Nehru
had their preliminary conversations regarding the formation of the
Interim Government on 17 and 18 August, 1946.
had their preliminary conversations regarding the formation of the
Interim Government on 17 and 18 August, 1946.
Cambridge History of India - v4 - Indian Empire
The leader of delegation was Professor
Robert Richard. In his final press Conference, he said, "There are
deep divisions among you, but these divisions disappear in the unity
with which you very rightly demand a measure of self-govern-
ment. . . . We are all conscious of the fact that India has at last
attained political manhood. ”
THE CABINET MISSION
On 19 February, 1946, Lord Pethick Lawrence declared in the
## p. 853 (#895) ############################################
THE CABINET MISSION SCHEME
853
House of Lords that the British Government had decided to send a
special mission of Cabinet Ministers to resolve the constitutional
deadlock in India. The members of the Cabinet mission were Lord
Pethick Lawrence, Sir Stafford Cripps and Mr. A. V. Alexander.
The mission reached Delhi on 24 March, 1946 and there were pro-
longed discussions between the members of the Cabinet Mission
and Lord Wavell on the one hand and the leaders of the Indian
National Congress and the Muslim League on the ther. The
members of the Cabinet Mission found that they were not able to
accept either the point of view of the Congress or that of the Mus-
lim League. Mr. Jinnah demanded a sovereign Pakistan. The
Congress was even opposed to the creation of an All-India Union
on a three-tier basis. Hence the Mission came to the conclusion
that it must decide the matter in manner which they considered
to be the best under the circumstances. The view of the Mission
was that a new interim Government should be formed and that
should be entrusted with the task of setting up an All-India Com-
mission from the elected members of the Provincial and Central
Assemblies. That Commission was to decide whether there were
to be one or two sovereign states in British India. If the Commis-
sion failed to come to a decision within 30 days, the question was
to be decided by taking votes. If the dissenting minority was more
than a certain prescribed percentage, the question whether they
should be allowed to form a separate state was to be decided in the
following manner. The Muslim representatives in each of the
Legislative Assemblies of Sind, North-Western Frontier Province,
the Punjab and Bengal (with the addition of the district of Sylhet
from Assam) were to meet separately to decide whether they would
like to separate from the rest of India or not. Baluchistan was to
be separated if the contiguous Provinces voted for separation. If
the Muslim representatives of North-Western Frontier Province
voted again separation, the Province was still to be separated if the
surrounding Provinces voted for separation. The non-Muslim re-
presentatives of the districts in which the non-Muslims were in
majority and which were contiguous to India were to be allowed
to vote whether they should be separated from their parent Pro-
vinces and attached to the territory of India. If 75% of the Mus-
lim representatives voted for separation, they were to have a Consti-
tuent Assembly to frame a constitution for their own area. This
scheme was rejected both by the Congress and the Muslim League.
Ultimately, the Cabinet Mission announced their final scheme on
16 May, 1946.
According to the Cabinet Mission Scheme, there was to be Union
of India embracing both British India and the Indian states and it
## p. 854 (#896) ############################################
854
PAKISTAN
was to deal with Foreign Affairs, Defence and Communications.
The Union was also to have the necessary power to raise the finances
for the above mentioned three subjects. All other subjects were
to vest in the Provinces. The States were to retain all subjects and
powers other than those ceded to the Union of India. The Union
of India was to have an Executive and a Legislature constituted
from British India and representatives from the Indian states. The
Provinces were to be free to form Groups and each Group was to
determine which Provincial subjects be taken in common.
The
constitutions of the Union of India and of the Groups were to con-
tain a Provision whereby any Province, if a majority in its Legisla-
tive Assembly so desired, could call for a reconsideration of the
terms of the constitution after an initial period of ten years and at
ten yearly intervals thereafter.
As regards the constitution-making machinery, the Legislative
Assemblies of the Provinces were to elect the members of that body
on the basis of one representative for one million of the population.
The Sikh and Muslim Legislators were to elect the quota of their
communities on the basis of their population. The representatives
from the Provinces were to divide themselves into three Sections A,
B and C. Section C was to consist of the representatives of Bengal
and Assam, Section B of the Punjab, Sind and North-Western Fron-
tier Province and Section A of the rest of the Provinces of India.
These Sections were to settle the Provincial constitutions for the
Provinces included in each Section and were also to decide whether
any Group Constitution was to be set for those Provinces and if
so with what provincial subjects the Group should deal. The repre-
sentatives of the Sections were then to reassemble and settle the
Union Constitution. The Provinces of India were given the power
to opt out of the Groups by a decision of their Legislatures after
the general elections under the New Constitution. The Resolutions
of the Union Constituent Assembly regarding major Communal
issues were to require a majority of the representatives present and
voting of each of the two major communities. The Chairman of
the Constituent Assembly was to decide which Resolution raised
major Communal issues and he was to consult the Federal Court
of India before giving his decision. A plan for Interim Govern-
ment was also envisaged in Cabinet Mission Scheme.
The Muslim League accepted the Cabinet Mission Scheme. The
resolution of the Muslim League accepting the scheme stated: “In
as much as the basis and the foundation of Pakistan are inherent in
the Mission's plan by virtue of the compulsory grouping of the six
Muslim Provinces in Sections B and C, is willing to co-operate
with the constitution-making machinery proposed in the scheme
## p. 855 (#897) ############################################
THE CABINET MISSION SCHEME
855
outlined by the Mission, in the hope that it would ultimately re-
sult in the establishment of complete sovereign Pakistan, and the
consummation of the goal of independence for the major nations,
Muslims and Hindus, and all the other people inhabitirig the vast
sub-continent. It is for these reasons that the Muslim League is
accepting the scheme and will join the constitution-making body,
and it will keep in view the opportunity and right of secession of
Provinces or groups from the Union, which have been provided in
the Mission's plan by implication. ”
The Muslim League accepted the Cabinet Mission Scheme be-
cause it provided for a weak centre and an opportunity to large
Muslim majority Provinces like the Punjab and Bengal to dominate
in their respective Sections. Those Sections were allowed to frame
both Group and Provincial Constitutions. The Provinces were
given the right to opt out but only after the first general election
and under the terms of the constitution settled by the Section.
Moreover, under Sections B and C, the Muslim League was getting
the entire territory of the Provinces like the Punjab, Bengal and
Assam in parts of which the non-Muslims were in a majority. The
Congress was not happy with the Cabinet Mission Scheme as it
provided for the compulsory grouping of the Provinces. In other
words, a Province like North-Western Frontier Province in which
a Congress Government was functioning, could be compelled to
join Section B. The Province of Assam which had a Hindu
majority, could be compelled to join Section C. Mr. Jinnah was
right in saying that the Cabinet Mission Scheme was a sugar-
coated pill for the Congress. Mr. Jinnah was determined to have
Pakistan and he found that the Cabinet Mission Scheme gave him
an opportunity to have it. To begin with, he would have the
compulsory grouping of the Provinces in the North-West and North-
East. When the group constitutions of Sections B and C were
prepared, he could decide later on to leave the Union of India.
In that case, what he was going to have would be the whole of
the Punjab, Sind, North-Western Frontier Province, Bengal and
Assam. Once these areas became independent of the Union of
India, the Hindu populations from those areas could be turned out
making room for the Muslims from the rest of India to take their
place. The great merit of the Cabinet Scheme from the point of
view of the Muslim League was that it gave them the whole of the
Punjab and the whole of Assam and Bengal. It the Congress had
accepted this Scheme, it would have lost the whole of the Punjab and
the whole of Bengal and Assam. By not accepting it, the Congress
was ultimately able to save East Punjab, the whole of the Province
of Assam minus the district of Sylhet and the whole of West Bengal.
## p. 856 (#898) ############################################
856
PAKISTAN
That explains the reason while the Muslim League enthusiastically
accepted the Cabinet Mission Scheme by a resolution passed on
6 June, 1946. The Working Committee of the Congress passed
the resolution on 26 June, 1946 by which it accepted the scheme
partially. The Congress accepted only that part of the Scheme
which dealt with the constitution-making of the country. The
view of the Congress was that the grouping of the Provinces was
not to be compulsory. However, the Congress rejected the Interim
Government Scheme on the ground that the clarifications given on
the subject were not acceptable to it and the resolution of the
Working Committee of the Congress was ratified by the All-India
Congress Committee.
FORMATION OF INTERIM GOVERNMENT
Mr. Jinnah who had accepted the Scheme in its entirety, asked
Lord Wavell to invite the Muslim League to form the Interim
Government but Lord Wavell refused to oblige him as he was
anxious to bring the Congress also into the Interim Government.
