And the same holds good in
natural changes, as is evident from the Philosopher (Phys.
natural changes, as is evident from the Philosopher (Phys.
Summa Theologica
Hence this opinion is to be avoided as heretical.
Reply to Objection 1: God "wedded His Godhead," i. e. His Divine power,
to the bread and wine, not that these may remain in this sacrament, but
in order that He may make from them His body and blood.
Reply to Objection 2: Christ is not really present in the other
sacraments, as in this; and therefore the substance of the matter
remains in the other sacraments, but not in this.
Reply to Objection 3: The species which remain in this sacrament, as
shall be said later [4530](A[5]), suffice for its signification;
because the nature of the substance is known by its accidents.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the substance of the bread or wine is annihilated after the
consecration of this sacrament, or dissolved into their original matter?
Objection 1: It seems that the substance of the bread is annihilated
after the consecration of this sacrament, or dissolved into its
original matter. For whatever is corporeal must be somewhere. But the
substance of bread, which is something corporeal, does not remain, in
this sacrament, as stated above [4531](A[2]); nor can we assign any
place where it may be. Consequently it is nothing after the
consecration. Therefore, it is either annihilated, or dissolved into
its original matter.
Objection 2: Further, what is the term "wherefrom" in every change
exists no longer, except in the potentiality of matter; e. g. when air
is changed into fire, the form of the air remains only in the
potentiality of matter; and in like fashion when what is white becomes
black. But in this sacrament the substance of the bread or of the wine
is the term "wherefrom," while the body or the blood of Christ is the
term "whereunto": for Ambrose says in De Officiis (De Myster. ix):
"Before the blessing it is called another species, after the blessing
the body of Christ is signified. " Therefore, when the consecration
takes place, the substance of the bread or wine no longer remains,
unless perchance dissolved into its (original) matter.
Objection 3: Further, one of two contradictories must be true. But this
proposition is false: "After the consecration the substance of the
bread or wine is something. " Consequently, this is true: "The substance
of the bread or wine is nothing. "
On the contrary, Augustine says ([4532]Q[83]): "God is not the cause of
tending to nothing. " But this sacrament is wrought by Divine power.
Therefore, in this sacrament the substance of the bread or wine is not
annihilated.
I answer that, Because the substance of the bread and wine does not
remain in this sacrament, some, deeming that it is impossible for the
substance of the bread and wine to be changed into Christ's flesh and
blood, have maintained that by the consecration, the substance of the
bread and wine is either dissolved into the original matter, or that it
is annihilated.
Now the original matter into which mixed bodies can be dissolved is the
four elements. For dissolution cannot be made into primary matter, so
that a subject can exist without a form, since matter cannot exist
without a form. But since after the consecration nothing remains under
the sacramental species except the body and the blood of Christ, it
will be necessary to say that the elements into which the substance of
the bread and wine is dissolved, depart from thence by local motion,
which would be perceived by the senses. In like manner also the
substance of the bread or wine remains until the last instant of the
consecration; but in the last instant of the consecration there is
already present there the substance of the body or blood of Christ,
just as the form is already present in the last instant of generation.
Hence no instant can be assigned in which the original matter can be
there. For it cannot be said that the substance of the bread or wine is
dissolved gradually into the original matter, or that it successively
quits the species, for if this began to be done in the last instant of
its consecration, then at the one time under part of the host there
would be the body of Christ together with the substance of bread, which
is contrary to what has been said above [4533](A[2]). But if this begin
to come to pass before the consecration, there will then be a time in
which under one part of the host there will be neither the substance of
bread nor the body of Christ, which is not fitting. They seem indeed to
have taken this into careful consideration, wherefore they formulated
their proposition with an alternative viz. that (the substance) may be
annihilated. But even this cannot stand, because no way can be assigned
whereby Christ's true body can begin to be in this sacrament, except by
the change of the substance of bread into it, which change is excluded
the moment we admit either annihilation of the substance of the bread,
or dissolution into the original matter. Likewise no cause can be
assigned for such dissolution or annihilation, since the effect of the
sacrament is signified by the form: "This is My body. " Hence it is
clear that the aforesaid opinion is false.
Reply to Objection 1: The substance of the bread or wine, after the
consecration, remains neither under the sacramental species, nor
elsewhere; yet it does not follow that it is annihilated; for it is
changed into the body of Christ; just as if the air, from which fire is
generated, be not there or elsewhere, it does not follow that it is
annihilated.
Reply to Objection 2: The form, which is the term "wherefrom," is not
changed into another form; but one form succeeds another in the
subject; and therefore the first form remains only in the potentiality
of matter. But here the substance of the bread is changed into the body
of Christ, as stated above. Hence the conclusion does not follow.
Reply to Objection 3: Although after the consecration this proposition
is false: "The substance of the breed is something," still that into
which the substance of the bread is changed, is something, and
consequently the substance of the bread is not annihilated.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether bread can be converted into the body of Christ?
Objection 1: It seems that bread cannot be converted into the body of
Christ. For conversion is a kind of change. But in every change there
must be some subject, which from being previously in potentiality is
now in act. because as is said in Phys. iii: "motion is the act of a
thing existing in potentiality. " But no subject can be assigned for the
substance of the bread and of the body of Christ, because it is of the
very nature of substance for it "not to be in a subject," as it is said
in Praedic. iii. Therefore it is not possible for the whole substance
of the bread to be converted into the body of Christ.
Objection 2: Further, the form of the thing into which another is
converted, begins anew to inhere in the matter of the thing converted
into it: as when air is changed into fire not already existing, the
form of fire begins anew to be in the matter of the air; and in like
manner when food is converted into non-pre-existing man, the form of
the man begins to be anew in the matter of the food. Therefore, if
bread be changed into the body of Christ, the form of Christ's body
must necessarily begin to be in the matter of the bread, which is
false. Consequently, the bread is not changed into the substance of
Christ's body.
Objection 3: Further, when two things are diverse, one never becomes
the other, as whiteness never becomes blackness, as is stated in Phys.
i. But since two contrary forms are of themselves diverse, as being the
principles of formal difference, so two signate matters are of
themselves diverse, as being the principles of material distinction.
Consequently, it is not possible for this matter of bread to become
this matter whereby Christ's body is individuated, and so it is not
possible for this substance of bread to be changed into the substance
of Christ's body.
On the contrary, Eusebius Emesenus says: "To thee it ought neither to
be a novelty nor an impossibility that earthly and mortal things be
changed into the substance of Christ. "
I answer that, As stated above [4534](A[2]), since Christ's true body
is in this sacrament, and since it does not begin to be there by local
motion, nor is it contained therein as in a place, as is evident from
what was stated above (A[1], ad 2), it must be said then that it begins
to be there by conversion of the substance of bread into itself.
Yet this change is not like natural changes, but is entirely
supernatural, and effected by God's power alone. Hence Ambrose says
[(De Sacram. iv): "See how Christ's word changes nature's laws, as He
wills: a man is not wont to be born save of man and woman: see
therefore that against the established law and order a man is born of a
Virgin": and] [*The passage in the brackets is not in the Leonine
edition] (De Myster. iv): "It is clear that a Virgin begot beyond the
order of nature: and what we make is the body from the Virgin. Why,
then, do you look for nature's order in Christ's body, since the Lord
Jesus was Himself brought forth of a Virgin beyond nature? " Chrysostom
likewise (Hom. xlvii), commenting on Jn. 6:64: "The words which I have
spoken to you," namely, of this sacrament, "are spirit and life," says:
i. e. "spiritual, having nothing carnal, nor natural consequence; but
they are rent from all such necessity which exists upon earth, and from
the laws here established. "
For it is evident that every agent acts according as it is in act. But
every created agent is limited in its act, as being of a determinate
genus and species: and consequently the action of every created agent
bears upon some determinate act. Now the determination of every thing
in actual existence comes from its form. Consequently, no natural or
created agent can act except by changing the form in something; and on
this account every change made according to nature's laws is a formal
change. But God is infinite act, as stated in the [4535]FP, Q[7], A[1];
Q[26], A[2]; hence His action extends to the whole nature of being.
Therefore He can work not only formal conversion, so that diverse forms
succeed each other in the same subject; but also the change of all
being, so that, to wit, the whole substance of one thing be changed
into the whole substance of another. And this is done by Divine power
in this sacrament; for the whole substance of the bread is changed into
the whole substance of Christ's body, and the whole substance of the
wine into the whole substance of Christ's blood. Hence this is not a
formal, but a substantial conversion; nor is it a kind of natural
movement: but, with a name of its own, it can be called
"transubstantiation. "
Reply to Objection 1: This objection holds good in respect of formal
change, because it belongs to a form to be in matter or in a subject;
but it does not hold good in respect of the change of the entire
substance. Hence, since this substantial change implies a certain order
of substances, one of which is changed into the other, it is in both
substances as in a subject, just as order and number.
Reply to Objection 2: This argument also is true of formal conversion
or change, because, as stated above (ad 1), a form must be in some
matter or subject. But this is not so in a change of the entire
substance; for in this case no subject is possible.
Reply to Objection 3: Form cannot be changed into form, nor matter into
matter by the power of any finite agent. Such a change, however, can be
made by the power of an infinite agent, which has control over all
being, because the nature of being is common to both forms and to both
matters; and whatever there is of being in the one, the author of being
can change into whatever there is of being in the other, withdrawing
that whereby it was distinguished from the other.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the accidents of the bread and wine remain in this sacrament after
the change?
Objection 1: It seems that the accidents of the bread and wine do not
remain in this sacrament. For when that which comes first is removed,
that which follows is also taken away. But substance is naturally
before accident, as is proved in Metaph. vii. Since, then, after
consecration, the substance of the bread does not remain in this
sacrament, it seems that its accidents cannot remain.
Objection 2: Further, there ought not to be any deception in a
sacrament of truth. But we judge of substance by accidents. It seems,
then, that human judgment is deceived, if, while the accidents remain,
the substance of the bread does not. Consequently this is unbecoming to
this sacrament.
Objection 3: Further, although our faith is not subject to reason,
still it is not contrary to reason, but above it, as was said in the
beginning of this work ([4536]FP, Q[1], A[6], ad 2; A[8]). But our
reason has its origin in the senses. Therefore our faith ought not to
be contrary to the senses, as it is when sense judges that to be bread
which faith believes to be the substance of Christ's body. Therefore it
is not befitting this sacrament for the accidents of bread to remain
subject to the senses, and for the substance of bread not to remain.
Objection 4: Further, what remains after the change has taken place
seems to be the subject of change. If therefore the accidents of the
bread remain after the change has been effected, it seems that the
accidents are the subject of the change. But this is impossible; for
"an accident cannot have an accident" (Metaph. iii). Therefore the
accidents of the bread and wine ought not to remain in this sacrament.
On the contrary, Augustine says in his book on the Sentences of Prosper
(Lanfranc, De Corp. et Sang. Dom. xiii): "Under the species which we
behold, of bread and wine, we honor invisible things, i. e. flesh and
blood. "
I answer that, It is evident to sense that all the accidents of the
bread and wine remain after the consecration. And this is reasonably
done by Divine providence. First of all, because it is not customary,
but horrible, for men to eat human flesh, and to drink blood. And
therefore Christ's flesh and blood are set before us to be partaken of
under the species of those things which are the more commonly used by
men, namely, bread and wine. Secondly, lest this sacrament might be
derided by unbelievers, if we were to eat our Lord under His own
species. Thirdly, that while we receive our Lord's body and blood
invisibly, this may redound to the merit of faith.
