shall itbe from this, That one
Contrary
has but one Contrary ?
Plato - 1701 - Works - a
Things.
And how' littleToeVer the advantage \&M>>*f"f
thatanotherMan hasoverus,topushus,forward^f"0"
andtomakeusadvanceinthewayofVirtue>itis
always a very considerable thing, and for whi^h we
oughttothinkourselvesveryhappy. Now Iamobservtthe
certainlyone of those who have all the necessaryTridtostbe Qualities for that j for I k n o w better than any other So? W-
Person in the World, all that must be done to be comeperfectlyanhonestMan:andIcansay,that IdonotrobthemoftheMoneywhichItakejnay, I deserve more, even in the Opinion of m y Scholars. Wherefore this }s the Bargain that I usually make : When any Body has learned of me, if he will, he paysmewhatothersusedtogivemejifnot,he may go into a Temple, and, after having sworn that, whatIhavetaughthimisworthsomuch,deposit theSumwhichhedesignsforme. Socrates,Thisis the Fable and the simple Reasons I have thought fit tomakeuseoftoprovetoyou,thatVirtuemaybe. taught, ^nd that the Athenians are all perlwaded of itj and to let you fee, that we must not be astonish ediftheChildrenofthegreatestMen arecommon lyverylittleworth, andifthoseoftheignorantand of the poorest succeed better, since we even see that theSonsofPolycletus, whoareofthefameAgewith Xanttppm and Puralus, are nothing, if compared with theirFather, andsoofmany otherChildrenof (C)urgreatestMasters. But>>forthosewhom tjust how nam'd, itisnottimetojddgethem, thereisstill hopes, andtheirYouthisaRefugeforthem.
This long and 'fine'Discourse being pronounced with much Ostentation and Pride, Protagoras held his Tongue, and I, after having been a long time put toastand,asaMancharm'dandravish'd,Ilookt upon him as ifhe ought to speak on still, and to tell me thingsthatIveryimpatientlyexpected:Butfee
ing that he had actually done , and having at last . 'i ? resu
? ? z66
Protagoras: Or, tbeSophistsl
resumed Courage with much difficulty, I turned to wardsHippocrates. Intruth,Hippocrates,laidIto him,IcannotexpresshowmuchIamindebtedto you, for having obliged me to come hither , for I would not for all the World not have heard Protago ras : hitherto I believed, that it was nowise by the help and care of Men, that we became honest Peo ple:butnowIam perswadedthatitisathing purelyhumane. ThereisonlyonesmallDifficulty1 remaining, which Protagoras, who has just now de monstratedsuchfinethings,willeasilyresolve. If we should consult some of our great Orators upon
those Matters, perhaps they would entertain us with Herepn*- such like Discourses, * and that we should believe desailthosewq heard a Pericles, or some of those who have
te'fthat ^eenthem0^Eloquentjand,afterthat,ifweshould the]were a make objection to them, they would not know what
little taint- t o s a y n o r w h a t t o a n s w e r , b u t b e a s m u t e a s a B o o k . edbythe guttjj0'oneshouldaskthemneversolittleupon
the"? "! ! wsiattnevmighthavealreadysaid,theywouldne ws*/;the verend,andwoulddoasaBrassKettle,which,be- Sophijis. ingoncestruck,keepsitssoundalongtime,unless
one puts his Hand upon it and stops it^ for that's just what our Or-ators do, so soon as they are touch edtheyresoundwithoutend. Itisnotthefame
with Protagoras, for he is not only very capable of holdinglongandfineDiscourses, ashehasjustnow madeitappear, butalsoofansweringpreciselyand in few Words, to the Questions that are asked him,
and can start others, arid wait for and receive the Answers as he ought , which few People are able to do.
Now then, Protagoras, saidItohim, therewants but a small thing to content me upon the whole, and I shall be fully satisfied when you shall have
*This isadifficultPassage,ifwe havenoregardtothetimej thatistofay,ifwe dohotobservetheDateoftheDialogue. It is that w h i c h deceived Henry Steplxns, w h o translated it as
? iiTerideswere stillalive,whereashehadbeendeadeightor nine Years.
had
? ? Protagoras: Or, the Sophists. z6f
hadthegoodnesstoanswerit. Yousay,thatVirtue can be taught, and ifI may believe any Body in the Worlduponthat,'tisyou. *ButIprayyoutore movetheScruplewhichyouhaveleftinmyMind: You have said, that Jupiter sent Shame and Justice to Men-, and in your whole Discourse you have spoke of Justice, Temperance and Sanctity, as ifVir tue were one only thing which ineludeth all those Qualities. Explainittomethenexactly,ifVirtue be one, and if Justice, Temperance, Sanctity, are only itsParts, or ifall those Qualities which I have now named be only different Names of one and the lamething. Thisiswhat1furtherdesireofyou.
'There is nothing more eafie, Socrates, than to h-TUS^st tisfie you in that point : For Virtue is one thing and **? <<**; those are itsParts. ses,***
mSS Kofi*hinV? ethose*? p*rts>astfe? S? * Mouth, Nose, Ears and Eyes are the Parts of theftfrcoup- Face > Or are they Parts like Parts of Gold, that/"* <f*ffi- are all of the fame Nature as the Mass, and differ*"*****? from each other only in Quantity ?
They are without doubt parts of it, as the Mouth and the Nose are parts of the Face.
_ But,saidI,doMen acquire,someonepartofthis Virtue,andothersanother? Or isthereanecessity thathewho acquiresonemustacquireall>
Bynomeansansweredhe. +Foryouseeevery Pay People who are valiant and unjust, and others who arejustwithout being wife.
For
* Spcrates does not trouble himself to answer all the So phisms o? -TrotaSoras, which are too gross ; but he goes at once to the main point of the Question, which consists to know theNatureofVirtuejforVirtuebeingwellknown, it willbeclearlyseen,thatitisnotpossibleforMen toteach
? t That'sthePoison ofthisDoctrine, which isbuttoomuch
spreadabroadtothisDay Somefancy,thatVirtuemaybe divided,soasaManmayhavesomeofitspartswithoutha ving the restj which is contrary to all the Light of Reason, ashasbeenexplainedintheArgument, ftwafinopposition
? ? x68
Protagoras: Or, The Sophist/;
? .
For Valour and Wisdom are only parts of Vir"
tuc.
Assuredly, laid-he, andWisdom isthegreatestof
its parts.
And is,everyoneofitspartsdifferentfromano
ther?
'Without doubt.
And everyonehasitsProperties: Asintheparts
of the Face the Eyes are not of the lame use with
the Ears, and have different Properties and Faculties,
and ib of all the other parts, they are all different
and don't resemble each other neither in Form nor
Quality, tsitthefameofthepartsofVirtuejdoes
hot one of them in no wise resemble another ? and do
they absolutely differ in themselves and in their Fa- culties? Itisevident, thattheydonotresembleeach
otheratall,ifitbethefameofthemasoftheEx ample which we have made use of.
Socrates^, that is Very certain and the Example is . just.
Then, laid I to him, Virtue has no other of its parts which resemble Knowledge, Justice, Valour, Temperance nor Sanctity.
No withoutDoubt.
Comethen,LetyouandIseeandexaminetothe bottomtheNatureofeveryoneofitsparts. Letus beginwithJustice:Isitanythingornothing? For my part,Ifinditissomething;whatdoyouthink?
I also think it to be something.
Socrates>> IfthenanyBodyshouldapplyhimselftoyou goingto an(jmg5anjshouldfayt0US)ProtagorasandSocra-
justiceW tes->exP*aint0me>Iprayyou,whatisthatwhich SanctityanyoujustnowcalTdJustice5isitsomething thatis UtoneandjustOrUnjust?
the fame
'""*? ?
to this very Error that Solomon wrote in theEcclesiasies, Ch. 9.
HewhofinrnthinonethingfbaO. UsemuchBJches. ForitisOneof the Explanations that St. Hierome gives to this Passage, 7l>at one only Sin cansetb many former good Works to perish , and that all Virtues accompany one another, insomuch that lie who has one has all ; and he who fins in one thing issubject to all Vices without exception*
I
? ? Pfotdgoras : Ot, the Sophists. i6?
I s h o u l d a n s w e r h i m o f f h a n d , t h a t it is s o m e t h i n g that isjust; would not you answer the feme?
Yes certainly.
Justice consists then , he would lay , according to
you, inbeingjust? Wewouldfayyes? ,isitnotso?
Without doubt, Socrates.
And ifhe. should ask us after that, Don't you also lay, that there is a Sanctity ? should not w e answer him in the same manner, that there is?
Assuredly.
You maintain, he'd reply, that it is something;
whatisitthen? isittobeholyortobeprophane?
Formy part, Iconfess, Protagoras, thatatthisQue
stion I should be all in a passion, and should say to t h e M a n , S p e a k S e n s e , I p r a y y o u ? , W h a t i s t h e r e
that can be holy , if Sanctity it self be not holy ? Wouldnotyouanswerthus?
