No More Learning

[212] Cp. v. 10.

[213] See i. 10 and 76.

[214] Reading _inexperti belli rubor_ (Andresen).

[215] Of Pontus, Syria, and Egypt.

[216] Antiochus of Commagene (between Syria and Cappadocia),
Agrippa of Peraea (east of Jordan), and Sohaemus of Sophene
(on the Upper Euphrates, round the sources of the Tigris). See
chap. 81.

[217] Which dethroned Nero.

[218] III Cyrenaica, XXII Deiotariana.

[219] Titus and their officers and friends.

[220] These accounts are lost. There was one such attempt
under Domitian and another under Titus. The Christians
expected him to re-appear as Antichrist.

[221] Thermia.

[222] See i. 54.

[223] These with Lycia at this date formed a single imperial
province.


THE TRIAL OF ANNIUS FAUSTUS

In a country so divided and tossed by frequent change of rulers 10
between liberty and licence even small events caused serious
disturbance. It happened that Vibius Crispus,[224] a man whose wealth,
influence, and ability had won him a reputation that was great rather
than good, had impeached before the senate a man of equestrian rank,
called Annius Faustus, who had been a professional informer under
Nero. The senate had recently in Galba's principate passed a
resolution authorizing the prosecution of informers. This resolution
had been variously applied from time to time, and interpreted
rigorously or leniently according as the defendant was helpless or
influential. But it still retained some terrors. Crispus, moreover,
had exerted all his powers to secure the conviction of the man who had
informed against his brother. [225] He had, in fact, induced a large
proportion of the senate to demand that Faustus should be sent to
execution undefended and unheard. However, with others, the defendant
gained a great advantage from his prosecutor's undue influence. 'We
must give him time,' they argued, 'the charges must be published:
however hateful the criminal his case must be properly heard. ' At
first this advice prevailed. The trial was postponed for a few days.
At length came the conviction of Faustus, which aroused in the country
less satisfaction than his vile character warranted. People recalled
the fact that Crispus himself had turned informer with pecuniary
profit. It was not the penalty but the prosecutor that was unpopular.

FOOTNOTES:

[224] A close friend of Vespasian, who was supposed to ply the
trade of informer (cp. iv. 41 and 43).

[225] Vibius Secundus, banished for extortion in Mauretania.


OTHO'S MEASURES OF DEFENCE

Meanwhile the war opened successfully for Otho. At his order the 11
armies of Dalmatia and Pannonia started from their base. They
comprised four legions,[226] each of which had sent forward
detachments two thousand strong. The rest followed at a short
interval: the Seventh legion raised by Galba,[227] the Eleventh and
Thirteenth, both composed of veteran troops, and the Fourteenth, which
had won great distinction by crushing the rebellion in Britain. [228]
Nero had further increased their glory by choosing them for special
service,[229] which accounts for their lasting loyalty to Nero and
their keen support of Otho. But the stronger their numbers the greater
their self-confidence and the slower their march. The cavalry and
auxiliaries preceded the main body of the legions. From Rome itself
came no mean force, five regiments of Guards with some detachments of
cavalry and the First legion. [230] To these were added an irregular
force of 2,000 gladiators,[231] a shameful assistance of which during
the civil wars even strict generals availed themselves. Annius Gallus
was placed in command of these forces with Vestricius Spurinna,[232]
and they were sent forward to hold the line of the Po. Their first
plans had failed, Caecina, whom Otho had hoped to hold within the
Gallic provinces, having already crossed the Alps. [233] Under Otho's
personal command marched picked detachments of his Body Guard and the
rest of the Household troops, together with reservists of the Guard
and a large force of marines. [234] He let no luxury either delay or
disgrace his march. In an iron breast-plate he marched on foot at the
head of his troops, looking rough and dishevelled, quite unlike his
reputation.