Reply to Objection 1: As is said in the book De Causis, an effect
depends more on the first cause than on the second. And therefore by
God's power, which is the first cause of all things, it is possible for
that which follows to remain, while that which is first is taken away.
Reply to Objection 2: There is no deception in this sacrament; for the
accidents which are discerned by the senses are truly present. But the
intellect, whose proper object is substance as is said in De Anima iii,
is preserved by faith from deception.
And this serves as answer to the third argument; because faith is not
contrary to the senses, but concerns things to which sense does not
reach.
Reply to Objection 4: This change has not properly a subject, as was
stated above (A[4], ad 1); nevertheless the accidents which remain have
some resemblance of a subject.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the substantial form of the bread remains in this sacrament after
the consecration?
Objection 1: It seems that the substantial form of the bread remains in
this sacrament after the consecration. For it has been said
[4537](A[5]) that the accidents remain after the consecration. But
since bread is an artificial thing, its form is an accident. Therefore
it remains after the consecration.
Objection 2: Further, the form of Christ's body is His soul: for it is
said in De Anima ii, that the soul "is the act of a physical body which
has life in potentiality". But it cannot be said that the substantial
form of the bread is changed into the soul. Therefore it appears that
it remains after the consecration.
Objection 3: Further, the proper operation of a things follows its
substantial form. But what remains in this sacrament, nourishes, and
performs every operation which bread would do were it present.
Therefore the substantial form of the bread remains in this sacrament
after the consecration.
On the contrary, The substantial form of bread is of the substance of
bread. But the substance of the bread is changed into the body of
Christ, as stated above ([4538]AA[2],3,4). Therefore the substantial
form of the bread does not remain.
I answer that, Some have contended that after the consecration not only
do the accidents of the bread remain, but also its substantial form.
But this cannot be. First of all, because if the substantial form of
the bread were to remain, nothing of the bread would be changed into
the body of Christ, excepting the matter; and so it would follow that
it would be changed, not into the whole body of Christ, but into its
matter, which is repugnant to the form of the sacrament, wherein it is
said: "This is My body. "
Secondly, because if the substantial form of the bread were to remain,
it would remain either in matter, or separated from matter. The first
cannot be, for if it were to remain in the matter of the bread, then
the whole substance of the bread would remain, which is against what
was said above [4539](A[2]). Nor could it remain in any other matter,
because the proper form exists only in its proper matter. But if it
were to remain separate from matter, it would then be an actually
intelligible form, and also an intelligence; for all forms separated
from matter are such.
Thirdly, it would be unbefitting this sacrament: because the accidents
of the bread remain in this sacrament, in order that the body of Christ
may be seen under them, and not under its proper species, as stated
above [4540](A[5]).
And therefore it must be said that the substantial form of the bread
does not remain.
Reply to Objection 1: There is nothing to prevent art from making a
thing whose form is not an accident, but a substantial form; as frogs
and serpents can be produced by art: for art produces such forms not by
its own power, but by the power of natural energies. And in this way it
produces the substantial forms of bread, by the power of fire baking
the matter made up of flour and water.
Reply to Objection 2: The soul is the form of the body, giving it the
whole order of perfect being, i. e. being, corporeal being, and animated
being, and so on. Therefore the form of the bread is changed into the
form of Christ's body, according as the latter gives corporeal being,
but not according as it bestows animated being.
Reply to Objection 3: Some of the operations of bread follow it by
reason of the accidents, such as to affect the senses, and such
operations are found in the species of the bread after the consecration
on account of the accidents which remain. But some other operations
follow the bread either by reason of the matter, such as that it is
changed into something else, or else by reason of the substantial form,
such as an operation consequent upon its species, for instance, that it
"strengthens man's heart" (Ps. 103:15); and such operations are found
in this sacrament, not on account of the form or matter remaining, but
because they are bestowed miraculously upon the accidents themselves,
as will be said later (Q[77], A[3], ad 2,3; [4541]AA[5],6).
__________________________________________________________________
Whether this change is wrought instantaneously?
Objection 1: It seems that this change is not wrought instantaneously,
but successively. For in this change there is first the substance of
bread, and afterwards the substance of Christ's body. Neither, then, is
in the same instant, but in two instants. But there is a mid-time
between every two instants. Therefore this change must take place
according to the succession of time, which is between the last instant
in which the bread is there, and the first instant in which the body of
Christ is present.
Objection 2: Further, in every change something is "in becoming" and
something is "in being. " But these two things do not exist at the one
time for, what is "in becoming," is not yet, whereas what is "in
being," already is. Consequently, there is a before and an after in
such change: and so necessarily the change cannot be instantaneous, but
successive.
Objection 3: Further, Ambrose says (De Sacram. iv) that this sacrament
"is made by the words of Christ. " But Christ's words are pronounced
successively. Therefore the change takes place successively.
On the contrary, This change is effected by a power which is infinite,
to which it belongs to operate in an instant.
I answer that, A change may be instantaneous from a threefold reason.
First on the part of the form, which is the terminus of the change.
For, if it be a form that receives more and less, it is acquired by its
subject successively, such as health; and therefore because a
substantial form does not receive more and less, it follows that its
introduction into matter is instantaneous.
Secondly on the part of the subject, which sometimes is prepared
successively for receiving the form; thus water is heated successively.
When, however, the subject itself is in the ultimate disposition for
receiving the form, it receives it suddenly, as a transparent body is
illuminated suddenly. Thirdly on the part of the agent, which possesses
infinite power: wherefore it can instantly dispose the matter for the
form. Thus it is written (Mk. 7:34) that when Christ had said,
"'Ephpheta,' which is 'Be thou opened,' immediately his ears were
opened, and the string of his tongue was loosed. "
For these three reasons this conversion is instantaneous. First,
because the substance of Christ's body which is the term of this
conversion, does not receive more or less. Secondly, because in this
conversion there is no subject to be disposed successively. Thirdly,
because it is effected by God's infinite power.
Reply to Objection 1: Some [*Cf. Albert the Great, Sent. iv, D, 11; St.
Bonaventure, Sent. , iv, D, 11] do not grant simply that there is a
mid-time between every two instants. For they say that this is true of
two instants referring to the same movement, but not if they refer to
different things. Hence between the instant that marks the close of
rest, and another which marks the beginning of movement, there is no
mid-time. But in this they are mistaken, because the unity of time and
of instant, or even their plurality, is not taken according to
movements of any sort, but according to the first movement of the
heavens, which is the measure of all movement and rest.
Accordingly others grant this of the time which measures movement
depending on the movement of the heavens. But there are some movements
which are not dependent on the movement of the heavens, nor measured by
it, as was said in the [4542]FP, Q[53], A[3] concerning the movements
of the angels. Hence between two instants responding to those movements
there is no mid-time. But this is not to the point, because although
the change in question has no relation of itself to the movement of the
heavens, still it follows the pronouncing of the words, which
(pronouncing) must necessarily be measured by the movement of the
heavens. And therefore there must of necessity be a mid-time between
every two signate instants in connection with that change.
Some say therefore that the instant in which the bread was last, and
the instant in which the body of Christ is first, are indeed two in
comparison with the things measured, but are one comparatively to the
time measuring; as when two lines touch, there are two points on the
part of the two lines, but one point on the part of the place
containing them. But here there is no likeness, because instant and
time is not the intrinsic measure of particular movements, as a line
and point are of a body, but only the extrinsic measure, as place is to
bodies.
Hence others say that it is the same instant in fact, but another
according to reason. But according to this it would follow that things
really opposite would exist together; for diversity of reason does not
change a thing objectively.
And therefore it must be said that this change, as stated above, is
wrought by Christ's words which are spoken by the priest, so that the
last instant of pronouncing the words is the first instant in which
Christ's body is in the sacrament; and that the substance of the bread
is there during the whole preceding time. Of this time no instant is to
be taken as proximately preceding the last one, because time is not
made up of successive instants, as is proved in Phys. vi. And therefore
a first instant can be assigned in which Christ's body is present; but
a last instant cannot be assigned in which the substance of bread is
there, but a last time can be assigned.
And the same holds good in
natural changes, as is evident from the Philosopher (Phys. viii).
Reply to Objection 2: In instantaneous changes a thing is "in
becoming," and is "in being" simultaneously; just as becoming
illuminated and to be actually illuminated are simultaneous: for in
such, a thing is said to be "in being" according as it now is; but to
be "in becoming," according as it was not before.
Reply to Objection 3: As stated above (ad 1), this change comes about
in the last instant of the pronouncing of the words, for then the
meaning of the words is finished, which meaning is efficacious in the
forms of the sacraments. And therefore it does not follow that this
change is successive.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether this proposition is false: "The body of Christ is made out of
bread"?
Objection 1: It seems that this proposition is false: "The body of
Christ is made out of bread. " For everything out of which another is
made, is that which is made the other; but not conversely: for we say
that a black thing is made out of a white thing, and that a white thing
is made black: and although we may say that a man becomes black still
we do not say that a black thing is made out of a man, as is shown in
Phys. i. If it be true, then, that Christ's body is made out of bread,
it will be true to say that bread is made the body of Christ. But this
seems to be false, because the bread is not the subject of the making,
but rather its term. Therefore, it is not said truly that Christ's body
is made out of bread.
Objection 2: Further, the term of "becoming" is something that is, or
something that is "made. " But this proposition is never true: "The
bread is the body of Christ"; or "The bread is made the body of
Christ"; or again, "The bread will be the body of Christ. " Therefore it
seems that not even this is true: "The body of Christ is made out of
bread. "
Objection 3: Further, everything out of which another is made is
converted into that which is made from it. But this proposition seems
to be false: "The bread is converted into the body of Christ," because
such conversion seems to be more miraculous than the creation of the
world, in which it is not said that non-being is converted into being.
Therefore it seems that this proposition likewise is false: "The body
of Christ is made out of bread. "
Objection 4: Further, that out of which something is made, can be that
thing. But this proposition is false: "Bread can be the body of
Christ. " Therefore this is likewise false: "The body of Christ is made
out of bread. "
On the contrary, Ambrose says (De Sacram. iv): "When the consecration
takes place, the body of Christ is made out of the bread. "
I answer that, This conversion of bread into the body of Christ has
something in common with creation, and with natural transmutation, and
in some respect differs from both. For the order of the terms is common
to these three; that is, that after one thing there is another (for, in
creation there is being after non-being; in this sacrament, Christ's
body after the substance of bread; in natural transmutation white after
black, or fire after air); and that the aforesaid terms are not
coexistent.
Now the conversion, of which we are speaking, has this in common with
creation, that in neither of them is there any common subject belonging
to either of the extremes; the contrary of which appears in every
natural transmutation.
Again, this conversion has something in common with natural
transmutation in two respects, although not in the same fashion. First
of all because in both, one of the extremes passes into the other, as
bread into Christ's body, and air into fire; whereas non-being is not
converted into being. But this comes to pass differently on the one
side and on the other; for in this sacrament the whole substance of the
bread passes into the whole body of Christ; whereas in natural
transmutation the matter of the one receives the form of the other, the
previous form being laid aside. Secondly, they have this in common,
that on both sides something remains the same; whereas this does not
happen in creation: yet differently; for the same matter or subject
remains in natural transmutation; whereas in this sacrament the same
accidents remain.
