These normative rules urge or measure us; our
ontological
creation ofourselves and our world within language measures orjudges language.
Constructing a Replacement for the Soul - Bourbon
Pollockshiftstheproblemofconsciousnessorqualitativefeelingintosome magical processing.
How do these interpretations produce new effects?
Or how do we invest ourselves in all o f the complicated ways we do in our correlation between internal sensors and our picture ofthe world?
I don't think we should find Pollock's picture satisfactory.
Whatever the merits ofthis model ofthe mind (and there are many), it leaves us with a puzzle. So far I have described only two kinds of meta-languages, which seem to describe the limits o f the other, but whose relation remains unclear: a language o f cause
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described vaguely here by different versions of Oscar, call this Darwinian engineering, and a language o f interpretation, commonly used in literary analysis, asking about meaning, anddeterminingthedistinctionsbetweenanimateandinanimate,etc. Butthisinterpretive language undermines its own status by showing how its distinctions and categories are so unstable as to be senseless without ontological limits o f exactly the sort described by science. But these scientific limits are not foundations precisely because we cannot get outside o f our interpretations. Thus these languages o f science and literature speak in two directionsatthesamething. Ithinkthisisourinheritanceandtheforgingofanother language that includes both of these languages is the underlying although unrealized promise o f AI, and I think our problem.
1Translated and found in Kenny, "Wittgenstein on the Nature of Philosophy", 14.
2 In Being and Time.
3 Is Thoreau's jump from anyone's embodied, particular eyes to God's eyes justified by the same trick that Heidegger uses to move from Dasein-as-mine to its identity as Being-with in Chapter IV of Being and Time! The kind of holistic, non-formalizable link between particular and universal that Heidegger constructs both elucidates a critical dependence between meaning and existence, while at the same time offeringthegreatestresistancetothepossibilityofembodyingaconstructedmind. Daseinbecomesa soul. Ibelieve,however,thatHeidegger's"soul''isfalse. (Howisitpossibletotalkaboutfalsesouls? ) But I am nevertheless left with investigating the intransigent existence and meaning of our use of, belief in,andneedforwhatHeideggerpointsto. Ifconceptsarenotthings,thenwhatarethey: howisit possible for us to function at a level o f abstraction beyond materiality?
4 Cora Diamond describes what it means to understand the answer to a Sphiax-like riddle:
[T]o know the solution to a riddle is not merely to know o f something that thought o f in some way or other it is the solution: you have to know how it is the solution, If you are simply told that man is the solution to the Sphinx's riddle, but do not understand why--ifi that is, you do not understnad why man is supposed to have four legs in the morning and so on--you are in the positoion of someone who 'knows' that every equation has a solution without any idea o fhow that may be arrived at (270)
5This is, of course, not the end of the opportunities for analysis.
6 P. M. S. Hacker. Insight and Illusion: Themes in the Philosophy o f Wittgenstein. 1Neuronscanbeintwostates:excitatoryorinhibatory;onoroff:thustheyaredigitalcircuits, by stimulation a neuron reaches an activation potential and fires. The energy of this firing is not variable-- so no information can be encoded in the strength of the output--only by the fact of the firing and in, what doeschange,therateoffiring. Greaterstimulationofaneuronincreasestherateoffiring. Thereissome confusionwhetherthebraindescribedinthiswayislikeadigitalorananologcomputer, digitalswitches (or in computer science these are called logic gates) are like digital clocks, they are in one state or
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another- analog switches are like a clock with two hands--the changes in rate describe an analog relation. Itdoesn'tmatterforus--buttheassumptionbymostAItheoristsandcognitivescientistsisthat it is digital. .
8 This might be a way o f explaining how replicants in the movie Blade Runner can generate emotions even though they are designed not to have any.
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3
Romantic Fragments and Modernist Machines
InalettertohissisterandbrotherKeatsimaginessoulsasmadenotgiven. This making proceeds through what is given: the world as circumstance and the mind as intelligenceandmemoryandemotion. Whywouldapictureofthemindexpressa theology or a moral stance? "The point at which Man may arrive is as far as the parallel state in inanimate nature and not further" (326). 1The inanimate is the limit o f human happiness. Thislimitengenderstheworldasa"valeofSoul-making",rewritingthe Biblical "a vale o f tears. " In support for this inanimate limit, Keats animates a rose with sensation, in order to tell a tale of crucifixion:
For instance suppose a rose to have sensation, it blooms on a beautiful
morning, it enjoys itself, but then comes a cold wind, a hot sun--it cannot escape it, it cannot destroy its annoyances--they are as native to the world as itself--no more can man be happy in spite, the worldly elements will prey upon his
nature. (326)
The unity between the divine and human, between fundamental ontological difference, is twisted toward biology, into a unity between rose and human. In order for Keats to tell the story of our inhabitation and involvement in the world as a limitation on our happiness he endows a rose with a conscious o f that which threatens not its consciousness specifically, butitslife. Sucharoseisnotnativetoanyrealworld,butevenitsfantasticsentience
Notes for this chapter are on page 102
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does not free it from its containment and belonging to a world described by power, not determined by the roses intentions.
The rose slips from the perception ofsensation to an interpretation ofthe meaning ofthese sensations as 'annoyances'. Even to evaluate negative stimuli as annoyances implies a complex o f responses that involves the possibilities o f happiness and hope, a language ofintention in which the consciousness or the desires or beliefs or values ofthe rosestructureitsrelationtotheworld. Therosefunctionsasarosewithinasystemof opposedintentions. Intention,inthiscaseannoyanceorhappiness,isafunctionofthe systematic relation between the rose and the world, and is therefore in neither. The world is animated and the intentionality o f our involvement in the world is determined and guaranteedbythisanimation. Coleridgepicturesthisin"TheEolianHarp":
And what if all of animated nature
Be but organic Harps diversely framed,
That tremble into thought, as o'er them sweeps Plastic and vast, one intellectual breeze,
At once the Soul of each, and God of all?
Thought is generated as a consequence of our involvement with dominant non-human forces;intentionfunctionswithinthesystemofworldandbeings. Ourintentioncanbe generated by reducing ourselves to things--and then displacing intention into the environmentthroughwhichthisintentionbecomesvisible. Weenterintothedominionof arbitrary forces to the degree that we can let the rose stand for ourselves, allegorize ourselvesasusedbytheworld. Inthissensewearealwaysinvisibleinthisallegory. We
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exist as nothing more than our own interpretations o f ourselves through our language or actions. Allegories describe and constitute a limit to our knowing ourselves.
Consequently, it is a mistake to imagine that these allegories can describe our becominganything. Theycanonlydescribehowourinterpretationschange. Whenthey describe change they describe it teleologically, as if the allegory were a machine. Even if wearemachineswefunctiononlypartiallythroughourinterpretations. 'Causation'hasa particular grammar that overlaps but is not continuous with 'interpretation'. Wittgenstein at one point investigates how the word 'reading' describes how we read words into speech, how words 'cause' our reading, not our understanding o f what we read.
But why do you say that we felt a causal connection? Causation is surely something established by experiments, by observing a regular concomitance of eventsforexample. SohowcouldIsaythatIfeltsomethingwhichisestablished by experiment? (it is indeed true that observation o f regular concomitances is not the only way we establish causation. ) One might rather say, I feel that the letters are the reason why I read such-and-such. For if someone asks me "Why do you read such-and-such? "--I justify my reading by the letters which are there. (PI? 169)
Whatever a causal connection is, it is not a 'feeling'. "We imagine that a feeling enables us to perceive as it were a connecting mechanism between the look of the word and the soundthatweutter"(PI? 170). Ourfeelingisaninterpretationafterthefactofour reading. Itisthecasethatwereadwords,andthusthatthereisacausallinkbetween
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these words and our reading. But we do not 'know' this through introspection, nor through feeling ourselves reading.
Is Keats confusing the language o f causation for that o f interpretation when he claims that "[t]hen you will find out the use ofthe world . . . [is] I say 'Soul-making"'? What kind of making is this "soul-making"? To what degree should we read poetic soul- making, a "Soul or Intelligence destined to possess the sense o f Identity," as theology, psychology, hyperbole, anachronistic, animistic, metaphoric? Keats configures the world as meaningful through our use o f it. Soul-making is how we use the world. Do we know or experience the world separate from this, or any use? The world acts against us as a limit, and in this uses us. This use does not imply the intention o f the world so much as an interpretationofaneffect. Keatsreinterpretsthislimitingforceasthecontextinand
through which we make a 'soul'. Thus the interaction between the domain of what is, nature, and the functioning o f our intentionality produces a surrogate in the 'soul' for both ourintentionality(oridentityorselfor. . . )andtheworldaslimit. Descartesseparates consciousness from living: ". . I, perceiving that the principle by which we are nourished is wholly distinct from that by means of which we think, have declared that the name soul when used for both is equivocal. . . I consider the mind not as part o f the soul, but as the whole o f that soul which thinks" {Philosophical Works, 2. 210). Keats in effect stitches
together this separation with the soul. Self-reflection and self-generation as descriptions of both consciousness and of animation constitutes a theology. But this does not answer the question about the ontological status ofthe soul or ofthis theology. What this does
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show is that we respond to this problem by translating ontological questions into semantic questions. Thisisagrammaticalpebble-game.
