he chose to empioy his forces in the
relief of Samoa, which was under the jurisdiction of Athens, and unjustiv
seized by the king's lieutenants in order to facilitate his operations araiust
the rebels on tite seacoast.
relief of Samoa, which was under the jurisdiction of Athens, and unjustiv
seized by the king's lieutenants in order to facilitate his operations araiust
the rebels on tite seacoast.
Demosthenes - Leland - Orations
If not, this people must
necessarily oppose our endeavours to restore the
cities: an event which they must justly regard as
their own destruction: and, in our own affair,1 the
attempt must prove ineffectual. And what in truth
can be expected, if we are ever suffering cities now
in being to be destroyed, and demanding that cities
long since ruined should be restored ?
It hath been urged in this debate, by those who
have spoken with the greatest appearance of reason,
that these people should take down the public monu-
ments2 of their treaty with Thebes, if they mean to
1 Our own aflair. ]^That Is, the recovery of Oropus.
2 The public monuments, &c. ]--In the original, Tas XTHAA2
Kadckuv ras irpos Qr}/iaiovs. It was the custom of Greece thit the trea-
ties of the several states, and the conditions of these treaties, should be
Inscribed on columns, which were erected, and, while the treaties sub-
sisted, were preserved, in the most public and frequented places; as u.
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? 262 ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES.
be real allies to this state. On the other side, it is
alleged that it is not such monuments, but interest,
which they regTlrd as the essential cause of friend-
ship; that they must look on those as their real allies
who will grant them their assistance.
But, however sincerely they may thus profess, this
is my opinion: that you should demand both that
these monuments be taken down, and that Lacedae-
monTje obliged to peace. If either of these demands
be rejected, we should then unite with that party
which hath acquiesced: for, if when they are allowed
to live unmolested the Megalopolitans should still
adhere to their connexions with the Thebans, they
must then discover to the world that they were in-
fluenced by the hopes conceived from the superiority
of Thebes, not by motives of equity. If, on the other
hand, when the Megalopolitans have, with real faith
and sincerity, formed an alliance with us, the Lace-
daemonians should still refuse to live in peace, it must
be manifest that all this their solicitude is not that
Thespia may be restored, but that, while the Thebans
are embroiled in this war, they may seize the oppor-
tunity of reducing all Peloponnesus.
I am surprised at some persons, who express
dreadful apprehensions at the allies of Thebes be-
coming enemies to Lacedsemon; yet, should Lace-
the scenes of their great games, where the whole nation was collected
at particular seasons, and there had an opportunity of being witnesses
of tho terms agreed on. The observance of these was, in some sort, a
matter of national concern, and came under the cognizance of the great
couneil of amphictyons. That the contracting powers themselves might
have the monuments of their public acts continually in view, the like
columns were erected in the most conspicuous places of their cities.
. Thus we learn from Thucydides that when the Athenians and Lacedae-
monians had concluded a truce for fifty years, in the tenth year of the
famous Peloponnesian war, it was provided that the columns on which
the treaty was inscribed should be erected in such places as have been
mentioned. XrriXas Se crtiffat OXupttiafft, Kai HvOau Kai laB^y, Kai cv
ABiivais tv ttoXci, Kai tv AaKtSaiuovi tv A/iUKAaiif). Pausanias observes
that in his days many of these columns were preserved in the Olympian
temple, and particularly that which was the monument of the treaty
concluded between the Athenians, Argians, and Mantineans, in the
twelfth year ofthe Peloponnesian war.
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? ORATION FOR THE MEGAX. OPOLITANS. 263
daemon subdue these people, see no danger in such
an event; especially when we have the experience
of past times to assure us that the Thebans have
ever used those allies1 against the Lacedaemonians;
the Lacedaemonians, when their masters, have ever
employed them against us. It is therefore seriously
to be considered, that should you now refuse to admit
the Megalopolitans to your alliance, they must either
be subverted and dispersed, and then the Lacedae-
monians at once become powerful; or, they must
escape the danger (as we sometimes see strange and
unexpected events); and then, with good reason,
they must become firm associates to the Thebans:
but, if we accept of these their overtures, they must
then owe and acknowledge their preservation to this
state.
But let us turn our thoughts from their fortunes
and their dangers, arfd fix our attention on the The-
bans and Lacedaemonians. Should this war prove
fatal to the Thebans (as our interest requires), still
i By those allies, the orator undoubtedly means, not the Arcadians
only, but the whole body of the Peloponnesian states. And what he
observes of these states is fully eonfirrned by history. To mention only
the more famous battles fought between the Thebans and Athenians,
it appears that the former were not assisted by the Peloponnesians in
their first unsuccessful engagement at Tanagra (An. 4. Ol. 80): in the
second, when they were victorious (An. 2. 01. 83); or in the third, when
they were again conquered (An. 1. Oi. 89); or in theirvictory at Delium,
in the following year. On the other hand, after the battle of Leuctra the
Thebans were joined by the Arcadians in their invasion of Sparta (An.
3. 01. 102); and the next year entered the territory of LacedEemon, in
conjunction with the Arcadians, Argives, and Eleans. But the Lace-
dsemotiians were assisted by their Peloponnesian allies in all their wars
with the Athenians. In the great Peloponnesian war " the confederates
of the Lacedaemonians were (says Thucydides) all the Peloponnesians
that dwelt within the isthmus, except the Arrives and Achaeans, who
had attachments to each of the contending parries. "--AaKt&aipoviwv fiev
o'i fyfipaxoi, HeXoirovviurtoi. ptv oi tvtos IcOfiov iravriff, ttXiiv Apyemv
Kai A%atu)v. Tovtois oe eg afuporepovs 0iXia tiv.
Many other instances to the same purpose might be produced from
Mstory. But should U be objected to the assertion of the orator, that
at the battle of Man tinea, some of the Peloponnesians united with the
Thebans against the Athenian powers, the answer is obvious, that the
Athenians were not the objects of this confederacy; that it was formed
against the Spartans, to whom Athens served but as an auyin--"
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? 264 OB>>T)ONS OF DEMOSTHENES.
the powe 'Jf the Lacedaemonians will be duly circum-
scribed, while they have the Arcadians on their
borders, ever ready to arm against them. But sup-
pose the Thebans should prove superior to their
dangers, should still defend their country, and should
not fall before their enemies: yet, must they be the
less powerful, if on our side we be strengthened by
allies to v. hom we ourselves gave being ? At all
events, therefore, the interest of the state demands
that we should not abandon the Arcadians; that, if
preserved, they should not seem to owe their preserva-
tion to themselves; that they should not owe it to
any others; but that it should* be the act of the
Athenians. .
And now, my fellow-citizens, I call the gods to
witness, that I have spoken, not from private affec-
tion, not from particular resentment to either party,
but from a regard to what I deem the real interest
of my country! This then is my opinion; that you
should not abandon the people of Megalopolis; no,
nor any weaker state, to the power of the stronger. 1
1 It does not appear from history that this oration had the due effect.
Whether the prospect of recovering Oropus had greater influence than
the more liberal and less confined policy of Demosthenes; or whether
the present circumstances and connexions of the Athenians prevented
them from acting in favour of the Megalopolitans; certain it is, that they
did not exert themselves on this occasion in defence of the liberty of
Peloponnesus. The quarrel was carried on for some short time. The
LacedtBmonians had generally the advantage; but soon found it neces-
sary to end the war by a truce with the people of Megalopolis.
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? THE ORATION FOR THE LIBERTY OP
THE RHODIANS:
PRONOUNCED IN THE ARCIIONSHIP OF THKSSALUS, THE SECOND YEAR
OF THE HUNDRED AND SEVENTH OLYMPIAD.
INTRODUCTION.
An attempt made in the hundred and fifth. Olympiad to reduce the
states of Chios, Cos, and Rhodes to a dependency on Athens produced
the war well known by the name of " The Social War," wiiich was for
three years supported by the Athenians on one side, and on the other by
the Chians, Coans, and Rhodians, assisted by the Byzantines and by
Mausolus, King of Caria; which prince (or rather his wife, Artemisia,
who governed in his name) was the principal agent in fomenting this
quarrel. Their fears of the Persian arms obliged the Athenians to give
a peace to the confederates, in which it was expressly stipulated that
they should be free and independent. So that, in effect, these states tri-
umphed over their adversary, whose concessions were extorted by neces-
sity, and who, of consequent, harboured all the resentment of disap-
pointed ambition against their opponents.
The people of Rhodes, who had engaged warmly in this confederacy,
had formerly been indebted to Athens for assistance in defence of their
popular form of government against the favourers of aristocracy, who,
on their part, had been supported by the Lacedaemonians, The peace
now concluded promised to put an end to those civil commotions and
revolutions :o which the state of Rhodes had been exposed. But the
enterprising genius of Artemisia, who now reigned in Caria, prompted
her to attempt the conquest of Rhodes The King of Persia favoured her
design against an island which, by its situation, commanded the Egeau
Sea, and rendered the passage into Greece secure and easy ; and which
he justly expelled to gain from the Carian princess by treaty or by arms,
with less umbrage to the Greeks than any direct attack would give.