From these observations we can gather the various ways of speaking in
such matters. For, because in no one of the aforesaid three things are
the extremes coexistent, therefore in none of them can one extreme be
predicated of the other by the substantive verb of the present tense:
for we do not say, "Non-being is being" or, "Bread is the body of
Christ," or, "Air is fire," or, "White is black. " Yet because of the
relationship of the extremes in all of them we can use the preposition
"ex" [out of], which denotes order; for we can truly and properly say
that "being is made out of non-being," and "out of bread, the body of
Christ," and "out of air, fire," and "out of white, black. " But because
in creation one of the extremes does not pass into the other, we cannot
use the word "conversion" in creation, so as to say that "non-being is
converted into being": we can, however, use the word in this sacrament,
just as in natural transmutation. But since in this sacrament the whole
substance is converted into the whole substance, on that account this
conversion is properly termed transubstantiation.
Again, since there is no subject of this conversion, the things which
are true in natural conversion by reason of the subject, are not to be
granted in this conversion. And in the first place indeed it is evident
that potentiality to the opposite follows a subject, by reason whereof
we say that "a white thing can be black," or that "air can be fire";
although the latter is not so proper as the former: for the subject of
whiteness, in which there is potentiality to blackness, is the whole
substance of the white thing; since whiteness is not a part thereof;
whereas the subject of the form of air is part thereof: hence when it
is said, "Air can be fire," it is verified by synecdoche by reason of
the part. But in this conversion, and similarly in creation, because
there is no subject, it is not said that one extreme can be the other,
as that "non-being can be being," or that "bread can be the body of
Christ": and for the same reason it cannot be properly said that "being
is made of [de] non-being," or that "the body of Christ is made of
bread," because this preposition "of" [de] denotes a consubstantial
cause, which consubstantiality of the extremes in natural
transmutations is considered according to something common in the
subject. And for the same reason it is not granted that "bread will be
the body of Christ," or that it "may become the body of Christ," just
as it is not granted in creation that "non-being will be being," or
that "non-being may become being," because this manner of speaking is
verified in natural transmutations by reason of the subject: for
instance, when we say that "a white thing becomes black," or "a white
thing will be black. "
Nevertheless, since in this sacrament, after the change, something
remains the same, namely, the accidents of the bread, as stated above
[4543](A[5]), some of these expressions may be admitted by way of
similitude, namely, that "bread is the body of Christ," or, "bread will
be the body of Christ," or "the body of Christ is made of bread";
provided that by the word "bread" is not understood the substance of
bread, but in general "that which is contained under the species of
bread," under which species there is first contained the substance of
bread, and afterwards the body of Christ.
Reply to Objection 1: That out of which something else is made,
sometimes implies together with the subject, one of the extremes of the
transmutation, as when it is said "a black thing is made out of a white
one"; but sometimes it implies only the opposite or the extreme, as
when it is said---"out of morning comes the day. " And so it is not
granted that the latter becomes the former, that is, "that morning
becomes the day. " So likewise in the matter in hand, although it may be
said properly that "the body of Christ is made out of bread," yet it is
not said properly that "bread becomes the body of Christ," except by
similitude, as was said above.
Reply to Objection 2: That out of which another is made, will sometimes
be that other because of the subject which is implied. And therefore,
since there is no subject of this change, the comparison does not hold.
Reply to Objection 3: In this change there are many more difficulties
than in creation, in which there is but this one difficulty, that
something is made out of nothing; yet this belongs to the proper mode
of production of the first cause, which presupposes nothing else. But
in this conversion not only is it difficult for this whole to be
changed into that whole, so that nothing of the former may remain
(which does not belong to the common mode of production of a cause),
but furthermore it has this difficulty that the accidents remain while
the substance is destroyed, and many other difficulties of which we
shall treat hereafter ([4544]Q[77]). Nevertheless the word "conversion"
is admitted in this sacrament, but not in creation, as stated above.
Reply to Objection 4: As was observed above, potentiality belongs to
the subject, whereas there is no subject in this conversion. And
therefore it is not granted that bread can be the body of Christ: for
this conversion does not come about by the passive potentiality of the
creature, but solely by the active power of the Creator.
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OF THE WAY IN WHICH CHRIST IS IN THIS SACRAMENT (EIGHT ARTICLES)
We have now to consider the manner in which Christ exists in this
sacrament; and under this head there are eight points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the whole Christ is under this sacrament?
(2) Whether the entire Christ is under each species of the sacrament?
(3) Whether the entire Christ is under every part of the species?
(4) Whether all the dimensions of Christ's body are in this sacrament?
(5) Whether the body of Christ is in this sacrament locally?
(6) Whether after the consecration, the body of Christ is moved when
the host or chalice is moved?
(7) Whether Christ's body, as it is in this sacrament, can be seen by
the eye?
(8) Whether the true body of Christ remains in this sacrament when He
is seen under the appearance of a child or of flesh?
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Whether the whole Christ is contained under this sacrament?
Objection 1: It seems that the whole Christ is not contained under this
sacrament, because Christ begins to be in this sacrament by conversion
of the bread and wine. But it is evident that the bread and wine cannot
be changed either into the Godhead or into the soul of Christ. Since
therefore Christ exists in three substances, namely, the Godhead, soul
and body, as shown above ([4545]Q[2], A[5];[4546] Q[5], AA[1],3), it
seems that the entire Christ is not under this sacrament.
Objection 2: Further, Christ is in this sacrament, forasmuch as it is
ordained to the refection of the faithful, which consists in food and
drink, as stated above ([4547]Q[74], A[1]). But our Lord said (Jn.
6:56): "My flesh is meat indeed, and My blood is drink indeed. "
Therefore, only the flesh and blood of Christ are contained in this
sacrament. But there are many other parts of Christ's body, for
instance, the nerves, bones, and such like. Therefore the entire Christ
is not contained under this sacrament.
Objection 3: Further, a body of greater quantity cannot be contained
under the measure of a lesser. But the measure of the bread and wine is
much smaller than the measure of Christ's body. Therefore it is
impossible that the entire Christ be contained under this sacrament.
On the contrary, Ambrose says (De Officiis): "Christ is in this
sacrament. "
I answer that, It is absolutely necessary to confess according to
Catholic faith that the entire Christ is in this sacrament. Yet we must
know that there is something of Christ in this sacrament in a twofold
manner: first, as it were, by the power of the sacrament; secondly,
from natural concomitance. By the power of the sacrament, there is
under the species of this sacrament that into which the pre-existing
substance of the bread and wine is changed, as expressed by the words
of the form, which are effective in this as in the other sacraments;
for instance, by the words: "This is My body," or, "This is My blood. "
But from natural concomitance there is also in this sacrament that
which is really united with that thing wherein the aforesaid conversion
is terminated. For if any two things be really united, then wherever
the one is really, there must the other also be: since things really
united together are only distinguished by an operation of the mind.
Reply to Objection 1: Because the change of the bread and wine is not
terminated at the Godhead or the soul of Christ, it follows as a
consequence that the Godhead or the soul of Christ is in this sacrament
not by the power of the sacrament, but from real concomitance. For
since the Godhead never set aside the assumed body, wherever the body
of Christ is, there, of necessity, must the Godhead be; and therefore
it is necessary for the Godhead to be in this sacrament concomitantly
with His body. Hence we read in the profession of faith at Ephesus (P.
I. , chap. xxvi): "We are made partakers of the body and blood of
Christ, not as taking common flesh, nor as of a holy man united to the
Word in dignity, but the truly life-giving flesh of the Word Himself. "
On the other hand, His soul was truly separated from His body, as
stated above ([4548]Q[50], A[5]). And therefore had this sacrament been
celebrated during those three days when He was dead, the soul of Christ
would not have been there, neither by the power of the sacrament, nor
from real concomitance. But since "Christ rising from the dead dieth
now no more" (Rom. 6:9), His soul is always really united with His
body. And therefore in this sacrament the body indeed of Christ is
present by the power of the sacrament, but His soul from real
concomitance.
Reply to Objection 2: By the power of the sacrament there is contained
under it, as to the species of the bread, not only the flesh, but the
entire body of Christ, that is, the bones the nerves, and the like. And
this is apparent from the form of this sacrament, wherein it is not
said: "This is My flesh," but "This is My body. " Accordingly, when our
Lord said (Jn. 6:56): "My flesh is meat indeed," there the word flesh
is put for the entire body, because according to human custom it seems
to be more adapted for eating, as men commonly are fed on the flesh of
animals, but not on the bones or the like.
Reply to Objection 3: As has been already stated ([4549]Q[75], A[5]),
after the consecration of the bread into the body of Christ, or of the
wine into His blood, the accidents of both remain. From which it is
evident that the dimensions of the bread or wine are not changed into
the dimensions of the body of Christ, but substance into substance. And
so the substance of Christ's body or blood is under this sacrament by
the power of the sacrament, but not the dimensions of Christ's body or
blood. Hence it is clear that the body of Christ is in this sacrament
"by way of substance," and not by way of quantity. But the proper
totality of substance is contained indifferently in a small or large
quantity; as the whole nature of air in a great or small amount of air,
and the whole nature of a man in a big or small individual. Wherefore,
after the consecration, the whole substance of Christ's body and blood
is contained in this sacrament, just as the whole substance of the
bread and wine was contained there before the consecration.
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Whether the whole Christ is contained under each species of this sacrament?
Objection 1: It seems that the whole Christ is not contained under both
species of this sacrament. For this sacrament is ordained for the
salvation of the faithful, not by virtue of the species, but by virtue
of what is contained under the species, because the species were there
even before the consecration, from which comes the power of this
sacrament. If nothing, then, be contained under one species, but what
is contained under the other, and if the whole Christ be contained
under both, it seems that one of them is superfluous in this sacrament.
Objection 2: Further, it was stated above (A[1], ad 1) that all the
other parts of the body, such as the bones, nerves, and the like, are
comprised under the name of flesh. But the blood is one of the parts of
the human body, as Aristotle proves (De Anima Histor. i). If, then,
Christ's blood be contained under the species of bread, just as the
other parts of the body are contained there, the blood ought not to be
consecrated apart, just as no other part of the body is consecrated
separately.
Objection 3: Further, what is once "in being" cannot be again "in
becoming. " But Christ's body has already begun to be in this sacrament
by the consecration of the bread. Therefore, it cannot begin again to
be there by the consecration of the wine; and so Christ's body will not
be contained under the species of the wine, and accordingly neither the
entire Christ. Therefore the whole Christ is not contained under each
species.
On the contrary, The gloss on 1 Cor. 11:25, commenting on the word
"Chalice," says that "under each species," namely, of the bread and
wine, "the same is received"; and thus it seems that Christ is entire
under each species.
I answer that, After what we have said above [4550](A[1]), it must be
held most certainly that the whole Christ is under each sacramental
species yet not alike in each. For the body of Christ is indeed present
under the species of bread by the power of the sacrament, while the
blood is there from real concomitance, as stated above (A[1], ad 1) in
regard to the soul and Godhead of Christ; and under the species of wine
the blood is present by the power of the sacrament, and His body by
real concomitance, as is also His soul and Godhead: because now
Christ's blood is not separated from His body, as it was at the time of
His Passion and death. Hence if this sacrament had been celebrated
then, the body of Christ would have been under the species of the
bread, but without the blood; and, under the species of the wine, the
blood would have been present without the body, as it was then, in
fact.
