No More Learning

I answer that, Anyone can absolve from minor excommunication who can
absolve from the sin of participation in the sin of another. But in the
case of a major excommunication, this is pronounced either by a judge,
and then he who pronounced sentence or his superior can absolve---or it
is pronounced by law, and then the bishop or even a priest can absolve
except in the six cases which the Pope, who is the maker of laws,
reserves to himself: the first is the case of a man who lays hands on a
cleric or a religious; the second is of one who breaks into a church
and is denounced for so doing; the third is of the man who sets fire to
a church and is denounced for the deed; the fourth is of one who
knowingly communicates in the Divine worship with those whom the Pope
has excommunicated by name; the fifth is the case of one who tampers
with the letters of the Holy See; the sixth is the case of one who
communicates in a crime of one who is excommunicated. For he should not
be absolved except by the person who excommunicated him, even though he
be not subject to him, unless, by reason of the difficulty of appearing
before him, he be absolved by the bishop or by his own priest, after
binding himself by oath to submit to the command of the judge who
pronounced the excommunication on him.

There are however eight exceptions to the first case: (1) In the hour
of death, when a person can be absolved by any priest from any
excommunication; (2) if the striker be the doorkeeper of a man in
authority, and the blow be given neither through hatred nor of set
purpose; (3) if the striker be a woman; (4) if the striker be a
servant, whose master is not at fault and would suffer from his
absence; (5) if a religious strike a religious, unless he strike him
very grievously; (6) if the striker be a poor man; (7) if he be a
minor, an old man, or an invalid; (8) if there be a deadly feud between
them.

There are, besides, seven cases in which the person who strikes a
cleric does not incur excommunication: (1) if he do it for the sake of
discipline, as a teacher or a superior; (2) if it be done for fun; (3)
if the striker find the cleric behaving with impropriety towards his
wife his mother, his sister or his daughter; (4) if he return blow for
blow at once; (5) if the striker be not aware that he is striking a
cleric; (6) if the latter be guilty of apostasy after the triple
admonition; (7) if the cleric exercise an act which is altogether
contrary to the clerical life, e. g. if he become a soldier, or if he be
guilty of bigamy [*Namely, that which is known by canonists as "similar
bigamy"].

Reply to Objection 1: Although the chains of sin are in themselves
greater than those of excommunication, yet in a certain respect the
chains of excommunication are greater, inasmuch as they bind a man not
only in the sight of God, but also in the eye of the Church. Hence
absolution from excommunication requires jurisdiction in the external
forum, whereas absolution from sin does not. Nor is there need of
giving one's word by oath, as in the case of absolution from
excommunication, because, as the Apostle declares (Heb. 6:16),
controversies between men are decided by oath.

Reply to Objection 2: As an excommunicated person has no share in the
sacraments of the Church, a priest cannot absolve him from his guilt,
unless he be first absolved from excommunication.
__________________________________________________________________

Whether anyone can be absolved against his will?

Objection 1: It would seem that no man can be absolved against his
will. For spiritual things are not conferred on anyone against his
will. Now absolution from excommunication is a spiritual favor.
Therefore it cannot be granted to a man against his will.

Objection 2: Further, the cause of excommunication is contumacy. But
when, through contempt of the excommunication, a man is unwilling to be
absolved, he shows a high degree of contumacy. Therefore he cannot be
absolved.

On the contrary, Excommunication can be pronounced on a man against his
will. Now things that happen to a man against his will, can be removed
from him against his will, as in the case of the goods of fortune.
Therefore excommunication can be removed from a man against his will.

I answer that, Evil of fault and evil of punishment differ in this,
that the origin of fault is within us, since all sin is voluntary,
whereas the origin of punishment is sometimes without, since punishment
does not need to be voluntary, in fact the nature of punishment is
rather to be against the will. Wherefore, just as a man commits no sin
except willingly, so no sin is forgiven him against his will. On the
other hand just as a person can be excommunicated against his will, so
can he be absolved therefrom.

Reply to Objection 1: The assertion is true of those spiritual goods
which depend on our will, such as the virtues, which we cannot lose
unwillingly; for knowledge, although a spiritual good, can be lost by a
man against his will through sickness. Hence the argument is not to the
point.

Reply to Objection 2: It is possible for excommunication to be removed
from a man even though he be contumacious, if it seem to be for the
good of the man for whom the excommunication was intended as a
medicine.
__________________________________________________________________

Whether a man can be absolved from one excommunication without being
absolved from all?

Objection 1: It would seem that a man cannot be absolved from one
excommunication without being absolved from all. For an effect should
be proportionate to its cause. Now the cause of excommunication is a
sin. Since then a man cannot be absolved from one sin without being
absolved from all, neither can this happen as regards excommunication.

Objection 2: Further, absolution from excommunication is pronounced in
the Church. But a man who is under the ban of one excommunication is
outside the Church. Therefore so long as one remains, a man cannot be
loosed from another.

On the contrary, Excommunication is a punishment. Now a man can be
loosed from one punishment, while another remains. Therefore a man can
be loosed from one excommunication and yet remain under another.

I answer that, Excommunications are not connected together in any way,
and so it is possible for a man to be absolved from one, and yet remain
under another.

