No More Learning

On the other hand, this desire, "thus ought
be," has only called forth that other desire, "what exists f" The desire knowing what exists, already consequence the question, "how? possible? Why precisely so? " Our wonder
the disagreement between our desires and the course the world has led our learning know the course the world. Perhaps the matter stands differently: maybe the expression,
? ? of
it
at is is it
to
a
of
a
of
a of
of of to
it
it,
to
ofas
It as
it is,
it
to
as
of
so
to
a
in
of
in
/
of
be
is
? 268 THE WILL TO POWER.
"thus it ought to be," is merely the utterance of our desire to overcome the world
3. 34.
To-day when every attempt at determining how
man should be--is received with some irony, when
we adhere to the notion that in spite of all one
only becomes what one is (in spite of all--that
say, education, instruction, environment, accident, and disaster), in the matter of morality we have learnt, in a very peculiar way, how to
is to
reverse the relation of cause and effect.
? perhaps distinguishes
Nothing
us more than this from the
ancient believers in morality. We no longer say,
for instance, "Vice is the cause of a man's physical ruin," and we no longer say, "A man prospers with
virtue because it brings a long life and happiness. " Our minds to-day are much more inclined to the belief that vice and virtue are not causes but only effects. A man becomes a respectable member of society because he was a respectable man from the start--that is to say, because he was born in possession of good instincts and prosperous pro
pensities. . . . Should a man enter the world poor,
and the son of parents who are neither economical nor thrifty, he is insusceptible of being improved--
that is to say, he is only for the prison the madhouse. To-day we are no longer able separate moral from physical degeneration: the former merely complicated symptom the latter; man necessarily bad just he
necessarily
Bad: this word here stands
? ? ill.
. . .
a is
. isa .
as
or
is
to
of
fit
? A CRITICISM OF MORALITY.
269
for a certain lack of capacity which is related physiologically with the degenerating type--for
instance, a weak will, an uncertain and many-sided
personality, the inability to resist reacting to a
stimulus and to control one's self, and a certain constraint resulting from every suggestion pro
ceeding from another's will. Vice is not a cause;
arbitrary epitome of certain effects resulting from physio logical degeneracy. A general proposition such
as that which Christianity teaches, namely, "Man is evil," would be justified provided one were justified in regarding a given type of degenerate man as normal. But this may be an exaggeration. Of course, wherever Christianity prospers and pre vails, the proposition holds good: for then the
existence of an unhealthy soil--of a degenerate
it is an effect. . . . Vice is a somewhat
? - territory--is
demonstrated.
3. 35.
It is difficult to have sufficient respect for man, when one sees how he understands the art of
fighting his way, of enduring, of turning circum
stances to his own advantage, and of overthrowing
opponents; but when he is seen in the light of his desires, he is the most absurd of all animals. . . . It is just as if he required a playground for his cowardice, his laziness, his feebleness, his sweetness, his submissiveness, where he recovers
from his strong virile virtues. Just look at man's "desiderata " and his "ideals. " Man, when he
desires,
tries to recover from that which is
? ? ? THE WILL TO POWER.
27o
eternally valuable in him, from his deeds; and
then he rushes into nonentity, absurdity, valueless
ness, childishness. The intellectual indigence and
lack of inventive power of this resourceful and
inventive animal is simply terrible. The "ideal"
is at the same time the penalty man pays for the
enormous expenditure which he has to defray
in all real and pressing duties. Should reality cease to prevail, there follow dreams, fatigue,
weakness: an "ideal" might even be regarded
as a form of dream, fatigue, or weakness. The
strongest and the most impotent men become
alike when this condition overtakes them: they deify the cessation of work, of war, of passions,
of suspense, of contrasts, of "reality"--in short, of
the struggle for knowledge and of the trouble of acquiring
"Innocence" them idealised stultification;
"blessedness" idealised idleness; "love," the
ideal state the gregarious animal that will no longer have an enemy. And thus everything that
? elevated to an ideal.
desire magnifies the thing desired; and by not being realised grows--the greatest ideas
are those which have been created by the strongest and longest desiring. Things grow ever more
waluable our estimation, the more our desire for them increases: "moral values" have become
the highest values, simply shows that the moral ideal the one which has been realised least (and
lowers and belittles man
336.