Fortune smiled on his first efforts. By sea his fleet held most of 12
the Italian coast right up to the foot of the Maritime Alps. To secure
these mountains and attack the province of Narbonese Gaul he had
placed in command Suedius Clemens, Antonius Novellus, and Aemilius
Pacensis. [235] Pacensis, however, was made a prisoner by his mutinous
troops: Novellus had no authority: Clemens' command rested on
popularity, and he was as greedy of battle as he was criminally blind
to insubordination. No one could have imagined they were in Italy, on
the soil of their native land. As though on foreign shores and among
an enemy's towns, they burnt, ravaged, plundered, with results all the
more horrible since no precautions had been taken against danger. The
fields were full, the houses open. The inhabitants came to meet them
with their wives and children, and were lured by the security of
peace into all the horrors of war. The Governor of the Maritime
Alps[236] at that time was Marius Maturus. He summoned the
inhabitants, whose fighting strength was ample, and proposed to resist
at the frontier the Othonians' invasion of the province. But at the
first engagement the mountaineers were cut down and dispersed. They
had assembled in random haste; they knew nothing of military service
or discipline, nothing of the glory of victory or the disgrace of
flight.

Enraged by this engagement, Otho's troops visited their 13
indignation on the town of Albintimilium. [237] The battle had brought
them no booty, for the peasants were poor and their armour worthless,
and being swift of foot, with a good knowledge of the country, they
had escaped capture. However, the soldiers sated their greed at the
expense of the innocent town. A Ligurian woman afforded a fine example
of courage which made their conduct the more odious. She had concealed
her son, and when the soldiers, who believed that she had hidden some
money as well, demanded from her under torture where she was keeping
him concealed, she pointed to her belly and replied, 'He is in
hiding. ' No subsequent tortures nor even death itself could bring her
to change that brave and noble answer.

Panic-stricken couriers brought to Fabius Valens the news that 14
Otho's fleet was threatening the province of Narbonese Gaul, which had
sworn allegiance to Vitellius. Representatives from the Roman colonies
also arrived beseeching his aid. He dispatched two cohorts of the
Tungri[238] and four troops of horse, together with the entire cavalry
regiment of the Treviri. [239] This force was put under the command of
Julius Classicus,[240] and part of it was detained in the colony of
Forum Julii,[241] since if the whole force marched inland and the
sea-board were left unprotected Otho's fleet would swoop down at once.
Twelve troops of cavalry and a picked body of auxiliaries marched
against the enemy: these were reinforced by a Ligurian cohort which
had long garrisoned this district, and a draft of five hundred
Pannonian recruits who had not yet joined their legion. [242] The
engagement began promptly. Their line was so arranged that some of the
marines, reinforced by the peasants, held the rising ground by the
sea, while the Guards filled the level space between the hills and the
shore. The fleet, acting in conjunction with the land force, was ready
to play its part in the battle, and extended a threatening front
facing the coast. The Vitellians, weaker in infantry, put their trust
in their horse. The mountaineers[243] were posted on the neighbouring
heights, and the auxiliaries massed in close order behind the cavalry.
The Treviran cavalry rashly charged the enemy, and meeting Otho's
guards in front were simultaneously assailed in the flank by the
peasants, flinging stones. This they could do well enough; and,
drafted among the regulars, they all, bold and timid alike, showed the
same courage in the hour of victory. Panic struck the defeated
Vitellians when the fleet began to harass their rear. They were now
surrounded, and would have been entirely destroyed had not darkness
arrested the victors and sheltered their flight. But though beaten 15
the Vitellians were not cowed. Calling up reinforcements, they
suddenly attacked while the unsuspecting enemy were taking their ease
after the victory. They killed the pickets, broke into the camp and
terrified the sailors. In time the panic subsided. The Othonians
seized a hill, defended their position, and eventually assumed the
offensive. The slaughter was frightful. The officers commanding the
Tungri, after a long defence of their position, fell beneath a shower
of weapons. The victory also cost the Othonians heavy loss, for the
enemy's cavalry rallied and cut off all who rashly ventured too far in
pursuit. So they agreed to a sort of armistice. As a safeguard against
sudden raids either by the fleet on the one side or the cavalry on the
other, the Vitellians retired to Antipolis,[244] a town of the
Narbonese province, and the Othonians to Albingaunum[245] in the
interior of Liguria.