It must be observed however that sometimes a man lies under several
excommunications pronounced by one judge; and then, when he is absolved
from one, he is understood to be absolved from all, unless the contrary
be expressed, or unless he ask to be absolved from excommunication on
one count only, whereas he was excommunicated under several. On the
other hand sometimes a man lies under several sentences of
excommunication pronounced by several judges; and then, when absolved
from one excommunication, he is not therefore absolved from the others,
unless at his prayer they all confirm his absolution, or unless they
all depute one to absolve him.

Reply to Objection 1: All sins are connected together in aversion from
God, which is incompatible with the forgiveness of sin: wherefore one
sin cannot be forgiven without another. But excommunications have no
such connection. Nor again is absolution from excommunication hindered
by contrariety of the will, as stated above [4886](A[2]). Hence the
argument does not prove.

Reply to Objection 2: Just as such a man was for several reasons
outside the Church so is it possible for his separation to be removed
on one count and to remain on another.
__________________________________________________________________

OF INDULGENCES (THREE ARTICLES)

We must now consider indulgence: (1) in itself; (2) those who grant
indulgence; (3) those who receive it.

Under the first head there are three points of inquiry:

(1) Whether an indulgence remits any part of the punishment due for the
satisfaction of sins?

(2) Whether indulgences are as effective as they claim to be?

(3) Whether an indulgence should be granted for temporal assistance?
__________________________________________________________________

Whether an indulgence can remit any part of the punishment due for the
satisfaction of sins?

Objection 1: It would seem that an indulgence cannot remit any part of
the punishment due for the satisfaction of sins. Because a gloss on 2
Tim. 2:13, "He cannot deny Himself," says: "He would do this if He did
not keep His word. " Now He said (Dt. 25:2): "According to the measure
of the sin shall the measure also of the stripes be. " Therefore nothing
can be remitted from the satisfactory punishment which is appointed
according to the measure of sin.

Objection 2: Further, an inferior cannot absolve from an obligation
imposed by his superior. But when God absolves us from sin He binds us
to temporal punishment, as Hugh of St. Victor declares (Tract. vi Sum.
Sent. [*Of doubtful authenticity]). Therefore no man can absolve from
that punishment, by remitting any part of it.

Objection 3: Further, the granting of the sacramental effect without
the sacraments belongs to the power of excellence. Now none but Christ
has the power of excellence in the sacraments. Since then satisfaction
is a part of the sacrament of Penance, conducing to the remission of
the punishment due, it seems that no mere man can remit the debt of
punishment without satisfaction.

Objection 4: Further, the power of the ministers of the Church was
given them, not "unto destruction," but "unto edification" (2 Cor.
10:8). But it would be conducive to destruction, if satisfaction, which
was intended for our good, inasmuch as it serves for a remedy, were
done away with. Therefore the power of the ministers of the Church does
not extend to this.

On the contrary, It is written (2 Cor. 2:10): "For, what I have
pardoned, if I have pardoned anything, for your sakes have I done it in
the person of Christ," and a gloss adds: i. e. "as though Christ Himself
had pardoned. " But Christ could remit the punishment of a sin without
any satisfaction, as evidenced in the case of the adulterous woman (Jn.
8). Therefore Paul could do so likewise. Therefore the Pope can too,
since his power in the Church is not less than Paul's.

Further, the universal Church cannot err; since He Who "was heard for
His reverence" (Heb. 5:7) said to Peter, on whose profession of faith
the Church was founded (Lk. 22:32): "I have prayed for thee that thy
faith fail not. " Now the universal Church approves and grants
indulgences. Therefore indulgences have some value.

I answer that, All admit that indulgences have some value, for it would
be blasphemy to say that the Church does anything in vain. But some say
that they do not avail to free a man from the debt of punishment which
he has deserved in Purgatory according to God's judgment, and that they
merely serve to free him from the obligation imposed on him by the
priest as a punishment for his sins, or from the canonical penalties he
has incurred. But this opinion does not seem to be true. First, because
it is expressly opposed to the privilege granted to Peter, to whom it
was said (Mat. 16:19) that whatsoever he should loose on earth should
be loosed also in heaven. Wherefore whatever remission is granted in
the court of the Church holds good in the court of God. Moreover the
Church by granting such indulgences would do more harm than good,
since, by remitting the punishment she had enjoined on a man, she would
deliver him to be punished more severely in Purgatory.

Hence we must say on the contrary that indulgences hold good both in
the Church's court and in the judgment of God, for the remission of the
punishment which remains after contrition, absolution, and confession,
whether this punishment be enjoined or not. The reason why they so
avail is the oneness of the mystical body in which many have performed
works of satisfaction exceeding the requirements of their debts; in
which, too, many have patiently borne unjust tribulations whereby a
multitude of punishments would have been paid, had they been incurred.
So great is the quantity of such merits that it exceeds the entire debt
of punishment due to those who are living at this moment: and this is
especially due to the merits of Christ: for though He acts through the
sacraments, yet His efficacy is nowise restricted to them, but
infinitely surpasses their efficacy.

