These
difficulties
can be refuted.
Abhidharmakosabhasyam-Vol-2-Vasubandhu-Poussin-Pruden-1991
It was not a god (ii.
64d) who intelligently created it.
la. The variety of the world arises from aaion.
The variety of the world arises from the actions of living beings.
But, in this hypothesis, how does it happen that actions produce at one and the same time, pleasing things,--saffron, sandalwood, etc. --on the one hand, and bodies of quite opposite qualities on the other?
The actions of beings whose conduct is a mixture of good and bad actions (vydmisrakarm, iv. 60) produce bodies resembling abscesses whose impurities flow out through the nine gates, and, in order to serve as a remedy to these bodies, they also produce objeas of pleasing enjoyment, colors and shapes, odors, tastes and tangibles.
But the gods have accomplished only good actions: their bodies and their objeas of enjoyment are equally pleasing.
***
What is aaion?
lb. It is volition and that which is produced through volition.
The sutra says that there are two types of aaion, volition (cetand)
l
and the action after having been willed. Aaion after having been
? 552 Chopper Four
willed (cetayitvd) is what the kdrikd designates by the words "that which is produced through volition. "
These two aaions form three aaions: bodily aaion, vocal aaion, and mental aaion.
How do you establish this division, according to the support of its aaion, according to its nature, or according to its original cause?
To what does this question tend? If one were to regard its support,
there is nothing but an aaion, for all aaions are supported on a physical
support, a body. If one were to regard its nature, there is only vocal
aaion, for, of these three,--body, speech and manas,--only the voice is 2
ultimatelyaaionbyitsnature. Ifoneweretoregarditsorigionalcause, we have only mental aaion, for all aaions have their origin in the mind The Vaibhasikas say that the three types of aaion are established by reason of all of these three causes, support, nature and original cause, in this order.
Ic-d. Volition is mental aaion: it gives rise to two aaions, bodily and vocal aaioa
3 Volition is called mental aaion; that which arises from volition,
4
namely aaion which has been willed, is made up of the two other
aaions, bodily and vocal aaion.
***
2a. These two aaions are informative and non-informative. Bodily aaion and vocal aaion are informative (vijnapti) and non-
informative (avijnapti, i. 11, iv. 4); we then have bodily informative 5
aaion, vocal informative aaion, bodily non-informative aaion, and vocal non-informative aaion.
What aaion is "bodily informative aaion? "
2b-3b. Bodily vijnapti is shape. It is not movement because all conditioned things are momentary, since they perish: on the other hand, nothing does not perish without a cause and the creative cause would be at the same time destruaive.
Bodily vijnapti is such and such a shape (samsthana, i,10a) of the
? body by reason of a volition
6
According to others, (the Vatslputriyas,) bodily vijnapti is dis-
7
placement, forittakesplacewhenthereismovement,andnotwhen
8 there is no movement.
The author answers: This is not so, because all conditioned things are momentary.
What is understood by "momentary" (ksanika)!
Ksana means to perish immediately after having acquired its being; ksanika is a dharma that has ksana, as a dandika is one who has a staff
9 (danda).
A conditioned thing does not exist beyond the acquisition of its being: it perishes on the spot where it arises; it cannot go from this spot to another. Consequently bodily vijnapti is not movement.
The Vatslputriyas: If conditioned things are momentary, we would admit that they are not susceptible of displacement.
It is proven that they are momentary, "since they necessarily
10
perish;" for the destruction of conditioned things is spontaneous; it
does not come from anything; it does not depend on a cause.
1. That which depends oh a cause is an effect, something "done," "created" Destruction is a negation: how can a negation "be done" or
"created? " Therefore destruction does not depend on a cause.
2. Destruction does not depend on a cause: hence a conditioned thing perishes as soon as it arises; if it did not perish immediately, it
would not perish later, since it would then remain the same. Since you
n
admit that it perishes, you must admit that it immediately perishes. 3. Would you say that a conditioned thing changes and that,
consequently, it is later subject to destruction? It is absurd to say that a certain thing changes, becoming another thing, staying the same thing that you say shows its modified characteristics (ii. 46a, p. 245).
4. Would you say that there is no means of correct knowledge more decisive than direct perception; would you say that everyone holds that kindling perishes through its relationship with fire; and that, con- sequently, it is false that all things perish without a cause? There are many remarks to make with respect to this.
In fact, people do not directly perceive the destruction of kindling by reason of fire. If you think that kindling perishes through its relationship to fire because we no longer see the kindling when this
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relationship has taken place, then your thesis rests on an inference, and not on direct perception, and your reasoning is not conclusive.
The fact that we no longer see kindling after its relationship with fire is open to two interpretations: either the kindling perishes by reason of this relationship, or it unceasingly perishes in and of itself, and under normal conditions is unceasingly reborn in and of itself, but stops renewing itself by virtue of its relationship with the fire.
You admit that the destruction of the flame is spontaneous. When, after a relationship with wind, the flame is no longer visible, you admit that this relationship is not the cause of the destruction of the flame; but you admit that the flame, by virtue of this relationship, stops renewing itself. The same for the sound of the bell: a hand, laid on the bell, prevents a renewing of its sound; but it does not destroy the sound that you admit is momentary.
Therefore it is inference that should determine this question.
5. The Vatsiputriyas: What reasons do you bring to bear in favor of the thesis of spontaneous destruction?
We have already said that destruction, being a negative state, cannot be caused. We would further say that if destruction is the effect of a cause, nothing would not perish without a cause.
If, like arising, destruction proceeds from a cause, it would never take place without a cause. Now we hold that intelligence, a flame, or a sound, which are momentary, perish without their destruction de- pending on a cause. Hence the destruction of the kindling, etc. , is spontaneous.
The Vaibhasikas maintain that an earlier thought perishes by reason of a later thought, that earlier sound perishes by reason of later sound.
But the two thoughts in question are not simultaneous. Some contradictory thoughts,--doubt and certainty, pleasure and suffering, love and hate,--do not displace one another; and the same holds for non-contradictory thoughts. And if you suppose that they do contradict one another, then how can weak dharmas destroy strong dharmas of the same type--as when weak thoughts or sounds immediately follow strong thoughts or sounds?
12
6. Some [the Sthavira Vasubandhu] think that a flame perishes
through the absence of a cause of duratioa But an absence cannot be a
? cause.
According to the Vaisesikas, a flame perishes by reason of dharma
and adharma, merit and demerit.
This explanation is inadmissible. Dharma and adharma would both
be causes of arising and of destruction: dharma would cause the flame to
arise and cause it to perish, accordingly as the flame is favorable or
unfavorable; adharma, accordingly as it is unfavorable or favorable.
Now we cannot admit that dharma and adharma enter into activity and
13
cease being active from moment to moment.
Furthermore since this manner of explaining destruction would
hold for all conditioned things, it is useless to pursue the discussion. You
do not have the right to say that kindling perishes through its
14 relationship with the flame.
7. If one holds that the destruction of the kindling, etc. , has for its cause the relationship of this kindling with fire, one would then be forced to acknowledge that a cause that engenders is at the same time a cause that destroys.
Cooking (paka), or a relationship with fire, produces different products (pakaja), of deeper and deeper color. The same cause that produces the first color destroys this first color, or, at least--if you object that it refers to a new relationship with fire, since the fire is momentary--the cause that destroys the first color is similar to the cause that produces it. Now it is impossible that a certain cause would produce a certain effect and that later this same cause, or a parallel cause, would destroy this same effect. (Compare Tarka-samgraha, xxiii).
Would you say that, if the successive flames are different,--long,
short, large and small,--our conclusion does not become indispensable?
Let us use another example. By the prolonged action of ashes, snow,
caustics, sun, water, or earth, there arises and disappears in turn
different "products of cooking. " But you do not attribute the character-
istic of momentariness to these diverse factors of cooking.
15
ask why water diminishes when it is heated if a
8. Some
relationship with fire is not destruction of the water?
By reason of its relationship with fire, through the force of the fire, the heat element--which is present in water (ii. 22, p. 186)--increases and, increasing, causes the mass of water to be reborn in quantities more and more reduced, until being totally reduced, the water ceases renewing
1<s itself. This is what a relationship with fire does to water.
