Still another view is that
China withdrew because she feared an attack on the mainland from
the Nationalist Government in Formosa.
China withdrew because she feared an attack on the mainland from
the Nationalist Government in Formosa.
Cambridge History of India - v4 - Indian Empire
The
Central authorities also will not alter the established status, func-
tions and powers of the Dalai Lama. Officials of the various ranks
shall hold office as usual. The established status, functions and
powers of Panchen Erdeni shall be maintained. By the established
status, functions and powers of the Dalai Lama and of the Panchen
Erdeni are meant the status, functions and powers of the 13th Dalai
Lama and relations with each other. The policy of freedom of
religious belief laid down in the Common Programme of the Chi-
nese People's Political Consultative Conference shall be carried
out. The religious beliefs, customs and habits of the Tibetan people
shall be respected and Lama monasteries shall be protected. The
Central authorities will not effect a change in the income of the
monasteries. Tibetan troops shall be reorganised by stages into the
People's Liberation Army and become a part of the national defence
forces of the People's Republic of China. The spoken and written
language and school education of the Tibetan nationality shall be
developed step by step in accordance with the actual conditions of
Tibet. Tibetan agriculture, livestock raising, industry and com-
merce shall be developed step by step and the people's livelihood
shall be improved step by step in accordance with the actual condi-
tions of Tibet. In matters relating to various reforms in Tibet,
there will be no compulsion on the part of the Central authorities.
The Local Government of Tibet should carry out reforms of its
own accord and when the people raise demands for reform, they
shall be settled by means of consultation with the leading personnel
of Tibet. In so far as the former pro-imperialist and pro-Kuomin-
## p. 1000 (#1044) ##########################################
1000
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS SINCE 1909
tang officials resolutely sever relations with imperialism and the
Kuomintang and do not engage in sabotage or resistance, they may
continue to hold office irrespective of their past. The People's
Liberation Army entering Tibet shall abide by all the above-men-
tioned policies and shall also be fair in all buying and selling and
shall not arbitrarily take a single needle or thread from the people.
The Central People's Government shall conduct the centralized
handling of all external affairs of the area of Tibet and there will
be peaceful co-existence with the neighbouring countries and estab-
lishment and development of fair commercial and trading relations
with them on the basis of equality, mutual benefit, mutual respect
for territory and sovereignty. In order to ensure the implementa-
tion of this agreement, the Central People's Government shall set
up a military and administrative committee and a military area
headquarters in Tibet and apart from the personnel sent there by
the Central People's Government, shall absorb as many local Tibe-
tan personnel as possible to take part in the work. Funds needed
by the military and administrative committee, the military area
headquarters and the People's Liberation Army entering Tibet shall
be provided for by the Central People's Government. The Local
Government of Tibet will assist the People's Liberation Army in
the purchase and transport of food, fodder and other daily necessi-
ties.
In 1954, a treaty of friendship was signed between India and
China. By that treaty, India and China pledged themselves to
follow the five principles in their relations with each other. Those
five principles were the mutual recognition of each other's territo-
rial integrity and sovereignty, non-interference in each other's inter-
nal affairs, non-aggression, equality and mutual benefit and peace-
ful co-existence. These principles came to be known as Pancha-
Shila. India gave up all the territorial rights enjoyed by the British
Government in Tibet. The Indian military posts at Yatung and
Gyantse were to be withdrawn. The Indian pilgrims were to be
provided facilities to visit the religious shrines in Tibet and recipro-
cal facilities were to be provided by India to the Tibetans. Trade
missions were to be set up by the Chinese at Delhi, Kalimpong and
Calcutta and India was allowed to open trade centres at Gartok,
Gyantse and Yatung. India made a gift to China of the post and
telegraph communication system set up by the British Government
in Tibet.
Chou En-lai, Prime Minister of Communist China, visited Delhi
in June, 1954 and he was given a rousing welcome. There was
a talk of Hindi-Chini Bhai Bhai. In spite of this, the Chinese
officially protested on 17 July, 1954 against the presence of Indian
## p. 1001 (#1045) ##########################################
INDIA AND COMMUNIST CHINA
1001
Her res-
troops in Barahoti, in the Indian State of Uttar Pradesh. They
went to the extent of giving Barahoti a Chinese name, Wu-Je.
Obviously, the Chinese were making a claim to a territory which
was absolutely Indian. In spite of this provocation, there was no
vigorous action on behalf of the Government of India.
ponse was in these words: “In the agreement of 29th April, 1954,
the Government of China, far from laying claim to any part of
Indian territory, had given a solemn undertaking to respect the
territorial integrity and sovereignty of India. In view of this, the
Government of India concluded that the claim to Barahoti was
made by the Chinese in ignorance, particularly as they did not seem
to be aware of its exact location. "
At this time, maps were published in China which showed 50,000
square miles of Indian territory as Chinese territory. When Prime
Minister Nehru visited China in October, 1954, he brought this
fact to the notice of Chou En-lai. The reply that he got was that
the maps in question were reproductions of the old Kuomintang
maps and the new Chinese Government were so very busy that they
had no time to revise them. It was foolish on the part of India to
have accepted an explanation which was absurd on the face of it.
In April, 1955, Nehru introduced Chou En-lai to the heads of
the 29 nations which had assembled at the Bandung Conference.
Communist China was given a special treatment but it appears it
had no effect on her attitude towards India.
In June, 1955, the Chinese troops set up a camp at Barahoti.
They came down 10 miles south of the Niti Pass and challenged the
Indian patrols. In April, 1956, they entered the Nilang area which
is in Uttar Pradesh. Six months afterwards, the Chinese troops
entered India through the Shipki Pass. In spite of all these provo-
cations, India took no action. She merely forwarded protest notes
to China. When Chou En-lai visited New Delhi in November,
1956 and again in January, 1957, “it was decided that while there
were no disputes regarding the border, there were certain petty
problems which should be settled amicably. ”
In 1956, the Khampa tribesmen of South-East Tibet began a
guerilla revolt against the Chinese. The same year, Dalai Lama
visited India in connection with the 2500th Mahaparinirvana of
Lord Buddha. Although Dalai Lama was not prepared to go back
to Tibet, he was persuaded to do so by the Government of India.
In 1957, the Chinese Government announced a moratorium on
changes in Tibet's economic, social and religious structure, but the
promise was not kept and every effort was made to consolidate the
Chinese position in Tibet. In 1958, the Chinese Government ask-
ed Dalai Lama to attend at Peking the People's Congress but he
## p. 1002 (#1046) ##########################################
1002
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS SINCE 1909
refused to do so as he feared that he might not be allowed to go
back. On 17 March, 1959, there was a serious revolt against the
Chinese in Lhasa and Dalai Lama fled and took shelter in India.
It was in this way that the Chinese occupation in Tibet became
complete.
The occupation of Tibet by China was a diplomatic defeat for
India.
For centuries, Tibet had served as a buffer state between
India and China and after the occupation of Tibet, the borders of
China reached the borders of India. About Chinese occupation
of Tibet and India's attitude towards it, Jai Prakash Narain says:
“It is true that we could not have prevented the Chinese from an-
nexing Tibet. But we could have saved ourselves from being party
to a wrong. The Chinese occupation of Tibet endangered the
safety of India. “Tibet is the palm of the hand and now that the
Chinese have it, they want the five fingers without which the palm
is useless.
The five fingers are Ladakh, Nepal, Sikkim, Bhutan and
the North-East Frontier Agency. ”
The frontiers of India and China are about 2,640 miles and they
include the boundaries of Sikkim and Bhutan with Tibet because
the external relations and defence of these States are a part of India's
responsibility. This long boundary has three divisions, viz. , the
Western, Middle and Eastern Sectors. The Western Sector begins
at the tri-junction where the boundaries of India, China and Afgha-
nistan meet. It ends in the region where the Indian States of
Kashmir, Punjab and Himachal Pradesh form a common boundary
with Tibet. From here starts the middle sector which ends at the
tri-junction of Uttar Pradesh, Nepal and Tibet. Then starts the
boundary of Nepal with Tibet. Where it ends at the tri-junction of
Nepal, Sikkim and Tibet, there starts the Eastern Sector which
covers Sikkim, Bhutan and NEFA frontiers with Tibet. The Sec-
tor ends at the tri-junction of the NEFA, Tibet and Burma boun-
daries. The line which divides NEFA from its junction with
Bhutan up to the point where it meets the Burma border is known
as the McMahon Line. This line was accepted by the representa-
tives of the Government of India, Tibet and China in a Conference
at Simla in 1913-14. This frontier was accepted through tradi-
tion, custom and administrative convenience by all the three coun-
tries concerned.