Now one man can satisfy for another, as we have explained above
([4887]Q[13], A[2]). And the saints in whom this super-abundance of
satisfactions is found, did not perform their good works for this or
that particular person, who needs the remission of his punishment (else
he would have received this remission without any indulgence at all),
but they performed them for the whole Church in general, even as the
Apostle declares that he fills up "those things that are wanting of the
sufferings of Christ . . . for His body, which is the Church" to whom
he wrote (Col. 1:24). These merits, then, are the common property of
the whole Church. Now those things which are the common property of a
number are distributed to the various individuals according to the
judgment of him who rules them all. Hence, just as one man would obtain
the remission of his punishment if another were to satisfy for him, so
would he too if another's satisfactions be applied to him by one who
has the power to do so.

Reply to Objection 1: The remission which is granted by means of
indulgences does not destroy the proportion between punishment and sin,
since someone has spontaneously taken upon himself the punishment due
for another's guilt, as explained above.

Reply to Objection 2: He who gains an indulgence is not, strictly
speaking, absolved from the debt of punishment, but is given the means
whereby he may pay it.

Reply to Objection 3: The effect of sacramental absolution is the
removal of a man's guilt, an effect which is not produced by
indulgences. But he who grants indulgences pays the debt of punishment
which a man owes, out of the common stock of the Church's goods, as
explained above.

Reply to Objection 4: Grace affords a better remedy for the avoidance
of sin than does habituation to (good) works. And since he who gains an
indulgence is disposed to grace through the love which he conceives for
the cause for which the indulgence is granted, it follows that
indulgences provide a remedy against sin. Consequently it is not
harmful to grant indulgences unless this be done without discretion.
Nevertheless those who gain indulgences should be advised, not, on this
account, to omit the penitential works imposed on them, so that they
may derive a remedy from these also, even though they may be quit of
the debt of punishment; and all the more, seeing that they are often
more in debt than they think.
__________________________________________________________________

Whether indulgences are as effective as they claim to be?

Objection 1: It would seem that indulgences are not as effective as
they claim to be. For indulgences have no effect save from the power of
the keys. Now by the power of the keys, he who has that power can only
remit some fixed part of the punishment due for sin, after taking into
account the measure of the sin and of the penitent's sorrow. Since then
indulgences depend on the mere will of the grantor, it seems that they
are not as effective as they claim to be.

Objection 2: Further, the debt of punishment keeps man back from the
attainment of glory, which he ought to desire above all things. Now, if
indulgences are as effective as they claim to be, a man by setting
himself to gain indulgences might become immune from all debt of
temporal punishment. Therefore it would seem that a man ought to put
aside all other kinds of works, and devote himself to gain indulgences.

Objection 3: Further, sometimes an indulgence whereby a man is remitted
a third part of the punishment due for his sins is granted if he
contribute towards the erection of a certain building. If, therefore,
indulgences produce the effect which is claimed for them, he who gives
a penny, and then another, and then again another, would obtain a
plenary absolution from all punishment due for his sins, which seems
absurd.

Objection 4: Further, sometimes an indulgence is granted, so that for
visiting a church a man obtains a seven years' remission. If, then, an
indulgence avails as much as is claimed for it a man who lives near
that church, or the clergy attached thereto who go there every day,
obtain as much indulgence as one who comes from a distance (which would
appear unjust); moreover, seemingly, they would gain the indulgence
several times a day, since they go there repeatedly.

Objection 5: Further, to remit a man's punishment beyond a just
estimate seems to amount to the same as to remit it without reason;
because in so far as he exceeds that estimate, he limits the
compensation. Now he who grants an indulgence cannot without cause
remit a man's punishment either wholly or partly, even though the Pope
were to say to anyone: "I remit to all the punishment you owe for your
sins. " Therefore it seems that he cannot remit anything beyond the just
estimate. Now indulgences are often published which exceed that just
estimate. Therefore they do not avail as much as is claimed for them.

On the contrary, It is written (Job 13:7): "Hath God any need of your
lie, that you should speak deceitfully for Him? " Therefore the Church,
in publishing indulgences, does not lie; and so they avail as much as
is claimed for them.

Further, the Apostle says (1 Cor. 15:14): "If . . . our preaching is
vain, your faith is also vain. " Therefore whoever utters a falsehood in
preaching, so far as he is concerned, makes faith void. and so sins
mortally. If therefore indulgences are not as effective as they claim
to be, all who publish indulgences would commit a mortal sin: which is
absurd.

I answer that, on this point there are many opinions. For some maintain
that indulgences have not the efficacy claimed for them, but that they
simply avail each individual in proportion to his faith and devotion.
And consequently those who maintain this, say that the Church publishes
her indulgences in such a way as, by a kind of pious fraud, to induce
men to do well, just as a mother entices her child to walk by holding
out an apple. But this seems a very dangerous assertion to make. For as
Augustine states (Ep. ad Hieron. lxxviii), "if any error were
discovered in Holy Writ, the authority of Holy Writ would perish. " In
like manner, if any error were to be found in the Church's preaching,
her doctrine would have no authority in settling questions of faith.