? ? is
A in
it
if
it
is
is
of
is to
it.
? A CRITICISM OF MORALITY.
271
thus it represented the Beyond to all suffering, as a
road to blessedness). Man, with ever-increasing ardour, has only been embracing clouds: and
ultimately called his desperation and impotence "GOd. "
337.
Think of the naivete? of all ultimate "desiderata. " --when the "wherefore " of man remains unknown.
338.
What is the counterfeit coinage of morality?
First of all we should know what "good and
evil" mean. That is as good as wishing to know
why man is here, and what his goal or his destiny is. And that means that one would fain know
that man actually has a goal or a destiny.
339.
The very obscure and arbitrary notion that humanity has a general duty to perform, and that,
as a whole, it is striving towards a goal, is
still in infancy. Perhaps we shall once more be rid of before becomes "fixed idea. "
(But humanity does not constitute whole: indissoluble multiplicity ascending and
descending organisms--it knows no such thing
state youth followed by maturity and then age. But its strata lie confused and superimposed--and few thousand years
? ? ? in a
as a
is an
it its of
a of
a
. it .
it
? 272
THE WILL TO POWER.
there may be even younger types of men than we can point out to-day. Decadence, on the
other hand, belongs to all periods of human history: everywhere there is refuse and decaying
matter, such things are in themselves vital pro cesses; for withering and decaying elements must be eliminated.
>k
Under the empire of Christian prejudice this
question was never put at all : the purpose of life seemed to lie in the salvation of the individual
soul; the question whether humanity might last for a long or a short time was not considered. The best Christians longed for the end to come as soon as possible;--concerning the needs of the individual, there seemed to be no doubt whatsoever.
. . . The duty of every individual for the present
was identical with what it would be in any sort
of future for the man of the future: the value,
the purpose, the limit of values was for ever fixed, unconditioned, eternal, one with God. . . . What
deviated from this eternal type was impious, diabolic, criminal.
The centre of gravity of all values for each
soul lay in that soul itself: salvation or damnation | The salvation of the immortal soul! The most
extreme form of personalisation. . . . For each soul there was only one kind of perfection; only one ideal, only one road to salvation. . . . The most extreme form of the principle of equal rights,
associated with an optical magnification of in dividual importance to the point of megalomania
? ? ? ? A CRITICISM OF MORALITY.
273
. . . Nothing but insanely important souls, re
volving round their own axes with unspeakable terror. . . .
sk
Nobody believes in these assumed airs of im portance any longer to-day: and we have sifted
our wisdom through the sieve of contempt.
Nevertheless the optical habit survives, which
would fain measure the value of man by his
proximity to a certain ideal man: at bottom the personalisation view is upheld as firmly as that of
the equality of rights as regards the ideal. In
short: people seem to think that they know what the ultimate desideratum is in regard to the ideal IIlall. . . .
But this belief is merely the result of the
exceedingly detrimental influence of the Christian
ideal, as anybody can discover for himself every
time he carefully examines the "ideal type. " In
the first place, it is believed that the approach to a given "type" is desirable; secondly, that this
particular type is known; thirdly, that every deviation from this type is a retrograde movement, a stemming of the spirit of progress, a loss of
power and might in man. . . . To dream of a state of affairs in which this perfect man will be in the majority: our friends the Socialists and even Messrs. the Utilitarians have not gone farther than this. In this way an aim seems to have crept into the evolution of man: at any rate the belief in a certain progress towards an
ideal is the only shape in which an aim is con VOL. I. S
? ? ? ? 274
THE WILL TO POWER.
ceived in the history of mankind to-day. ) In
short: the coming of the "Kingdom of God" has
been placed in the future, and has been given an
earthly, a human meaning--but on the whole the faith in the old ideal is still maintained. . . .
34O.