Direct access to Tibet is easy from the East but the roads through
it have to pass through a very difficult terrain. There is also the
danger of attacks from the Khampas. The Southern roads pass
through Bhutan, Sikkim, Nepal and India and are not available
to China. The major trade route from the North-West goes to
Leh, capital of Ladakh which is a part of Indian territory. The
## p. 1003 (#1047) ##########################################
INDIA AND COMMUNIST CHINA
1003
alternative for China was to build a major highway over the Aksai
Chin Plateau in the Indian region of Ladakh. “The road that the
Chinese first built in 1956-57 across Ladakh was important to the
maintenance of their control over Tibet. Without such a supply
route, the officially acknowledged Khampa revolt in Eastern Tibet
might have reached disastrous proportions. . . . . . It soon gained the
status of a major road, connecting Yarkand and Khotan with
Rudok, Gartok and finally Taklakot, a trade and agricultural centre
of long recognized strategic interest just North of the point where
the borders of Tibet, Nepal and India meet. "
During the days of India's friendship with Tibet, this road was
completed by China without any opposition and by 1958 China
occupied over 6,000 sq. miles of Indian territory.
There were many violations of the Indian border by the Chinese
from time to time. On 27 September, 1958, a group of 51 Chinese
troops crossed into the Lohit Frontier of NEFA. On 7 August,
1959, another Chinese patrol crossed the Indian border at Khinze-
mane in NEFA. Another incursion took place at Longju. The
Indian detachment had to retire and the Chinese forces occupied
the Longju Post. Later on, the Chinese withdrew from this post
on account of the outbreak of an epidemic. On 6 October, 1959,
the Chinese ambushed a party of 19 Indians in Ladakh and killed
16 of them.
On 9 November, 1959, Chou En-lai proposed a withdrawal of
troops by both sides 124/2 miles on each side of the positions held
by both the countries at that time and also urged early talks to dis-
cuss the border issue. On 18 December, 1959, he rejected the
Indian proposal for the neutralisation of the disputed areas in
Ladakh. However, he accepted the proposal for neutralisation of
Longju. He rejected the Indian proposal that in Ladakh, the Chi-
nese should withdraw their civil and military forces to the East of
the Indian border and India in turn should withdraw to the west
of the line claimed as international frontier in the Chinese maps of
1956. Chou En-lai, on his part, proposed the neutralisation of
Khinzemane, Lapthal, Nilang, Shipki Pass, Demchok, Chura and
Chuje. That proposal was rejected by India.
In March 1960, a meeting was held at New Delhi and it was
attended by Chou En-lai. China wanted to strike a barter deal.
She was prepared to give up her claim on the disputed territory in
the Eastern Sector if India recognized China's claim in the Ladakh
The suggestion was not accepted by India. It was decided
to set up a committee of Officials of both the countries to investi-
gate the claims of each side and to submit a report by September,
1960. However, nothing came out of the report of the Committee
area.
## p. 1004 (#1048) ##########################################
1004
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS SINCE 1909
It was
and China continued to occupy large chunks of Indian territory.
It appears that Indian Government did not attach due importance
to the Chinese activities. It was foolishly maintained that the areas
occupied by the Chinese consisted of "barren mountain tops where
not even a blade of grass grows. ” China claimed about 15,000
sq. miles of territory in Ladakh and NEFA. She also claimed
Longju, Khinzemane, Spiti, Shipki, Nilang, Jodhang, Lapthal and
Barahoti. She also claimed about 2,000 sq. miles of the territory
of Bhutan and put forward her claim to negotiate directly with
Bhutan.
It is true that there had been Chinese intrusions from time to
time but the relations between India and China got very much
strained after India gave political asylum to Dalai Lama.
considered to be an affront by China and the Chinese attitude to-
wards India became very aggressive. When the attention of China
was drawn to the activities of Guard Units, Chou En-lai wrote
thus to Nehru: “I can assure your Excellency that it is merely for
preventing remnant armed Tibetan rebels from crossing the border
back and forth to carry out harassing activities that the Chinese
Government in recent months despatched guard units to be station-
ed in the south-eastern part of Tibet region of China. This is obvi-
ously in the interest of ensuring the tranquillity of the border and
will in no way constitute a threat to India. ”
In 1961, war clouds began to gather over Ladakh and NEFA.
In April, 1961, the Chinese intruded into Sikkim, in May into the
Chushul area of Ladakh and in July into the Kameng Division of
NEFA. In August, 1961, the Chinese intruded into Ladakh once
again and established three checkposts, one at Nyagzu and two
near Danbuguru. In January, 1962, the Chinese crossed over near
Longju in NEFA. In April, May and June, they entered the
Chipchap and Spanggur areas of Ladakh. In July, 1962, the
Indian post in the Galwan valley was surrounded by the Chinese.
However, they did not advance further as Indian army was given
orders to defend itself in case of further Chinese advance. On 8
September, 1962, the Chinese launched a massive attack on the
NEFA border. They crossed the Thagla Ridge and intruded into
the Indian territory. On 20 September, 1962, they again opened
fire on India Guards. On 9 October, 1962, they attacked the
Indian posts on the Indian side of the Thagla Ridge. They opened
fire on Indian troops with 2" mortars, automatic weapons and hand
grenades. On 20 October, 1962, the Chinese started their big
offensive. In NEFA, the strength of the attacking forces reached
"three divisions, two from the direction of Tawang and one Divi-
sion in the direction of Kibithoo. To launch such an attack on
## p. 1005 (#1049) ##########################################
INDIA AND COMMUNIST CHINA
1005
such a large scale, one can imagine the amount of preparation they
must have undertaken. They must have been planning this for a
long time in considerable detail, and these actions in overrunning
outpost in Dhola Bridge and in occupying Thagla Ridge, must have
been with the specific aim of forcing us to react so as to give them
a good excuse for launching an attack on us” (General K. S.
Thimayya). They also attacked in the Chip Chap Valley and the
Pangong Lake areas of Ladakh. In three days, major fighting was
going on in five main areas. By 24 October, the Chinese were
well across the McMahon Line through a 25-mile wide sector to a
depth of 8 miles into the Indian territory. Kibithoo had fallen into
the hands of the enemy.
On 24 October 1962, China made a peace offer. The terms
were that the Sino-Indian border question should be settled peace-
fully. Emphas
Emphasis was put on the sanctity of the “line of actual con-
trol. ” It was suggested that the Prime Ministers of the two coun-
tries should meet and resolve the differences between the two coun-
tries. Chou En-lai observed: "What issue is there between China
and India which cannot be settled peacefully? . . . . . . China doesn't
want a single inch of India's territory. ” The reply of Nehru was:
“There is no sense or meaning in the Chinese offer to withdraw 20
kilometres from what they call 'line of actual control. ' What is
this line of actual control? ' Is this the line they have created by
aggression since the beginning of September? Advancing 40 or 60
kilometres by blatant military aggression and offering to withdraw
20 kilometres provided both sides do this is a deceptive device which
can fool nobody. "
On 26 October, 1962, India declared a state of emergency. By
31 October, 1962, the Chinese had consolidated their positions in
NEFA and were poised to threaten the plains of India. On that
day, they actually launched a massive attack. Tawang fell into
their hands. Walong, Sela and Bomdila also fell into their hands
in quick succession. On the Ladakh front, Daulat Beg Oldi fell
into their hands. Chushul was attacked and its air-port was under
heavy enemy fire. Indian troops were entrenched in strong posi-
tions and put up a very gallant defence. On account of the heavy
casualties suffered by the Chinese, they give up the idea of cap-
turing Chushul.
When the Government of India was under heavy pressure from
China and there was every possibility of Assam falling into the
hands of the Chinese, Prime Minister Nehru requested the United
States and Great Britain to help him.
prompt one. There was a constant flow of arms into India from
various quarters. Help also came from Canada, West Germany
The response
was
a
## p. 1006 (#1050) ##########################################
2006
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS SINCE 1909
and Australia. It was this help which enabled the Indian troops
to stand against the Chinese and it was at this time that China
declared a unilateral cease-fire to be effective from the midnight of
21 and 22 November, 1962. When the cease-fire was declared,
"the Chinese Communist armies were in possession of mountain
gateways into the plains of Assam. . . . . . were in command of the
natural approaches through the mountains to the Brahmaputra
valley and threatened the whole of Assam and its oil fields. The
entire North-Eastern Frontier Agency area now lay under the
threat of Chinese conquest. . . . . . The Chinese in lightning conquest
had seized the crest lines and now controlled the key passes and
were moving downhill towards the crowded plains. ”
While declaring cease-fire, the Chinese announced that their
frontier guards would withdraw to positions 1272 miles behind the
lines of actual control which existed between China and India.
China was to set up check-posts on its own side of the McMahon
line to forestall the activities of the saboteurs and to maintain order.
However, on Ladakh front, the Chinese were still controlling about
12,000 sq. miles of Indian territory which included Aksai Chin
area through which the Chinese had built a strategic road linking
Sinkiang with Tibet.