As a step previously necessary to this design, the aristocratical faction
was, partly by the gradual influence of secret practices and partly by
force, established in the government of Rhodes, which they proceeded
to exercise in an oppressive and tyrannical manner. The people, whose
liberties were thus overturned, saw no resource in their distress but to
apply to the generosity of Athens, their ancient protector. Ambassadors
were despatched to implore the assistance of the great defenders of
liberty; and in the assembly convened on this occasion the following
^ration was delivered in favour of the people of Rhodes.
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? 266 INTRODUCTION.
Their cause laboured under many difficulties. They had defied fht
people whose protection they were soliciting, and were now the objects
of their resentment. Their late opposition was considered at Athens as
the effect, not of a zeal for liberty, but of ingratitude and pride, of per-
verseness and insolence, which were represented as a part of their
national character. No speaker could venture to oppose these senti-
ments, which afforded those who spoke against the Rhodians ample
matter for invective. It was well known that the Persian king interested
himself in favour of the reigning party at Rhodes. The danger of irri-
tating this prince had been by Demosthenes himself strongly urged upon
other occasions; so that not only the passions and prejudices of the
assembly, but policy also pleaded powerfully against the present demand
of the Rhodians. Tn these circumstances, they required au able, artful,
and insinuating advocate; and such they found in our orator.
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? THE ORATION FOR THE LIBERTY OF
THE RHODIANS.
When affairs like these become the subject of our
uebates, it is my opinion, Athenians, that a general
liberty of speech should be allowed to all in this
assembly. 1 Not that I have ever thought it difficult
to point out the measures fittest to be pursued; for
(to speak my thoughts plainly) you seem of your-
selves sufficiently apprized of these. But to prevail
on you to pursue them,--there is the difficulty; for
when any thing hath been resolved, when it hath been
confirmed by your voices, we are just as far from
carrying it into execution as if it had never been
resolved.
> This exordium seems to have been founded on some particular cir-
cumstances of the assembly, or some difficulties which Demosthenes
was obliged to encounter before he could obtain an audience: the assem-
bly of the people at Athens was necessarily subject to the inconveniences
attending all popular meetings. Clamour, tumult, and contention fre-
quently disturbed it, especially when the point in debate was of an im-
portant kind, or the popular leaders divided, and, by interest or principle,
prompted to support their different opinions and parties with zeal and
ardour. Sometimes, as we learn from some passages in JEschines, the
leaders on one side took care to seize the gallery, from whence the
speakers addressed themselves to the people, and by open violence pre-
vented any one from taking his place there who was not a friend to the
measures which they recommended. Sometimes the magistrates who
presided in the assembly either thought it necessary for the preservation
of peace and order, or were induced by private motives to exert their
authority, and to circumscribe that liberty of speech for which the con-
stitution of Athens had so scrupulously provided. Hence frequently
arose a tumultuous mixture of acclamation, opposition, loud and vehe
ment commanding, and earnest expostulation, which formed a scene
fitted to discourage and terrify an inexperienced or dastardly speaker J--a
scene for which Demosthenes prepared himself by declaiming on the
seashore amid the roaring of the waves.
Vol. I. --X
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? 268
ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES.
One particular there is eminently distinguishable
among all those favours which we owe to Heaven. I
mean that they who not long since, prompted by their
insolence, appeared in arms against us, now rest all
their hopes of safety on this state; an event which
should inspire us with the greatest satisfaction: for
by a just and proper conduct on this occasion we
shall by our actions gloriously and nobly refute the
calumnies of our traducers. The Chians, and the
Byzantines, and the Rhodians accused us of danger-
ous designs against them, and from this pretence
conspired to raise the late war against us. But it
will now appear that Mausolus,1 the great author and
conductor of this war,--he who affected such zeal for
the interest of the Rhodians,--is the very person who
deprived them of their freedom; that the Chians and
the Byzantines,2 who then professed to be their allies,
have refused to assist them when distressed; but that
you, the great objects of their apprehensions, prove
to be the people of all others to whom alone they are
indebted for protection. When this is once made
manifest to the world, such must be the sentiments
with which you shall inspire the people of every com-
munity, that they will regard your friendship as the
pledge of their security. And surely, you cannot
enjoy greater happiness than such a universal confi-
dence and affection.
It is with surprise I find the very persons who urged
us to oppose the king3 in defence of the Egyptians
1 This passage seems to intimate that measures had been taken to
establish the aristocracy at Rhodes during the lifetime of Mausolus. The
queen, who is said to have directed and governed her husband, probably
recommended and made some progress in the execution of a design which,
was crowned with complete success in her own reign.
2 It was probably the fear of Artemisia's power which- prevented the
Chians and Byzantines from assisting their friends the Rhodians to
overturn the usurpation ; otherwise, the Chians, whose government was
republican, must have exerted themselves to secure the like constitution
to their allies. --LucChesini.
a When Artaxerxes engaged in the war with Nectanebus, King of
Egypt, both parties applied to the Greeks for assistance. The Persian
was refused; but such numbers of Grecian mercenaries engaged in tha
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? ORATION FOR THE KHODIANS. 269
now deterring us, by the apprehensions of his displea-
sure, from engaging in the affairs of Rhodes, and this
when it is well known that the Rhodians are really
Greeks; the others of the number of this prince's
subjects.
There are some among you who may remember
that at the time when the affairs of Persia were the
subject of our consultations, I was the first, I think
the only, or almost the only, one to recommend it as
the wisest measure not to assign your enmity to the
king as the motive of your armament; to make your
preparations against your avowed adversaries; but
to employ them even against him should he attempt
to injure you. Nor did I urge these things without
your full concurrence. You received them with ap-
plause. " On this present occasion my sentiments are
exactly consonant to what I then proposed; and were
I a subject to the king, were I called to be his coun-
sellor, to him I should suggest the very measures I
now recommend to you--to fight for his own domin
service of Nectanebus, that he was enabled to detach four thousand of
these to the assistance of the Sidonians; and probably the greater part
of these forces were Athenians, as the inveterate resentment of this
people to tin Persians prompted them to take all means of opposing thtm
which were not absolutely inconsistent with treaties. --Jjucchesini.
1 The approbation of tho people ho affects to consider as a full proof
of the justness of these his sentiments. "If they be then just, the king
must adopt them : no other can be recommended to him. And if his
conduct is to be guided by such principles, he cannot be provoked to take -
up arms against the Athenians by their interposition in favour of the
liberty of Rhodes, a Grecian state. It must be equally his interest not
to oppose the Athenians where his own kingdom is not immediately
attacked, as it is for the Athenians not to give unnecessary umbrage to
him. Such delicacy and caution must be acknowledged just and neces-
sary', hut are quite different from a supine inattention to all his motions
and an abject concession of all the conquests he may be prompted to
make, however injurious to Greece. Such conduct would not only be
dishonourable, but impolitic. While, on the contrary, vigour and resolu-
tion, prudently directed, instead of involving them in war, must awetheir
enemies, and preserve them in peace and security. " This seems to be
the sum of tho present argument; and the judicious will probably for-
give the attempt to open and illustrate particular passages, as the senti-
ments, in this oration especially, are delivered with such liveliness and
rapidity, that a reader not strictly attentive is oftentimes in danger of
losing the full view of our orator.
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? 270
ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES.
ions if attacked by any of the Greeks: never to in-
dulge an extravagant ambition of making foreign
conquests. If on your part, ye men of Athens, it be
resolved to give up all those cities to the king which
he may reduce to his obedience by surprising and
deceiving some members of the several cities, it is a
resolution I can by no means praise. But if ye be
persuaded that in the cause of justice ye should on all
occasions boldly draw the sword and encounter every
difficulty,--in the first place, such occasions will
occur more rarely the more you are possessed with
this persuasion; and then, it must be acknowledged
that such sentiments are worthy of this state.
That I recommend nothing new in moving you to
give liberty to the Rhodians, that you will do nothing
new if my counsels should prevail, may appear" from
one instance of our former conduct which proved of
important service. It maybe remembered,Athenians,
that you once sent out Timotheus to assist Ariobar-
zanes. 1 It was expressly prescribed in his commis-
sion that he should not proceed to any infringement
1 The time and circumstances of this expedition do not seem necessary
for illustrating the argument of Demosthenes, as he himself has dis-
tinctly explained the particulars necessary for his purpose. However,
the reader whose curiosity may prompt him to seek tor farther informs*
tion has here a fuller account from the Italian commentator. There is
no doubt but that T'motheus was sent on this expedition in the second,
or in the beginning of the third year of the hundred and fourth Olympiad ;
because in this year Ariobarzanes, together with some other satraps oh
the seacoast, Mausolus, and Tachus, king of Egypt, revolted from Ar-
taxerxes. The rebellion of Ariobarzanes was probably unknown to the
Athenians at this time. The design of the expedition was to establish
this satrap in the government of Phrygia, which he had seized on Ike
death of Mithridates by his own authority, though possibly he mipht
have assured the Athenians that he had acted by the king's commission.