The more concealed forms of the cult of Christian,
moral ideals. --The insipid and cowardly notion
"Mature," invented by Nature-enthusiasts (without any knowledge whatsoever of the terrible, the
implacable, and the cynical element in even "the
most beautiful" aspects), is only a sort of attempt
at reading the moral and Christian notion of "humanity" into Nature;--Rousseau's concept of
Nature, for instance, which took for granted that
? freedom, goodness, innocence, equity, justice, and Idylls, was nothing more at
bottom than the cult of Christian morality. We should collect passages from the poets in order to see what they admired, in lofty mountains, for instance. What Goethe had to do with them--
why he admired Spinoza. Absolute ignorance
"Nature" meant
concerning
The insipid and cowardly concept "Man," a la
the reasons of this cult. . . .
Comte and Stuart Mill, is at times the subject of
a cult. . . . This is only the Christian moral ideal
again under another name. . . . Refer also to the freethinkers--Guyau for example.
The insipid and cowardly concept "Art," which
is held to mean sympathy with all suffering and with everything botched and bungled (the same
? ? ? A CRITICISM OF MORALITY,
275
And now, the whole socialistic ideal: nothing but blockheaded misunderstanding the Christian moral ideal.
34
The origin the ideal. The examination
states during which the world seems rounder, fuller, and more perfect: we have the pagan ideal
thing happens to history, Thierry): again the cult of the Christian moral ideal.
grows.
the soil out which
A. Starting out from those "aesthetic" mental
? with dominating spirit
(people give their abundance). type: the classical ideal--regarded
self-affirmation The highest an expres
sion of the successful nature of all the more
important
find the grand style
expression instinct which
this classical ideal we the highest style. An
power" itself. The
when "spiritualisation" and the absence sensu
ality assume the rank perfection, and when all that brutal, animal, direct, and proximate
avoided (people calculate and select): the "sage,"
angel"; priestliness virginity ignorance,
are the physiological ideals such idealists: the anaemic ideal. Under certain circumstances this
anaemic ideal may the ideal such natures
ledge
Starting
"the
itself.
instincts.
the "will
most feared dares acknow
out from the mental states which the world seemed emptier, paler, and thinner,
? ? be
it
I.
of = of
to
cf.
as
is in
B. is
its
of of of
=
of
of as
of
as In
is
of
to
it of ofisis
a
as to
it
? 276
THE WILL TO POWER.
represent paganism (thus Goethe sees his "saint" in Spinoza).
C. Starting out from those mental states in
which the world seemed more absurd, more evil,
poorer, and more deceptive, an ideal cannot even be imagined or desired in it (people deny and annihilate); the projection of the ideal into the sphere of the anti-natural, anti-actual, anti-logical;
the state of him who judges thus (the "impover
ishment" of the world as a result of suffering:
People take, they no longer bestow): the anti-natural ideal.
(The Christian ideal is a transitional form between the second and the third, now inclining more towards the former type, and anon inclining towards the latter. )
The three ideals: A. Either a strengthening of Life (paganism), or B. an impoverishment of Life
(anaemia), or C. a denial of Life (anti-naturalism). The state of beatitude in A. is the feeling of extreme abundance; in B. it is reached by the most fastidious selectiveness; in C, it is the contempt and the destruction of Life.
342.
A.
The consistent type understands that even
evil must not be hated, must not be resisted, and
that it is not allowable to make war against
one's self; that it does not suffice merely to accept
the pain which such behaviour brings in its train; that one lives entirely in positive feelings; that
one takes the side of one's opponents in word
? ? ? ? A CRITICISM OF MORALITY.
277
and deed; that by means of a superfoetation of peaceful, kindly, conciliatory, helpful, and loving
states, one impoverishes the soil of the other states, . . . that one is in need of unremitting practice. What is achieved thereby ? --The
Buddhistic type, or the perfect cow.
This point of view is possible only where no
moral fanaticism prevails--that is to say, when
evil is not hated on its own account, but because
it opens the road to conditions which are painful (unrest, work, care, complications, dependence).
This is the Buddhistic point of view: there is no hatred of sin, the concept "sin," in fact, is
entirely lacking.