Many reasons have been given for unilateral cease-fire by China.
One view is that China withdrew on account of pressure from
Moscow. The Soviet Union did not approve of the Chinese aggres-
sion against India and hence China withdrew. Another view is
that China could not maintain a long supply line on account of the
approaching winter and hence withdrew.
Still another view is that
China withdrew because she feared an attack on the mainland from
the Nationalist Government in Formosa. Another view is that
there was shortage of food in China and the Chinese Government
was afraid that food supplies from Canada and Australia might be
cut off if she continued her aggression against India. The world
opinion was also against China. However, a very important reason
why China withdrew was that the Governments of the United
States and Great Britain promised India military help which enabl-
ed her to put up a stiff resistance. The military help to India was
increasing and with that her capacity to defend herself. There
were the prospects of the war being a long one and hence China
stopped the war by unilateral action.
Many reasons have been given explaining China's attack on
India. One reason was that China resented the enormous prestige
which India enjoyed in South-East Asia and also among the neu-
tral powers of the world. If India was defeated in the battle-field,
all her prestige would disappear and China would emerge as the
## p. 1007 (#1051) ##########################################
INDIA AND COMMUNIST CHINA
1007
leader of Asia. In this object, China succeeded to a very great
extent. China was also not happy with the assistance given to
India by the Soviet Union and she wanted the Soviet Union to
come into the open by either joining India or China. It is con-
tended that China was jealous of the economic progress made by
India and she would like the same to be halted. That was possible
only if India was attacked by China and thus she was forced to
divert her resources from economic development to defence expendi-
ture. China also had her greedy eyes on the oil wells of Assam.
If China had conquered Assam, she would have been in possession
of oil and hence her dependence on the Soviet Union for the supply
of oil would have been avoided.
The Chinese started withdrawing on both the fronts on 1 Decem-
ber, 1962. They returned the sick and wounded Indian prisoners.
They withdrew beyond the McMahon Line on the NEFA front.
They also withdrew from the Western Sector but set up their own
check-posts in the evacuated areas in order to strengthen their
position.
After the Chinese cease-fire, many efforts were made to resolve
the Sino-Indian dispute. A conference of the representatives of
Cambodia, Burma, Indonesia, Ceylon, the U. A. R. and Ghana was
held at Colombo from 10 December to 12 December, 1962. The
Conference put forward the famous Colombo Proposals. Accord-
ing to them, China was to withdraw on the Ladakh front 20 kilo-
metres and India was to maintain its positions. The area evacuat-
ed by the Chinese was to be administered by joint civilian posts of
both the countries. On the Eastern Sector, the line of actual con-
trol recognized by both the countries was to serve as a cease-fire
line. As regards the middle sector, the problem was to be solved
peacefully without resorting to force. Although the proposals were
against India, yet those were accepted by this country and endorsed
by the Indian Parliament. However, China refused to accept them
on the plea that those were vague and suggested that India and
China should meet and settle the dispute. Since 1962, India has
shown her willingness to start a meaningful dialogue with China
but nothing has come out of it and China continues to occupy the
territories grabbed by her through force.
Mention must be made of certain facts concerning the war
between India and China. Prime Minister Nehru expected to get
a lot of help from the Soviet Union but the promised M. I. G.
fighter planes did not come in the hour of need. Some of them
were sent so late that those could not be used at all. The non-
aligned Afro-Asian countries remained non-aligned in the hour of
India's need and advised her to negotiate for cease-fire. The Indian
## p. 1008 (#1052) ##########################################
1008
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS SINCE 1909
troops “hurriedly called to the front and completely unfamiliar
with the terrain held. . . . . . a Chinese army five times larger in
number, preparing this attack for months and possessing fire power
atleast thrice more effective. " It was realised that Prime Minister
Nehru committed a blunder when he appointed V. K. Krishna
Menon as the Defence Minister of India in 1957 and kept him in
that post during the crucial period of 5 years from 1957 to 1962.
The latter did nothing to prepare the country for a war with China
although there were unmistakable signs and blunt warnings by men
like Dr. Raghuvira that war between India and China was inevit-
able and the existing Indian armies were no match for Chinese
armies both in numbers and efficiency. The time was wasted in
superseding one military officer by another and thereby creating
dissensions and discontentment in the armed forces of the country.
Favourites were appointed as the Chief of the Army Staff and also
the persons who were to lead the Indian army against the Chinese.
There was too much of interference from New Delhi and no initia-
tive was left with the men on the spot. It was found that India
entered the war with absolutely no preparation for it.
The relations between India and China are positively hostile.
China continues to maintain a war of nerves. She is trying to
interfere into the internal affairs of India. A lot of money is being
distributed in India by China to win over certain sections of the
people in this country. A section of the Communist Party of India
is pro-China. The Naxalites are openly in favour of China. China
is carrying on a lot of propaganda on her borders with India.
When Pakistan attacked India in 1965, China gave an ultimatum
to India that unless certain frivolous demands of that country
were conceded, China would declare war on India. However, the
,
Pakistan war ended abruptly and China did not attack India.
China knows full well that the relations of India and Pakistan are
not cordial and hence deliberately sights with Pakistan against
India. China has given a lot of military help to Pakistan so that
the same may be used against a common enemy, India.
PAKISTAN
The relations between India and Pakistan have never been cordial.
In October, 1947, the tribal raiders backed by Pakistan attacked the
State of Jammu and Kashmir. When the latter acceded to India,
Indian troops were flown to Kashmir to halt the invasion and ulti-
mately the raiders were successfully driven out of the Kashmir
Valley. However, the problem of Kashmir was not solved and
it has been the bone of contention between the two countries. Vari-
## p. 1009 (#1053) ##########################################
INDIA AND PAKISTAN
1009
ous resolutions and missions of the United Nations have failed to
solve the tangle.
Pakistan has complained on many occasion that she is affraid
of an attack from India and that is why she has to put emphasis
on military preparedness. That also is the reason why Pakistan
has joined the Cento and the Seato. That is also the reason
why Pakistan entered into an agreement with the U. S. A. in 1954
by which she was to get a lot of military help from the United
States. Another justification is also put forward to explain her
friendship with China and the receipt of military help from that
country. However, all these assertions of Pakistan are without any
substance. India had to face an attack from China in 1962 and
from Pakistan in 1965 and she has to arm herself in self-defence.
India had requested Pakistan many a time to make a “no war”
declaration but it is Pakistan which has refused to do so. India
has no ambition against Pakistan and in spite of it Liaquat Ali
Khan followed the “clenched fist” policy towards India. There
was no substance in the allegation of Feroze Khan Noon that India
was the only enemy of Pakistan. He should not have threatened
India that he would “let loose the hordes of tribesmen who had
thoroughly devastated the part of Kashmir during the autumn of
1947. ” Alama Mashriqi, the Khaksar leader, is said to have re-
marked on 2 January, 1957: “Just as dawn of the day after every
night is certain, similarly downfall of the present Bharati Govern-
ment is a settled fact. Forces of history have ordained that I should
direct the energies of the Muslims to the right channel and thus
realise the 900-year-old prediction of Nematullah Shah Wali as
also of Hindu astrologers that Bharat is to lose tremendously in this
year. Hindus and Sikhs are looking for liberation. ”
The Indus Basin Water dispute strained the relations between
the two countries but the same was ultimately settled amicably by
the Indus Waters Treaty signed by the Governments of Pakistan
and India on 19 September 1960. The Treaty allocated the waters
of the rivers Ravi, Beas and Sutlej to India with certain exceptions.
The main exception was that during the transitional period when
the works were being constructed in Pakistan for the replacement
of the Eastern river water, India would continue to deliver water
to Pakistan from her rivers. The transitional period was to last
ten years but the same could be extended for three more years.
The waters of the Indus, Jhelum and Chenab were to be for the
use of Pakistan and India undertook to let flow for the unrestricted
use of Pakistan all the waters of those three rivers subject to the
condition that some of those waters could be used by India in areas
upstream of the Pakistan border for the development of irrigation,
a
## p. 1010 (#1054) ##########################################
1010
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS SINCE 1909
electric power and certain other specific uses. Pakistan was to
construct during the transitional period a system of works, a part
of which was to replace from the Western rivers those irrigation
uses in Pakistan which had hitherto been met from the Eastern
rivers. India was to contribute to the Indus Basin Development Fund
£62,000,000 in ten equal instalments. The total cost of construc-
tion was to be about £380 millions of which approximately £310
million were to be spent on works in Pakistan and approximately £70
millions on works in India. The money was to come from the
contributions to be made by India, Australia, Canada, Germany,
New Zealand, United Kingdom and the United States, proceeds
of a United States Government Loan to Pakistan, proceeds of a
World Bank Loan to Pakistan and some contribution to be made
by Pakistan. The Treaty provided for a permanent Indus Com-
mission which was to have general responsibility for implementing
the terms of the Treaty and reconcile any points of disagreement
that might arise. If differences or disputes between the parties
could not be resolved by agreement, the same were to be referred
to a neutral expert for final decision on technical questions. The
matter could also be taken to a Court of Arbitration.