Yes indeed, Socrates.
Ifafter that, the Man should continue to que stion us, and should say, But what did you fay a Minute ago ? have I misunderstood you ? It seem ed to me, that you said the parts of Virtue were all different, and that one was never like another. Formypart,Ishouldanswerhim,Youhavereason to alledge, that that was said ; but if you think it was Iwho saidit,youmisunderstoodme;forit isProtagoraswho affirmedit,Ionlyask'dtheQue stion : doubtless he would not fail to apply himself toyou,Protagoras;hewouldsay,Doyouagreeto what Socrates says? Is*it you alone that assure me, that none of the parts of Virtue are like to one ano
ther? Isthatyour Opinion? What would you an swer him, Protagorai ?
I should be forced to confess it, Socrates.
And, afterthisConfession, what couldwe answer
him, if he should continue his Questions and tellFar that us,AccordingtoyouthenSanctityisneitherajust""*/*'f**' j thing,norJusticeaholything; butJusticeispro-"^J'j% phaneandSanctityisunjust. IsthenthejustMm^JZwere
pro- unlike.
? ? 2jo
Protagoras: Or, The Sophists.
prophane and impious? what should we answer him, Protagoras? Iconfess,thatformypart,Ishould answer him, that I maintain Justice to be holy, and Sanctitytobejust; and, ifyou yourselfdid not preventme,Ishouldanswerforyou,thatyou are perswaded, that Justice is the fame thing with San ctity, or at least a thing very like it, and that Sancti ty is the fame thing with Justice, or very like it. See thenifyouwouldhinderme toanswersoforyou, o r i f y o u w o u l d c o n f e s s it t o m e .
I should not confess it to you, Socrates ; for that does not seem to m e to be true at the bottom, and we oughtnottograntsoeasily,thatJusticeisHo liness, and that Sanctity is Justice : There is some difference between them ; But what will you make ofthat? Ifyouwill,IconsentthatJusticeisHoly, and thatSanctity isJust.
How, z/J to/, said I to him, I have nothing to dowiththat,itisnotasJwillthat isinquestion, it is You or I, it is our Perswasion and our Prin
ciple,and,ifwe refuteoneanother,that fortoarz>>eagai>>siS>>t,. g whjch do? S nothing but darken tfae
tevli"1" - Tlut<<and renderProofsuseless,must be removed.
However, we may fay, answered he, that Justice resembles Sanctity in something; for
^sorryEvasionofthe l^fnlu^m^rlr tTsareLTaniai^ft
insensibleresemblance,that hemaynotacknowledge thatrtftJT "? yery^naturaa veryjen-
onethingalwaysresemblesanotherin s? mes? n'WhUe " selfhaSlns? me measurearesemblancetoBlack,Hard
tO Soft, and K) of all Other Things whichseemtobethemostcontraryto eachother- ThoseveryPartswnichwe kaveagree(jhaveeachdifferentProper
ties and Faculties , and that one is not l i k e t h e o t h e r , I m e a n t h e p a r t s o f t h e F a c e -, i f y o u look to them narrowly, you will find, that they re semble each other a little, and that they are in some measure one like another : and, after this manner, you may verywellprove,ifyouwill,thatallthings arelikeoneanother. But,however,itisnotjustto
call
? ? iProtagprast Or9 The Sophists. 27*
call things alike, that have but a small resemblance toeachother, asitisnotjustneithertocallthose thingsunlikethatdifferbutaverylittlefrom each other: As a light resemblance does not render things alike, to (peak properly, ib a finall difference does not make them unlike.
Being amazed at this Discourse of the Sophist, I askhim, Doesthenthejustandholyseemtoyouto have only a lightresemblance to each other?
That resemblance, Socrates^ is not so small as I have said, but at the fame time it is not so great as you fly.
Well, saidItohim, sinceyouseemtome tobein ibillanHumour againstthisSanctityandJustice,lee us leave them there, and let us take some other Sub ject. *WhatdoyouthinkofFolly,isitnotentire lycontrarytoWisdom?
It seems so to me.
When Men have govern'd themselves well and and profitably, don't they seem to you to be more temperate and more moderate than when they do the contrary ?
Without contradiction.
Are they not then govern'd by Moderation ?
It cannot be otherwise.
And those who have no good government over
themselves, don't they act foolishly, and are in no wise moderate in their Conduct?
I agree with you in that.
Therefore is not acting foolishly contrary to acting moderately ?
Itisagreed.
? That which is done foolishly, does it not come
from Folly 5 and does not that which is done di screetly proceed from Moderation ?
* Socrates isgoing to prove, that Temperance and Modera tionarethefamethingwithWisdom, seeingtheyarecontra ry to Folly; for one Contrary can have but one Contrary! And thus Temperance, Moderation and Wisdom are the si milarprfrtsof Virtue. . And consequently, &c.
That
? ? tyt
Protagoras: 6r, the Sophists.
Thatistrue. . - . ? ?
Isnot that whkh proceeds from Force, strongs
and that which proceeds from Weakness, feeble ?
Certainly. _
Is itnot from Swiftness that a thing is swift, and
from Slowness that a thing is flow ?
Without doubt.
Andallthatisdonethefame,isitnotdoneby the fame, and is not the contrary done by the con
trary?
Yes, doubtlels. #. Oh ! letusfeethen,saidI,Istherenotsomething
that is called Beauty ?
Yes.
This Beauty, has it any other Contrary than Ugli
ness? No,
Is there not something that is called Good ?
Yes.
This Good, has itany other contrary than Evil?
No, ithasnoother.
Is there not in the Voice a Sound which is called
Acute. Yes.
And that Shrill, has it any other Contrary than Grave ?
No.
Every Contrary then has but one Contrary, and
therearenomore?
I confess it.
Letusleethen;letusmake aRecitaloftheThings
whereinweareagreed. Wehaveagreed,
it That every Contrary his bdt one only Con
trary.
2. That Contraries are made by Contraries.
3. That that which is done foolishly is done after
a quite contrary manner to that which is done di
screetly.
4. That that which is done discreetly proceeds
fromModeration, andthatWhichisdonefoolishly proceeds from Folly. 'Tia
? ? Protagoras: Or, The Sophists. 27^
. 'Tis agreed.
Thatthereforewhichisdone'acontraryway ought*>>? contra-
to be done by the Contrary ; that which is done di- ri" "Iways screetly is done by Moderation, and that which isZ7h"C? T
done foolishly is done by Folly, of a contrary W a y tiTflml'
and always by Contraries. Certainly.
Is not Moderation then contrary to Folly? Soitseemstome.
Yourememberhowever, thatyouagreedjustnow,
that Wisdom was contrary to Folly. . I confess it.
And that one Contrary had but one. Contrary. Thatistrue. J .
From which then of those two Principles shall we recede, my dear Protagoras?
shall itbe from this, That one Contrary has but one Contrary ? or from that which we assertedjust now, That Wisdom is some other thing than Temperance or Modesty ; That each of them are parts of Virtue, and that as they are different, they are also unlike, both by their N a ture and Effects, as the parts of the Face ? which of those two Principles (hall we renounce ? for they don't agree well, and they make a horrible Discord. Ah, how isitpossibletheyshouldagree, iftherebe a necessity that one Contrary must have but one only contrary, and can't have more, and that it be found
producethe far! te-
in the mean time, that Folly has two Contraries, whichareWisdomandTemperance. Doesitnot appear so to you, Protagoras ? He has agreed to it whether he will or not.
Wisdom and Temperance then must of all necessi ty be but one and the same thing, as we found just now, that Justice and Sanctity were a little while ago. Butdon'tletuswearyourselves,mydear Protagoras,andsetusexaminetherest. Iaskyou, A Man, who does an unjust thing, is he prudent in being unjust ?
Ss For
? ? tabu.
me. Foritimportsmenothingthatyouthinkthat orthatjIexamineonlytheOpinion:Butitrnay verywellbe thatinexaminingtheOpinion, 'tisrhy selfwhen Iexamine, and sometimes also the Person who Answers me.
'Upon thatProtagorasmade somescruple,disdain ing to be thus questioned, and faying, that the Mat terwasthorny. Butatlasthetookhispartandre-
. solvedtoanswerme. ThenIsaidtohim,Protago ras,Answer,Iprayyou,tomyfirstQuestion. Do you think any of those who act Injustice are pru dent?
I think there are some, said he.
Is not to be prudent, to be wise ?
Yes.
Is not to be wile, to have right Aims, and to take
the best part even in Injustice it self?
I grant it.
But do the Unjust take the right fide when they
succeed well or when their Successes nought ? When theysucceedwell.
You affirmthen,thattherearecertaingoodthings. Certainly.
Then do you call those things that are profitable
274 Protagoras: Or, the Sofbifis.
For my part, Socrates, saidhe, I should be a-
^ ^ ^ - s h a m ' d to confess it. However it is the Opinion of
? /? ;/' the People.