On 22 July, 1946, Lord Wavell wrote a personal and confiden-
tial letter to Mr. Jinnah with proposals to form an Interim Govern-
ment. It was stated therein that the Interim Government would
consist of fourteen members. Six members including one Scheduled
Caste representatives, would be nominated by the Congress, five
members would be nominated by the Muslim League. Three re-
presentatives of the minorities would be nominated by Viceroy. One
of these three places would be kept for Sikhs. It was not
open to either the Congress or the Muslim League to object to the
names submitted by the other party, provided those were accepted
by the Viceroy. Distribution of portfolios was to be decided after
the parties had agreed to enter the Government and had submitted
their names. The Congress and the Muslim League were each to
have an equitable share of the most important portfolios. Mr.
Jinnah was also informed that assurances about the status of the
Interim Government which had been given by Lord Wavell in his
Jetter dated 30 May, 1946 to Maulana Azad were to stand. Lord
Wavell ended his letter with the following words: “We should not
spend further time in negotiation but should try out at once a
Government on the basis proposed above. If it does not work and
you find the conditions unsatisfactory, it will be open to you to
withdraw, but I am confident that you will not. ” It is clear from
this letter that the Muslim League was not to have the right to
object to the Congress nominating a Muslim in its quota of six.
Mr. Jinnah sent his reply on 31 July, 1946. He pointed out
## p. 857 (#899) ############################################
FORMATION OF INTERIM GOVERNMENT
857
to the Viceroy that “Your present proposal clearly destroys the
principle of parity as well as representation according to communi-
ties and gives a clear majority to the Congress as against the
Muslim League to start with. . . . . . I think you will appreciate that
when you start with six Congress and five Muslim League with a
Congress majority, the minority representatives will hold a very
strong position as a balancing element, who would be nominated by
you without even consultation with the Muslim League and this is
serious departure from what we are assured of in your letter of
June 20. . . . " In the end, Mr. Jinnah informed the Viceroy that
there was no chance of the Muslim League accepting the pro-
posal.
But even before writing this letter on 31 July, 1946, Mr. Jinnah
and the Muslim League Council had passed the resolution on 29
July, 1946 in which the Muslim League withdrew its earlier ac-
ceptance of the Cabinet Mission Scheme. In that resolution, it
was declared that "now the time has come for the Muslim Nation
to resort to Direct Action to achieve Pakistan, to assert their just
rights, to vindicate their honour and to get rid of the present
British slavery and the contemplated future caste-Hindu domi-
nation”. Mr. Jinnah called upon the Muslims throughout India
to observe 16 August, 1946 as Direct Action Day. He told the
Muslims, “our motto should be discipline, unity and srust in the
power of our own nation. If there is not sufficient power, create
that power. If we do that, the Mission and the British Govern-
ment may be rescued, released and freed from being cowed down
by the threats of the Congress that they would launch a struggle
and start non-co-operation. Let us also say that. ” Mr. Jinnah
also declared, “This day we bid good-bye to
constitutional
methods. . . . today we have also forged a pistol and are in a position
a
to use it (Leonard Mosley: The Last Days of the British Raj,
p. 29).
In reply to Mr. Jinnah's letter of 31 July, 1946, Lord Wavell
wrote to him a personal, secret and final letter on 8 August, 1946
in which he stated that the basis of representation was the same
as the Muslim League Working Committee had accepted on 25
June, 1946. Lord Wavell also informed Mr. Jinnah that in view
of the League Resolution of 29 July, 1946, he had decided to in-
vite the Congress to make proposals for an interim Government.
The Working Committee of the All-India Congress Committee also
authorised the Congress President to accept the invitation of the
Viceroy to form the Interim Government. On 12 August, 1946, the
Viceroy issued a communique from New Delhi in which it was an-
nounced: "His Excellency the Viceroy, with the approval of His
>
## p. 858 (#900) ############################################
858
PAKISTAN
Majesty's Government, has invited the President of the Congress to
make proposals for the immediate formation of an Interim Govern-
ment and the President of the Congress has accepted the invitation.
Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru will shortly visit New Delhi to discuss
his proposals with His Excellency the Viceroy. ” On 13 August,
1946, Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru wrote a letter to Mr. Jinnah from
Wardha informing him about the Viceroy's invitation to him as
Congress President to form the Interim Government. In the same
letter, Mr. Nehru wrote: “I have accepted this invitation. I feel
that my first step should be to approach you and seek your co-
operation in the formation of a coalition provisional Government.
It is naturally our desire to have as representative a Government
as possible. . . ”. Mr. Nehru met Mr. Jinnah on 16 August at
Bombay and after the meeting, Mr. Nehru announced: “Co-
operation in the formation of the Provisional Government is being
offered to the Congress by all elements excepting the Muslim League
for the moment. . . . We shall always look for the larger measure of
co-operation. . . .
16 August, 1946 was Direct Action Day for the Muslim League.
At that time, Mr. S. H. Suhrawardy was the Chief Minister of
Bengal. He was an enthusiastic supporter of the Muslim League
and also a member of the Working Committee of the All-India
Muslim League. He has been described as an “outwardly affable
but inwardly ruthless politico. ” In the issue of the Calcutta States-
man on 5 August, 1946, he wrote, "Bloodshed and disorder are not
necessarily evil in themselves, if resorted to for a noble
Among Muslims today, no cause is dearer or nobler than Pakis-
tan. . . . . ” On 16 August, 1946, the Muslims of Calcutta did
havoc on the Hindus. Their shops were looted.
women and children were mercilessly butchered. This state of
affairs continued in Calcutta for three days.
Although Mr. Ian Stephens, the editor of the Statesman, was
pro-Muslim, he was constrained to write in these words about the
Calcutta-killing: “When we wrote two days ago, conditions in
Calcutta were horrifying. They have gone beyond that since.
Whatever the appropriate adjective is, they were nothing in com.
parison with what we have subsequently seen. The latest estimate
of dead is 3,000, who have lain thick about the streets. The injured
number many thousand and it is impossible to say how many busi-
ness houses and private dwellings have been destroyed. This is
not a riot.
It needs a word found in medieval history, a fury.
Yet fury sounds spontaneous, and there must have been some de-
liberation and organization to set this fury on its way. The horde
who ran about battering and killing with lathis may have found
cause.
Hindu men,
## p. 859 (#901) ############################################
COMMUNAL RIOTS
859
them lying about or brought them out of their own packets, but
that is not to be believed. We have already commented on the
bands who found it easy to get petrol and vehicles when no others
were permitted on the streets. It is not mere supposition that
men were brought into Calcutta to make an impression
thousands have been brutally hurt, smashed eyes, smashed jaws,
smashed limbs, of men, women and children—these are the kind of
political arguments the twentieth century does not expect. . . . What
befell India's largest city last week was no mere communal riot,
as we have hitherto understood the sanguinary term. For three
days, the city concentrated on unrestrained civil war. Upon whom
the main guilt for it rests is manifest. There has been criticism
of the Governor. We do not think he has emerged particularly
well. But none except a very great man holding his traditionally
constitutional office during such a swift crisis could have done so.
Where the primary blame lies is where we have squarely put it--
upon the Provincial Muslim League Cabinet which carries responsi-
bility for law and order in Bengal, and particularly upon the one
able man of large administrative experience, the Chief Minister
(Suhrawardy). That in the whole of India the only Province
.
where carnage occurred, on the League's professed peaceful Direct
Action Day, should have been in Bengal, where a League Ministry
holds office, astounds us. ”
The troubles spread from Calcutta to Noakhali in Bengal.
There also the Muslims who formed the majority feli upon the
Hindus who were in a minority. Thousand of Hindus were killed.
Hindu women were molested and butchered. Children were put
to death in a shameless manner. The trouble spread from Bengal
to Bihar where the Hindus had their revenge on the Muslims.
When all this was going on outside, Lord Wavell and Mr.
Nehru
had their preliminary conversations regarding the formation of the
Interim Government on 17 and 18 August, 1946. On 24 August,
Lord Wavell officially announced the resignation of the care-taker
Government which had been appointed by the Viceroy in June
1946. Lord Wavell also approved the appointment of an Interim
Government proposed by the Congress Party. It was announced
.
that the Interim Government would take office on 2 September
1946 and would consist of the six Congressmen, five Muslims and
three Minority members.