In spite of the Treaty, the relations between the two countries
did not improve. When India was attacked by China in 1962,
Pakistan showed her sympathies for China. After 1962, Pakistan
started following the politico-military tactics of the Chinese against
India. Cease-fire violations in Kashmir became a common feature.
There were 448 cease-fire violations in Kashmir in 1963, 1,522 in
1964 and 1,800 in 1965 up to the end of July. In April, 1965,
Pakistan tried to occupy Kutch, but the matter was ultimately
referred to arbitration. Pakistan also tried to cut the Srinagar-Leh
road and as that was India's life-line to Ladakh, India replied by
occupying two important Pakistani posts overlooking Kargil on
16 May, 1965. India withdrew her armies from the two Pakistani
posts when she was given a guarantee of security by the United
Nations.
On 4 August, 1965, armed Pakistanis in civilian clothes crossed
the cease-fire line in thousands and mixed with the native popula-
tion of Kashmir on the Indian side. India got the information
from one Mohammad Din, a shepherd, who was bribed by the
Pakistani military officials to supply them information regarding the
location of Indian grain stores, transport depots etc. so that they
may be able to destroy them. Mohammed Din alerted the police
about the presence of “out soldiers. ” Pakistani infiltration went on
steadily from 5 August onwards but the Kashmir Muslims gave
the infiltrators no quarter. On 7 August, Pakistani commandoes
## p. 1011 (#1055) ##########################################
INDIA AND PAKISTAN
1011
9
with grenades, guns and detonators took up positions throughout
the valley of Kashmir. On 9 August, the news broke out that
major moves had been made across the border into Kashmir.
Within a few days, it was an open secret. Referring to the events
of 7 and 8 August, in the Baramula sector, General Nimmo, Chief
of the U. N. observers team, reported that “the observers interviewed
one of the captured raiders who stated that he was a soldier of the
16th Azad Kashmir infantry and that the raiding party was com-
posed of about 300 soldiers of his battalion and hundred Mujahids
(armed civilians trained in guerilla tactics). ” Writing from Rawal-
pindi, the Times correspondent reported on 31st August that "there
can be no doubt that the guerilla action in Kashmir results from
infiltration from this (Pakistan) side in an operation conceived,
planned and directed by the Government of Pakistan. ” The Daily
Telegraph reported that the “most likely reason for Pakistan's ac-
tion in sending the infiltrators into Kashmir seems to be the realiza-
tion by Pakistan that it was futile to place any reliance on the local
population and that the only way to keep the Kashmir question
alive was to send in groups of well armed intruders for sabotage
and general guerilla warfare. ” William Patterson wrote on 13
October, 1965: "The armed infiltrators Pakistan began sending
into Kashmir last August were to inspire local uprisings. . . . . . The
Pakistan army, poised and waiting, was then to respond to pleas
from ‘our Kashmir brothers' for protection against Indian brutality,
and was to sweep through Kashmir on a mission of mercy right to
the Indian frontier. There it was to halt while President Ayub
Khan presented the world with a fait accompli. . . . . . the strategy
was to mix force with appeals to the United Nations for peace. . . .
in order to consolidate politically the armed seizure of Kashmir. ”
8 August, 1965, was the annual festival day of Pir Dastgir Sahib,
a local saint of Srinagar. Pakistani infiltrators hoped to join the
pilgrim crowd and make that day the day of Kashmir's deliverance
from India. However, the invasion miscarried and Srinagar whose
fall was reported to be imminent, was safe in the hands of India.
On the night of 14 August, 1965, some Pakistani infiltrators got
into within a few miles of Srinagar and set fire to Batmalu. "Pakis-
tani radio broadcast this jubilantly but later insisted that the Indian
army had set fire to this quarter when it realized that its confession
of arson was not going to be kindly received by those who had
been rendered homeless. "
Once again, Pakistan deliberately tried to cut the Srinagar-Leh
road. The result was that on 15 August, India recaptured the two
important Pakistani posts overlooking Kargil and also occupied
another vital post to prevent Pakistan from doing mischief in that
## p. 1012 (#1056) ##########################################
1012
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS SINCE 1909
“highly sensitive sector. ” On the night of 24-25 August, the de-
tachments of the Indian Army crossed over into Azad Kashmir to
occupy the Pakistani outposts in the Tithwal sector and on 27-28
August into the Uri-Poonch area to secure vantage positions,
amongst them the Haji Pir Pass which overlooks the routes the
infiltrators took to come into the State of Kashmir.
The authorities in Pakistan were under the impression that after
the death of Jawaharlal Nehru, no great leader was left in India
and hence it was the time to attack India. It was believed that
India was defended by an ill-equipped army lacking in physical
strength and moral courage. The Pakistani soldiers took pride in
the fact that they were infinitely superior to the Indian soldiers.
Pakistan was sure of support from her Allies. Pakistan felt that
she was in stronger position on account of her membership of the
Seato and the Cento. She was also certain of help from Commun-
ist China against India India was considered to be a land of
Banias or shopkeepers who could not stand against the Pathans of
Pakistan. Such was the psychological background with which
Pakistan attacked India in September, 1965.
At dawn on 1 September, 1965, tanks of Pakistan's Armoured
Division rumbled across the Indian border in the Akhnoor sector
in Jammu with the objective of cutting off a Jaurian, India's main-
link with Jammu and the entire valley of Kashmir and Ladakh.
Pakistan was more advantageously situated than India to use her
tanks with telling effect. It was not possible for India to move in
her heavy armour beyond Akhnoor. Even if it was possible, it was
not prudent to do so. Consequently, the Indian troops fell back
in a series of planned withdrawals behind Chhamb. A day later,
,
the enemy came in water-proof jeeps and tanks with sealed engines.
At this stage, the aid of the Indian Air Force was sought and with-
in 45 minutes as many as 28 sorties were flown in 7 missions. The
Indian Air Force did a wonderful job. It knocked out 13 enemy
tanks. The ground fire disabled five tanks. Pakistan also called
in its Air Force but her Sabres were no match for Indian Gnats.
Pakistani drive to Akhnoor was temporarily halted on 1 September,
1965.
On 2 September, 1965, U Thant appealed to both India and
Pakistan for a cease-fire. He frankly told the Security Council
that he was not able to get from Pakistan “any assurance that the
cease-fire and the cease-fire line will be respected henceforth. ” On
4 September, the Security Council formally called for a cease-fire.
India was willing to accept a cease-fire provided Pakistan withdrew
from Chhamb and pulled out the infiltrators from Kashmir and
also promised not to do so again.
## p. 1013 (#1057) ##########################################
INDIA AND PAKISTAN
1013
2
war.
Marshal Chen-i, the Foreign Minister of China, flew to Karachi
on 4 September and conferred with Pakistan Foreign Minister, Mr.
Bhutto for 6 hours. The Chinese Marshal openly supported the
"just action taken by Pakistan to repel the Indian armed provoca-
tion in Kashmir. ” On 5 September, a Pakistani Sabre made an
unsuccessful low level attack on certain key Air Force installations
in the Amritsar area. The situation was really grave.
It was at this stage that India decided to hit back. On 9 Sep-
tember, 1965, Indian troops opened two new fronts, one against
Pakistan's Sialkot sector and the other across the border at Gadra
in Rajasthan. The Indian offensive in Lahore sector was carried
up to the Ichogil Canal. It was found that Pakistan had built
up in this area military structures which must have taken her
years to do so.
That showed that Pakistan was making prepara-
tions for a war with India for years. In the Lahore sector, the
battles were fought between the Indian border and the Ichogil
Canal. There were attacks and counter-attacks. India was able
to capture Dograi and Burki. No attempt was made to capture
Lahore as this would have been given back to Pakistan after the
India concentrated on destroying the war potential and mili-
tary machine of Pakistan.
Two battles deserve special treatment, one at Asal-uttar and the
other at Phillora. The Pakistani soldiers were well poised for at-
tack at Kasur and they attacked the Indians with all their vigour
and strength. The Indian army was forced to fall back under
heavy pressure. The Indian troops took up new positions at the
head of a fort at Khem Karan bordering on the village of Asal-
uttar. The Pakistanis felt that the Indian troops were running
away and it was the most opportune time to attack them. The
battle was fought at Asal-uttar. There are two meanings of this
word, 'true north' and 'the real answer. ' India won a splendid
victory at Asal-Uttar. “Pakistan had lost 97 tanks, a large number
of them pattons, of which 9 were captured intact and two were
surrendered with crew. Ten lieutenant-colonels, six majors, six
other officers and several other ranks were captured in this engage-
ment.