Keats' souls begin as intelligences, "sparks of divinity . . . atoms of perception-- they know and they see and they are pure, in short they are God. " A soul arises only when an intelligence becomes itself, that is, acquires an identity. Keats asks "How then are Souls to be made? "
This is effected by three grand materials acting the one upon the other for a series o f years. These three materials are the Intelligence--the human heart (as distinguished from intelligence or Mind) and the World or Elemental space suited for the proper action ofMind and Heart on each other for the purpose of forming the Soul or Intelligence destined to possess the sense of Identity. (326-27)
Keats describes the soul and its making as if it were a theory or a recipe, which structurally looks as much like Hegel as like Freud. What can this theory do? What can the recipe create? The problem, for Keats, is that the world uses us, and we must somehowusetheworld. Technologywouldofferonewayofdiminishingthepowerof nature to annoy us; but other human beings are as native to the world as storms and neitherseemsultimatelycontrollable. Onekindofhappinesscanbeincreasedif fundamental needs are met and disease is eradicated. Intelligence, phenomenal
consciousness or awareness, what we see, and judgment, how we know, alters the Heart, the 'Mind's Bible", a hornbook, the Mind's experience'; in turn, the Heart, "the text from which the Mind or Intelligence sucks its identity, alters the Mind. Intelligence must be transformed into a soul through a suffering and experience within the world:
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I will call the world a School instituted for the purpose of teaching little children to read -- I will call the human heart the horn Book used in that school anditshornbook. DoyounotseehownecessaryaWorldofPainsandtroubles is to school an Intelligence and make it a soul? (327)
This is a picture through which to generate humanness beyond the ontological limits of the inanimate and o f circumstances. What kind o f theoretical weight can such a picture sustain? WeshouldnotlookfortheIntelligencenortheHeartinourmindorbody. This picture, while it describes interactions, only mimics a mechanism. The movement from mind to soul is internal, a process of moral instruction and selfconversion. If this is a reduction o f a theological commitment to the ontological status o f the soul, can we say that in reducing it to a moral ideal it works only as a metaphor? What is growing here? if not a real soul then the imagination, the mental, our being as what? The world or poetry becomes a moral laboratory, a realization or transformation of our potential selves into greater degrees o f actuality.
Mind through its confrontation and interaction with the inanimate limits o f the world and the limits of self, exposed in suffering, failing, desire, and self-reflection, determinesitselfasanethicalstance:asoul. Ifthisisnotaphilosophyofmindthenwhat is the function o f the symbolic language that invokes this philosophy? Its function, I believe, is to offer a particular kind of foundation for a morality that need not appeal to Godnortotherelativisticvaluesofaparticularcommunity. Thisfoundationis simultaneously aesthetic and ontological: a theory about how we inhabit language as if both language, our inhabitation, and 'we' or 'I' are real. The interpretative and the
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constitutiveareconfusedasanIdentity. Thelinkbetweentheoriesofmindandaesthetics follows from this function. This is why theories o f aesthetic justification attempt to justify art by attempting to establish the truth-status of figurative language or fantasy. This defenseoftenarguesforamoraleffectgeneratedbyfiction. HarryBergerJr. thinksthat "the great problem confronting classical thought was that it did not quite know how to keep the order it assumed as objective reality from looking like a projection" (10). This is why Aristotle's poetics, in which truth is recovered, reworks his theory o f perception in
De Anima as simultaneously a work of making and knowing. The problem for the Romantics, I think, is that they did not know how the unity o f experience determining the world as a world could be distinguished from their interpretations o f the world.
In Keats theory the Soul is an analogue for art: "so let me be thy choir" ('"Ode to Psyche"). The question 'what justifies this analogue? ' seems to demand answering the question 'what is the ontological status of this "theory" of mind? ' I take this question to beawayofaskinghowweinhabitlanguage. Keats'theoryofthebecomingofthe intelligence (through its interaction with the Heart and circumstance [the world]) into a Soul stabilized as a self-possessed identity is a theory ofjustification directed at the question 'how we can live? '.
Geoffrey Hill re-constructs this soul-making as a means o f redemption in his claim that Coleridge's "To William Wordsworth" functions as "the private utterance of highly organized art can for a while stabilize the self-dissipating brilliance o f the listener's mind, that is, Coleridge's mind, the mind that is concentrating upon that very diffusion" (12). How does 'mind' 'stabilize' in "the private utterance of highly organized art'? "Private
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utterance" does not mean 'private meaning', susceptible to the force o f Wittgenstein's private language 'argument', the absurdity o f a language functioning as a language without public criteria determining the meaning o f words from one moment to the next. The force o f 'private utterance' attaches to what it means for someone to be 'stabilized' in language. The specialness of aesthetic language lies not in its form, but in its utterance or its use as language standing for, or acting as the expression of, a 'mind' ('mind' here remainsablackbox). Anexpressionofmindisnotatheoryofmind. Rather,itisa temporary identity that allows a fiction or a figure to seduce us into a moral stance towards ourselves as if toward the world, or towards the worlds as if towards ourselves: "a poet can transfigure his own dissipation by a metaphor that perfectly comprehends it" (13). This moral stance is an interpretive stance ('this means x'), where we allow the interpretation to constitute ourselves or a text.
This metaphoric comprehension entangles the poet in the very language in which hefailstoactorconfiguretheworldorhimselfasmeaningful. Wecanuselanguageto describe the world within systems of values (the logic of a language game); the application of the distinctions determining any language game, however, is continually subject to normativerestrictions,criteriaoflegitimacy,andontologicaljustification. Thecriteria determining legitimate use, while grounded in social and linguistic conventions, continuously require ontological support justifying the actuality of the distinctions and entities indicated or expressed within a language. In other words we can use language as a self-contained descriptive system of values or distinctions, but we can only enter language, that is, constitute ourselves and the world through the justifications o f both the
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application and the existence o f these distinctions and values. (This is not to say we do not make mistakes, but that there are limits. I can, for example imagine that rocks rolling downmountainsaregods. IfIaminthepathofsucharock,Icanstandthereand embracethisgodinamomentofexquisitehappiness. Mylifemightbemoremeaningful than someone who thinks rocks are rocks, and they are better avoided when they reach a certainvelocity. IfIclaimtherock-as-godpictureisequivalenttotherocks-are-hard
picture I have made a grammatical mistake. The rocks-are-hard school is superior if ones goal is to stay alive. The rock-god school might be superior if my goal is to die meaningfully in a mountain accident. Relativistic arguments often make confused comparisons. Inthiscasephysicsactsasalimitonhowsuccessfulabeliefsystemisasa survival system. The question remains: is it better to live a life o f fictional fantasy that may be meaningful, or a life o f scientific realism that may not be? . These may not be opposites in any real sense, but their application is fraught with confusions). Ontological
justification can describe the limits o f our involvement, and the meaning o f this involvement, in our language.
Poetry works through configuring ontological justification as a problem o f interpretation. This formulation can justify Ransom's vague description o f poetry as "ontological or metaphysical maneuver" (The World's Body, 347). In poetic use the demand for ontological justification appears as a demand for recognition, to use the creation ofmeaning as an expression ofself. The constitution or the making ofourselves marks our expressions o f value as expressions o f power; these expressions cannot supersede the systematic normative organization and functioning o f language, where the
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accuracy o f statements becomes an acting through, agreement with, and description o f language. Our failure or success within these normative rules cannot be mediated through our self-constructions, but only by the determining structures o f society, language, biology.