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16 itself. This is what a relationship with fire does to water.
9. Let us conclude. The destruction of things is spontaneous. Things perish in and of themselves, because it is their nature to perish. As they perish in and of themselves, they perish upon arising. As they perish upon arising, they are momentary. Thus there is no movement, no displacement; there is only arising in another place of the second moment of the series: this is the case, even in the opinion of our opponent, for the fire which consumes firewood The idea of movement is a false conception.
Hence bodily vijnapti is not displacement, movement; rather bodily vijnapti is shape.
###
The Sautrantikas say that shape is not a distinct thing, a thing in and of itself. [For the Vaibhasikas, rupayatana, visible physical matter is both varnarupa or color: blue, etc. , and samsthdnarupa or shape: long, etc. (i. 10a). For the Sautrantikas, shape does not exist as a substance, but only as a designation. ]
When there arises, in one direction, a large mass of color, this mass is called "long. " When, by comparison, a mass of color is small, it is called "short. " When a color arises in a great quantity in the four directions, it is called "square. " When it arises equally in all directions, it is called "circular. " The other figures,--high, low, etc,--are explained in the same manner, when a color arises in a great quantity in the direction of the zenith, it is called "high," etc Shape is thus not a thing in and of itself, a rupa.
1. First argument. If shape were a thing in and of itself, 3c It would be perceived by two organs.
In fact, seeing through the organ of sight, one has the idea of length, etc. ; touching through the tactile organ, one has the idea of length. Thus if length, or any other shape, were a thing in and of itself, it would be perceived by two organs. Now, according to the scriptural definition, rupayatana, the visible physical matter, is perceived by only the eye.
The Vaibhasikas answer that touch does not perceive length relative to softness or hardness, arranged in a certain manner, without length
? forming part of the tangible.
This is quite right: but exactly the same holds for the visible. Length
is not visible: one calls a visible (color) or a tangible (softness, etc) arranged in a certain manner "long. "
The Vaibhasikas: When we have the idea of length after having touched something, we are not perceiving shape through touch; we remember the shape, because it is associated with a tangible. It is the same when we see the color (visible) of fire, for we then remember heat (tangible); and when we smell the odor of flower, we then remember its color.
In the two cases that you allege, one imagines that a color recalls a tangible, or that an odor recalls a color, because the dharmas as cause are closely associated: all fire is hot, and certain odors belong to certain flowers. But a tangible (softness, etc. ) is not invariably associated with a certain shape: how then does the perception of a tangible provoke the rememberance of a certain shape? If a similar remembrance is produced without there having been an invariable association between a tangible and its shape, one would in this same manner remember color after having touched something. But such is not the case. Hence, one must not say that the perception of a tangible provokes the remembrance of its shape.
2. Second argument. One sees many shapes in a multicolored piece of cloth. Thus, there would be, according to you, many rupas, in the category of shape in one and the same piece: this is impossible, as it was for color. If shape were a real thing, that which, in the cloth, forms part of a long line cannot at the same time form a part of a short line.
3. Third argument. All "real" rupa, susceptible of being struck (sapratigha, i. 29b),--blue, etc. ,--is made up of real atoms of a certain nature: color rupa (blue, etc. ) necessarily exists in the octuple atom, etc. (ii. 22, trans, p. 185). Now
3c. Shape does not exist in an atom.
There is no atom of length. In fact, when a long mass diminishes, we arrive at the moment when we no longer have the idea of long with regard to it, but rather the idea of short: hence this idea does not proceed from a rupa "shape" existing in the thing. Therefore what we designate as long is a number of real things,--atoms of color,--arranged in a
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certain manner.
If you maintain that the expressions, "long," etc. refer to some
atoms of shape arranged in a certain manner, and that some atoms that would not be "shape" by nature could not be designated as "long," etc. --this is merely repeating your affirmation without the support of any argument. In fact, if the existence of special atoms of shape were proved, you would be able to maintain that united, arranged in a certain fashion, they constitute length: but since the existence of these atoms has not been proved, as the existence of the atoms of color has been
17 proved, how could they be united and arranged?
[4. Objection of the Sarvastivadins:] If a shape is not distinct in color, if a shape is nothing other than a certain color, then shapes would not differ when their color is the same: now some jugs of the same color have different shapes.
Have we not said that one designates a number of real things arranged in a certain manner as "long? " Some ants, all similar, arrange themselves in a straight line or in a circle, and so present different shapes. In the same way the shapes of jugs differ without their color differing.
[5. Objection of the Sarvastivadins:] But, in darkness or at a distance, one sees the shape of an object,--a column, a person, etc,-- without seeing its color. Hence shape exists separate from color.
In fact, one first sees color in an indistinct manner; one then forms--through the mental consciousness--the idea of shape, in the same way that one forms the idea of a line, or the idea of an army accordingly as one has seen, indistinctly, some birds, some ants, some
18
elephants, etc. : "This army is arranged in a circle. " Or rather it
happens that one does not clearly distinguish either color or shape; one only knows,--through the mental consciousness--a mass.
[6. The Sarvastivadins criticize the Sautrantikas,] You Sautrantikas negate both movement and shape. Then what is designated by the term "bodily vijnapti? "
We say that bodily vijnapti is shape [thus separating ourselves from the Vatsiputriyas-Sarhmitlyas] but we do not say that shape is a thing in and of itself [thus separating ourselves from the Sarvastivadins. ]
{The Sarvastivadins:] If you maintain that bodily vijnapti is not a real thing, but solely a shape that exists as designation, what then is the
? real dharma that constitutes bodily aaion?
Bodily aaion is the aaion which has for its objea the body: that is to
say, the volition that puts a body into motion in diverse ways: it proceeds by being supported on this gate which is the body, and is thus called bodily aaion. Other aaions should be defined according to their natures: [i. e. , vocal aaion is the aaion which has the voice for its objea; mental aaion is the aaion of the manas or aaion associated with the manas (see iv. 78c-d). ]
[The Sarvastivadins:] A scripture says that "aaion is volition and willed aaion. " If bodily aaion and vocal aaion are volition, what difference is there between the two types of aaion defined in this saipture?
19
There are two types of volition. First, the initial or preparatory
stage, wherein one produces a volition which is pure volition, "I must do such and such an aaion": this is what the Scripture calls cetandkarmany aaion which is volition. Then, after this stage of pure volition, one produces a volition of aaion, the volition of doing an aaion in conformity with what has been previously willed, to move the body or to emit a voice: this is what the Scripture calls cetayitva karman, aaion after having been willed, or willed aaion.
[The Sarvastivadins:] If this is the case, then informative (vijnapti)
action does not exist: bodily-vocal action, according to you, is only
volition; there is no place for the vijnapti which is matter (rupa) by its
nature. And if vijnapti does not exist, then avijnapti, "non-information" 20
of the sphere of Kamadhatu, does not exist. From whence there would be a great number of difficulties which will be enumerated later (i. e. , samvarasamvardbhdva, etc. , see below 4a-b).
These difficulties can be refuted. Avijnapti is explained very well in our system. We admit two types of volition bearing on bodily aaions and vocal sounds which are the bodily and vocal vijnaptis. These two types of volitions--which bear the names of bodily action and vocal aaion--are capable of producing a volition sui generis which is the avijnapti. Where is the difficulty in this?
[The Sarvastivadins:] This sui generis volition is subordinate to the mind (cittdnuparivartin, ii. 31), like the avijnapti which in our system arises from dhydna, for the avijnapti of Kamadhatu develops during sleep, etc. (i. 11)
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No, for this sui generis volition is projected by a certain volition of decision (pure cetand), its distant cause, and by a certain volition of action and voice, its near cause. Now however you would have it that the vijnapti, if it exists, would depend, like the projection of the avijnapti, on the force of the thought: for it is itself nonintelligent.
***
The Vaibhasikas say that shape exists in and of itself, and that bodily vijnapti is shape.
3d. Vocal vijnapti is vocal sound.
Sound which is discourse by nature--that is, articulated sound (ii.
47)--is vocal vijnapti.
*#*
Avijnapti has already been defined ( i l l ; above n. 5).
