No More Learning

A esto vos respondo que dezides bien,
e mando que se faga e guarda asy;
pero que el conoscimiento del tal
quando la procuracion viniere on dis-
cordia, que quede ami mercet para lo
mandar ver e determinar. "
Cf. iii. 21, 9.
>> Id. , iii. 19, 60 (Valladolid, 1447):
"Otrosi muy poderoso sennor, algunos
con importunidad ganan cartas de
vuestra sennoria delos que estan
cerca dello para que quando vuestra
sennoria llama a Cortes e manda quele
enbien procuradores, que enbien a ellas,
? ? lo qual no es vuestro servicio e dello se
Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-12-19 10:34 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/mdp. 39015002404211 Public Domain in the United States, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-us-google
? CHAP. VI. ] REPRESENTATIVE INSTITUTIONS.
209
that the King, Henry IV. , should not interfere in the elections,
and that any person who produced royal Briefs for his elec-
tion in any city, should be perpetually disqualified for holding
any office or "procuration" in that city. The King replied
that this was already provided for by the laws, specially those
of Juan II. 1
This jealous insistence on the freedom of the elections by the
Cortes is of great significance, as we have said, in showing
that they were much concerned to vindicate their representative
character, and the fact that the Crown was evidently from
time to time attempting to control the elections, is significant
of the continuing importance of the Cortes.
We have in an earlier chapter considered the functions and
authority of the Cortes with reference to legislation, and in
the last chapter we have dealt with their authority in taxation,
but it must be carefully observed that the Cortes did not con-
ceive of their function and authority as limited to finance
and legislation, but claimed that they should be consulted
on all the more important affairs of the Commonwealth.
There is an excellent illustration of this in the early part
of the century. The Cortes in 1419 represented to the King,
Juan II. , that when his predecessors ordained anything new
or of general importance for the kingdom, they were accustomed
to call together the Cortes and to act with their advice, and
not otherwise; they complained that this had not been done
since his accession, and that this was contrary to custom and
law and reason; and they therefore petitioned him that he
should do this in the future. The King replied that he had
always done this in important matters, and that he intended
to do it in the future. 2
In 1469 we have a statement by the Cortes as emphatic as
that of 1419. They protested to Henry IV. against an affiance
with England instead of with France, and represented them-
selves as aggrieved for several reasons, of which the first is
important from our present point of view. They maintained
proprio motu, entendiondo sor asy
complidero a mi servic? io, otra cosa me
ploguiere de mandar e diaponer. "
1 Id. , iii. 23, 37 (Toledo, 1462).
? Id. , iii. 3, 19 (Madrid, 1419).
VOL. VI.
0
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-12-19 10:34 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/mdp. 39015002404211 Public Domain in the United States, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-us-google
? 210
[PABT II.
FIFTEENTH CENTURY.
that according to the laws of the kingdom, when the kings had
to deal with any matter of great importance, they ought not
to do this without the counsel of the principal cities and
"villas" of the kingdom, and they complained that the King
had not observed this, but had acted without the knowledge
of the greater part of the grandees, and of the cities and
"villas. " It is true that the answer of the King was, as
it seems to us, evasive; he only promised to consider their
petition with his Council, and to take such action upon it as
might seem best; but this dogmatic statement of the Cortes
of their claim to be consulted on all important matters, and
their assertion that this was in accordance with the laws,
remains very important. 1
We turn to the character of the representative system in
France in the fifteenth century, but we must again notice that
in considering this we must remember not only the States
General, but also the Estates of the great Provinces. If we
could take account of them we should recognise more clearly
the importance of the representative system in France, for
though the meetings of the States General in the fifteenth
century were important, the meetings of the Provincial
Estates were, as we should judge, much more frequent.
What were the matters with which they were concerned ?
We have already dealt with some of these, especially legislation
and taxation, but we must observe that, besides these, they
were concerned with all the important affairs of the kingdom.
In the first part of this volume we have pointed out that
the attitude of France to the great Schism in the Papacy was
determined in some kind of great council of the kingdom.