Hence was Timotheus sent to support him, with instructions, however,
to commit no infringement of the treaties subsisting between Athens and
the Persian; and as this general coald not consistently with these in-
structions pursue the intended expedition in favour of Ariobarzanes, it
was not without good reason that .
he chose to empioy his forces in the
relief of Samoa, which was under the jurisdiction of Athens, and unjustiv
seized by the king's lieutenants in order to facilitate his operations araiust
the rebels on tite seacoast. Nor was it at all prudent for the Athenians
to suffer the Persians to possess an Wand from whence they miatrt
readily pass over into Greece. ' B
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? ORATION FOR THE RHODIANS.
271
of our treaty with die king. He saw that Ariobar-
zanes had openly revolted from his master. He saw
that Samos was held by Cyprothemes and his Persian
garrison, and that Tigranes, the king's own lieutenant,
had placed them in this city. To Ariobarzanes,
therefore, he refused assistance; Samos he invested
and restored to freedom; and to this day we never
were involved in any war on this account. For there
is a material difference between these two motives
for war--the enlargement of dominion, and the de-
fence of rightful possessions. When an invasion is
to be repelled, the contest is supported to the utmost:
not so for the objects of ambition. Men will indeed
attempt to gratify this passion if permitted; but if
opposed, they do not charge the opposition as injuri-
ous. Nor do I think that Artemisia will act contrary
to these principles if the state should interpose in the
affairs of Rhodes. Hear me for a moment, and judge
whether my reasons be well founded or invalid.
I think, then, that if all the king's attempts in
Egypt had been crowned with effectual success,
Artemisia would have exerted her utmost efforts to
teduce Rhodes to his suDjection, not from an affection
to the king, but in order to bind him by a signal
favour should he extend his dominions to her neigh-
bourhood, that in return he might admit her to the
strictest connexions of friendship. But since he hath
acted, as fame reports'--since he hath been unsue-
1 We learn from Diodorus (1. xvi. ), that in the present year, when this
oration was delivered, Ochus had not penetrated as far as Egypt, but led
his army against Sidon; which city, being betrayed by Mentor and
Tennes, its king, was set on fire and reduced to ashes by the inhabitants.
From hence the Persians marched the next year into Egypt, where they
at first met with some sinister accidents (a considerable part of tbe army
being lostin morasses), though in the conclusion they were enabled to con-
quer Nectanebus at Pelusium, and to reduce him to the utmost extremity.
Thus the assertion of Demosthenes seems not reconcileable to history.
But it must not be forgotten, that a passionate eagerness for intelligence
was a distinguishing part of the character of the Athenians, which, we
must suppose, was frequently gratified by rumours and advices invented
to please them, and artfully or credulously propagated. Something of
this kind ought have happened at present; and agreeable news from th>>
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? ST2 ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES.
cessful in all his attempts--she must suppose (and it
is in fact the case) that this islant. can be of no other
use to him but as a citadel to awe her kingdom and
to control her motions. So that, in my opinion, she
would rather that we were in possession of the island
(provided that this did not appear to be the act of
Artemisia) than that he should gain it. Nor would
she assist him in such an attempt, at least not with
sincerity ar. J vigour. As to the king, how he may
act oh any emergency I do not pretend to say. But
that it highly imports this state to have it known
explicitly whether he means to assert any claim to
Rhodes or no, this I firmly maintain. If he should,
our consultations are not to be confined to the Rho-
dians; our concern must be for ourselves and for all
the Greeks.
Yet, were these Rhodians, who now possess the
city, strong enough to maintain their possessions, I
should not have advised you to grant them aid: no,
though they should make you the most magnificent
promises. For I find, that in order to dissolve the
free government, they first seduced some citizens to
their party; and then, the moment they had gained
their purpose, they drove out those very citizens.
And they who have been false to both parties cannot.
I presume, prove faithful allies to this state. 1
Persian camp, whether believed by the orator or no, might have beer*
assumed as certain, without any scruple, te-answer the present purpose.
t At first glance, it may occur to the reader to ask how it comes that
Demosthenes, who pleads for the restoration of the popular state, here
seems to speak in favour of the reigning party. And though the com-
mentators, &c. take no notice of any difficulty in this passage, it may
not be deemed impertinent to endeavour to illustrate its purport and:
connexion. --Demosthenes has endeavoured to prove that the king, how-
ever he may favour or support the aristocracy at Rhodes, yet will not
consider the interposition of the Athenians in defence of the liberty of
that island as an acts of hostility against him ; and that neither he noe
Artemisia will oppose them. " Not that I pretend," says the orator
" to ascertain what the king's designs are, or what measures he may
pursue. But if he should assert any direct ciaim to the dominion of
Rhodes, his treaty with the Greeks is broken: we and all Greece arc
threatened. Tho question is no longer how the Rhodians shall bs
governed: the island must be defended for our own, sake, whatever
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? ORATION FOR THE RHODIANS. 273
These things I never should have urged had I only
considered the interest of Rhodes. 1 have no pub-
lic1 attachment to that state ; no particular connex-
ion with any of its citizens; or, were I engaged by
both these ties, in this assembly I should be influ-
enced only by the interest of my country. As to
these Rhodians (if one may so speak who pleads
for their protection), I rejoice at what hath hap-
pened; that the men who could not bear that we
should regain our just rights have now lost their own
liberty; that they who might have united on terms
of equality with the Greeks, and with us, the best of
Greeks, chose to admit Barbarians and slaves2 into
party may prevail there. Bat in such a case, it is the interest of Greece,
not that of the aristocratical faction at Rhodes, which should be con-
sidered; and however warrantable and just and prudent a vigorous
defence of the island would tben he; yet still, nothing but necessity,
nothing but the certainty of its falling into the power of the Persian,
without our assistance, could induce me to recommend the granting
that assistance. If the reigning party could by themselves defend the
island, they do not merit, nor should they be favoured with, our interpo-
sition : but if not, our own and our nation's interests require that we
should defeat the designs of the Persian against Rhodes, even though
this party should reap the immediate advantage. "
1 I have no public, &c. ]--The citizens of the more eminentstates in
Greece had it sometimes in their power to confer favours on inferior
communities; and these in return expressed their gratitude by declar-
ing that such persons should, at any time during their residence among
them, be entitled to entertainment at the public expense. In like man
ner favours conferred and received by particular persons entitled them
to the rights of private hospitality from each other. These were decla
rations of the most strict and inviolable friendship; and the least
neglect or violation of this hospitality was accounted a crime of the
most heinous nature. --The expressions in the original are founded on
these customs.
2 By Barbarians and slaves be means the forces of Artemisia, which
she sent to the assistance of the aristocratical faction, and which they
kept in the citadel for their defence. --Ijuccheshu. --The admission of
these forces into Rhodes is ascribed by Vitruvius to a stratagem of an
extraordinary nature. He tells us the Rhodians held a private intelli-
gence in Halicarnassus, the capital of Caria, and hoped that the inhabit-
ants would willingly unite with them, in order to shake off the yoke
of a woman. In these expectations they sent a fleet thither. But Arte-
misia, having discovered the plot, ordered the inhabitants to range them-
selves under their wails, and to receive the Rhodians as their expected
deliverers. Deceived by this appearance, the Rhodians landed, and left
their ships deserted. They were surrounded, and cut to pieces. Arte-
misia, who had ordered her galleys to fall down some canals which
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? 274 ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES.
their citadel, and to become their abject vassals. I
had almost said that these things must prove of use
to them, if you vouchsafe your aid. In a course of
prosperity, I know not whether they would ever
have returned to reason; for they are Rhodians. 1
But now, taught by experience that perverse folly
is the cause of numberless calamities, they may
possibly entertain sentiments more just and prudent
for the future. And this, I apprehend, would be no
small advantage to them. Let us then endeavour
to avert their ruin: let us not harbour ancient resent-
ments: let it be remembered that you yourselves
have oftentimes been deceived by those who enter-
tained designs against the state ; and yet on none
of these will you confess that punishment should be
inflicted.