The fame of this naval victory kept Corsica and Sardinia and the 16
adjacent islands faithful to Otho's cause. However, Decumus Pacarius,
the procurator,[246] nearly ruined Corsica by an act of indiscretion,
which in a war of such dimensions could not possibly have affected the
issue, and only ended in his own destruction. He hated Otho and
determined to aid Vitellius with all the forces of Corsica; a useless
assistance, even if it had been forthcoming. He summoned the chief men
of the island and disclosed his project. Claudius Pyrrhicus, who
commanded the Liburnian cruisers[247] stationed there, and a Roman
knight named Quintius Certus ventured to oppose him. He ordered their
execution. This overawed the others who were present. So they swore
allegiance to Vitellius, as did also the general mass of ignorant
people, who blindly shared a fear they did not feel. However, when
Pacarius began to enlist them and to harass his undisciplined men with
military duties, their loathing for the unwonted labour set them
thinking of their weakness. 'They lived in an island: Vitellius'
legions were in Germany, a long way off: Otho's fleet had already
sacked and plundered districts that had even horse and foot to protect
them. ' The revulsion was sudden, but did not issue in overt
resistance. They chose a suitable moment for their treachery. Waiting
till Pacarius' visitors[248] were gone, they murdered him, stripped
and helpless, in his bath, and killed his comrades too. The heads they
bore themselves to Otho, like enemies' scalps. Neither did Otho reward
nor Vitellius punish them. In the general confusion their deed was
overshadowed by more heinous crimes.

We have already described[249] how 'Silius' Horse' had admitted the 17
war into the heart of Italy. No one there either supported Otho or
preferred Vitellius. But prolonged peace had broken their spirits to
utter servility. They were an easy prey to the first comer and cared
little who was the better man. All the fields and cities between the
Alps and the Po, the most fertile district in Italy, were held by the
Vitellian forces, the cohorts sent forward by Caecina[249] having
already arrived. One of the Pannonian cohorts had been captured at
Cremona: a hundred cavalry and a thousand marines had been cut off
between Placentia and Ticinum. [250] After this success the river and
its steep banks were no barrier to the Vitellian troops: indeed the
Batavians and other Germans found the Po a positive temptation.
Crossing suddenly opposite Placentia, they captured a handful of
scouts and created such a panic that the others in terror spread the
false report that Caecina's whole army was upon them.

Spurinna, who was holding Placentia, had made up his mind that 18
Caecina had not yet arrived, and that, if he should, his troops must
be kept within their lines: he could not pit three cohorts of guards
with one detachment a thousand strong,[251] and a few cavalry, against
Caecina's veteran army. But his men were unruly and ignorant of
war. [252] Seizing the standards and colours[253] they broke out,
threatening to kill the general who tried to check them and paying no
heed to their superior officers. They even clamoured that Otho was
being betrayed, and Caecina had been summoned. [254] Spurinna yielded
unwillingly to their folly, at first under compulsion, later with a
show of sympathy. He was anxious to gain weight for his advice,
should the mutiny cool.

At nightfall, with the Po in sight, Spurinna decided to entrench 19
his camp. [255] The unaccustomed hard work soon blunted the enthusiasm
of his town-bred troops. The older men began to curse their credulity,
and to point out the fearful danger to their small force of being
surrounded by Caecina's army in the open country. Soon a more sober
spirit pervaded the camp. The tribunes and centurions mingled with the
men, and every one talked with admiration of Spurinna's foresight in
selecting a powerful and wealthy colony as a strong base for their
operations. Finally Spurinna himself rather explained his plans than
reproached their faults, and, leaving patrols behind, succeeded
eventually in leading the rest of the men back to Placentia in a
quieter and more submissive frame of mind. There the walls were
repaired, outworks built, and the turrets increased in height and
number, while Spurinna provided not only for arms and ammunition but
also for obedience and discipline. This was all his party lacked, for
their courage was unimpeachable.