Hence others have maintained that indulgences avail as much as is
claimed for them, according to a just estimate, not of him who grants
it---who perhaps puts too high a value on it---nor of the
recipient---for he may prize too highly the gift he receives, but a
just estimate according to the estimate of good men who consider the
condition of the person affected, and the utility and needs of the
Church, for the Church's needs are greater at one time than at another.
Yet, neither, seemingly, can this opinion stand. First, because in that
case indulgences would no longer be a remission, but rather a mere
commutation. Moreover the preaching of the Church would not be excused
from untruth, since, at times, indulgences are granted far in excess of
the requirements of this just estimate, taking into consideration all
the aforesaid conditions, as, for example, when the Pope granted to
anyone who visited a certain church, an indulgence of seven years,
which indulgence was granted by Blessed Gregory for the Roman Stations.

Hence others say that the quantity of remission accorded in an
indulgence is not to be measured by the devotion of the recipient, as
the first opinion suggested, nor according to the quantity of what is
given, as the second opinion held; but according to the cause for which
the indulgence is granted, and according to which a person is held
deserving of obtaining such an indulgence. Thus according as a man
approached near to that cause, so would he obtain remission in whole or
in part. But neither will this explain the custom of the Church, who
assigns, now a greater, now a lesser indulgence, for the same cause:
thus, under the same circumstances, now a year's indulgence, now one of
only forty days, according to the graciousness of the Pope, who grants
the indulgence, is granted to those who visit a church. Wherefore the
amount of the remission granted by the indulgence is not to be measured
by the cause for which a person is worthy of an indulgence.

We must therefore say otherwise that the quantity of an effect is
proportionate to the quantity of the cause. Now the cause of the
remission of punishment effected by indulgences is no other than the
abundance of the Church's merits, and this abundance suffices for the
remission of all punishment. The effective cause of the remission is
not the devotion, or toil, or gift of the recipient; nor, again, is it
the cause for which the indulgence was granted. We cannot, then,
estimate the quantity of the remission by any of the foregoing, but
solely by the merits of the Church---and these are always
superabundant. Consequently, according as these merits are applied to a
person so does he obtain remission. That they should be so applied
demands, firstly, authority to dispense this treasure. secondly, union
between the recipient and Him Who merited it---and this is brought
about by charity; thirdly, there is required a reason for so dispensing
this treasury, so that the intention, namely, of those who wrought
these meritorious works is safeguarded, since they did them for the
honor of God and for the good of the Church in general. Hence whenever
the cause assigned tends to the good of the Church and the honor of
God, there is sufficient reason for granting an indulgence.

Hence, according to others, indulgences have precisely the efficacy
claimed for them, provided that he who grants them have the authority,
that the recipient have charity, and that, as regards the cause, there
be piety which includes the honor of God and the profit of our
neighbor. Nor in this view have we "too great a market of the Divine
mercy" [*St. Bonaventure, Sent. iv, D, 20], as some maintain, nor again
does it derogate from Divine justice, for no punishment is remitted,
but the punishment of one is imputed to another.

Reply to Objection 1: As stated above ([4888]Q[19], A[3]) there are two
keys, the key of orders and the key of jurisdiction. The key of orders
is a sacramental: and as the effects of the sacraments are fixed, not
by men but by God, the priest cannot decide in the tribunal of
confession how much shall be remitted by means of the key of orders
from the punishment due; it is God Who appoints the amount to be
remitted. On the other hand the key of jurisdiction is not something
sacramental, and its effect depends on a man's decision. The remission
granted through indulgences is the effect of this key, since it does
not belong to the dispensation of the sacraments, but to the
distribution of the common property of the Church: hence it is that
legates, even though they be not priests, can grant indulgences.
Consequently the decision of how much punishment is to be remitted by
an indulgence depends on the will of the one who grants that
indulgence. If, however, he remits punishment without sufficient
reason, so that men are enticed to substitute mere nothings, as it
were, for works of penance, he sins by granting such indulgences,
although the indulgence is gained fully.

Reply to Objection 2: Although indulgences avail much for the remission
of punishment, yet works of satisfaction are more meritorious in
respect of the essential reward, which infinitely transcends the
remission of temporal punishment.

Reply to Objection 3: When an indulgence is granted in a general way to
anyone that helps towards the building of a church, we must understand
this to mean a help proportionate to the giver: and in so far as he
approaches to this, he will gain the indulgence more or less fully.
Consequently a poor man by giving one penny would gain the full
indulgence, not so a rich man, whom it would not become to give so
little to so holy and profitable a work; Just as a king would not be
said to help a man if he gave him an "obol. "

Reply to Objection 4: A person who lives near the church, and the
priest and clergy of the church, gain the indulgence as much as those
who come perhaps a distance of a thousand days' journey: because the
remission, as stated above, is proportionate, not to the toil, but to
the merits which are applied. Yet he who toils most gains most merit.
This, however, is to be understood of those cases in which an
indulgence is given in an undeterminate manner. For sometimes a
distinction is expressed: thus the Pope at the time of general
absolution grants an indulgence of five years to those who come from
across the seas, and one of three years to those who come from across
the mountains, to others an indulgence of one year. Nor does a person
gain the indulgence each time he visits the church during the term of
indulgence, because sometimes it is granted for a fixed time; thus when
it is said, "Whoever visits such and such a church until such and such
a day, shall gain so much indulgence," we must understand that it can
be gained only once. on the other hand if there be a continual
indulgence in a certain church, as the indulgence of forty days to be
gained in the church of the Blessed Peter, then a person gains the
indulgence as often as he visits the church.

