No More Learning

For every vegetable swells and throws out its
constituent parts toward the circumference, both upward and downward.
And there is no difference between the roots and branches, except that
the root is buried in the earth, and the branches are exposed to the
air and sun. For if one take a young and vigorous shoot, and bend it
down to a small portion of loose earth, although it be not fixed to
the ground, yet will it immediately produce a root, and not a branch.
And, _vice versâ_, if earth be placed above, and so forced down with a
stone or any hard substance, as to confine the plant and prevent its
branching upward, it will throw out branches into the air downward.

The gums of trees, and most rock gems, are similar instances; for both
of them are exudations and filtered juices, derived in the former
instance from trees, in the latter from stones; the brightness and
clearness of both arising from a delicate and accurate filtering. For
nearly the same reason, the hair of animals is less beautiful and vivid
in its color than the plumage of most birds, because the juices are
less delicately filtered through the skin than through the quills.

The scrotum of males and matrix of females are also similar instances;
so that the noble formation which constitutes the difference of the
sexes appears to differ only as to the one being internal and the other
external; a greater degree of heat causing the genitals to protrude in
the male, while the heat of the female being too weak to effect this,
they are retained internally.

The fins of fishes and the feet of quadrupeds, or the feet and wings of
birds, are similar instances; to which Aristotle adds the four folds in
the motion of serpents;[118] so that in the formation of the universe,
the motion of animals appears to be chiefly effected by four joints or
bendings.

The teeth of land animals, and the beaks of birds, are similar
instances, whence it is clear, that in all perfect animals there is a
determination of some hard substance toward the mouth.

Again, the resemblance and conformity of man to an inverted plant
is not absurd. For the head is the root of the nerves and animal
faculties, and the seminal parts are the lowest, not including the
extremities of the legs and arms. But in the plant, the root (which
resembles the head) is regularly placed in the lowest, and the seeds in
the highest part. [119]

Lastly, we must particularly recommend and suggest, that man’s present
industry in the investigation and compilation of natural history be
entirely changed, and directed to the reverse of the present system.
For it has hitherto been active and curious in noting the variety of
things, and explaining the accurate differences of animals, vegetables,
and minerals, most of which are the mere sport of nature, rather
than of any real utility as concerns the sciences. Pursuits of this
nature are certainly agreeable, and sometimes of practical advantage,
but contribute little or nothing to the thorough investigation of
nature. Our labor must therefore be directed toward inquiring into and
observing resemblances and analogies, both in the whole and its parts,
for they unite nature, and lay the foundation of the sciences.

Here, however, a severe and rigorous caution must be observed, that we
only consider as similar and proportionate instances, those which (as
we first observed) point out physical resemblances; that is, real and
substantial resemblances, deeply founded in nature, and not casual and
superficial, much less superstitious or curious; such as those which
are constantly put forward by the writers on natural magic (the most
idle of men, and who are scarcely fit to be named in connection with
such serious matters as we now treat of), who, with much vanity and
folly, describe, and sometimes too, invent, unmeaning resemblances and
sympathies.

But leaving such to themselves, similar instances are not to be
neglected, in the greater portions of the world’s conformation; such
as Africa and the Peruvian continent, which reaches to the Straits of
Magellan; both of which possess a similar isthmus and similar capes, a
circumstance not to be attributed to mere accident.

Again, the New and Old World are both of them broad and expanded toward
the north, and narrow and pointed toward the south.

Again, we have very remarkable similar instances in the intense cold,
toward the middle regions (as it is termed) of the air, and the violent
fires which are often found to burst from subterraneous spots, the
similarity consisting in both being ends and extremes; the extreme of
the nature of cold, for instance, is toward the boundary of heaven,
and that of the nature of heat toward the centre of the earth, by a
similar species of opposition or rejection of the contrary nature.

Lastly, in the axioms of the sciences, there is a similarity of
instances worthy of observation. Thus the rhetorical trope which is
called surprise, is similar to that of music termed the declining of
a cadence. Again--the mathematical postulate, that things which are
equal to the same are equal to one another, is similar to the form of
the syllogism in logic, which unites things agreeing in the middle
term. [120] Lastly, a certain degree of sagacity in collecting and
searching for physical points of similarity, is very useful in many
respects. [121]

XXVIII. In the seventh rank of prerogative instances, we will place
singular instances, which we are also wont to call irregular or
heteroclite (to borrow a term from the grammarians). They are such
as exhibit bodies in the concrete, of an apparently extravagant and
separate nature, agreeing but little with other things of the same
species. For, while the similar instances resemble each other, those
we now speak of are only like themselves. Their use is much the same
with that of clandestine instances: they bring out and unite nature,
and discover genera or common natures, which must afterward be limited
by real differences. Nor should we desist from inquiry, until the
properties and qualities of those things, which may be deemed miracles,
as it were, of nature, be reduced to, and comprehended in, some form or
certain law; so that all irregularity or singularity may be found to
depend on some common form; and the miracle only consists in accurate
differences, degree, and rare coincidence, not in the species itself.
Man’s meditation proceeds no further at present, than just to consider
things of this kind as the secrets and vast efforts of nature, without
an assignable cause, and, as it were, exceptions to general rules.

As examples of singular instances, we have the sun and moon among
the heavenly bodies; the magnet among minerals; quicksilver among
metals; the elephant among quadrupeds; the venereal sensation among
the different kinds of touch; the scent of sporting dogs among those
of smell. The letter S, too, is considered by the grammarians as sui
generis, from its easily uniting with double or triple consonants,
which no other letter will. These instances are of great value, because
they excite and keep alive inquiry, and correct an understanding
depraved by habit and the common course of things.

XXIX. In the eighth rank of prerogative instances, we will place
deviating instances, such as the errors of nature, or strange and
monstrous objects, in which nature deviates and turns from her
ordinary course. For the errors of nature differ from singular
instances, inasmuch as the latter are the miracles of species, the
former of individuals. Their use is much the same, for they rectify the
understanding in opposition to habit, and reveal common forms. For with
regard to these, also, we must not desist from inquiry, till we discern
the cause of the deviation. The cause does not, however, in such cases
rise to a regular form, but only to the latent process toward such a
form. For he who is acquainted with the paths of nature, will more
readily observe her deviations; and, _vice versâ_, he who has learned
her deviations will be able more accurately to describe her paths.

They differ again from singular instances, by being much more apt for
practice and the operative branch. For it would be very difficult to
generate new species, but less so to vary known species, and thus
produce many rare and unusual results. [122] The passage from the
miracles of nature to those of art is easy; for if nature be once
seized in her variations, and the cause be manifest, it will be easy to
lead her by art to such deviation as she was at first led to by chance;
and not only to that but others, since deviations on the one side
lead and open the way to others in every direction. Of this we do not
require any examples, since they are so abundant. For a compilation, or
particular natural history, must be made of all monsters and prodigious
births of nature; of everything, in short, which is new, rare and
unusual in nature. This should be done with a rigorous selection, so as
to be worthy of credit. Those are most to be suspected which depend
upon superstition, as the prodigies of Livy, and those perhaps, but
little less, which are found in the works of writers on natural magic,
or even alchemy, and the like; for such men, as it were, are the very
suitors and lovers of fables; but our instances should be derived from
some grave and credible history, and faithful narration.

XXX. In the ninth rank of prerogative instances, we will place
bordering instances, which we are also wont to term participants. They
are such as exhibit those species of bodies which appear to be composed
of two species, or to be the rudiments between the one and the other.
They may well be classed with the singular or heteroclite instances;
for in the whole system of things, they are rare and extraordinary. Yet
from their dignity, they must be treated of and classed separately,
for they point out admirably the order and constitution of things, and
suggest the causes of the number and quality of the more common species
in the universe, leading the understanding from that which is, to that
which is possible.

We have examples of them in moss, which is something between
putrescence and a plant;[123] in some comets, which hold a place
between stars and ignited meteors; in flying fishes, between fishes and
birds; and in bats, between birds and quadrupeds. [124] Again,

Simia quam similis turpissima bestia nobis.

We have also biformed fœtus, mingled species and the like.

XXXI. In the tenth rank of prerogative instances, we will place the
instances of power, or the fasces (to borrow a term from the insignia
of empire), which we are also wont to call the wit or hands of man.
These are such works as are most noble and perfect, and, as it were,
the masterpieces in every art. For since our principal object is to
make nature subservient to the state and wants of man, it becomes us
well to note and enumerate the works, which have long since been in the
power of man, especially those which are most polished and perfect:
because the passage from these to new and hitherto undiscovered
works, is more easy and feasible. For if any one, after an attentive
contemplation of such works as are extant, be willing to push forward
in his design with alacrity and vigor, he will undoubtedly either
advance them, or turn them to something within their immediate reach,
or even apply and transfer them to some more noble purpose.