1 Id. , iii. 25, 29 (Ooafla, 1469): "La
primora, porque sogund loyos di vuestros
rregnos, quando los rreyes han de hazer
alguna cosa de gran importancia, no lo
deuen hazer sin consejo e sabiduria
delos cibdades e villas principales de
vuestros rreynos; lo qual en osto no
guardd vueetra alteza, hablando noe
otros con humill reverencia, ca nunca
cosa desto supieron la mayor parte delos
grandes de vuestros rregnos, ni las
principales cibdades e villas dellos. . . .
A esto vos rrespondo que yo entiendo
deliberar sobre lo contenido en uestra
petic? ion e platicar esto enel mi consejo 6
hazer sobrello lo que se hallare que ea
mas complidero a servizio de Dios e al
pro e bien commun de mis rregnos e
sennorios. "
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-12-19 10:34 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/mdp. 39015002404211 Public Domain in the United States, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-us-google
? CHAP. VI. ] REPRESENTATIVE INSTITUTIONS. 211
It does not seem that we can call the Assembly, at which in
1408 it was detennined that France should be neutral as
between the rival claimants to the Papacy, a meeting of the
States General, but it had at least something of the character
of a National Assembly. The King speaks of the decision as
being made after great and mature deliberation with the
Princes of the Blood, the great Council and others, both
clerical and lay. 1
We are on clearer ground when we observe that the Assembly
summoned to meet in Paris in 1413 in the name of Charles VI. ,
was composed of the Princes, Prelates, representatives of the
University, and those of the good towns. The business of this
Assembly was to deliberate on the great affairs of the kingdom, .
and especially on the reform of the Eoyal officials. 2
In the Treaty of Troyes by which in 1420 Charles VI. gave
the actual administration, and the future succession to the
French Crown to Henry V. of England, it was specially pro-
vided that the Treaty was to be confirmed by the oaths not
only of the great Lords, but also by those of the Estates of
the kingdom, spiritual and temporal, and the cities and
communities of the kingdom. 3 In another clause of the Treaty
it was provided that Henry was to endeavour to secure that,
by the advice and consent of the three Estates of the two king-
doms, the union of the crowns of England and France in one
person should be perpetual. * It was no doubt in accordance
with these provisions of the Treaty that the Three Estates were
called together in Paris in December of the same year. We
have unfortunately only an incomplete account of the pro-
1 'Ordonnances,' vol. iz. p. 342.
? 'Recueil,' vol. vii. 5, 39. Cf.
Monstrelet,' Chronique,' vol. ii. p. 307.
? 'Recueil,' vol. viii. 695, 13, p. 636.
"D est accords que les grands seigneurs,
barons et nobles, et les Estate dudit
royaume, tant spirituol que tomporelz,
et au*si les citez et notables communitez,
lea citoyens et bourgeois du dit royaume,
a nous obeissans pour le temps, feront
lee serf mens qui s'ensuivent. "
? Id. , vol. viii. 695, 24, p. 369:
"II est accorde? que notre dit fill
labourora par effect de son pouvoir, quo
de l'adviz et consentement des TroU
Estas desdiz royaumes, ostez los
obstacles en costo partie, soit ordonne
et pourveu que du temps que notre dit
filz sera venu a la couronne de France,
ou aucun de ses hoirs, les deux couronnee
de France et d'Angleterre a toujoura
mais perpetuelment, demourront en-
semble, et seront en une mesme per-
sonnel'
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-12-19 10:34 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/mdp. 39015002404211 Public Domain in the United States, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-us-google
? 212
[PABT II.
FIFTEENTH CENTURY.
ceedings in Juvenal des Ursins' 'Histoire de Charles VI,'1
but if we could trust a document printed by Eymer in the
'Foedera,' whose source is unknown, we have an important
statement of the composition and proceedings of the Estates.