The Sautrantikas say that the avijnapti does not really exist as a substance: (1) because it solely consists of not doing an action after
having undertaken not to do it; (2) because one designates a thing which would exist by reason of past primary elements (i. 11) as avijnapti; now past dharmas no longer exist (v. 25); and (3) because avijnapti does not have the nature of rupa: the nature of rupa is rupyate and since the avijnapti is not "susceptible of destruaion" (apratigha), it cannot be rupa (i. 13).
[The Vaibhasikas prove the existence of avijnapti:]
4a-b. Scripture says that rupa is of three types and that there is a pure rupa; there is increase of merit; and there is a course of aaion for him who is not concerned with himself, etc.
[By the word et cetera, theKarika refers to reasons 5 to 8 below. ] 1. A scripture says that there are three types of rupa: "Rupa is embraced within a threefold rupa: there is visible rupa susceptible of
destruaion (visible physical matter); there is an invisible r&pa susceptible of destruaion (the eye, etc); and there is an invisible rupa,
21 free from destruction," and this latter can only be the avijnapti.
? f
tf 2. TheBlessedOnesaidinascripturethatthereispurerupa: What
are the pure dharmas? All rupa of the past, the future and the present. . . all consciousness of the past, future, present, concerning which there arises neither affection nor antipathy: these are the pure dharmas. " (see Ekottardgama, TD 2, p. 13b-c).
Now, apart from avijnapti, there exists no rupa which can be invisible and free from destruction, and no rupa which is pure. [For bodily and vocal action does not pertain to one who has entered into the Truth of the Way, mdrgasatyasamdpanna. ]
3. A scripture says that there is an increase of merit,". . . There are
seven material meritorious works, (aupadhikapunyakriydvastu, iv. 113)
. . . when a believer, son or daughter of good family, who is endowed,
walks, stands still, sleeps or is awake, his merit increases with intensity,
without ceasing;merit continues adding to itself. What are these seven
material works? . . . In this same way there are seven non-material
22 meritorious works. . "
By reason of what dharma, other than the avijnapti, could merit increase even when the mind is not good, or when one is without thought?
4. If avijnapti does not exist, he who does not himself act, who gives orders to others, will not be endowed with a course of action (iv. 66). For a vocal action that consists of giving an order cannnot constitute a course of action, killing etc; this action in fact does not actually accomplish the action to be accomplished.
Would one say that when the action is accomplished the action that consists of giving the order becomes a course of action?
But it is evident that the nature of this action is not modified by the execution of the order.
5. The Blessed One said, "Monks, the dharmas, the external sources of consciousness not included within the eleven ayatanas, are invisible, and are free from destruction" (Samyukta, TD 2, p. 91cl9). He did not say that the dharmayatana is non-rupa.
If the Blessed One did not intend to refer to the avijnapti, which is rupa and so included in the dharmayatana [and not in rupdyatana\ then what is the rupa that is included in the dharmayatana?
6. If avijnapti does not exist, the Way no longer has eight parts, for the parts, samyagvdc, samyakkarmdnta, and samyagdjtva (correct
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speech, correct action, and correct livelihood, iv. 86), are incompatible with absorption (samadhi). (lf the ascetic, in a state of absorption, possesses these three, it is because these three are by nature avijnapti vi. 67, 68).
But, one would answer, a scripture says, "When he knows thus, when he. sees thus, samyagdrsti, samyaksamkalpa, samyagvyayama, samyaksmrti, and samyaksamadhi are cultivated and achieved; sam-
yagvdc, samyakkarmanta and samyagajiva have been previously puri- fied. " Thus the last three are considered as vijnapti and as previous to absorption.
This text, the Vaibhasikas say, does not refer to the last three parts of the Way, but rather to speech, action, and livelihood in a state of detachment which have been obtained through the worldly path. This does not prevent speech, etc. , from not forming part of the Way under the aspect of avijnapti
7. If the avijnapti does not exist, the Pratimoksa discipline (samvara, 23
iv. l4a) would disappear. For a person who has assumed the vows of religion is still a Bhiksu or Bhiksuni, when his mind is bad or neutral.
8. A scripture teaches that the renouncing of sin is a dike which 24
arrests immorality. An "absence" cannot be a dike: virati is thus a real dharma (the avijnapti), and not the mere fact of no longer accomplish- ing an action which one has renounced, as the Sautrantikas maintain (p. 560, 562).
***
[The Sautrantikas answer:] These arguments are numerous and diverse, but are not conclusive. Let us examine them one by one.
25
1. The Sutra teaches that rupa is of three types. The Yogacarins say
that in the Dhyanas, through the force of absorption, a rupa arises which is the object of the absorption, that is, which is perceived by the person in the absorption, [for example a skeleton in the asubhabhavana, (vL9). ] This rupa is not seen by the eye; it is thus invisible. It does not "cover," it does not occupy a place: it is thus "free from destruaioa" If you ask how this object of absorption can be rupa [since it does not possess the usual characteristics of rupa,] you forget that the existence of avijnapti would give rise to the same question.
? 2. The scripture says that there is a pure rupa. The Yogacarins maintain that the rupa that arises through the force of the absorption is pure, since the absorption is pure.
26
But other masters, [the Darsttantikas,] maintain that the rupa of
the Arhats (organ of sight, etc) and external rupa, [namely the five objects of the senses (i. 9a), are pure (andsrava)] because they are not a support of the vices.
To this one can object that the scripture expresses itself [without making a distinction,] "What are the impure dharmas? All that which is organ of sight, all that which is visible . . . "
[The Darstantikas answer that all the dharmas referred to in this scripture are qualified as] impure because they are not opposed to the vices: [in fact, only the mind and its mental states can oppose the vices and destroy them. ]
To this one could object that the same dharmas would be impure, because they are not opposed to the vices, and at the same time pure, because they are not a support of the vices, with the unpleasant consequence that the charaaeristic of pure and impure would be confused
No, answer the Darstantikas, for these dharmas are not pure from
the same point of view in which they are impure. Further, if the visible
and the other ayatanas are exclusively impure, why would the scripture 27
specify, "The impure and updddna-provckhig rupas, . . . the impure and updddna-provoking dharmas are the cause of the hardening of the
28
mind and of hypocrisy. " (v. 47)
3. The scripture says that merit increases.
The ancient masters say: It is in the nature of things that merit
increases when persons who have received a gift utilize this gift: by reason of the qualities of these persons (dhyana, absorption of benevolence, etc. ), by reason of the benevolence that they get out of the gift for themselves and for all creatures, the mental series of the givers, be they of bad or of neutral minds, is found to be perfumed by the volition of giving which has for its object the person who receives: their series undergo a subtle ascending transformation and arrives at the state where they are finally capable of bringing forth many results. It is in this sense that the text says, "Merit increases in an intense and un-
29 interrupted manner, merit adds to itself/*
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But how does one explain the increase of merit in the case of nonmaterial meritorious work?
[The mental series,transforms itself] by reason of the repetition of volitions having for their object [the Tathagata or the Sravakas]. Even during dreams these volitions are linked together.
On the contrary, we do not see how the [Vaibhasikas,] partisans of an avijnapti, can explain the growth of merit in the case of nonmaterial meritorious work. [This does not consist of bodily or vocal action, vijnapti, but merely the joy experienced with regard to the Tathagata or the Sravakas; it does not consist of an absorptioa Now according to the Vaibhasikas, the avijnapti can only give rise to the vijnapti or to an absorptioa Hence it is impossible here. ]
But according to other masters, [certain Sautrantikas,] in the case also of material meritorious works, merit proceeds from the repetition of a volition having for its object [the person who receives. ]
But this opinion is inadmissible in light of the scripture which says, "When an energetic Bhiksu, endowed with morality, possessor of good dharmas, eats the alms of a donor, he then enters into and dwells in the
absorption called 'infinites' (good-will, etc. ), and by reason of this fact
there is certainly produced for the donor an out-flowing of merit, and
30
out-flowing of good and prosperity. " Now does the donor whose
merit thus continues to increase, have a special volition whose object is the person who receives? [We should thus prefer the opinion of the first masters:] in the case of material meritorious works, the merit proceeds from a transformation of the series [of the donor by reason of the qualities of the person who receives. ]
4. According to the Vaibhasikas, if the avijnapti does not exist, he who has an action accomplished by another will not be endowed with the course of action ("path-of-action," karmapatha). When an emissary charged with murder accomplishes the murder, it is in the nature of things that the mental series of the author of the instigation will submit to a certain subtle transformation by virtue of which his series will bear a result later. This holds likewise when one acts for oneself; when the courseofaction(murder,etc. )isachieved,atthismoment theseries undergoes a transformatioa This transformation is called "course of action," and consequently the person whose series is transformed is endowed with the course of action--for the effect (transformation of
? the series) receives the name which belongs more properly to the cause (course of action),--and this transformation is called bodily or vocal accordingly as it results from an action of the body or the voice. It is by virtue of these same principles that the partisans of avijnapti consider the avijnapti as a bodily or vocal course of action.