Reply to Objection 5: An indulgence requires a cause, not as a measure
of the remission of punishment, but in order that the intention of
those whose merits are applied, may reach to this particular
individual. Now one person's good is applied to another in two ways:
first, by charity; and in this way, even without indulgences, a person
shares in all the good deeds done, provided he have charity: secondly,
by the intention of the person who does the good action; and in this
way, provided there be a lawful cause, the intention of a person who
has done something for the profit of the Church, may reach to some
individual through indulgences.
__________________________________________________________________

Whether an indulgence ought to be granted for temporal help?

Objection 1: It would seem that an indulgence ought not to be granted
for temporal help. Because the remission of sins is something
spiritual. Now to exchange a spiritual for a temporal thing is simony.
Therefore this ought not to be done.

Objection 2: Further, spiritual assistance is more necessary than
temporal. But indulgences do not appear to be granted for spiritual
assistance. Much less therefore ought they to be granted for temporal
help.

On the contrary, stands the common custom of the Church in granting
indulgences for pilgrimages and almsgiving.

I answer that, Temporal things are subordinate to spiritual matters,
since we must make use of temporal things on account of spiritual
things. Consequently an indulgence must not be granted for the sake of
temporal matters as such, but in so far as they are subordinate to
spiritual things: such as the quelling of the Church's enemies, who
disturb her peace; or such as the building of a church, of a bridge,
and other forms of almsgiving. It is therefore evident that there is no
simony in these transactions, since a spiritual thing is exchanged, not
for a temporal but for a spiritual commodity.

Hence the Reply to the First Objection is clear.

Reply to Objection 2: Indulgences can be, and sometimes are, granted
even for purely spiritual matters. Thus Pope Innocent IV granted an
indulgence of ten days to all who prayed for the king of France; and in
like manner sometimes the same indulgence is granted to those who
preach a crusade as to those who take part in it.
__________________________________________________________________

OF THOSE WHO CAN GRANT INDULGENCES (FOUR ARTICLES)

We must now consider those who can grant indulgences: under which head
there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether every parish priest can grant indulgences?

(2) Whether a deacon or another, who is not a priest, can grant
indulgences?

(3) Whether a bishop can grant them?

(4) Whether they can be granted by one who is in mortal sin?
__________________________________________________________________

Whether every parish priest can grant indulgences?

Objection 1: It would seem that every parish priest can grant
indulgences. For an indulgence derives its efficacy from the
superabundance of the Church's merits. Now there is no congregation
without some superabundance of merits. Therefore every priest, who has
charge of a congregation, can grant indulgences, and, in like manner,
so can every prelate.

Objection 2: Further, every prelate stands for a multitude, just as an
individual stands for himself. But any individual can assign his own
goods to another and thus offer satisfaction for a third person.
Therefore a prelate can assign the property of the multitude subject to
him, and so it seems that he can grant indulgences.

On the contrary, To excommunicate is less than to grant indulgences.
But a parish priest cannot do the former. Therefore he cannot do the
latter.

I answer that, Indulgences are effective, in as much as the works of
satisfaction done by one person are applied to another, not only by
virtue of charity, but also by the intention of the person who did them
being directed in some way to the person to whom they are applied. Now
a person's intention may be directed to another in three ways,
specifically, generically and individually. Individually, as when one
person offers satisfaction for another particular person; and thus
anyone can apply his works to another. Specifically, as when a person
prays for the congregation to which he belongs, for the members of his
household, or for his benefactors, and directs his works of
satisfaction to the same intention: in this way the superior of a
congregation can apply those works to some other person, by applying
the intention of those who belong to his congregation to some fixed
individual. Generically, as when a person directs his works for the
good of the Church in general; and thus he who presides over the whole
Church can communicate those works, by applying his intention to this
or that individual. And since a man is a member of a congregation, and
a congregation is a part of the Church, hence the intention of private
good includes the intention of the good of the congregation, and of the
good of the whole Church. Therefore he who presides over the Church can
communicate what belongs to an individual congregation or to an
individual man: and he who presides over a congregation can communicate
what belongs to an individual man, but not conversely. Yet neither the
first nor the second communication is called an indulgence, but only
the third; and this for two reasons. First, because, although those
communications loose man from the debt of punishment in the sight of
God, yet he is not freed from the obligation of fulfilling the
satisfaction enjoined, to which he is bound by a commandment of the
Church; whereas the third communication frees man even from this
obligation. Secondly, because in one person or even in one congregation
there is not such an unfailing supply of merits as to be sufficient
both for the one person or congregation and for all others; and
consequently the individual is not freed from the entire debt of
punishment unless satisfaction is offered for him individually, to the
very amount that he owes. On the other hand, in the whole Church there
is an unfailing supply of merits, chiefly on account of the merit of
Christ. Consequently he alone who is at the head of the Church can
grant indulgences. Since, however, the Church is the congregation of
the faithful, and since a congregation of men is of two kinds, the
domestic, composed of members of the same family, and the civil,
composed of members of the same nationality, the Church is like to a
civil congregation, for the people themselves are called the Church;
while the various assemblies, or parishes of one diocese are likened to
a congregation in the various families and services. Hence a bishop
alone is properly called a prelate of the Church, wherefore he alone,
like a bridegroom, receives the ring of the Church. Consequently full
power in the dispensation of the sacraments, and jurisdiction in the
public tribunal, belong to him alone as the public person, but to
others by delegation from him. Those priests who have charge of the
people are not prelates strictly speaking, but assistants, hence, in
consecrating priests the bishop says: "The more fragile we are, the
more we need these assistants": and for this reason they do not
dispense all the sacraments. Hence parish priests, or abbots or other
like prelates cannot grant indulgences.