JTMmany Well,would youhaveme applymy selftothe
injustices People,orshallIspeaktoyou?
whichare ibe? it0fyOU faidhe,direct:yourselfonlyto
G & the People.
"profit That'sequaltome,saidI,providedyouanswer are
TheSofist to Men, good ?
Uyeryan. Yes,byJupiter;andfrequentlyIdon'tstickto
Socrate caIi those which are not Proficable to Men, also
fl)oM have S00d'
fin'dfrom TheToneinwhichhespoketome,mademe himthucon-know, thathewasexasperated, inagreatDisorder,
itcTiisllLandread*rt0betransportedwithAnger; seeinghim
whhhupro-m tnisCondition,Ihadamindtomakethebestof litMepod. him ;
? ? Protagoras: Or, The Sophists. zjf
M m : Therefore I asked him with greater Precaution andDiscretion; Protagoras, said1 tohim, Do you Callgood, thosethingsthatarenotprofitabletoany Man, or those that are no ways profitable>
Notatall,Socrates. ForIknowmanythatare absolutelyuselesstoMen, ascertain
Drinks,certainFoods,certainMedicines,
andathousandothersofthefamena-
ture;andIknowothersthatareuseful . tothem. Therearesomethatarein- differenttoMenandexcellentgoodfor
u <? n 1 r c i *. /~> j. ^1 Horses. SomeareonlyusefultoCattle,
? JjfTM2*"*f ? 'ZdHZgc*>>dtby
him,hethrowshimselfin-
*>>*iitheseDistinctions,
where>in<? mTMf>>g>>}f
an impertinent bcience. he M>0kthcchiefs&jtim.
othersonlytoDogs. Suchathingisof nousetoAnimals,andverygoodforTrees. More over, that which is good for the Root is often bad for the Twigs , which you should make to dye if youshouldcoverthemwithit. Withoutgoingfur ther, Oil is the greatest Enemy to all Plants and to theSkinofallCattle,anditisverygoodforthe SkinofMan. Itissotrue,thatthatwhichiscal led good, is various * for Oil it Ms, which I speak of, is good for the exterior parts of Man, and very badfortheinteriour. ForthatreasonthePhysicians absolutely forbid the sick to eat it, or at leaff give them but very little and only enough to correct the bad Smell of certain-things which they make them
take. .
Protagoras , having thus spoken , all the C o m p a
ny clapt their Hands, as if he had said Wonders : And Isaidtohim, Protagoras, Iam aMan natural lyveryforgetful, and,ifanyBodymakeslongDi scourses to me, I immediately forget the Subject of theDispute. Therefore,asifIweresomethingdeaf, and you had a mind to discourse with me, you would resolve to speak a little louder to me than to others, even so I-desire you to accommodate your
selftothisFaultthatIhave. Andsinceyouhave to do with a Man whose Memory is very short, shorten your Answers , if you intend that I should follow you,
Ssa . How
? ? 276
Protagoras: Or, the Sophists.
How would ye have me abridge my Answers? Would you have me make them shorter than they ought tobe.
No, saidI.
Then isitasshortasitmustbe?
Itis.
But who shall be judge of it, and to what mea
sure shall w e cut it, must it be mine or yours ?
I have always heard Protagoras, that you were averycapableMan, andthatyoucouldmakeothers
capable of making as long and as short Discourses upon all forts of Subjects as one pleas'd, and as no body. enlargeth so much as you when- you think fit, sonobodycanexplainhimselfinfewerwords. If thenyouhaveamindthatIshouldenjoyyourCon versation, make use of the latterwith me ; few words Iconjure you.
Socrates, laid he, I have had- to do with many PeopleinmyLife,andevenwiththemostrenown e d -, y o u c a n n o t b u t h a v e h e a r d o f m y D i s p u t e s , b u t ifI had done, what you would have me to do n o w , a n d i f I. h a d s u f f e r e d m y D i s c o u r s e s t o b e c u t short by my Antagonists, I should never have ob tained so great Advantages over them, and . the name of Protagoras would never have been so famous among the Greeks.
By thisAnswerIfoundthatthismannerofAn swering precisely to questions did not please him, and that he would never submit to be questioned. Seeing then that I could no longer be of that Con versation,Protagoras,saidItohim, Idonotpress you to dispute with me whether you will or not,
and tofollowamethodthatisdisagreableto,you; but if you have a mind to speak to me 'tis your part to proportion your self to me, and to speak so as that I may be able to follow you : For as all the World fays, and as you your self fay. it is equal to you to make long or short Discourses. You are very learned, there is nothing to fay against that. Formy partitisimpossibleforme tofollow
Discour
? ? Protagoras : Or, 2he Sophists. 2-jj
Discoursesthataresolongwinded. IwishIwere capable of it, but no Man makes himself. And seeing that is indifferent to you, you ought to have thatcomplaisanceforme, totheendthatourCon versationmaycontinue. Atpresent,seeingyouhave it not, and that I have not time to hear you so prolixly, for I must be going, farewell, I am just going, what Pleasure soever I might have without doubttakeninyourcuriousDissertations. Atthe fame time I rose, as having a mind to retire, but Callias taking me with one hand by the Arm, and with the other holding me by the Cloak, we will not suffer you to go, Socrates, said he, for if you go all is done, there will be no more Conversation. I conjure you then in the name of God to stay, for there is nothing that I would so willingly hear as yourDispute:Ibegitofyou,dousthisFavour.
I answered him standing as I was ready to go, Son of Hipponicus I have always admir'd the love youhaveforSciences,Iadmireitstillnow, andI commend"youforit. TruelyIwouldwithallmy Heart do you the Favour you ask of me if you de
manded a thing that was possible. But as if you shouldcommandme torunaRacewithCrifond'Hi-Ti>hCrifon mereorsomeofthosewhoruntheRacesixtimesf^"ner?
together, or with some Courier, I would say, Cal-'? tH7Ic" Has, Ishoulddemandnothingmore thantohaveall<>fafm-tong theswiftnessnecessary\Icouldwishitasmuch as*lw"'>>>>" you,butthatisimpossible. Ifyouwouldfeev&s^'^'h'
run, Orison and me, you must obtain of him that he will proportion himself to my weakness, for I cannotgoveryswift,anditliesonhimtogo slow ly. ItellyouthefameonthisOccasion, ifyouhave a mind to hear Protagoras and me desire him to an swerme infewwordsashehadbeguntodo:For otherwise what fort of Conversation will it be ? I have hitherto heard M e n say and always believed it, that to converse with one's Friends, and to make Ha rangues, weretwo very differentthings.
Ss ? Never-
? ? 278 Protagoras: Or, the Sophists.
Calliasft- Nevertheless,Socrates,saidCalliastome,me *? *"alit-thinksthatProtagorasdemands averyjustthing,
Commerl seeing he desires only to be permitted to speak as hebadwithmuchasheshallthinkfit,andthatyoumay have
theSofbisit the same Liberty ; the Condition is equal. hdgedwith youaredeceivedCallias,saidAlcibiades,thatis
ITM* im<r not at al* eclua^ ^or Socrates eonfesseth that he discourses, has not that abundance, that affluence of Words ?
andheyieldsthatAdvantagetoProtagoras. Butas for the Art of Dispute, and to know how to questi-' on and answer well, I shall be much surprized if he yields it either to Protagoras, or any body else who-
TUt'sex- soever. Let Protagoras then confess, inhis turn
It? **al sWithttte&me Ingenuity, thatheismoreweak iri
AkAEiade(that Point than Socrates, that will be enough -,
hefancies but. if he brags that he will oppose him, then let
ft>atSocra-him entertheListwithequalArms,thatistofay, tesdiftut"by questioning, and being questioned without en-
y/^ty? ltd^ar? 'ng without end, and without deviating upon that//Pro- every question on purpose to imbroil the Discourse,
tagoras toshunthegivingofanAnswerandtomakethe shouldac- Auditor losetheStateoftheQuestion. ? Forasfor
frmfetffL Socrates, I will be security for him that he will for-
feriar, So-
a-ates wouldpre- t<<dt*no
_ ^
get nothing ; he jeers us when he fays he is forget-
ful. So itseems to me that his Demand is the more reasonable, for every one must speak and tell hissentjm^s inallDilbutes<
At these Words of Alcibiades, Criiias directing
his Discourse to Prodicus and Hippias said, me
thinks, my Friends, thatCallias hasdeclaredhim- self openly for Protagoras ? , and that AJcibiades is
<<n Opiniator, who strivesto dispute, and to exas perate Mens Spirits. As for us, let us not fall out with one another in taking part some with Protago ras and others with Socrates : Let us rather jdiri our Prayers to obtain of them, not to part in lo fair a
way,but to continue such an agreeable Conversation. iou speak extraordinary well, Critias said Pro- arepresent dieus,allthosewho arepresentatadispute, ought ataDisputeto be neuters, but not indifferent, for these two things
Ji'afewho
? ? Protagoras: O, TheSophists. 279
things ought not to be confounded; to be neuter is
to give to each partly all the Attention which he re
q u i r e s ; a n d n o t t o b e i n d i f f e r e n t is w h e n o n e r e s e r v e s
hisVoteforhimwhoisintheright. Formypart
ifyou would follow my Advice, Protagoras and
you, Socrates, here is a thing wherein I would wil
lingly have you agree between you, that is to dis
p u t e a n d n o t t o q u a r r e l -, f o r F r i e n d s d i s p u t e b e
tweenthemselvesfortheirbetterInstruction, and
Enemies quarrel to destroy one another. By this
means this Conversation would be very agreeable
andveryprofitabletousall. FirsttheFruitwhich
on your side you would reap there from, would be,
I don't fay our Praises, but our Esteem: Now Theffer-
EsteemisasincereHomage, whichcausesaSoulto'^L^u to be truly touched and perswaded, whereas praise -Pr<use. is frequently, but a vain and deceiving Sound, which
the Mouth pronounces contrary to the proper Senti mentsoftheHeart. Andwe,theAuditorsshould" getthereby, not that which iscalled * a certain Pleasure,butarealandsensibleSatisfaction. For Satisfaction is the contentment of the Spirit, which
is instructed, and which acquires Wisdom and Pru dence, whereas Pleasure is only, properly speaking, the tickling of the Senses.