31
The Bhadanta (Vibhasa, TD 27, p. 6l7al8) proves in a different
manner the nonexistence of avijnapti: "A person is touched by the sin of murder by reason of a tritemporal volition with regard to the skandhas which constitute a living being (iv. 73), that is, when he thinks, 1 shall
e
kill;Ikill;heiskilled*"[Th courseofactioniscompletewhenthereis
preparatory action, principal action, and consecutive action, consisting solely of cetana, iv. 68c]
But this triple volition does not necessarily bring about the achievement of the course of action, for, according to the theory of the Bhadanta, there would be a mortal sin (iv. 97) for the child who says, "my mother has been murdered," if she has not in fact been killed by the emissary charged with the murder.
Nevertheless all this exercise of volition, "I shall kill, I kill, he is
killed" applies only to the person who kills: the intention of the
32 Bhadanta is to refer to this type of murder.
***
But, [ask the Sarvastivadins,] why do you, in your antipathy, deny the existence of the avijnapti and yet admit a transformation of the mental series (ii. 36c-d)?
[In truth, avijnapti, a doctrine of the Sarvastivadins, and the transformation of the mental series, a thesis of the Sautrantikas, are both equally difficult to understand;] I thus have no antipathy [for these doarines. ] But, to say that there arises at the moment of the achieving of the course of action by a bodily operation dependent on a mind, a certain dharma, called avijnapti, [in him who has ordered the course of action,] either from the mind of him who has ordered, or separate from the body of him who has accomplished the murder, is a hypothesis that cannot satisfy us; but to say that there is produced at the moment of the achievement of the course of action by an operation ordered by a certain person, a transformation of the mental series of this person, is a
Karma 565
? hypothesis that satisfies us. And it also satisfies us that the result arises from a transformation of the series and not from an avijnapti.
[Take into account also the arguments enumerated above:] "if the vijnapti does not exist, [how could there be avijnapti! ", "The avijnapti consists solely in no longer doing a certain action," "the avijnapti cannot depend on past primary elements. "]
5. The dharmdyatana is not defined as nonmateriaL The response to this objection is as has been given above: there is an invisible rupa free from destruaion, forming part of the dharmdyatana: this is not the avijnapti; this is a rupa which is the object of the absorption and which arises from the force of the absorptioa
6. The Way, say the Vaibhasikas, would not have eight parts.
How does the saint, when he has attained the Way, [when he sees or meditates on the Truths,] possess correct speech, action, and livelihood? Does he pronounce correct speech, act in a correct manner, and correctly ask for the robes of a monk?
[Such is not our thought, answer the Sarvastivadins. ] In the Path, the saint takes possession of certain pure avijnaptis, so that,Vhen he leaves the contemplation, it is by the force of these pure avijnaptis that he produces correct speech, actions, and livelihood, and does not produce incorrect speech, actions, and livelihood A cause takes the name of its result: thus speech, action and livelihood are designated as avijnapti.
If this is so, why not accept my theory? There is no avijnapti; but the saint, when he finds himself in the Path, takes possession of a certain
33
intention (dsaya) and of a certain personality (asraya) so that, when he
comes out of this contemplation, by reason of the force of these two factors he henceforth produces correct speech, actions and livelihood One gives to the cause (dsaya and asraya) the name of their result; and we can thus affirm that the Path possesses eight parts.
According to another opinion, the parts of the Path solely consist of non-commission. What is non-commission? The person who is in absorption acquires, through the force of the Path, definite absolute abstention (akarananiyama, vi. 33a-b). This abstention, which is ac- quired having the pure Path as its support, is pure. This is a part of the Path.
Without doubt, the part (correct speech, etc. ) is not a "thing"
? (dravya), being only abstention: but these are not the only real and distina things which constitute the dharmas; there are for example, the
34
eight worldly dharmas; possession and non-possession; glory and
non-glory; praise and blame; pleasure and suffering. Non-possession of clothes, of food, etc. , is not a thing. (Anguttara, iv. 157, Digha, iii. 260) 7. If the avijnapti does not exist, say the Vaibhasikas, the Pratimoksa
discipline would disappear.
One refutes this objection according to the same principles, by
making a state out of the force of the intention. Discipline is volition which, after it has been translated into the positive action (vidhi) of abstaining from transgression, into the pledge of no longer committing transgression, arrests bad actions and disciplines the body and the voice: the Pratimoksa discipline should be understood in this manner.
The Vaibhasikas object that, if the Pratimoksa discipline is volition, the monk who thinks a thought other than this thought of volition would cease being "disciplined," for he does not then possess the volition which disciplines.
This objection is worthless. In fact, the mental series is perfumed in such a way that, when a thought of transgression starts to appear, the memory of the vow undertaken also appears: the volition of abstention is then found to be present.
8. And this volition has the characteristic of a dike. When one is obliged not to commit transgression, one remembers this obligation, shame (hrt, ii. 32) is present, and one constrains oneself in such a manner that one does not violate morality.
In your system, on the contrary, if immorality is dammed up by an avijnapti independent of memory, then even a person who has a faulty memory would not be able to commit a transgression, since the avijnapti is always there.
Let us stop this discussion here. The Vaibhasikas say that there exists a certain substantial thing (dravya), sui generis, which is avijnaptirupa.
We have seen (i. llb) that the avijnapti arises dependent (upaddya) on the primary elements: the question is then posed whether it derives from the same primary elements which are the support of the vijnapti, that is, the primary elements of the body through which the action termed vijnapti (iv. p. 3,33) is accomplished; or if it derives from other
Karma 567
? 35 primary elements.
The avijnapti derives from primary elements different from those
which serve as the support for the vijnapti: for it is impossible that one
and the same complex of four primary elements would produce both a
subtle, derived rupa,--the avijnapti--, and at the same time a gross, 36
***
The vijnapti is simultaneous to the primary elements from whence it derives; is such also the case for the avijnapti?
The general rule is that all derived rupa is simultaneous to its primary elements. But certain derived rupa,--of the present and the future,--derive from past primary elements:
4c-d. From the first moment, the avijnapti of Kamadhatu arises derived from past primary elements.
The moment the avijnapti arises, it arises derived from primary elements simultaneous to its arising. From this first moment on, avijnapti of the sphere of Kamadhatu--in opposition to the avijnapti arisen from the dhyana, and pure avijnapti (p. 32)--arises, that is, it continues to be reborn, being derived (upadaya) from the same primary elements of the first moment, which are now past: these past primary elements constitute, from the second moment onward, the support of the avijnapti, for they are the cause of its pravrtti, they are its projecting cause; the primary elements simultaneous to each of the moments from the second moment onward are the support of the avijnapti, for they are the cause of its anuvrtti, they are its supporting cause. In the same way, the hand that has hurled the wheel and the ground that the supports the wheel, are the causes, respectively, of the pravrtti and the anuvrtti of the movement of the wheel (see p. 576).
***
To which sphere,--Kamadhatu and the Four Dhyanas--do the primary elements belong, from whence the bodily and vocal aaions of the different spheres derive?
derived rupa, the vijnapti.
? 5a-b. When impure, bodily and vocal action derive from the primary elements of the sphere to which they belong.
Bodily and vocal actions of Kamadhatu derive from the primary, elements of Kamadhatu, and so on to the bodily and vocal actions of the Fourth Dhyana which derives from primary elements of the Fourth Dhyana.