Caecina, on the other hand, seemed to have left his cruelty and 20
profligacy on the other side of the Alps. He marched through Italy
with a well-disciplined force. The people in the country-towns and
colonies took offence at his costume as showing arrogance. While they
wore the plain toga, Caecina addressed them attired in a
parti-coloured plaid and trousers. [256] Moreover, his wife Salonina
rode on a fine horse with purple trappings, and though this did no one
any harm, they grumbled and seemed hurt. It is an ineradicable human
trait to turn critical eyes on new-found fortune, and to insist upon
moderation most of all in those who used to be our equals. Crossing
the Po, Caecina tried to undermine the loyalty of the Othonians by
negotiations and promises. They retaliated with the same weapons, and
when they had finished bandying empty and fine-sounding phrases about
Peace and Union, Caecina devoted all his attention and plans to an
assault on Placentia in terrific force. He knew that his future
reputation rested on the issue of his first engagements. [257]

But the first day's work savoured more of impatience than of a 21
veteran army's methods. The men ventured under the walls without cover
or precaution, drunk and overfed. Meanwhile the amphitheatre, a fine
building outside the walls, was burnt down. It was set on fire either
by the attacking force hurling torches and heated shot and
fire-brands, or by the besieged in returning their fire. The common
people of the town harboured a suspicion that fuel for the fire had
been surreptitiously introduced from one of the neighbouring colonies,
and that the motive was jealousy, since no building in Italy could
hold so many people. However it happened, they thought little of it,
while worse disasters threatened: safety assured, they bewailed it as
the worst calamity they could have suffered. To return, however, to
Caecina: he was repulsed with heavy losses, and the night was spent in
preparations. The Vitellians provided mantlets, fascines, and
penthouses,[258] to protect the assailants while undermining the
walls: the Othonians procured stakes and huge masses of stone or lead
or brass, to break through the enemy's formation and crush them to
pieces. Both parties were actuated by feelings of pride and ambition.
Various encouragements were used, one side praising the strength of
the legions and the German army, the other the reputation of the
Guards and the City Garrison. The Vitellians decried their enemy as
lazy effeminates demoralized by the circus and the theatre: to which
they replied that the Vitellians were a pack of foreigners and
barbarians. Meanwhile, Otho and Vitellius were held up to praise or
blame, insult providing the more fruitful stimulus.

Hardly had day dawned before the walls of Placentia bristled with 22
defenders, and the fields glittered with the soldiers' armour. The
Vitellian legions[259] advancing in close order with their auxiliaries
in scattered bands assailed the higher portions of the walls with
stones and arrows: where the walls were in disrepair or crumbling from
age they came close up to them. The Othonians above, poising and
aiming their weapons with surer effect, rained them down on the
Germans, who came rashly charging under the walls with the wild songs
and scanty dress of their country, brandishing their shields over
their heads. Meanwhile, the legionaries under cover of their mantlets
and fascines set to work to undermine the walls, build up a mound, and
assail the gates, while Otho's Guards rolled on to them with terrific
crashes huge millstones, which they had arranged for this purpose
along the walls. Of those beneath, some were crushed by the stones;
others, wounded by darts, were left mangled and bleeding to death.
Panic redoubled the slaughter, and the rain of missiles came all the
fiercer from the walls. At last they sacrificed the honour of their
party and beat a retreat. Caecina, ashamed of his rash attempt at
assault, was afraid of looking ridiculous and useless if he sat still
in the same camp. So he crossed the Po and made for Cremona. As he
was retiring, Turullius Cerialis with a large force of marines, and
Julius Briganticus[260] with a few cavalry, came over to his side. The
latter, a Batavian born, had held a cavalry command: the former was a
senior centurion, who was known to Caecina, as he had served in that
capacity in Germany.

Spurinna, learning the enemy's route, informed Annius Gallus[261] 23
by letter of all that had happened, the defence of Placentia and
Caecina's plans. Gallus was leading the First legion to the relief of
Placentia, for he doubted the ability of the weak force of Guards to
resist a long siege and the full strength of the German army. Hearing
that Caecina was defeated and making for Cremona, he halted at
Bedriacum, though he found it hard to restrain the ardour of his
troops, whose zeal for battle nearly broke into mutiny. The village of
Bedriacum lies between Verona and Cremona,[262] and two Roman
disasters have now given it a sinister notoriety.