These normative rules urge or measure us; our ontological creation ofourselves and our world within language measures orjudges language. We can forgive our ontological failures but never our failures in clarity. Hill, quoting Chesterton's study of
Dickens says, "'a saint after repentance will forgive himselffor a sin; a man about town willneverforgivehimselfforafauxpas"'(7). Artisaconstructionwithinthe'density'
o f language, the normative resistance o f words and the incommensurability between different concepts, ideas, meanings, and language games. This poetic making delivers both the poet and our poetic responses "up to judgment"(14). Hill divides this judgment up between a (1) judgment o f our "empirical guilt" accompanying our possible failures and faux pas within the normative criteria of our language and social life and a (2) judgment of the "Sin" that Karl Barth understands as the 'specific gravity of human nature as such' (15). 6 This 'empirical guilt', or the normative force of language, has its own weight. "[I]t is at the heart o f this 'heaviness' that poetry must do its atoning work, this heaviness which is simultaneously the 'density' o f language and the 'specific gravity o f human nature'" (15).
The failure of clarity, the difficulty requiring interpretation in Finnegans Wake (and in a different way in Philosophical Investigations) forces the reader to mediate the normative rules through ontological justification (the radical need to determine the ontological status of its language as the exercise of its art), and to mediate the constitutive
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force of ontological justification by the normative rules of our language (its humor, what Wittgenstein calls grammatical jokes). The normative rules o f language can function like the laws o f nature (the descriptions o f form as quantity) and our ontological justifications are judgments about how we function within these laws. Together these rules and
judgments constitute us within language and describes our intentionality, seemingly our qualitative mental relations. Finnegans Wake, therefore, can describe our constitution as humanbeingsasafunctionofacommentaryaboutitsownlanguage. Ournormative language while constituting the possibilities of meaning available to us can not function ontologically, that is, we can exist within and through these possibilities, but we can only exist at all, through the ontological or creative pressure attending the kinds o f ontological
judgments we make about the normative status of our language games, for example, 'Do I love you? ' 'Can I love? ' 'Is love possible? ' This explains why ordinary criteria can fail; why we are continually tempted by skepticism. 2 If I rewrite Hill's formulation of our deliverance up to judgment, I can suggest a vague canopy to include this play between ontology and epistemology as a moral crisis: "in the constraint of shame the [Wakean\ poet and [grammatical philosopher] [are] free to discover both the 'menace' and the atoning power o f his own art" (17).
Our survival in language requires an act of will. We must, however, take responsibility for the governance of our will, and not cede or abrogate our moral involvement within language to the confusion ofuse which distorts and hides this moral dimension within the confusions and entanglements between language games o f power
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(ideology)disguisedasmoraljudgments. Somethinglikethissensemotivates Wittgenstein to remark his distrust oflanguage:
Human beings are profoundly enmeshed in philosophical--i. e. grammatical-- confusions. They cannot be freed without first being extricated from the extraordinary variety o f associations which hold them prisoner. Y ou have as it were to reconstitute their entire language. --But this language grew up as it did becausehumanbeingshad--andhave--thetendencytothinkinthisway. So you can only succeed in extricating people who live in an instinctive rebellion against language; you cannot help those whose entire instinct is to live in the herd
which has created this language as its own proper mode o f expression. (MS 213,
? 423; quoted in Kenny, "Wittgenstein on the Nature of Philosophy", 16).
Poetry and philosophy both constitute kinds of rebellion against language. This distrust of language constitutes a religious stance, a configuration of oneself as anything or anyone in relation to a negative limit which can determine our meaning and our world. What is it like to be trapped within a system of meaning within which you cannot escape but which you distrust? Finnegans Wake is a comic version o f Kafka's The Castle.
Coleridge, commenting on the mental schema articulated in Wordsworth's Prelude, redescribes the reciprocal relation between the senses and the world that constructs the mind. Following what he believes was "partly suggested by me . . . He
[Wordsworth] was to treat man as man--a subject o f eye, ear, touch, and taste, in contact with external nature, and informing the senses from the mind, and not compounding a mind out ofthe senses"(188). This could seem a conquest ofa world, or the construction
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o f a Khananite pleasure palace after such a conquest. Eliot, in 'Gerontion,' finds such a
world "a decayed house", where "In depraved May, dogwood and chestnut, flowering judas,/ To be eaten, to be divided, to be drunk/ Among the whispers"; where these whispers, these "vacant shuttles weave the wind" into a riddle about the consequences of
knowledge ["After such knowledge, what forgiveness? "]. Our ordinary needs eat, divide and drink the world into metaphors (cliches: whispers, weave the wind) that signal the loss, consumption and disappearance ofthe world. The organic world symbolizes its own loss. Eliotdescribesamoralterror,akindofknowledgethatcanappearasaskepticism generated from failing senses, but I think it is more likely a realization that a soul can fragment through a kind of self-reflection in which the indifference ofthe world and our own indifference generates a specific terror. Poetry can enact this terror as what we are. Thisstance-indifferentterror--isneitherexistentialnorstrictlyspeakingmoral. Eliot's poetry describes this terror as a realization that the soul (and our demand for redemption) and subjectivity (at least our speaking T ) describes the subjunctive: we live counterfactually. Eliot does not discover this. The possibilities of either idealism or modem skepticism, when understood as moral responses to scientific knowing, outlines
the soul, subject, self as subjunctive. (This does not mean the soul, subject, self are constructed; they may be given as perpetual possibility; making a soul or a mind follows as apossibilityofthispossibility). Eliot'sdiscoveryisoftheterrorgraspingandattending modemself-reflection. Heexposespartlywhatthis'subjunctive'means,teachingusthe consequence ofthis knowledge (ifit is 'knowledge'). Words describe ideal forms that our descriptions belie into algorithms of loss:
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To lose beauty in terror, terror in inquisition.
I have lost my passion: why should I need to keep it Since what is kept must be adulterated?
I have lost my site, smell, hearing, taste, and touch: How should I use them for your closer contact?
Age and terror and revulsion and the failure of our knowing and knowledge, the realization that not only can the mind and the world be confused for each other but that a failure o f courage, sense, or meaning can tempt us to deny our mind. Instinct, the algorithm describing the non-human, and our dying, the algorithm o f loss, sketch the limits ofour knowledge ofboth ofthese as despair: "What will the spider do,/ Suspend its operations, will the weevil Delay? De Bailhache, Fresca, Mrs. Cammel, whirled/ Beyond the circuit o f the shuddering Bear/ In fractured atoms. " The constellation Ursus Major can mean a " shuddering Bear", a promised stability o f meaning that cannot preserve the atoms ofanyone'sbody. MeaningdescribesthelimitbeyondwhichNothingbeckons.
For the Ancient Mariner the periodicity of the stars measures our human needs as our involvement in the world as a promise of a home. Hill offers Coleridge's prose gloss of the Ancient Mariner's loneliness as "an outstandingly beautiful image of the attainability of atonement":
In his loneliness and fixedness he yeameth towards the journeying Moon, and the stars that still sojourn, yet still move onward; and every where the blue sky belongs to them, and is their appointed rest, and their native country and their
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own natural homes, which they enter unannounced, as lords that are certainly
expected and yet there is a silent joy at their arrival.
This description has the coherence o f a poem, a fragment: not a fragment o f the world it describes, nor of the longing it evokes but of a kind of self-reflection that the glosses accompanying the poem form on the poem, and in this case a coherence o f self-sufficiency that ironically refers to the complex worlds that include the poem, Coleridge, the heavens, us, the future ad infinitum. This is the promise o f the Romantic fragment. These fragments are a profound attempt, even in the anti-Newtonianism ofBlake, to configure
poetry as Schlegel describes Romanticism as kind o f aesthetic-moral formula describing itself and all worlds in which it would or will make sense:
"The whole history of modem poetry is a running commentary on the following brief philosophical text: all art should become science, and all science art; poetry and philosophy should be made one" (Critical Fragment 1 1 5).
The different ways of finding a text speaking to us, for us, at us, allegorizing us allows us to displace forms o f skepticism into fantasies o f intelligibility which animate the text into various forms o f animism. As a form o f animism, and, therefore, as a kind o f romanticism attempting to link science and art, the animation o f the text parallels the mechanical, like the animation of dolls, bodies, and clay heads, as if science gave us the truth of what we see, a common sense weeding out visions and spirits. Is this the kind o f animism we find
in Henry Adams' dynamo or in Yeats' Byzantine birds?
In "Byzantium" we are presented with three categories o f being: "Miracle, bird or
golden handiwork". These are what in "Sailing to Byzantium" Yeats called "bodily form".
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"Once out of nature" the poet's voice rejects the form of natural things, the category "bird" in the later poem in order to enter the " artifice of eternity" as an aesthetic form "as Grecian goldsmiths make". This collapse of natural form into artifact is what Wittgenstein, in Investigations, called the sublimation o f the machine into a symbol: where the normative structures o f language, rules, conventions, etc. are confused as the causal structures o f our psychology determining what we actually say. A symbol built out o f this confusion can seem to stabilize our linguistic practices. The structure o f a symbol so constitutedoutofthisstabilityisdeterminedasaformofidentity. Thus,Wittgenstein writes in the Tractatus:
Only the proposition has sense; only in the context o f a proposition has a name meaning. (3. 3)
Every part of a proposition which characterizes its sense I call an expression
(a symbol).