Central authorities also will not alter the established status, func-
tions and powers of the Dalai Lama. Officials of the various ranks
shall hold office as usual. The established status, functions and
powers of Panchen Erdeni shall be maintained. By the established
status, functions and powers of the Dalai Lama and of the Panchen
Erdeni are meant the status, functions and powers of the 13th Dalai
Lama and relations with each other. The policy of freedom of
religious belief laid down in the Common Programme of the Chi-
nese People's Political Consultative Conference shall be carried
out. The religious beliefs, customs and habits of the Tibetan people
shall be respected and Lama monasteries shall be protected. The
Central authorities will not effect a change in the income of the
monasteries. Tibetan troops shall be reorganised by stages into the
People's Liberation Army and become a part of the national defence
forces of the People's Republic of China. The spoken and written
language and school education of the Tibetan nationality shall be
developed step by step in accordance with the actual conditions of
Tibet. Tibetan agriculture, livestock raising, industry and com-
merce shall be developed step by step and the people's livelihood
shall be improved step by step in accordance with the actual condi-
tions of Tibet. In matters relating to various reforms in Tibet,
there will be no compulsion on the part of the Central authorities.
The Local Government of Tibet should carry out reforms of its
own accord and when the people raise demands for reform, they
shall be settled by means of consultation with the leading personnel
of Tibet. In so far as the former pro-imperialist and pro-Kuomin-
## p. 1000 (#1044) ##########################################
1000
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS SINCE 1909
tang officials resolutely sever relations with imperialism and the
Kuomintang and do not engage in sabotage or resistance, they may
continue to hold office irrespective of their past. The People's
Liberation Army entering Tibet shall abide by all the above-men-
tioned policies and shall also be fair in all buying and selling and
shall not arbitrarily take a single needle or thread from the people.
The Central People's Government shall conduct the centralized
handling of all external affairs of the area of Tibet and there will
be peaceful co-existence with the neighbouring countries and estab-
lishment and development of fair commercial and trading relations
with them on the basis of equality, mutual benefit, mutual respect
for territory and sovereignty. In order to ensure the implementa-
tion of this agreement, the Central People's Government shall set
up a military and administrative committee and a military area
headquarters in Tibet and apart from the personnel sent there by
the Central People's Government, shall absorb as many local Tibe-
tan personnel as possible to take part in the work. Funds needed
by the military and administrative committee, the military area
headquarters and the People's Liberation Army entering Tibet shall
be provided for by the Central People's Government. The Local
Government of Tibet will assist the People's Liberation Army in
the purchase and transport of food, fodder and other daily necessi-
ties.
In 1954, a treaty of friendship was signed between India and
China. By that treaty, India and China pledged themselves to
follow the five principles in their relations with each other. Those
five principles were the mutual recognition of each other's territo-
rial integrity and sovereignty, non-interference in each other's inter-
nal affairs, non-aggression, equality and mutual benefit and peace-
ful co-existence. These principles came to be known as Pancha-
Shila. India gave up all the territorial rights enjoyed by the British
Government in Tibet. The Indian military posts at Yatung and
Gyantse were to be withdrawn. The Indian pilgrims were to be
provided facilities to visit the religious shrines in Tibet and recipro-
cal facilities were to be provided by India to the Tibetans. Trade
missions were to be set up by the Chinese at Delhi, Kalimpong and
Calcutta and India was allowed to open trade centres at Gartok,
Gyantse and Yatung. India made a gift to China of the post and
telegraph communication system set up by the British Government
in Tibet.
Chou En-lai, Prime Minister of Communist China, visited Delhi
in June, 1954 and he was given a rousing welcome. There was
a talk of Hindi-Chini Bhai Bhai. In spite of this, the Chinese
officially protested on 17 July, 1954 against the presence of Indian
## p. 1001 (#1045) ##########################################
INDIA AND COMMUNIST CHINA
1001
Her res-
troops in Barahoti, in the Indian State of Uttar Pradesh. They
went to the extent of giving Barahoti a Chinese name, Wu-Je.
Obviously, the Chinese were making a claim to a territory which
was absolutely Indian. In spite of this provocation, there was no
vigorous action on behalf of the Government of India.
ponse was in these words: “In the agreement of 29th April, 1954,
the Government of China, far from laying claim to any part of
Indian territory, had given a solemn undertaking to respect the
territorial integrity and sovereignty of India. In view of this, the
Government of India concluded that the claim to Barahoti was
made by the Chinese in ignorance, particularly as they did not seem
to be aware of its exact location. "
At this time, maps were published in China which showed 50,000
square miles of Indian territory as Chinese territory. When Prime
Minister Nehru visited China in October, 1954, he brought this
fact to the notice of Chou En-lai. The reply that he got was that
the maps in question were reproductions of the old Kuomintang
maps and the new Chinese Government were so very busy that they
had no time to revise them. It was foolish on the part of India to
have accepted an explanation which was absurd on the face of it.
In April, 1955, Nehru introduced Chou En-lai to the heads of
the 29 nations which had assembled at the Bandung Conference.
Communist China was given a special treatment but it appears it
had no effect on her attitude towards India.
In June, 1955, the Chinese troops set up a camp at Barahoti.
They came down 10 miles south of the Niti Pass and challenged the
Indian patrols. In April, 1956, they entered the Nilang area which
is in Uttar Pradesh. Six months afterwards, the Chinese troops
entered India through the Shipki Pass. In spite of all these provo-
cations, India took no action. She merely forwarded protest notes
to China. When Chou En-lai visited New Delhi in November,
1956 and again in January, 1957, “it was decided that while there
were no disputes regarding the border, there were certain petty
problems which should be settled amicably. ”
In 1956, the Khampa tribesmen of South-East Tibet began a
guerilla revolt against the Chinese. The same year, Dalai Lama
visited India in connection with the 2500th Mahaparinirvana of
Lord Buddha. Although Dalai Lama was not prepared to go back
to Tibet, he was persuaded to do so by the Government of India.
In 1957, the Chinese Government announced a moratorium on
changes in Tibet's economic, social and religious structure, but the
promise was not kept and every effort was made to consolidate the
Chinese position in Tibet. In 1958, the Chinese Government ask-
ed Dalai Lama to attend at Peking the People's Congress but he
## p. 1002 (#1046) ##########################################
1002
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS SINCE 1909
refused to do so as he feared that he might not be allowed to go
back. On 17 March, 1959, there was a serious revolt against the
Chinese in Lhasa and Dalai Lama fled and took shelter in India.
It was in this way that the Chinese occupation in Tibet became
complete.
The occupation of Tibet by China was a diplomatic defeat for
India.
For centuries, Tibet had served as a buffer state between
India and China and after the occupation of Tibet, the borders of
China reached the borders of India. About Chinese occupation
of Tibet and India's attitude towards it, Jai Prakash Narain says:
“It is true that we could not have prevented the Chinese from an-
nexing Tibet. But we could have saved ourselves from being party
to a wrong. The Chinese occupation of Tibet endangered the
safety of India. “Tibet is the palm of the hand and now that the
Chinese have it, they want the five fingers without which the palm
is useless.
The five fingers are Ladakh, Nepal, Sikkim, Bhutan and
the North-East Frontier Agency. ”
The frontiers of India and China are about 2,640 miles and they
include the boundaries of Sikkim and Bhutan with Tibet because
the external relations and defence of these States are a part of India's
responsibility. This long boundary has three divisions, viz. , the
Western, Middle and Eastern Sectors. The Western Sector begins
at the tri-junction where the boundaries of India, China and Afgha-
nistan meet. It ends in the region where the Indian States of
Kashmir, Punjab and Himachal Pradesh form a common boundary
with Tibet. From here starts the middle sector which ends at the
tri-junction of Uttar Pradesh, Nepal and Tibet. Then starts the
boundary of Nepal with Tibet. Where it ends at the tri-junction of
Nepal, Sikkim and Tibet, there starts the Eastern Sector which
covers Sikkim, Bhutan and NEFA frontiers with Tibet. The Sec-
tor ends at the tri-junction of the NEFA, Tibet and Burma boun-
daries. The line which divides NEFA from its junction with
Bhutan up to the point where it meets the Burma border is known
as the McMahon Line. This line was accepted by the representa-
tives of the Government of India, Tibet and China in a Conference
at Simla in 1913-14. This frontier was accepted through tradi-
tion, custom and administrative convenience by all the three coun-
tries concerned.