In the same week Martius Macer[263] gained a victory in the
neighbourhood of Cremona. With great enterprise he had transported his
gladiators across the Po, and suddenly flung them on to the opposite
bank. There they routed the Vitellian auxiliaries and killed all who
offered resistance, the rest taking flight to Cremona. But Macer
checked their victorious ardour, for fear that the enemy might be
reinforced and reverse the fortune of the battle. This aroused
suspicion among the Othonians, who put a bad construction on all that
their generals did. All the least courageous and most impudent of the
troops vied incessantly with each other in bringing various charges
against Annius Gallus, Suetonius Paulinus, and Marius Celsus, for the
two latter had also been placed in command by Otho. [264] The most
energetic in promoting mutiny and dissension were Galba's murderers,
who, maddened by their feelings of fear and of guilt, created endless
disorder, sometimes talking open sedition, sometimes sending anonymous
letters to Otho. As he always believed men of the meaner sort and
distrusted patriots, he now wavered nervously, being always irresolute
in success and firmer in the face of danger. He therefore sent for his
brother Titianus[265] and gave him the chief command.

Meanwhile success attended the generalship of Paulinus and 24
Celsus. [266] Caecina was tortured by his constant failure and the
waning reputation of his army. Repulsed from Placentia, he had lately
seen his auxiliaries defeated, and his patrols constantly worsted in
skirmishes more frequent than memorable. Now that Fabius Valens was
close at hand, he determined not to let all the glory of the war fall
to him, and hastened with more zeal than prudence to retrieve his
reputation. About twelve miles[267] distant from Cremona, at a place
called _Twin Brethren_,[268] he carefully concealed the bravest of his
auxiliaries in a wood overlooking the road. The cavalry were ordered
to ride forward down the road and provoke an engagement. They were
then to feign flight and lure the pursuers on in hot haste until they
fell into the ambush. This plan was betrayed to Otho's generals.
Paulinus took charge of the infantry, Celsus of the horse. A
detachment of the Thirteenth legion,[269] four auxiliary cohorts of
foot, and five hundred cavalry were stationed on the left flank. Three
cohorts of the Guards in column occupied the raised high-road. [270] On
the right flank marched the First legion, two auxiliary cohorts of
foot, and five hundred cavalry. Besides these they moved out a
thousand cavalry--Guards and auxiliaries--as a reserve to crown their
success, or assist them in difficulties.

Before they came to close quarters, the Vitellians began to 25
retire. Celsus, forewarned of the ruse, halted his men. Whereupon the
Vitellians impatiently rose from their ambush and, while Celsus slowly
retired, followed him further and further until they plunged headlong
into an ambush themselves. The auxiliaries were on their flanks; the
legions faced them in front; and the cavalry by a sudden manoeuvre had
closed in on their rear. However, Suetonius Paulinus did not
immediately give the signal for his infantry to charge. He was by
nature dilatory, and preferred cautiously reasoned measures to
accidental success. He kept on issuing orders about filling up the
ditches, clearing the fields and extending the line, convinced that it
was soon enough to play for victory when he had taken every precaution
against defeat. This delay gave the Vitellians time to take refuge in
the vineyards, where the interlaced vine-stems made it hard to follow.
Adjoining these was a little wood, from under cover of which they
ventured another sally and killed the foremost of the Guards' cavalry.
There Prince Epiphanes[271] was wounded, while making vigorous efforts
to rally Otho's forces.
At this point Otho's infantry charged, crushed the opposing line, 26
and even routed the troops who were hurrying up in support. For
Caecina had brought up his reinforcements not all at once but in
separate detachments. These, arriving in scattered units, and never in
sufficient force, only added to the confusion, since the panic of the
rout infected them as well. Mutiny, too, broke out in the camp,
because the troops were not all taken into battle. Julius Gratus, the
camp-prefect, was put in irons on a charge of plotting with his
brother, who was fighting on Otho's side. It was known that the
Othonians had arrested the brother, Julius Fronto, on the same charge.
For the rest, such was the universal panic among pursuers and pursued,
on the field and in the camp, that it was commonly said on both sides
that, if Suetonius Paulinus had not sounded the retreat, Caecina's
whole army might have been destroyed. Paulinus maintained that he
avoided any excessive strain of work or marching, for fear of exposing
his exhausted troops to a counter-attack from the Vitellians in the
camp, who were still fresh for battle: besides, he had no reserves to
fall back on in case of defeat. A few approved of the general's
strategy, but the common opinion was adverse. [272]

FOOTNOTES:

[226] See note 3.