5c.
la. The variety of the world arises from aaion.
The variety of the world arises from the actions of living beings.
But, in this hypothesis, how does it happen that actions produce at one and the same time, pleasing things,--saffron, sandalwood, etc. --on the one hand, and bodies of quite opposite qualities on the other?
The actions of beings whose conduct is a mixture of good and bad actions (vydmisrakarm, iv. 60) produce bodies resembling abscesses whose impurities flow out through the nine gates, and, in order to serve as a remedy to these bodies, they also produce objeas of pleasing enjoyment, colors and shapes, odors, tastes and tangibles.
But the gods have accomplished only good actions: their bodies and their objeas of enjoyment are equally pleasing.
***
What is aaion?
lb. It is volition and that which is produced through volition.
The sutra says that there are two types of aaion, volition (cetand)
l
and the action after having been willed. Aaion after having been
? 552 Chopper Four
willed (cetayitvd) is what the kdrikd designates by the words "that which is produced through volition. "
These two aaions form three aaions: bodily aaion, vocal aaion, and mental aaion.
How do you establish this division, according to the support of its aaion, according to its nature, or according to its original cause?
To what does this question tend? If one were to regard its support,
there is nothing but an aaion, for all aaions are supported on a physical
support, a body. If one were to regard its nature, there is only vocal
aaion, for, of these three,--body, speech and manas,--only the voice is 2
ultimatelyaaionbyitsnature. Ifoneweretoregarditsorigionalcause, we have only mental aaion, for all aaions have their origin in the mind The Vaibhasikas say that the three types of aaion are established by reason of all of these three causes, support, nature and original cause, in this order.
Ic-d. Volition is mental aaion: it gives rise to two aaions, bodily and vocal aaioa
3 Volition is called mental aaion; that which arises from volition,
4
namely aaion which has been willed, is made up of the two other
aaions, bodily and vocal aaion.
***
2a. These two aaions are informative and non-informative. Bodily aaion and vocal aaion are informative (vijnapti) and non-
informative (avijnapti, i. 11, iv. 4); we then have bodily informative 5
aaion, vocal informative aaion, bodily non-informative aaion, and vocal non-informative aaion.
What aaion is "bodily informative aaion? "
2b-3b. Bodily vijnapti is shape. It is not movement because all conditioned things are momentary, since they perish: on the other hand, nothing does not perish without a cause and the creative cause would be at the same time destruaive.
Bodily vijnapti is such and such a shape (samsthana, i,10a) of the
? body by reason of a volition
6
According to others, (the Vatslputriyas,) bodily vijnapti is dis-
7
placement, forittakesplacewhenthereismovement,andnotwhen
8 there is no movement.
The author answers: This is not so, because all conditioned things are momentary.
What is understood by "momentary" (ksanika)!
Ksana means to perish immediately after having acquired its being; ksanika is a dharma that has ksana, as a dandika is one who has a staff
9 (danda).
A conditioned thing does not exist beyond the acquisition of its being: it perishes on the spot where it arises; it cannot go from this spot to another. Consequently bodily vijnapti is not movement.
The Vatslputriyas: If conditioned things are momentary, we would admit that they are not susceptible of displacement.
It is proven that they are momentary, "since they necessarily
10
perish;" for the destruction of conditioned things is spontaneous; it
does not come from anything; it does not depend on a cause.
1. That which depends oh a cause is an effect, something "done," "created" Destruction is a negation: how can a negation "be done" or
"created? " Therefore destruction does not depend on a cause.
2. Destruction does not depend on a cause: hence a conditioned thing perishes as soon as it arises; if it did not perish immediately, it
would not perish later, since it would then remain the same. Since you
n
admit that it perishes, you must admit that it immediately perishes. 3. Would you say that a conditioned thing changes and that,
consequently, it is later subject to destruction? It is absurd to say that a certain thing changes, becoming another thing, staying the same thing that you say shows its modified characteristics (ii. 46a, p. 245).
4. Would you say that there is no means of correct knowledge more decisive than direct perception; would you say that everyone holds that kindling perishes through its relationship with fire; and that, con- sequently, it is false that all things perish without a cause? There are many remarks to make with respect to this.
In fact, people do not directly perceive the destruction of kindling by reason of fire. If you think that kindling perishes through its relationship to fire because we no longer see the kindling when this
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relationship has taken place, then your thesis rests on an inference, and not on direct perception, and your reasoning is not conclusive.
The fact that we no longer see kindling after its relationship with fire is open to two interpretations: either the kindling perishes by reason of this relationship, or it unceasingly perishes in and of itself, and under normal conditions is unceasingly reborn in and of itself, but stops renewing itself by virtue of its relationship with the fire.
You admit that the destruction of the flame is spontaneous. When, after a relationship with wind, the flame is no longer visible, you admit that this relationship is not the cause of the destruction of the flame; but you admit that the flame, by virtue of this relationship, stops renewing itself. The same for the sound of the bell: a hand, laid on the bell, prevents a renewing of its sound; but it does not destroy the sound that you admit is momentary.
Therefore it is inference that should determine this question.
5. The Vatsiputriyas: What reasons do you bring to bear in favor of the thesis of spontaneous destruction?
We have already said that destruction, being a negative state, cannot be caused. We would further say that if destruction is the effect of a cause, nothing would not perish without a cause.
If, like arising, destruction proceeds from a cause, it would never take place without a cause. Now we hold that intelligence, a flame, or a sound, which are momentary, perish without their destruction de- pending on a cause. Hence the destruction of the kindling, etc. , is spontaneous.
The Vaibhasikas maintain that an earlier thought perishes by reason of a later thought, that earlier sound perishes by reason of later sound.
But the two thoughts in question are not simultaneous. Some contradictory thoughts,--doubt and certainty, pleasure and suffering, love and hate,--do not displace one another; and the same holds for non-contradictory thoughts. And if you suppose that they do contradict one another, then how can weak dharmas destroy strong dharmas of the same type--as when weak thoughts or sounds immediately follow strong thoughts or sounds?
12
6. Some [the Sthavira Vasubandhu] think that a flame perishes
through the absence of a cause of duratioa But an absence cannot be a
? cause.
According to the Vaisesikas, a flame perishes by reason of dharma
and adharma, merit and demerit.
This explanation is inadmissible. Dharma and adharma would both
be causes of arising and of destruction: dharma would cause the flame to
arise and cause it to perish, accordingly as the flame is favorable or
unfavorable; adharma, accordingly as it is unfavorable or favorable.
Now we cannot admit that dharma and adharma enter into activity and
13
cease being active from moment to moment.
Furthermore since this manner of explaining destruction would
hold for all conditioned things, it is useless to pursue the discussion. You
do not have the right to say that kindling perishes through its
14 relationship with the flame.
7. If one holds that the destruction of the kindling, etc. , has for its cause the relationship of this kindling with fire, one would then be forced to acknowledge that a cause that engenders is at the same time a cause that destroys.
Cooking (paka), or a relationship with fire, produces different products (pakaja), of deeper and deeper color. The same cause that produces the first color destroys this first color, or, at least--if you object that it refers to a new relationship with fire, since the fire is momentary--the cause that destroys the first color is similar to the cause that produces it. Now it is impossible that a certain cause would produce a certain effect and that later this same cause, or a parallel cause, would destroy this same effect. (Compare Tarka-samgraha, xxiii).
Would you say that, if the successive flames are different,--long,
short, large and small,--our conclusion does not become indispensable?
Let us use another example. By the prolonged action of ashes, snow,
caustics, sun, water, or earth, there arises and disappears in turn
different "products of cooking. " But you do not attribute the character-
istic of momentariness to these diverse factors of cooking.
15
ask why water diminishes when it is heated if a
8. Some
relationship with fire is not destruction of the water?
By reason of its relationship with fire, through the force of the fire, the heat element--which is present in water (ii. 22, p. 186)--increases and, increasing, causes the mass of water to be reborn in quantities more and more reduced, until being totally reduced, the water ceases renewing
1<s itself. This is what a relationship with fire does to water.
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16 itself. This is what a relationship with fire does to water.