During a meeting with Mahatma Gandhi which was brought
about by the efforts of the Nawab of Bhopal, Mr. Jinnah cleverly
made Mahatma Gandhi sign the following statement: "The Con-
gress does not challenge but accepts that the Muslim League now is
the authoritative representative of an overwhelming majority of the
## p. 860 (#902) ############################################
860
PAKISTAN
Muslims of India. As such and in accordance with democratic
principles they alone have today an unquestionable right to re-
present the Muslims of India. But the Congress cannot agree that
any restriction or limitation should be put upon the Congress to
choose such representatives as they think proper from amongst the
members of the Congress as their representatives. ” This was the great
tactical victory for Mr. Jinnah and when Mr. Nehru came to know
of it, he wrote to Mr. Jinnah pointing out that “My colleagues and
I did not accept the formula agreed to by Gandhiji and you. "
Mahatma Gandhi also stated in a prayer meeting that he was
thoroughly ashamed of having signed the formula.
“No public
servant has a right to act in this way. ”
Mr. Nehru formed the Interim Government on 2 September,
1946. When he was taking oath inside, there were cries of Pakis-
tan outside. The demonstrators were shouting that they would
have Pakistan at any cost.
MUSLIM LEAGUE JOINS INTERIM GOVERNMENT
Lord Wavell was not satisfied with having secured co-operation
from the Congress. He also wanted the Muslim League to join
the Interim Government. Mr. Jinnah was also anxious to join the
Interim Government so that the Muslim League may be able to
fight the battle of Pakistan from a position of strength. It was
in this atmosphere that Lord Wavell invited Mr. Jinnah to come
to New Delhi and see him. Mr. Jinnah came to Delhi from
Bombay on 15 September, and met the Viceroy on 16, 25 and 28
September, 1946. On 2 October, Mr. Jinnah met the Viceroy
for nearly an hour. On 5 October, Mr. Jinnah and Mr. Nehru
met in New Delhi at the residence of the Nawab of Bhopal and
talked for more than three hours. Between 6 October and 13
October, Mr. Nehru and Mr. Jinnah corresponded with each other
regarding the new formula of the respective position of the
Congress Party and the Muslim League in the Executive Council
cf the Governor-General. Mr. Jinnah also corresponded with the
Viceroy. On 3 October, 1946, Mr. Jinnah wrote a letter to the
Viceroy virtually accepting his proposals of an Interim Govern-
ment as mentioned in his letter of 22 July, 1946. However, he
made one reservation that the Congress should not include in the
remaining five members of their quota a Muslim of thrir choice".
On 12 October, Mr. Jinnah met the Viceroy again. On the same
day, the Viceroy wrote to Mr. Jinnah informing him that “The
Muslim League are at liberty to nominate anyone they wish from
their own quota of seats in the Cabinet, though any person pro-
## p. 861 (#903) ############################################
LEAGUE JOINS INTERIM GOVERNMENT
861
a
posed must, of course, be accepted by me and His Majesty before
being appointed”. On 13 October, 1946, Mr. Jinnah sent a reply
in which he observed that "it will be fatal to leave the entire field
of administration of the Central Government in the hands of the
Congress”, and therefore "we have decided to nominate five (mem-
bers of the Interim Government) on behalf of the Muslim League".
On the same day, the Viceroy wrote to Mr. Jinnah: “I am glad to
know that the Muslim League has decided to join the Interim Gov-
ernment” and requested Mr. Jinnah to send the names of five re-
presentatives. The names sent by Mr. Jinnah were Liaquat Ali
Khan, I. I. Chundrigar, A. R. Nishtar, Ghazanfar Ali Khan and
Jogendra Nath Mandal. Mr. Jinnah carefully selected only those
persons who were likely to put up fight for the Muslim League and
Pakistan in the Interim Government. He did not include men like
Nawab Ismail Khan and Choudury Khaliquzzaman because they
were moderates and were anxious to come to terms with the Con-
gress. Even Husain Imam who was the leader of the Muslim
League Party in the Council of State was not selected. Even
Nazimuddin was not included as Jogendra Nath Mandal,
Scheduled Caste Minister in the Muslim League Ministry of Bengal,
was to be taken.
With regard to the distribution of the important portfolios, Mr.
Jinnah played the game skilfully. The impression given by him
was that he was not interested in other portfolios but was concerned
about the position of the Vice-President of the Executive Council
of the Viceroy. He rightly came to the conclusion that he would
get the best bargain if he allowed the Viceroy to do the bargaining
for him. The Viceroy suggested to the Congress to give up the
Home Department which was held by Sardar Patel. However, the
Congress was not prepared to give to the Muslim League the port-
folios of Home and Defence. The Congress thought that if the
portfolio of Finance was offered to the Muslim League, the latter
would refuse it on account of the proverbial Muslim inability to
handle Finance. If the League accepted it, they would make fools
of themselves. The League demanded that the Office of the Vice-
President should go by rotation to the Congress and the League
but the League was offered the Vice Chairmanship of the Co-
ordination Committee of the Cabinet. Experience showed that the
Congress was in the wrong. Liaquat Ali Khan was able to manage
the Department of Finance with the help of Choudhuri Mohammad
Ali. With the Department of Finance under its control, the
Muslim League was able to give the maximum trouble to the Con-
gress Ministers, Sardar Patel is set to have observed: “Whatever
proposal he made was either rejected or modified beyond recogni-
## p. 862 (#904) ############################################
862
PAKISTAN
tion by Liaquat Ali. ” With the help of Choudhri Mohammad Ali,
Liaquat Ali Khan prepared a Budget by which he imposed heavy
taxes on the high incomes of the rich Hindu industrialists who were
supporting the Congress. Liaquat Ali also proposed the setting up
of a Commission to investigate charges of tax evasion made against
industrialists and businessmen. Cleverly, Liaquat Ali did not dis-
close the details of the Budget to the members of the Cabinet but
got its assent only to the general principles of the Budget. The
result was that when the Budget was presented in the Central
Assembly, there was a lot of hue and cry. It was contended that
the object of the Budget was to cripple commerce and industry
which was largely in the hands of the Hindus. What applied to
the Department of Finance equally applied to other Departments
under the control of the nominees of the Muslim League. It was
found that the Muslim League ministers were trying to create the
greatest amount of friction and disharmony in the Government.
Every Department of theirs became a cell of the Muslim League.
It appeared that there were two hostile camps in the Government
of India. There was absolutely no co-operation. It was difficult
to say how long such a state of affairs could continue without a
break-down.
Outside the Government, there were serious differences between
the Congress and the Muslim League with regard to the inter-
pretation of the Cabinet Mission Scheme with regard to the group-
ing of the Provinces. The contention of the Muslim League was
that the grouping was compulsory. Mahatma Gandhi openly ex-
pressed the opinion that the grouping was optional. A similar
view was held by Jawaharlal Nehru, K. M. Munshi and other
constitutional experts of India. The situation became so serious
that the British Government invited the Congress and Muslim
League leaders to London. The London meeting was attended
ky Jawaharlal Nehru, Baldev Singh, Jinnah and Liaquat Ali Khan.
The final decision of the British Government was in favour of the
Muslim League. The British Government issued the following state-
ment on 6 December, 1946: "The Cabinet Mission have through-
out maintained the view that decisions of the Sections should, in
the absence of an agreement to the contrary, be taken by a simple
majority vote of the representatives in the Sections. This view has
been accepted by the Muslim League, but the Congress have put
forward a different view. They have asserted that the true mean-
ing of the statement, read as a whole, is that the Provinces have the
right to decide both as to grouping and as to their own Constitu-
tions.
"His Majesty's Government have had legal advice which confirms
## p. 863 (#905) ############################################
MOUNTBATTEN AND PARTITION OF INDIA
863
that the statement of 16 May means what the Cabinet Mission
have always stated was their intention. This part of the state-
ment, as so interpreted, must, therefore, be considered an essential
part of the scheme of 16 May for enabling the Indian people to
formulate a Constitution which His Majesty's Government would
be prepared to submit to Parliament. It should, therefore, be ac-
cepted by all parties in the Constituent Assembly. ”
The first session of the Constituent Assembly was held on 9
December, 1946 but the same was boycotted by the Muslim League.
The resolutions passed by the Constituent Assembly were denounc-
ed by the Muslim League as ultra vires, invalid and illegal. The
Congress demanded the resignation of the Muslim League nominees
in the interim Government on the ground that the League was not
taking part in the proceedings of the Constituent Assembly and was
also committed to a programme of Direct Action. A similar de-
mand was made by the Muslim League for the resignation
Congress nominees. A very serious situation arose in the country.