(The proposition itself is an expression. )
Expressions are everything--essential for the sense o f the proposition-- that propositions can have in common with one another.
An expression characterizes a form and a content. (3. 31)
Identity functions as a metaconcept, or rather as the logical possibility that allows propositions to be decomposed and recharacterized as expressions. In this sense propositions function as expressions when they have a sense, in Frege's picture when they can stand in for each other. This commonality or conceptual identity functions as a repeatability that lies behind and extends the Cartesian idea of animal
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animation as mechanical, a rule-bound persistence, to that of the mind: a picture of the soul as a perpetual motion, or rather expression, machine. This is like the picture o f the soul in Swift's Tale o fa Tub as clothes or the kind of person described by Adams in his preface as "a manikin. . . clothes . . . the same value as any other geometrical figure o f three ormoredimensions,whichisusedforthestudyofrelation"(xxx). ForAdamsthe collapse into the mechanical attends a despair over the virgin's failure, the failure of spirit, to limit, let alone convert, human violence. This renunciation requires that he convert himself into a vision o f mechanical time and identity, into at least a metaphor o f the algorithmic: "Every man with self-respect enough to become effective, if only as a machine, has had to account for himself somehow, and to invent a formula of his own for his universe, if the standard formulas failed" (471-72).
This vision of self-transformation is quite different from what we find in Keats: "Even a Proverb is no proverb to you till your Life has illustrated it. " A proverb in its generality and structure is formulaic. This formula, however, is not applied to the world, but you interpret yourself as expressing it, that is, it becomes a proverb to you only when you can use it to describe your life. "Life" and a "Proverb" articulate incommensurable and irreducible domains, as do picture and text, and thus the aptness o f the word 'illustrate,' as a means o f mapping one domain onto another, as a picture illustrates a text. But what allows ones' life to be such an illustration? This is a question not only of application but of intentionality (the formulaic aspect calls for application: apply this formula across this domain; an application that leads to illustration opens up a problem of intentionality: what exactly is being illustrated? Matisse was commissioned to illustrate
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Joyce'sUlysses. HeproducedaseriesofdrawingsillustratingHomer'sOdyssey,not having bothered to read Joyce's book. What if he had read the book would he have then been able to illustrate it? ) What an illustration picks out in a text is like an interpretation, but its application to the text remains unclear or even tenuous: Is a movie an illustration of a book? Is it a translation ofat least a word, or phrase, or character into another medium? A particular shot in a movie might be an illustration; the musical score might be an illustration; but the movie itself is an interpretation, an attempt to tell not illustrate.
Asking "What does it mean? " leads to interpretation; asking, "What is it like? " leads to illustration. The first gives us a logic or a language we can understand; the other shows us the answer to a riddle.
A proverb is a fragment, as Schlegel called it, a kind o f self-articulating totality pointing, however, beyond itselftoward the world or experience which it describes or to which it can be applied. Schlegel's fragments function organically; they are not analogized into machinery as in Modernism (poetries appealing to Newton under the pressure of further scientific and technological transformations), but, akin to Goethe's conceptualizations ofthe Urphanomen, the ground phenomena, the principle ofform out of which and through which all other forms metamorphosize. This principle of holographic gestalt, organic self-articulation does not describe the mutual identification of ontogenyandphylogeny,butratherthereductionofbeingintoorganicmorphology. For Schlegel this form was the hedgehog:
A Fragment should be like a little work of art, complete in itself and totally separated from the surrounding world like a hedgehog.
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Ein Fragment muss gleich einem kleinem Kunstwerke von der umgebenden Welt ganz abgesondert und in sich selbst vollendet sein wie ein Ingel. (Athenaeum, 206)
Fragments define an holographic ecology: "Fragmentary totality, in keeping with what should be called the logic ofthe hedgehog, cannot be situated in any single point: it is simultaneouslyinthewholeandinthepart. Eachfragmentstandsforitselfandforthat from which it is detached" (The Literary Absolute, 44). Schlegel describes this symbolic function as constituting a mode ofbeing, a function ofa particular kind ofart: "I have expressed a few ideas pointing toward the heart o f things, and have greeted the dawn . . . from my own point ofview. . . Let anyone who knows the road do likewise . . . from his own point ofview. " (Ideas, 155). This is what Blanchot called "a totally new mode of completion" (358), the "demand posited by poetry that it reflect itself and accomplish itself through its reflection . . . poetry no longer wants to be natural spontaneity but solely and absolutely conscious" (353). This requirement displaces the site o f poetry away from the
"poetic work" and towards "the poetic activity" (357). The relationship between consciousness and the world takes place through animation. For human beings this describes knowing as a poetic activity and for the world describes its dynamism. Blanchot describes this as a "mode of completion" that "mobilizes . . . the whole through its interruption and through interruptions various modes" (358). Gasche explains this mode as the consequence o f "a cross-fertilization between the Romantics' practice o f writing andKantiandoctrine,which. . . dealswiththeuniversalconditionsofcompletion"(ix). I will tilt my way to one side of such a characterization of the relation between the two
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senses o f the aesthetic playing out in Kant: the aesthetic as "reflective judgment" (in the Critique o fJudgment) and the aesthetic as the constitutivejudgment determining the relation between concepts and experience (in the Critique o fPure Reason).
Schlegel analogizes the relation between science and art as between the dissipating force ofthe individual mind and the organized rigidity ofa system. The systemic supports the ground o f the real and is thus necessary; the dissipating force o f the mind constitutes the subjectively true and is also necessary. Thus "it's equally fatal for the mind to have a system and to have none. It will simply have to decide to combine the two" (Athenaeum 53). This integration follows by constituting the individual as embryo system, and thus the implication between individual and system follows from phylogenesis: "All individuals are systems at least in embryo and tendency" (Athenaeum 242). Human beings are embedded in the a priori, which functions as a determining system.
The categorical imperative universalizes the individual outside of the semantics of 'morality'. The force ofthis universalizing functions as an 'ought', a necessity determining the moral autonomy of any particular human as the microcosmic version of the universal law. The categorical imperative determines moral necessity "without reference to any purpose", but rather through the "form ofthe action and the principle from which it follows" ("Grounding for the Metaphysics ofMorals", 26). In Kant's picture, moral action measures the distance between someone who acts and rational moral criteria. This distance is measured by the special character o f 'ought' which marks the criterion for action and serves as the motive for action. Kant describes the criterion for moral action in a self-reflexive proverb which appeals to and contains another proverb:
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"Act only according to that maxim whereby you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law' ("Grounding", 30). The embedded proverb divides (1) an action (moral action) into a personal act in a particular situation and (2) an act ofwill universalizing this action. Kant's model for action, therefore, enacts the way of seeing described in Blake's "Auguries o f Innocence" as a description o f moral action:
To see a World in a Grain of Sand,
And a Heaven in a Wild Flower,
Hold Infinity in the palm o f your hand, And Eternity in an hour.
Kant imagines human moral failure to be a failure in the application o f moral precepts. Underlying this assumption is a theological picture translated into a logical problem: how to translate the universal, in which the moral 'ought' and the ontological 'is' are related as a conditional (if x, then y), into the particular contingencies determining human action. Kant's 'is' is not Hume's: Kant's criterion for existence is not grounded in human practice but in the simultaneous demand for individual human moral autonomy (to act and
judge through and as being 'I') and the necessity of a universal moral law. The means by which he accomplishes the translation of the 'I' into the moral universal proceeds through our formal equivalence as human beings within the formal limits o f our identity as agents. Within the categorical imperative this takes the form of a textual self-reflection that in itselfservesasamodelforhumanaction. Thustheproverb"Actonlyaccordingtothat maxim" describes the application of "that maxim". This textual self-reflection functions as a means of application that displaces the implicit 'act as if. . . " in the embedded proverb
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into the initial proverb concerning action. This initial "Act only. . . " assumes that we act outside o f moral commitments (and thus these commitments must be shaped and ordered). (I think this is a skewed picture but I cannot criticize it here).
Because ofthis assumption, however, this new proverb would require a proverb of application ad infinitum. Kant's response is to characterize 'acting' itself as a form of self-reflection: "Actinsuchawaythatyoutreathumanity,whetherinyourownperson or in the person of another, always at the same time as an end, and never as a means" (36). The particular concerns o f any action are dissolved in his designation o f humanity as the defactoobjectofanymoralact. Thisispossiblebecauseanyindividualisalsoanexample of humanity ("whether in your own person or in another").