Let it also be considered that you, my fellow-citi-
zens, have waged many wars against states both of
popular and oligarchical government. Of this you
are not to be informed : but perhaps you have never
once reflected what were the causes of your several
wars with each. With popular states2 your wars
arose from particular complaints, which could not
be decided in a national council; or from disputes
about districts and boundaries; or from the love of
glory or pre-eminence. But of your wars with
oligarchies,3 there were different causes: with these
communicated with the port, and to seize their ships, now set sail in
the Rhodian fleet, and appeared before their island. It was supposed
by the people of Rhodes that their own army was returned victorious;
and the Carians were masters of their fortress before the fatal mistake
was perceived.
t They are Rhodians. ]--Homer calls the Rhodians Wio^arouff, inso-
lent. And to this day they are said to be distinguished by the same
fault, though now reduced to the extremity of slavery. --Lucchesini.
2 1 imagine that the orator had here in view the expeditions against
the Corinthians and Syracusans. With the former the Athenians con
tended about boundaries and territory ; particular causes of complaint,
but especially ambition, prompted them to wage war against the latter
And the government both of Corinth and Syracuse was regularly demo-
cratical. --Lucchesini. v
3 By oligarchies the orator means the Boeotians and Mcgareans, but
principally the Lacedemonians. --Lucchesini.
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? ORATION FOR THE RHODIANS. 275
you fought for your constitution, for your liberty.
So that I should not scruple to avow my opinion that
it would be better for us to be at war with all the
states of Greece, provided1 that they enjoyed a popu-
lar government, than to be in friendship with them
all, if commanded by oligarchies ; for with free states
I should not think it difficult to conclude a peace
whenever you were inclined ; but with oligarchical
governments we could not even form a union to be
relied on: for it is not possible that the few can en-
tertain a sincere affection for the many; or the
friends of arbitrary power for the men who choose
to live in free equality.
l With all the states of Greece, provided, &c. ]--To this the orator sub-
joins a reason, which makes the assertion appear less extraordinary:
" If attacked by all, it is true, the contest could not be supported, yet no
terms of accommodation would be imposed that would alter or destroy
our constitution. But no peace could secure the freedom of the only
democratical state. The enemies of liberty, however apparently recon-
ciled, must ever hate and fear, and at length destroy it. "--As I have
taken the liberty to translate this passage in a manner different from
that of the commentators and interpreters, it will be necessary fairly to
quote the original at large: 'Start cywyc ovk av oKvtiffaifit uttbiv fiaXKov
hyetadat ovfitptpetv, SrifioKpatovfievovs tovs t'E\Xr}vas hitavtas itoXzptiv
vpiv iKryapxovfievovs <f>tXovs ctvat. --AtipoKpatovfiEVovg tovs 'EXX^va?
hath been generally taken as equivalent to tovs rwv 'EXX^iw SiifioKpa-
rovfitvavs, &c. ; and the original understood as containing this asser-
tion, "It would be more eligible that all the republics in Greece should
be at war with us, than that we should be in alliance with all the oligar-
chies. " The learned in the Greek language will determme whether, in
orde- to warrant this interpretation, the form of the sentence in the
original should not have been tovs IrifioKparovfitvovs 'EWrivas, instead
of dtifioKpatovfievovs tovsi &c. But, not to insist on grammatical nice-
ties, 11 is submitted to the reader who attends to the history and cir-
cumstances of Greece, whether to be at war with the free states, that
is. the states of Peloponnesus, or to be in alliance with the oligarchies,
that is (principally), the states of Lacedsemon and Bceotia, be two par-
ticulars so necessarily incompatible as to oblige the Athenians to choose
one or the other. If it be said that it is sufficient to suppose that par-
ticular quarrels might arise, in which a union with Sparta and Bceotia
Would prevent the free states from attacking the Athenians, and the
rejecting this union might encourage them to th*. attack ; in such case
I suspect that Che orator never could have advised his countrymen to
engage singly in a war. as the most eligible measure, which, by weak-
ening each party, would render both an easier prey to those who are
supposed (from the nature of their constitution) to be their common
enemies. And such advice would still be more unaccountable should
It be supposed, that in consequence of rejecting the alliance of Sparta
and Bee Kia, these states would unite with the enemies of Athens,
i
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? 278 ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES.
I am surprised that none among you should con-
ceive, that if the Chians, and the Mityleneans, and.
now the Rhodians, are to be subjected to a few,1 iP
had almost said, if all mankind are to be thus en-
slaved, our constitution must be threatened with
danger. It is surprising that none among you should
reflect, that if this form of polity be established in
every place, it is not possible that our free govern-
ment should be suffered to continue: for it must
then be certain that none others but the Athenians
can arise to restore affairs to their original state of
freedom; and those whom men regard as dangerous
they must ever labour to destroy. In every other
case they who act unjustly are enemies only to those
whom their injustice hath immediately affected; but
they who subvert free states, and reduce them to
the power of a few, are to be deemed the common
enemies of all the zealous friends of liberty. And
justice too demands, ye men of Athens, that you,
who enjoy a popular government, should discover
the same concern for the misfortunes of other free
states which you yourselves would expect from
them, if at any time (which Heaven avert! ) the like
misfortunes should oppress you. It may be said,
indeed, that the Rhodians are deservedly distressed:
but this is not a time for such objections. Let the
prosperous ever show the tenderest solicitude for
the unhappy, since none can say what may be their
own future fortune.
I have heard it frequently observed in this assem
bly, that when the state was in its deepest distress,
there were not wanting friends to concert measures
for its restoration. Of this I shall at present briefly
1 From this passage it seems not improbable tbat the designs of the-
Perrian had extended farther than to Rhodes, and that he had by hi>>
power <<r influence lately made alterations in the state and government
of these inferior islands which the embarrassed condition of the Athe-
nians, and their attention to the motions of the Macedonian king, migtu
have prevented them trom opposing.
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? ORATION FOR THE RHODIANS. 277
mention but one instance--I mean that of the Ar-
rives. ' And I should be sorry that we, whose dis-
tinguished character it is to protect the wietched,
should appear inferior to the Argives in this particu-
lar. They, though seated on the borders of Lace-
daemon, witnesses of the uncontrolled power of this
city, both by sea and land, yet couldnot be diverted,
could not be deterred from expressing their affection
to the Athenians. When ambassadors came from
Lacedaemon to demand some Athenian exiles who
had taken refuge at Argos, they declared by a de-
cree, that unless these ambassadors departed from
their city before the setting sun they should be ac-
counted. enemies. And would it not be shameful,
my countrymen, that the populace of Argos should,
in such times as these, defy the terror of the Lacedae-
monian power and sovereignty, and yet that you, who
are Athenians, should be terrified by a Barbarian,
nay, by a woman ? The Argives might have justly
pleaded that they had oftentimes been conquered
by the Lacedaemonians. But you have frequently
proved victorious over the king; never were once
defeated, either by his slaves or by himself. Or, if
the Persian boasts to have obtained any advantage
over us, he owes it to those treasures which he lav-
ished on the corrupt traitors and hirelings of Greece.
If ever he hath prevailed, by these means hath he
prevailed. Nor have such successes proved of real
use. No: we find that, at the very time when he
was endeavouring to depress this state by the help
of Lacedaemon, his own dominions were exposed to
the dangerous attempts of Clearchus and Cyrus. 3
- This instance of the magnanimity of the Argives most have been
particularly agreeable to the assembly, as the form of government at
Argos was, like that of Athens, republican. The memory of this noble
and generous act has been passed over by historians: but we have it
here preserved, enlivened, and enforced by the most vivid colouring and
the utmost strength of expression. --Liicckesini.
2 In the first year of the ninety-fourth Olympiad the Lacedaemonians
became masters of Athens, and there established the thirty tyrants. In
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? 278 ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES.
Thus were his avowed attacks ever unsuccessful,
his secret practices attended with no real advantage.
There are men among you who frequently affect
a disregard of Philip, as if beneath their attention;
but of the king express the most terrible apprehen-
sions, as of an enemy truly dangerous to those whom
he may determine to attack. If, then, we are never
to oppose the one, because weak, and to make un-
bounded concessions to the other, because formida-
ble, against whom, my countrymen, are we to draw
our swords?
There are men, too, most powerful in pleading for
the rights of others in opposition to your demands.
To these I would make one request; that they
should endeavour to display an equal zeal in the
defence of your rights against your adversaries.
Thus shall they be the first to show a real regard
to justice. It is absurd to urge its precepts to you
if they themselves pay no deference to its authority.
And surely a member of this state cannot pretend
to a regard for justice, who seeks industriously for
every argument against us, never for those which
may be urged in our favour. Consider, I conjure
you, why, among the Byzantines, there is no man
to inform them that they are not to seize Chalcedon,1
which is really the king's; which you some time
possessed; but to which they have no sort of claim:
that they should not attempt to reduce Sylembria to
their subjection, a city once united in alliance with
us: that in assuming a power of determining the '
boundaries of the Sylembriao territory, the Byzan-
tines violate their oaths, they infringe those treaties
the fourth year of the same Olympiad Cyrus took up arms against his
brother Artaxerxes. So that between these two events but a smali
interval of time intervened ; which sufficiently warrants the assertion
of the orator. --Jjucchesiui.