The Viceroy did not know what to do. It was difficult to pick
and choose between the Congress and the Muslim League. Which-
ever party was favoured, the other party was bound to create mis-
chief.
of
ANNOUNCEMENT OF 20 FEBRUARY, 1947
some
It was under these circumstances that the British Government
made an epoch-making statement on 20 February, 1947 in which
it was declared that the British Government would transfer power
into the hands of the Indians by a date not later than June 1948.
It was declared that the British Government shall have to decide
to whom the powers of the Central Government in British India
were to be handed over on the due date, whether as a whole to
some form of Central Government for British India or in
areas to existing Provincial Governments or in such other way as
might seem most reasonable and in the best interests of the Indian
people. The British Government also announced that Lord
Mountbatten was to succeed Lord Wavell as the Viceroy of India.
It was stated that Lord Mountbatten was to be entrusted with the
task of transferring into the hands of the Indians the responsibility
for the Government of British India in a manner that would best
ensure the future happiness and prosperity of India.
MOUNTBATTEN AND PARTITION OF INDIA
Lord Mountbatten arrived in India on 22 March, 1947. On
## p. 864 (#906) ############################################
864
PAKISTAN
SO.
23 March, the Muslim League observed the Pakistan Day. On
27 March, Mr. Jinnah declared: “I am fighting for Pakistan, which
means I am fighting for the freedom of India. I am fighting for
Pakistan because it is the only practical solution for solving the
problem and the other ideal of a United India and a rule based on
parliamentary system of Government is a vain dream and an impos-
sibility. India is neither a country nor a nation, but is a score of
nations. ” There were serious riots in the Punjab in the month of
March. These riots were preceded by a very virulent agitation by
the Muslim League in the Punjab, Sind and the North-Western
Frontier Province. The Muslim League volunteers were given a
free hand to do whatever they pleased. They were allowed to go
to the roofs of the Government buildings and hoist the Muslim
League flags and there was none to ask them why they were doing
Whatever the Muslim League did was watched with patience
and internal satisfaction by the British bureaucracy. Even when
the riots broke out in March, 1947, there was no Government
machinery to stop them. The eye witness accounts of the havoc
brought about by the Muslim rioters at Rawalpindi and its neigh-
bourhood were simply disgusting. Hindus and Sikhs were mur-
dered and burnt and thrown into the drains. There was none to
care for their dead bodies. In the foundations of present Islama-
bad near Rawalpindi lies the blood of the innocent Hindus and
Sikhs who had done nothing to deserve their fate. Alan Campbell
Johnson who accompanied Lord Mountbatten on a visit to Kahuta
near Rawalpindi, writes: "We arrived to find that the havoc in
the small town was very great. Picking our way through the rub-
ble, we could see that the devastation was as thorough as any pro-
duced by fire-bomb raids in the war. This particular communal
orgy involved the destruction of Sikhs and their livelihood by
Moslems who were proving difficult to track down. The Muslims
in the area seemed to be quite pleased with themselves, and to be
unable to appreciate that the local Sikh traders were one of the
principal sources of their own prosperity. . . . . One is really
amazed how such a thing could happen in the neighbourhood of
Rawalpindi which was one of the biggest Military Headquarters
of the Government of India. There was no dearth of the soldiers
who could be sent from the Cantonment to the scene of the riots
at a moment's notice. There was the Chaklala Aerodrome at
hand from where the bombers could fly to control the situation and
stop the rioters. One cannot help observing that at this critical
time, the Englishmen forgot their duties and behaved like partisans.
India had a Governor-General in Lord Wavell who was every inch
a General but even he kept quiet. Even he could do nothing at
## p. 865 (#907) ############################################
MOUNTBATTEN AND PARTITION OF INDIA
865
the time of the Calcutta killing or at the time of Rawalpindi riots.
The fact of the matter is that when Lord Mountbatten reached
India, the situation in the country was drifting towards a civil war.
There was no love lost between the Hindus and the Muslims in the
country. In the cities where the Hindus and the Muslims lived,
each was determined to destroy the other. A Hindu would not
live in the area where the Muslims predominated and vice versa.
There was no security of life or property. People were disposing
of properties in areas inhabited by the other community. The
whole situation was volcanic. The Government officials were
taking sides. Barring noble exceptions, the general trend was that
no Muslim was prepared to do anything for a Hindu who was
formerly his friend or neighbour. The country was divided into
hostile camps.
When Lord Mountbatten was faced with such a situation, he
came to the inevitable conclusion that the only solution for India
was the partitioning of the country. He found that even Con-
gress leaders like Sardar Patel and Jawaharlal Nehru were forced
by the circumstances to admit that there was no other way. The
unity of India was very dear to them but it was found that the
circumstances were such that the same could not be maintained.
Mahatma Gandhi was of the definite opinion that it was better to
face a civil war than to have partition of the country. He is stated
to have declared that the partition “will be over my dead body. ”
However, the situation in the country bcame so horrible that even
he was converted to the point of view that the only solution for the
country was its partition. It appears that both Patel and Nehru
were impressed by the argument that it was better to have a smal-
ler India where they could do what they pleased than to have a
bigger India where the Muslim League will not allow them to do
anything. Within hardly two weeks of the arrival of Mountbatten
in India, it became clear that India was going to be partitioned.
It is pointed out that Lord Mountbatten was not enamoured of the
Cabinet Mission plan as it was not his own child. The circums-
tances dictated the partitioning of the country. We are told that
on 8 April 1947, Lord Mountbatten was discussing Liaquat Ali
Khan's paper on the division of the Armed Forces. On 19 April,
Lord Ismay, Chief of the Viceroy's Staff, emphasised the difficulty
of East Pakistan and West Pakistan who were so much separated
from each other. The reply of Mountbatten was that “Whatever
its implications, he was beginning to think that Pakistan was in-
evitable. ” On 27 April, the news leaked out in the press that the
Government of India was thinking of the partitioning of the coun-
try. The reaction of Lord Mountbatten was: “The more the
## p. 866 (#908) ############################################
866
PAKISTAN
papers speculate about partition, the more they are preparing pub-
lic opinion for its arrival. ” It appears that even before the arrival
of Lord Mountbatten, the Cabinet Mission plan had already col-
lapsed.
The first plan of Lord Mountbatten was to hand over power to
the Provinces or to such confederations of Provinces as the latter
might decide to form. He also was in favour of partitioning the
Provinces of Bengal and Punjab with a view to separate the predo-
minantly Muslim areas from the predominantly non-Muslim areas.
He was also in favour of allowing the Muslim district of Sylhet the
option of joining the Muslim Province of Bengal. In the case of
North-Western Frontier Province, fresh elections were to be held
to ascertain the wishes of the people.
There was opposition to his proposals. Sir Evan Jenkins, Gover-
nor of the Punjab, opposed the partition on the ground that the
divided Provinces would still be having minorities. The conten-
tion of the Governor of Bengal was that the division of Bengal
would make East Bengal a rural slum. Mr. Jinnah contended
that the division of the Punjab and Bengal would destroy the ad-
ministrative and economic fabric of the Provinces which had been
built up during the last century. He contended that ultimately
there would be exchange of populations between India and Pakis-
tan and the problem of the minorities would be automatically solv-
ed in that manner. Mr. Jinnah's argument was that if the Punjab
and Bengal were to be partitioned, then the other Provinces where
the Muslims lived in large numbers must also be partitioned.
Lord Mountbatten sent his plan to London on 2 May with Lord
Ismay and his secretary, George Abell. He requested the British
Government to send their approval by 10 May, 1947. He was
thinking of putting his plan before a meeting of the party leaders
on 17 May, 1947. However, when his plan came back from
London, many changes had been made in it. It is said that when
he showed the same to Jawaharlal Nehru, he told the Viceroy frank-
ly that the Congress would not accept it. The scheme was likely
to result in the Balkanization of India. When Lord Mountbatten
found that Nehru was opposed to the draft he had received from
London, he decided to make another attempt. The plan of V. P.
Menon was examined. According to that plan, the transfer of
power was to take place on the basis of Dominion Status to India
and such other areas as wanted to separate from India and form
another state. Lord Mountbatten found that Nehru was not
opposed to a plan according to which power was to be transferred
to two Central Governments on the basis of Dominion Status. The
provisions with regard to the partitioning of the Punjab, Bengal and
## p. 867 (#909) ############################################
3 JUNE PLAN
867
Assam were already known. The wishes of the Muslim areas of
the Punjab, Bengal, Sind and the North-Western Frontier Province
could also be ascertained. The great merit of the scherre of V.