9. Let us conclude. The destruction of things is spontaneous. Things perish in and of themselves, because it is their nature to perish. As they perish in and of themselves, they perish upon arising. As they perish upon arising, they are momentary. Thus there is no movement, no displacement; there is only arising in another place of the second moment of the series: this is the case, even in the opinion of our opponent, for the fire which consumes firewood The idea of movement is a false conception.
Hence bodily vijnapti is not displacement, movement; rather bodily vijnapti is shape.
###
The Sautrantikas say that shape is not a distinct thing, a thing in and of itself. [For the Vaibhasikas, rupayatana, visible physical matter is both varnarupa or color: blue, etc. , and samsthdnarupa or shape: long, etc. (i. 10a). For the Sautrantikas, shape does not exist as a substance, but only as a designation. ]
When there arises, in one direction, a large mass of color, this mass is called "long. " When, by comparison, a mass of color is small, it is called "short. " When a color arises in a great quantity in the four directions, it is called "square. " When it arises equally in all directions, it is called "circular. " The other figures,--high, low, etc,--are explained in the same manner, when a color arises in a great quantity in the direction of the zenith, it is called "high," etc Shape is thus not a thing in and of itself, a rupa.
1. First argument. If shape were a thing in and of itself, 3c It would be perceived by two organs.
In fact, seeing through the organ of sight, one has the idea of length, etc. ; touching through the tactile organ, one has the idea of length. Thus if length, or any other shape, were a thing in and of itself, it would be perceived by two organs. Now, according to the scriptural definition, rupayatana, the visible physical matter, is perceived by only the eye.
The Vaibhasikas answer that touch does not perceive length relative to softness or hardness, arranged in a certain manner, without length
? forming part of the tangible.
This is quite right: but exactly the same holds for the visible. Length
is not visible: one calls a visible (color) or a tangible (softness, etc) arranged in a certain manner "long. "
The Vaibhasikas: When we have the idea of length after having touched something, we are not perceiving shape through touch; we remember the shape, because it is associated with a tangible. It is the same when we see the color (visible) of fire, for we then remember heat (tangible); and when we smell the odor of flower, we then remember its color.
In the two cases that you allege, one imagines that a color recalls a tangible, or that an odor recalls a color, because the dharmas as cause are closely associated: all fire is hot, and certain odors belong to certain flowers. But a tangible (softness, etc. ) is not invariably associated with a certain shape: how then does the perception of a tangible provoke the rememberance of a certain shape? If a similar remembrance is produced without there having been an invariable association between a tangible and its shape, one would in this same manner remember color after having touched something. But such is not the case. Hence, one must not say that the perception of a tangible provokes the remembrance of its shape.
2. Second argument. One sees many shapes in a multicolored piece of cloth. Thus, there would be, according to you, many rupas, in the category of shape in one and the same piece: this is impossible, as it was for color. If shape were a real thing, that which, in the cloth, forms part of a long line cannot at the same time form a part of a short line.
3. Third argument. All "real" rupa, susceptible of being struck (sapratigha, i. 29b),--blue, etc. ,--is made up of real atoms of a certain nature: color rupa (blue, etc. ) necessarily exists in the octuple atom, etc. (ii. 22, trans, p. 185). Now
3c. Shape does not exist in an atom.
There is no atom of length. In fact, when a long mass diminishes, we arrive at the moment when we no longer have the idea of long with regard to it, but rather the idea of short: hence this idea does not proceed from a rupa "shape" existing in the thing. Therefore what we designate as long is a number of real things,--atoms of color,--arranged in a
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certain manner.
If you maintain that the expressions, "long," etc. refer to some
atoms of shape arranged in a certain manner, and that some atoms that would not be "shape" by nature could not be designated as "long," etc. --this is merely repeating your affirmation without the support of any argument. In fact, if the existence of special atoms of shape were proved, you would be able to maintain that united, arranged in a certain fashion, they constitute length: but since the existence of these atoms has not been proved, as the existence of the atoms of color has been
17 proved, how could they be united and arranged?
[4. Objection of the Sarvastivadins:] If a shape is not distinct in color, if a shape is nothing other than a certain color, then shapes would not differ when their color is the same: now some jugs of the same color have different shapes.
Have we not said that one designates a number of real things arranged in a certain manner as "long? " Some ants, all similar, arrange themselves in a straight line or in a circle, and so present different shapes. In the same way the shapes of jugs differ without their color differing.
[5. Objection of the Sarvastivadins:] But, in darkness or at a distance, one sees the shape of an object,--a column, a person, etc,-- without seeing its color. Hence shape exists separate from color.
In fact, one first sees color in an indistinct manner; one then forms--through the mental consciousness--the idea of shape, in the same way that one forms the idea of a line, or the idea of an army accordingly as one has seen, indistinctly, some birds, some ants, some
18
elephants, etc. : "This army is arranged in a circle. " Or rather it
happens that one does not clearly distinguish either color or shape; one only knows,--through the mental consciousness--a mass.
[6. The Sarvastivadins criticize the Sautrantikas,] You Sautrantikas negate both movement and shape. Then what is designated by the term "bodily vijnapti? "
We say that bodily vijnapti is shape [thus separating ourselves from the Vatsiputriyas-Sarhmitlyas] but we do not say that shape is a thing in and of itself [thus separating ourselves from the Sarvastivadins. ]
{The Sarvastivadins:] If you maintain that bodily vijnapti is not a real thing, but solely a shape that exists as designation, what then is the
? real dharma that constitutes bodily aaion?
Bodily aaion is the aaion which has for its objea the body: that is to
say, the volition that puts a body into motion in diverse ways: it proceeds by being supported on this gate which is the body, and is thus called bodily aaion. Other aaions should be defined according to their natures: [i. e. , vocal aaion is the aaion which has the voice for its objea; mental aaion is the aaion of the manas or aaion associated with the manas (see iv. 78c-d). ]
[The Sarvastivadins:] A scripture says that "aaion is volition and willed aaion. " If bodily aaion and vocal aaion are volition, what difference is there between the two types of aaion defined in this saipture?
19
There are two types of volition. First, the initial or preparatory
stage, wherein one produces a volition which is pure volition, "I must do such and such an aaion": this is what the Scripture calls cetandkarmany aaion which is volition. Then, after this stage of pure volition, one produces a volition of aaion, the volition of doing an aaion in conformity with what has been previously willed, to move the body or to emit a voice: this is what the Scripture calls cetayitva karman, aaion after having been willed, or willed aaion.
[The Sarvastivadins:] If this is the case, then informative (vijnapti)
action does not exist: bodily-vocal action, according to you, is only
volition; there is no place for the vijnapti which is matter (rupa) by its
nature. And if vijnapti does not exist, then avijnapti, "non-information" 20
of the sphere of Kamadhatu, does not exist. From whence there would be a great number of difficulties which will be enumerated later (i. e. , samvarasamvardbhdva, etc. , see below 4a-b).
These difficulties can be refuted. Avijnapti is explained very well in our system. We admit two types of volition bearing on bodily aaions and vocal sounds which are the bodily and vocal vijnaptis. These two types of volitions--which bear the names of bodily action and vocal aaion--are capable of producing a volition sui generis which is the avijnapti. Where is the difficulty in this?
[The Sarvastivadins:] This sui generis volition is subordinate to the mind (cittdnuparivartin, ii. 31), like the avijnapti which in our system arises from dhydna, for the avijnapti of Kamadhatu develops during sleep, etc. (i. 11)
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No, for this sui generis volition is projected by a certain volition of decision (pure cetand), its distant cause, and by a certain volition of action and voice, its near cause. Now however you would have it that the vijnapti, if it exists, would depend, like the projection of the avijnapti, on the force of the thought: for it is itself nonintelligent.
***
The Vaibhasikas say that shape exists in and of itself, and that bodily vijnapti is shape.
3d. Vocal vijnapti is vocal sound.
Sound which is discourse by nature--that is, articulated sound (ii.
47)--is vocal vijnapti.
*#*
Avijnapti has already been defined ( i l l ; above n. 5).