Whatever the merits ofthis model ofthe mind (and there are many), it leaves us with a puzzle. So far I have described only two kinds of meta-languages, which seem to describe the limits o f the other, but whose relation remains unclear: a language o f cause
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described vaguely here by different versions of Oscar, call this Darwinian engineering, and a language o f interpretation, commonly used in literary analysis, asking about meaning, anddeterminingthedistinctionsbetweenanimateandinanimate,etc. Butthisinterpretive language undermines its own status by showing how its distinctions and categories are so unstable as to be senseless without ontological limits o f exactly the sort described by science. But these scientific limits are not foundations precisely because we cannot get outside o f our interpretations. Thus these languages o f science and literature speak in two directionsatthesamething. Ithinkthisisourinheritanceandtheforgingofanother language that includes both of these languages is the underlying although unrealized promise o f AI, and I think our problem.
1Translated and found in Kenny, "Wittgenstein on the Nature of Philosophy", 14.
2 In Being and Time.
3 Is Thoreau's jump from anyone's embodied, particular eyes to God's eyes justified by the same trick that Heidegger uses to move from Dasein-as-mine to its identity as Being-with in Chapter IV of Being and Time! The kind of holistic, non-formalizable link between particular and universal that Heidegger constructs both elucidates a critical dependence between meaning and existence, while at the same time offeringthegreatestresistancetothepossibilityofembodyingaconstructedmind. Daseinbecomesa soul. Ibelieve,however,thatHeidegger's"soul''isfalse. (Howisitpossibletotalkaboutfalsesouls? ) But I am nevertheless left with investigating the intransigent existence and meaning of our use of, belief in,andneedforwhatHeideggerpointsto. Ifconceptsarenotthings,thenwhatarethey: howisit possible for us to function at a level o f abstraction beyond materiality?
4 Cora Diamond describes what it means to understand the answer to a Sphiax-like riddle:
[T]o know the solution to a riddle is not merely to know o f something that thought o f in some way or other it is the solution: you have to know how it is the solution, If you are simply told that man is the solution to the Sphinx's riddle, but do not understand why--ifi that is, you do not understnad why man is supposed to have four legs in the morning and so on--you are in the positoion of someone who 'knows' that every equation has a solution without any idea o fhow that may be arrived at (270)
5This is, of course, not the end of the opportunities for analysis.
6 P. M. S. Hacker. Insight and Illusion: Themes in the Philosophy o f Wittgenstein. 1Neuronscanbeintwostates:excitatoryorinhibatory;onoroff:thustheyaredigitalcircuits, by stimulation a neuron reaches an activation potential and fires. The energy of this firing is not variable-- so no information can be encoded in the strength of the output--only by the fact of the firing and in, what doeschange,therateoffiring. Greaterstimulationofaneuronincreasestherateoffiring. Thereissome confusionwhetherthebraindescribedinthiswayislikeadigitalorananologcomputer, digitalswitches (or in computer science these are called logic gates) are like digital clocks, they are in one state or
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another- analog switches are like a clock with two hands--the changes in rate describe an analog relation. Itdoesn'tmatterforus--buttheassumptionbymostAItheoristsandcognitivescientistsisthat it is digital. .
8 This might be a way o f explaining how replicants in the movie Blade Runner can generate emotions even though they are designed not to have any.
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3
Romantic Fragments and Modernist Machines
InalettertohissisterandbrotherKeatsimaginessoulsasmadenotgiven. This making proceeds through what is given: the world as circumstance and the mind as intelligenceandmemoryandemotion. Whywouldapictureofthemindexpressa theology or a moral stance? "The point at which Man may arrive is as far as the parallel state in inanimate nature and not further" (326). 1The inanimate is the limit o f human happiness. Thislimitengenderstheworldasa"valeofSoul-making",rewritingthe Biblical "a vale o f tears. " In support for this inanimate limit, Keats animates a rose with sensation, in order to tell a tale of crucifixion:
For instance suppose a rose to have sensation, it blooms on a beautiful
morning, it enjoys itself, but then comes a cold wind, a hot sun--it cannot escape it, it cannot destroy its annoyances--they are as native to the world as itself--no more can man be happy in spite, the worldly elements will prey upon his
nature. (326)
The unity between the divine and human, between fundamental ontological difference, is twisted toward biology, into a unity between rose and human. In order for Keats to tell the story of our inhabitation and involvement in the world as a limitation on our happiness he endows a rose with a conscious o f that which threatens not its consciousness specifically, butitslife. Sucharoseisnotnativetoanyrealworld,butevenitsfantasticsentience
Notes for this chapter are on page 102
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does not free it from its containment and belonging to a world described by power, not determined by the roses intentions.
The rose slips from the perception ofsensation to an interpretation ofthe meaning ofthese sensations as 'annoyances'. Even to evaluate negative stimuli as annoyances implies a complex o f responses that involves the possibilities o f happiness and hope, a language ofintention in which the consciousness or the desires or beliefs or values ofthe rosestructureitsrelationtotheworld. Therosefunctionsasarosewithinasystemof opposedintentions. Intention,inthiscaseannoyanceorhappiness,isafunctionofthe systematic relation between the rose and the world, and is therefore in neither. The world is animated and the intentionality o f our involvement in the world is determined and guaranteedbythisanimation. Coleridgepicturesthisin"TheEolianHarp":
And what if all of animated nature
Be but organic Harps diversely framed,
That tremble into thought, as o'er them sweeps Plastic and vast, one intellectual breeze,
At once the Soul of each, and God of all?
Thought is generated as a consequence of our involvement with dominant non-human forces;intentionfunctionswithinthesystemofworldandbeings. Ourintentioncanbe generated by reducing ourselves to things--and then displacing intention into the environmentthroughwhichthisintentionbecomesvisible. Weenterintothedominionof arbitrary forces to the degree that we can let the rose stand for ourselves, allegorize ourselvesasusedbytheworld. Inthissensewearealwaysinvisibleinthisallegory. We
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exist as nothing more than our own interpretations o f ourselves through our language or actions. Allegories describe and constitute a limit to our knowing ourselves.
Consequently, it is a mistake to imagine that these allegories can describe our becominganything. Theycanonlydescribehowourinterpretationschange. Whenthey describe change they describe it teleologically, as if the allegory were a machine. Even if wearemachineswefunctiononlypartiallythroughourinterpretations. 'Causation'hasa particular grammar that overlaps but is not continuous with 'interpretation'. Wittgenstein at one point investigates how the word 'reading' describes how we read words into speech, how words 'cause' our reading, not our understanding o f what we read.
But why do you say that we felt a causal connection? Causation is surely something established by experiments, by observing a regular concomitance of eventsforexample. SohowcouldIsaythatIfeltsomethingwhichisestablished by experiment? (it is indeed true that observation o f regular concomitances is not the only way we establish causation. ) One might rather say, I feel that the letters are the reason why I read such-and-such. For if someone asks me "Why do you read such-and-such? "--I justify my reading by the letters which are there. (PI? 169)
Whatever a causal connection is, it is not a 'feeling'. "We imagine that a feeling enables us to perceive as it were a connecting mechanism between the look of the word and the soundthatweutter"(PI? 170). Ourfeelingisaninterpretationafterthefactofour reading. Itisthecasethatwereadwords,andthusthatthereisacausallinkbetween
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these words and our reading. But we do not 'know' this through introspection, nor through feeling ourselves reading.
Is Keats confusing the language o f causation for that o f interpretation when he claims that "[t]hen you will find out the use ofthe world . . . [is] I say 'Soul-making"'? What kind of making is this "soul-making"? To what degree should we read poetic soul- making, a "Soul or Intelligence destined to possess the sense o f Identity," as theology, psychology, hyperbole, anachronistic, animistic, metaphoric? Keats configures the world as meaningful through our use o f it. Soul-making is how we use the world. Do we know or experience the world separate from this, or any use? The world acts against us as a limit, and in this uses us. This use does not imply the intention o f the world so much as an interpretationofaneffect. Keatsreinterpretsthislimitingforceasthecontextinand
through which we make a 'soul'. Thus the interaction between the domain of what is, nature, and the functioning o f our intentionality produces a surrogate in the 'soul' for both ourintentionality(oridentityorselfor. . . )andtheworldaslimit. Descartesseparates consciousness from living: ". . I, perceiving that the principle by which we are nourished is wholly distinct from that by means of which we think, have declared that the name soul when used for both is equivocal. . . I consider the mind not as part o f the soul, but as the whole o f that soul which thinks" {Philosophical Works, 2. 210). Keats in effect stitches
together this separation with the soul. Self-reflection and self-generation as descriptions of both consciousness and of animation constitutes a theology. But this does not answer the question about the ontological status ofthe soul or ofthis theology. What this does
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show is that we respond to this problem by translating ontological questions into semantic questions. Thisisagrammaticalpebble-game.