Nor is this all: for as the understanding is elevated and raised by
rare and unusual works of nature, to investigate and discover the forms
which include them also, so is the same effect frequently produced by
the excellent and wonderful works of art; and even to a greater degree,
because the mode of effecting and constructing the miracles of art is
generally plain, while that of effecting the miracles of nature is more
obscure. Great care, however, must be taken, that they do not depress
the understanding, and fix it, as it were, to earth.

For there is some danger, lest the understanding should be astonished
and chained down, and as it were bewitched, by such works of art, as
appear to be the very summit and pinnacle of human industry, so as not
to become familiar with them, but rather to suppose that nothing of
the kind can be accomplished, unless the same means be employed, with
perhaps a little more diligence, and more accurate preparation.

Now, on the contrary, it may be stated as a fact, that the ways and
means hitherto discovered and observed, of effecting any matter or
work, are for the most part of little value, and that all really
efficient power depends, and is really to be deduced from the sources
of forms, none of which have yet been discovered.

Thus (as we have before observed), had any one meditated on ballistic
machines, and battering rams, as they were used by the ancients,
whatever application he might have exerted, and though he might have
consumed a whole life in the pursuit, yet would he never have hit upon
the invention of flaming engines, acting by means of gunpowder; nor
would any person, who had made woollen manufactories and cotton the
subject of his observation and reflection, have ever discovered thereby
the nature of the silkworm or of silk.

Hence all the most noble discoveries have (if you observe) come to
light, not by any gradual improvement and extension of the arts, but
merely by chance; while nothing imitates or anticipates chance (which
is wont to act at intervals of ages) but the invention of forms.

There is no necessity for adducing any particular examples of these
instances, since they are abundant. The plan to be pursued is this:
all the mechanical, and even the liberal arts (as far as they are
practical), should be visited and thoroughly examined, and thence there
should be formed a compilation or particular history of the great
masterpieces, or most finished works in each, as well as of the mode
of carrying them into effect.

Nor do we confine the diligence to be used in such a compilation to the
leading works and secrets only of every art, and such as excite wonder;
for wonder is engendered by rarity, since that which is rare, although
it be compounded of ordinary natures, always begets wonder.

On the contrary, that which is really wonderful, from some specific
difference distinguishing it from other species, is carelessly
observed, if it be but familiar. Yet the singular instances of art
should be observed no less than those of nature, which we have before
spoken of: and as in the latter we have classed the sun, the moon, the
magnet, and the like, all of them most familiar to us, but yet in their
nature singular, so should we proceed with the singular instances of
art.

For example: paper, a very common substance, is a singular instance
of art; for if you consider the subject attentively, you will find
that artificial substances are either woven by straight and transverse
lines, as silk, woollen, or linen cloth, and the like; or coagulated
from concrete juices, such as brick, earthenware, glass, enamel,
porcelain and the like, which admit of a polish if they be compact, but
if not, become hard without being polished; all which latter substances
are brittle, and not adherent or tenacious. On the contrary, paper is
a tenacious substance, which can be cut and torn, so as to resemble
and almost rival the skin of any animal, or the leaf of vegetables,
and the like works of nature; being neither brittle like glass, nor
woven like cloth, but having fibres and not distinct threads, just as
natural substances, so that scarcely anything similar can be found
among artificial substances, and it is absolutely singular. And in
artificial works we should certainly prefer those which approach the
nearest to an imitation of nature, or, on the other hand, powerfully
govern and change her course.

Again, in these instances which we term the wit and hands of man,
charms and conjuring should not be altogether despised, for although
mere amusements, and of little use, yet they may afford considerable
information.

Lastly, superstition and magic (in its common acceptation) are not to
be entirely omitted; for although they be overwhelmed by a mass of lies
and fables, yet some investigation should be made, to see if there be
really any latent natural operation in them; as in fascination, and the
fortifying of the imagination, the sympathy of distant objects, the
transmission of impressions from spirit to spirit no less than from
body to body, and the like.

XXXII. From the foregoing remarks, it is clear that the last five
species of instances (the similar, singular, deviating and bordering
instances, and those of power) should not be reserved for the
investigation of any given nature, as the preceding and many of the
succeeding instances must, but a collection of them should be made at
once, in the style of a particular history, so that they may arrange
the matter which enters the understanding, and correct its depraved
habit, for it is necessarily imbued, corrupted, perverted and distorted
by daily and habitual impressions.

They are to be used, therefore, as a preparative, for the purpose of
rectifying and purifying the understanding; for whatever withdraws it
from habit, levels and planes down its surface for the reception of the
dry and pure light of true notions.

These instances, moreover, level and prepare the way for the operative
branch, as we will mention in its proper place when speaking of the
practical deductions.

XXXIII. In the eleventh rank of prerogative instances we will place
accompanying and hostile instances. These are such as exhibit any body
or concrete, where the required nature is constantly found, as an
inseparable companion, or, on the contrary, where the required nature
is constantly avoided, and excluded from attendance, as an enemy. From
these instances may be formed certain and universal propositions,
either affirmative or negative; the subject of which will be the
concrete body, and the predicate the required nature. For particular
propositions are by no means fixed, when the required nature is found
to fluctuate and change in the concrete, either approaching and
acquired, or receding and laid aside. Hence particular propositions
have no great prerogative, except in the case of migration, of which we
have spoken above. Yet such particular propositions are of great use,
when compared with the universal, as will be mentioned in its proper
place. Nor do we require absolute affirmation or negation, even in
universal propositions, for if the exceptions be singular or rare, it
is sufficient for our purpose.

The use of accompanying instances is to narrow the affirmative of
form; for as it is narrowed by the migrating instances, where the form
must necessarily be something communicated or destroyed by the act of
migration, so it is narrowed by accompanying instances, where the form
must necessarily be something which enters into the concretion of the
body, or, on the contrary, is repugnant to it; and one who is well
acquainted with the constitution or formation of the body, will not be
far from bringing to light the form of the required nature.

For example: let the required nature be heat. Flame is an accompanying
instance; for in water, air, stone, metal, and many other substances,
heat is variable, and can approach or retire; but all flame is hot,
so that heat always accompanies the concretion of flame. We have no
hostile instance of heat; for the senses are unacquainted with the
interior of the earth, and there is no concretion of any known body
which is not susceptible of heat.

Again, let solidity be the required nature. Air is a hostile instance;
for metals may be liquid or solid, so may glass; even water may become
solid by congelation, but air cannot become solid or lose its fluidity.

With regard to these instances of fixed propositions, there are
two points to be observed, which are of importance. First, that
if there be no universal affirmative or negative, it be carefully
noted as not existing. Thus, in heat, we have observed that there
exists no universal negative, in such substances, at least, as have
come to our knowledge. Again, if the required nature be eternity or
incorruptibility, we have no universal affirmative within our sphere,
for these qualities cannot be predicated of any bodies below the
heavens, or above the interior of the earth. Secondly, to our general
propositions as to any concrete, whether affirmative or negative, we
should subjoin the concretes which appear to approach nearest to the
non-existing substances; such as the most gentle or least-burning
flames in heat, or gold in incorruptibility, since it approaches
nearest to it. For they all serve to show the limit of existence and
non-existence, and circumscribe forms, so that they cannot wander
beyond the conditions of matter.

XXXIV. In the twelfth rank of prerogative instances, we will class
those subjunctive instances, of which we spoke in the last aphorism,
and which we are also wont to call instances of extremity or limits;
for they are not only serviceable when subjoined to fixed propositions,
but also of themselves and from their own nature. They indicate with
sufficient precision the real divisions of nature, and measures of
things, and the “how far” nature effects or allows of anything, and
her passage thence to something else. Such are gold in weight, iron in
hardness, the whale in the size of animals, the dog in smell, the flame
of gunpowder in rapid expansion, and others of a like nature. Nor are
we to pass over the extremes in defect, as well as in abundance, as
spirits of wine in weight, the touchstone in softness, the worms upon
the skin in the size of animals, and the like.

XXXV. In the thirteenth rank of prerogative instances we will place
those of alliance or union. They are such as mingle and unite natures
held to be heterogeneous, and observed and marked as such in received
classifications.

These instances show that the operation and effect, which is considered
peculiar to some one of such heterogeneous natures, may also be
attributed to another nature styled heterogeneous, so as to prove that
the difference of the natures is not real nor essential, but a mere
modification of a common nature. They are very serviceable, therefore,
in elevating and carrying on the mind, from differences to genera,
and in removing those phantoms and images of things, which meet it in
disguise in concrete substances.