[227] The legion brought from Spain, mentioned in i. 6.

[228] The revolt of Boadicea crushed by Suetonius Paulinus;
described by Tacitus in his life of Agricola and in Book XIV
of the _Annals_.

[229] i. e. for his projected war against the Albanians (cp. i.
6). Probably they stopped in Dalmatia on hearing of Nero's
fall.

[230] The quondam marines (cp. i. 6, 9, &c. ).

[231] They were commanded by Martius Macer (see chaps. 23, 35. &c. ).

[232] The defender of Placentia. He earned further laurels
under Trajan in Germany. He was a friend of Tacitus and the
younger Pliny, and is suspected of writing some bad verse.

[233] Early in March (cp. i. 70).

[234] Not regularly formed into a legion: those to whom 'he
held out hopes of honourable service' (cp. i. 87).

[235] Cp. i. 87.

[236] The mountainous district north of the Italian frontier
on the Var.

[237] Ventimiglia, the modern frontier town between France and
Italy on the Riviera.

[238] A Gallic tribe living round Tongres and Spa.

[239] Living round Trier.

[240] Afterwards one of the leaders in the rebellion on the
Rhine (cp. iv. 55).

[241] Fréjus.

[242] i. e. either the VII Galbian or XIII Gemina, both of
which were on Otho's side.

[243] i. e. the Ligurian cohort, mentioned above.

[244] Antibes.

[245] Albenga.

[246] Sardinia and Corsica were an imperial province A. D.
6-67. Then Nero gave it back to the senate to compensate for
his declaration of the independence of Achaia. Vespasian once
more transferred it to imperial government. If _procurator_ is
correct here, Pacarius must have been a subordinate imperial
functionary in a senatorial province. As the province changed
hands so often and was so soon after this placed under
imperial control, it is possible that Tacitus made a mistake
and that Pacarius was an ex-praetor. Those who feel that
Tacitus is unlikely to have made this error, and that Pacarius
can hardly have been anything but governor, adopt the
suggestion that Corsica did not share the fate of Sardinia in
A. D. 67, but remained under the control of an imperial
procurator. There is no clear evidence of this, but under
Diocletian Corsica was certainly separate.

[247] These cruisers were of a peculiarly light build, called
after the Liburni, an Illyrian tribe, who fought for Octavian
in the battle of Actium. He introduced similar craft into the
Roman navy. They were very fast, and worked with a triangular,
instead of the usual square sail.

[248] i. e. his Corsican and Roman clients.

[249] i. 70.

[250] Piacenza and Pavia.

[251] i. e. one of the two detachments sent forward by the
armies of Dalmatia and Pannonia (cp. chap. 11).

[252] Otho's Praetorian Guards were the weakest point in his army.

[253] Cp. i. 36 note 61.

[254] i. e. that Spurinna was in league with Caecina, and meant
to hand them over to him.

[255] He was making 'a reconnaissance in force westwards along
the river bank to discover, if he could, the strength and
intentions of the enemy' (B. W. Henderson, _Civil War_, &c. ).
But Mr. E. G. Hardy points out that, as he had only 4,000 men
and Caecina's 30,000 were in the immediate neighbourhood, this
would have been foolish. It seems better to believe Tacitus'
suggestion that his insubordinate troops forced Spurinna to
march out.

[256] Considered Gallic and effeminate.

[257] Mr. Henderson (_Civil War_, &c. ) argues that it was
imperative for Caecina to take the fortress at Placentia,
since it threatened his sole line of communication with
Valens' column. Tacitus, as usual, gives a practical rather
than a strategic motive. His interests are purely human.

[258] Familiar devices for sheltering troops against missiles
from a town wall. They were generally made of hurdles covered
with raw hides. The _vinea_ was a shelter on poles, so named
from its resemblance to a pergola of vines.

[259] In i. 61 only legion XXI is mentioned. But Caecina may
have formed the detachments into another legion.

[260] Civilis' nephew and bitter enemy. See iv. 70, v. 21.

[261] Spurinna's colleague in the command of the advanced
guard from Rome. He was now probably at Mantua.