1 Chalcedon.
necessarily oppose our endeavours to restore the
cities: an event which they must justly regard as
their own destruction: and, in our own affair,1 the
attempt must prove ineffectual. And what in truth
can be expected, if we are ever suffering cities now
in being to be destroyed, and demanding that cities
long since ruined should be restored ?
It hath been urged in this debate, by those who
have spoken with the greatest appearance of reason,
that these people should take down the public monu-
ments2 of their treaty with Thebes, if they mean to
1 Our own aflair. ]^That Is, the recovery of Oropus.
2 The public monuments, &c. ]--In the original, Tas XTHAA2
Kadckuv ras irpos Qr}/iaiovs. It was the custom of Greece thit the trea-
ties of the several states, and the conditions of these treaties, should be
Inscribed on columns, which were erected, and, while the treaties sub-
sisted, were preserved, in the most public and frequented places; as u.
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? 262 ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES.
be real allies to this state. On the other side, it is
alleged that it is not such monuments, but interest,
which they regTlrd as the essential cause of friend-
ship; that they must look on those as their real allies
who will grant them their assistance.
But, however sincerely they may thus profess, this
is my opinion: that you should demand both that
these monuments be taken down, and that Lacedae-
monTje obliged to peace. If either of these demands
be rejected, we should then unite with that party
which hath acquiesced: for, if when they are allowed
to live unmolested the Megalopolitans should still
adhere to their connexions with the Thebans, they
must then discover to the world that they were in-
fluenced by the hopes conceived from the superiority
of Thebes, not by motives of equity. If, on the other
hand, when the Megalopolitans have, with real faith
and sincerity, formed an alliance with us, the Lace-
daemonians should still refuse to live in peace, it must
be manifest that all this their solicitude is not that
Thespia may be restored, but that, while the Thebans
are embroiled in this war, they may seize the oppor-
tunity of reducing all Peloponnesus.
I am surprised at some persons, who express
dreadful apprehensions at the allies of Thebes be-
coming enemies to Lacedsemon; yet, should Lace-
the scenes of their great games, where the whole nation was collected
at particular seasons, and there had an opportunity of being witnesses
of tho terms agreed on. The observance of these was, in some sort, a
matter of national concern, and came under the cognizance of the great
couneil of amphictyons. That the contracting powers themselves might
have the monuments of their public acts continually in view, the like
columns were erected in the most conspicuous places of their cities.
. Thus we learn from Thucydides that when the Athenians and Lacedae-
monians had concluded a truce for fifty years, in the tenth year of the
famous Peloponnesian war, it was provided that the columns on which
the treaty was inscribed should be erected in such places as have been
mentioned. XrriXas Se crtiffat OXupttiafft, Kai HvOau Kai laB^y, Kai cv
ABiivais tv ttoXci, Kai tv AaKtSaiuovi tv A/iUKAaiif). Pausanias observes
that in his days many of these columns were preserved in the Olympian
temple, and particularly that which was the monument of the treaty
concluded between the Athenians, Argians, and Mantineans, in the
twelfth year ofthe Peloponnesian war.
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? ORATION FOR THE MEGAX. OPOLITANS. 263
daemon subdue these people, see no danger in such
an event; especially when we have the experience
of past times to assure us that the Thebans have
ever used those allies1 against the Lacedaemonians;
the Lacedaemonians, when their masters, have ever
employed them against us. It is therefore seriously
to be considered, that should you now refuse to admit
the Megalopolitans to your alliance, they must either
be subverted and dispersed, and then the Lacedae-
monians at once become powerful; or, they must
escape the danger (as we sometimes see strange and
unexpected events); and then, with good reason,
they must become firm associates to the Thebans:
but, if we accept of these their overtures, they must
then owe and acknowledge their preservation to this
state.
But let us turn our thoughts from their fortunes
and their dangers, arfd fix our attention on the The-
bans and Lacedaemonians. Should this war prove
fatal to the Thebans (as our interest requires), still
i By those allies, the orator undoubtedly means, not the Arcadians
only, but the whole body of the Peloponnesian states. And what he
observes of these states is fully eonfirrned by history. To mention only
the more famous battles fought between the Thebans and Athenians,
it appears that the former were not assisted by the Peloponnesians in
their first unsuccessful engagement at Tanagra (An. 4. Ol. 80): in the
second, when they were victorious (An. 2. 01. 83); or in the third, when
they were again conquered (An. 1. Oi. 89); or in theirvictory at Delium,
in the following year. On the other hand, after the battle of Leuctra the
Thebans were joined by the Arcadians in their invasion of Sparta (An.
3. 01. 102); and the next year entered the territory of LacedEemon, in
conjunction with the Arcadians, Argives, and Eleans. But the Lace-
dsemotiians were assisted by their Peloponnesian allies in all their wars
with the Athenians. In the great Peloponnesian war " the confederates
of the Lacedaemonians were (says Thucydides) all the Peloponnesians
that dwelt within the isthmus, except the Arrives and Achaeans, who
had attachments to each of the contending parries. "--AaKt&aipoviwv fiev
o'i fyfipaxoi, HeXoirovviurtoi. ptv oi tvtos IcOfiov iravriff, ttXiiv Apyemv
Kai A%atu)v. Tovtois oe eg afuporepovs 0iXia tiv.
Many other instances to the same purpose might be produced from
Mstory. But should U be objected to the assertion of the orator, that
at the battle of Man tinea, some of the Peloponnesians united with the
Thebans against the Athenian powers, the answer is obvious, that the
Athenians were not the objects of this confederacy; that it was formed
against the Spartans, to whom Athens served but as an auyin--"
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? 264 OB>>T)ONS OF DEMOSTHENES.
the powe 'Jf the Lacedaemonians will be duly circum-
scribed, while they have the Arcadians on their
borders, ever ready to arm against them. But sup-
pose the Thebans should prove superior to their
dangers, should still defend their country, and should
not fall before their enemies: yet, must they be the
less powerful, if on our side we be strengthened by
allies to v. hom we ourselves gave being ? At all
events, therefore, the interest of the state demands
that we should not abandon the Arcadians; that, if
preserved, they should not seem to owe their preserva-
tion to themselves; that they should not owe it to
any others; but that it should* be the act of the
Athenians. .
And now, my fellow-citizens, I call the gods to
witness, that I have spoken, not from private affec-
tion, not from particular resentment to either party,
but from a regard to what I deem the real interest
of my country! This then is my opinion; that you
should not abandon the people of Megalopolis; no,
nor any weaker state, to the power of the stronger. 1
1 It does not appear from history that this oration had the due effect.
Whether the prospect of recovering Oropus had greater influence than
the more liberal and less confined policy of Demosthenes; or whether
the present circumstances and connexions of the Athenians prevented
them from acting in favour of the Megalopolitans; certain it is, that they
did not exert themselves on this occasion in defence of the liberty of
Peloponnesus. The quarrel was carried on for some short time. The
LacedtBmonians had generally the advantage; but soon found it neces-
sary to end the war by a truce with the people of Megalopolis.
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? THE ORATION FOR THE LIBERTY OP
THE RHODIANS:
PRONOUNCED IN THE ARCIIONSHIP OF THKSSALUS, THE SECOND YEAR
OF THE HUNDRED AND SEVENTH OLYMPIAD.
INTRODUCTION.
An attempt made in the hundred and fifth. Olympiad to reduce the
states of Chios, Cos, and Rhodes to a dependency on Athens produced
the war well known by the name of " The Social War," wiiich was for
three years supported by the Athenians on one side, and on the other by
the Chians, Coans, and Rhodians, assisted by the Byzantines and by
Mausolus, King of Caria; which prince (or rather his wife, Artemisia,
who governed in his name) was the principal agent in fomenting this
quarrel. Their fears of the Persian arms obliged the Athenians to give
a peace to the confederates, in which it was expressly stipulated that
they should be free and independent. So that, in effect, these states tri-
umphed over their adversary, whose concessions were extorted by neces-
sity, and who, of consequent, harboured all the resentment of disap-
pointed ambition against their opponents.
The people of Rhodes, who had engaged warmly in this confederacy,
had formerly been indebted to Athens for assistance in defence of their
popular form of government against the favourers of aristocracy, who,
on their part, had been supported by the Lacedaemonians, The peace
now concluded promised to put an end to those civil commotions and
revolutions :o which the state of Rhodes had been exposed. But the
enterprising genius of Artemisia, who now reigned in Caria, prompted
her to attempt the conquest of Rhodes The King of Persia favoured her
design against an island which, by its situation, commanded the Egeau
Sea, and rendered the passage into Greece secure and easy ; and which
he justly expelled to gain from the Carian princess by treaty or by arms,
with less umbrage to the Greeks than any direct attack would give.