Direct access to Tibet is easy from the East but the roads through
it have to pass through a very difficult terrain. There is also the
danger of attacks from the Khampas. The Southern roads pass
through Bhutan, Sikkim, Nepal and India and are not available
to China. The major trade route from the North-West goes to
Leh, capital of Ladakh which is a part of Indian territory. The
## p. 1003 (#1047) ##########################################
INDIA AND COMMUNIST CHINA
1003
alternative for China was to build a major highway over the Aksai
Chin Plateau in the Indian region of Ladakh. “The road that the
Chinese first built in 1956-57 across Ladakh was important to the
maintenance of their control over Tibet. Without such a supply
route, the officially acknowledged Khampa revolt in Eastern Tibet
might have reached disastrous proportions. . . . . . It soon gained the
status of a major road, connecting Yarkand and Khotan with
Rudok, Gartok and finally Taklakot, a trade and agricultural centre
of long recognized strategic interest just North of the point where
the borders of Tibet, Nepal and India meet. "
During the days of India's friendship with Tibet, this road was
completed by China without any opposition and by 1958 China
occupied over 6,000 sq. miles of Indian territory.
There were many violations of the Indian border by the Chinese
from time to time. On 27 September, 1958, a group of 51 Chinese
troops crossed into the Lohit Frontier of NEFA. On 7 August,
1959, another Chinese patrol crossed the Indian border at Khinze-
mane in NEFA. Another incursion took place at Longju. The
Indian detachment had to retire and the Chinese forces occupied
the Longju Post. Later on, the Chinese withdrew from this post
on account of the outbreak of an epidemic. On 6 October, 1959,
the Chinese ambushed a party of 19 Indians in Ladakh and killed
16 of them.
On 9 November, 1959, Chou En-lai proposed a withdrawal of
troops by both sides 124/2 miles on each side of the positions held
by both the countries at that time and also urged early talks to dis-
cuss the border issue. On 18 December, 1959, he rejected the
Indian proposal for the neutralisation of the disputed areas in
Ladakh. However, he accepted the proposal for neutralisation of
Longju. He rejected the Indian proposal that in Ladakh, the Chi-
nese should withdraw their civil and military forces to the East of
the Indian border and India in turn should withdraw to the west
of the line claimed as international frontier in the Chinese maps of
1956. Chou En-lai, on his part, proposed the neutralisation of
Khinzemane, Lapthal, Nilang, Shipki Pass, Demchok, Chura and
Chuje. That proposal was rejected by India.
In March 1960, a meeting was held at New Delhi and it was
attended by Chou En-lai. China wanted to strike a barter deal.
She was prepared to give up her claim on the disputed territory in
the Eastern Sector if India recognized China's claim in the Ladakh
The suggestion was not accepted by India. It was decided
to set up a committee of Officials of both the countries to investi-
gate the claims of each side and to submit a report by September,
1960. However, nothing came out of the report of the Committee
area.
## p. 1004 (#1048) ##########################################
1004
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS SINCE 1909
It was
and China continued to occupy large chunks of Indian territory.
It appears that Indian Government did not attach due importance
to the Chinese activities. It was foolishly maintained that the areas
occupied by the Chinese consisted of "barren mountain tops where
not even a blade of grass grows. ” China claimed about 15,000
sq. miles of territory in Ladakh and NEFA. She also claimed
Longju, Khinzemane, Spiti, Shipki, Nilang, Jodhang, Lapthal and
Barahoti. She also claimed about 2,000 sq. miles of the territory
of Bhutan and put forward her claim to negotiate directly with
Bhutan.
It is true that there had been Chinese intrusions from time to
time but the relations between India and China got very much
strained after India gave political asylum to Dalai Lama.
considered to be an affront by China and the Chinese attitude to-
wards India became very aggressive. When the attention of China
was drawn to the activities of Guard Units, Chou En-lai wrote
thus to Nehru: “I can assure your Excellency that it is merely for
preventing remnant armed Tibetan rebels from crossing the border
back and forth to carry out harassing activities that the Chinese
Government in recent months despatched guard units to be station-
ed in the south-eastern part of Tibet region of China. This is obvi-
ously in the interest of ensuring the tranquillity of the border and
will in no way constitute a threat to India. ”
In 1961, war clouds began to gather over Ladakh and NEFA.
In April, 1961, the Chinese intruded into Sikkim, in May into the
Chushul area of Ladakh and in July into the Kameng Division of
NEFA. In August, 1961, the Chinese intruded into Ladakh once
again and established three checkposts, one at Nyagzu and two
near Danbuguru. In January, 1962, the Chinese crossed over near
Longju in NEFA. In April, May and June, they entered the
Chipchap and Spanggur areas of Ladakh. In July, 1962, the
Indian post in the Galwan valley was surrounded by the Chinese.
However, they did not advance further as Indian army was given
orders to defend itself in case of further Chinese advance. On 8
September, 1962, the Chinese launched a massive attack on the
NEFA border. They crossed the Thagla Ridge and intruded into
the Indian territory. On 20 September, 1962, they again opened
fire on India Guards. On 9 October, 1962, they attacked the
Indian posts on the Indian side of the Thagla Ridge. They opened
fire on Indian troops with 2" mortars, automatic weapons and hand
grenades. On 20 October, 1962, the Chinese started their big
offensive. In NEFA, the strength of the attacking forces reached
"three divisions, two from the direction of Tawang and one Divi-
sion in the direction of Kibithoo. To launch such an attack on
## p. 1005 (#1049) ##########################################
INDIA AND COMMUNIST CHINA
1005
such a large scale, one can imagine the amount of preparation they
must have undertaken. They must have been planning this for a
long time in considerable detail, and these actions in overrunning
outpost in Dhola Bridge and in occupying Thagla Ridge, must have
been with the specific aim of forcing us to react so as to give them
a good excuse for launching an attack on us” (General K. S.
Thimayya). They also attacked in the Chip Chap Valley and the
Pangong Lake areas of Ladakh. In three days, major fighting was
going on in five main areas. By 24 October, the Chinese were
well across the McMahon Line through a 25-mile wide sector to a
depth of 8 miles into the Indian territory. Kibithoo had fallen into
the hands of the enemy.
On 24 October 1962, China made a peace offer. The terms
were that the Sino-Indian border question should be settled peace-
fully. Emphas
Emphasis was put on the sanctity of the “line of actual con-
trol. ” It was suggested that the Prime Ministers of the two coun-
tries should meet and resolve the differences between the two coun-
tries. Chou En-lai observed: "What issue is there between China
and India which cannot be settled peacefully? . . . . . . China doesn't
want a single inch of India's territory. ” The reply of Nehru was:
“There is no sense or meaning in the Chinese offer to withdraw 20
kilometres from what they call 'line of actual control. ' What is
this line of actual control? ' Is this the line they have created by
aggression since the beginning of September? Advancing 40 or 60
kilometres by blatant military aggression and offering to withdraw
20 kilometres provided both sides do this is a deceptive device which
can fool nobody. "
On 26 October, 1962, India declared a state of emergency. By
31 October, 1962, the Chinese had consolidated their positions in
NEFA and were poised to threaten the plains of India. On that
day, they actually launched a massive attack. Tawang fell into
their hands. Walong, Sela and Bomdila also fell into their hands
in quick succession. On the Ladakh front, Daulat Beg Oldi fell
into their hands. Chushul was attacked and its air-port was under
heavy enemy fire. Indian troops were entrenched in strong posi-
tions and put up a very gallant defence. On account of the heavy
casualties suffered by the Chinese, they give up the idea of cap-
turing Chushul.
When the Government of India was under heavy pressure from
China and there was every possibility of Assam falling into the
hands of the Chinese, Prime Minister Nehru requested the United
States and Great Britain to help him.
prompt one. There was a constant flow of arms into India from
various quarters. Help also came from Canada, West Germany
The response
was
a
## p. 1006 (#1050) ##########################################
2006
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS SINCE 1909
and Australia. It was this help which enabled the Indian troops
to stand against the Chinese and it was at this time that China
declared a unilateral cease-fire to be effective from the midnight of
21 and 22 November, 1962. When the cease-fire was declared,
"the Chinese Communist armies were in possession of mountain
gateways into the plains of Assam. . . . . . were in command of the
natural approaches through the mountains to the Brahmaputra
valley and threatened the whole of Assam and its oil fields. The
entire North-Eastern Frontier Agency area now lay under the
threat of Chinese conquest. . . . . . The Chinese in lightning conquest
had seized the crest lines and now controlled the key passes and
were moving downhill towards the crowded plains. ”
While declaring cease-fire, the Chinese announced that their
frontier guards would withdraw to positions 1272 miles behind the
lines of actual control which existed between China and India.
China was to set up check-posts on its own side of the McMahon
line to forestall the activities of the saboteurs and to maintain order.
However, on Ladakh front, the Chinese were still controlling about
12,000 sq. miles of Indian territory which included Aksai Chin
area through which the Chinese had built a strategic road linking
Sinkiang with Tibet.
Many reasons have been given for unilateral cease-fire by China.