Keats' souls begin as intelligences, "sparks of divinity . . . atoms of perception-- they know and they see and they are pure, in short they are God. " A soul arises only when an intelligence becomes itself, that is, acquires an identity. Keats asks "How then are Souls to be made? "
This is effected by three grand materials acting the one upon the other for a series o f years. These three materials are the Intelligence--the human heart (as distinguished from intelligence or Mind) and the World or Elemental space suited for the proper action ofMind and Heart on each other for the purpose of forming the Soul or Intelligence destined to possess the sense of Identity. (326-27)
Keats describes the soul and its making as if it were a theory or a recipe, which structurally looks as much like Hegel as like Freud. What can this theory do? What can the recipe create? The problem, for Keats, is that the world uses us, and we must somehowusetheworld. Technologywouldofferonewayofdiminishingthepowerof nature to annoy us; but other human beings are as native to the world as storms and neitherseemsultimatelycontrollable. Onekindofhappinesscanbeincreasedif fundamental needs are met and disease is eradicated. Intelligence, phenomenal
consciousness or awareness, what we see, and judgment, how we know, alters the Heart, the 'Mind's Bible", a hornbook, the Mind's experience'; in turn, the Heart, "the text from which the Mind or Intelligence sucks its identity, alters the Mind. Intelligence must be transformed into a soul through a suffering and experience within the world:
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I will call the world a School instituted for the purpose of teaching little children to read -- I will call the human heart the horn Book used in that school anditshornbook. DoyounotseehownecessaryaWorldofPainsandtroubles is to school an Intelligence and make it a soul? (327)
This is a picture through which to generate humanness beyond the ontological limits of the inanimate and o f circumstances. What kind o f theoretical weight can such a picture sustain? WeshouldnotlookfortheIntelligencenortheHeartinourmindorbody. This picture, while it describes interactions, only mimics a mechanism. The movement from mind to soul is internal, a process of moral instruction and selfconversion. If this is a reduction o f a theological commitment to the ontological status o f the soul, can we say that in reducing it to a moral ideal it works only as a metaphor? What is growing here? if not a real soul then the imagination, the mental, our being as what? The world or poetry becomes a moral laboratory, a realization or transformation of our potential selves into greater degrees o f actuality.
Mind through its confrontation and interaction with the inanimate limits o f the world and the limits of self, exposed in suffering, failing, desire, and self-reflection, determinesitselfasanethicalstance:asoul. Ifthisisnotaphilosophyofmindthenwhat is the function o f the symbolic language that invokes this philosophy? Its function, I believe, is to offer a particular kind of foundation for a morality that need not appeal to Godnortotherelativisticvaluesofaparticularcommunity. Thisfoundationis simultaneously aesthetic and ontological: a theory about how we inhabit language as if both language, our inhabitation, and 'we' or 'I' are real. The interpretative and the
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constitutiveareconfusedasanIdentity. Thelinkbetweentheoriesofmindandaesthetics follows from this function. This is why theories o f aesthetic justification attempt to justify art by attempting to establish the truth-status of figurative language or fantasy. This defenseoftenarguesforamoraleffectgeneratedbyfiction. HarryBergerJr. thinksthat "the great problem confronting classical thought was that it did not quite know how to keep the order it assumed as objective reality from looking like a projection" (10). This is why Aristotle's poetics, in which truth is recovered, reworks his theory o f perception in
De Anima as simultaneously a work of making and knowing. The problem for the Romantics, I think, is that they did not know how the unity o f experience determining the world as a world could be distinguished from their interpretations o f the world.
In Keats theory the Soul is an analogue for art: "so let me be thy choir" ('"Ode to Psyche"). The question 'what justifies this analogue? ' seems to demand answering the question 'what is the ontological status of this "theory" of mind? ' I take this question to beawayofaskinghowweinhabitlanguage. Keats'theoryofthebecomingofthe intelligence (through its interaction with the Heart and circumstance [the world]) into a Soul stabilized as a self-possessed identity is a theory ofjustification directed at the question 'how we can live? '.
Geoffrey Hill re-constructs this soul-making as a means o f redemption in his claim that Coleridge's "To William Wordsworth" functions as "the private utterance of highly organized art can for a while stabilize the self-dissipating brilliance o f the listener's mind, that is, Coleridge's mind, the mind that is concentrating upon that very diffusion" (12). How does 'mind' 'stabilize' in "the private utterance of highly organized art'? "Private
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utterance" does not mean 'private meaning', susceptible to the force o f Wittgenstein's private language 'argument', the absurdity o f a language functioning as a language without public criteria determining the meaning o f words from one moment to the next. The force o f 'private utterance' attaches to what it means for someone to be 'stabilized' in language. The specialness of aesthetic language lies not in its form, but in its utterance or its use as language standing for, or acting as the expression of, a 'mind' ('mind' here remainsablackbox). Anexpressionofmindisnotatheoryofmind. Rather,itisa temporary identity that allows a fiction or a figure to seduce us into a moral stance towards ourselves as if toward the world, or towards the worlds as if towards ourselves: "a poet can transfigure his own dissipation by a metaphor that perfectly comprehends it" (13). This moral stance is an interpretive stance ('this means x'), where we allow the interpretation to constitute ourselves or a text.
This metaphoric comprehension entangles the poet in the very language in which hefailstoactorconfiguretheworldorhimselfasmeaningful. Wecanuselanguageto describe the world within systems of values (the logic of a language game); the application of the distinctions determining any language game, however, is continually subject to normativerestrictions,criteriaoflegitimacy,andontologicaljustification. Thecriteria determining legitimate use, while grounded in social and linguistic conventions, continuously require ontological support justifying the actuality of the distinctions and entities indicated or expressed within a language. In other words we can use language as a self-contained descriptive system of values or distinctions, but we can only enter language, that is, constitute ourselves and the world through the justifications o f both the
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application and the existence o f these distinctions and values. (This is not to say we do not make mistakes, but that there are limits. I can, for example imagine that rocks rolling downmountainsaregods. IfIaminthepathofsucharock,Icanstandthereand embracethisgodinamomentofexquisitehappiness. Mylifemightbemoremeaningful than someone who thinks rocks are rocks, and they are better avoided when they reach a certainvelocity. IfIclaimtherock-as-godpictureisequivalenttotherocks-are-hard
picture I have made a grammatical mistake. The rocks-are-hard school is superior if ones goal is to stay alive. The rock-god school might be superior if my goal is to die meaningfully in a mountain accident. Relativistic arguments often make confused comparisons. Inthiscasephysicsactsasalimitonhowsuccessfulabeliefsystemisasa survival system. The question remains: is it better to live a life o f fictional fantasy that may be meaningful, or a life o f scientific realism that may not be? . These may not be opposites in any real sense, but their application is fraught with confusions). Ontological
justification can describe the limits o f our involvement, and the meaning o f this involvement, in our language.
Poetry works through configuring ontological justification as a problem o f interpretation. This formulation can justify Ransom's vague description o f poetry as "ontological or metaphysical maneuver" (The World's Body, 347). In poetic use the demand for ontological justification appears as a demand for recognition, to use the creation ofmeaning as an expression ofself. The constitution or the making ofourselves marks our expressions o f value as expressions o f power; these expressions cannot supersede the systematic normative organization and functioning o f language, where the
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accuracy o f statements becomes an acting through, agreement with, and description o f language. Our failure or success within these normative rules cannot be mediated through our self-constructions, but only by the determining structures o f society, language, biology.
These normative rules urge or measure us; our ontological creation ofourselves and our world within language measures orjudges language. We can forgive our ontological failures but never our failures in clarity. Hill, quoting Chesterton's study of
Dickens says, "'a saint after repentance will forgive himselffor a sin; a man about town willneverforgivehimselfforafauxpas"'(7). Artisaconstructionwithinthe'density'
o f language, the normative resistance o f words and the incommensurability between different concepts, ideas, meanings, and language games. This poetic making delivers both the poet and our poetic responses "up to judgment"(14). Hill divides this judgment up between a (1) judgment o f our "empirical guilt" accompanying our possible failures and faux pas within the normative criteria of our language and social life and a (2) judgment of the "Sin" that Karl Barth understands as the 'specific gravity of human nature as such' (15). 6 This 'empirical guilt', or the normative force of language, has its own weight. "[I]t is at the heart o f this 'heaviness' that poetry must do its atoning work, this heaviness which is simultaneously the 'density' o f language and the 'specific gravity o f human nature'" (15).