They are described as composed of the Bishops and Clergy,
the "Proceres," nobles, citizens, and burgesses. After the
Chancellor had read the Treaty to them, and the King had
declared that he had sworn to observe it, the Estates were
adjourned for a few days, and on their reassembling they
reported that they approved, accepted and authorised the
Treaty and all its provisions. 2
To return to the legitimate government of France, we have
a reference to a meeting of the States General at Chinon, in a
letter of 1426. 3 We have already dealt with the very impor-
tant meeting of the States General at Orleans in November
1439, and we need only point out again that it was with the
advice of the Estates that Charles VII. created the new
military organisation of France. *
In April 1468, Louis XI. called together the States General
to deal with a great constitutional question; that was--the
demand of his brother Charles that the Duchy of Normandy
should be separated from the Crown of France, and held by
himself. The Three Estates agreed that it could not be thus
separated, but must remain inseparably united and joined
to the Crown. 5 It is also significant of the constitutional
authority of the States General that on the same occasion, in
view of the attacks made by the Duke of Brittany in Normandy,
1 Juvenal des Ursins, 'Histoire de
Charles VI. ,' ed. Paris, 1653, p. 384.
* Rymer, 'Foedera,' vol. x. p. 30:
"Responderunt quod, quantum ad
Pacem predictam, Ipei eandem Pacom
censentes et reputantes laudabilem,
necessariam et utilem utrisque Regnis et
subditis eorundem, ymo et toti christi-
anitati, ipsam Pacem ao omnia et
singula in eadem contenta, quantum
in cis erat et velud ipsi tros Status dicti
Regni, approbarunt, laudarunt, accep-
tarunt et auctorisarunt. "
(How far this document can be
trusted is uncertain. It is possible
that it represents an attempt in
England to give the Treaty of Troyee
a legal and constitutional character. )
? 'Ordonnances,' vol. xiii. p. 140.
? Cf. pp. 138, 194.
? 'Recueil,' vol. x. 114 (3), p. 853:
"Que en tant qu'il touche ladicte duche
di Normandie, elle ne doit et no peut
etre eeparee do la couronne en quelque
maniere que co soit, mais y est et doit
etre et demeurer unie, annexee et oon-
jointe inse? parablement. "
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-12-19 10:34 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/mdp. 39015002404211 Public Domain in the United States, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-us-google
? CHAP. VI. ] BEPRESENTATIVE INSTITUTIONS.
213
they gave the King authority to take such action as should be
necessary to maintain the statutes and ordinances of the
kingdom without waiting to call together the Estates. 1
It is, we think, evident that the States General in France^
were conceived of, not merely as a body which should sanction
taxation, important though this was, but as, in some sense and
degree, representing the whole community of the nation, whose
approval and support it was desirable that the King should
obtain in matters of great political importance. It is only
with this in our mind that we can understand the constitutional
attitude of the great States General of Tours which met in
January 1484, on the accession of Charles VIII.
We have already dealt with some important questions which
arose in the course of their meetings, and here, therefore, we
only deal with some other of the most important of these. When
the States General met, they conceived their function as being
primarily to consider the abuses which had grown up during I
the last reigns, and secondly to consider and provide for the'
government of the country during the minority of the King.
The first they proceeded to deal with by arranging the
Estates in six divisions, representing the six groups of provinces;
each of these divisions was to prepare a statement of grievances
and remedies. They then created a commission of six
members of each division to prepare a general statement on
this basis. We are not here concerned with the details of these
statements, but it is important to observe that they covered \
almost the whole range of the government of the country, not \
only in matters of finance, but also of the administration of
justice. 2
The question of the Council of Eegency was the subject of
protracted discussion. It is evident from Masselin's account
that there was much difference of opinion among the members
1 Id. id. id. (9), p. 558: "Et de? s pourcoque aisement ila ne se peuvent
m&intenant pour lore, et des-lors pour pas assembler, y puisse proceder a
main tenant, toutos les fois quo les- faire tout ce que ordre de droit et de
dits cas echerroient, icoux des Etatz ont justice, et les statuts et ordonnancos du
eccordc et consenti, accordent et con- royaume le portent. "
sentont que le roi, sans attendre autre 1 Masselin, 'Diarium,' pp. 66, 74,
assemble? e ne congregation des Etats, 76.
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-12-19 10:34 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/mdp. 39015002404211 Public Domain in the United States, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-us-google
? 214
[PABT II.