Most of theAuditorshighly applauded this Dis course of Prodicus, and the wise Hippias after wards beginning said : M y Friends I look upon you
ail so many as are here, as Kinsmen, Friends, and Citizens of one and the fame City, not by Law but by Nature ; + for by Nature every thing istyed
* By this Passage it appears that the Greeh made son* dif ferencebetween"tvtp&uvt3nt& nfiSni,thatbythefirstthey meant the delights of the Spirit and by the other the pleasures oftheBody. Thatwasnotalwaysexactlyobserved:But
at the bottom these Words are determined to this Sense by . their Root.
t For the Law establishes several Corporations that are contrary one to another, whereas Nature unites allthatare or the fame kind. Therefore there is a principle of Union in Humane Nature.
Ss4 to
? ? 280
Protagoras': Or, The Sophist's.
tpitslike. ButtheLaw,whichisaTyrantover Men, forceth and layeth violent hands upon Nature onmanyOccasions. Itwouldbeaveryshameful thing,ifwe,whoknowtheNatureofThingsper fectly, and w h o pass for the ablest a m o n g the Greets, should be come into Athens, which for Sciences ought to be look'd upon as the august Prytanneum of Greece, and should be assembled in the greatest and richest House of the City, to do nothing there worthy of our Reputati6n, and to spend our Time in wrangling and contesting about Trifles, like the
mostignorantofMen: IconjureyouthenProta goras and Socrates, and I adviie you, as if w e were here your Arbitrators, to regulate you, to pitch up
onaTemperamentandaMedium. YouSocrates, don't you stick too rigoroufly to the plain and coi- cise Method of a Dialogue, unless Protagoras will acquiescetherewith. LeavehimsomeLiberty,and slacken the Reins to his Discourse, that it may appear more magnificent and sublime to us. And you, Protagoras, don't swell the Sails of your Elo quence, so as to carry you into the High Sea, and tomakeyoulosethesightoftheShoar. Thereisa Medium between thole two Extremities. There fore if you will give Ear to me, you shall chuse a Moderator, a President who shall oblige you both to keep within Bounds.
ThisExpedientpleas'dalltheCompany. Calliat told me again, that he would not suffer me to go, andtheypressedme tonamethePresident,myself: I declin'd it, saying it would be a shame for us to takeaModeratorofourDiscomses. For,saidI, he whom we shall chuse shall be, either our Infe riororourEqual. IfhebeourInferior,itisnot
just that the most uncapable should -give Laws to the most learned ; and if he be our equal, he will think as well as we, and that choice will become altogether useless.
But, itwillbe said, you shall name who ismore learned than you; it is easie to fay so, but in truth
? ? Protagoras : Or, the Sophists. 281
truth I don't think it possible to find a more able ManthanProtagorashandifyoushouldchuseone who is not so able as he, and whom you pretend howevertobemoreable,youyourselvesseewhat ' distaste you give to a M a n of that Merit, in subject inghim tosuchaModerator. For,asformy part, that in no ways concerns me, it is not m y Interest that makes me ipeak, I am ready to renew our Conversation to satisfie you. That if Protagoras will not Answer let him Question ; I will answer, and at the same time shall endeavour to show him the manner how I think every Man who is que stioned ought to answer. When I have answered him as often as he shall have thought fit to question
me, hewillgivemeleavetoquestionhiminmy turn, and he will answer me after the lame man ner. That if he scruples to answer me, then you and I will join to beg that favour of him which you desire of me at present, which isnot to break the Conversation, and there is no necessity to name a Moderator for that ^ instead of one w e shall have many, foryoushallallbeso.
Every Body said that this was what ought to be done. Protagoras was not much for itj but in fine, he was obliged to submit, and to promise that he would Question first, and that when he should be weary ofquestioning, he should permit me to do itin my turn, and should answer inhis turn pre cisely to the Question without roaming.
Then he began after this manner.
* Methinks Socrates, that the best part of Erudi tion, consists in being very well versed in reading thePoets. Thatistofay,tounderstandallthey fay so well as to be able to distinguish what is well said and what is ill said j to give Reasons for it,
* The Sophists boasted that they understood all the Poets perfectly well, and we are going to fee the difference in
thatpointbetween aSophistandaManwhoistrulylearn ed--' ? '? - >>.
and
? ? tSz
Protagoras: Or, The Sophists:
and make every Body sensible of it. Don't fear
thatIam goingtoremovemy selffaroffromthe
Subject of our Dispute, m y Question shall run up
onVirtue. Allthedifferencethereshallbetherein,
is that I shall transport you into the Country of
Poetry. Simonidessaysinsomeplace,directinghis
Discourse to Scapas, the Son of Creon. the Theffalo-
man: ' It is very difficult to become truly Virtu-
* ous, and to be in Virtue as a Cube, that is to fay,
* that neither our Carriage, our Actions, nor our
*Thoughtsshallshakeus, andshallneverdrawus * f r o m t h a t s t a t e o f o u r M i n d ? , a n d t h a t t h e y s h a l l
* neither deserve the least reproach nor the least *blame. DoyourememberthatPassage,orshall I relate it to you >
There is no need, said I, I remember it, and have studieditwithgreatpains. ,
You are in the right-, but do you think that Piece iswell or ildone?
. Itseemstome tobeperfectlywelldone, andis of very great Sense.
But would you call that Piece well done, ifthe Poet contradicts himself in it ?
No, without doubt,
Oh! laid he, another time examine Things bet^ ter, and look into them more narrowly.
A s for that, m y dear Protagoras, said I, I believe I have sufficiently examin'd it.
Since you have so well examin'd it, you know then, that he says in the sequel: ' The saying of 1 Pittacus does not please m e at ali, tho' Pittacus
*wasoneoftheSages. Forhefaysthatitisdif- *ficulttobecome Virtuous. Do youcomprehend that the fame M a n said this after what he had said but a little before ?
Yes I do.
And do you find that those two Passages agree ? Yes, Protagoras, said I, and at the same time,
least he should go upon some other Thing, I asked him, Don't you find that they agree?
How
? ? Protagoras : Or, the Sophists. i8j
How shouldIfindthataManagreeswithhim selfwhen heblows coldandhot? At firsthefixes this Principle, That it is difficult to become Virtuous. And a minute after he forgets that fine Principlej and in relating the fame Motto spoke in his own fensebyFittacus, Thatitisverydifficulttobecome V i r t u o u s ? , h e b l a m e s h i m , a n d f a y s i n p l a i n t e r m s ,
that that Sentiment does not please him in any wise,andyetitishisown. Thuswhenhecon demns ah Author, who fays nothing but what he had said himself, he manifestly cuts his own Throat, and he must of necessity Ipeak ill either there or here.