B. The inconsistent type. War is waged against evil--there is a belief that war waged
for Goodness' sake does not involve the same moral
results or affect character in the same way as
war generally does (and owing to which tend
encies it is detested as evil). As a matter of
fact, a war of this sort carried on against evil is much more profoundly pernicious than any sort
of personal hostility; and generally, it is "the person" which reassumes, at least in fancy, the position of opponent (the devil, evil spirits, etc. ).
The attitude of hostile observation and spying in regard to everything which may be bad in us, or
hail from a bad source, culminates in a most tormented and most anxious state of mind: thus
"miracles," rewards, ecstasy, and transcendental solutions of the earth-riddle now became desir
able. . . . The Christian type: or the perfect bigot, >k
? ? ? ? THE WILL TO POWER.
type. Firmness, self-control, imperturbability, peace in the form of the rigidity of a will long active--profound quiet, the de fensive state, the fortress, t-he mistrust of war--
278
C. The stoical
firmness of principles; the unity of knowledge and will; great self-respect. The type of the
fanchorite. The perfect blockhead. --"
-Z
343.
/*-
An ideal which is striving to prevail or to
. ** /
purpose (a) by laying claim spurious origin; (b) by
assert itself endeavours to further
? assuming relationship
powerful ideals already existing; (c) by means
produced by mystery, though an unquestionable power were manifesting itself;
(d) by the slander its opponents' ideals; (e) by lying teaching the advantages which follow its wake, for instance: happiness, spiritual peace,
general peace, even the assistance mighty
God, etc. --Contributions the psychology the idealists: Carlyle, Schiller, Michelet.
the thrill
Supposing protection, by means are discovered,
Morality emancipated.
between itself and the
all the means defence and which an ideal survives, thereby refuted? has
the means by which every
merely availed itself
thing lives and grows--they are all "immoral. "
My view: all the forces and instincts which
are the source life are lying beneath the ban of morality: morality the life-denying instinct.
must be annihilated life
? ? if
of
is to be
It
of is
is
or
a of
it
of of
of
to
to
of a
as
its
of in
a
of
a
? A CRITICISM OF MORALITY.
344.
279
To avoid knowing himself is the prudence of the idealist. The idealist: a creature who has reasons
for remaining in the dark concerning himself, and who is also clever enough to remain in the dark
concerning
these reasons also.
345.
The tendency of moral evolution. --Every one's
desire is that there should be no other teaching and valuation of things than those by means of which he himself succeeds. Thus the fundamental tendency of the weak and mediocre of all times, has been to enfeeble the strong and to reduce them to the level of the weak : their chief weapon in this process was the moral principle. The attitude of the strong towards the weak is branded as evil; the highest states of the strong become bad bywords.
The struggle of the many against the strong, of the ordinary against the extraordinary, of the
weak against the strong: meets with one of finest interruptions the fact that the rare, the refined, the more exacting, present themselves the weak, and repudiate the coarser weapons power.
346.
(1) The so-called pure instinct for knowledge philosophers dictated them by their moral "truths," and only seemingly inde
pendent.
(2) The "Moral Truths," "thus shall things
? ? ? be
of as
its
is is
in
of all
to
? 28O
THE WILL TO POWER.
p
done," are mere states of consciousness of an
instinct which has grown tired, "thus and thus
are things done by us. " The "ideal" is supposed
to re-establish and strengthen an instinct; it
flatters man to feel he can obey when he is only an automaton.
347.
Morality as a means of seduction. --"Nature is
good; for a wise and good God is its cause. Who, therefore, is responsible for the 'corruption
of man'? Tyrants and seducers and the ruling classes are responsible--they must be wiped out": this is Rousseau's logic (compare with Pascal's logic, which concludes by an appeal to original sin).