FIFTEENTH CENTURY.
of the States General, some maintaining that it was for them
to appoint the Council, for the care of the State had now (in
the King's minority) come to them, while others maintained
that the appointment of the Council belonged to the Princes
of the Blood. 1 The final result seems to have been that the
Estates did not maintain the right to appoint the Council of
Kegency, but they requested the King and his Council to add
to it twelve persons, to be chosen from the six divisions of the
Estates. 2
It is no doubt probably true that behind the controversy
in the Estates about the composition of the Council of Eegency,
we can see the influence of different factions among the Princes
and great nobles, but we are not attempting to write the history
of the times.
We turn again to Commines and to his attitude to the
States General. His opinions have a special value, not only
because he was a man of great experience in political and
diplomatic affairs, but because he was a great servant of the
French Crown, and cannot be suspected of any desire to de-
preciate its authority.
We have in the last chapter cited his
important statements about taxation, but these are only
incidental to his treatment of the importance of reasonable
relations between the King and his subjects. It is not only
with reference to taxation that he thinks that the King should
act with the consent of his subjects. After the general con-
demnation of the attempts of kings to impose taxes upon their
subjects without their consent, as being mere tyranny,
which wo have cited, he continues, that even in the case of
war it was much wiser for kings to act after consulting the
assemblies of their people, and with their consent, and that this
would greatly increase the King's power. 3 Commines is
1 Id. id. , p. 138. l'entrepreudre. Ne se fault point
* Id. id. , p. 702, 3. haster, et on a assez temps: et si voua
* Commines, 'Memoires,' v. 19, p. dis que les Roys et Princes en sont trop
141 : "On pourroit respondre qu'il y a plus fors, quand ilz entreprenneut du
de saisons qu'il ne faut pas attendre conseil de leurs sujectz, et en sont plus
l'assembloe, et que la chose seroit trop crainctz de leurs ennemis. "
longue, a` commencer la guerre et a`
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-12-19 10:34 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/mdp. 39015002404211 Public Domain in the United States, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-us-google
? CHAP. VI. ] REPRESENTATIVE INSTITUTIONS.
215
obviously referring to the Estates when he speaks of the
assembly, and a little later on he speaks of them with
special reference to the States General of Tours in 1484. He
describes contemptuously certain persons who spoke of this
assembly as dangerous, and denounced it as being treason
(leze majeste? ) to speak of calling together the Estates, and
argued that this would diminish the authority of the King;
such persons, he says, were really guilty of a crime against
God and the King; they were men who held some undeserved
authority, and talked thus foolishly, because they were afraid
of the great assemblies, and feared that they would be known
for what they were, and be censured. 1 It is clear that Com-
mines looked upon the States General, that is, the meeting of
the representatives of the community, and its consultation by
the King, as being a useful and normal part of the organi-
sation of a political society, necessary for taxation, and
desirable for the effectiveness of public action.
We do not need to discuss in detail the character of the
representative Assembly of the Empire, for it is clear that the
Emperor was the head of a political body which was tending
to become a federal system rather than a unified monarchy,
and that the final authority in this system belonged rather to
the Diet than to the Emperor.
It is, however, important to observe the terms in which the
Diet is described by Nicolas of Cusa. The Council of the
Empire, he says, consists of the Emperor, the principal Eulers
1 Id. id. , p. 143: "Et pour parler
de l'experience do la bonte? des Franc? ais,
ne faut alleguer pour nostre temps que
les Trois Estats tenus a` Tours, apres le
deoez de notre bon maistre le Roy
Louis XI. (a` qui Dieu fasse pardon) qui
fut l'an mil, quatre cents, quatrevingta
et trois.
L'on povait estimer lors que ceste
assemblee estoit dangereux, et disoient
quelques ungz de petite condition et de
petite vertu, et ont dit plusieurs fois
depuis, que c'est crime de Leze Majeste? ,
qui de parler d'assembler Estatz, et
que c'est pour diminuer l'auctorite? du
roi: et sont ceulx qui commettent ce
crime envers Dieu et le Roy, et la chose
publique; mais servoient ces paroles, et
servent a` ceulx qui sont en auctorite?
et credit, sans en riens l'avoir merite? , et
qui ne sont points propices d'y e^tre, et
n'ont accoustume? que de fleureter en
l'oreille, et parler de choses de peu de
valleur; et craigneut les grandes
assemblees, de paour qu'ils ne soieut
congneuz, ou que leurs oeuvres no soient
blasme? es. "
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-12-19 10:34 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/mdp. 39015002404211 Public Domain in the United States, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-us-google
? 216
[PABT II.