As a step previously necessary to this design, the aristocratical faction
was, partly by the gradual influence of secret practices and partly by
force, established in the government of Rhodes, which they proceeded
to exercise in an oppressive and tyrannical manner. The people, whose
liberties were thus overturned, saw no resource in their distress but to
apply to the generosity of Athens, their ancient protector. Ambassadors
were despatched to implore the assistance of the great defenders of
liberty; and in the assembly convened on this occasion the following
^ration was delivered in favour of the people of Rhodes.
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? 266 INTRODUCTION.
Their cause laboured under many difficulties. They had defied fht
people whose protection they were soliciting, and were now the objects
of their resentment. Their late opposition was considered at Athens as
the effect, not of a zeal for liberty, but of ingratitude and pride, of per-
verseness and insolence, which were represented as a part of their
national character. No speaker could venture to oppose these senti-
ments, which afforded those who spoke against the Rhodians ample
matter for invective. It was well known that the Persian king interested
himself in favour of the reigning party at Rhodes. The danger of irri-
tating this prince had been by Demosthenes himself strongly urged upon
other occasions; so that not only the passions and prejudices of the
assembly, but policy also pleaded powerfully against the present demand
of the Rhodians. Tn these circumstances, they required au able, artful,
and insinuating advocate; and such they found in our orator.
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? THE ORATION FOR THE LIBERTY OF
THE RHODIANS.
When affairs like these become the subject of our
uebates, it is my opinion, Athenians, that a general
liberty of speech should be allowed to all in this
assembly. 1 Not that I have ever thought it difficult
to point out the measures fittest to be pursued; for
(to speak my thoughts plainly) you seem of your-
selves sufficiently apprized of these. But to prevail
on you to pursue them,--there is the difficulty; for
when any thing hath been resolved, when it hath been
confirmed by your voices, we are just as far from
carrying it into execution as if it had never been
resolved.
> This exordium seems to have been founded on some particular cir-
cumstances of the assembly, or some difficulties which Demosthenes
was obliged to encounter before he could obtain an audience: the assem-
bly of the people at Athens was necessarily subject to the inconveniences
attending all popular meetings. Clamour, tumult, and contention fre-
quently disturbed it, especially when the point in debate was of an im-
portant kind, or the popular leaders divided, and, by interest or principle,
prompted to support their different opinions and parties with zeal and
ardour. Sometimes, as we learn from some passages in JEschines, the
leaders on one side took care to seize the gallery, from whence the
speakers addressed themselves to the people, and by open violence pre-
vented any one from taking his place there who was not a friend to the
measures which they recommended. Sometimes the magistrates who
presided in the assembly either thought it necessary for the preservation
of peace and order, or were induced by private motives to exert their
authority, and to circumscribe that liberty of speech for which the con-
stitution of Athens had so scrupulously provided. Hence frequently
arose a tumultuous mixture of acclamation, opposition, loud and vehe
ment commanding, and earnest expostulation, which formed a scene
fitted to discourage and terrify an inexperienced or dastardly speaker J--a
scene for which Demosthenes prepared himself by declaiming on the
seashore amid the roaring of the waves.
Vol. I. --X
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? 268
ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES.
One particular there is eminently distinguishable
among all those favours which we owe to Heaven. I
mean that they who not long since, prompted by their
insolence, appeared in arms against us, now rest all
their hopes of safety on this state; an event which
should inspire us with the greatest satisfaction: for
by a just and proper conduct on this occasion we
shall by our actions gloriously and nobly refute the
calumnies of our traducers. The Chians, and the
Byzantines, and the Rhodians accused us of danger-
ous designs against them, and from this pretence
conspired to raise the late war against us. But it
will now appear that Mausolus,1 the great author and
conductor of this war,--he who affected such zeal for
the interest of the Rhodians,--is the very person who
deprived them of their freedom; that the Chians and
the Byzantines,2 who then professed to be their allies,
have refused to assist them when distressed; but that
you, the great objects of their apprehensions, prove
to be the people of all others to whom alone they are
indebted for protection. When this is once made
manifest to the world, such must be the sentiments
with which you shall inspire the people of every com-
munity, that they will regard your friendship as the
pledge of their security. And surely, you cannot
enjoy greater happiness than such a universal confi-
dence and affection.
It is with surprise I find the very persons who urged
us to oppose the king3 in defence of the Egyptians
1 This passage seems to intimate that measures had been taken to
establish the aristocracy at Rhodes during the lifetime of Mausolus. The
queen, who is said to have directed and governed her husband, probably
recommended and made some progress in the execution of a design which,
was crowned with complete success in her own reign.
2 It was probably the fear of Artemisia's power which- prevented the
Chians and Byzantines from assisting their friends the Rhodians to
overturn the usurpation ; otherwise, the Chians, whose government was
republican, must have exerted themselves to secure the like constitution
to their allies. --LucChesini.
a When Artaxerxes engaged in the war with Nectanebus, King of
Egypt, both parties applied to the Greeks for assistance. The Persian
was refused; but such numbers of Grecian mercenaries engaged in tha
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? ORATION FOR THE KHODIANS. 269
now deterring us, by the apprehensions of his displea-
sure, from engaging in the affairs of Rhodes, and this
when it is well known that the Rhodians are really
Greeks; the others of the number of this prince's
subjects.
There are some among you who may remember
that at the time when the affairs of Persia were the
subject of our consultations, I was the first, I think
the only, or almost the only, one to recommend it as
the wisest measure not to assign your enmity to the
king as the motive of your armament; to make your
preparations against your avowed adversaries; but
to employ them even against him should he attempt
to injure you. Nor did I urge these things without
your full concurrence. You received them with ap-
plause. " On this present occasion my sentiments are
exactly consonant to what I then proposed; and were
I a subject to the king, were I called to be his coun-
sellor, to him I should suggest the very measures I
now recommend to you--to fight for his own domin
service of Nectanebus, that he was enabled to detach four thousand of
these to the assistance of the Sidonians; and probably the greater part
of these forces were Athenians, as the inveterate resentment of this
people to tin Persians prompted them to take all means of opposing thtm
which were not absolutely inconsistent with treaties. --Jjucchesini.
1 The approbation of tho people ho affects to consider as a full proof
of the justness of these his sentiments. "If they be then just, the king
must adopt them : no other can be recommended to him. And if his
conduct is to be guided by such principles, he cannot be provoked to take -
up arms against the Athenians by their interposition in favour of the
liberty of Rhodes, a Grecian state. It must be equally his interest not
to oppose the Athenians where his own kingdom is not immediately
attacked, as it is for the Athenians not to give unnecessary umbrage to
him. Such delicacy and caution must be acknowledged just and neces-
sary', hut are quite different from a supine inattention to all his motions
and an abject concession of all the conquests he may be prompted to
make, however injurious to Greece. Such conduct would not only be
dishonourable, but impolitic. While, on the contrary, vigour and resolu-
tion, prudently directed, instead of involving them in war, must awetheir
enemies, and preserve them in peace and security. " This seems to be
the sum of tho present argument; and the judicious will probably for-
give the attempt to open and illustrate particular passages, as the senti-
ments, in this oration especially, are delivered with such liveliness and
rapidity, that a reader not strictly attentive is oftentimes in danger of
losing the full view of our orator.
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? 270
ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES.
ions if attacked by any of the Greeks: never to in-
dulge an extravagant ambition of making foreign
conquests. If on your part, ye men of Athens, it be
resolved to give up all those cities to the king which
he may reduce to his obedience by surprising and
deceiving some members of the several cities, it is a
resolution I can by no means praise. But if ye be
persuaded that in the cause of justice ye should on all
occasions boldly draw the sword and encounter every
difficulty,--in the first place, such occasions will
occur more rarely the more you are possessed with
this persuasion; and then, it must be acknowledged
that such sentiments are worthy of this state.
That I recommend nothing new in moving you to
give liberty to the Rhodians, that you will do nothing
new if my counsels should prevail, may appear" from
one instance of our former conduct which proved of
important service. It maybe remembered,Athenians,
that you once sent out Timotheus to assist Ariobar-
zanes. 1 It was expressly prescribed in his commis-
sion that he should not proceed to any infringement
1 The time and circumstances of this expedition do not seem necessary
for illustrating the argument of Demosthenes, as he himself has dis-
tinctly explained the particulars necessary for his purpose. However,
the reader whose curiosity may prompt him to seek tor farther informs*
tion has here a fuller account from the Italian commentator. There is
no doubt but that T'motheus was sent on this expedition in the second,
or in the beginning of the third year of the hundred and fourth Olympiad ;
because in this year Ariobarzanes, together with some other satraps oh
the seacoast, Mausolus, and Tachus, king of Egypt, revolted from Ar-
taxerxes. The rebellion of Ariobarzanes was probably unknown to the
Athenians at this time. The design of the expedition was to establish
this satrap in the government of Phrygia, which he had seized on Ike
death of Mithridates by his own authority, though possibly he mipht
have assured the Athenians that he had acted by the king's commission.