Reply to Objection 1: Although the whole Christ is under each species,
yet it is so not without purpose. For in the first place this serves to
represent Christ's Passion, in which the blood was separated from the
body; hence in the form for the consecration of the blood mention is
made of its shedding. Secondly, it is in keeping with the use of this
sacrament, that Christ's body be shown apart to the faithful as food,
and the blood as drink. Thirdly, it is in keeping with its effect, in
which sense it was stated above ([4551]Q[74], A[1]) that "the body is
offered for the salvation of the body, and the blood for the salvation
of the soul. "
Reply to Objection 2: In Christ's Passion, of which this is the
memorial, the other parts of the body were not separated from one
another, as the blood was, but the body remained entire, according to
Ex. 12:46: "You shall not break a bone thereof. " And therefore in this
sacrament the blood is consecrated apart from the body, but no other
part is consecrated separately from the rest.
Reply to Objection 3: As stated above, the body of Christ is not under
the species of wine by the power of the sacrament, but by real
concomitance: and therefore by the consecration of the wine the body of
Christ is not there of itself, but concomitantly.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether Christ is entire under every part of the species of the bread and
wine?
Objection 1: It seems that Christ is not entire under every part of the
species of bread and wine. Because those species can be divided
infinitely. If therefore Christ be entirely under every part of the
said species, it would follow that He is in this sacrament an infinite
number of times: which is unreasonable; because the infinite is
repugnant not only to nature, but likewise to grace.
Objection 2: Further, since Christ's is an organic body, it has parts
determinately distant. for a determinate distance of the individual
parts from each other is of the very nature of an organic body, as that
of eye from eye, and eye from ear. But this could not be so, if Christ
were entire under every part of the species; for every part would have
to be under every other part, and so where one part would be, there
another part would be. It cannot be then that the entire Christ is
under every part of the host or of the wine contained in the chalice.
Objection 3: Further, Christ's body always retains the true nature of a
body, nor is it ever changed into a spirit. Now it is the nature of a
body for it to be "quantity having position" (Predic. iv). But it
belongs to the nature of this quantity that the various parts exist in
various parts of place. Therefore, apparently it is impossible for the
entire Christ to be under every part of the species.
On the contrary, Augustine says in a sermon (Gregory, Sacramentarium):
"Each receives Christ the Lord, Who is entire under every morsel, nor
is He less in each portion, but bestows Himself entire under each. "
I answer that, As was observed above (A[1], ad 3), because the
substance of Christ's body is in this sacrament by the power of the
sacrament, while dimensive quantity is there by reason of real
concomitance, consequently Christ's body is in this sacrament
substantively, that is, in the way in which substance is under
dimensions, but not after the manner of dimensions, which means, not in
the way in which the dimensive quantity of a body is under the
dimensive quantity of place.
Now it is evident that the whole nature of a substance is under every
part of the dimensions under which it is contained; just as the entire
nature of air is under every part of air, and the entire nature of
bread under every part of bread; and this indifferently, whether the
dimensions be actually divided (as when the air is divided or the bread
cut), or whether they be actually undivided, but potentially divisible.
And therefore it is manifest that the entire Christ is under every part
of the species of the bread, even while the host remains entire, and
not merely when it is broken, as some say, giving the example of an
image which appears in a mirror, which appears as one in the unbroken
mirror, whereas when the mirror is broken, there is an image in each
part of the broken mirror: for the comparison is not perfect, because
the multiplying of such images results in the broken mirror on account
of the various reflections in the various parts of the mirror; but here
there is only one consecration, whereby Christ's body is in this
sacrament.
Reply to Objection 1: Number follows division, and therefore so long as
quantity remains actually undivided, neither is the substance of any
thing several times under its proper dimensions, nor is Christ's body
several times under the dimensions of the bread; and consequently not
an infinite number of times, but just as many times as it is divided
into parts.
Reply to Objection 2: The determinate distance of parts in an organic
body is based upon its dimensive quantity; but the nature of substance
precedes even dimensive quantity. And since the conversion of the
substance of the bread is terminated at the substance of the body of
Christ, and since according to the manner of substance the body of
Christ is properly and directly in this sacrament; such distance of
parts is indeed in Christ's true body, which, however, is not compared
to this sacrament according to such distance, but according to the
manner of its substance, as stated above (A[1], ad 3).
Reply to Objection 3: This argument is based on the nature of a body,
arising from dimensive quantity. But it was said above (ad 2) that
Christ's body is compared with this sacrament not by reason of
dimensive quantity, but by reason of its substance, as already stated.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the whole dimensive quantity of Christ's body is in this sacrament?
Objection 1: It seems that the whole dimensive quantity of Christ's
body is not in this sacrament. For it was said [4552](A[3]) that
Christ's entire body is contained under every part of the consecrated
host. But no dimensive quantity is contained entirely in any whole, and
in its every part. Therefore it is impossible for the entire dimensive
quantity of Christ's body to be there.
Objection 2: Further, it is impossible for two dimensive quantities to
be together, even though one be separate from its subject, and the
other in a natural body, as is clear from the Philosopher (Metaph.
iii). But the dimensive quantity of the bread remains in this
sacrament, as is evident to our senses. Consequently, the dimensive
quantity of Christ's body is not there.
Objection 3: Further, if two unequal dimensive quantities be set side
by side, the greater will overlap the lesser. But the dimensive
quantity of Christ's body is considerably larger than the dimensive
quantity of the consecrated host according to every dimension.
Therefore, if the dimensive quantity of Christ's body be in this
sacrament together with the dimensive quantity of the host, the
dimensive quantity of Christ's body is extended beyond the quantity of
the host, which nevertheless is not without the substance of Christ's
body. Therefore, the substance of Christ's body will be in this
sacrament even outside the species of the bread, which is unreasonable,
since the substance of Christ's body is in this sacrament, only by the
consecration of the bread, as stated above [4553](A[2]). Consequently,
it is impossible for the whole dimensive quantity of Christ's body to
be in this sacrament.
On the contrary, The existence of the dimensive quantity of any body
cannot be separated from the existence of its substance. But in this
sacrament the entire substance of Christ's body is present, as stated
above ([4554]AA[1],3). Therefore the entire dimensive quantity of
Christ's body is in this sacrament.
I answer that, As stated above [4555](A[1]), any part of Christ is in
this sacrament in two ways: in one way, by the power of the sacrament;
in another, from real concomitance. By the power of the sacrament the
dimensive quantity of Christ's body is not in this sacrament; for, by
the power of the sacrament that is present in this sacrament, whereat
the conversion is terminated. But the conversion which takes place in
this sacrament is terminated directly at the substance of Christ's
body, and not at its dimensions; which is evident from the fact that
the dimensive quantity of the bread remains after the consecration,
while only the substance of the bread passes away.
Nevertheless, since the substance of Christ's body is not really
deprived of its dimensive quantity and its other accidents, hence it
comes that by reason of real concomitance the whole dimensive quantity
of Christ's body and all its other accidents are in this sacrament.
Reply to Objection 1: The manner of being of every thing is determined
by what belongs to it of itself, and not according to what is coupled
accidentally with it: thus an object is present to the sight, according
as it is white, and not according as it is sweet, although the same
object may be both white and sweet; hence sweetness is in the sight
after the manner of whiteness, and not after that of sweetness. Since,
then, the substance of Christ's body is present on the altar by the
power of this sacrament, while its dimensive quantity is there
concomitantly and as it were accidentally, therefore the dimensive
quantity of Christ's body is in this sacrament, not according to its
proper manner (namely, that the whole is in the whole, and the
individual parts in individual parts), but after the manner of
substance, whose nature is for the whole to be in the whole, and the
whole in every part.
Reply to Objection 2: Two dimensive quantities cannot naturally be in
the same subject at the same time, so that each be there according to
the proper manner of dimensive quantity. But in this sacrament the
dimensive quantity of the bread is there after its proper manner, that
is, according to commensuration: not so the dimensive quantity of
Christ's body, for that is there after the manner of substance, as
stated above (ad 1).
Reply to Objection 3: The dimensive quantity of Christ's body is in
this sacrament not by way of commensuration, which is proper to
quantity, and to which it belongs for the greater to be extended beyond
the lesser; but in the way mentioned above (ad 1,2).
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Whether Christ's body is in this sacrament as in a place?
Objection 1: It seems that Christ's body is in this sacrament as in a
place. Because, to be in a place definitively or circumscriptively
belongs to being in a place. But Christ's body seems to be definitively
in this sacrament, because it is so present where the species of the
bread and wine are, that it is nowhere else upon the altar: likewise it
seems to be there circumscriptively, because it is so contained under
the species of the consecrated host, that it neither exceeds it nor is
exceeded by it. Therefore Christ's body is in this sacrament as in a
place.
Objection 2: Further, the place of the bread and wine is not empty,
because nature abhors a vacuum; nor is the substance of the bread
there, as stated above ([4556]Q[75], A[2]); but only the body of Christ
is there. Consequently the body of Christ fills that place. But
whatever fills a place is there locally. Therefore the body of Christ
is in this sacrament locally.
Objection 3: Further, as stated above [4557](A[4]), the body of Christ
is in this sacrament with its dimensive quantity, and with all its
accidents. But to be in a place is an accident of a body; hence "where"
is numbered among the nine kinds of accidents. Therefore Christ's body
is in this sacrament locally.
On the contrary, The place and the object placed must be equal, as is
clear from the Philosopher (Phys. iv). But the place, where this
sacrament is, is much less than the body of Christ. Therefore Christ's
body is not in this sacrament as in a place.
I answer that, As stated above (A[1], ad 3; A[3]), Christ's body is in
this sacrament not after the proper manner of dimensive quantity, but
rather after the manner of substance. But every body occupying a place
is in the place according to the manner of dimensive quantity, namely,
inasmuch as it is commensurate with the place according to its
dimensive quantity. Hence it remains that Christ's body is not in this
sacrament as in a place, but after the manner of substance, that is to
say, in that way in which substance is contained by dimensions; because
the substance of Christ's body succeeds the substance of bread in this
sacrament: hence as the substance of bread was not locally under its
dimensions, but after the manner of substance, so neither is the
substance of Christ's body. Nevertheless the substance of Christ's body
is not the subject of those dimensions, as was the substance of the
bread: and therefore the substance of the bread was there locally by
reason of its dimensions, because it was compared with that place
through the medium of its own dimensions; but the substance of Christ's
body is compared with that place through the medium of foreign
dimensions, so that, on the contrary, the proper dimensions of Christ's
body are compared with that place through the medium of substance;
which is contrary to the notion of a located body.
Hence in no way is Christ's body locally in this sacrament.
Reply to Objection 1: Christ's body is not in this sacrament
definitively, because then it would be only on the particular altar
where this sacrament is performed: whereas it is in heaven under its
own species, and on many other altars under the sacramental species.
Likewise it is evident that it is not in this sacrament
circumscriptively, because it is not there according to the
commensuration of its own quantity, as stated above. But that it is not
outside the superficies of the sacrament, nor on any other part of the
altar, is due not to its being there definitively or circumscriptively,
but to its being there by consecration and conversion of the bread and
wine, as stated above [4558](A[1]; Q[15], A[2], sqq. ).
Reply to Objection 2: The place in which Christ's body is, is not
empty; nor yet is it properly filled with the substance of Christ's
body, which is not there locally, as stated above; but it is filled
with the sacramental species, which have to fill the place either
because of the nature of dimensions, or at least miraculously, as they
also subsist miraculously after the fashion of substance.
Reply to Objection 3: As stated above [4559](A[4]), the accidents of
Christ's body are in this sacrament by real concomitance. And therefore
those accidents of Christ's body which are intrinsic to it are in this
sacrament. But to be in a place is an accident when compared with the
extrinsic container. And therefore it is not necessary for Christ to be
in this sacrament as in a place.