This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.
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Whether a deacon or another who is not a priest can grant an indulgence?

Objection 1: It would seem that a deacon, or one that is not a priest
cannot grant an indulgence. Because remission of sins is an effect of
the keys. Now none but a priest has the keys. Therefore a priest alone
can grant indulgences.

Objection 2: Further, a fuller remission of punishment is granted by
indulgences than by the tribunal of Penance. But a priest alone has
power in the latter, and, therefore, he alone has power in the former.

On the contrary, The distribution of the Church's treasury is entrusted
to the same person as the government of the Church. Now this is
entrusted sometimes to one who is not a priest. Therefore he can grant
indulgences, since they derive their efficacy from the distribution of
the Church's treasury.

I answer that, The power of granting indulgences follows jurisdiction,
as stated above ([4889]Q[25], A[2]). And since deacons and others, who
are not priests, can have jurisdiction either delegated, as legates, or
ordinary, as bishops-elect, it follows that even those who are not
priests can grant indulgences, although they cannot absolve in the
tribunal of Penance, since this follows the reception of orders. This
suffices for the Replies to the Objections, because the granting of
indulgences belongs to the key of jurisdiction and not to the key of
orders.
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Whether a bishop can grant indulgences?

Objection 1: It would seem that even a bishop cannot grant indulgences.
Because the treasury of the Church is the common property of the whole
Church. Now the common property of the whole Church cannot be
distributed save by him who presides over the whole Church. Therefore
the Pope alone can grant indulgences.

Objection 2: Further, none can remit punishments fixed by law, save the
one who has the power to make the law. Now punishments in satisfaction
for sins are fixed by law. Therefore the Pope alone can remit these
punishments, since he is the maker of the law.

On the contrary, stands the custom of the Church in accordance with
which bishops grant indulgences.

I answer that, The Pope has the plenitude of pontifical power, being
like a king in his kingdom: whereas the bishops are appointed to a
share in his solicitude, like judges over each city. Hence them alone
the Pope, in his letters, addresses as "brethren," whereas he calls all
others his "sons. " Therefore the plenitude of the power of granting
indulgences resides in the Pope, because he can grant them, as he
lists, provided the cause be a lawful one: while, in bishops, this
power resides subject to the Pope's ordination, so that they can grant
them within fixed limits and not beyond.

This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.
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Whether indulgences can be granted by one who is in mortal sin?

Objection 1: It would seem that indulgences cannot be granted by one
who is in mortal sin. For a stream can no longer flow if cut off from
its source. Now the source of grace which is the Holy Ghost is cut off
from one who is in mortal sin. Therefore such a one can convey nothing
to others by granting indulgences.

Objection 2: Further, it is a greater thing to grant an indulgence than
to receive one. But one who is in mortal sin cannot receive an
indulgence, as we shall show presently ([4890]Q[27], A[1]). Neither,
therefore, can he grant one.

On the contrary, Indulgences are granted in virtue of the power
conferred on the prelates of the Church. Now mortal sin takes away, not
power but goodness. Therefore one who is in mortal sin can grant
indulgences.

I answer that, The granting of indulgences belongs to jurisdiction. But
a man does not, through sin, lose jurisdiction. Consequently
indulgences are equally valid, whether they be granted by one who is in
mortal sin, or by a most holy person; since he remits punishment, not
by virtue of his own merits, but by virtue of the merits laid up in the
Church's treasury.

Reply to Objection 1: The prelate who, while in a state of mortal sin,
grants an indulgence, does not pour forth anything of his own, and so
it is not necessary that he should receive an inflow from the source,
in order that he may grant a valid indulgence.

Reply to Objection 2: Further, to grant an indulgence is more than to
receive one, if we consider the power, but it is less, if we consider
the personal profit.
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OF THOSE WHOM INDULGENCES AVAIL (FOUR ARTICLES)

We must now consider those whom indulgences avail: under which head
there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether indulgences avail those who are in mortal sin?

(2) Whether they avail religious?

(3) Whether they avail a person who does not fulfill the conditions for
which the indulgence is given?

(4) Whether they avail him who grants them?
__________________________________________________________________

Whether an indulgence avails those who are in mortal sin?

Objection 1: It would seem that an indulgence avails those who are in
mortal sin. For one person can merit grace and many other good things
for another, even though he be in mortal sin. Now indulgences derive
their efficacy from the application of the saints' merits to an
individual. Therefore they are effective in one who is in mortal sin.

Objection 2: Further, the greater the need, the more room there is for
pity. Now a man who is in mortal sin is in very great need. Therefore
all the more should pity be extended to him by indulgence.

On the contrary, A dead member receives no inflow from the other
members that are living. But one who is in mortal sin, is like a dead
member. Therefore he receives no inflow, through indulgences, from the
merits of living members.