Refer also to Luther's logic, which is similar. In both cases a pretext is sought for the
Compare this with Paul's logic, which is similar. It is always under the cover of God's business that these reactions appear, under the cover of what is right, or of humanity, etc. In
the case of Christ the rejoicings of the people
? introduction of an insatiable lust of
as a moral and religious duty. The hatred directed against the ruling classes tries to sanctify itself . . . (the "sinfulness of Israel" is the basis of the priest's powerful position).
as the cause of His crucifixion. It was
appear
an anti-priestly movement from the beginning. Even in the anti-Semitic movement we find the
same trick: the opponent is overcome with moral condemnations, and those who attack him pose as retributive Justice.
revenge
? ? ? A. CRITICISM OF MORALITY. 28I
348.
The incidents of the fight: the fighter tries to transform his opponent into the exact opposite of
himself--imaginatively,
of course. He tries to
believe in himself to such an extent that he may have the courage necessary for the "good Cause"
(as if he were the good Cause); as if reason, taste,
and virtue were being assailed by his opponents.
. . . The belief of which he is most in need, as
the strongest means of defence and attack, is the belief in himself, which, however, knows how to
misinterpret itself as a belief in God. He never pictures the advantages and the uses of victory,
but only understands victory for the sake of victory--for God's sake. Every small community (or individual), finding itself involved in a struggle,
strives to convince itself of this: "Good taste, good judgment, and virtue are ours. " War urges people
to this exaggerated self-esteem. . . .
349.
Whatever kind of eccentric ideal one may have (whether as a "Christian," a "free-spirit," an
? "immoralist," or a German Imperialist), one should try to avoid insisting upon its being the ideal; for, by so doing, it is deprived of all its privileged
nature. One should have an ideal as a distinction; one should not propagate and thus
level one's self down to the rest of mankind.
How that spite this obvious fact, the majority idealists indulge propaganda for
? ? of is it,
of in
in
it,
? 282 THE WILL TO POWER.
their ideal, just as if they had no right to it unless the majority acquiesce therein P--For instance, all
those plucky and insignificant girls behave in this way, who claim the right to study Latin and
mathematics. What is it urges them to do this? I fear it is the instinct of the herd, and the terror of the herd: they fight for the "emancipation of
woman," because they are best able to achieve their own private little distinction by fighting for it under the cover of a charitable movement, under the banner bearing the device "For others. " per
The cleverness of idealists consists in their sistently posing as the missionaries and "repre
sentatives" of an ideal: they thus "beautify"
themselves in the eyes of those who still believe in disinterestedness and heroism. Whereas real
heroism consists, not in fighting under the banner of self-sacrifice, submission, and disinterestedness,
but in not fighting at all. . . . "Iam thus; I will be thus--and you can go to the devil! "
35O.
Every ideal assumes love, hate, reverence, and con tempt. Either positive feeling is the primum mobile, or negative feeling Hatred and contempt are
the primum mobile all the ideals which proceed from resentment.
Criticism the "Good Man," the Saint, etc.
35
The "good man. " Or, hemiplegia virtue. -- the opinion every strong and natural man,
? ? ? In
B. A
of
I.
of
in is.
of of
? *
A CRITICISM OF MORALITY.
283
love and hate, gratitude and revenge, goodness
and anger, affirmative and negative action, belong
to each other. A man is good on condition that he knows how to be evil; a man is evil, because otherwise he would not know how to be good.
--which teaches a sort of one-sided efficiency as the highest of all things? Whence this hemiplegia
of virtue, the invention of the good man? The object seems to be to make man amputate those
instincts which enable him to be an enemy, to be harmful, to be angry, and to insist upon revenge. . . . This unnaturalness, then, corresponds to
that dualistic concept of a wholly good and of a wholly bad creature (God, Spirit, Man); in the first
are found all the positive, in the second all the
"idealistic"; it never doubts that in concept the "good man," has found the highest de
sideratum. When aspiring its zenith fancies state which all evil wiped out, and which only good creatures have actually remained over.
does not therefore regard the mutual depend ence the opposites good and evil proved. On the contrary, the latter ought vanish, and
right
all. What, matter fact, the reason this desire? all ages, and particularly the
Christian age, much labour has been spent trying reduce men this one-sided activity:
Whence comes the morbidness and unnaturalness which repudiates these compounds
ideological
? negative forces, intentions,
and states. This method of valuing thus believes itself to be
the former should remain. The first has exist, the second ought not with
? ? to
. . .