Reply to Objection 1: God "wedded His Godhead," i. e. His Divine power,
to the bread and wine, not that these may remain in this sacrament, but
in order that He may make from them His body and blood.
Reply to Objection 2: Christ is not really present in the other
sacraments, as in this; and therefore the substance of the matter
remains in the other sacraments, but not in this.
Reply to Objection 3: The species which remain in this sacrament, as
shall be said later [4530](A[5]), suffice for its signification;
because the nature of the substance is known by its accidents.
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Whether the substance of the bread or wine is annihilated after the
consecration of this sacrament, or dissolved into their original matter?
Objection 1: It seems that the substance of the bread is annihilated
after the consecration of this sacrament, or dissolved into its
original matter. For whatever is corporeal must be somewhere. But the
substance of bread, which is something corporeal, does not remain, in
this sacrament, as stated above [4531](A[2]); nor can we assign any
place where it may be. Consequently it is nothing after the
consecration. Therefore, it is either annihilated, or dissolved into
its original matter.
Objection 2: Further, what is the term "wherefrom" in every change
exists no longer, except in the potentiality of matter; e. g. when air
is changed into fire, the form of the air remains only in the
potentiality of matter; and in like fashion when what is white becomes
black. But in this sacrament the substance of the bread or of the wine
is the term "wherefrom," while the body or the blood of Christ is the
term "whereunto": for Ambrose says in De Officiis (De Myster. ix):
"Before the blessing it is called another species, after the blessing
the body of Christ is signified. " Therefore, when the consecration
takes place, the substance of the bread or wine no longer remains,
unless perchance dissolved into its (original) matter.
Objection 3: Further, one of two contradictories must be true. But this
proposition is false: "After the consecration the substance of the
bread or wine is something. " Consequently, this is true: "The substance
of the bread or wine is nothing. "
On the contrary, Augustine says ([4532]Q[83]): "God is not the cause of
tending to nothing. " But this sacrament is wrought by Divine power.
Therefore, in this sacrament the substance of the bread or wine is not
annihilated.
I answer that, Because the substance of the bread and wine does not
remain in this sacrament, some, deeming that it is impossible for the
substance of the bread and wine to be changed into Christ's flesh and
blood, have maintained that by the consecration, the substance of the
bread and wine is either dissolved into the original matter, or that it
is annihilated.
Now the original matter into which mixed bodies can be dissolved is the
four elements. For dissolution cannot be made into primary matter, so
that a subject can exist without a form, since matter cannot exist
without a form. But since after the consecration nothing remains under
the sacramental species except the body and the blood of Christ, it
will be necessary to say that the elements into which the substance of
the bread and wine is dissolved, depart from thence by local motion,
which would be perceived by the senses. In like manner also the
substance of the bread or wine remains until the last instant of the
consecration; but in the last instant of the consecration there is
already present there the substance of the body or blood of Christ,
just as the form is already present in the last instant of generation.
Hence no instant can be assigned in which the original matter can be
there. For it cannot be said that the substance of the bread or wine is
dissolved gradually into the original matter, or that it successively
quits the species, for if this began to be done in the last instant of
its consecration, then at the one time under part of the host there
would be the body of Christ together with the substance of bread, which
is contrary to what has been said above [4533](A[2]). But if this begin
to come to pass before the consecration, there will then be a time in
which under one part of the host there will be neither the substance of
bread nor the body of Christ, which is not fitting. They seem indeed to
have taken this into careful consideration, wherefore they formulated
their proposition with an alternative viz. that (the substance) may be
annihilated. But even this cannot stand, because no way can be assigned
whereby Christ's true body can begin to be in this sacrament, except by
the change of the substance of bread into it, which change is excluded
the moment we admit either annihilation of the substance of the bread,
or dissolution into the original matter. Likewise no cause can be
assigned for such dissolution or annihilation, since the effect of the
sacrament is signified by the form: "This is My body. " Hence it is
clear that the aforesaid opinion is false.
Reply to Objection 1: The substance of the bread or wine, after the
consecration, remains neither under the sacramental species, nor
elsewhere; yet it does not follow that it is annihilated; for it is
changed into the body of Christ; just as if the air, from which fire is
generated, be not there or elsewhere, it does not follow that it is
annihilated.
Reply to Objection 2: The form, which is the term "wherefrom," is not
changed into another form; but one form succeeds another in the
subject; and therefore the first form remains only in the potentiality
of matter. But here the substance of the bread is changed into the body
of Christ, as stated above. Hence the conclusion does not follow.
Reply to Objection 3: Although after the consecration this proposition
is false: "The substance of the breed is something," still that into
which the substance of the bread is changed, is something, and
consequently the substance of the bread is not annihilated.
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Whether bread can be converted into the body of Christ?
Objection 1: It seems that bread cannot be converted into the body of
Christ. For conversion is a kind of change. But in every change there
must be some subject, which from being previously in potentiality is
now in act. because as is said in Phys. iii: "motion is the act of a
thing existing in potentiality. " But no subject can be assigned for the
substance of the bread and of the body of Christ, because it is of the
very nature of substance for it "not to be in a subject," as it is said
in Praedic. iii. Therefore it is not possible for the whole substance
of the bread to be converted into the body of Christ.
Objection 2: Further, the form of the thing into which another is
converted, begins anew to inhere in the matter of the thing converted
into it: as when air is changed into fire not already existing, the
form of fire begins anew to be in the matter of the air; and in like
manner when food is converted into non-pre-existing man, the form of
the man begins to be anew in the matter of the food. Therefore, if
bread be changed into the body of Christ, the form of Christ's body
must necessarily begin to be in the matter of the bread, which is
false. Consequently, the bread is not changed into the substance of
Christ's body.
Objection 3: Further, when two things are diverse, one never becomes
the other, as whiteness never becomes blackness, as is stated in Phys.
i. But since two contrary forms are of themselves diverse, as being the
principles of formal difference, so two signate matters are of
themselves diverse, as being the principles of material distinction.
Consequently, it is not possible for this matter of bread to become
this matter whereby Christ's body is individuated, and so it is not
possible for this substance of bread to be changed into the substance
of Christ's body.
On the contrary, Eusebius Emesenus says: "To thee it ought neither to
be a novelty nor an impossibility that earthly and mortal things be
changed into the substance of Christ. "
I answer that, As stated above [4534](A[2]), since Christ's true body
is in this sacrament, and since it does not begin to be there by local
motion, nor is it contained therein as in a place, as is evident from
what was stated above (A[1], ad 2), it must be said then that it begins
to be there by conversion of the substance of bread into itself.
Yet this change is not like natural changes, but is entirely
supernatural, and effected by God's power alone. Hence Ambrose says
[(De Sacram. iv): "See how Christ's word changes nature's laws, as He
wills: a man is not wont to be born save of man and woman: see
therefore that against the established law and order a man is born of a
Virgin": and] [*The passage in the brackets is not in the Leonine
edition] (De Myster. iv): "It is clear that a Virgin begot beyond the
order of nature: and what we make is the body from the Virgin. Why,
then, do you look for nature's order in Christ's body, since the Lord
Jesus was Himself brought forth of a Virgin beyond nature? " Chrysostom
likewise (Hom. xlvii), commenting on Jn. 6:64: "The words which I have
spoken to you," namely, of this sacrament, "are spirit and life," says:
i. e. "spiritual, having nothing carnal, nor natural consequence; but
they are rent from all such necessity which exists upon earth, and from
the laws here established. "
For it is evident that every agent acts according as it is in act. But
every created agent is limited in its act, as being of a determinate
genus and species: and consequently the action of every created agent
bears upon some determinate act. Now the determination of every thing
in actual existence comes from its form. Consequently, no natural or
created agent can act except by changing the form in something; and on
this account every change made according to nature's laws is a formal
change. But God is infinite act, as stated in the [4535]FP, Q[7], A[1];
Q[26], A[2]; hence His action extends to the whole nature of being.
Therefore He can work not only formal conversion, so that diverse forms
succeed each other in the same subject; but also the change of all
being, so that, to wit, the whole substance of one thing be changed
into the whole substance of another. And this is done by Divine power
in this sacrament; for the whole substance of the bread is changed into
the whole substance of Christ's body, and the whole substance of the
wine into the whole substance of Christ's blood. Hence this is not a
formal, but a substantial conversion; nor is it a kind of natural
movement: but, with a name of its own, it can be called
"transubstantiation. "
Reply to Objection 1: This objection holds good in respect of formal
change, because it belongs to a form to be in matter or in a subject;
but it does not hold good in respect of the change of the entire
substance. Hence, since this substantial change implies a certain order
of substances, one of which is changed into the other, it is in both
substances as in a subject, just as order and number.
Reply to Objection 2: This argument also is true of formal conversion
or change, because, as stated above (ad 1), a form must be in some
matter or subject. But this is not so in a change of the entire
substance; for in this case no subject is possible.
Reply to Objection 3: Form cannot be changed into form, nor matter into
matter by the power of any finite agent. Such a change, however, can be
made by the power of an infinite agent, which has control over all
being, because the nature of being is common to both forms and to both
matters; and whatever there is of being in the one, the author of being
can change into whatever there is of being in the other, withdrawing
that whereby it was distinguished from the other.
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Whether the accidents of the bread and wine remain in this sacrament after
the change?
Objection 1: It seems that the accidents of the bread and wine do not
remain in this sacrament. For when that which comes first is removed,
that which follows is also taken away. But substance is naturally
before accident, as is proved in Metaph. vii. Since, then, after
consecration, the substance of the bread does not remain in this
sacrament, it seems that its accidents cannot remain.
Objection 2: Further, there ought not to be any deception in a
sacrament of truth. But we judge of substance by accidents. It seems,
then, that human judgment is deceived, if, while the accidents remain,
the substance of the bread does not. Consequently this is unbecoming to
this sacrament.
Objection 3: Further, although our faith is not subject to reason,
still it is not contrary to reason, but above it, as was said in the
beginning of this work ([4536]FP, Q[1], A[6], ad 2; A[8]). But our
reason has its origin in the senses. Therefore our faith ought not to
be contrary to the senses, as it is when sense judges that to be bread
which faith believes to be the substance of Christ's body. Therefore it
is not befitting this sacrament for the accidents of bread to remain
subject to the senses, and for the substance of bread not to remain.
Objection 4: Further, what remains after the change has taken place
seems to be the subject of change. If therefore the accidents of the
bread remain after the change has been effected, it seems that the
accidents are the subject of the change. But this is impossible; for
"an accident cannot have an accident" (Metaph. iii). Therefore the
accidents of the bread and wine ought not to remain in this sacrament.
On the contrary, Augustine says in his book on the Sentences of Prosper
(Lanfranc, De Corp. et Sang. Dom. xiii): "Under the species which we
behold, of bread and wine, we honor invisible things, i. e. flesh and
blood. "
I answer that, It is evident to sense that all the accidents of the
bread and wine remain after the consecration. And this is reasonably
done by Divine providence. First of all, because it is not customary,
but horrible, for men to eat human flesh, and to drink blood. And
therefore Christ's flesh and blood are set before us to be partaken of
under the species of those things which are the more commonly used by
men, namely, bread and wine. Secondly, lest this sacrament might be
derided by unbelievers, if we were to eat our Lord under His own
species. Thirdly, that while we receive our Lord's body and blood
invisibly, this may redound to the merit of faith.