The Sautrantikas say that the avijnapti does not really exist as a substance: (1) because it solely consists of not doing an action after
having undertaken not to do it; (2) because one designates a thing which would exist by reason of past primary elements (i. 11) as avijnapti; now past dharmas no longer exist (v. 25); and (3) because avijnapti does not have the nature of rupa: the nature of rupa is rupyate and since the avijnapti is not "susceptible of destruaion" (apratigha), it cannot be rupa (i. 13).
[The Vaibhasikas prove the existence of avijnapti:]
4a-b. Scripture says that rupa is of three types and that there is a pure rupa; there is increase of merit; and there is a course of aaion for him who is not concerned with himself, etc.
[By the word et cetera, theKarika refers to reasons 5 to 8 below. ] 1. A scripture says that there are three types of rupa: "Rupa is embraced within a threefold rupa: there is visible rupa susceptible of
destruaion (visible physical matter); there is an invisible r&pa susceptible of destruaion (the eye, etc); and there is an invisible rupa,
21 free from destruction," and this latter can only be the avijnapti.
? f
tf 2. TheBlessedOnesaidinascripturethatthereispurerupa: What
are the pure dharmas? All rupa of the past, the future and the present. . . all consciousness of the past, future, present, concerning which there arises neither affection nor antipathy: these are the pure dharmas. " (see Ekottardgama, TD 2, p. 13b-c).
Now, apart from avijnapti, there exists no rupa which can be invisible and free from destruction, and no rupa which is pure. [For bodily and vocal action does not pertain to one who has entered into the Truth of the Way, mdrgasatyasamdpanna. ]
3. A scripture says that there is an increase of merit,". . . There are
seven material meritorious works, (aupadhikapunyakriydvastu, iv. 113)
. . . when a believer, son or daughter of good family, who is endowed,
walks, stands still, sleeps or is awake, his merit increases with intensity,
without ceasing;merit continues adding to itself. What are these seven
material works? . . . In this same way there are seven non-material
22 meritorious works. . "
By reason of what dharma, other than the avijnapti, could merit increase even when the mind is not good, or when one is without thought?
4. If avijnapti does not exist, he who does not himself act, who gives orders to others, will not be endowed with a course of action (iv. 66). For a vocal action that consists of giving an order cannnot constitute a course of action, killing etc; this action in fact does not actually accomplish the action to be accomplished.
Would one say that when the action is accomplished the action that consists of giving the order becomes a course of action?
But it is evident that the nature of this action is not modified by the execution of the order.
5. The Blessed One said, "Monks, the dharmas, the external sources of consciousness not included within the eleven ayatanas, are invisible, and are free from destruction" (Samyukta, TD 2, p. 91cl9). He did not say that the dharmayatana is non-rupa.
If the Blessed One did not intend to refer to the avijnapti, which is rupa and so included in the dharmayatana [and not in rupdyatana\ then what is the rupa that is included in the dharmayatana?
6. If avijnapti does not exist, the Way no longer has eight parts, for the parts, samyagvdc, samyakkarmdnta, and samyagdjtva (correct
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speech, correct action, and correct livelihood, iv. 86), are incompatible with absorption (samadhi). (lf the ascetic, in a state of absorption, possesses these three, it is because these three are by nature avijnapti vi. 67, 68).
But, one would answer, a scripture says, "When he knows thus, when he. sees thus, samyagdrsti, samyaksamkalpa, samyagvyayama, samyaksmrti, and samyaksamadhi are cultivated and achieved; sam-
yagvdc, samyakkarmanta and samyagajiva have been previously puri- fied. " Thus the last three are considered as vijnapti and as previous to absorption.
This text, the Vaibhasikas say, does not refer to the last three parts of the Way, but rather to speech, action, and livelihood in a state of detachment which have been obtained through the worldly path. This does not prevent speech, etc. , from not forming part of the Way under the aspect of avijnapti
7. If the avijnapti does not exist, the Pratimoksa discipline (samvara, 23
iv. l4a) would disappear. For a person who has assumed the vows of religion is still a Bhiksu or Bhiksuni, when his mind is bad or neutral.
8. A scripture teaches that the renouncing of sin is a dike which 24
arrests immorality. An "absence" cannot be a dike: virati is thus a real dharma (the avijnapti), and not the mere fact of no longer accomplish- ing an action which one has renounced, as the Sautrantikas maintain (p. 560, 562).
***
[The Sautrantikas answer:] These arguments are numerous and diverse, but are not conclusive. Let us examine them one by one.
25
1. The Sutra teaches that rupa is of three types. The Yogacarins say
that in the Dhyanas, through the force of absorption, a rupa arises which is the object of the absorption, that is, which is perceived by the person in the absorption, [for example a skeleton in the asubhabhavana, (vL9). ] This rupa is not seen by the eye; it is thus invisible. It does not "cover," it does not occupy a place: it is thus "free from destruaioa" If you ask how this object of absorption can be rupa [since it does not possess the usual characteristics of rupa,] you forget that the existence of avijnapti would give rise to the same question.
? 2. The scripture says that there is a pure rupa. The Yogacarins maintain that the rupa that arises through the force of the absorption is pure, since the absorption is pure.
26
But other masters, [the Darsttantikas,] maintain that the rupa of
the Arhats (organ of sight, etc) and external rupa, [namely the five objects of the senses (i. 9a), are pure (andsrava)] because they are not a support of the vices.
To this one can object that the scripture expresses itself [without making a distinction,] "What are the impure dharmas? All that which is organ of sight, all that which is visible . . . "
[The Darstantikas answer that all the dharmas referred to in this scripture are qualified as] impure because they are not opposed to the vices: [in fact, only the mind and its mental states can oppose the vices and destroy them. ]
To this one could object that the same dharmas would be impure, because they are not opposed to the vices, and at the same time pure, because they are not a support of the vices, with the unpleasant consequence that the charaaeristic of pure and impure would be confused
No, answer the Darstantikas, for these dharmas are not pure from
the same point of view in which they are impure. Further, if the visible
and the other ayatanas are exclusively impure, why would the scripture 27
specify, "The impure and updddna-provckhig rupas, . . . the impure and updddna-provoking dharmas are the cause of the hardening of the
28
mind and of hypocrisy. " (v. 47)
3. The scripture says that merit increases.
The ancient masters say: It is in the nature of things that merit
increases when persons who have received a gift utilize this gift: by reason of the qualities of these persons (dhyana, absorption of benevolence, etc. ), by reason of the benevolence that they get out of the gift for themselves and for all creatures, the mental series of the givers, be they of bad or of neutral minds, is found to be perfumed by the volition of giving which has for its object the person who receives: their series undergo a subtle ascending transformation and arrives at the state where they are finally capable of bringing forth many results. It is in this sense that the text says, "Merit increases in an intense and un-
29 interrupted manner, merit adds to itself/*
Karma 563
? 564 Chapter Four _ _
But how does one explain the increase of merit in the case of nonmaterial meritorious work?
[The mental series,transforms itself] by reason of the repetition of volitions having for their object [the Tathagata or the Sravakas]. Even during dreams these volitions are linked together.
On the contrary, we do not see how the [Vaibhasikas,] partisans of an avijnapti, can explain the growth of merit in the case of nonmaterial meritorious work. [This does not consist of bodily or vocal action, vijnapti, but merely the joy experienced with regard to the Tathagata or the Sravakas; it does not consist of an absorptioa Now according to the Vaibhasikas, the avijnapti can only give rise to the vijnapti or to an absorptioa Hence it is impossible here. ]
But according to other masters, [certain Sautrantikas,] in the case also of material meritorious works, merit proceeds from the repetition of a volition having for its object [the person who receives. ]
But this opinion is inadmissible in light of the scripture which says, "When an energetic Bhiksu, endowed with morality, possessor of good dharmas, eats the alms of a donor, he then enters into and dwells in the
absorption called 'infinites' (good-will, etc. ), and by reason of this fact
there is certainly produced for the donor an out-flowing of merit, and
30
out-flowing of good and prosperity. " Now does the donor whose
merit thus continues to increase, have a special volition whose object is the person who receives? [We should thus prefer the opinion of the first masters:] in the case of material meritorious works, the merit proceeds from a transformation of the series [of the donor by reason of the qualities of the person who receives. ]
4. According to the Vaibhasikas, if the avijnapti does not exist, he who has an action accomplished by another will not be endowed with the course of action ("path-of-action," karmapatha). When an emissary charged with murder accomplishes the murder, it is in the nature of things that the mental series of the author of the instigation will submit to a certain subtle transformation by virtue of which his series will bear a result later. This holds likewise when one acts for oneself; when the courseofaction(murder,etc. )isachieved,atthismoment theseries undergoes a transformatioa This transformation is called "course of action," and consequently the person whose series is transformed is endowed with the course of action--for the effect (transformation of
? the series) receives the name which belongs more properly to the cause (course of action),--and this transformation is called bodily or vocal accordingly as it results from an action of the body or the voice. It is by virtue of these same principles that the partisans of avijnapti consider the avijnapti as a bodily or vocal course of action.