One view is that China withdrew on account of pressure from
Moscow. The Soviet Union did not approve of the Chinese aggres-
sion against India and hence China withdrew. Another view is
that China could not maintain a long supply line on account of the
approaching winter and hence withdrew.
Still another view is that
China withdrew because she feared an attack on the mainland from
the Nationalist Government in Formosa. Another view is that
there was shortage of food in China and the Chinese Government
was afraid that food supplies from Canada and Australia might be
cut off if she continued her aggression against India. The world
opinion was also against China. However, a very important reason
why China withdrew was that the Governments of the United
States and Great Britain promised India military help which enabl-
ed her to put up a stiff resistance. The military help to India was
increasing and with that her capacity to defend herself. There
were the prospects of the war being a long one and hence China
stopped the war by unilateral action.
Many reasons have been given explaining China's attack on
India. One reason was that China resented the enormous prestige
which India enjoyed in South-East Asia and also among the neu-
tral powers of the world. If India was defeated in the battle-field,
all her prestige would disappear and China would emerge as the
## p. 1007 (#1051) ##########################################
INDIA AND COMMUNIST CHINA
1007
leader of Asia. In this object, China succeeded to a very great
extent. China was also not happy with the assistance given to
India by the Soviet Union and she wanted the Soviet Union to
come into the open by either joining India or China. It is con-
tended that China was jealous of the economic progress made by
India and she would like the same to be halted. That was possible
only if India was attacked by China and thus she was forced to
divert her resources from economic development to defence expendi-
ture. China also had her greedy eyes on the oil wells of Assam.
If China had conquered Assam, she would have been in possession
of oil and hence her dependence on the Soviet Union for the supply
of oil would have been avoided.
The Chinese started withdrawing on both the fronts on 1 Decem-
ber, 1962. They returned the sick and wounded Indian prisoners.
They withdrew beyond the McMahon Line on the NEFA front.
They also withdrew from the Western Sector but set up their own
check-posts in the evacuated areas in order to strengthen their
position.
After the Chinese cease-fire, many efforts were made to resolve
the Sino-Indian dispute. A conference of the representatives of
Cambodia, Burma, Indonesia, Ceylon, the U. A. R. and Ghana was
held at Colombo from 10 December to 12 December, 1962. The
Conference put forward the famous Colombo Proposals. Accord-
ing to them, China was to withdraw on the Ladakh front 20 kilo-
metres and India was to maintain its positions. The area evacuat-
ed by the Chinese was to be administered by joint civilian posts of
both the countries. On the Eastern Sector, the line of actual con-
trol recognized by both the countries was to serve as a cease-fire
line. As regards the middle sector, the problem was to be solved
peacefully without resorting to force. Although the proposals were
against India, yet those were accepted by this country and endorsed
by the Indian Parliament. However, China refused to accept them
on the plea that those were vague and suggested that India and
China should meet and settle the dispute. Since 1962, India has
shown her willingness to start a meaningful dialogue with China
but nothing has come out of it and China continues to occupy the
territories grabbed by her through force.
Mention must be made of certain facts concerning the war
between India and China. Prime Minister Nehru expected to get
a lot of help from the Soviet Union but the promised M. I. G.
fighter planes did not come in the hour of need. Some of them
were sent so late that those could not be used at all. The non-
aligned Afro-Asian countries remained non-aligned in the hour of
India's need and advised her to negotiate for cease-fire. The Indian
## p. 1008 (#1052) ##########################################
1008
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS SINCE 1909
troops “hurriedly called to the front and completely unfamiliar
with the terrain held. . . . . . a Chinese army five times larger in
number, preparing this attack for months and possessing fire power
atleast thrice more effective. " It was realised that Prime Minister
Nehru committed a blunder when he appointed V. K. Krishna
Menon as the Defence Minister of India in 1957 and kept him in
that post during the crucial period of 5 years from 1957 to 1962.
The latter did nothing to prepare the country for a war with China
although there were unmistakable signs and blunt warnings by men
like Dr. Raghuvira that war between India and China was inevit-
able and the existing Indian armies were no match for Chinese
armies both in numbers and efficiency. The time was wasted in
superseding one military officer by another and thereby creating
dissensions and discontentment in the armed forces of the country.
Favourites were appointed as the Chief of the Army Staff and also
the persons who were to lead the Indian army against the Chinese.
There was too much of interference from New Delhi and no initia-
tive was left with the men on the spot. It was found that India
entered the war with absolutely no preparation for it.
The relations between India and China are positively hostile.
China continues to maintain a war of nerves. She is trying to
interfere into the internal affairs of India. A lot of money is being
distributed in India by China to win over certain sections of the
people in this country. A section of the Communist Party of India
is pro-China. The Naxalites are openly in favour of China. China
is carrying on a lot of propaganda on her borders with India.
When Pakistan attacked India in 1965, China gave an ultimatum
to India that unless certain frivolous demands of that country
were conceded, China would declare war on India. However, the
,
Pakistan war ended abruptly and China did not attack India.
China knows full well that the relations of India and Pakistan are
not cordial and hence deliberately sights with Pakistan against
India. China has given a lot of military help to Pakistan so that
the same may be used against a common enemy, India.
PAKISTAN
The relations between India and Pakistan have never been cordial.
In October, 1947, the tribal raiders backed by Pakistan attacked the
State of Jammu and Kashmir. When the latter acceded to India,
Indian troops were flown to Kashmir to halt the invasion and ulti-
mately the raiders were successfully driven out of the Kashmir
Valley. However, the problem of Kashmir was not solved and
it has been the bone of contention between the two countries. Vari-
## p. 1009 (#1053) ##########################################
INDIA AND PAKISTAN
1009
ous resolutions and missions of the United Nations have failed to
solve the tangle.
Pakistan has complained on many occasion that she is affraid
of an attack from India and that is why she has to put emphasis
on military preparedness. That also is the reason why Pakistan
has joined the Cento and the Seato. That is also the reason
why Pakistan entered into an agreement with the U. S. A. in 1954
by which she was to get a lot of military help from the United
States. Another justification is also put forward to explain her
friendship with China and the receipt of military help from that
country. However, all these assertions of Pakistan are without any
substance. India had to face an attack from China in 1962 and
from Pakistan in 1965 and she has to arm herself in self-defence.
India had requested Pakistan many a time to make a “no war”
declaration but it is Pakistan which has refused to do so. India
has no ambition against Pakistan and in spite of it Liaquat Ali
Khan followed the “clenched fist” policy towards India. There
was no substance in the allegation of Feroze Khan Noon that India
was the only enemy of Pakistan. He should not have threatened
India that he would “let loose the hordes of tribesmen who had
thoroughly devastated the part of Kashmir during the autumn of
1947. ” Alama Mashriqi, the Khaksar leader, is said to have re-
marked on 2 January, 1957: “Just as dawn of the day after every
night is certain, similarly downfall of the present Bharati Govern-
ment is a settled fact. Forces of history have ordained that I should
direct the energies of the Muslims to the right channel and thus
realise the 900-year-old prediction of Nematullah Shah Wali as
also of Hindu astrologers that Bharat is to lose tremendously in this
year. Hindus and Sikhs are looking for liberation. ”
The Indus Basin Water dispute strained the relations between
the two countries but the same was ultimately settled amicably by
the Indus Waters Treaty signed by the Governments of Pakistan
and India on 19 September 1960. The Treaty allocated the waters
of the rivers Ravi, Beas and Sutlej to India with certain exceptions.
The main exception was that during the transitional period when
the works were being constructed in Pakistan for the replacement
of the Eastern river water, India would continue to deliver water
to Pakistan from her rivers. The transitional period was to last
ten years but the same could be extended for three more years.
The waters of the Indus, Jhelum and Chenab were to be for the
use of Pakistan and India undertook to let flow for the unrestricted
use of Pakistan all the waters of those three rivers subject to the
condition that some of those waters could be used by India in areas
upstream of the Pakistan border for the development of irrigation,
a
## p. 1010 (#1054) ##########################################
1010
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS SINCE 1909
electric power and certain other specific uses. Pakistan was to
construct during the transitional period a system of works, a part
of which was to replace from the Western rivers those irrigation
uses in Pakistan which had hitherto been met from the Eastern
rivers. India was to contribute to the Indus Basin Development Fund
£62,000,000 in ten equal instalments. The total cost of construc-
tion was to be about £380 millions of which approximately £310
million were to be spent on works in Pakistan and approximately £70
millions on works in India. The money was to come from the
contributions to be made by India, Australia, Canada, Germany,
New Zealand, United Kingdom and the United States, proceeds
of a United States Government Loan to Pakistan, proceeds of a
World Bank Loan to Pakistan and some contribution to be made
by Pakistan. The Treaty provided for a permanent Indus Com-
mission which was to have general responsibility for implementing
the terms of the Treaty and reconcile any points of disagreement
that might arise. If differences or disputes between the parties
could not be resolved by agreement, the same were to be referred
to a neutral expert for final decision on technical questions. The
matter could also be taken to a Court of Arbitration.