Reply to Objection 1: As is said in the book De Causis, an effect
depends more on the first cause than on the second. And therefore by
God's power, which is the first cause of all things, it is possible for
that which follows to remain, while that which is first is taken away.
Reply to Objection 2: There is no deception in this sacrament; for the
accidents which are discerned by the senses are truly present. But the
intellect, whose proper object is substance as is said in De Anima iii,
is preserved by faith from deception.
And this serves as answer to the third argument; because faith is not
contrary to the senses, but concerns things to which sense does not
reach.
Reply to Objection 4: This change has not properly a subject, as was
stated above (A[4], ad 1); nevertheless the accidents which remain have
some resemblance of a subject.
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Whether the substantial form of the bread remains in this sacrament after
the consecration?
Objection 1: It seems that the substantial form of the bread remains in
this sacrament after the consecration. For it has been said
[4537](A[5]) that the accidents remain after the consecration. But
since bread is an artificial thing, its form is an accident. Therefore
it remains after the consecration.
Objection 2: Further, the form of Christ's body is His soul: for it is
said in De Anima ii, that the soul "is the act of a physical body which
has life in potentiality". But it cannot be said that the substantial
form of the bread is changed into the soul. Therefore it appears that
it remains after the consecration.
Objection 3: Further, the proper operation of a things follows its
substantial form. But what remains in this sacrament, nourishes, and
performs every operation which bread would do were it present.
Therefore the substantial form of the bread remains in this sacrament
after the consecration.
On the contrary, The substantial form of bread is of the substance of
bread. But the substance of the bread is changed into the body of
Christ, as stated above ([4538]AA[2],3,4). Therefore the substantial
form of the bread does not remain.
I answer that, Some have contended that after the consecration not only
do the accidents of the bread remain, but also its substantial form.
But this cannot be. First of all, because if the substantial form of
the bread were to remain, nothing of the bread would be changed into
the body of Christ, excepting the matter; and so it would follow that
it would be changed, not into the whole body of Christ, but into its
matter, which is repugnant to the form of the sacrament, wherein it is
said: "This is My body. "
Secondly, because if the substantial form of the bread were to remain,
it would remain either in matter, or separated from matter. The first
cannot be, for if it were to remain in the matter of the bread, then
the whole substance of the bread would remain, which is against what
was said above [4539](A[2]). Nor could it remain in any other matter,
because the proper form exists only in its proper matter. But if it
were to remain separate from matter, it would then be an actually
intelligible form, and also an intelligence; for all forms separated
from matter are such.
Thirdly, it would be unbefitting this sacrament: because the accidents
of the bread remain in this sacrament, in order that the body of Christ
may be seen under them, and not under its proper species, as stated
above [4540](A[5]).
And therefore it must be said that the substantial form of the bread
does not remain.
Reply to Objection 1: There is nothing to prevent art from making a
thing whose form is not an accident, but a substantial form; as frogs
and serpents can be produced by art: for art produces such forms not by
its own power, but by the power of natural energies. And in this way it
produces the substantial forms of bread, by the power of fire baking
the matter made up of flour and water.
Reply to Objection 2: The soul is the form of the body, giving it the
whole order of perfect being, i. e. being, corporeal being, and animated
being, and so on. Therefore the form of the bread is changed into the
form of Christ's body, according as the latter gives corporeal being,
but not according as it bestows animated being.
Reply to Objection 3: Some of the operations of bread follow it by
reason of the accidents, such as to affect the senses, and such
operations are found in the species of the bread after the consecration
on account of the accidents which remain. But some other operations
follow the bread either by reason of the matter, such as that it is
changed into something else, or else by reason of the substantial form,
such as an operation consequent upon its species, for instance, that it
"strengthens man's heart" (Ps. 103:15); and such operations are found
in this sacrament, not on account of the form or matter remaining, but
because they are bestowed miraculously upon the accidents themselves,
as will be said later (Q[77], A[3], ad 2,3; [4541]AA[5],6).
__________________________________________________________________
Whether this change is wrought instantaneously?
Objection 1: It seems that this change is not wrought instantaneously,
but successively. For in this change there is first the substance of
bread, and afterwards the substance of Christ's body. Neither, then, is
in the same instant, but in two instants. But there is a mid-time
between every two instants. Therefore this change must take place
according to the succession of time, which is between the last instant
in which the bread is there, and the first instant in which the body of
Christ is present.
Objection 2: Further, in every change something is "in becoming" and
something is "in being. " But these two things do not exist at the one
time for, what is "in becoming," is not yet, whereas what is "in
being," already is. Consequently, there is a before and an after in
such change: and so necessarily the change cannot be instantaneous, but
successive.
Objection 3: Further, Ambrose says (De Sacram. iv) that this sacrament
"is made by the words of Christ. " But Christ's words are pronounced
successively. Therefore the change takes place successively.
On the contrary, This change is effected by a power which is infinite,
to which it belongs to operate in an instant.
I answer that, A change may be instantaneous from a threefold reason.
First on the part of the form, which is the terminus of the change.
For, if it be a form that receives more and less, it is acquired by its
subject successively, such as health; and therefore because a
substantial form does not receive more and less, it follows that its
introduction into matter is instantaneous.
Secondly on the part of the subject, which sometimes is prepared
successively for receiving the form; thus water is heated successively.
When, however, the subject itself is in the ultimate disposition for
receiving the form, it receives it suddenly, as a transparent body is
illuminated suddenly. Thirdly on the part of the agent, which possesses
infinite power: wherefore it can instantly dispose the matter for the
form. Thus it is written (Mk. 7:34) that when Christ had said,
"'Ephpheta,' which is 'Be thou opened,' immediately his ears were
opened, and the string of his tongue was loosed. "
For these three reasons this conversion is instantaneous. First,
because the substance of Christ's body which is the term of this
conversion, does not receive more or less. Secondly, because in this
conversion there is no subject to be disposed successively. Thirdly,
because it is effected by God's infinite power.
Reply to Objection 1: Some [*Cf. Albert the Great, Sent. iv, D, 11; St.
Bonaventure, Sent. , iv, D, 11] do not grant simply that there is a
mid-time between every two instants. For they say that this is true of
two instants referring to the same movement, but not if they refer to
different things. Hence between the instant that marks the close of
rest, and another which marks the beginning of movement, there is no
mid-time. But in this they are mistaken, because the unity of time and
of instant, or even their plurality, is not taken according to
movements of any sort, but according to the first movement of the
heavens, which is the measure of all movement and rest.
Accordingly others grant this of the time which measures movement
depending on the movement of the heavens. But there are some movements
which are not dependent on the movement of the heavens, nor measured by
it, as was said in the [4542]FP, Q[53], A[3] concerning the movements
of the angels. Hence between two instants responding to those movements
there is no mid-time. But this is not to the point, because although
the change in question has no relation of itself to the movement of the
heavens, still it follows the pronouncing of the words, which
(pronouncing) must necessarily be measured by the movement of the
heavens. And therefore there must of necessity be a mid-time between
every two signate instants in connection with that change.
Some say therefore that the instant in which the bread was last, and
the instant in which the body of Christ is first, are indeed two in
comparison with the things measured, but are one comparatively to the
time measuring; as when two lines touch, there are two points on the
part of the two lines, but one point on the part of the place
containing them. But here there is no likeness, because instant and
time is not the intrinsic measure of particular movements, as a line
and point are of a body, but only the extrinsic measure, as place is to
bodies.
Hence others say that it is the same instant in fact, but another
according to reason. But according to this it would follow that things
really opposite would exist together; for diversity of reason does not
change a thing objectively.
And therefore it must be said that this change, as stated above, is
wrought by Christ's words which are spoken by the priest, so that the
last instant of pronouncing the words is the first instant in which
Christ's body is in the sacrament; and that the substance of the bread
is there during the whole preceding time. Of this time no instant is to
be taken as proximately preceding the last one, because time is not
made up of successive instants, as is proved in Phys. vi. And therefore
a first instant can be assigned in which Christ's body is present; but
a last instant cannot be assigned in which the substance of bread is
there, but a last time can be assigned.
And the same holds good in
natural changes, as is evident from the Philosopher (Phys. viii).
Reply to Objection 2: In instantaneous changes a thing is "in
becoming," and is "in being" simultaneously; just as becoming
illuminated and to be actually illuminated are simultaneous: for in
such, a thing is said to be "in being" according as it now is; but to
be "in becoming," according as it was not before.
Reply to Objection 3: As stated above (ad 1), this change comes about
in the last instant of the pronouncing of the words, for then the
meaning of the words is finished, which meaning is efficacious in the
forms of the sacraments. And therefore it does not follow that this
change is successive.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether this proposition is false: "The body of Christ is made out of
bread"?
Objection 1: It seems that this proposition is false: "The body of
Christ is made out of bread. " For everything out of which another is
made, is that which is made the other; but not conversely: for we say
that a black thing is made out of a white thing, and that a white thing
is made black: and although we may say that a man becomes black still
we do not say that a black thing is made out of a man, as is shown in
Phys. i. If it be true, then, that Christ's body is made out of bread,
it will be true to say that bread is made the body of Christ. But this
seems to be false, because the bread is not the subject of the making,
but rather its term. Therefore, it is not said truly that Christ's body
is made out of bread.
Objection 2: Further, the term of "becoming" is something that is, or
something that is "made. " But this proposition is never true: "The
bread is the body of Christ"; or "The bread is made the body of
Christ"; or again, "The bread will be the body of Christ. " Therefore it
seems that not even this is true: "The body of Christ is made out of
bread. "
Objection 3: Further, everything out of which another is made is
converted into that which is made from it. But this proposition seems
to be false: "The bread is converted into the body of Christ," because
such conversion seems to be more miraculous than the creation of the
world, in which it is not said that non-being is converted into being.
Therefore it seems that this proposition likewise is false: "The body
of Christ is made out of bread. "
Objection 4: Further, that out of which something is made, can be that
thing. But this proposition is false: "Bread can be the body of
Christ. " Therefore this is likewise false: "The body of Christ is made
out of bread. "
On the contrary, Ambrose says (De Sacram. iv): "When the consecration
takes place, the body of Christ is made out of the bread. "
I answer that, This conversion of bread into the body of Christ has
something in common with creation, and with natural transmutation, and
in some respect differs from both. For the order of the terms is common
to these three; that is, that after one thing there is another (for, in
creation there is being after non-being; in this sacrament, Christ's
body after the substance of bread; in natural transmutation white after
black, or fire after air); and that the aforesaid terms are not
coexistent.
Now the conversion, of which we are speaking, has this in common with
creation, that in neither of them is there any common subject belonging
to either of the extremes; the contrary of which appears in every
natural transmutation.
Again, this conversion has something in common with natural
transmutation in two respects, although not in the same fashion. First
of all because in both, one of the extremes passes into the other, as
bread into Christ's body, and air into fire; whereas non-being is not
converted into being. But this comes to pass differently on the one
side and on the other; for in this sacrament the whole substance of the
bread passes into the whole body of Christ; whereas in natural
transmutation the matter of the one receives the form of the other, the
previous form being laid aside. Secondly, they have this in common,
that on both sides something remains the same; whereas this does not
happen in creation: yet differently; for the same matter or subject
remains in natural transmutation; whereas in this sacrament the same
accidents remain.