FIFTEENTH CENTURY.
of the various provinces as representing these, and the heads
of the great communities (Universitates); and, he adds signifi-
cantly, when these are met in one representative body, the
whole Empire is gathered together. 1
We may put beside this the terms in which at the Diet of
Worms in 1495, a new Court of the Empire, the "Eeichs
Kammergericht," was established. Its creation was a part of
the attempt made in the last years of the fifteenth century
to reorganise the constitution of the Empire. The creation of
this new Court is represented as being related to an attempt
to establish a "Common Peace " for the whole Empire, and
it was with the consent of the Electors, Princes, Counts,
Nobles, and Estates that the Peace and the Court were
established. 2 And it was with the counsel and will of the Diet
that the Emperor was to appoint the judges of the Court. 3
We do not discuss the development of the representative
system in the fifteenth century in England, for this has been
done by the great historians, but it is worth while to put beside
1 Nicolas of Cuss, 'De Concordantia
Catholica,' iii. 25: "Scimus impera-
torem caput et primum omnium, apud
quem est imperial is iussio, de congre-
gandis subditis, regibus et principibus,
si vero qui ut membra ad ipsun caput
concurrere ha bent; in hoo univereali
concilio sunt principales praosides
provinciarum, suas provincial reprc-
sentantes, ac etiam universitatum
magnarum rectores et magistri, et illi
qui e senatorio gradu, qui sacer conven-
tus appelatur, existunt. . . . Et dum
simul conveniunt in uno compendio
repreeentativo, totum imperium colloc-
tum est. "
1 "Neue Sammlung," 'Senckenburg
und Schmaus,' vol. ii. p. 21; Roichs-
abschied, Worms. 1495: "Darumb
mit eynmutigen, zeytigen Rate der
Erwerdigen und Hochgeporenen . . .
Curfiirsten und Fursten, Geysstlichen
und Weltligon auch Prelaten, Grafen,
Herren und Stende, haben Wir durch
heylig Reich und Teutsche Nacion eyn
gemainen Fried furgenommen, aufger-
ichtet und gemacht. " (p. 6) "Ordnung
des kavserliohen Cammergerichts zu
Worms. . . . Wir haben aus beweg-
lichen Ursachen, einen gemeinen Landt .
Frieden, durch den heylig Rdmisch
Reich und teutsche Nacion, aufgericht,
und zuhalten gepoten, und nachdem
der selb on redlich, erber und furderlich
Rocht schwerlich in Wesen besteen
mOcht, darumb auch Germanien Nutz
zu Flirderung und Nothurfften euer
aller, unser und des Heyligen Reychs
Cammergerichts mit zeitigem Rath
Euer der Churfursten Fursten und
Gemainen Besammlung, auff unserem
und des Reychs Tage, hie zu Worms,
aufzurichten und zu halten, furgenom-
men in Form und Massen als hernacb
volget. "
? Id. id. : "Die Richter und Urtheiler
die all wir mit Rath und Willen der
? ? Sammllung yetz hie kiesen werden. "
Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-12-19 10:34 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/mdp. 39015002404211 Public Domain in the United States, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-us-google
? chap. VI. ] REPRESENTATIVE INSTITUTIONS.
217
Nicolas of Cusa and Commines, some of those passages which
we have already cited in which Sir John Fortescue describes
this, and also some observations on what he understood to
have been its history in France.