Robert Richard. In his final press Conference, he said, "There are
deep divisions among you, but these divisions disappear in the unity
with which you very rightly demand a measure of self-govern-
ment. . . . We are all conscious of the fact that India has at last
attained political manhood. ”
THE CABINET MISSION
On 19 February, 1946, Lord Pethick Lawrence declared in the
## p. 853 (#895) ############################################
THE CABINET MISSION SCHEME
853
House of Lords that the British Government had decided to send a
special mission of Cabinet Ministers to resolve the constitutional
deadlock in India. The members of the Cabinet mission were Lord
Pethick Lawrence, Sir Stafford Cripps and Mr. A. V. Alexander.
The mission reached Delhi on 24 March, 1946 and there were pro-
longed discussions between the members of the Cabinet Mission
and Lord Wavell on the one hand and the leaders of the Indian
National Congress and the Muslim League on the ther. The
members of the Cabinet Mission found that they were not able to
accept either the point of view of the Congress or that of the Mus-
lim League. Mr. Jinnah demanded a sovereign Pakistan. The
Congress was even opposed to the creation of an All-India Union
on a three-tier basis. Hence the Mission came to the conclusion
that it must decide the matter in manner which they considered
to be the best under the circumstances. The view of the Mission
was that a new interim Government should be formed and that
should be entrusted with the task of setting up an All-India Com-
mission from the elected members of the Provincial and Central
Assemblies. That Commission was to decide whether there were
to be one or two sovereign states in British India. If the Commis-
sion failed to come to a decision within 30 days, the question was
to be decided by taking votes. If the dissenting minority was more
than a certain prescribed percentage, the question whether they
should be allowed to form a separate state was to be decided in the
following manner. The Muslim representatives in each of the
Legislative Assemblies of Sind, North-Western Frontier Province,
the Punjab and Bengal (with the addition of the district of Sylhet
from Assam) were to meet separately to decide whether they would
like to separate from the rest of India or not. Baluchistan was to
be separated if the contiguous Provinces voted for separation. If
the Muslim representatives of North-Western Frontier Province
voted again separation, the Province was still to be separated if the
surrounding Provinces voted for separation. The non-Muslim re-
presentatives of the districts in which the non-Muslims were in
majority and which were contiguous to India were to be allowed
to vote whether they should be separated from their parent Pro-
vinces and attached to the territory of India. If 75% of the Mus-
lim representatives voted for separation, they were to have a Consti-
tuent Assembly to frame a constitution for their own area. This
scheme was rejected both by the Congress and the Muslim League.
Ultimately, the Cabinet Mission announced their final scheme on
16 May, 1946.
According to the Cabinet Mission Scheme, there was to be Union
of India embracing both British India and the Indian states and it
## p. 854 (#896) ############################################
854
PAKISTAN
was to deal with Foreign Affairs, Defence and Communications.
The Union was also to have the necessary power to raise the finances
for the above mentioned three subjects. All other subjects were
to vest in the Provinces. The States were to retain all subjects and
powers other than those ceded to the Union of India. The Union
of India was to have an Executive and a Legislature constituted
from British India and representatives from the Indian states. The
Provinces were to be free to form Groups and each Group was to
determine which Provincial subjects be taken in common.
The
constitutions of the Union of India and of the Groups were to con-
tain a Provision whereby any Province, if a majority in its Legisla-
tive Assembly so desired, could call for a reconsideration of the
terms of the constitution after an initial period of ten years and at
ten yearly intervals thereafter.
As regards the constitution-making machinery, the Legislative
Assemblies of the Provinces were to elect the members of that body
on the basis of one representative for one million of the population.
The Sikh and Muslim Legislators were to elect the quota of their
communities on the basis of their population. The representatives
from the Provinces were to divide themselves into three Sections A,
B and C. Section C was to consist of the representatives of Bengal
and Assam, Section B of the Punjab, Sind and North-Western Fron-
tier Province and Section A of the rest of the Provinces of India.
These Sections were to settle the Provincial constitutions for the
Provinces included in each Section and were also to decide whether
any Group Constitution was to be set for those Provinces and if
so with what provincial subjects the Group should deal. The repre-
sentatives of the Sections were then to reassemble and settle the
Union Constitution. The Provinces of India were given the power
to opt out of the Groups by a decision of their Legislatures after
the general elections under the New Constitution. The Resolutions
of the Union Constituent Assembly regarding major Communal
issues were to require a majority of the representatives present and
voting of each of the two major communities. The Chairman of
the Constituent Assembly was to decide which Resolution raised
major Communal issues and he was to consult the Federal Court
of India before giving his decision. A plan for Interim Govern-
ment was also envisaged in Cabinet Mission Scheme.
The Muslim League accepted the Cabinet Mission Scheme. The
resolution of the Muslim League accepting the scheme stated: “In
as much as the basis and the foundation of Pakistan are inherent in
the Mission's plan by virtue of the compulsory grouping of the six
Muslim Provinces in Sections B and C, is willing to co-operate
with the constitution-making machinery proposed in the scheme
## p. 855 (#897) ############################################
THE CABINET MISSION SCHEME
855
outlined by the Mission, in the hope that it would ultimately re-
sult in the establishment of complete sovereign Pakistan, and the
consummation of the goal of independence for the major nations,
Muslims and Hindus, and all the other people inhabitirig the vast
sub-continent. It is for these reasons that the Muslim League is
accepting the scheme and will join the constitution-making body,
and it will keep in view the opportunity and right of secession of
Provinces or groups from the Union, which have been provided in
the Mission's plan by implication. ”
The Muslim League accepted the Cabinet Mission Scheme be-
cause it provided for a weak centre and an opportunity to large
Muslim majority Provinces like the Punjab and Bengal to dominate
in their respective Sections. Those Sections were allowed to frame
both Group and Provincial Constitutions. The Provinces were
given the right to opt out but only after the first general election
and under the terms of the constitution settled by the Section.
Moreover, under Sections B and C, the Muslim League was getting
the entire territory of the Provinces like the Punjab, Bengal and
Assam in parts of which the non-Muslims were in a majority. The
Congress was not happy with the Cabinet Mission Scheme as it
provided for the compulsory grouping of the Provinces. In other
words, a Province like North-Western Frontier Province in which
a Congress Government was functioning, could be compelled to
join Section B. The Province of Assam which had a Hindu
majority, could be compelled to join Section C. Mr. Jinnah was
right in saying that the Cabinet Mission Scheme was a sugar-
coated pill for the Congress. Mr. Jinnah was determined to have
Pakistan and he found that the Cabinet Mission Scheme gave him
an opportunity to have it. To begin with, he would have the
compulsory grouping of the Provinces in the North-West and North-
East. When the group constitutions of Sections B and C were
prepared, he could decide later on to leave the Union of India.
In that case, what he was going to have would be the whole of
the Punjab, Sind, North-Western Frontier Province, Bengal and
Assam. Once these areas became independent of the Union of
India, the Hindu populations from those areas could be turned out
making room for the Muslims from the rest of India to take their
place. The great merit of the Cabinet Scheme from the point of
view of the Muslim League was that it gave them the whole of the
Punjab and the whole of Assam and Bengal. It the Congress had
accepted this Scheme, it would have lost the whole of the Punjab and
the whole of Bengal and Assam. By not accepting it, the Congress
was ultimately able to save East Punjab, the whole of the Province
of Assam minus the district of Sylhet and the whole of West Bengal.
## p. 856 (#898) ############################################
856
PAKISTAN
That explains the reason while the Muslim League enthusiastically
accepted the Cabinet Mission Scheme by a resolution passed on
6 June, 1946. The Working Committee of the Congress passed
the resolution on 26 June, 1946 by which it accepted the scheme
partially. The Congress accepted only that part of the Scheme
which dealt with the constitution-making of the country. The
view of the Congress was that the grouping of the Provinces was
not to be compulsory. However, the Congress rejected the Interim
Government Scheme on the ground that the clarifications given on
the subject were not acceptable to it and the resolution of the
Working Committee of the Congress was ratified by the All-India
Congress Committee.
FORMATION OF INTERIM GOVERNMENT
Mr. Jinnah who had accepted the Scheme in its entirety, asked
Lord Wavell to invite the Muslim League to form the Interim
Government but Lord Wavell refused to oblige him as he was
anxious to bring the Congress also into the Interim Government.