From these observations we can gather the various ways of speaking in
such matters. For, because in no one of the aforesaid three things are
the extremes coexistent, therefore in none of them can one extreme be
predicated of the other by the substantive verb of the present tense:
for we do not say, "Non-being is being" or, "Bread is the body of
Christ," or, "Air is fire," or, "White is black. " Yet because of the
relationship of the extremes in all of them we can use the preposition
"ex" [out of], which denotes order; for we can truly and properly say
that "being is made out of non-being," and "out of bread, the body of
Christ," and "out of air, fire," and "out of white, black. " But because
in creation one of the extremes does not pass into the other, we cannot
use the word "conversion" in creation, so as to say that "non-being is
converted into being": we can, however, use the word in this sacrament,
just as in natural transmutation. But since in this sacrament the whole
substance is converted into the whole substance, on that account this
conversion is properly termed transubstantiation.
Again, since there is no subject of this conversion, the things which
are true in natural conversion by reason of the subject, are not to be
granted in this conversion. And in the first place indeed it is evident
that potentiality to the opposite follows a subject, by reason whereof
we say that "a white thing can be black," or that "air can be fire";
although the latter is not so proper as the former: for the subject of
whiteness, in which there is potentiality to blackness, is the whole
substance of the white thing; since whiteness is not a part thereof;
whereas the subject of the form of air is part thereof: hence when it
is said, "Air can be fire," it is verified by synecdoche by reason of
the part. But in this conversion, and similarly in creation, because
there is no subject, it is not said that one extreme can be the other,
as that "non-being can be being," or that "bread can be the body of
Christ": and for the same reason it cannot be properly said that "being
is made of [de] non-being," or that "the body of Christ is made of
bread," because this preposition "of" [de] denotes a consubstantial
cause, which consubstantiality of the extremes in natural
transmutations is considered according to something common in the
subject. And for the same reason it is not granted that "bread will be
the body of Christ," or that it "may become the body of Christ," just
as it is not granted in creation that "non-being will be being," or
that "non-being may become being," because this manner of speaking is
verified in natural transmutations by reason of the subject: for
instance, when we say that "a white thing becomes black," or "a white
thing will be black. "
Nevertheless, since in this sacrament, after the change, something
remains the same, namely, the accidents of the bread, as stated above
[4543](A[5]), some of these expressions may be admitted by way of
similitude, namely, that "bread is the body of Christ," or, "bread will
be the body of Christ," or "the body of Christ is made of bread";
provided that by the word "bread" is not understood the substance of
bread, but in general "that which is contained under the species of
bread," under which species there is first contained the substance of
bread, and afterwards the body of Christ.
Reply to Objection 1: That out of which something else is made,
sometimes implies together with the subject, one of the extremes of the
transmutation, as when it is said "a black thing is made out of a white
one"; but sometimes it implies only the opposite or the extreme, as
when it is said---"out of morning comes the day. " And so it is not
granted that the latter becomes the former, that is, "that morning
becomes the day. " So likewise in the matter in hand, although it may be
said properly that "the body of Christ is made out of bread," yet it is
not said properly that "bread becomes the body of Christ," except by
similitude, as was said above.
Reply to Objection 2: That out of which another is made, will sometimes
be that other because of the subject which is implied. And therefore,
since there is no subject of this change, the comparison does not hold.
Reply to Objection 3: In this change there are many more difficulties
than in creation, in which there is but this one difficulty, that
something is made out of nothing; yet this belongs to the proper mode
of production of the first cause, which presupposes nothing else. But
in this conversion not only is it difficult for this whole to be
changed into that whole, so that nothing of the former may remain
(which does not belong to the common mode of production of a cause),
but furthermore it has this difficulty that the accidents remain while
the substance is destroyed, and many other difficulties of which we
shall treat hereafter ([4544]Q[77]). Nevertheless the word "conversion"
is admitted in this sacrament, but not in creation, as stated above.
Reply to Objection 4: As was observed above, potentiality belongs to
the subject, whereas there is no subject in this conversion. And
therefore it is not granted that bread can be the body of Christ: for
this conversion does not come about by the passive potentiality of the
creature, but solely by the active power of the Creator.
__________________________________________________________________
OF THE WAY IN WHICH CHRIST IS IN THIS SACRAMENT (EIGHT ARTICLES)
We have now to consider the manner in which Christ exists in this
sacrament; and under this head there are eight points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the whole Christ is under this sacrament?
(2) Whether the entire Christ is under each species of the sacrament?
(3) Whether the entire Christ is under every part of the species?
(4) Whether all the dimensions of Christ's body are in this sacrament?
(5) Whether the body of Christ is in this sacrament locally?
(6) Whether after the consecration, the body of Christ is moved when
the host or chalice is moved?
(7) Whether Christ's body, as it is in this sacrament, can be seen by
the eye?
(8) Whether the true body of Christ remains in this sacrament when He
is seen under the appearance of a child or of flesh?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the whole Christ is contained under this sacrament?
Objection 1: It seems that the whole Christ is not contained under this
sacrament, because Christ begins to be in this sacrament by conversion
of the bread and wine. But it is evident that the bread and wine cannot
be changed either into the Godhead or into the soul of Christ. Since
therefore Christ exists in three substances, namely, the Godhead, soul
and body, as shown above ([4545]Q[2], A[5];[4546] Q[5], AA[1],3), it
seems that the entire Christ is not under this sacrament.
Objection 2: Further, Christ is in this sacrament, forasmuch as it is
ordained to the refection of the faithful, which consists in food and
drink, as stated above ([4547]Q[74], A[1]). But our Lord said (Jn.
6:56): "My flesh is meat indeed, and My blood is drink indeed. "
Therefore, only the flesh and blood of Christ are contained in this
sacrament. But there are many other parts of Christ's body, for
instance, the nerves, bones, and such like. Therefore the entire Christ
is not contained under this sacrament.
Objection 3: Further, a body of greater quantity cannot be contained
under the measure of a lesser. But the measure of the bread and wine is
much smaller than the measure of Christ's body. Therefore it is
impossible that the entire Christ be contained under this sacrament.
On the contrary, Ambrose says (De Officiis): "Christ is in this
sacrament. "
I answer that, It is absolutely necessary to confess according to
Catholic faith that the entire Christ is in this sacrament. Yet we must
know that there is something of Christ in this sacrament in a twofold
manner: first, as it were, by the power of the sacrament; secondly,
from natural concomitance. By the power of the sacrament, there is
under the species of this sacrament that into which the pre-existing
substance of the bread and wine is changed, as expressed by the words
of the form, which are effective in this as in the other sacraments;
for instance, by the words: "This is My body," or, "This is My blood. "
But from natural concomitance there is also in this sacrament that
which is really united with that thing wherein the aforesaid conversion
is terminated. For if any two things be really united, then wherever
the one is really, there must the other also be: since things really
united together are only distinguished by an operation of the mind.
Reply to Objection 1: Because the change of the bread and wine is not
terminated at the Godhead or the soul of Christ, it follows as a
consequence that the Godhead or the soul of Christ is in this sacrament
not by the power of the sacrament, but from real concomitance. For
since the Godhead never set aside the assumed body, wherever the body
of Christ is, there, of necessity, must the Godhead be; and therefore
it is necessary for the Godhead to be in this sacrament concomitantly
with His body. Hence we read in the profession of faith at Ephesus (P.
I. , chap. xxvi): "We are made partakers of the body and blood of
Christ, not as taking common flesh, nor as of a holy man united to the
Word in dignity, but the truly life-giving flesh of the Word Himself. "
On the other hand, His soul was truly separated from His body, as
stated above ([4548]Q[50], A[5]). And therefore had this sacrament been
celebrated during those three days when He was dead, the soul of Christ
would not have been there, neither by the power of the sacrament, nor
from real concomitance. But since "Christ rising from the dead dieth
now no more" (Rom. 6:9), His soul is always really united with His
body. And therefore in this sacrament the body indeed of Christ is
present by the power of the sacrament, but His soul from real
concomitance.
Reply to Objection 2: By the power of the sacrament there is contained
under it, as to the species of the bread, not only the flesh, but the
entire body of Christ, that is, the bones the nerves, and the like. And
this is apparent from the form of this sacrament, wherein it is not
said: "This is My flesh," but "This is My body. " Accordingly, when our
Lord said (Jn. 6:56): "My flesh is meat indeed," there the word flesh
is put for the entire body, because according to human custom it seems
to be more adapted for eating, as men commonly are fed on the flesh of
animals, but not on the bones or the like.
Reply to Objection 3: As has been already stated ([4549]Q[75], A[5]),
after the consecration of the bread into the body of Christ, or of the
wine into His blood, the accidents of both remain. From which it is
evident that the dimensions of the bread or wine are not changed into
the dimensions of the body of Christ, but substance into substance. And
so the substance of Christ's body or blood is under this sacrament by
the power of the sacrament, but not the dimensions of Christ's body or
blood. Hence it is clear that the body of Christ is in this sacrament
"by way of substance," and not by way of quantity. But the proper
totality of substance is contained indifferently in a small or large
quantity; as the whole nature of air in a great or small amount of air,
and the whole nature of a man in a big or small individual. Wherefore,
after the consecration, the whole substance of Christ's body and blood
is contained in this sacrament, just as the whole substance of the
bread and wine was contained there before the consecration.
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Whether the whole Christ is contained under each species of this sacrament?
Objection 1: It seems that the whole Christ is not contained under both
species of this sacrament. For this sacrament is ordained for the
salvation of the faithful, not by virtue of the species, but by virtue
of what is contained under the species, because the species were there
even before the consecration, from which comes the power of this
sacrament. If nothing, then, be contained under one species, but what
is contained under the other, and if the whole Christ be contained
under both, it seems that one of them is superfluous in this sacrament.
Objection 2: Further, it was stated above (A[1], ad 1) that all the
other parts of the body, such as the bones, nerves, and the like, are
comprised under the name of flesh. But the blood is one of the parts of
the human body, as Aristotle proves (De Anima Histor. i). If, then,
Christ's blood be contained under the species of bread, just as the
other parts of the body are contained there, the blood ought not to be
consecrated apart, just as no other part of the body is consecrated
separately.
Objection 3: Further, what is once "in being" cannot be again "in
becoming. " But Christ's body has already begun to be in this sacrament
by the consecration of the bread. Therefore, it cannot begin again to
be there by the consecration of the wine; and so Christ's body will not
be contained under the species of the wine, and accordingly neither the
entire Christ. Therefore the whole Christ is not contained under each
species.
On the contrary, The gloss on 1 Cor. 11:25, commenting on the word
"Chalice," says that "under each species," namely, of the bread and
wine, "the same is received"; and thus it seems that Christ is entire
under each species.
I answer that, After what we have said above [4550](A[1]), it must be
held most certainly that the whole Christ is under each sacramental
species yet not alike in each. For the body of Christ is indeed present
under the species of bread by the power of the sacrament, while the
blood is there from real concomitance, as stated above (A[1], ad 1) in
regard to the soul and Godhead of Christ; and under the species of wine
the blood is present by the power of the sacrament, and His body by
real concomitance, as is also His soul and Godhead: because now
Christ's blood is not separated from His body, as it was at the time of
His Passion and death. Hence if this sacrament had been celebrated
then, the body of Christ would have been under the species of the
bread, but without the blood; and, under the species of the wine, the
blood would have been present without the body, as it was then, in
fact.