He deals with it first in his treatise on the Law of Nature,
where he treats the English constitutional system as embodying
the " dominium politicum et regale," for no laws can be made,
nor taxes imposed without the consent of the Three Estates
of the Kingdom, while on the other hand the subjects could
not make laws without the authority of the King. 1 He deals
with it again in the treatise, 'De Laudibus Legis Angliae,'
where he points out that the laws of England do not proceed
from the mere will of the King, for laws which are made by the
Prince alone might often be directed to his private advantage
and turn to the injury of his subjects, while the laws of England
are made by the wisdom and prudence of more than three
hundred elected men, that is by the assent of the whole
kingdom, and for the good of the people. 2
In his 'Government of England' Fortescue contrasts the
unhappy condition of the French people under a " Dominium
Regale " with that of the English under a " Dominium Politi-
cum et Eegale," as he had done in his 'De Laudibus Legis
Angliae,' but he also says that though the French King now
reigned "Dommio Eegali," this had not always been so, for
neither St Louis nor his ancestors imposed taxes on the people
without the assent of the Three Estates, which were like the
Parliament in England, and this had continued till the time
of the wars of England against France. 3
We have, we think, said enough to justify our own conclusion
that that representative system whose beginnings in the
1 Fortescue, 'De Natura Legis id est plurium dispensatione regulatum
Naturae,' i. 16: "Sed et tertium esse dici possit, verum etiam et regale
dominium, non minus his dignitate et dominium nominari mereatur, cum nec
laude, quod politicum et regale nomi- ipsi subditi, sine regia auctoritate leges
natur. . . . In regno namque Angliae condere valeant. "
regee sine trium statuum regni illius * Id. ,' De Laudibus Legum Angliae,'
consensu leges non condunt, nec sub- zviii.
imponunt subditis suis. . . . * Id. , ' Governance of England,' iii.
Numquid tunc hoc dominium polit icum, Cf. p. 175.
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-12-19 10:34 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/mdp. 39015002404211 Public Domain in the United States, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-us-google
? FIFTEENTH CENTURY.
[PABT II.
twelfth and thirteenth centuries we have traced in the last
volume, and whose continued importance in the fourteenth
century we have illustrated in the first part of this volume,
continued to be a normal part of the political civilisation of
Western Europe in the fifteenth century. As we have often
said, we are not writing a constitutional history of Europe, and
we are only concerned with the representative system as illus-
trating the conception that political authority was understood
to be the authority of the community, primarily indeed
through the law which was the expression and the form of
its life, but secondarily and in these later centuries especially,
as embodied in the Assemblies, Estates, or Parliaments which
were accepted as representing the whole community.
We have examined the political and legal literature of the
fifteenth century, and we have compared it with the constitu-
tional practice especially of Spain and France, and we think
that it is clear that there is little trace of the development of
any political conceptions which were different from those of
the fourteenth century, or of the Middle Ages. It seems to
us evident that the political thought of the time was still
dominated by the conception of the supremacy of law and
custom, that is, if we use the rather unhappy terms of some
moderns, it was not the Prince, but the Law, which was con-
ceived of as sovereign.
The Prince was indeed thought of as august, and was treated
with profound deference and respect, but he was not absolute,
and his authority was derived from the community. His
authority was limited and even terminable if he violated the
laws and liberties of the community.
It is true that when we turn from the general political
literature to the Civilians we find that they generally repre-
sented another mode of thought, and we have come across
a few statements of the theory of "Divine Eight," in the
fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, but there is very little
evidence that these absolutist theories had any appreciable
influence on the general character of the political ideas of the
fifteenth century.
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-12-19 10:34 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/mdp. 39015002404211 Public Domain in the United States, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-us-google
? PART III.
THE EARLIER SIXTEENTH CENTURY.
CHAPTEE I.
THE THEORY OF A LIMITED MONARCHY.
We have so far considered the character of the political
theory of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, and its
relation to the actual constitutional conditions of some of
the greater European countries. We have now to examine
the question how far, and in what respects, we can trace
the appearance and development of any new and important
political conceptions in the sixteenth century. We have
to consider how far the great political and religious movements
of the century, or that great but indefinable movement
which we call the Eenaissance, may have brought with them
new conceptions of the nature and principles of political
society and authority. If, however, we are to approach the
subject seriously, we must begin by putting aside all pre-
conceptions and must not allow our judgment to be swayed
by any traditional notions, or assume that those great move-
ments were or were not important in the development of
political ideas or principles.