For example: let the required nature be heat. The classification
of heat into three kinds, that of the celestial bodies, that of
animals, and that of fire, appears to be settled and admitted; and
these kinds of heat, especially one of them compared with the other
two, are supposed to be different, and clearly heterogeneous in
their essence and species, or specific nature, since the heat of the
heavenly bodies and of animals generates and cherishes, while that of
fire corrupts and destroys. We have an instance of alliance, then,
in a very common experiment, that of a vine branch admitted into a
building where there is a constant fire, by which the grapes ripen a
whole month sooner than in the air; so that fruit upon the tree can
be ripened by fire, although this appear the peculiar effect of the
sun. From this beginning, therefore, the understanding rejects all
essential difference, and easily ascends to the investigation of the
real differences between the heat of the sun and that of fire, by which
their operation is rendered dissimilar, although they partake of a
common nature.

These differences will be found to be four in number. 1. The heat of
the sun is much milder and gentler in degree than that of fire. 2. It
is much more moist in quality, especially as it is transmitted to us
through the air. 3. Which is the chief point, it is very unequal,
advancing and increased at one time, retiring and diminished at
another, which mainly contributes to the generation of bodies. For
Aristotle rightly asserted, that the principal cause of generation and
corruption on the surface of the earth was the oblique path of the sun
in the zodiac, whence its heat becomes very unequal, partly from the
alternation of night and day, partly from the succession of summer and
winter. Yet must he immediately corrupt and pervert his discovery,
by dictating to nature according to his habit, and dogmatically
assigning the cause of generation to the approach of the sun, and
that of corruption to its retreat; while, in fact, each circumstance
indifferently and not respectively contributes both to generation and
corruption; for unequal heat tends to generate and corrupt, as equable
heat does to preserve. 4. The fourth difference between the heat of the
sun and fire is of great consequence; namely, that the sun, gradually,
and for a length of time, insinuates its effects, while those of fire
(urged by the impatience of man) are brought to a termination in a
shorter space of time. But if any one were to pay attention to the
tempering of fire, and reducing it to a more moderate and gentle degree
(which may be done in various ways), and then were to sprinkle and mix
a degree of humidity with it; and, above all, were to imitate the sun
in its inequality; and, lastly, were patiently to suffer some delay
(not such, however, as is proportioned to the effects of the sun,
but more than men usually admit of in those of fire), he would soon
banish the notion of any difference, and would attempt, or equal, or
perhaps sometimes surpass the effect of the sun, by the heat of fire.
A like instance of alliance is that of reviving butterflies, benumbed
and nearly dead from cold, by the gentle warmth of fire; so that fire
is no less able to revive animals than to ripen vegetables. We may
also mention the celebrated invention of Fracastorius, of applying a
pan considerably heated to the head in desperate cases of apoplexy,
which clearly expands the animal spirits, when compressed and almost
extinguished by the humors and obstructions of the brain, and excites
them to action, as the fire would operate on water or air, and in the
result produces life. Eggs are sometimes hatched by the heat of fire,
an exact imitation of animal heat; and there are many instances of the
like nature, so that no one can doubt that the heat of fire, in many
cases, can be modified till it resemble that of the heavenly bodies and
of animals.

Again, let the required natures be motion and rest. There appears to
be a settled classification, grounded on the deepest philosophy, that
natural bodies either revolve, move in a straight line, or stand still
and rest. For there is either motion without limit, or continuance
within a certain limit, or a translation toward a certain limit. The
eternal motion of revolution appears peculiar to the heavenly bodies,
rest to this our globe, and the other bodies (heavy and light, as they
are termed, that is to say, placed out of their natural position) are
borne in a straight line to masses or aggregates which resemble them,
the light toward the heaven, the heavy toward the earth; and all this
is very fine language.

But we have an instance of alliance in low comets, which revolve,
though far below the heavens; and the fiction of Aristotle, of the
comet being fixed to, or necessarily following some star, has been
long since exploded; not only because it is improbable in itself, but
from the evident fact of the discursive and irregular motion of comets
through various parts of the heavens. [125]

Another instance of alliance is that of the motion of air, which
appears to revolve from east to west within the tropics, where the
circles of revolution are the greatest.

The flow and ebb of the sea would perhaps be another instance, if the
water were once found to have a motion of revolution, though slow and
hardly perceptible, from east to west, subject, however, to a reaction
twice a day. If this be so, it is clear that the motion of revolution
is not confined to the celestial bodies, but is shared, also, by air
and water.

Again--the supposed peculiar disposition of light bodies to rise is
rather shaken; and here we may find an instance of alliance in a water
bubble. For if air be placed under water, it rises rapidly toward
the surface by that striking motion (as Democritus terms it) with
which the descending water strikes the air and raises it, not by any
struggle or effort of the air itself; and when it has reached the
surface of the water, it is prevented from ascending any further, by
the slight resistance it meets with in the water, which does not allow
an immediate separation of its parts, so that the tendency of the air
to rise must be very slight.

Again, let the required nature be weight. It is certainly a received
classification, that dense and solid bodies are borne toward the centre
of the earth, and rare and light bodies to the circumference of the
heavens, as their appropriate places. As far as relates to places
(though these things have much weight in the schools), the notion of
there being any determinate place is absurd and puerile. Philosophers
trifle, therefore, when they tell you, that if the earth were
perforated, heavy bodies would stop on their arrival at the centre.
This centre would indeed be an efficacious nothing, or mathematical
point, could it affect bodies or be sought by them, for a body is not
acted upon except by a body. [126] In fact, this tendency to ascend
and descend is either in the conformation of the moving body, or in
its harmony and sympathy with another body. But if any dense and solid
body be found, which does not, however, tend toward the earth, the
classification is at an end. Now, if we allow of Gilbert’s opinion,
that the magnetic power of the earth, in attracting heavy bodies, is
not extended beyond the limit of its peculiar virtue (which operates
always at a fixed distance and no further),[127] and this be proved by
some instance, such an instance will be one of alliance in our present
subject. The nearest approach to it is that of waterspouts, frequently
seen by persons navigating the Atlantic toward either of the Indies.
For the force and mass of the water suddenly effused by waterspouts,
appears to be so considerable, that the water must have been collected
previously, and have remained fixed where it was formed, until it was
afterward forced down by some violent cause, rather than made to fall
by the natural motion of gravity: so that it may be conjectured that
a dense and compact mass, at a great distance from the earth, may be
suspended as the earth itself is, and would not fall, unless forced
down. We do not, however, affirm this as certain. In the meanwhile,
both in this respect and many others, it will readily be seen how
deficient we are in natural history, since we are forced to have
recourse to suppositions for examples, instead of ascertained instances.

Again, let the required nature be the discursive power of the mind.
The classification of human reason and animal instinct appears to be
perfectly correct. Yet there are some instances of the actions of
brutes which seem to show that they, too, can syllogize. Thus it is
related, that a crow, which had nearly perished from thirst in a great
drought, saw some water in the hollow trunk of a tree, but as it was
too narrow for him to get into it, he continued to throw in pebbles,
which made the water rise till he could drink; and it afterward became
a proverb.

Again, let the required nature be vision. The classification
appears real and certain, which considers light as that which is
originally visible, and confers the power of seeing; and color, as
being secondarily visible, and not capable of being seen without
light, so as to appear a mere image or modification of light. Yet
there are instances of alliance in each respect; as in snow when in
great quantities, and in the flame of sulphur; the one being a color
originally and in itself light, the other a light verging toward
color. [128]

XXXVI. In the fourteenth rank of prerogative instances, we will place
the instances of the cross, borrowing our metaphor from the crosses
erected where two roads meet, to point out the different directions.
We are wont also to call them decisive and judicial instances, and in
some cases instances of the oracle and of command. Their nature is as
follows: When in investigating any nature the understanding is, as it
were, balanced, and uncertain to which of two or more natures the cause
of the required nature should be assigned, on account of the frequent
and usual concurrence of several natures, the instances of the cross
show that the union of one nature with the required nature is firm
and indissoluble, while that of the other is unsteady and separable;
by which means the question is decided, and the first is received as
the cause, while the other is dismissed and rejected. Such instances,
therefore, afford great light, and are of great weight, so that the
course of interpretation sometimes terminates, and is completed in
them. Sometimes, however, they are found among the instances already
observed, but they are generally new, being expressly and purposely
sought for and applied, and brought to light only by attentive and
active diligence.