Hence was Timotheus sent to support him, with instructions, however,
to commit no infringement of the treaties subsisting between Athens and
the Persian; and as this general coald not consistently with these in-
structions pursue the intended expedition in favour of Ariobarzanes, it
was not without good reason that .
he chose to empioy his forces in the
relief of Samoa, which was under the jurisdiction of Athens, and unjustiv
seized by the king's lieutenants in order to facilitate his operations araiust
the rebels on tite seacoast. Nor was it at all prudent for the Athenians
to suffer the Persians to possess an Wand from whence they miatrt
readily pass over into Greece. ' B
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? ORATION FOR THE RHODIANS.
271
of our treaty with die king. He saw that Ariobar-
zanes had openly revolted from his master. He saw
that Samos was held by Cyprothemes and his Persian
garrison, and that Tigranes, the king's own lieutenant,
had placed them in this city. To Ariobarzanes,
therefore, he refused assistance; Samos he invested
and restored to freedom; and to this day we never
were involved in any war on this account. For there
is a material difference between these two motives
for war--the enlargement of dominion, and the de-
fence of rightful possessions. When an invasion is
to be repelled, the contest is supported to the utmost:
not so for the objects of ambition. Men will indeed
attempt to gratify this passion if permitted; but if
opposed, they do not charge the opposition as injuri-
ous. Nor do I think that Artemisia will act contrary
to these principles if the state should interpose in the
affairs of Rhodes. Hear me for a moment, and judge
whether my reasons be well founded or invalid.
I think, then, that if all the king's attempts in
Egypt had been crowned with effectual success,
Artemisia would have exerted her utmost efforts to
teduce Rhodes to his suDjection, not from an affection
to the king, but in order to bind him by a signal
favour should he extend his dominions to her neigh-
bourhood, that in return he might admit her to the
strictest connexions of friendship. But since he hath
acted, as fame reports'--since he hath been unsue-
1 We learn from Diodorus (1. xvi. ), that in the present year, when this
oration was delivered, Ochus had not penetrated as far as Egypt, but led
his army against Sidon; which city, being betrayed by Mentor and
Tennes, its king, was set on fire and reduced to ashes by the inhabitants.
From hence the Persians marched the next year into Egypt, where they
at first met with some sinister accidents (a considerable part of tbe army
being lostin morasses), though in the conclusion they were enabled to con-
quer Nectanebus at Pelusium, and to reduce him to the utmost extremity.
Thus the assertion of Demosthenes seems not reconcileable to history.
But it must not be forgotten, that a passionate eagerness for intelligence
was a distinguishing part of the character of the Athenians, which, we
must suppose, was frequently gratified by rumours and advices invented
to please them, and artfully or credulously propagated. Something of
this kind ought have happened at present; and agreeable news from th>>
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? ST2 ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES.
cessful in all his attempts--she must suppose (and it
is in fact the case) that this islant. can be of no other
use to him but as a citadel to awe her kingdom and
to control her motions. So that, in my opinion, she
would rather that we were in possession of the island
(provided that this did not appear to be the act of
Artemisia) than that he should gain it. Nor would
she assist him in such an attempt, at least not with
sincerity ar. J vigour. As to the king, how he may
act oh any emergency I do not pretend to say. But
that it highly imports this state to have it known
explicitly whether he means to assert any claim to
Rhodes or no, this I firmly maintain. If he should,
our consultations are not to be confined to the Rho-
dians; our concern must be for ourselves and for all
the Greeks.
Yet, were these Rhodians, who now possess the
city, strong enough to maintain their possessions, I
should not have advised you to grant them aid: no,
though they should make you the most magnificent
promises. For I find, that in order to dissolve the
free government, they first seduced some citizens to
their party; and then, the moment they had gained
their purpose, they drove out those very citizens.
And they who have been false to both parties cannot.
I presume, prove faithful allies to this state. 1
Persian camp, whether believed by the orator or no, might have beer*
assumed as certain, without any scruple, te-answer the present purpose.
t At first glance, it may occur to the reader to ask how it comes that
Demosthenes, who pleads for the restoration of the popular state, here
seems to speak in favour of the reigning party. And though the com-
mentators, &c. take no notice of any difficulty in this passage, it may
not be deemed impertinent to endeavour to illustrate its purport and:
connexion. --Demosthenes has endeavoured to prove that the king, how-
ever he may favour or support the aristocracy at Rhodes, yet will not
consider the interposition of the Athenians in defence of the liberty of
that island as an acts of hostility against him ; and that neither he noe
Artemisia will oppose them. " Not that I pretend," says the orator
" to ascertain what the king's designs are, or what measures he may
pursue. But if he should assert any direct ciaim to the dominion of
Rhodes, his treaty with the Greeks is broken: we and all Greece arc
threatened. Tho question is no longer how the Rhodians shall bs
governed: the island must be defended for our own, sake, whatever
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? ORATION FOR THE RHODIANS. 273
These things I never should have urged had I only
considered the interest of Rhodes. 1 have no pub-
lic1 attachment to that state ; no particular connex-
ion with any of its citizens; or, were I engaged by
both these ties, in this assembly I should be influ-
enced only by the interest of my country. As to
these Rhodians (if one may so speak who pleads
for their protection), I rejoice at what hath hap-
pened; that the men who could not bear that we
should regain our just rights have now lost their own
liberty; that they who might have united on terms
of equality with the Greeks, and with us, the best of
Greeks, chose to admit Barbarians and slaves2 into
party may prevail there. Bat in such a case, it is the interest of Greece,
not that of the aristocratical faction at Rhodes, which should be con-
sidered; and however warrantable and just and prudent a vigorous
defence of the island would tben he; yet still, nothing but necessity,
nothing but the certainty of its falling into the power of the Persian,
without our assistance, could induce me to recommend the granting
that assistance. If the reigning party could by themselves defend the
island, they do not merit, nor should they be favoured with, our interpo-
sition : but if not, our own and our nation's interests require that we
should defeat the designs of the Persian against Rhodes, even though
this party should reap the immediate advantage. "
1 I have no public, &c. ]--The citizens of the more eminentstates in
Greece had it sometimes in their power to confer favours on inferior
communities; and these in return expressed their gratitude by declar-
ing that such persons should, at any time during their residence among
them, be entitled to entertainment at the public expense. In like man
ner favours conferred and received by particular persons entitled them
to the rights of private hospitality from each other. These were decla
rations of the most strict and inviolable friendship; and the least
neglect or violation of this hospitality was accounted a crime of the
most heinous nature. --The expressions in the original are founded on
these customs.
2 By Barbarians and slaves be means the forces of Artemisia, which
she sent to the assistance of the aristocratical faction, and which they
kept in the citadel for their defence. --Ijuccheshu. --The admission of
these forces into Rhodes is ascribed by Vitruvius to a stratagem of an
extraordinary nature. He tells us the Rhodians held a private intelli-
gence in Halicarnassus, the capital of Caria, and hoped that the inhabit-
ants would willingly unite with them, in order to shake off the yoke
of a woman. In these expectations they sent a fleet thither. But Arte-
misia, having discovered the plot, ordered the inhabitants to range them-
selves under their wails, and to receive the Rhodians as their expected
deliverers. Deceived by this appearance, the Rhodians landed, and left
their ships deserted. They were surrounded, and cut to pieces. Arte-
misia, who had ordered her galleys to fall down some canals which
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? 274 ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES.
their citadel, and to become their abject vassals. I
had almost said that these things must prove of use
to them, if you vouchsafe your aid. In a course of
prosperity, I know not whether they would ever
have returned to reason; for they are Rhodians. 1
But now, taught by experience that perverse folly
is the cause of numberless calamities, they may
possibly entertain sentiments more just and prudent
for the future. And this, I apprehend, would be no
small advantage to them. Let us then endeavour
to avert their ruin: let us not harbour ancient resent-
ments: let it be remembered that you yourselves
have oftentimes been deceived by those who enter-
tained designs against the state ; and yet on none
of these will you confess that punishment should be
inflicted.
Let it also be considered that you, my fellow-citi-
zens, have waged many wars against states both of
popular and oligarchical government. Of this you
are not to be informed : but perhaps you have never
once reflected what were the causes of your several
wars with each. With popular states2 your wars
arose from particular complaints, which could not
be decided in a national council; or from disputes
about districts and boundaries; or from the love of
glory or pre-eminence. But of your wars with
oligarchies,3 there were different causes: with these
communicated with the port, and to seize their ships, now set sail in
the Rhodian fleet, and appeared before their island. It was supposed
by the people of Rhodes that their own army was returned victorious;
and the Carians were masters of their fortress before the fatal mistake
was perceived.
t They are Rhodians. ]--Homer calls the Rhodians Wio^arouff, inso-
lent. And to this day they are said to be distinguished by the same
fault, though now reduced to the extremity of slavery. --Lucchesini.