I answer that, Some hold that indulgences avail those even who are in
mortal sin, for the acquiring of grace, but not for the remission of
their punishment, since none can be freed from punishment who is not
yet freed from guilt. For he who has not yet been reached by God's
operation unto the remission of guilt, cannot receive the remission of
his punishment from the minister of the Church neither by indulgences
nor in the tribunal of Penance.

But this opinion seems to be untrue. Because, although those merits
which are applied by means of an indulgence, might possibly avail a
person so that he could merit grace (by way of congruity and
impetration), yet it is not for this reason that they are applied, but
for the remission of punishment. Hence they do not avail those who are
in mortal sin, and consequently, true contrition and confession are
demanded as conditions for gaining all indulgences. If however the
merits were applied by such a form as this: "I grant you a share in the
merits of the whole Church---or of one congregation, or of one
specified person," then they might avail a person in mortal sin so that
he could merit something, as the foregoing opinion holds.

This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.

Reply to Objection 2: Although he who is in mortal sin is in greater
need of help, yet he is less capable of receiving it.
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Whether indulgences avail religious?

Objection 1: It would seem that indulgences do not avail religious. For
there is no reason to bring supplies to those who supply others out of
their own abundance. Now indulgences are derived from the abundance of
works of satisfaction to be found in religious. Therefore it is
unreasonable for them to profit by indulgences.

Objection 2: Further, nothing detrimental to religious life should be
done in the Church. But, if indulgences were to avail religious, this
would be detrimental to regular discipline, because religious would
become lax on account of indulgences, and would neglect the penances
imposed in chapter. Therefore indulgences do not avail religious.

On the contrary, Good brings harm to no man. But the religious life is
a good thing. Therefore it does not take away from religious the profit
to be derived from indulgences.

I answer that, Indulgences avail both seculars and religious, provided
they have charity and satisfy the conditions for gaining the
indulgences: for religious can be helped by indulgences no less than
persons living in the world.

Reply to Objection 1: Although religious are in the state of
perfection, yet they cannot live without sin: and so if at times they
are liable to punishment on account of some sin, they can expiate this
debt by means of indulgences. For it is not unreasonable that one who
is well off absolutely speaking, should be in want at times and in some
respect, and thus need to be supplied with what he lacks. Hence it is
written (Gal. 6:2): "Bear ye one another's burdens. "

Reply to Objection 2: There is no reason why indulgences should be
detrimental to religious observance, because, as to the reward of
eternal life, religious merit more by observing their rule than by
gaining indulgences; although, as to the remission of punishment, which
is a lesser good, they merit less. Nor again do indulgences remit the
punishment enjoined in chapter, because the chapter is a judicial
rather than a penitential tribunal. hence even those who are not
priests hold chapter. Absolution from punishment enjoined or due for
sin is given in the tribunal of Penance.
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Whether an indulgence can ever be granted to one who does not fulfill the
conditions required?

Objection 1: It would seem that an indulgence can sometimes be granted
to one who does not fulfill the required conditions. Because when a
person is unable to perform a certain action his will is taken for the
deed. Now sometimes an indulgence is to be gained by giving an alms,
which a poor man is unable to do, though he would do so willingly.
Therefore he can gain the indulgence.

Objection 2: Further, one man can make satisfaction for another. Now an
indulgence is directed to the remission of punishment, just as
satisfaction is. Therefore one man can gain an indulgence for another;
and so a man can gain an indulgence without doing that for which the
indulgence is given.

On the contrary, If the cause is removed, the effect is removed. If
therefore a person fails to do that for which an indulgence is granted,
and which is the cause of the indulgence, he does not gain the
indulgence.

I answer that, Failing the condition of a grant, no grant ensues.
Hence, as an indulgence is granted on the condition that a person does
or gives a certain thing, if he fails in this, he does not gain the
indulgence.

Reply to Objection 1: This is true of the essential reward, but not of
certain accidental rewards, such as the remission of punishment and the
like.

Reply to Objection 2: A person can by his intention apply his own
action to whomever he lists, and so he can make satisfaction for
whomever he chooses. On the other hand, an indulgence cannot be applied
to someone, except in accordance with the intention of the grantor.
Hence, since he applies it to the doer or giver of a particular action
or thing, the doer cannot transfer this intention to another. If,
however, the indulgence were expressed thus: "Whosoever does this, or
for whomsoever this is done, shall gain so much indulgence," it would
avail the person for whom it is done. Nor would the person who does
this action, give the indulgence to another, but he who grants the
indulgence in this form.
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Whether an indulgence avails the person who grants it?

Objection 1: It would seem that an indulgence does not avail him who
grants it. For the granting of an indulgence belongs to jurisdiction.
Now no one can exercise jurisdiction on himself. thus no one can
excommunicate himself. Therefore no one can participate in an
indulgence granted by himself.

Objection 2: Further, if this were possible, he who grants an
indulgence might gain the remission of the punishment of all his sins
for some small deed, so that he would sin with impunity, which seems
senseless.

Objection 3: Further, to grant indulgences and to excommunicate belong
to the same power. Now a man cannot excommunicate himself. Therefore he
cannot share in the indulgence of which he is the grantor.