For example: let the required nature be the flow and ebb of the sea,
which is repeated twice a day, at intervals of six hours between each
advance and retreat, with some little difference, agreeing with the
motion of the moon. We have here the following crossways:

This motion must be occasioned either by the advancing and the retiring
of the sea, like water shaken in a basin, which leaves one side while
it washes the other; or by the rising of the sea from the bottom,
and its again subsiding, like boiling water. But a doubt arises, to
which of these causes we should assign the flow and ebb. If the first
assertion be admitted, it follows, that when there is a flood on
one side, there must at the same time be an ebb on another, and the
question therefore is reduced to this. Now Acosta, and some others,
after a diligent inquiry, have observed that the flood tide takes place
on the coast of Florida, and the opposite coasts of Spain and Africa,
at the same time, as does also the ebb; and that there is not, on the
contrary, a flood tide at Florida when there is an ebb on the coasts
of Spain and Africa. Yet if one consider the subject attentively,
this does not prove the necessity of a rising motion, nor refute the
notion of a progressive motion. For the motion may be progressive, and
yet inundate the opposite shores of a channel at the same time; as if
the waters be forced and driven together from some other quarter, for
instance, which takes place in rivers, for they flow and ebb toward
each bank at the same time, yet their motion is clearly progressive,
being that of the waters from the sea entering their mouths. So it may
happen, that the waters coming in a vast body from the eastern Indian
Ocean are driven together, and forced into the channel of the Atlantic,
and therefore inundate both coasts at once. We must inquire, therefore,
if there be any other channel by which the waters can at the same time
sink and ebb; and the Southern Ocean at once suggests itself, which is
not less than the Atlantic, but rather broader and more extensive than
is requisite for this effect.

We at length arrive, then, at an instance of the cross, which is this.
If it be positively discovered, that when the flood sets in toward
the opposite coasts of Florida and Spain in the Atlantic, there is at
the same time a flood tide on the coasts of Peru and the back part
of China, in the Southern Ocean, then assuredly, from this decisive
instance, we must reject the assertion, that the flood and ebb of the
sea, about which we inquire, takes place by progressive motion; for
no other sea or place is left where there can be an ebb. But this may
most easily be learned, by inquiring of the inhabitants of Panama and
Lima (where the two oceans are separated by a narrow isthmus), whether
the flood and ebb takes place on the opposite sides of the isthmus
at the same time, or the reverse. This decision or rejection appears
certain, if it be granted that the earth is fixed; but if the earth
revolves, it may perhaps happen, that from the unequal revolution (as
regards velocity) of the earth and the waters of the sea, there may
be a violent forcing of the waters into a mass, forming the flood,
and a subsequent relaxation of them (when they can no longer bear the
accumulation), forming the ebb. A separate inquiry must be made into
this. Even with this hypothesis, however, it remains equally true, that
there must be an ebb somewhere, at the same time that there is a flood
in another quarter.

Again, let the required nature be the latter of the two motions we
have supposed; namely, that of a rising and subsiding motion, if it
should happen that upon diligent examination the progressive motion
be rejected. We have, then, three ways before us, with regard to this
nature. The motion, by which the waters raise themselves, and again
fall back, in the floods and ebbs, without the addition of any other
water rolled toward them, must take place in one of the three following
ways: Either the supply of water emanates from the interior of the
earth, and returns back again; or there is really no greater quantity
of water, but the same water (without any augmentation of its quantity)
is extended or rarefied, so as to occupy a greater space and dimension,
and again contracts itself; or there is neither an additional supply
nor any extension, but the same waters (with regard to quantity,
density, or rarity) raise themselves and fall from sympathy, by some
magnetic power attracting and calling them up, as it were, from
above. Let us then (passing over the first two motions) reduce the
investigation to the last, and inquire if there be any such elevation
of the water by sympathy or a magnetic force; and it is evident, in the
first place, that the whole mass of water being placed in the trench
or cavity of the sea, cannot be raised at once, because there would
not be enough to cover the bottom, so that if there be any tendency of
this kind in the water to raise itself, yet it would be interrupted
and checked by the cohesion of things, or (as the common expression
is) that there may be no vacuum. The water, therefore, must rise on
one side, and for that reason be diminished and ebb on another. But it
will again necessarily follow that the magnetic power not being able to
operate on the whole, operates most intensely on the centre, so as to
raise the waters there, which, when thus raised successively, desert
and abandon the sides. [129]

We at length arrive, then, at an instance of the cross, which is this:
if it be found that during the ebb the surface of the waters at sea
is more curved and round, from the waters rising in the middle, and
sinking at the sides or coast, and if, during a flood, it be more even
and level, from the waters returning to their former position, then
assuredly, by this decisive instance, the raising of them by a magnetic
force can be admitted; if otherwise, it must be entirely rejected.
It is not difficult to make the experiment (by sounding in straits),
whether the sea be deeper toward the middle in ebbs, than in floods.
But it must be observed, if this be the case, that (contrary to common
opinion) the waters rise in ebbs, and only return to their former
position in floods, so as to bathe and inundate the coast.

Again, let the required nature be the spontaneous motion of revolution,
and particularly, whether the diurnal motion, by which the sun and
stars appear to us to rise and set, be a real motion of revolution in
the heavenly bodies, or only apparent in them, and real in the earth.
There may be an instance of the cross of the following nature. If there
be discovered any motion in the ocean from east to west, though very
languid and weak, and if the same motion be discovered rather more
swift in the air (particularly within the tropics, where it is more
perceptible from the circles being greater). If it be discovered also
in the low comets, and be already quick and powerful in them; if it
be found also in the planets, but so tempered and regulated as to be
slower in those nearest the earth, and quicker in those at the greatest
distance, being quickest of all in the heavens, then the diurnal motion
should certainly be considered as real in the heavens, and that of the
earth must be rejected; for it will be evident that the motion from
east to west is part of the system of the world and universal; since it
is most rapid in the height of the heavens, and gradually grows weaker,
till it stops and is extinguished in rest at the earth.

Again, let the required nature be that other motion of revolution,
so celebrated among astronomers, which is contrary to the diurnal,
namely, from west to east--and which the ancient astronomers assign
to the planets, and even to the starry sphere, but Copernicus and his
followers to the earth also--and let it be examined whether any such
motion be found in nature, or it be rather a fiction and hypothesis
for abridging and facilitating calculation, and for promoting that
fine notion of effecting the heavenly motions by perfect circles; for
there is nothing which proves such a motion in heavenly objects to be
true and real, either in a planet’s not returning in its diurnal motion
to the same point of the starry sphere, or in the pole of the zodiac
being different from that of the world, which two circumstances have
occasioned this notion. For the first phenomenon is well accounted for
by the spheres overtaking or falling behind each other, and the second
by spiral lines; so that the inaccuracy of the return and declination
to the tropics may be rather modifications of the one diurnal motion
than contrary motions, or about different poles. And it is most
certain, if we consider ourselves for a moment as part of the vulgar
(setting aside the fictions of astronomers and the school, who are
wont undeservedly to attack the senses in many respects, and to affect
obscurity), that the apparent motion is such as we have said, a model
of which we have sometimes caused to be represented by wires in a sort
of a machine.

We may take the following instances of the cross upon this subject. If
it be found in any history worthy of credit, that there has existed any
comet, high or low, which has not revolved in manifest harmony (however
irregularly) with the diurnal motion, then we may decide so far as to
allow such a motion to be possible in nature. But if nothing of the
sort be found, it must be suspected, and recourse must be had to other
instances of the cross.

Again, let the required nature be weight or gravity.
Heavy and
ponderous bodies must, either of their own nature, tend toward the
centre of the earth by their peculiar formation, or must be attracted
and hurried by the corporeal mass of the earth itself, as being an
assemblage of similar bodies, and be drawn to it by sympathy. But if
the latter be the cause, it follows that the nearer bodies approach to
the earth, the more powerfully and rapidly they must be borne toward
it, and the further they are distant, the more faintly and slowly (as
is the case in magnetic attractions), and that this must happen within
a given distance; so that if they be separated at such a distance from
the earth that the power of the earth cannot act upon them, they will
remain suspended like the earth, and not fall at all. [130]

The following instance of the cross may be adopted. Take a clock moved
by leaden weights,[131] and another by a spring, and let them be set
well together, so that one be neither quicker nor slower than the
other; then let the clock moved by weights be placed on the top of
a very high church, and the other be kept below, and let it be well
observed, if the former move slower than it did, from the diminished
power of the weights. Let the same experiment be made at the bottom
of mines worked to a considerable depth, in order to see whether the
clock move more quickly from the increased power of the weights. But
if this power be found to diminish at a height, and to increase in
subterraneous places, the attraction of the corporeal mass of the earth
may be taken as the cause of weight.

Again, let the required nature be the polarity of the steel needle when
touched with the magnet. We have these two ways with regard to this
nature--Either the touch of the magnet must communicate polarity to
the steel toward the north and south, or else it may only excite and
prepare it, while the actual motion is occasioned by the presence of
the earth, which Gilbert considers to be the case, and endeavors to
prove with so much labor. The particulars he has inquired into with
such ingenious zeal amount to this--1. An iron bolt placed for a long
time toward the north and south acquires polarity from this habit,
without the touch of the magnet, as if the earth itself operating
but weakly from its distance (for the surface or outer crust of the
earth does not, in his opinion, possess the magnetic power), yet, by
long continued motion, could supply the place of the magnet, excite
the iron, and convert and change it when excited. 2. Iron, at a red
or white heat, when quenched in a direction parallel to the north
and south, also acquires polarity without the touch of the magnet, as
if the parts of iron being put in motion by ignition, and afterward
recovering themselves, were, at the moment of being quenched, more
susceptible and sensitive of the power emanating from the earth, than
at other times, and therefore as it were excited. But these points,
though well observed, do not completely prove his assertion.