2 1 imagine that the orator had here in view the expeditions against
the Corinthians and Syracusans. With the former the Athenians con
tended about boundaries and territory ; particular causes of complaint,
but especially ambition, prompted them to wage war against the latter
And the government both of Corinth and Syracuse was regularly demo-
cratical. --Lucchesini. v
3 By oligarchies the orator means the Boeotians and Mcgareans, but
principally the Lacedemonians. --Lucchesini.
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? ORATION FOR THE RHODIANS. 275
you fought for your constitution, for your liberty.
So that I should not scruple to avow my opinion that
it would be better for us to be at war with all the
states of Greece, provided1 that they enjoyed a popu-
lar government, than to be in friendship with them
all, if commanded by oligarchies ; for with free states
I should not think it difficult to conclude a peace
whenever you were inclined ; but with oligarchical
governments we could not even form a union to be
relied on: for it is not possible that the few can en-
tertain a sincere affection for the many; or the
friends of arbitrary power for the men who choose
to live in free equality.
l With all the states of Greece, provided, &c. ]--To this the orator sub-
joins a reason, which makes the assertion appear less extraordinary:
" If attacked by all, it is true, the contest could not be supported, yet no
terms of accommodation would be imposed that would alter or destroy
our constitution. But no peace could secure the freedom of the only
democratical state. The enemies of liberty, however apparently recon-
ciled, must ever hate and fear, and at length destroy it. "--As I have
taken the liberty to translate this passage in a manner different from
that of the commentators and interpreters, it will be necessary fairly to
quote the original at large: 'Start cywyc ovk av oKvtiffaifit uttbiv fiaXKov
hyetadat ovfitptpetv, SrifioKpatovfievovs tovs t'E\Xr}vas hitavtas itoXzptiv
vpiv iKryapxovfievovs <f>tXovs ctvat. --AtipoKpatovfiEVovg tovs 'EXX^va?
hath been generally taken as equivalent to tovs rwv 'EXX^iw SiifioKpa-
rovfitvavs, &c. ; and the original understood as containing this asser-
tion, "It would be more eligible that all the republics in Greece should
be at war with us, than that we should be in alliance with all the oligar-
chies. " The learned in the Greek language will determme whether, in
orde- to warrant this interpretation, the form of the sentence in the
original should not have been tovs IrifioKparovfitvovs 'EWrivas, instead
of dtifioKpatovfievovs tovsi &c. But, not to insist on grammatical nice-
ties, 11 is submitted to the reader who attends to the history and cir-
cumstances of Greece, whether to be at war with the free states, that
is. the states of Peloponnesus, or to be in alliance with the oligarchies,
that is (principally), the states of Lacedsemon and Bceotia, be two par-
ticulars so necessarily incompatible as to oblige the Athenians to choose
one or the other. If it be said that it is sufficient to suppose that par-
ticular quarrels might arise, in which a union with Sparta and Bceotia
Would prevent the free states from attacking the Athenians, and the
rejecting this union might encourage them to th*. attack ; in such case
I suspect that Che orator never could have advised his countrymen to
engage singly in a war. as the most eligible measure, which, by weak-
ening each party, would render both an easier prey to those who are
supposed (from the nature of their constitution) to be their common
enemies. And such advice would still be more unaccountable should
It be supposed, that in consequence of rejecting the alliance of Sparta
and Bee Kia, these states would unite with the enemies of Athens,
i
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? 278 ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES.
I am surprised that none among you should con-
ceive, that if the Chians, and the Mityleneans, and.
now the Rhodians, are to be subjected to a few,1 iP
had almost said, if all mankind are to be thus en-
slaved, our constitution must be threatened with
danger. It is surprising that none among you should
reflect, that if this form of polity be established in
every place, it is not possible that our free govern-
ment should be suffered to continue: for it must
then be certain that none others but the Athenians
can arise to restore affairs to their original state of
freedom; and those whom men regard as dangerous
they must ever labour to destroy. In every other
case they who act unjustly are enemies only to those
whom their injustice hath immediately affected; but
they who subvert free states, and reduce them to
the power of a few, are to be deemed the common
enemies of all the zealous friends of liberty. And
justice too demands, ye men of Athens, that you,
who enjoy a popular government, should discover
the same concern for the misfortunes of other free
states which you yourselves would expect from
them, if at any time (which Heaven avert! ) the like
misfortunes should oppress you. It may be said,
indeed, that the Rhodians are deservedly distressed:
but this is not a time for such objections. Let the
prosperous ever show the tenderest solicitude for
the unhappy, since none can say what may be their
own future fortune.
I have heard it frequently observed in this assem
bly, that when the state was in its deepest distress,
there were not wanting friends to concert measures
for its restoration. Of this I shall at present briefly
1 From this passage it seems not improbable tbat the designs of the-
Perrian had extended farther than to Rhodes, and that he had by hi>>
power <<r influence lately made alterations in the state and government
of these inferior islands which the embarrassed condition of the Athe-
nians, and their attention to the motions of the Macedonian king, migtu
have prevented them trom opposing.
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? ORATION FOR THE RHODIANS. 277
mention but one instance--I mean that of the Ar-
rives. ' And I should be sorry that we, whose dis-
tinguished character it is to protect the wietched,
should appear inferior to the Argives in this particu-
lar. They, though seated on the borders of Lace-
daemon, witnesses of the uncontrolled power of this
city, both by sea and land, yet couldnot be diverted,
could not be deterred from expressing their affection
to the Athenians. When ambassadors came from
Lacedaemon to demand some Athenian exiles who
had taken refuge at Argos, they declared by a de-
cree, that unless these ambassadors departed from
their city before the setting sun they should be ac-
counted. enemies. And would it not be shameful,
my countrymen, that the populace of Argos should,
in such times as these, defy the terror of the Lacedae-
monian power and sovereignty, and yet that you, who
are Athenians, should be terrified by a Barbarian,
nay, by a woman ? The Argives might have justly
pleaded that they had oftentimes been conquered
by the Lacedaemonians. But you have frequently
proved victorious over the king; never were once
defeated, either by his slaves or by himself. Or, if
the Persian boasts to have obtained any advantage
over us, he owes it to those treasures which he lav-
ished on the corrupt traitors and hirelings of Greece.
If ever he hath prevailed, by these means hath he
prevailed. Nor have such successes proved of real
use. No: we find that, at the very time when he
was endeavouring to depress this state by the help
of Lacedaemon, his own dominions were exposed to
the dangerous attempts of Clearchus and Cyrus. 3
- This instance of the magnanimity of the Argives most have been
particularly agreeable to the assembly, as the form of government at
Argos was, like that of Athens, republican. The memory of this noble
and generous act has been passed over by historians: but we have it
here preserved, enlivened, and enforced by the most vivid colouring and
the utmost strength of expression. --Liicckesini.
2 In the first year of the ninety-fourth Olympiad the Lacedaemonians
became masters of Athens, and there established the thirty tyrants. In
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? 278 ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES.
Thus were his avowed attacks ever unsuccessful,
his secret practices attended with no real advantage.
There are men among you who frequently affect
a disregard of Philip, as if beneath their attention;
but of the king express the most terrible apprehen-
sions, as of an enemy truly dangerous to those whom
he may determine to attack. If, then, we are never
to oppose the one, because weak, and to make un-
bounded concessions to the other, because formida-
ble, against whom, my countrymen, are we to draw
our swords?
There are men, too, most powerful in pleading for
the rights of others in opposition to your demands.
To these I would make one request; that they
should endeavour to display an equal zeal in the
defence of your rights against your adversaries.
Thus shall they be the first to show a real regard
to justice. It is absurd to urge its precepts to you
if they themselves pay no deference to its authority.
And surely a member of this state cannot pretend
to a regard for justice, who seeks industriously for
every argument against us, never for those which
may be urged in our favour. Consider, I conjure
you, why, among the Byzantines, there is no man
to inform them that they are not to seize Chalcedon,1
which is really the king's; which you some time
possessed; but to which they have no sort of claim:
that they should not attempt to reduce Sylembria to
their subjection, a city once united in alliance with
us: that in assuming a power of determining the '
boundaries of the Sylembriao territory, the Byzan-
tines violate their oaths, they infringe those treaties
the fourth year of the same Olympiad Cyrus took up arms against his
brother Artaxerxes. So that between these two events but a smali
interval of time intervened ; which sufficiently warrants the assertion
of the orator. --Jjucchesiui.
1 Chalcedon.