On the contrary, He would be worse off than others if he could not make
use of the Church's treasury which he dispenses to others.

I answer that, An indulgence should be given for some reason, in order
for anyone to be enticed by the indulgence to perform some action that
conduces to the good of the Church and to the honor of God. Now the
prelate to whom is committed the care of the Church's good and of the
furthering of God's honor, does not need to entice himself thereto.
Therefore he cannot grant an indulgence to himself alone; but he can
avail himself of an indulgence that he grants for others, since it is
based on a cause for granting it to them.

Reply to Objection 1: A man cannot exercise an act of jurisdiction on
himself, but a prelate can avail himself of those things which are
granted to others by the authority of his jurisdiction, both in
temporal and in spiritual matters: thus also a priest gives himself the
Eucharist which he gives to others. And so a bishop too can apply to
himself the suffrages of the Church which he dispenses to others, the
immediate effect of which suffrages, and not of his jurisdiction, is
the remission of punishment by means of indulgences.

The Reply to the Second Objection is clear from what had been said.

Reply to Objection 3: Excommunication is pronounced by way of sentence,
which no man can pronounce on himself, for the reason that in the
tribunal of justice the same man cannot be both judge and accused. On
the other hand an indulgence is not given under the form of a sentence,
but by way of dispensation, which a man can apply to himself.
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OF THE SOLEMN RITE OF PENANCE (THREE ARTICLES)

We must now consider the solemn rite of Penance: under which head there
are three points of inquiry:

(1) Whether a penance can be published or solemnized?

(2) Whether a solemn penance can be repeated?

(3) Whether public penance should be imposed on women?
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Whether a penance should be published or solemnized?

Objection 1: It would seem that a penance should not be published or
solemnized. Because it is not lawful for a priest, even through fear,
to divulge anyone's sin, however notorious it may be. Now a sin is
published by a solemn penance. Therefore a penance should not be
solemnized.

Objection 2: Further, the judgment should follow the nature of the
tribunal. Now penance is a judgment pronounced in a secret tribunal.
Therefore it should not be published or solemnized.

Objection 3: Further, "Every deficiency is made good by penance" as
Ambrose [*Cf. Hypognost. iii, among the spurious works ascribed to St.
Augustine] states. Now solemnization has a contrary effect, since it
involves the penitent in many deficiencies: for a layman cannot be
promoted to the ranks of the clergy nor can a cleric be promoted to
higher orders, after doing solemn penance. Therefore Penance should not
be solemnized.

On the contrary, Penance is a sacrament. Now some kind of solemnity is
observed in every sacrament. Therefore there should be some solemnity
in Penance.

Further, the medicine should suit the disease. Now a sin is sometimes
public, and by its example draws many to sin. Therefore the penance
which is its medicine should also be public and solemn so as to give
edification to many.

I answer that, Some penances should be public and solemn for four
reasons. First, so that a public sin may have a public remedy;
secondly, because he who has committed a very grave crime deserves the
greatest confusion even in this life; thirdly, in order that it may
deter others; fourthly, that he may be an example of repentance, lest
those should despair, who have committed grievous sins.

Reply to Objection 1: The priest does not divulge the confession by
imposing such a penance, though people may suspect the penitent of
having committed some great sin. For a man is not certainly taken to be
guilty, because he is punished, since sometimes one does penance for
another: thus we read in the Lives of the Fathers of a certain man who,
in order to incite his companion to do penance, did penance together
with him. And if the sin be public, the penitent, by fulfilling his
penance, shows that he has been to confession.

Reply to Objection 2: A solemn penance, as to its imposition, does not
go beyond the limits of a secret tribunal, since, just as the
confession is made secretly, so the penance is imposed secretly. It is
the execution of the penance, that goes beyond the limits of the secret
tribunal: and there is nothing objectionable in this.

Reply to Objection 3: Although Penance cancels all deficiencies, by
restoring man to his former state of grace, yet it does not always
restore him to his former dignity. Hence women after doing penance for
fornication are not given the veil, because they do not recover the
honor of virginity. In like manner, after doing public penance, a
sinner does not recover his former dignity so as to be eligible for the
clerical state and a bishop who would ordain such a one ought to be
deprived of the power of ordaining, unless perhaps the needs of the
Church or custom require it. In that case such a one would be admitted
to minor orders by way of exception, but not to the sacred orders.
First, on account of the dignity of the latter; secondly, for fear of
relapse; thirdly, in order to avoid the scandal which the people might
take through recollection of his former sins; fourthly, because he
would not have the face to correct others, by reason of the publicity
of his own sin.
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Whether a solemn penance can be repeated?

Objection 1: It would seem that a solemn penance can be repeated. For
those sacraments which do not imprint a character, can be solemnized a
second time, such as the Eucharist, Extreme Unction and the like. But
Penance does not imprint a character, therefore it can be solemnized
over again.

Objection 2: Further, penance is solemnized on account of the gravity
and publicity of the sin. Now, after doing penance, a person may commit
the same sins over again, or even more grievous sins. Therefore the
solemn penance should be imposed again.

On the contrary, Solemn penance signifies the expulsion of the first
man from paradise. Now this was done but once. Therefore solemn penance
should be imposed once only.

I answer that, Solemn penance ought not to be repeated, for three
reasons.