31
The Bhadanta (Vibhasa, TD 27, p. 6l7al8) proves in a different
manner the nonexistence of avijnapti: "A person is touched by the sin of murder by reason of a tritemporal volition with regard to the skandhas which constitute a living being (iv. 73), that is, when he thinks, 1 shall
e
kill;Ikill;heiskilled*"[Th courseofactioniscompletewhenthereis
preparatory action, principal action, and consecutive action, consisting solely of cetana, iv. 68c]
But this triple volition does not necessarily bring about the achievement of the course of action, for, according to the theory of the Bhadanta, there would be a mortal sin (iv. 97) for the child who says, "my mother has been murdered," if she has not in fact been killed by the emissary charged with the murder.
Nevertheless all this exercise of volition, "I shall kill, I kill, he is
killed" applies only to the person who kills: the intention of the
32 Bhadanta is to refer to this type of murder.
***
But, [ask the Sarvastivadins,] why do you, in your antipathy, deny the existence of the avijnapti and yet admit a transformation of the mental series (ii. 36c-d)?
[In truth, avijnapti, a doctrine of the Sarvastivadins, and the transformation of the mental series, a thesis of the Sautrantikas, are both equally difficult to understand;] I thus have no antipathy [for these doarines. ] But, to say that there arises at the moment of the achieving of the course of action by a bodily operation dependent on a mind, a certain dharma, called avijnapti, [in him who has ordered the course of action,] either from the mind of him who has ordered, or separate from the body of him who has accomplished the murder, is a hypothesis that cannot satisfy us; but to say that there is produced at the moment of the achievement of the course of action by an operation ordered by a certain person, a transformation of the mental series of this person, is a
Karma 565
? hypothesis that satisfies us. And it also satisfies us that the result arises from a transformation of the series and not from an avijnapti.
[Take into account also the arguments enumerated above:] "if the vijnapti does not exist, [how could there be avijnapti! ", "The avijnapti consists solely in no longer doing a certain action," "the avijnapti cannot depend on past primary elements. "]
5. The dharmdyatana is not defined as nonmateriaL The response to this objection is as has been given above: there is an invisible rupa free from destruaion, forming part of the dharmdyatana: this is not the avijnapti; this is a rupa which is the object of the absorption and which arises from the force of the absorptioa
6. The Way, say the Vaibhasikas, would not have eight parts.
How does the saint, when he has attained the Way, [when he sees or meditates on the Truths,] possess correct speech, action, and livelihood? Does he pronounce correct speech, act in a correct manner, and correctly ask for the robes of a monk?
[Such is not our thought, answer the Sarvastivadins. ] In the Path, the saint takes possession of certain pure avijnaptis, so that,Vhen he leaves the contemplation, it is by the force of these pure avijnaptis that he produces correct speech, actions, and livelihood, and does not produce incorrect speech, actions, and livelihood A cause takes the name of its result: thus speech, action and livelihood are designated as avijnapti.
If this is so, why not accept my theory? There is no avijnapti; but the saint, when he finds himself in the Path, takes possession of a certain
33
intention (dsaya) and of a certain personality (asraya) so that, when he
comes out of this contemplation, by reason of the force of these two factors he henceforth produces correct speech, actions and livelihood One gives to the cause (dsaya and asraya) the name of their result; and we can thus affirm that the Path possesses eight parts.
According to another opinion, the parts of the Path solely consist of non-commission. What is non-commission? The person who is in absorption acquires, through the force of the Path, definite absolute abstention (akarananiyama, vi. 33a-b). This abstention, which is ac- quired having the pure Path as its support, is pure. This is a part of the Path.
Without doubt, the part (correct speech, etc. ) is not a "thing"
? (dravya), being only abstention: but these are not the only real and distina things which constitute the dharmas; there are for example, the
34
eight worldly dharmas; possession and non-possession; glory and
non-glory; praise and blame; pleasure and suffering. Non-possession of clothes, of food, etc. , is not a thing. (Anguttara, iv. 157, Digha, iii. 260) 7. If the avijnapti does not exist, say the Vaibhasikas, the Pratimoksa
discipline would disappear.
One refutes this objection according to the same principles, by
making a state out of the force of the intention. Discipline is volition which, after it has been translated into the positive action (vidhi) of abstaining from transgression, into the pledge of no longer committing transgression, arrests bad actions and disciplines the body and the voice: the Pratimoksa discipline should be understood in this manner.
The Vaibhasikas object that, if the Pratimoksa discipline is volition, the monk who thinks a thought other than this thought of volition would cease being "disciplined," for he does not then possess the volition which disciplines.
This objection is worthless. In fact, the mental series is perfumed in such a way that, when a thought of transgression starts to appear, the memory of the vow undertaken also appears: the volition of abstention is then found to be present.
8. And this volition has the characteristic of a dike. When one is obliged not to commit transgression, one remembers this obligation, shame (hrt, ii. 32) is present, and one constrains oneself in such a manner that one does not violate morality.
In your system, on the contrary, if immorality is dammed up by an avijnapti independent of memory, then even a person who has a faulty memory would not be able to commit a transgression, since the avijnapti is always there.
Let us stop this discussion here. The Vaibhasikas say that there exists a certain substantial thing (dravya), sui generis, which is avijnaptirupa.
We have seen (i. llb) that the avijnapti arises dependent (upaddya) on the primary elements: the question is then posed whether it derives from the same primary elements which are the support of the vijnapti, that is, the primary elements of the body through which the action termed vijnapti (iv. p. 3,33) is accomplished; or if it derives from other
Karma 567
? 35 primary elements.
The avijnapti derives from primary elements different from those
which serve as the support for the vijnapti: for it is impossible that one
and the same complex of four primary elements would produce both a
subtle, derived rupa,--the avijnapti--, and at the same time a gross, 36
***
The vijnapti is simultaneous to the primary elements from whence it derives; is such also the case for the avijnapti?
The general rule is that all derived rupa is simultaneous to its primary elements. But certain derived rupa,--of the present and the future,--derive from past primary elements:
4c-d. From the first moment, the avijnapti of Kamadhatu arises derived from past primary elements.
The moment the avijnapti arises, it arises derived from primary elements simultaneous to its arising. From this first moment on, avijnapti of the sphere of Kamadhatu--in opposition to the avijnapti arisen from the dhyana, and pure avijnapti (p. 32)--arises, that is, it continues to be reborn, being derived (upadaya) from the same primary elements of the first moment, which are now past: these past primary elements constitute, from the second moment onward, the support of the avijnapti, for they are the cause of its pravrtti, they are its projecting cause; the primary elements simultaneous to each of the moments from the second moment onward are the support of the avijnapti, for they are the cause of its anuvrtti, they are its supporting cause. In the same way, the hand that has hurled the wheel and the ground that the supports the wheel, are the causes, respectively, of the pravrtti and the anuvrtti of the movement of the wheel (see p. 576).
***
To which sphere,--Kamadhatu and the Four Dhyanas--do the primary elements belong, from whence the bodily and vocal aaions of the different spheres derive?
derived rupa, the vijnapti.
? 5a-b. When impure, bodily and vocal action derive from the primary elements of the sphere to which they belong.
Bodily and vocal actions of Kamadhatu derive from the primary, elements of Kamadhatu, and so on to the bodily and vocal actions of the Fourth Dhyana which derives from primary elements of the Fourth Dhyana.
5c.