In spite of the Treaty, the relations between the two countries
did not improve. When India was attacked by China in 1962,
Pakistan showed her sympathies for China. After 1962, Pakistan
started following the politico-military tactics of the Chinese against
India. Cease-fire violations in Kashmir became a common feature.
There were 448 cease-fire violations in Kashmir in 1963, 1,522 in
1964 and 1,800 in 1965 up to the end of July. In April, 1965,
Pakistan tried to occupy Kutch, but the matter was ultimately
referred to arbitration. Pakistan also tried to cut the Srinagar-Leh
road and as that was India's life-line to Ladakh, India replied by
occupying two important Pakistani posts overlooking Kargil on
16 May, 1965. India withdrew her armies from the two Pakistani
posts when she was given a guarantee of security by the United
Nations.
On 4 August, 1965, armed Pakistanis in civilian clothes crossed
the cease-fire line in thousands and mixed with the native popula-
tion of Kashmir on the Indian side. India got the information
from one Mohammad Din, a shepherd, who was bribed by the
Pakistani military officials to supply them information regarding the
location of Indian grain stores, transport depots etc. so that they
may be able to destroy them. Mohammed Din alerted the police
about the presence of “out soldiers. ” Pakistani infiltration went on
steadily from 5 August onwards but the Kashmir Muslims gave
the infiltrators no quarter. On 7 August, Pakistani commandoes
## p. 1011 (#1055) ##########################################
INDIA AND PAKISTAN
1011
9
with grenades, guns and detonators took up positions throughout
the valley of Kashmir. On 9 August, the news broke out that
major moves had been made across the border into Kashmir.
Within a few days, it was an open secret. Referring to the events
of 7 and 8 August, in the Baramula sector, General Nimmo, Chief
of the U. N. observers team, reported that “the observers interviewed
one of the captured raiders who stated that he was a soldier of the
16th Azad Kashmir infantry and that the raiding party was com-
posed of about 300 soldiers of his battalion and hundred Mujahids
(armed civilians trained in guerilla tactics). ” Writing from Rawal-
pindi, the Times correspondent reported on 31st August that "there
can be no doubt that the guerilla action in Kashmir results from
infiltration from this (Pakistan) side in an operation conceived,
planned and directed by the Government of Pakistan. ” The Daily
Telegraph reported that the “most likely reason for Pakistan's ac-
tion in sending the infiltrators into Kashmir seems to be the realiza-
tion by Pakistan that it was futile to place any reliance on the local
population and that the only way to keep the Kashmir question
alive was to send in groups of well armed intruders for sabotage
and general guerilla warfare. ” William Patterson wrote on 13
October, 1965: "The armed infiltrators Pakistan began sending
into Kashmir last August were to inspire local uprisings. . . . . . The
Pakistan army, poised and waiting, was then to respond to pleas
from ‘our Kashmir brothers' for protection against Indian brutality,
and was to sweep through Kashmir on a mission of mercy right to
the Indian frontier. There it was to halt while President Ayub
Khan presented the world with a fait accompli. . . . . . the strategy
was to mix force with appeals to the United Nations for peace. . . .
in order to consolidate politically the armed seizure of Kashmir. ”
8 August, 1965, was the annual festival day of Pir Dastgir Sahib,
a local saint of Srinagar. Pakistani infiltrators hoped to join the
pilgrim crowd and make that day the day of Kashmir's deliverance
from India. However, the invasion miscarried and Srinagar whose
fall was reported to be imminent, was safe in the hands of India.
On the night of 14 August, 1965, some Pakistani infiltrators got
into within a few miles of Srinagar and set fire to Batmalu. "Pakis-
tani radio broadcast this jubilantly but later insisted that the Indian
army had set fire to this quarter when it realized that its confession
of arson was not going to be kindly received by those who had
been rendered homeless. "
Once again, Pakistan deliberately tried to cut the Srinagar-Leh
road. The result was that on 15 August, India recaptured the two
important Pakistani posts overlooking Kargil and also occupied
another vital post to prevent Pakistan from doing mischief in that
## p. 1012 (#1056) ##########################################
1012
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS SINCE 1909
“highly sensitive sector. ” On the night of 24-25 August, the de-
tachments of the Indian Army crossed over into Azad Kashmir to
occupy the Pakistani outposts in the Tithwal sector and on 27-28
August into the Uri-Poonch area to secure vantage positions,
amongst them the Haji Pir Pass which overlooks the routes the
infiltrators took to come into the State of Kashmir.
The authorities in Pakistan were under the impression that after
the death of Jawaharlal Nehru, no great leader was left in India
and hence it was the time to attack India. It was believed that
India was defended by an ill-equipped army lacking in physical
strength and moral courage. The Pakistani soldiers took pride in
the fact that they were infinitely superior to the Indian soldiers.
Pakistan was sure of support from her Allies. Pakistan felt that
she was in stronger position on account of her membership of the
Seato and the Cento. She was also certain of help from Commun-
ist China against India India was considered to be a land of
Banias or shopkeepers who could not stand against the Pathans of
Pakistan. Such was the psychological background with which
Pakistan attacked India in September, 1965.
At dawn on 1 September, 1965, tanks of Pakistan's Armoured
Division rumbled across the Indian border in the Akhnoor sector
in Jammu with the objective of cutting off a Jaurian, India's main-
link with Jammu and the entire valley of Kashmir and Ladakh.
Pakistan was more advantageously situated than India to use her
tanks with telling effect. It was not possible for India to move in
her heavy armour beyond Akhnoor. Even if it was possible, it was
not prudent to do so. Consequently, the Indian troops fell back
in a series of planned withdrawals behind Chhamb. A day later,
,
the enemy came in water-proof jeeps and tanks with sealed engines.
At this stage, the aid of the Indian Air Force was sought and with-
in 45 minutes as many as 28 sorties were flown in 7 missions. The
Indian Air Force did a wonderful job. It knocked out 13 enemy
tanks. The ground fire disabled five tanks. Pakistan also called
in its Air Force but her Sabres were no match for Indian Gnats.
Pakistani drive to Akhnoor was temporarily halted on 1 September,
1965.
On 2 September, 1965, U Thant appealed to both India and
Pakistan for a cease-fire. He frankly told the Security Council
that he was not able to get from Pakistan “any assurance that the
cease-fire and the cease-fire line will be respected henceforth. ” On
4 September, the Security Council formally called for a cease-fire.
India was willing to accept a cease-fire provided Pakistan withdrew
from Chhamb and pulled out the infiltrators from Kashmir and
also promised not to do so again.
## p. 1013 (#1057) ##########################################
INDIA AND PAKISTAN
1013
2
war.
Marshal Chen-i, the Foreign Minister of China, flew to Karachi
on 4 September and conferred with Pakistan Foreign Minister, Mr.
Bhutto for 6 hours. The Chinese Marshal openly supported the
"just action taken by Pakistan to repel the Indian armed provoca-
tion in Kashmir. ” On 5 September, a Pakistani Sabre made an
unsuccessful low level attack on certain key Air Force installations
in the Amritsar area. The situation was really grave.
It was at this stage that India decided to hit back. On 9 Sep-
tember, 1965, Indian troops opened two new fronts, one against
Pakistan's Sialkot sector and the other across the border at Gadra
in Rajasthan. The Indian offensive in Lahore sector was carried
up to the Ichogil Canal. It was found that Pakistan had built
up in this area military structures which must have taken her
years to do so.
That showed that Pakistan was making prepara-
tions for a war with India for years. In the Lahore sector, the
battles were fought between the Indian border and the Ichogil
Canal. There were attacks and counter-attacks. India was able
to capture Dograi and Burki. No attempt was made to capture
Lahore as this would have been given back to Pakistan after the
India concentrated on destroying the war potential and mili-
tary machine of Pakistan.
Two battles deserve special treatment, one at Asal-uttar and the
other at Phillora. The Pakistani soldiers were well poised for at-
tack at Kasur and they attacked the Indians with all their vigour
and strength. The Indian army was forced to fall back under
heavy pressure. The Indian troops took up new positions at the
head of a fort at Khem Karan bordering on the village of Asal-
uttar. The Pakistanis felt that the Indian troops were running
away and it was the most opportune time to attack them. The
battle was fought at Asal-uttar. There are two meanings of this
word, 'true north' and 'the real answer. ' India won a splendid
victory at Asal-Uttar. “Pakistan had lost 97 tanks, a large number
of them pattons, of which 9 were captured intact and two were
surrendered with crew. Ten lieutenant-colonels, six majors, six
other officers and several other ranks were captured in this engage-
ment.