The failure of clarity, the difficulty requiring interpretation in Finnegans Wake (and in a different way in Philosophical Investigations) forces the reader to mediate the normative rules through ontological justification (the radical need to determine the ontological status of its language as the exercise of its art), and to mediate the constitutive
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force of ontological justification by the normative rules of our language (its humor, what Wittgenstein calls grammatical jokes). The normative rules o f language can function like the laws o f nature (the descriptions o f form as quantity) and our ontological justifications are judgments about how we function within these laws. Together these rules and
judgments constitute us within language and describes our intentionality, seemingly our qualitative mental relations. Finnegans Wake, therefore, can describe our constitution as humanbeingsasafunctionofacommentaryaboutitsownlanguage. Ournormative language while constituting the possibilities of meaning available to us can not function ontologically, that is, we can exist within and through these possibilities, but we can only exist at all, through the ontological or creative pressure attending the kinds o f ontological
judgments we make about the normative status of our language games, for example, 'Do I love you? ' 'Can I love? ' 'Is love possible? ' This explains why ordinary criteria can fail; why we are continually tempted by skepticism. 2 If I rewrite Hill's formulation of our deliverance up to judgment, I can suggest a vague canopy to include this play between ontology and epistemology as a moral crisis: "in the constraint of shame the [Wakean\ poet and [grammatical philosopher] [are] free to discover both the 'menace' and the atoning power o f his own art" (17).
Our survival in language requires an act of will. We must, however, take responsibility for the governance of our will, and not cede or abrogate our moral involvement within language to the confusion ofuse which distorts and hides this moral dimension within the confusions and entanglements between language games o f power
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(ideology)disguisedasmoraljudgments. Somethinglikethissensemotivates Wittgenstein to remark his distrust oflanguage:
Human beings are profoundly enmeshed in philosophical--i. e. grammatical-- confusions. They cannot be freed without first being extricated from the extraordinary variety o f associations which hold them prisoner. Y ou have as it were to reconstitute their entire language. --But this language grew up as it did becausehumanbeingshad--andhave--thetendencytothinkinthisway. So you can only succeed in extricating people who live in an instinctive rebellion against language; you cannot help those whose entire instinct is to live in the herd
which has created this language as its own proper mode o f expression. (MS 213,
? 423; quoted in Kenny, "Wittgenstein on the Nature of Philosophy", 16).
Poetry and philosophy both constitute kinds of rebellion against language. This distrust of language constitutes a religious stance, a configuration of oneself as anything or anyone in relation to a negative limit which can determine our meaning and our world. What is it like to be trapped within a system of meaning within which you cannot escape but which you distrust? Finnegans Wake is a comic version o f Kafka's The Castle.
Coleridge, commenting on the mental schema articulated in Wordsworth's Prelude, redescribes the reciprocal relation between the senses and the world that constructs the mind. Following what he believes was "partly suggested by me . . . He
[Wordsworth] was to treat man as man--a subject o f eye, ear, touch, and taste, in contact with external nature, and informing the senses from the mind, and not compounding a mind out ofthe senses"(188). This could seem a conquest ofa world, or the construction
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o f a Khananite pleasure palace after such a conquest. Eliot, in 'Gerontion,' finds such a
world "a decayed house", where "In depraved May, dogwood and chestnut, flowering judas,/ To be eaten, to be divided, to be drunk/ Among the whispers"; where these whispers, these "vacant shuttles weave the wind" into a riddle about the consequences of
knowledge ["After such knowledge, what forgiveness? "]. Our ordinary needs eat, divide and drink the world into metaphors (cliches: whispers, weave the wind) that signal the loss, consumption and disappearance ofthe world. The organic world symbolizes its own loss. Eliotdescribesamoralterror,akindofknowledgethatcanappearasaskepticism generated from failing senses, but I think it is more likely a realization that a soul can fragment through a kind of self-reflection in which the indifference ofthe world and our own indifference generates a specific terror. Poetry can enact this terror as what we are. Thisstance-indifferentterror--isneitherexistentialnorstrictlyspeakingmoral. Eliot's poetry describes this terror as a realization that the soul (and our demand for redemption) and subjectivity (at least our speaking T ) describes the subjunctive: we live counterfactually. Eliot does not discover this. The possibilities of either idealism or modem skepticism, when understood as moral responses to scientific knowing, outlines
the soul, subject, self as subjunctive. (This does not mean the soul, subject, self are constructed; they may be given as perpetual possibility; making a soul or a mind follows as apossibilityofthispossibility). Eliot'sdiscoveryisoftheterrorgraspingandattending modemself-reflection. Heexposespartlywhatthis'subjunctive'means,teachingusthe consequence ofthis knowledge (ifit is 'knowledge'). Words describe ideal forms that our descriptions belie into algorithms of loss:
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To lose beauty in terror, terror in inquisition.
I have lost my passion: why should I need to keep it Since what is kept must be adulterated?
I have lost my site, smell, hearing, taste, and touch: How should I use them for your closer contact?
Age and terror and revulsion and the failure of our knowing and knowledge, the realization that not only can the mind and the world be confused for each other but that a failure o f courage, sense, or meaning can tempt us to deny our mind. Instinct, the algorithm describing the non-human, and our dying, the algorithm o f loss, sketch the limits ofour knowledge ofboth ofthese as despair: "What will the spider do,/ Suspend its operations, will the weevil Delay? De Bailhache, Fresca, Mrs. Cammel, whirled/ Beyond the circuit o f the shuddering Bear/ In fractured atoms. " The constellation Ursus Major can mean a " shuddering Bear", a promised stability o f meaning that cannot preserve the atoms ofanyone'sbody. MeaningdescribesthelimitbeyondwhichNothingbeckons.
For the Ancient Mariner the periodicity of the stars measures our human needs as our involvement in the world as a promise of a home. Hill offers Coleridge's prose gloss of the Ancient Mariner's loneliness as "an outstandingly beautiful image of the attainability of atonement":
In his loneliness and fixedness he yeameth towards the journeying Moon, and the stars that still sojourn, yet still move onward; and every where the blue sky belongs to them, and is their appointed rest, and their native country and their
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own natural homes, which they enter unannounced, as lords that are certainly
expected and yet there is a silent joy at their arrival.
This description has the coherence o f a poem, a fragment: not a fragment o f the world it describes, nor of the longing it evokes but of a kind of self-reflection that the glosses accompanying the poem form on the poem, and in this case a coherence o f self-sufficiency that ironically refers to the complex worlds that include the poem, Coleridge, the heavens, us, the future ad infinitum. This is the promise o f the Romantic fragment. These fragments are a profound attempt, even in the anti-Newtonianism ofBlake, to configure
poetry as Schlegel describes Romanticism as kind o f aesthetic-moral formula describing itself and all worlds in which it would or will make sense:
"The whole history of modem poetry is a running commentary on the following brief philosophical text: all art should become science, and all science art; poetry and philosophy should be made one" (Critical Fragment 1 1 5).
The different ways of finding a text speaking to us, for us, at us, allegorizing us allows us to displace forms o f skepticism into fantasies o f intelligibility which animate the text into various forms o f animism. As a form o f animism, and, therefore, as a kind o f romanticism attempting to link science and art, the animation o f the text parallels the mechanical, like the animation of dolls, bodies, and clay heads, as if science gave us the truth of what we see, a common sense weeding out visions and spirits. Is this the kind o f animism we find
in Henry Adams' dynamo or in Yeats' Byzantine birds?
In "Byzantium" we are presented with three categories o f being: "Miracle, bird or
golden handiwork". These are what in "Sailing to Byzantium" Yeats called "bodily form".
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"Once out of nature" the poet's voice rejects the form of natural things, the category "bird" in the later poem in order to enter the " artifice of eternity" as an aesthetic form "as Grecian goldsmiths make". This collapse of natural form into artifact is what Wittgenstein, in Investigations, called the sublimation o f the machine into a symbol: where the normative structures o f language, rules, conventions, etc. are confused as the causal structures o f our psychology determining what we actually say. A symbol built out o f this confusion can seem to stabilize our linguistic practices. The structure o f a symbol so constitutedoutofthisstabilityisdeterminedasaformofidentity. Thus,Wittgenstein writes in the Tractatus:
Only the proposition has sense; only in the context o f a proposition has a name meaning. (3. 3)
Every part of a proposition which characterizes its sense I call an expression
(a symbol).