An instance of the cross on this point might be as follows: Let a small
magnetic globe be taken, and its poles marked, and placed toward the
east and west, not toward the north and south, and let it continue
thus. Then let an untouched needle be placed over it, and suffered
to remain so for six or seven days. Now, the needle (for this is not
disputed), while it remains over the magnet, will leave the poles of
the world and turn to those of the magnet, and therefore, as long as it
remains in the above position, will turn to the east and west. But if
the needle, when removed from the magnet and placed upon a pivot, be
found immediately to turn to the north and south, or even by degrees
to return thither, then the presence of the earth must be considered
as the cause, but if it remains turned as at first, toward the east
and west, or lose its polarity, then that cause must be suspected, and
further inquiry made.

Again, let the required nature be the corporeal substance of the
moon, whether it be rare, fiery, and aërial (as most of the ancient
philosophers have thought), or solid and dense (as Gilbert and many
of the moderns, with some of the ancients, hold). [132] The reasons
for this latter opinion are grounded chiefly upon this, that the
moon reflects the sun’s rays, and that light does not appear capable
of being reflected except by solids. The instances of the cross will
therefore (if any) be such as to exhibit reflection by a rare body,
such as flame, if it be but sufficiently dense. Now, certainly, one
of the reasons of twilight is the reflection[133] of the rays of the
sun by the upper part of the atmosphere. We see the sun’s rays also
reflected on fine evenings by streaks of moist clouds, with a splendor
not less, but perhaps more bright and glorious than that reflected
from the body of the moon, and yet it is not clear that those clouds
have formed into a dense body of water. We see, also, that the dark
air behind the windows at night reflects the light of a candle in the
same manner as a dense body would do. [134] The experiment should also
be made of causing the sun’s rays to fall through a hole upon some dark
and bluish flame. The unconfined rays of the sun, when falling on faint
flames, do certainly appear to deaden them, and render them more like
white smoke than flames. These are the only instances which occur at
present of the nature of those of the cross, and better perhaps can
be found. But it must always be observed that reflection is not to
be expected from flame, unless it be of some depth, for otherwise it
becomes nearly transparent. This at least may be considered certain,
that light is always either received and transmitted or reflected by an
even surface.

Again, let the required nature be the motion of projectiles (such
as darts, arrows, and balls) through the air. The school, in its
usual manner, treats this very carelessly, considering it enough to
distinguish it by the name of violent motion, from that which they
term natural, and as far as regards the first percussion or impulse,
satisfies itself by its axiom, that two bodies cannot exist in one
place, or there would be a penetration of dimensions. With regard to
this nature we have these two crossways--The motion must arise either
from the air carrying the projected body, and collecting behind it,
like a stream behind boats, or the wind behind straws; or from the
parts of the body itself not supporting the impression, but pushing
themselves forward in succession to ease it. Fracastorius, and nearly
all those who have entered into any refined inquiry upon the subject,
adopt the first. Nor can it be doubted that the air has some effect,
yet the other motion is without doubt real, as is clear from a vast
number of experiments. Among others we may take this instance of the
cross, namely, that a thin plate or wire of iron rather stiff, or even
a reed or pen split in two, when drawn up and bent between the finger
and thumb, will leap forward; for it is clear that this cannot be
attributed to the air’s being collected behind the body, because the
source of motion is in the centre of the plate or pen, and not in its
extremities.

Again, let the required nature be the rapid and powerful motion of the
explosion of gunpowder, by which such vast masses are upheaved, and
such weights discharged as we observe in large mines and mortars, there
are two crossways before us with regard to this nature. This motion
is excited either by the mere effort of the body expanding itself when
inflamed, or by the assisting effort of the crude spirit, which escapes
rapidly from fire, and bursts violently from the surrounding flame as
from a prison. The school, however, and common opinion only consider
the first effort; for men think that they are great philosophers when
they assert that flame, from the form of the element, is endowed with
a kind of necessity of occupying a greater space than the same body
had occupied when in the form of powder, and that thence proceeds the
motion in question. In the meantime they do not observe, that although
this may be true, on the supposition of flame being generated, yet the
generation may be impeded by a weight of sufficient force to compress
and suffocate it, so that no such necessity exists as they assert. They
are right, indeed, in imagining that the expansion and the consequent
emission or removal of the opposing body, is necessary if flame be once
generated, but such a necessity is avoided if the solid opposing mass
suppress the flame before it be generated; and we in fact see that
flame, especially at the moment of its generation, is mild and gentle,
and requires a hollow space where it can play and try its force. The
great violence of the effect, therefore, cannot be attributed to this
cause; but the truth is, that the generation of these exploding flames
and fiery blasts arises from the conflict of two bodies of a decidedly
opposite nature--the one very inflammable, as is the sulphur, the
other having an antipathy to flame, namely, the crude spirit of the
nitre; so that an extraordinary conflict takes place while the sulphur
is becoming inflamed as far as it can (for the third body, the willow
charcoal, merely incorporates and conveniently unites the two others),
and the spirit of nitre is escaping, as far also as it can, and at
the same time expanding itself (for air, and all crude substances,
and water are expanded by heat), fanning thus, in every direction,
the flame of the sulphur by its escape and violence, just as if by
invisible bellows.

Two kinds of instances of the cross might here be used--the one of
very inflammable substances, such as sulphur and camphor, naphtha and
the like, and their compounds, which take fire more readily and easily
than gunpowder if left to themselves (and this shows that the effort
to catch fire does not of itself produce such a prodigious effect);
the other of substances which avoid and repel flame, such as all
salts; for we see that when they are cast into the fire, the aqueous
spirit escapes with a crackling noise before flame is produced, which
also happens in a less degree in stiff leaves, from the escape of
the aqueous part before the oily part has caught fire. This is more
particularly observed in quicksilver, which is not improperly called
mineral water, and which, without any inflammation, nearly equals the
force of gunpowder by simple explosion and expansion, and is said, when
mixed with gunpowder, to increase its force.

Again, let the required nature be the transitory nature of flame and
its momentaneous extinction; for to us the nature of flame does not
appear to be fixed or settled, but to be generated from moment to
moment, and to be every instant extinguished; it being clear that
those flames which continue and last, do not owe their continuance to
the same mass of flame, but to a continued succession of new flame
regularly generated, and that the same identical flame does not
continue. This is easily shown by removing the food or source of the
flame, when it at once goes out. We have the two following crossways
with regard to this nature:

This momentary nature either arises from the cessation of the cause
which first produced it, as in light, sounds, and violent motions,
as they are termed, or flame may be capable, by its own nature, of
duration, but is subjected to some violence from the contrary natures
which surround it, and is destroyed.

We may therefore adopt the following instance of the cross. We see
to what a height the flames rise in great conflagrations; for as the
base of the flame becomes more extensive, its vertex is more lofty.
It appears, then, that the commencement of the extinction takes place
at the sides, where the flame is compressed by the air, and is ill
at ease; but the centre of the flame, which is untouched by the air
and surrounded by flame, continues the same, and is not extinguished
until compressed by degrees by the air attacking it from the sides.
All flame, therefore, is pyramidal, having its base near the source,
and its vertex pointed from its being resisted by the air, and not
supplied from the source. On the contrary, the smoke, which is narrow
at the base, expands in its ascent, and resembles an inverted pyramid,
because the air admits the smoke, but compresses the flame; for let
no one dream that the lighted flame is air, since they are clearly
heterogeneous.

The instance of the cross will be more accurate, if the experiment can
be made by flames of different colors. Take, therefore, a small metal
sconce, and place a lighted taper in it, then put it in a basin, and
pour a small quantity of spirits of wine round the sconce, so as not to
reach its edge, and light the spirit. Now the flame of the spirit will
be blue, and that of the taper yellow; observe, therefore, whether the
latter (which can easily be distinguished from the former by its color,
for flames do not mix immediately, as liquids do) continue pyramidal,
or tend more to a globular figure, since there is nothing to destroy or
compress it. If the latter result be observed, it must be considered
as settled, that flame continues positively the same, while inclosed
within another flame, and not exposed to the resisting force of the air.