[262] At the meeting of two high roads leading to Cremona, the
one from Hostilia and the other from Mantua. It was near here
that Vitellius defeated Otho, and here that his power fell
before Vespasian (cp. iii. 15 f. ).

[263] See note 231.

[264] This was stated in i. 87. The reminder is inserted
because they were not mentioned with Gallus in ii. 11--unless,
indeed, Mr. Onions is right in suggesting that _quoque_ is an
error for _duces_.

[265] He had left him in charge of Rome. See i. 90.

[266] We learn in chap. 33 that Gallus was disabled and took
no part in this engagement: hence the omission of his name.

[267] About 10½ English miles.

[268] Locus Castorum.

[269] See chap. 11.

[270] The Via Postumia, built up on a causeway high above the
fields on either side.

[271] Son of Antiochus, king of Commagene (see note 216). He
was in Rome probably as a hostage, and accompanied Otho.

[272] An eminent critic has called Tacitus' account of this
battle an 'historical nightmare', but those who do not suffer
from a surfeit of military knowledge may find that it lies
easy upon them. It is written for the plain man with an eye
for situations and an ear for phrases.


THE DECISIVE STRUGGLE

This reverse reduced the Vitellians not to despair but to 27
discipline. Not only was this the case in Caecina's camp, who blamed
his men as being readier for mutiny than for battle, but the troops
under Fabius Valens, who had now reached Ticinum,[273] lost their
contempt for the enemy, conceived a desire to retrieve their glory,
and offered their general a more respectful and steady obedience.
There had, indeed, been a serious outbreak of mutiny, the account of
which I may now resume from an earlier chapter,[274] where it seemed
wrong to break the narrative of Caecina's operations. The Batavian
auxiliaries, who had left the Fourteenth legion during the war against
Vindex, heard of Vitellius' rising while on their way to Britain, and,
as I have already described,[275] joined Fabius Valens in the country
of the Lingones. There they grew insolent. Whenever they passed the
tents of the Roman soldiers, they boasted loudly that they had coerced
the Fourteenth, had deprived Nero of Italy, and held the whole issue
of the war in the hollow of their hand. This insulted the soldiers and
annoyed the general; brawls and quarrels ruined good discipline.
Ultimately Valens began to suspect that their insubordination meant
treachery. Accordingly, on receiving the news that Otho's fleet 28
had defeated the Treviran cavalry[276] and the Tungri, and was now
blockading Narbonese Gaul, he determined at the same time to assist
his allies, and by a stroke of generalship to separate contingents
that were so insubordinate and, if united, so strong. He therefore
ordered the Batavians to march to the support of Narbo. Immediately
this order became generally known, the auxiliaries began to complain
and the legionaries to chafe. 'They were being deprived of their
strongest support: here were these invincible veterans promptly
withdrawn directly the enemy came in sight: if the province was more
important than the safety of Rome and the empire, why not all go
there? but if Italy was the corner-stone of their success, he ought
not as it were to amputate their strongest limb. '[277] In answer 29
to this presumptuous criticism, Valens loosed his lictors upon them
and set to work to check the mutiny. They attacked their general,
stoned him, and chased him out of the camp, shouting that he was
concealing the spoils of Gaul and the gold from Vienne,[278] the due
reward of their labours. They looted the baggage, ransacked the
general's quarters, and even rummaged in the ground with javelins and
lances. Valens, in slave's dress, took refuge with a cavalry officer.
Gradually the disorder began to die down. Alfenus Varus, the
camp-prefect, then hit upon the plan of forbidding the centurions to
go the rounds or to have the bugle sounded to summon the men to their
duties. No one had anything to do: they eyed each other in
astonishment, dismayed above all at having no one to command them. At
first by silent submission, at last with tearful prayers, they sought
pardon. Valens appeared, haggard and in tears, but above all
expectation safe and sound,--joy, sympathy, cheers! With a wild
revulsion of feeling--mobs are always extravagant--they made a ring
round him with the eagles and standards, and carried him to the
Tribunal with loud praises and congratulations. With wise moderation
he demanded no punishment, but, to disarm suspicion of his good
faith, he criticized one or two of them severely. [279] He was well
aware that in civil war the men are allowed more licence than their
officers.