We have a work of the early years of the sixteenth century
which is of the highest importance both as representing
the experience of the past and as anticipating future develop-
ments. This is the work entitled 'La Grant Monarchic de
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-12-19 10:34 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/mdp. 39015002404211 Public Domain in the United States, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-us-google
? 220
THE EARLIER SIXTEENTH CENTURY. [PABT in.
France,' which was written in the first quarter of the century
by Claude de Seyssel, the Archbishop of Turin, who, though
a noble of Savoy, had been for many years, from 1497 to
1517, in the service of the French Crown, under Louis XII.
It is the work, therefore, of a man who had a large practical
political experience, and though it may be described as a work
of political theory, it is rather of the nature of the recorded
observations of a practical statesman on what he had seen.
This is indeed a remarkable work, both for its shrewd and
penetrating observation of the actual character of the political
system, and for the sharp contrast it presents to the work
of another important French writer, of the latter part of the
century, that is the 'De la Eepublique' of Jean Bodin, first
published in 1576. We shall have much to say about this
in a later chapter, but we may at once contrast Bodin's
dogmatic and abstract conception of the nature of the political
authority, which he calls "Majestas," which we should call
Sovereignty, with the cautious and tentative conception of
de Seyssel, that in the actual fact of human experience,
political authority is conditioned and limited by forces, some-
times intangible, but none the less real.
At the outset of the work de Seyssel says that the French
monarchy was the best of all monarchies, because it was
neither completely absolute, nor too much restrained; it -was
regulated and restrained by good laws, ordinances, and cus-
toms which were so firmly established that they could scarcely
be broken. The absolute power of the kings of France was
regulated by three restraints (freins), Eeligion, Justice, and
what de Seyssel calls "la police. " 1 In a later passage he
says that it is by these "freins" that the absolute power of
the monarch, which is called tyrannical when it is exercised
1 De Seyssel, 'Grant Monarchic de adnichiler, iacoit que, en quelque
France,' i. 8: "Et neantmoings temps et en quelque endroiot, il y
demeure toujours la dignite? et authorite? adviegne quelque infraction et violence,
royale en son entier, non pas totale- Et pour parler desdicts freins par
ment absolue, ne aussy restraincte lesquels la puissance absolue des rois
par tropt: mais reglee et refrenee par de France est reglee, jen trouve trois
bonnes lois, ordonnances et coustumes, principaulx. Le premier est la religion,
lesquelles sont establies de telle sorte le second la justice, et le tiers, la police. "
que a peine se peuvent rompre et
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-12-19 10:34 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/mdp. 39015002404211 Public Domain in the United States, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-us-google
? CHAP. I. ] THE THEORY OF A IJMITED MONARCHY. 221
against reason, is reduced to "civilite? ," and if he sets aside
these limits, and follows his uncontrolled will, ho is held to be
an evil tyrant, cruel and intolerable, and earns the hatred
of God and of his subjects. 1
We must consider these "freins" a little more closely.
About Eeligion he does not say much which is of importance
for our present subject except that the people would hate the
king if he were notoriously irreligious, and would hardly obey
him. 2 Of the second, "la justice," he has much to say which
is of the greatest importance. This, he says, was more highly
developed in France than in any other part of the world,
under the form of the "Parlemens" which had been created
chiefly for the purpose of restraining the absolute power
which the king might desire to exercise. In respect of dis-
tributive justice the kings had always been subject to this,
so that in civil matters every man could obtain justice against
them, just as much as against other subjects, and the king's
letters and rescripts are subject to the judgment of the
"Parlemens. " In regard to criminal matters the kings'
"graces et remissions " are subject to such discussion in these
courts, that few would venture to do evil in hope of them. 3
1 Id. , ii. 6: "Et premie`rement
touchant les troys freins dont jay
parlee dessus par lesquels la puissance
absolue du prince et monarque, laquelle
est appelee tyrannique, quant l'on
en use contre raison, est refrenee ot
reduite a civilite? . . . . Et par lo
contraire, des qu'il se desnoyo desdits
troya limitee et veult user de volonte?
desordonnee, il est tenu et repute?