Let this suffice for the instances of the cross. We have dwelt the
longer upon them in order gradually to teach and accustom mankind to
judge of nature by these instances, and enlightening experiments, and
not by probable reasons. [135]

XXXVII. We will treat of the instances of divorce as the fifteenth of
our prerogative instances. They indicate the separation of natures of
the most common occurrence. They differ, however, from those subjoined
to the accompanying instances; for the instances of divorce point out
the separation of a particular nature from some concrete substance with
which it is usually found in conjunction, while the hostile instances
point out the total separation of one nature from another. They differ,
also, from the instances of the cross, because they decide nothing, but
only inform us that the one nature is capable of being separated from
the other. They are of use in exposing false forms, and dissipating
hasty theories derived from obvious facts; so that they add ballast and
weight, as it were, to the understanding.

For instance, let the acquired natures be those four which Telesius
terms associates, and of the same family, namely, heat, light, rarity,
and mobility, or promptitude to motion; yet many instances of divorce
can be discovered between them. Air is rare and easily moved, but
neither hot nor light; the moon is light but not hot; boiling water is
warm but not light; the motion of the needle in the compass is swift
and active, and yet its substance is cold, dense, and opaque; and there
are many similar examples.

Again, let the required natures be corporeal nature and natural action.
The latter appears incapable of subsisting without some body, yet may
we, perhaps, even here find an instance of divorce, as in the magnetic
motion, which draws the iron to the magnet, and heavy bodies to the
globe of the earth; to which we may add other actions which operate at
a distance. For such action takes place in time, by distinct moments,
not in an instant; and in space, by regular degrees and distances.
There is, therefore, some one moment of time and some interval of
space, in which the power or action is suspended between the two bodies
creating the motion. Our consideration, then, is reduced to this,
whether the bodies which are the extremes of motion prepare or alter
the intermediate bodies, so that the power advances from one extreme
to the other by succession and actual contact, and in the meantime
exists in some intermediate body; or whether there exists in reality
nothing but the bodies, the power, and the space? In the case of the
rays of light, sounds, and heat, and some other objects which operate
at a distance, it is indeed probable that the intermediate bodies
are prepared and altered, the more so because a qualified medium is
required for their operation. But the magnetic or attractive power
admits of an indifferent medium, and it is not impeded in any. But
if that power or action is independent of the intermediate body, it
follows that it is a natural power or action existing in a certain time
and space without any body, since it exists neither in the extreme nor
in the intermediate bodies. Hence the magnetic action may be taken as
an instance of divorce of corporeal nature and natural action; to which
we may add, as a corollary and an advantage not to be neglected, that
it may be taken as a proof of essence and substance being separate and
incorporeal, even by those who philosophize according to the senses.
For if natural power and action emanating from a body can exist at any
time and place entirely without any body, it is nearly a proof that
it can also emanate originally from an incorporeal substance; for a
corporeal nature appears to be no less necessary for supporting and
conveying, than for exciting or generating natural action.

XXXVIII. Next follow five classes of instances which we are wont to
call by the general term of instances of the lamp, or of immediate
information. They are such as assist the senses; for since every
interpretation of nature sets out from the senses, and leads, by a
regular fixed and well-established road, from the perceptions of
the senses to those of the understanding (which are true notions
and axioms), it necessarily follows, that in proportion as the
representatives or ministerings of the senses are more abundant and
accurate, everything else must be more easy and successful.

The first of these five sets of instances of the lamp, strengthen,
enlarge, and correct the immediate operations of the senses; the second
reduce to the sphere of the senses such matters as are beyond it; the
third indicate the continued process or series of such things and
motions, as for the most part are only observed in their termination,
or in periods; the fourth supply the absolute wants of the senses; the
fifth excite their attention and observation, and at the same time
limit the subtilty of things. We will now proceed to speak of them
singly.

XXXIX. In the sixteenth rank, then, of prerogative instances, we will
place the instances of the door or gate, by which name we designate
such as assist the immediate action of the senses. It is obvious,
that sight holds the first rank among the senses, with regard to
information, for which reason we must seek principally helps for that
sense. These helps appear to be threefold, either to enable it to
perceive objects not naturally seen, or to see them from a greater
distance, or to see them more accurately and distinctly.

We have an example of the first (not to speak of spectacles and the
like, which only correct and remove the infirmity of a deficient
sight, and therefore give no further information) in the lately
invented microscopes, which exhibit the latent and invisible minutiæ
of substances, and their hidden formation and motion, by wonderfully
increasing their apparent magnitude. By their assistance we behold
with astonishment the accurate form and outline of a flea, moss, and
animalculæ, as well as their previously invisible color and motion.
It is said, also, that an apparently straight line, drawn with a
pen or pencil, is discovered by such a microscope to be very uneven
and curved, because neither the motion of the hand, when assisted
by a ruler, nor the impression of ink or color, are really regular,
although the irregularities are so minute as not to be perceptible
without the assistance of the microscope. Men have (as is usual in
new and wonderful discoveries) added a superstitious remark, that
the microscope sheds a lustre on the works of nature, and dishonor
on those of art, which only means that the tissue of nature is much
more delicate than that of art. For the microscope is only of use for
minute objects, and Democritus, perhaps, if he had seen it, would have
exulted in the thought of a means being discovered for seeing his atom,
which he affirmed to be entirely invisible. But the inadequacy of these
microscopes, for the observation of any but the most minute bodies, and
even of those if parts of a larger body, destroys their utility; for
if the invention could be extended to greater bodies, or the minute
parts of greater bodies, so that a piece of cloth would appear like a
net, and the latent minutiæ and irregularities of gems, liquids, urine,
blood, wounds, and many other things could be rendered visible, the
greatest advantage would, without doubt, be derived.

We have an instance of the second kind in the telescope, discovered
by the wonderful exertions of Galileo; by the assistance of which a
nearer intercourse may be opened (as by boats or vessels) between
ourselves and the heavenly objects. For by its aid we are assured
that the Milky Way is but a knot or constellation of small stars,
clearly defined and separate, which the ancients only conjectured to
be the case; whence it appears to be capable of demonstration, that
the spaces of the planetary orbits (as they are termed) are not quite
destitute of other stars, but that the heaven begins to glitter with
stars before we arrive at the starry sphere, although they may be too
small to be visible without the telescope. By the telescope, also, we
can behold the revolutions of smaller stars round Jupiter, whence it
may be conjectured that there are several centres of motion among the
stars. By its assistance, also, the irregularity of light and shade on
the moon’s surface is more clearly observed and determined, so as to
allow of a sort of selenography. [136] By the telescope we see the spots
in the sun, and other similar phenomena; all of which are most noble
discoveries, as far as credit can be safely given to demonstrations
of this nature, which are on this account very suspicious, namely,
that experiment stops at these few, and nothing further has yet
been discovered by the same method, among objects equally worthy of
consideration.

We have instances of the third kind in measuring-rods, astrolabes,
and the like, which do not enlarge, but correct and guide the sight.
If there be other instances which assist the other senses in their
immediate and individual action, yet if they add nothing further to
their information they are not apposite to our present purpose, and we
have therefore said nothing of them.

XL. In the seventeenth rank of prerogative instances we will place
citing instances (to borrow a term from the tribunals), because they
cite those things to appear, which have not yet appeared. We are wont
also to call them invoking instances, and their property is that of
reducing to the sphere of the senses objects which do not immediately
fall within it.

Objects escape the senses either from their distance, or the
intervention of other bodies, or because they are not calculated
to make an impression upon the senses, or because they are not in
sufficient quantity to strike the senses, or because there is not
sufficient time for their acting upon the senses, or because the
impression is too violent, or because the senses are previously filled
and possessed by the object, so as to leave no room for any new motion.
These remarks apply principally to sight, and next to touch, which two
senses act extensively in giving information, and that too upon general
objects, while the remaining three inform us only, as it were, by their
immediate action, and as to specific objects.

There can be no reduction to the sphere of the senses in the first
case, unless in the place of the object, which cannot be perceived
on account of the distance, there be added or substituted some other
object, which can excite and strike the sense from a greater distance,
as in the communication of intelligence by fires, bells, and the like.

In the second case we effect this reduction by rendering those things
which are concealed by the interposition of other bodies, and which
cannot easily be laid open, evident to the senses by means of that
which lies at the surface, or proceeds from the interior; thus the
state of the body is judged of by the pulse, urine, etc.

The third and fourth cases apply to many subjects, and the reduction
to the sphere of the senses must be obtained from every quarter in the
investigation of things. There are many examples. It is obvious that
air, and spirit, and the like, whose whole substance is extremely rare
and delicate, can neither be seen nor touched--a reduction, therefore,
to the senses becomes necessary in every investigation relating to such
bodies.

Let the required nature, therefore, be the action and motion of the
spirit inclosed in tangible bodies; for every tangible body with which
we are acquainted contains an invisible and intangible spirit, over
which it is drawn, and which it seems to clothe. This spirit being
emitted from a tangible substance, leaves the body contracted and dry;
when retained, it softens and melts it; when neither wholly emitted nor
retained, it models it, endows it with limbs, assimilates, manifests,
organizes it, and the like. All these points are reduced to the sphere
of the senses by manifest effects.