of
to
in
at
of to
It a of in
In as a
it is
in
a us
of to
to to
is be
as
in it
its
? 284
THE WILL TO POWER.
and even to-day, among those who have been deformed and weakened by the Church, people are not lacking who desire precisely the same thing with their "humanisation" generally, or with their "Will of God," or with their "Salvation of the Soul. " The principal injunction behind all these things that man should no longer do anything evil, that
stances be harmful arrive this state hostile tendencies, resentment, and
chronic disease.
should under no circum desire harm. The way
affairs amputate all
suppress the instincts establish "spiritual peace"
mind, which certain type
? This attitude
man bred, starts out with this absurd
hypothesis: good and evil are postulated realities which are in state of mutual contradic
tion (not complementary values, which they
are), people are advised take the side the good, and insisted upon that good man resists and forswears evil until every trace uprooted--but with this valuation Life actually denied, for all its instincts Life has both yea and nay. But far from understanding these facts, this valuation dreams rather returning the wholeness, oneness, and strengthfulness Life:
actually believes that state blessedness will reached when the inner anarchy and state
opposed impulses brought end. --It possible that more
unrest which result from these
dangerous ideology, greater
science psychology, has ever yet existed, than
mischief the this will good: the most repugnant type man
? ? 2.
is
of
to to
of inno
to
of it is
of
is
be
of is
a
at
to of
to init
an
as is
is,
no a
a
or
of he
of
it
as
as of to
of of of
allis
a is
to
in
a to
? A CRITICISM OF MORALITY,
285
has been reared, the man who is not free, the
bigot; it was taught that only in the form of a
bigot could one tread the path which leads to
God, and that only a bigot's life could be a godly life.
And even here, Life is still in the right--Life
that knows not how to separate Yea from Nay:
what is the good of declaring with all one's might
that war is an evil, that one must harm no one,
that one must not act negatively? One is still waging a war even in this, it is impossible to do
otherwise ! The good man who has renounced all evil, and who is afflicted according to his desire
with the hemiplegia of virtue, does not therefore cease from waging war, or from making enemies,
or from saying "nay" and doing "nay. " The
Christian, for instance, hates "sin" --and what on earth is there which he does not call "sin"!
It is precisely because of his belief in a moral antagonism between good and evil, that the world for him has grown so full of hatefulness and things that must be combated eternally. The "good man" sees himself surrounded by evil, and, thanks to the continual onslaughts of the latter, his eye grows more keen, and in the end discovers traces of evil in every one of his acts. And thus he ultimately arrives at the conclusion, which to him is quite logical, that Nature is evil, that man is corrupted, and that being good is an act of grace
(that is to say, it is impossible to man when he stands alone). In short: he denies Life, he sees
how "good," as the highest value, condemns Life. . . . And thus his ideology concerning good and
? ? ? ? 286 THE WILL TO POWER.
evil ought to strike him as refuted. But one cannot refute a disease. Therefore he is obliged to conceive another life . . .
352.
Power, whether in the hands of a god or of a man, is always understood to consist in the ability to harm as well as to help. This is the case with the Arabs and with the Hebrews, in fact with all strong and well-constituted races.
The dualistic separation of the two powers is fatal. . . . In this way morality becomes the
poisoner
A criticism of the good man,--Honesty, dignity, dutifulness, justice, humanity, loyalty, uprightness, clean conscience--is it really supposed that, by means of these fine-sounding words, the qualities they stand for are approved and affirmed for their own sake? Or is it this, that qualities and states indifferent in themselves have merely been looked at in a light which lends them some value? Does the worth of these qualities lie in themselves, or in the use and advantages to which they lead (or to which they seem to lead, to which they are expected to lead)?
I naturally do not wish to imply that there is
any opposition between the ego and the alter in the judgment: the question whether the
results these qualities, either regard him who possesses them regard environment,
? of life.
353.
? ? or in
of
is, to in
it to is
? A CRITICISM OF MORALITY.