(The proposition itself is an expression. )
Expressions are everything--essential for the sense o f the proposition-- that propositions can have in common with one another.
An expression characterizes a form and a content. (3. 31)
Identity functions as a metaconcept, or rather as the logical possibility that allows propositions to be decomposed and recharacterized as expressions. In this sense propositions function as expressions when they have a sense, in Frege's picture when they can stand in for each other. This commonality or conceptual identity functions as a repeatability that lies behind and extends the Cartesian idea of animal
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animation as mechanical, a rule-bound persistence, to that of the mind: a picture of the soul as a perpetual motion, or rather expression, machine. This is like the picture o f the soul in Swift's Tale o fa Tub as clothes or the kind of person described by Adams in his preface as "a manikin. . . clothes . . . the same value as any other geometrical figure o f three ormoredimensions,whichisusedforthestudyofrelation"(xxx). ForAdamsthe collapse into the mechanical attends a despair over the virgin's failure, the failure of spirit, to limit, let alone convert, human violence. This renunciation requires that he convert himself into a vision o f mechanical time and identity, into at least a metaphor o f the algorithmic: "Every man with self-respect enough to become effective, if only as a machine, has had to account for himself somehow, and to invent a formula of his own for his universe, if the standard formulas failed" (471-72).
This vision of self-transformation is quite different from what we find in Keats: "Even a Proverb is no proverb to you till your Life has illustrated it. " A proverb in its generality and structure is formulaic. This formula, however, is not applied to the world, but you interpret yourself as expressing it, that is, it becomes a proverb to you only when you can use it to describe your life. "Life" and a "Proverb" articulate incommensurable and irreducible domains, as do picture and text, and thus the aptness o f the word 'illustrate,' as a means o f mapping one domain onto another, as a picture illustrates a text. But what allows ones' life to be such an illustration? This is a question not only of application but of intentionality (the formulaic aspect calls for application: apply this formula across this domain; an application that leads to illustration opens up a problem of intentionality: what exactly is being illustrated? Matisse was commissioned to illustrate
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Joyce'sUlysses. HeproducedaseriesofdrawingsillustratingHomer'sOdyssey,not having bothered to read Joyce's book. What if he had read the book would he have then been able to illustrate it? ) What an illustration picks out in a text is like an interpretation, but its application to the text remains unclear or even tenuous: Is a movie an illustration of a book? Is it a translation ofat least a word, or phrase, or character into another medium? A particular shot in a movie might be an illustration; the musical score might be an illustration; but the movie itself is an interpretation, an attempt to tell not illustrate.
Asking "What does it mean? " leads to interpretation; asking, "What is it like? " leads to illustration. The first gives us a logic or a language we can understand; the other shows us the answer to a riddle.
A proverb is a fragment, as Schlegel called it, a kind o f self-articulating totality pointing, however, beyond itselftoward the world or experience which it describes or to which it can be applied. Schlegel's fragments function organically; they are not analogized into machinery as in Modernism (poetries appealing to Newton under the pressure of further scientific and technological transformations), but, akin to Goethe's conceptualizations ofthe Urphanomen, the ground phenomena, the principle ofform out of which and through which all other forms metamorphosize. This principle of holographic gestalt, organic self-articulation does not describe the mutual identification of ontogenyandphylogeny,butratherthereductionofbeingintoorganicmorphology. For Schlegel this form was the hedgehog:
A Fragment should be like a little work of art, complete in itself and totally separated from the surrounding world like a hedgehog.
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Ein Fragment muss gleich einem kleinem Kunstwerke von der umgebenden Welt ganz abgesondert und in sich selbst vollendet sein wie ein Ingel. (Athenaeum, 206)
Fragments define an holographic ecology: "Fragmentary totality, in keeping with what should be called the logic ofthe hedgehog, cannot be situated in any single point: it is simultaneouslyinthewholeandinthepart. Eachfragmentstandsforitselfandforthat from which it is detached" (The Literary Absolute, 44). Schlegel describes this symbolic function as constituting a mode ofbeing, a function ofa particular kind ofart: "I have expressed a few ideas pointing toward the heart o f things, and have greeted the dawn . . . from my own point ofview. . . Let anyone who knows the road do likewise . . . from his own point ofview. " (Ideas, 155). This is what Blanchot called "a totally new mode of completion" (358), the "demand posited by poetry that it reflect itself and accomplish itself through its reflection . . . poetry no longer wants to be natural spontaneity but solely and absolutely conscious" (353). This requirement displaces the site o f poetry away from the
"poetic work" and towards "the poetic activity" (357). The relationship between consciousness and the world takes place through animation. For human beings this describes knowing as a poetic activity and for the world describes its dynamism. Blanchot describes this as a "mode of completion" that "mobilizes . . . the whole through its interruption and through interruptions various modes" (358). Gasche explains this mode as the consequence o f "a cross-fertilization between the Romantics' practice o f writing andKantiandoctrine,which. . . dealswiththeuniversalconditionsofcompletion"(ix). I will tilt my way to one side of such a characterization of the relation between the two
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senses o f the aesthetic playing out in Kant: the aesthetic as "reflective judgment" (in the Critique o fJudgment) and the aesthetic as the constitutivejudgment determining the relation between concepts and experience (in the Critique o fPure Reason).
Schlegel analogizes the relation between science and art as between the dissipating force ofthe individual mind and the organized rigidity ofa system. The systemic supports the ground o f the real and is thus necessary; the dissipating force o f the mind constitutes the subjectively true and is also necessary. Thus "it's equally fatal for the mind to have a system and to have none. It will simply have to decide to combine the two" (Athenaeum 53). This integration follows by constituting the individual as embryo system, and thus the implication between individual and system follows from phylogenesis: "All individuals are systems at least in embryo and tendency" (Athenaeum 242). Human beings are embedded in the a priori, which functions as a determining system.
The categorical imperative universalizes the individual outside of the semantics of 'morality'. The force ofthis universalizing functions as an 'ought', a necessity determining the moral autonomy of any particular human as the microcosmic version of the universal law. The categorical imperative determines moral necessity "without reference to any purpose", but rather through the "form ofthe action and the principle from which it follows" ("Grounding for the Metaphysics ofMorals", 26). In Kant's picture, moral action measures the distance between someone who acts and rational moral criteria. This distance is measured by the special character o f 'ought' which marks the criterion for action and serves as the motive for action. Kant describes the criterion for moral action in a self-reflexive proverb which appeals to and contains another proverb:
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"Act only according to that maxim whereby you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law' ("Grounding", 30). The embedded proverb divides (1) an action (moral action) into a personal act in a particular situation and (2) an act ofwill universalizing this action. Kant's model for action, therefore, enacts the way of seeing described in Blake's "Auguries o f Innocence" as a description o f moral action:
To see a World in a Grain of Sand,
And a Heaven in a Wild Flower,
Hold Infinity in the palm o f your hand, And Eternity in an hour.
Kant imagines human moral failure to be a failure in the application o f moral precepts. Underlying this assumption is a theological picture translated into a logical problem: how to translate the universal, in which the moral 'ought' and the ontological 'is' are related as a conditional (if x, then y), into the particular contingencies determining human action. Kant's 'is' is not Hume's: Kant's criterion for existence is not grounded in human practice but in the simultaneous demand for individual human moral autonomy (to act and
judge through and as being 'I') and the necessity of a universal moral law. The means by which he accomplishes the translation of the 'I' into the moral universal proceeds through our formal equivalence as human beings within the formal limits o f our identity as agents. Within the categorical imperative this takes the form of a textual self-reflection that in itselfservesasamodelforhumanaction. Thustheproverb"Actonlyaccordingtothat maxim" describes the application of "that maxim". This textual self-reflection functions as a means of application that displaces the implicit 'act as if. . . " in the embedded proverb
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into the initial proverb concerning action. This initial "Act only. . . " assumes that we act outside o f moral commitments (and thus these commitments must be shaped and ordered). (I think this is a skewed picture but I cannot criticize it here).
Because ofthis assumption, however, this new proverb would require a proverb of application ad infinitum. Kant's response is to characterize 'acting' itself as a form of self-reflection: "Actinsuchawaythatyoutreathumanity,whetherinyourownperson or in the person of another, always at the same time as an end, and never as a means" (36). The particular concerns o f any action are dissolved in his designation o f humanity as the defactoobjectofanymoralact. Thisispossiblebecauseanyindividualisalsoanexample of humanity ("whether in your own person or in another").