On 22 July, 1946, Lord Wavell wrote a personal and confiden-
tial letter to Mr. Jinnah with proposals to form an Interim Govern-
ment. It was stated therein that the Interim Government would
consist of fourteen members. Six members including one Scheduled
Caste representatives, would be nominated by the Congress, five
members would be nominated by the Muslim League. Three re-
presentatives of the minorities would be nominated by Viceroy. One
of these three places would be kept for Sikhs. It was not
open to either the Congress or the Muslim League to object to the
names submitted by the other party, provided those were accepted
by the Viceroy. Distribution of portfolios was to be decided after
the parties had agreed to enter the Government and had submitted
their names. The Congress and the Muslim League were each to
have an equitable share of the most important portfolios. Mr.
Jinnah was also informed that assurances about the status of the
Interim Government which had been given by Lord Wavell in his
Jetter dated 30 May, 1946 to Maulana Azad were to stand. Lord
Wavell ended his letter with the following words: “We should not
spend further time in negotiation but should try out at once a
Government on the basis proposed above. If it does not work and
you find the conditions unsatisfactory, it will be open to you to
withdraw, but I am confident that you will not. ” It is clear from
this letter that the Muslim League was not to have the right to
object to the Congress nominating a Muslim in its quota of six.
Mr. Jinnah sent his reply on 31 July, 1946. He pointed out
## p. 857 (#899) ############################################
FORMATION OF INTERIM GOVERNMENT
857
to the Viceroy that “Your present proposal clearly destroys the
principle of parity as well as representation according to communi-
ties and gives a clear majority to the Congress as against the
Muslim League to start with. . . . . . I think you will appreciate that
when you start with six Congress and five Muslim League with a
Congress majority, the minority representatives will hold a very
strong position as a balancing element, who would be nominated by
you without even consultation with the Muslim League and this is
serious departure from what we are assured of in your letter of
June 20. . . . " In the end, Mr. Jinnah informed the Viceroy that
there was no chance of the Muslim League accepting the pro-
posal.
But even before writing this letter on 31 July, 1946, Mr. Jinnah
and the Muslim League Council had passed the resolution on 29
July, 1946 in which the Muslim League withdrew its earlier ac-
ceptance of the Cabinet Mission Scheme. In that resolution, it
was declared that "now the time has come for the Muslim Nation
to resort to Direct Action to achieve Pakistan, to assert their just
rights, to vindicate their honour and to get rid of the present
British slavery and the contemplated future caste-Hindu domi-
nation”. Mr. Jinnah called upon the Muslims throughout India
to observe 16 August, 1946 as Direct Action Day. He told the
Muslims, “our motto should be discipline, unity and srust in the
power of our own nation. If there is not sufficient power, create
that power. If we do that, the Mission and the British Govern-
ment may be rescued, released and freed from being cowed down
by the threats of the Congress that they would launch a struggle
and start non-co-operation. Let us also say that. ” Mr. Jinnah
also declared, “This day we bid good-bye to
constitutional
methods. . . . today we have also forged a pistol and are in a position
a
to use it (Leonard Mosley: The Last Days of the British Raj,
p. 29).
In reply to Mr. Jinnah's letter of 31 July, 1946, Lord Wavell
wrote to him a personal, secret and final letter on 8 August, 1946
in which he stated that the basis of representation was the same
as the Muslim League Working Committee had accepted on 25
June, 1946. Lord Wavell also informed Mr. Jinnah that in view
of the League Resolution of 29 July, 1946, he had decided to in-
vite the Congress to make proposals for an interim Government.
The Working Committee of the All-India Congress Committee also
authorised the Congress President to accept the invitation of the
Viceroy to form the Interim Government. On 12 August, 1946, the
Viceroy issued a communique from New Delhi in which it was an-
nounced: "His Excellency the Viceroy, with the approval of His
>
## p. 858 (#900) ############################################
858
PAKISTAN
Majesty's Government, has invited the President of the Congress to
make proposals for the immediate formation of an Interim Govern-
ment and the President of the Congress has accepted the invitation.
Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru will shortly visit New Delhi to discuss
his proposals with His Excellency the Viceroy. ” On 13 August,
1946, Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru wrote a letter to Mr. Jinnah from
Wardha informing him about the Viceroy's invitation to him as
Congress President to form the Interim Government. In the same
letter, Mr. Nehru wrote: “I have accepted this invitation. I feel
that my first step should be to approach you and seek your co-
operation in the formation of a coalition provisional Government.
It is naturally our desire to have as representative a Government
as possible. . . ”. Mr. Nehru met Mr. Jinnah on 16 August at
Bombay and after the meeting, Mr. Nehru announced: “Co-
operation in the formation of the Provisional Government is being
offered to the Congress by all elements excepting the Muslim League
for the moment. . . . We shall always look for the larger measure of
co-operation. . . .
16 August, 1946 was Direct Action Day for the Muslim League.
At that time, Mr. S. H. Suhrawardy was the Chief Minister of
Bengal. He was an enthusiastic supporter of the Muslim League
and also a member of the Working Committee of the All-India
Muslim League. He has been described as an “outwardly affable
but inwardly ruthless politico. ” In the issue of the Calcutta States-
man on 5 August, 1946, he wrote, "Bloodshed and disorder are not
necessarily evil in themselves, if resorted to for a noble
Among Muslims today, no cause is dearer or nobler than Pakis-
tan. . . . . ” On 16 August, 1946, the Muslims of Calcutta did
havoc on the Hindus. Their shops were looted.
women and children were mercilessly butchered. This state of
affairs continued in Calcutta for three days.
Although Mr. Ian Stephens, the editor of the Statesman, was
pro-Muslim, he was constrained to write in these words about the
Calcutta-killing: “When we wrote two days ago, conditions in
Calcutta were horrifying. They have gone beyond that since.
Whatever the appropriate adjective is, they were nothing in com.
parison with what we have subsequently seen. The latest estimate
of dead is 3,000, who have lain thick about the streets. The injured
number many thousand and it is impossible to say how many busi-
ness houses and private dwellings have been destroyed. This is
not a riot.
It needs a word found in medieval history, a fury.
Yet fury sounds spontaneous, and there must have been some de-
liberation and organization to set this fury on its way. The horde
who ran about battering and killing with lathis may have found
cause.
Hindu men,
## p. 859 (#901) ############################################
COMMUNAL RIOTS
859
them lying about or brought them out of their own packets, but
that is not to be believed. We have already commented on the
bands who found it easy to get petrol and vehicles when no others
were permitted on the streets. It is not mere supposition that
men were brought into Calcutta to make an impression
thousands have been brutally hurt, smashed eyes, smashed jaws,
smashed limbs, of men, women and children—these are the kind of
political arguments the twentieth century does not expect. . . . What
befell India's largest city last week was no mere communal riot,
as we have hitherto understood the sanguinary term. For three
days, the city concentrated on unrestrained civil war. Upon whom
the main guilt for it rests is manifest. There has been criticism
of the Governor. We do not think he has emerged particularly
well. But none except a very great man holding his traditionally
constitutional office during such a swift crisis could have done so.
Where the primary blame lies is where we have squarely put it--
upon the Provincial Muslim League Cabinet which carries responsi-
bility for law and order in Bengal, and particularly upon the one
able man of large administrative experience, the Chief Minister
(Suhrawardy). That in the whole of India the only Province
.
where carnage occurred, on the League's professed peaceful Direct
Action Day, should have been in Bengal, where a League Ministry
holds office, astounds us. ”
The troubles spread from Calcutta to Noakhali in Bengal.
There also the Muslims who formed the majority feli upon the
Hindus who were in a minority. Thousand of Hindus were killed.
Hindu women were molested and butchered. Children were put
to death in a shameless manner. The trouble spread from Bengal
to Bihar where the Hindus had their revenge on the Muslims.
When all this was going on outside, Lord Wavell and Mr.
Nehru
had their preliminary conversations regarding the formation of the
Interim Government on 17 and 18 August, 1946. On 24 August,
Lord Wavell officially announced the resignation of the care-taker
Government which had been appointed by the Viceroy in June
1946. Lord Wavell also approved the appointment of an Interim
Government proposed by the Congress Party. It was announced
.
that the Interim Government would take office on 2 September
1946 and would consist of the six Congressmen, five Muslims and
three Minority members.
