
the thread, as Augustine states (Tract. ix in Ep. i Joan. ). Or else, if
it be referred to initial fear, this is said to be the beginning of
love, not absolutely, but relatively to the state of perfect charity.
Reply to Objection 2: Initial fear does not dread punishment as its
proper object, but as having something of servile fear connected with
it: for this servile fear, as to its substance, remains indeed, with
charity, its servility being cast aside; whereas its act remains with
imperfect charity in the man who is moved to perform good actions not
only through love of justice, but also through fear of punishment,
though this same act ceases in the man who has perfect charity, which
"casteth out fear," according to 1 Jn. 4:18.
Reply to Objection 3: Initial fear is a mean between servile and filial
fear, not as between two things of the same genus, but as the imperfect
is a mean between a perfect being and a non-being, as stated in Metaph.
ii, for it is the same substantially as the perfect being, while it
differs altogether from non-being.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether fear is a gift of the Holy Ghost?
Objection 1: It would seem that fear is not a gift of the Holy Ghost.
For no gift of the Holy Ghost is opposed to a virtue, which is also
from the Holy Ghost; else the Holy Ghost would be in opposition to
Himself. Now fear is opposed to hope, which is a virtue. Therefore fear
is not a gift of the Holy Ghost.