He had no sooner spoke, but a great Noise was raised,andtheAuditorsfellapraisingofhim. As
forme, Iconfessit,likeaFencerwho hadreceiv'd
a great blow, I was so stunn'd that I neither saw
nor heard, and my Brains turn'd as well with the
Noise they made, as with what I had heard him
lay. Infine,forImusttellyoutheTruth,togain
time to dive into the meaning of the Poet, I turn'd
my self toward Prodkus, and directing my Dis
c o u r s e t o h i m ? , P r e d i c t s * , l a i d I t o h i m , S i m o n i d e s F o r P r e d i -
is your Country-man ; 'tis therefore just that you cus was *
should come to his Assistance, and I call you to it,cjjjl* as. Homer feigns that the Scamandre being vigorous weu M Si- ly pressed upon by Achilles, calls Simois to his Sue- momdes.
thatanotherMan hasoverus,topushus,forward^f"0"
andtomakeusadvanceinthewayofVirtue>itis
always a very considerable thing, and for whi^h we
oughttothinkourselvesveryhappy. Now Iamobservtthe
certainlyone of those who have all the necessaryTridtostbe Qualities for that j for I k n o w better than any other So? W-
Person in the World, all that must be done to be comeperfectlyanhonestMan:andIcansay,that IdonotrobthemoftheMoneywhichItakejnay, I deserve more, even in the Opinion of m y Scholars. Wherefore this }s the Bargain that I usually make : When any Body has learned of me, if he will, he paysmewhatothersusedtogivemejifnot,he may go into a Temple, and, after having sworn that, whatIhavetaughthimisworthsomuch,deposit theSumwhichhedesignsforme. Socrates,Thisis the Fable and the simple Reasons I have thought fit tomakeuseoftoprovetoyou,thatVirtuemaybe. taught, ^nd that the Athenians are all perlwaded of itj and to let you fee, that we must not be astonish ediftheChildrenofthegreatestMen arecommon lyverylittleworth, andifthoseoftheignorantand of the poorest succeed better, since we even see that theSonsofPolycletus, whoareofthefameAgewith Xanttppm and Puralus, are nothing, if compared with theirFather, andsoofmany otherChildrenof (C)urgreatestMasters. But>>forthosewhom tjust how nam'd, itisnottimetojddgethem, thereisstill hopes, andtheirYouthisaRefugeforthem.
This long and 'fine'Discourse being pronounced with much Ostentation and Pride, Protagoras held his Tongue, and I, after having been a long time put toastand,asaMancharm'dandravish'd,Ilookt upon him as ifhe ought to speak on still, and to tell me thingsthatIveryimpatientlyexpected:Butfee
ing that he had actually done , and having at last . 'i ? resu
? ? z66
Protagoras: Or, tbeSophistsl
resumed Courage with much difficulty, I turned to wardsHippocrates. Intruth,Hippocrates,laidIto him,IcannotexpresshowmuchIamindebtedto you, for having obliged me to come hither , for I would not for all the World not have heard Protago ras : hitherto I believed, that it was nowise by the help and care of Men, that we became honest Peo ple:butnowIam perswadedthatitisathing purelyhumane. ThereisonlyonesmallDifficulty1 remaining, which Protagoras, who has just now de monstratedsuchfinethings,willeasilyresolve. If we should consult some of our great Orators upon
those Matters, perhaps they would entertain us with Herepn*- such like Discourses, * and that we should believe desailthosewq heard a Pericles, or some of those who have
te'fthat ^eenthem0^Eloquentjand,afterthat,ifweshould the]were a make objection to them, they would not know what
little taint- t o s a y n o r w h a t t o a n s w e r , b u t b e a s m u t e a s a B o o k . edbythe guttjj0'oneshouldaskthemneversolittleupon
the"? "! ! wsiattnevmighthavealreadysaid,theywouldne ws*/;the verend,andwoulddoasaBrassKettle,which,be- Sophijis. ingoncestruck,keepsitssoundalongtime,unless
one puts his Hand upon it and stops it^ for that's just what our Or-ators do, so soon as they are touch edtheyresoundwithoutend. Itisnotthefame
with Protagoras, for he is not only very capable of holdinglongandfineDiscourses, ashehasjustnow madeitappear, butalsoofansweringpreciselyand in few Words, to the Questions that are asked him,
and can start others, arid wait for and receive the Answers as he ought , which few People are able to do.
Now then, Protagoras, saidItohim, therewants but a small thing to content me upon the whole, and I shall be fully satisfied when you shall have
*This isadifficultPassage,ifwe havenoregardtothetimej thatistofay,ifwe dohotobservetheDateoftheDialogue. It is that w h i c h deceived Henry Steplxns, w h o translated it as
? iiTerideswere stillalive,whereashehadbeendeadeightor nine Years.
had
? ? Protagoras: Or, the Sophists. z6f
hadthegoodnesstoanswerit. Yousay,thatVirtue can be taught, and ifI may believe any Body in the Worlduponthat,'tisyou. *ButIprayyoutore movetheScruplewhichyouhaveleftinmyMind: You have said, that Jupiter sent Shame and Justice to Men-, and in your whole Discourse you have spoke of Justice, Temperance and Sanctity, as ifVir tue were one only thing which ineludeth all those Qualities. Explainittomethenexactly,ifVirtue be one, and if Justice, Temperance, Sanctity, are only itsParts, or ifall those Qualities which I have now named be only different Names of one and the lamething. Thisiswhat1furtherdesireofyou.
'There is nothing more eafie, Socrates, than to h-TUS^st tisfie you in that point : For Virtue is one thing and **? <<**; those are itsParts. ses,***
mSS Kofi*hinV? ethose*? p*rts>astfe? S? * Mouth, Nose, Ears and Eyes are the Parts of theftfrcoup- Face > Or are they Parts like Parts of Gold, that/"* <f*ffi- are all of the fame Nature as the Mass, and differ*"*****? from each other only in Quantity ?
They are without doubt parts of it, as the Mouth and the Nose are parts of the Face.
_ But,saidI,doMen acquire,someonepartofthis Virtue,andothersanother? Or isthereanecessity thathewho acquiresonemustacquireall>
Bynomeansansweredhe. +Foryouseeevery Pay People who are valiant and unjust, and others who arejustwithout being wife.
For
* Spcrates does not trouble himself to answer all the So phisms o? -TrotaSoras, which are too gross ; but he goes at once to the main point of the Question, which consists to know theNatureofVirtuejforVirtuebeingwellknown, it willbeclearlyseen,thatitisnotpossibleforMen toteach
? t That'sthePoison ofthisDoctrine, which isbuttoomuch
spreadabroadtothisDay Somefancy,thatVirtuemaybe divided,soasaManmayhavesomeofitspartswithoutha ving the restj which is contrary to all the Light of Reason, ashasbeenexplainedintheArgument, ftwafinopposition
? ? x68
Protagoras: Or, The Sophist/;
? .
For Valour and Wisdom are only parts of Vir"
tuc.
Assuredly, laid-he, andWisdom isthegreatestof
its parts.
And is,everyoneofitspartsdifferentfromano
ther?
'Without doubt.
And everyonehasitsProperties: Asintheparts
of the Face the Eyes are not of the lame use with
the Ears, and have different Properties and Faculties,
and ib of all the other parts, they are all different
and don't resemble each other neither in Form nor
Quality, tsitthefameofthepartsofVirtuejdoes
hot one of them in no wise resemble another ? and do
they absolutely differ in themselves and in their Fa- culties? Itisevident, thattheydonotresembleeach
otheratall,ifitbethefameofthemasoftheEx ample which we have made use of.
Socrates^, that is Very certain and the Example is . just.
Then, laid I to him, Virtue has no other of its parts which resemble Knowledge, Justice, Valour, Temperance nor Sanctity.
No withoutDoubt.
Comethen,LetyouandIseeandexaminetothe bottomtheNatureofeveryoneofitsparts. Letus beginwithJustice:Isitanythingornothing? For my part,Ifinditissomething;whatdoyouthink?
I also think it to be something.
Socrates>> IfthenanyBodyshouldapplyhimselftoyou goingto an(jmg5anjshouldfayt0US)ProtagorasandSocra-
justiceW tes->exP*aint0me>Iprayyou,whatisthatwhich SanctityanyoujustnowcalTdJustice5isitsomething thatis UtoneandjustOrUnjust?
the fame
'""*? ?
to this very Error that Solomon wrote in theEcclesiasies, Ch. 9.
HewhofinrnthinonethingfbaO. UsemuchBJches. ForitisOneof the Explanations that St. Hierome gives to this Passage, 7l>at one only Sin cansetb many former good Works to perish , and that all Virtues accompany one another, insomuch that lie who has one has all ; and he who fins in one thing issubject to all Vices without exception*
I
? ? Pfotdgoras : Ot, the Sophists. i6?
I s h o u l d a n s w e r h i m o f f h a n d , t h a t it is s o m e t h i n g that isjust; would not you answer the feme?
Yes certainly.
Justice consists then , he would lay , according to
you, inbeingjust? Wewouldfayyes? ,isitnotso?
Without doubt, Socrates.
And ifhe. should ask us after that, Don't you also lay, that there is a Sanctity ? should not w e answer him in the same manner, that there is?
Assuredly.
You maintain, he'd reply, that it is something;
whatisitthen? isittobeholyortobeprophane?
Formy part, Iconfess, Protagoras, thatatthisQue
stion I should be all in a passion, and should say to t h e M a n , S p e a k S e n s e , I p r a y y o u ? , W h a t i s t h e r e
that can be holy , if Sanctity it self be not holy ? Wouldnotyouanswerthus?