During a meeting with Mahatma Gandhi which was brought
about by the efforts of the Nawab of Bhopal, Mr. Jinnah cleverly
made Mahatma Gandhi sign the following statement: "The Con-
gress does not challenge but accepts that the Muslim League now is
the authoritative representative of an overwhelming majority of the
## p. 860 (#902) ############################################
860
PAKISTAN
Muslims of India. As such and in accordance with democratic
principles they alone have today an unquestionable right to re-
present the Muslims of India. But the Congress cannot agree that
any restriction or limitation should be put upon the Congress to
choose such representatives as they think proper from amongst the
members of the Congress as their representatives. ” This was the great
tactical victory for Mr. Jinnah and when Mr. Nehru came to know
of it, he wrote to Mr. Jinnah pointing out that “My colleagues and
I did not accept the formula agreed to by Gandhiji and you. "
Mahatma Gandhi also stated in a prayer meeting that he was
thoroughly ashamed of having signed the formula.
“No public
servant has a right to act in this way. ”
Mr. Nehru formed the Interim Government on 2 September,
1946. When he was taking oath inside, there were cries of Pakis-
tan outside. The demonstrators were shouting that they would
have Pakistan at any cost.
MUSLIM LEAGUE JOINS INTERIM GOVERNMENT
Lord Wavell was not satisfied with having secured co-operation
from the Congress. He also wanted the Muslim League to join
the Interim Government. Mr. Jinnah was also anxious to join the
Interim Government so that the Muslim League may be able to
fight the battle of Pakistan from a position of strength. It was
in this atmosphere that Lord Wavell invited Mr. Jinnah to come
to New Delhi and see him. Mr. Jinnah came to Delhi from
Bombay on 15 September, and met the Viceroy on 16, 25 and 28
September, 1946. On 2 October, Mr. Jinnah met the Viceroy
for nearly an hour. On 5 October, Mr. Jinnah and Mr. Nehru
met in New Delhi at the residence of the Nawab of Bhopal and
talked for more than three hours. Between 6 October and 13
October, Mr. Nehru and Mr. Jinnah corresponded with each other
regarding the new formula of the respective position of the
Congress Party and the Muslim League in the Executive Council
cf the Governor-General. Mr. Jinnah also corresponded with the
Viceroy. On 3 October, 1946, Mr. Jinnah wrote a letter to the
Viceroy virtually accepting his proposals of an Interim Govern-
ment as mentioned in his letter of 22 July, 1946. However, he
made one reservation that the Congress should not include in the
remaining five members of their quota a Muslim of thrir choice".
On 12 October, Mr. Jinnah met the Viceroy again. On the same
day, the Viceroy wrote to Mr. Jinnah informing him that “The
Muslim League are at liberty to nominate anyone they wish from
their own quota of seats in the Cabinet, though any person pro-
## p. 861 (#903) ############################################
LEAGUE JOINS INTERIM GOVERNMENT
861
a
posed must, of course, be accepted by me and His Majesty before
being appointed”. On 13 October, 1946, Mr. Jinnah sent a reply
in which he observed that "it will be fatal to leave the entire field
of administration of the Central Government in the hands of the
Congress”, and therefore "we have decided to nominate five (mem-
bers of the Interim Government) on behalf of the Muslim League".
On the same day, the Viceroy wrote to Mr. Jinnah: “I am glad to
know that the Muslim League has decided to join the Interim Gov-
ernment” and requested Mr. Jinnah to send the names of five re-
presentatives. The names sent by Mr. Jinnah were Liaquat Ali
Khan, I. I. Chundrigar, A. R. Nishtar, Ghazanfar Ali Khan and
Jogendra Nath Mandal. Mr. Jinnah carefully selected only those
persons who were likely to put up fight for the Muslim League and
Pakistan in the Interim Government. He did not include men like
Nawab Ismail Khan and Choudury Khaliquzzaman because they
were moderates and were anxious to come to terms with the Con-
gress. Even Husain Imam who was the leader of the Muslim
League Party in the Council of State was not selected. Even
Nazimuddin was not included as Jogendra Nath Mandal,
Scheduled Caste Minister in the Muslim League Ministry of Bengal,
was to be taken.
With regard to the distribution of the important portfolios, Mr.
Jinnah played the game skilfully. The impression given by him
was that he was not interested in other portfolios but was concerned
about the position of the Vice-President of the Executive Council
of the Viceroy. He rightly came to the conclusion that he would
get the best bargain if he allowed the Viceroy to do the bargaining
for him. The Viceroy suggested to the Congress to give up the
Home Department which was held by Sardar Patel. However, the
Congress was not prepared to give to the Muslim League the port-
folios of Home and Defence. The Congress thought that if the
portfolio of Finance was offered to the Muslim League, the latter
would refuse it on account of the proverbial Muslim inability to
handle Finance. If the League accepted it, they would make fools
of themselves. The League demanded that the Office of the Vice-
President should go by rotation to the Congress and the League
but the League was offered the Vice Chairmanship of the Co-
ordination Committee of the Cabinet. Experience showed that the
Congress was in the wrong. Liaquat Ali Khan was able to manage
the Department of Finance with the help of Choudhuri Mohammad
Ali. With the Department of Finance under its control, the
Muslim League was able to give the maximum trouble to the Con-
gress Ministers, Sardar Patel is set to have observed: “Whatever
proposal he made was either rejected or modified beyond recogni-
## p. 862 (#904) ############################################
862
PAKISTAN
tion by Liaquat Ali. ” With the help of Choudhri Mohammad Ali,
Liaquat Ali Khan prepared a Budget by which he imposed heavy
taxes on the high incomes of the rich Hindu industrialists who were
supporting the Congress. Liaquat Ali also proposed the setting up
of a Commission to investigate charges of tax evasion made against
industrialists and businessmen. Cleverly, Liaquat Ali did not dis-
close the details of the Budget to the members of the Cabinet but
got its assent only to the general principles of the Budget. The
result was that when the Budget was presented in the Central
Assembly, there was a lot of hue and cry. It was contended that
the object of the Budget was to cripple commerce and industry
which was largely in the hands of the Hindus. What applied to
the Department of Finance equally applied to other Departments
under the control of the nominees of the Muslim League. It was
found that the Muslim League ministers were trying to create the
greatest amount of friction and disharmony in the Government.
Every Department of theirs became a cell of the Muslim League.
It appeared that there were two hostile camps in the Government
of India. There was absolutely no co-operation. It was difficult
to say how long such a state of affairs could continue without a
break-down.
Outside the Government, there were serious differences between
the Congress and the Muslim League with regard to the inter-
pretation of the Cabinet Mission Scheme with regard to the group-
ing of the Provinces. The contention of the Muslim League was
that the grouping was compulsory. Mahatma Gandhi openly ex-
pressed the opinion that the grouping was optional. A similar
view was held by Jawaharlal Nehru, K. M. Munshi and other
constitutional experts of India. The situation became so serious
that the British Government invited the Congress and Muslim
League leaders to London. The London meeting was attended
ky Jawaharlal Nehru, Baldev Singh, Jinnah and Liaquat Ali Khan.
The final decision of the British Government was in favour of the
Muslim League. The British Government issued the following state-
ment on 6 December, 1946: "The Cabinet Mission have through-
out maintained the view that decisions of the Sections should, in
the absence of an agreement to the contrary, be taken by a simple
majority vote of the representatives in the Sections. This view has
been accepted by the Muslim League, but the Congress have put
forward a different view. They have asserted that the true mean-
ing of the statement, read as a whole, is that the Provinces have the
right to decide both as to grouping and as to their own Constitu-
tions.
"His Majesty's Government have had legal advice which confirms
## p. 863 (#905) ############################################
MOUNTBATTEN AND PARTITION OF INDIA
863
that the statement of 16 May means what the Cabinet Mission
have always stated was their intention. This part of the state-
ment, as so interpreted, must, therefore, be considered an essential
part of the scheme of 16 May for enabling the Indian people to
formulate a Constitution which His Majesty's Government would
be prepared to submit to Parliament. It should, therefore, be ac-
cepted by all parties in the Constituent Assembly. ”
The first session of the Constituent Assembly was held on 9
December, 1946 but the same was boycotted by the Muslim League.
The resolutions passed by the Constituent Assembly were denounc-
ed by the Muslim League as ultra vires, invalid and illegal. The
Congress demanded the resignation of the Muslim League nominees
in the interim Government on the ground that the League was not
taking part in the proceedings of the Constituent Assembly and was
also committed to a programme of Direct Action. A similar de-
mand was made by the Muslim League for the resignation
Congress nominees. A very serious situation arose in the country.