For in every tangible and inanimate body the inclosed spirit at first
increases, and as it were feeds on the tangible parts which are most
open and prepared for it; and when it has digested and modified them,
and turned them into spirit, it escapes with them. This formation and
increase of spirit is rendered sensible by the diminution of weight;
for in every desiccation something is lost in quantity, not only of
the spirit previously existing in the body, but of the body itself,
which was previously tangible, and has been recently changed, for the
spirit itself has no weight. The departure or emission of spirit is
rendered sensible in the rust of metals, and other putrefactions of a
like nature, which stop before they arrive at the rudiments of life,
which belong to the third species of process. [137] In compact bodies
the spirit does not find pores and passages for its escape, and is
therefore obliged to force out, and drive before it, the tangible parts
also, which consequently protrude, whence arises rust and the like. The
contraction of the tangible parts, occasioned by the emission of part
of the spirit (whence arises desiccation), is rendered sensible by the
increased hardness of the substance, and still more by the fissures,
contractions, shrivelling, and folds of the bodies thus produced. For
the parts of wood split and contract, skins become shrivelled, and not
only that, but, if the spirit be emitted suddenly by the heat of the
fire, become so hastily contracted as to twist and roll themselves up.

On the contrary, when the spirit is retained, and yet expanded and
excited by heat or the like (which happens in solid and tenacious
bodies), then the bodies are softened, as in hot iron; or flow, as in
metals; or melt, as in gums, wax, and the like. The contrary effects
of heat, therefore (hardening some substances and melting others), are
easily reconciled,[138] because the spirit is emitted in the former,
and agitated and retained in the latter; the latter action is that of
heat and the spirit, the former that of the tangible parts themselves,
after the spirit’s emission.

But when the spirit is neither entirely retained nor emitted, but
only strives and exercises itself, within its limits, and meets with
tangible parts, which obey and readily follow it wherever it leads
them, then follows the formation of an organic body, and of limbs, and
the other vital actions of vegetables and animals. These are rendered
sensible chiefly by diligent observation of the first beginnings, and
rudiments or effects of life in animalculæ sprung from putrefaction, as
in the eggs of ants, worms, mosses, frogs after rain, etc. Both a mild
heat and a pliant substance, however, are necessary for the production
of life, in order that the spirit may neither hastily escape, nor be
restrained by the obstinacy of the parts, so as not to be able to bend
and model them like wax.

Again, the difference of spirit which is important and of effect
in many points (as unconnected spirit, branching spirit, branching
and cellular spirit, the first of which is that of all inanimate
substances, the second of vegetables, and the third of animals), is
placed, as it were, before the eyes by many reducing instances.

Again, it is clear that the more refined tissue and conformation of
things (though forming the whole body of visible or tangible objects)
are neither visible nor tangible. Our information, therefore, must
here also be derived from reduction to the sphere of the senses. But
the most radical and primary difference of formation depends on the
abundance or scarcity of matter within the same space or dimensions.
For the other formations which regard the dissimilarity of the parts
contained in the same body, and their collocation and position, are
secondary in comparison with the former.

Let the required nature then be the expansion or coherence of matter in
different bodies, or the quantity of matter relative to the dimensions
of each. For there is nothing in nature more true than the twofold
proposition--that nothing proceeds from nothing and that nothing is
reduced to nothing, but that the quantum, or sum total of matter, is
constant, and is neither increased nor diminished. Nor is it less true,
that out of this given quantity of matter, there is a greater or less
quantity, contained within the same space or dimensions according to
the difference of bodies; as, for instance, water contains more than
air. So that if any one were to assert that a given content of water
can be changed into an equal content of air, it is the same as if he
were to assert that something can be reduced into nothing. On the
contrary, if any one were to assert that a given content of air can be
changed into an equal content of water, it is the same as if he were
to assert that something can proceed from nothing. From this abundance
or scarcity of matter are properly derived the notions of density and
rarity, which are taken in various and promiscuous senses.

This third assertion may be considered as being also sufficiently
certain; namely, that the greater or less quantity of matter in this or
that body, may, by comparison, be reduced to calculation, and exact, or
nearly exact, proportion. Thus, if one should say that there is such
an accumulation of matter in a given quantity of gold, that it would
require twenty-one times the quantity in dimension of spirits of wine,
to make up the same quantity of matter, it would not be far from the
truth.

The accumulation of matter, however, and its relative quantity, are
rendered sensible by weight; for weight is proportionate to the
quantity of matter, as regards the parts of a tangible substance, but
spirit and its quantity of matter are not to be computed by weight,
which spirit rather diminishes than augments.

We have made a tolerably accurate table of weight, in which we have
selected the weights and size of all the metals, the principal
minerals, stones, liquids, oils, and many other natural and artificial
bodies: a very useful proceeding both as regards theory and practice,
and which is capable of revealing many unexpected results. Nor is this
of little consequence, that it serves to demonstrate that the whole
range of the variety of tangible bodies with which we are acquainted
(we mean tolerably close, and not spongy, hollow bodies, which are for
a considerable part filled with air), does not exceed the ratio of one
to twenty-one. So limited is nature, or at least that part of it to
which we are most habituated.

We have also thought it deserving our industry, to try if we could
arrive at the ratio of intangible or pneumatic bodies to tangible
bodies, which we attempted by the following contrivance. We took a
vial capable of containing about an ounce, using a small vessel in
order to effect the subsequent evaporation with less heat. We filled
this vial, almost to the neck, with spirits of wine, selecting it as
the tangible body which, by our table, was the rarest, and contained a
less quantity of matter in a given space than all other tangible bodies
which are compact and not hollow. Then we noted exactly the weight
of the liquid and vial. We next took a bladder, containing about two
pints, and squeezed all the air out of it, as completely as possible,
and until the sides of the bladder met. We first, however, rubbed the
bladder gently with oil, so as to make it air-tight, by closing its
pores with the oil. We tied the bladder tightly round the mouth of the
vial, which we had inserted in it, and with a piece of waxed thread
to make it fit better and more tightly, and then placed the vial on
some hot coals in a brazier. The vapor or steam of the spirit, dilated
and become aëriform by the heat, gradually swelled out the bladder,
and stretched it in every direction like a sail. As soon as that was
accomplished, we removed the vial from the fire and placed it on a
carpet, that it might not be cracked by the cold; we also pricked the
bladder immediately, that the steam might not return to a liquid state
by the cessation of heat, and confound the proportions. We then removed
the bladder, and again took the weight of the spirit which remained;
and so calculated the quantity which had been converted into vapor, or
an aëriform shape, and then examined how much space had been occupied
by the body in its form of spirits of wine in the vial, and how much,
on the other hand, had been occupied by it in its aëriform shape in the
bladder, and subtracted the results; from which it was clear that the
body, thus converted and changed, acquired an expansion of one hundred
times beyond its former bulk.

Again, let the required nature be heat or cold, of such a degree as
not to be sensible from its weakness. They are rendered sensible by
the thermometer, as we described it above;[139] for the cold and heat
are not actually perceived by the touch, but heat expands and cold
contracts the air. Nor, again, is that expansion or contraction of the
air in itself visible, but the air when expanded depresses the water,
and when contracted raises it, which is the first reduction to sight.

Again, let the required nature be the mixture of bodies; namely,
how much aqueous, oleaginous or spirituous, ashy or salt parts they
contain; or, as a particular example, how much butter, cheese, and whey
there is in milk, and the like. These things are rendered sensible by
artificial and skilful separations in tangible substances; and the
nature of the spirit in them, though not immediately perceptible, is
nevertheless discovered by the various motions and efforts of bodies.
And, indeed, in this branch men have labored hard in distillations
and artificial separations, but with little more success than in
their other experiments now in use; their methods being mere guesses
and blind attempts, and more industrious than intelligent; and what
is worst of all, without any imitation or rivalry of nature, but
rather by violent heats and too energetic agents, to the destruction
of any delicate conformation, in which principally consist the
hidden virtues and sympathies. Nor do men in these separations ever
attend to or observe what we have before pointed out; namely, that
in attacking bodies by fire, or other methods, many qualities are
superinduced by the fire itself, and the other bodies used to effect
the separation, which were not originally in the compound. Hence arise
most extraordinary fallacies; for the mass of vapor which is emitted
from water by fire, for instance, did not exist as vapor or air in the
water, but is chiefly created by the expansion of the water by the heat
of the fire.

So, in general, all delicate experiments on natural or artificial
bodies, by which the genuine are distinguished from the adulterated,
and the better from the more common, should be referred to this
division; for they bring that which is not the object of the senses
within their sphere. They are therefore to be everywhere diligently
sought after.