While they were entrenching themselves at Ticinum they heard the 30
news of Caecina's defeat, and the mutiny nearly broke out afresh:
Valens, they thought, had treacherously delayed in order to keep them
out of the battle. They refused rest, would not wait for the general,
marched on in front of the standards, hurrying on the bearers, and by
a forced march joined Caecina. Valens had a bad name with Caecina's
army. They complained that despite their greatly inferior numbers he
had exposed them to the full force of the enemy. At the same time, for
fear of being despised as defeated cowards, they excused themselves by
exaggerating the strength of the new arrivals. In fact, though Valens'
numbers were larger, and he had almost twice as many legionaries and
auxiliaries as Caecina,[280] yet it was Caecina who enjoyed the
confidence of the men. Apart from his kindness, in which he seemed
much readier than Valens, they admired him for his youthful vigour and
commanding stature,[281] and liked him too without exactly knowing
why. So there was rivalry between the generals. Caecina mocked at
Valens for his dirty and dishonest ways:[282] Valens at Caecina's
pompous vanity. But they smothered their dislike and worked together
for a common end, writing frequent letters in which they sacrificed
all hope of pardon and heaped abuse on Otho. Otho's generals refrained
from retaliating upon Vitellius, though his character offered richer
scope. In death Otho earned a noble name and Vitellius infamy, yet 31
at this time people were more afraid of Otho's burning passions than
of Vitellius' listless luxury. The murder of Galba had made Otho
feared and hated, while no one attributed to Vitellius the outbreak of
the war. It was felt that Vitellius' gluttony was a personal disgrace:
Otho's excesses, his cruelty and his daring, spelt more danger to the
country.

Now that Caecina and Valens had joined forces, the Vitellians had no
longer any reason to avoid a decisive battle. Otho accordingly held a
council to decide whether they should prolong the war or put their
fortune to the test. Suetonius Paulinus, who was considered the 32
most experienced general of his day,[283] now felt it was due to his
reputation to deliver his views on the general conduct of the war. His
contention was that the enemy's interests were best served by haste,
Otho's by delay. He argued thus: 'The whole of Vitellius' force has
now arrived and he has few reinforcements in his rear, for the Gallic
provinces are in a ferment, and it would be fatal to abandon the Rhine
with all those hostile tribes ready to swarm across it. The troops in
Britain are busy with their own foes and cut off by the sea: the
Spanish provinces can scarcely spare any troops: the Narbonese are
seriously alarmed by their recent reverse and the inroads of our
fleet. The country across the Po is shut in by the Alps and denied all
supplies by sea,[284] and, besides, its resources have been already
exhausted by the passage of their army. Nowhere can they get supplies,
and without commissariat no army can be kept together. The German
troops are their strongest fighting arm, but their constitutions will
not be strong enough to stand the change of weather, if we protract
the war into the summer. It has often happened that a force, which
seemed irresistible at first, has dwindled to nothing through the
tedium of forced inaction.

'On the other hand, our resources are rich and reliable. We have on
our side Pannonia, Moesia, Dalmatia, and the East; the armies there
are fresh and strong; we have Italy and Rome, the Queen of the World,
and the Roman Senate and People: those titles always mean something,
though their glory may sometimes be obscured. We have large public and
private resources, and in civil war a vast quantity of money is
stronger than the sword. Our soldiers are inured to the Italian
climate or, at any rate, to heat. We are entrenched behind the
Po:[285] its cities are protected by strong walls and willing hands,
and the defence of Placentia has shown that none of them will yield to
the enemy. ' Therefore Otho must remain on the defensive. In a few days
the Fourteenth legion would arrive: its fame alone was great, and the
Moesian forces[286] would be with it. He should, at any rate, postpone
his deliberations until then, and fight, if fight he must, with
augmented strength.

Marius Celsus supported Paulinus. Annius Gallus had been hurt a 33
few days before by a fall from his horse, but messengers were sent to
inquire his views, and they reported that he too agreed. Otho inclined
to a decisive engagement. His brother Titianus and Proculus, the
prefect of the Guard, with all the impatience of inexperience, stoutly
maintained that fortune and Providence, and Otho's own good genius
inspired his policy, and would inspire its performance. They had
descended to flattery by way of checking opposition.