The Viceroy did not know what to do. It was difficult to pick
and choose between the Congress and the Muslim League. Which-
ever party was favoured, the other party was bound to create mis-
chief.
of
ANNOUNCEMENT OF 20 FEBRUARY, 1947
some
It was under these circumstances that the British Government
made an epoch-making statement on 20 February, 1947 in which
it was declared that the British Government would transfer power
into the hands of the Indians by a date not later than June 1948.
It was declared that the British Government shall have to decide
to whom the powers of the Central Government in British India
were to be handed over on the due date, whether as a whole to
some form of Central Government for British India or in
areas to existing Provincial Governments or in such other way as
might seem most reasonable and in the best interests of the Indian
people. The British Government also announced that Lord
Mountbatten was to succeed Lord Wavell as the Viceroy of India.
It was stated that Lord Mountbatten was to be entrusted with the
task of transferring into the hands of the Indians the responsibility
for the Government of British India in a manner that would best
ensure the future happiness and prosperity of India.
MOUNTBATTEN AND PARTITION OF INDIA
Lord Mountbatten arrived in India on 22 March, 1947. On
## p. 864 (#906) ############################################
864
PAKISTAN
SO.
23 March, the Muslim League observed the Pakistan Day. On
27 March, Mr. Jinnah declared: “I am fighting for Pakistan, which
means I am fighting for the freedom of India. I am fighting for
Pakistan because it is the only practical solution for solving the
problem and the other ideal of a United India and a rule based on
parliamentary system of Government is a vain dream and an impos-
sibility. India is neither a country nor a nation, but is a score of
nations. ” There were serious riots in the Punjab in the month of
March. These riots were preceded by a very virulent agitation by
the Muslim League in the Punjab, Sind and the North-Western
Frontier Province. The Muslim League volunteers were given a
free hand to do whatever they pleased. They were allowed to go
to the roofs of the Government buildings and hoist the Muslim
League flags and there was none to ask them why they were doing
Whatever the Muslim League did was watched with patience
and internal satisfaction by the British bureaucracy. Even when
the riots broke out in March, 1947, there was no Government
machinery to stop them. The eye witness accounts of the havoc
brought about by the Muslim rioters at Rawalpindi and its neigh-
bourhood were simply disgusting. Hindus and Sikhs were mur-
dered and burnt and thrown into the drains. There was none to
care for their dead bodies. In the foundations of present Islama-
bad near Rawalpindi lies the blood of the innocent Hindus and
Sikhs who had done nothing to deserve their fate. Alan Campbell
Johnson who accompanied Lord Mountbatten on a visit to Kahuta
near Rawalpindi, writes: "We arrived to find that the havoc in
the small town was very great. Picking our way through the rub-
ble, we could see that the devastation was as thorough as any pro-
duced by fire-bomb raids in the war. This particular communal
orgy involved the destruction of Sikhs and their livelihood by
Moslems who were proving difficult to track down. The Muslims
in the area seemed to be quite pleased with themselves, and to be
unable to appreciate that the local Sikh traders were one of the
principal sources of their own prosperity. . . . . One is really
amazed how such a thing could happen in the neighbourhood of
Rawalpindi which was one of the biggest Military Headquarters
of the Government of India. There was no dearth of the soldiers
who could be sent from the Cantonment to the scene of the riots
at a moment's notice. There was the Chaklala Aerodrome at
hand from where the bombers could fly to control the situation and
stop the rioters. One cannot help observing that at this critical
time, the Englishmen forgot their duties and behaved like partisans.
India had a Governor-General in Lord Wavell who was every inch
a General but even he kept quiet. Even he could do nothing at
## p. 865 (#907) ############################################
MOUNTBATTEN AND PARTITION OF INDIA
865
the time of the Calcutta killing or at the time of Rawalpindi riots.
The fact of the matter is that when Lord Mountbatten reached
India, the situation in the country was drifting towards a civil war.
There was no love lost between the Hindus and the Muslims in the
country. In the cities where the Hindus and the Muslims lived,
each was determined to destroy the other. A Hindu would not
live in the area where the Muslims predominated and vice versa.
There was no security of life or property. People were disposing
of properties in areas inhabited by the other community. The
whole situation was volcanic. The Government officials were
taking sides. Barring noble exceptions, the general trend was that
no Muslim was prepared to do anything for a Hindu who was
formerly his friend or neighbour. The country was divided into
hostile camps.
When Lord Mountbatten was faced with such a situation, he
came to the inevitable conclusion that the only solution for India
was the partitioning of the country. He found that even Con-
gress leaders like Sardar Patel and Jawaharlal Nehru were forced
by the circumstances to admit that there was no other way. The
unity of India was very dear to them but it was found that the
circumstances were such that the same could not be maintained.
Mahatma Gandhi was of the definite opinion that it was better to
face a civil war than to have partition of the country. He is stated
to have declared that the partition “will be over my dead body. ”
However, the situation in the country bcame so horrible that even
he was converted to the point of view that the only solution for the
country was its partition. It appears that both Patel and Nehru
were impressed by the argument that it was better to have a smal-
ler India where they could do what they pleased than to have a
bigger India where the Muslim League will not allow them to do
anything. Within hardly two weeks of the arrival of Mountbatten
in India, it became clear that India was going to be partitioned.
It is pointed out that Lord Mountbatten was not enamoured of the
Cabinet Mission plan as it was not his own child. The circums-
tances dictated the partitioning of the country. We are told that
on 8 April 1947, Lord Mountbatten was discussing Liaquat Ali
Khan's paper on the division of the Armed Forces. On 19 April,
Lord Ismay, Chief of the Viceroy's Staff, emphasised the difficulty
of East Pakistan and West Pakistan who were so much separated
from each other. The reply of Mountbatten was that “Whatever
its implications, he was beginning to think that Pakistan was in-
evitable. ” On 27 April, the news leaked out in the press that the
Government of India was thinking of the partitioning of the coun-
try. The reaction of Lord Mountbatten was: “The more the
## p. 866 (#908) ############################################
866
PAKISTAN
papers speculate about partition, the more they are preparing pub-
lic opinion for its arrival. ” It appears that even before the arrival
of Lord Mountbatten, the Cabinet Mission plan had already col-
lapsed.
The first plan of Lord Mountbatten was to hand over power to
the Provinces or to such confederations of Provinces as the latter
might decide to form. He also was in favour of partitioning the
Provinces of Bengal and Punjab with a view to separate the predo-
minantly Muslim areas from the predominantly non-Muslim areas.
He was also in favour of allowing the Muslim district of Sylhet the
option of joining the Muslim Province of Bengal. In the case of
North-Western Frontier Province, fresh elections were to be held
to ascertain the wishes of the people.
There was opposition to his proposals. Sir Evan Jenkins, Gover-
nor of the Punjab, opposed the partition on the ground that the
divided Provinces would still be having minorities. The conten-
tion of the Governor of Bengal was that the division of Bengal
would make East Bengal a rural slum. Mr. Jinnah contended
that the division of the Punjab and Bengal would destroy the ad-
ministrative and economic fabric of the Provinces which had been
built up during the last century. He contended that ultimately
there would be exchange of populations between India and Pakis-
tan and the problem of the minorities would be automatically solv-
ed in that manner. Mr. Jinnah's argument was that if the Punjab
and Bengal were to be partitioned, then the other Provinces where
the Muslims lived in large numbers must also be partitioned.
Lord Mountbatten sent his plan to London on 2 May with Lord
Ismay and his secretary, George Abell. He requested the British
Government to send their approval by 10 May, 1947. He was
thinking of putting his plan before a meeting of the party leaders
on 17 May, 1947. However, when his plan came back from
London, many changes had been made in it. It is said that when
he showed the same to Jawaharlal Nehru, he told the Viceroy frank-
ly that the Congress would not accept it. The scheme was likely
to result in the Balkanization of India. When Lord Mountbatten
found that Nehru was opposed to the draft he had received from
London, he decided to make another attempt. The plan of V. P.
Menon was examined. According to that plan, the transfer of
power was to take place on the basis of Dominion Status to India
and such other areas as wanted to separate from India and form
another state. Lord Mountbatten found that Nehru was not
opposed to a plan according to which power was to be transferred
to two Central Governments on the basis of Dominion Status. The
provisions with regard to the partitioning of the Punjab, Bengal and
## p. 867 (#909) ############################################
3 JUNE PLAN
867
Assam were already known. The wishes of the Muslim areas of
the Punjab, Bengal, Sind and the North-Western Frontier Province
could also be ascertained. The great merit of the scherre of V.