Yes indeed, Socrates.
Ifafter that, the Man should continue to que stion us, and should say, But what did you fay a Minute ago ? have I misunderstood you ? It seem ed to me, that you said the parts of Virtue were all different, and that one was never like another. Formypart,Ishouldanswerhim,Youhavereason to alledge, that that was said ; but if you think it was Iwho saidit,youmisunderstoodme;forit isProtagoraswho affirmedit,Ionlyask'dtheQue stion : doubtless he would not fail to apply himself toyou,Protagoras;hewouldsay,Doyouagreeto what Socrates says? Is*it you alone that assure me, that none of the parts of Virtue are like to one ano
ther? Isthatyour Opinion? What would you an swer him, Protagorai ?
I should be forced to confess it, Socrates.
And, afterthisConfession, what couldwe answer
him, if he should continue his Questions and tellFar that us,AccordingtoyouthenSanctityisneitherajust""*/*'f**' j thing,norJusticeaholything; butJusticeispro-"^J'j% phaneandSanctityisunjust. IsthenthejustMm^JZwere
pro- unlike.
? ? 2jo
Protagoras: Or, The Sophists.
prophane and impious? what should we answer him, Protagoras? Iconfess,thatformypart,Ishould answer him, that I maintain Justice to be holy, and Sanctitytobejust; and, ifyou yourselfdid not preventme,Ishouldanswerforyou,thatyou are perswaded, that Justice is the fame thing with San ctity, or at least a thing very like it, and that Sancti ty is the fame thing with Justice, or very like it. See thenifyouwouldhinderme toanswersoforyou, o r i f y o u w o u l d c o n f e s s it t o m e .
I should not confess it to you, Socrates ; for that does not seem to m e to be true at the bottom, and we oughtnottograntsoeasily,thatJusticeisHo liness, and that Sanctity is Justice : There is some difference between them ; But what will you make ofthat? Ifyouwill,IconsentthatJusticeisHoly, and thatSanctity isJust.
How, z/J to/, said I to him, I have nothing to dowiththat,itisnotasJwillthat isinquestion, it is You or I, it is our Perswasion and our Prin
ciple,and,ifwe refuteoneanother,that fortoarz>>eagai>>siS>>t,. g whjch do? S nothing but darken tfae
tevli"1" - Tlut<<and renderProofsuseless,must be removed.
However, we may fay, answered he, that Justice resembles Sanctity in something; for
^sorryEvasionofthe l^fnlu^m^rlr tTsareLTaniai^ft
insensibleresemblance,that hemaynotacknowledge thatrtftJT "? yery^naturaa veryjen-
onethingalwaysresemblesanotherin s? mes? n'WhUe " selfhaSlns? me measurearesemblancetoBlack,Hard
tO Soft, and K) of all Other Things whichseemtobethemostcontraryto eachother- ThoseveryPartswnichwe kaveagree(jhaveeachdifferentProper
ties and Faculties , and that one is not l i k e t h e o t h e r , I m e a n t h e p a r t s o f t h e F a c e -, i f y o u look to them narrowly, you will find, that they re semble each other a little, and that they are in some measure one like another : and, after this manner, you may verywellprove,ifyouwill,thatallthings arelikeoneanother. But,however,itisnotjustto
call
? ? iProtagprast Or9 The Sophists. 27*
call things alike, that have but a small resemblance toeachother, asitisnotjustneithertocallthose thingsunlikethatdifferbutaverylittlefrom each other: As a light resemblance does not render things alike, to (peak properly, ib a finall difference does not make them unlike.
Being amazed at this Discourse of the Sophist, I askhim, Doesthenthejustandholyseemtoyouto have only a lightresemblance to each other?
That resemblance, Socrates^ is not so small as I have said, but at the fame time it is not so great as you fly.
Well, saidItohim, sinceyouseemtome tobein ibillanHumour againstthisSanctityandJustice,lee us leave them there, and let us take some other Sub ject. *WhatdoyouthinkofFolly,isitnotentire lycontrarytoWisdom?
It seems so to me.
When Men have govern'd themselves well and and profitably, don't they seem to you to be more temperate and more moderate than when they do the contrary ?
Without contradiction.
Are they not then govern'd by Moderation ?
It cannot be otherwise.
And those who have no good government over
themselves, don't they act foolishly, and are in no wise moderate in their Conduct?
I agree with you in that.
Therefore is not acting foolishly contrary to acting moderately ?
Itisagreed.
? That which is done foolishly, does it not come
from Folly 5 and does not that which is done di screetly proceed from Moderation ?
* Socrates isgoing to prove, that Temperance and Modera tionarethefamethingwithWisdom, seeingtheyarecontra ry to Folly; for one Contrary can have but one Contrary! And thus Temperance, Moderation and Wisdom are the si milarprfrtsof Virtue. . And consequently, &c.
That
? ? tyt
Protagoras: 6r, the Sophists.
Thatistrue. . - . ? ?
Isnot that whkh proceeds from Force, strongs
and that which proceeds from Weakness, feeble ?
Certainly. _
Is itnot from Swiftness that a thing is swift, and
from Slowness that a thing is flow ?
Without doubt.
Andallthatisdonethefame,isitnotdoneby the fame, and is not the contrary done by the con
trary?
Yes, doubtlels. #. Oh ! letusfeethen,saidI,Istherenotsomething
that is called Beauty ?
Yes.
This Beauty, has it any other Contrary than Ugli
ness? No,
Is there not something that is called Good ?
Yes.
This Good, has itany other contrary than Evil?
No, ithasnoother.
Is there not in the Voice a Sound which is called
Acute. Yes.
And that Shrill, has it any other Contrary than Grave ?
No.
Every Contrary then has but one Contrary, and
therearenomore?
I confess it.
Letusleethen;letusmake aRecitaloftheThings
whereinweareagreed. Wehaveagreed,
it That every Contrary his bdt one only Con
trary.
2. That Contraries are made by Contraries.
3. That that which is done foolishly is done after
a quite contrary manner to that which is done di
screetly.
4. That that which is done discreetly proceeds
fromModeration, andthatWhichisdonefoolishly proceeds from Folly. 'Tia
? ? Protagoras: Or, The Sophists. 27^
. 'Tis agreed.
Thatthereforewhichisdone'acontraryway ought*>>? contra-
to be done by the Contrary ; that which is done di- ri" "Iways screetly is done by Moderation, and that which isZ7h"C? T
done foolishly is done by Folly, of a contrary W a y tiTflml'
and always by Contraries. Certainly.
Is not Moderation then contrary to Folly? Soitseemstome.
Yourememberhowever, thatyouagreedjustnow,
that Wisdom was contrary to Folly. . I confess it.
And that one Contrary had but one. Contrary. Thatistrue. J .
From which then of those two Principles shall we recede, my dear Protagoras?
shall itbe from this, That one Contrary has but one Contrary ? or from that which we assertedjust now, That Wisdom is some other thing than Temperance or Modesty ; That each of them are parts of Virtue, and that as they are different, they are also unlike, both by their N a ture and Effects, as the parts of the Face ? which of those two Principles (hall we renounce ? for they don't agree well, and they make a horrible Discord. Ah, how isitpossibletheyshouldagree, iftherebe a necessity that one Contrary must have but one only contrary, and can't have more, and that it be found
producethe far! te-
in the mean time, that Folly has two Contraries, whichareWisdomandTemperance. Doesitnot appear so to you, Protagoras ? He has agreed to it whether he will or not.
Wisdom and Temperance then must of all necessi ty be but one and the same thing, as we found just now, that Justice and Sanctity were a little while ago. Butdon'tletuswearyourselves,mydear Protagoras,andsetusexaminetherest. Iaskyou, A Man, who does an unjust thing, is he prudent in being unjust ?
Ss For
? ? tabu.
me. Foritimportsmenothingthatyouthinkthat orthatjIexamineonlytheOpinion:Butitrnay verywellbe thatinexaminingtheOpinion, 'tisrhy selfwhen Iexamine, and sometimes also the Person who Answers me.
'Upon thatProtagorasmade somescruple,disdain ing to be thus questioned, and faying, that the Mat terwasthorny. Butatlasthetookhispartandre-
. solvedtoanswerme. ThenIsaidtohim,Protago ras,Answer,Iprayyou,tomyfirstQuestion. Do you think any of those who act Injustice are pru dent?
I think there are some, said he.
Is not to be prudent, to be wise ?
Yes.
Is not to be wile, to have right Aims, and to take
the best part even in Injustice it self?
I grant it.
But do the Unjust take the right fide when they
succeed well or when their Successes nought ? When theysucceedwell.
You affirmthen,thattherearecertaingoodthings. Certainly.
Then do you call those things that are profitable
274 Protagoras: Or, the Sofbifis.
For my part, Socrates, saidhe, I should be a-
^ ^ ^ - s h a m ' d to confess it. However it is the Opinion of
? /? ;/' the People.