With regard to the fifth cause of objects escaping our senses, it is
clear that the action of the sense takes place by motion, and this
motion is time. If, therefore, the motion of any body be either so slow
or so swift as not to be proportioned to the necessary momentum which
operates on the senses, the object is not perceived at all; as in the
motion of the hour hand, and that, again, of a musket-ball. The motion
which is imperceptible by the senses from its slowness, is readily and
usually rendered sensible by the accumulation of motion; that which is
imperceptible from its velocity, has not as yet been well measured; it
is necessary, however, that this should be done in some cases, with a
view to a proper investigation of nature.

The sixth case, where the sense is impeded by the power of the object,
admits of a reduction to the sensible sphere, either by removing the
object to a greater distance, or by deadening its effects by the
interposition of a medium, which may weaken and not destroy the object;
or by the admission of its reflection where the direct impression is
too strong, as that of the sun in a basin of water.

The seventh case, where the senses are so overcharged with the object
as to leave no further room, scarcely occurs except in the smell or
taste, and is not of much consequence as regards our present subject.
Let what we have said, therefore, suffice with regard to the reduction
to the sensible sphere of objects not naturally within its compass.

Sometimes, however, this reduction is not extended to the senses of
man, but to those of some other animal, whose senses, in some points,
exceed those of man; as (with regard to some scents) to that of the
dog, and with regard to light existing imperceptibly in the air, when
not illuminated from any extraneous source, to the sense of the cat,
the owl, and other animals which see by night. For Telesius has well
observed, that there appears to be an original portion of light even
in the air itself,[140] although but slight and meagre, and of no use
for the most part to the eyes of men, and those of the generality
of animals; because those animals to whose senses this light is
proportioned can see by night, which does not, in all probability,
proceed from their seeing either without light or by any internal light.

Here, too, we would observe, that we at present discuss only the
wants of the senses, and their remedies; for their deceptions must be
referred to the inquiries appropriated to the senses, and sensible
objects; except that important deception, which makes them define
objects in their relation to man, and not in their relation to the
universe, and which is only corrected by universal reasoning and
philosophy. [141]

XLI. In the eighteenth rank of prerogative instances we will class the
instances of the road, which we are also wont to call itinerant and
jointed instances. They are such as indicate the gradually continued
motions of nature. This species of instances escapes rather our
observation than our senses; for men are wonderfully indolent upon
this subject, consulting nature in a desultory manner, and at periodic
intervals, when bodies have been regularly finished and completed,
and not during her work. But if any one were desirous of examining
and contemplating the talents and industry of an artificer, he would
not merely wish to see the rude materials of his art, and then his
work when finished, but rather to be present while he is at labor,
and proceeding with his work. Something of the same kind should be
done with regard to nature. For instance, if any one investigate the
vegetation of plants, he should observe from the first sowing of any
seed (which can easily be done, by pulling up every day seeds which
have been two, three, or four days in the ground, and examining them
diligently), how and when the seed begins to swell and break, and be
filled, as it were, with spirit; then how it begins to burst the bark
and push out fibres, raising itself a little at the same time, unless
the ground be very stiff; then how it pushes out these fibres, some
downward for roots, others upward for the stem, sometimes also creeping
laterally, if it find the earth open and more yielding on one side, and
the like. The same should be done in observing the hatching of eggs,
where we may easily see the process of animation and organization, and
what parts are formed of the yolk, and what of the white of the egg,
and the like. The same may be said of the inquiry into the formation
of animals from putrefaction; for it would not be so humane to inquire
into perfect and terrestrial animals, by cutting the fœtus from the
womb; but opportunities may perhaps be offered of abortions, animals
killed in hunting, and the like. Nature, therefore, must, as it were,
be watched, as being more easily observed by night than by day: for
contemplations of this kind may be considered as carried on by night,
from the minuteness and perpetual burning of our watch-light.

The same must be attempted with inanimate objects, which we have
ourselves done by inquiring into the opening of liquids by fire.
For the mode in which water expands is different from that observed
in wine, vinegar, or verjuice, and very different, again, from that
observed in milk and oil, and the like; and this was easily seen by
boiling them with slow heat, in a glass vessel, through which the
whole may be clearly perceived. But we merely mention this, intending
to treat of it more at large and more closely when we come to the
discovery of the latent process; for it should always be remembered
that we do not here treat of things themselves, but merely propose
examples. [142]

XLII. In the nineteenth rank of prerogative instances we will class
supplementary or substitutive instances, which we are also wont to call
instances of refuge. They are such as supply information, where the
senses are entirely deficient, and we therefore have recourse to them
when appropriate instances cannot be obtained. This substitution is
twofold, either by approximation or by analogy. For instance, there is
no known medium which entirely prevents the effect of the magnet in
attracting iron--neither gold, nor silver, nor stone, nor glass, wood,
water, oil, cloth, or fibrous bodies, air, flame, or the like. Yet by
accurate experiment, a medium may perhaps be found which would deaden
its effect, more than another comparatively and in degree; as, for
instance, the magnet would not perhaps attract iron through the same
thickness of gold as of air, or the same quantity of ignited as of cold
silver, and so on; for we have not ourselves made the experiment, but
it will suffice as an example. Again, there is no known body which is
not susceptible of heat, when brought near the fire; yet air becomes
warm much sooner than stone. These are examples of substitution by
approximation.

Substitution by analogy is useful, but less sure, and therefore to be
adopted with some judgment. It serves to reduce that which is not the
object of the senses to their sphere, not by the perceptible operations
of the imperceptible body, but by the consideration of some similar
perceptible body. For instance, let the subject for inquiry be the
mixture of spirits, which are invisible bodies. There appears to be
some relation between bodies and their sources or support. Now, the
source of flame seems to be oil and fat; that of air, water, and watery
substances; for flame increases over the exhalation of oil, and air
over that of water. One must therefore consider the mixture of oil and
water, which is manifest to the senses, since that of air and flame in
general escapes the senses. But oil and water mix very imperfectly by
composition or stirring, while they are exactly and nicely mixed in
herbs, blood, and the parts of animals. Something similar, therefore,
may take place in the mixture of flame and air in spirituous
substances, not bearing mixture very well by simple collision, while
they appear, however, to be well mixed in the spirits of plants and
animals.

Again, if the inquiry do not relate to perfect mixtures of spirits,
but merely to their composition, as whether they easily incorporate
with each other, or there be rather (as an example) certain winds and
exhalations, or other spiritual bodies, which do not mix with common
air, but only adhere to and float in it in globules and drops, and
are rather broken and pounded by the air, than received into, and
incorporated with it; this cannot be perceived in common air, and other
aëriform substances, on account of the rarity of the bodies, but an
image, as it were, of this process may be conceived in such liquids
as quicksilver, oil, water, and even air, when broken and dissipated
it ascends in small portions through water, and also in the thicker
kinds of smoke; lastly, in dust, raised and remaining in the air, in
all of which there is no incorporation: and the above representation
in this respect is not a bad one, if it be first diligently
investigated, whether there can be such a difference of nature between
spirituous substances, as between liquids, for then these images might
conveniently be substituted by analogy.

And although we have observed of these supplementary instances, that
information is to be derived from them, when appropriate instances are
wanting, by way of refuge, yet we would have it understood, that they
are also of great use, when the appropriate instances are at hand, in
order to confirm the information afforded by them; of which we will
speak more at length, when our subject leads us, in due course, to the
support of induction.

XLIII. In the twentieth rank of prerogative instances we will place
lancing instances, which we are also wont (but for a different reason)
to call twitching instances. We adopt the latter name, because they
twitch the understanding, and the former because they pierce nature,
whence we style them occasionally the instances of Democritus. [143]
They are such as warn the understanding of the admirable and
exquisite subtilty of nature, so that it becomes roused and awakened
to attention, observation, and proper inquiry; as, for instance,
that a little drop of ink should be drawn out into so many letters;
that silver merely gilt on its surface should be stretched to such a
length of gilt wire; that a little worm, such as you may find on the
skin, should possess both a spirit and a varied conformation of its
parts; that a little saffron should imbue a whole tub of water with
its color; that a little musk or aroma should imbue a much greater
extent of air with its perfume; that a cloud of smoke should be
raised by a little incense; that such accurate differences of sounds
as articulate words should be conveyed in all directions through the
air, and even penetrate the pores of wood and water (though they
become much weakened), that they should be, moreover, reflected, and
that with such distinctness and velocity; that light and color should
for such an extent and so rapidly pass through solid bodies, such as
glass and water, with so great and so exquisite a variety of images,
and should be refracted and reflected; that the magnet should attract
through every description of body, even the most compact; but (what
is still more wonderful) that in all these cases the action of one
should not impede that of another in a common medium, such as air;
and that there should be borne through the air, at the same time, so
many images of visible objects, so many impulses of articulation, so
many different perfumes, as of the violet, rose, etc.