Reply to Objection 1: Although the whole Christ is under each species,
yet it is so not without purpose. For in the first place this serves to
represent Christ's Passion, in which the blood was separated from the
body; hence in the form for the consecration of the blood mention is
made of its shedding. Secondly, it is in keeping with the use of this
sacrament, that Christ's body be shown apart to the faithful as food,
and the blood as drink. Thirdly, it is in keeping with its effect, in
which sense it was stated above ([4551]Q[74], A[1]) that "the body is
offered for the salvation of the body, and the blood for the salvation
of the soul. "
Reply to Objection 2: In Christ's Passion, of which this is the
memorial, the other parts of the body were not separated from one
another, as the blood was, but the body remained entire, according to
Ex. 12:46: "You shall not break a bone thereof. " And therefore in this
sacrament the blood is consecrated apart from the body, but no other
part is consecrated separately from the rest.
Reply to Objection 3: As stated above, the body of Christ is not under
the species of wine by the power of the sacrament, but by real
concomitance: and therefore by the consecration of the wine the body of
Christ is not there of itself, but concomitantly.
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Whether Christ is entire under every part of the species of the bread and
wine?
Objection 1: It seems that Christ is not entire under every part of the
species of bread and wine. Because those species can be divided
infinitely. If therefore Christ be entirely under every part of the
said species, it would follow that He is in this sacrament an infinite
number of times: which is unreasonable; because the infinite is
repugnant not only to nature, but likewise to grace.
Objection 2: Further, since Christ's is an organic body, it has parts
determinately distant. for a determinate distance of the individual
parts from each other is of the very nature of an organic body, as that
of eye from eye, and eye from ear. But this could not be so, if Christ
were entire under every part of the species; for every part would have
to be under every other part, and so where one part would be, there
another part would be. It cannot be then that the entire Christ is
under every part of the host or of the wine contained in the chalice.
Objection 3: Further, Christ's body always retains the true nature of a
body, nor is it ever changed into a spirit. Now it is the nature of a
body for it to be "quantity having position" (Predic. iv). But it
belongs to the nature of this quantity that the various parts exist in
various parts of place. Therefore, apparently it is impossible for the
entire Christ to be under every part of the species.
On the contrary, Augustine says in a sermon (Gregory, Sacramentarium):
"Each receives Christ the Lord, Who is entire under every morsel, nor
is He less in each portion, but bestows Himself entire under each. "
I answer that, As was observed above (A[1], ad 3), because the
substance of Christ's body is in this sacrament by the power of the
sacrament, while dimensive quantity is there by reason of real
concomitance, consequently Christ's body is in this sacrament
substantively, that is, in the way in which substance is under
dimensions, but not after the manner of dimensions, which means, not in
the way in which the dimensive quantity of a body is under the
dimensive quantity of place.
Now it is evident that the whole nature of a substance is under every
part of the dimensions under which it is contained; just as the entire
nature of air is under every part of air, and the entire nature of
bread under every part of bread; and this indifferently, whether the
dimensions be actually divided (as when the air is divided or the bread
cut), or whether they be actually undivided, but potentially divisible.
And therefore it is manifest that the entire Christ is under every part
of the species of the bread, even while the host remains entire, and
not merely when it is broken, as some say, giving the example of an
image which appears in a mirror, which appears as one in the unbroken
mirror, whereas when the mirror is broken, there is an image in each
part of the broken mirror: for the comparison is not perfect, because
the multiplying of such images results in the broken mirror on account
of the various reflections in the various parts of the mirror; but here
there is only one consecration, whereby Christ's body is in this
sacrament.
Reply to Objection 1: Number follows division, and therefore so long as
quantity remains actually undivided, neither is the substance of any
thing several times under its proper dimensions, nor is Christ's body
several times under the dimensions of the bread; and consequently not
an infinite number of times, but just as many times as it is divided
into parts.
Reply to Objection 2: The determinate distance of parts in an organic
body is based upon its dimensive quantity; but the nature of substance
precedes even dimensive quantity. And since the conversion of the
substance of the bread is terminated at the substance of the body of
Christ, and since according to the manner of substance the body of
Christ is properly and directly in this sacrament; such distance of
parts is indeed in Christ's true body, which, however, is not compared
to this sacrament according to such distance, but according to the
manner of its substance, as stated above (A[1], ad 3).
Reply to Objection 3: This argument is based on the nature of a body,
arising from dimensive quantity. But it was said above (ad 2) that
Christ's body is compared with this sacrament not by reason of
dimensive quantity, but by reason of its substance, as already stated.
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Whether the whole dimensive quantity of Christ's body is in this sacrament?
Objection 1: It seems that the whole dimensive quantity of Christ's
body is not in this sacrament. For it was said [4552](A[3]) that
Christ's entire body is contained under every part of the consecrated
host. But no dimensive quantity is contained entirely in any whole, and
in its every part. Therefore it is impossible for the entire dimensive
quantity of Christ's body to be there.
Objection 2: Further, it is impossible for two dimensive quantities to
be together, even though one be separate from its subject, and the
other in a natural body, as is clear from the Philosopher (Metaph.
iii). But the dimensive quantity of the bread remains in this
sacrament, as is evident to our senses. Consequently, the dimensive
quantity of Christ's body is not there.
Objection 3: Further, if two unequal dimensive quantities be set side
by side, the greater will overlap the lesser. But the dimensive
quantity of Christ's body is considerably larger than the dimensive
quantity of the consecrated host according to every dimension.
Therefore, if the dimensive quantity of Christ's body be in this
sacrament together with the dimensive quantity of the host, the
dimensive quantity of Christ's body is extended beyond the quantity of
the host, which nevertheless is not without the substance of Christ's
body. Therefore, the substance of Christ's body will be in this
sacrament even outside the species of the bread, which is unreasonable,
since the substance of Christ's body is in this sacrament, only by the
consecration of the bread, as stated above [4553](A[2]). Consequently,
it is impossible for the whole dimensive quantity of Christ's body to
be in this sacrament.
On the contrary, The existence of the dimensive quantity of any body
cannot be separated from the existence of its substance. But in this
sacrament the entire substance of Christ's body is present, as stated
above ([4554]AA[1],3). Therefore the entire dimensive quantity of
Christ's body is in this sacrament.
I answer that, As stated above [4555](A[1]), any part of Christ is in
this sacrament in two ways: in one way, by the power of the sacrament;
in another, from real concomitance. By the power of the sacrament the
dimensive quantity of Christ's body is not in this sacrament; for, by
the power of the sacrament that is present in this sacrament, whereat
the conversion is terminated. But the conversion which takes place in
this sacrament is terminated directly at the substance of Christ's
body, and not at its dimensions; which is evident from the fact that
the dimensive quantity of the bread remains after the consecration,
while only the substance of the bread passes away.
Nevertheless, since the substance of Christ's body is not really
deprived of its dimensive quantity and its other accidents, hence it
comes that by reason of real concomitance the whole dimensive quantity
of Christ's body and all its other accidents are in this sacrament.
Reply to Objection 1: The manner of being of every thing is determined
by what belongs to it of itself, and not according to what is coupled
accidentally with it: thus an object is present to the sight, according
as it is white, and not according as it is sweet, although the same
object may be both white and sweet; hence sweetness is in the sight
after the manner of whiteness, and not after that of sweetness. Since,
then, the substance of Christ's body is present on the altar by the
power of this sacrament, while its dimensive quantity is there
concomitantly and as it were accidentally, therefore the dimensive
quantity of Christ's body is in this sacrament, not according to its
proper manner (namely, that the whole is in the whole, and the
individual parts in individual parts), but after the manner of
substance, whose nature is for the whole to be in the whole, and the
whole in every part.
Reply to Objection 2: Two dimensive quantities cannot naturally be in
the same subject at the same time, so that each be there according to
the proper manner of dimensive quantity. But in this sacrament the
dimensive quantity of the bread is there after its proper manner, that
is, according to commensuration: not so the dimensive quantity of
Christ's body, for that is there after the manner of substance, as
stated above (ad 1).
Reply to Objection 3: The dimensive quantity of Christ's body is in
this sacrament not by way of commensuration, which is proper to
quantity, and to which it belongs for the greater to be extended beyond
the lesser; but in the way mentioned above (ad 1,2).
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Whether Christ's body is in this sacrament as in a place?
Objection 1: It seems that Christ's body is in this sacrament as in a
place. Because, to be in a place definitively or circumscriptively
belongs to being in a place. But Christ's body seems to be definitively
in this sacrament, because it is so present where the species of the
bread and wine are, that it is nowhere else upon the altar: likewise it
seems to be there circumscriptively, because it is so contained under
the species of the consecrated host, that it neither exceeds it nor is
exceeded by it. Therefore Christ's body is in this sacrament as in a
place.
Objection 2: Further, the place of the bread and wine is not empty,
because nature abhors a vacuum; nor is the substance of the bread
there, as stated above ([4556]Q[75], A[2]); but only the body of Christ
is there. Consequently the body of Christ fills that place. But
whatever fills a place is there locally. Therefore the body of Christ
is in this sacrament locally.
Objection 3: Further, as stated above [4557](A[4]), the body of Christ
is in this sacrament with its dimensive quantity, and with all its
accidents. But to be in a place is an accident of a body; hence "where"
is numbered among the nine kinds of accidents. Therefore Christ's body
is in this sacrament locally.
On the contrary, The place and the object placed must be equal, as is
clear from the Philosopher (Phys. iv). But the place, where this
sacrament is, is much less than the body of Christ. Therefore Christ's
body is not in this sacrament as in a place.
I answer that, As stated above (A[1], ad 3; A[3]), Christ's body is in
this sacrament not after the proper manner of dimensive quantity, but
rather after the manner of substance. But every body occupying a place
is in the place according to the manner of dimensive quantity, namely,
inasmuch as it is commensurate with the place according to its
dimensive quantity. Hence it remains that Christ's body is not in this
sacrament as in a place, but after the manner of substance, that is to
say, in that way in which substance is contained by dimensions; because
the substance of Christ's body succeeds the substance of bread in this
sacrament: hence as the substance of bread was not locally under its
dimensions, but after the manner of substance, so neither is the
substance of Christ's body. Nevertheless the substance of Christ's body
is not the subject of those dimensions, as was the substance of the
bread: and therefore the substance of the bread was there locally by
reason of its dimensions, because it was compared with that place
through the medium of its own dimensions; but the substance of Christ's
body is compared with that place through the medium of foreign
dimensions, so that, on the contrary, the proper dimensions of Christ's
body are compared with that place through the medium of substance;
which is contrary to the notion of a located body.
Hence in no way is Christ's body locally in this sacrament.
Reply to Objection 1: Christ's body is not in this sacrament
definitively, because then it would be only on the particular altar
where this sacrament is performed: whereas it is in heaven under its
own species, and on many other altars under the sacramental species.
Likewise it is evident that it is not in this sacrament
circumscriptively, because it is not there according to the
commensuration of its own quantity, as stated above. But that it is not
outside the superficies of the sacrament, nor on any other part of the
altar, is due not to its being there definitively or circumscriptively,
but to its being there by consecration and conversion of the bread and
wine, as stated above [4558](A[1]; Q[15], A[2], sqq. ).
Reply to Objection 2: The place in which Christ's body is, is not
empty; nor yet is it properly filled with the substance of Christ's
body, which is not there locally, as stated above; but it is filled
with the sacramental species, which have to fill the place either
because of the nature of dimensions, or at least miraculously, as they
also subsist miraculously after the fashion of substance.
Reply to Objection 3: As stated above [4559](A[4]), the accidents of
Christ's body are in this sacrament by real concomitance. And therefore
those accidents of Christ's body which are intrinsic to it are in this
sacrament. But to be in a place is an accident when compared with the
extrinsic container. And therefore it is not necessary for Christ to be
in this sacrament as in a place.