JTMmany Well,would youhaveme applymy selftothe
injustices People,orshallIspeaktoyou?
whichare ibe? it0fyOU faidhe,direct:yourselfonlyto
G & the People.
"profit That'sequaltome,saidI,providedyouanswer are
TheSofist to Men, good ?
Uyeryan. Yes,byJupiter;andfrequentlyIdon'tstickto
Socrate caIi those which are not Proficable to Men, also
fl)oM have S00d'
fin'dfrom TheToneinwhichhespoketome,mademe himthucon-know, thathewasexasperated, inagreatDisorder,
itcTiisllLandread*rt0betransportedwithAnger; seeinghim
whhhupro-m tnisCondition,Ihadamindtomakethebestof litMepod. him ;
? ? Protagoras: Or, The Sophists. zjf
M m : Therefore I asked him with greater Precaution andDiscretion; Protagoras, said1 tohim, Do you Callgood, thosethingsthatarenotprofitabletoany Man, or those that are no ways profitable>
Notatall,Socrates. ForIknowmanythatare absolutelyuselesstoMen, ascertain
Drinks,certainFoods,certainMedicines,
andathousandothersofthefamena-
ture;andIknowothersthatareuseful . tothem. Therearesomethatarein- differenttoMenandexcellentgoodfor
u <? n 1 r c i *. /~> j. ^1 Horses. SomeareonlyusefultoCattle,
? JjfTM2*"*f ? 'ZdHZgc*>>dtby
him,hethrowshimselfin-
*>>*iitheseDistinctions,
where>in<? mTMf>>g>>}f
an impertinent bcience. he M>0kthcchiefs&jtim.
othersonlytoDogs. Suchathingisof nousetoAnimals,andverygoodforTrees. More over, that which is good for the Root is often bad for the Twigs , which you should make to dye if youshouldcoverthemwithit. Withoutgoingfur ther, Oil is the greatest Enemy to all Plants and to theSkinofallCattle,anditisverygoodforthe SkinofMan. Itissotrue,thatthatwhichiscal led good, is various * for Oil it Ms, which I speak of, is good for the exterior parts of Man, and very badfortheinteriour. ForthatreasonthePhysicians absolutely forbid the sick to eat it, or at leaff give them but very little and only enough to correct the bad Smell of certain-things which they make them
take. .
Protagoras , having thus spoken , all the C o m p a
ny clapt their Hands, as if he had said Wonders : And Isaidtohim, Protagoras, Iam aMan natural lyveryforgetful, and,ifanyBodymakeslongDi scourses to me, I immediately forget the Subject of theDispute. Therefore,asifIweresomethingdeaf, and you had a mind to discourse with me, you would resolve to speak a little louder to me than to others, even so I-desire you to accommodate your
selftothisFaultthatIhave. Andsinceyouhave to do with a Man whose Memory is very short, shorten your Answers , if you intend that I should follow you,
Ssa . How
? ? 276
Protagoras: Or, the Sophists.
How would ye have me abridge my Answers? Would you have me make them shorter than they ought tobe.
No, saidI.
Then isitasshortasitmustbe?
Itis.
But who shall be judge of it, and to what mea
sure shall w e cut it, must it be mine or yours ?
I have always heard Protagoras, that you were averycapableMan, andthatyoucouldmakeothers
capable of making as long and as short Discourses upon all forts of Subjects as one pleas'd, and as no body. enlargeth so much as you when- you think fit, sonobodycanexplainhimselfinfewerwords. If thenyouhaveamindthatIshouldenjoyyourCon versation, make use of the latterwith me ; few words Iconjure you.
Socrates, laid he, I have had- to do with many PeopleinmyLife,andevenwiththemostrenown e d -, y o u c a n n o t b u t h a v e h e a r d o f m y D i s p u t e s , b u t ifI had done, what you would have me to do n o w , a n d i f I. h a d s u f f e r e d m y D i s c o u r s e s t o b e c u t short by my Antagonists, I should never have ob tained so great Advantages over them, and . the name of Protagoras would never have been so famous among the Greeks.
By thisAnswerIfoundthatthismannerofAn swering precisely to questions did not please him, and that he would never submit to be questioned. Seeing then that I could no longer be of that Con versation,Protagoras,saidItohim, Idonotpress you to dispute with me whether you will or not,
and tofollowamethodthatisdisagreableto,you; but if you have a mind to speak to me 'tis your part to proportion your self to me, and to speak so as that I may be able to follow you : For as all the World fays, and as you your self fay. it is equal to you to make long or short Discourses. You are very learned, there is nothing to fay against that. Formy partitisimpossibleforme tofollow
Discour
? ? Protagoras : Or, 2he Sophists. 2-jj
Discoursesthataresolongwinded. IwishIwere capable of it, but no Man makes himself. And seeing that is indifferent to you, you ought to have thatcomplaisanceforme, totheendthatourCon versationmaycontinue. Atpresent,seeingyouhave it not, and that I have not time to hear you so prolixly, for I must be going, farewell, I am just going, what Pleasure soever I might have without doubttakeninyourcuriousDissertations. Atthe fame time I rose, as having a mind to retire, but Callias taking me with one hand by the Arm, and with the other holding me by the Cloak, we will not suffer you to go, Socrates, said he, for if you go all is done, there will be no more Conversation. I conjure you then in the name of God to stay, for there is nothing that I would so willingly hear as yourDispute:Ibegitofyou,dousthisFavour.
I answered him standing as I was ready to go, Son of Hipponicus I have always admir'd the love youhaveforSciences,Iadmireitstillnow, andI commend"youforit. TruelyIwouldwithallmy Heart do you the Favour you ask of me if you de
manded a thing that was possible. But as if you shouldcommandme torunaRacewithCrifond'Hi-Ti>hCrifon mereorsomeofthosewhoruntheRacesixtimesf^"ner?
together, or with some Courier, I would say, Cal-'? tH7Ic" Has, Ishoulddemandnothingmore thantohaveall<>fafm-tong theswiftnessnecessary\Icouldwishitasmuch as*lw"'>>>>" you,butthatisimpossible. Ifyouwouldfeev&s^'^'h'
run, Orison and me, you must obtain of him that he will proportion himself to my weakness, for I cannotgoveryswift,anditliesonhimtogo slow ly. ItellyouthefameonthisOccasion, ifyouhave a mind to hear Protagoras and me desire him to an swerme infewwordsashehadbeguntodo:For otherwise what fort of Conversation will it be ? I have hitherto heard M e n say and always believed it, that to converse with one's Friends, and to make Ha rangues, weretwo very differentthings.
Ss ? Never-
? ? 278 Protagoras: Or, the Sophists.
Calliasft- Nevertheless,Socrates,saidCalliastome,me *? *"alit-thinksthatProtagorasdemands averyjustthing,
Commerl seeing he desires only to be permitted to speak as hebadwithmuchasheshallthinkfit,andthatyoumay have
theSofbisit the same Liberty ; the Condition is equal. hdgedwith youaredeceivedCallias,saidAlcibiades,thatis
ITM* im<r not at al* eclua^ ^or Socrates eonfesseth that he discourses, has not that abundance, that affluence of Words ?
andheyieldsthatAdvantagetoProtagoras. Butas for the Art of Dispute, and to know how to questi-' on and answer well, I shall be much surprized if he yields it either to Protagoras, or any body else who-
TUt'sex- soever. Let Protagoras then confess, inhis turn
It? **al sWithttte&me Ingenuity, thatheismoreweak iri
AkAEiade(that Point than Socrates, that will be enough -,
hefancies but. if he brags that he will oppose him, then let
ft>atSocra-him entertheListwithequalArms,thatistofay, tesdiftut"by questioning, and being questioned without en-
y/^ty? ltd^ar? 'ng without end, and without deviating upon that//Pro- every question on purpose to imbroil the Discourse,
tagoras toshunthegivingofanAnswerandtomakethe shouldac- Auditor losetheStateoftheQuestion. ? Forasfor
frmfetffL Socrates, I will be security for him that he will for-
feriar, So-
a-ates wouldpre- t<<dt*no
_ ^
get nothing ; he jeers us when he fays he is forget-
ful. So itseems to me that his Demand is the more reasonable, for every one must speak and tell hissentjm^s inallDilbutes<
At these Words of Alcibiades, Criiias directing
his Discourse to Prodicus and Hippias said, me
thinks, my Friends, thatCallias hasdeclaredhim- self openly for Protagoras ? , and that AJcibiades is
<<n Opiniator, who strivesto dispute, and to exas perate Mens Spirits. As for us, let us not fall out with one another in taking part some with Protago ras and others with Socrates : Let us rather jdiri our Prayers to obtain of them, not to part in lo fair a
way,but to continue such an agreeable Conversation. iou speak extraordinary well, Critias said Pro- arepresent dieus,allthosewho arepresentatadispute, ought ataDisputeto be neuters, but not indifferent, for these two things
Ji'afewho
? ? Protagoras: O, TheSophists. 279
things ought not to be confounded; to be neuter is
to give to each partly all the Attention which he re
q u i r e s ; a n d n o t t o b e i n d i f f e r e n t is w h e n o n e r e s e r v e s
hisVoteforhimwhoisintheright. Formypart
ifyou would follow my Advice, Protagoras and
you, Socrates, here is a thing wherein I would wil
lingly have you agree between you, that is to dis
p u t e a n d n o t t o q u a r r e l -, f o r F r i e n d s d i s p u t e b e
tweenthemselvesfortheirbetterInstruction, and
Enemies quarrel to destroy one another. By this
means this Conversation would be very agreeable
andveryprofitabletousall. FirsttheFruitwhich
on your side you would reap there from, would be,
I don't fay our Praises, but our Esteem: Now Theffer-
EsteemisasincereHomage, whichcausesaSoulto'^L^u to be truly touched and perswaded, whereas praise -Pr<use. is frequently, but a vain and deceiving Sound, which
the Mouth pronounces contrary to the proper Senti mentsoftheHeart. Andwe,theAuditorsshould" getthereby, not that which iscalled * a certain Pleasure,butarealandsensibleSatisfaction. For Satisfaction is the contentment of the Spirit, which
is instructed, and which acquires Wisdom and Pru dence, whereas Pleasure is only, properly speaking, the tickling of the Senses.
Most of theAuditorshighly applauded this Dis course of Prodicus, and the wise Hippias after wards beginning said : M y Friends I look upon you
ail so many as are here, as Kinsmen, Friends, and Citizens of one and the fame City, not by Law but by Nature ; + for by Nature every thing istyed
* By this Passage it appears that the Greeh made son* dif ferencebetween"tvtp&uvt3nt& nfiSni,thatbythefirstthey meant the delights of the Spirit and by the other the pleasures oftheBody. Thatwasnotalwaysexactlyobserved:But
at the bottom these Words are determined to this Sense by . their Root.
t For the Law establishes several Corporations that are contrary one to another, whereas Nature unites allthatare or the fame kind. Therefore there is a principle of Union in Humane Nature.
Ss4 to
? ? 280
Protagoras': Or, The Sophist's.
tpitslike. ButtheLaw,whichisaTyrantover Men, forceth and layeth violent hands upon Nature onmanyOccasions. Itwouldbeaveryshameful thing,ifwe,whoknowtheNatureofThingsper fectly, and w h o pass for the ablest a m o n g the Greets, should be come into Athens, which for Sciences ought to be look'd upon as the august Prytanneum of Greece, and should be assembled in the greatest and richest House of the City, to do nothing there worthy of our Reputati6n, and to spend our Time in wrangling and contesting about Trifles, like the
mostignorantofMen: IconjureyouthenProta goras and Socrates, and I adviie you, as if w e were here your Arbitrators, to regulate you, to pitch up
onaTemperamentandaMedium. YouSocrates, don't you stick too rigoroufly to the plain and coi- cise Method of a Dialogue, unless Protagoras will acquiescetherewith. LeavehimsomeLiberty,and slacken the Reins to his Discourse, that it may appear more magnificent and sublime to us. And you, Protagoras, don't swell the Sails of your Elo quence, so as to carry you into the High Sea, and tomakeyoulosethesightoftheShoar. Thereisa Medium between thole two Extremities. There fore if you will give Ear to me, you shall chuse a Moderator, a President who shall oblige you both to keep within Bounds.
ThisExpedientpleas'dalltheCompany. Calliat told me again, that he would not suffer me to go, andtheypressedme tonamethePresident,myself: I declin'd it, saying it would be a shame for us to takeaModeratorofourDiscomses. For,saidI, he whom we shall chuse shall be, either our Infe riororourEqual. IfhebeourInferior,itisnot
just that the most uncapable should -give Laws to the most learned ; and if he be our equal, he will think as well as we, and that choice will become altogether useless.
But, itwillbe said, you shall name who ismore learned than you; it is easie to fay so, but in truth
? ? Protagoras : Or, the Sophists. 281
truth I don't think it possible to find a more able ManthanProtagorashandifyoushouldchuseone who is not so able as he, and whom you pretend howevertobemoreable,youyourselvesseewhat ' distaste you give to a M a n of that Merit, in subject inghim tosuchaModerator. For,asformy part, that in no ways concerns me, it is not m y Interest that makes me ipeak, I am ready to renew our Conversation to satisfie you. That if Protagoras will not Answer let him Question ; I will answer, and at the same time shall endeavour to show him the manner how I think every Man who is que stioned ought to answer. When I have answered him as often as he shall have thought fit to question
me, hewillgivemeleavetoquestionhiminmy turn, and he will answer me after the lame man ner. That if he scruples to answer me, then you and I will join to beg that favour of him which you desire of me at present, which isnot to break the Conversation, and there is no necessity to name a Moderator for that ^ instead of one w e shall have many, foryoushallallbeso.
Every Body said that this was what ought to be done. Protagoras was not much for itj but in fine, he was obliged to submit, and to promise that he would Question first, and that when he should be weary ofquestioning, he should permit me to do itin my turn, and should answer inhis turn pre cisely to the Question without roaming.
Then he began after this manner.
* Methinks Socrates, that the best part of Erudi tion, consists in being very well versed in reading thePoets. Thatistofay,tounderstandallthey fay so well as to be able to distinguish what is well said and what is ill said j to give Reasons for it,
* The Sophists boasted that they understood all the Poets perfectly well, and we are going to fee the difference in
thatpointbetween aSophistandaManwhoistrulylearn ed--' ? '? - >>.
and
? ? tSz
Protagoras: Or, The Sophists:
and make every Body sensible of it. Don't fear
thatIam goingtoremovemy selffaroffromthe
Subject of our Dispute, m y Question shall run up
onVirtue. Allthedifferencethereshallbetherein,
is that I shall transport you into the Country of
Poetry. Simonidessaysinsomeplace,directinghis
Discourse to Scapas, the Son of Creon. the Theffalo-
man: ' It is very difficult to become truly Virtu-
* ous, and to be in Virtue as a Cube, that is to fay,
* that neither our Carriage, our Actions, nor our
*Thoughtsshallshakeus, andshallneverdrawus * f r o m t h a t s t a t e o f o u r M i n d ? , a n d t h a t t h e y s h a l l
* neither deserve the least reproach nor the least *blame. DoyourememberthatPassage,orshall I relate it to you >
There is no need, said I, I remember it, and have studieditwithgreatpains. ,
You are in the right-, but do you think that Piece iswell or ildone?
. Itseemstome tobeperfectlywelldone, andis of very great Sense.
But would you call that Piece well done, ifthe Poet contradicts himself in it ?
No, without doubt,
Oh! laid he, another time examine Things bet^ ter, and look into them more narrowly.
A s for that, m y dear Protagoras, said I, I believe I have sufficiently examin'd it.
Since you have so well examin'd it, you know then, that he says in the sequel: ' The saying of 1 Pittacus does not please m e at ali, tho' Pittacus
*wasoneoftheSages. Forhefaysthatitisdif- *ficulttobecome Virtuous. Do youcomprehend that the fame M a n said this after what he had said but a little before ?
Yes I do.
And do you find that those two Passages agree ? Yes, Protagoras, said I, and at the same time,
least he should go upon some other Thing, I asked him, Don't you find that they agree?
How
? ? Protagoras : Or, the Sophists. i8j
How shouldIfindthataManagreeswithhim selfwhen heblows coldandhot? At firsthefixes this Principle, That it is difficult to become Virtuous. And a minute after he forgets that fine Principlej and in relating the fame Motto spoke in his own fensebyFittacus, Thatitisverydifficulttobecome V i r t u o u s ? , h e b l a m e s h i m , a n d f a y s i n p l a i n t e r m s ,
that that Sentiment does not please him in any wise,andyetitishisown. Thuswhenhecon demns ah Author, who fays nothing but what he had said himself, he manifestly cuts his own Throat, and he must of necessity Ipeak ill either there or here.
He had no sooner spoke, but a great Noise was raised,andtheAuditorsfellapraisingofhim. As
forme, Iconfessit,likeaFencerwho hadreceiv'd
a great blow, I was so stunn'd that I neither saw
nor heard, and my Brains turn'd as well with the
Noise they made, as with what I had heard him
lay. Infine,forImusttellyoutheTruth,togain
time to dive into the meaning of the Poet, I turn'd
my self toward Prodkus, and directing my Dis
c o u r s e t o h i m ? , P r e d i c t s * , l a i d I t o h i m , S i m o n i d e s F o r P r e d i -
is your Country-man ; 'tis therefore just that you cus was *
should come to his Assistance, and I call you to it,cjjjl* as. Homer feigns that the Scamandre being vigorous weu M Si- ly pressed upon by Achilles, calls Simois to his Sue- momdes.
