Objection
2: Further, perfect is what lacks nothing.
Summa Theologica
On the contrary, Augustine (De Orig. Animae iii, 15) mentions certain
opinions which he calls "exceedingly and evidently perverse, and
contrary to the Catholic Faith," among which the first is the opinion
that "God made the soul not out of nothing, but from Himself. "
I answer that, To say that the soul is of the Divine substance involves
a manifest improbability. For, as is clear from what has been said
([748]Q[77] , A[2]; [749]Q[79], A[2]; [750]Q[84], A[6]), the human soul
is sometimes in a state of potentiality to the act of intelligence
---acquires its knowledge somehow from things---and thus has various
powers; all of which are incompatible with the Divine Nature, Which is
a pure act---receives nothing from any other---and admits of no variety
in itself, as we have proved ([751]Q[3], AA[1],7; [752]Q[9], A[1]).
This error seems to have originated from two statements of the
ancients. For those who first began to observe the nature of things,
being unable to rise above their imagination, supposed that nothing but
bodies existed. Therefore they said that God was a body, which they
considered to be the principle of other bodies. And since they held
that the soul was of the same nature as that body which they regarded
as the first principle, as is stated De Anima i, 2, it followed that
the soul was of the nature of God Himself. According to this
supposition, also, the Manichaeans, thinking that God was corporeal
light, held that the soul was part of that light bound up with the
body.
Then a further step in advance was made, and some surmised the
existence of something incorporeal, not apart from the body, but the
form of a body; so that Varro said, "God is a soul governing the world
by movement and reason," as Augustine relates (De Civ. Dei vii, 6 [*The
words as quoted are to be found iv. 31. ]) So some supposed man's soul
to be part of that one soul, as man is a part of the whole world; for
they were unable to go so far as to understand the different degrees of
spiritual substance, except according to the distinction of bodies.
But, all these theories are impossible, as proved above ([753]Q[3],
AA[1],8; and [754]Q[75], A[1]), wherefore it is evidently false that
the soul is of the substance of God.
Reply to Objection 1: The term "breathe" is not to be taken in the
material sense; but as regards the act of God, to breathe [spirare], is
the same as to "make a spirit. " Moreover, in the material sense, man by
breathing does not send forth anything of his own substance, but an
extraneous thing.
Reply to Objection 2: Although the soul is a simple form in its
essence, yet it is not its own existence, but is a being by
participation, as above explained ([755]Q[75], A[5], ad 4). Therefore
it is not a pure act like God.
Reply to Objection 3: That which differs, properly speaking, differs in
something; wherefore we seek for difference where we find also
resemblance. For this reason things which differ must in some way be
compound; since they differ in something, and in something resemble
each other. In this sense, although all that differ are diverse, yet
all things that are diverse do not differ. For simple things are
diverse; yet do not differ from one another by differences which enter
into their composition. For instance, a man and a horse differ by the
difference of rational and irrational; but we cannot say that these
again differ by some further difference.
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Whether the soul was produced by creation?
Objection 1: It would seem that the soul was not produced by creation.
For that which has in itself something material is produced from
matter. But the soul is in part material, since it is not a pure act.
Therefore the soul was made of matter; and hence it was not created.
Objection 2: Further, every actuality of matter is educed from the
potentiality of that matter; for since matter is in potentiality to
act, any act pre-exists in matter potentially. But the soul is the act
of corporeal matter, as is clear from its definition. Therefore the
soul is educed from the potentiality of matter.
Objection 3: Further, the soul is a form. Therefore, if the soul is
created, all other forms also are created. Thus no forms would come
into existence by generation; which is not true.
On the contrary, It is written (Gn. 1:27): "God created man to His own
image. " But man is like to God in his soul. Therefore the soul was
created.
I answer that, The rational soul can be made only by creation; which,
however, is not true of other forms. The reason is because, since to be
made is the way to existence, a thing must be made in such a way as is
suitable to its mode of existence. Now that properly exists which
itself has existence; as it were, subsisting in its own existence.
Wherefore only substances are properly and truly called beings; whereas
an accident has not existence, but something is (modified) by it, and
so far is it called a being; for instance, whiteness is called a being,
because by it something is white. Hence it is said Metaph. vii, Did.
vi, 1 that an accident should be described as "of something rather than
as something. " The same is to be said of all non-subsistent forms.
Therefore, properly speaking, it does not belong to any non-existing
form to be made; but such are said to be made through the composite
substances being made. On the other hand, the rational soul is a
subsistent form, as above explained ([756]Q[75], A[2]). Wherefore it is
competent to be and to be made. And since it cannot be made of
pre-existing matter---whether corporeal, which would render it a
corporeal being---or spiritual, which would involve the transmutation
of one spiritual substance into another, we must conclude that it
cannot exist except by creation.
Reply to Objection 1: The soul's simple essence is as the material
element, while its participated existence is its formal element; which
participated existence necessarily co-exists with the soul's essence,
because existence naturally follows the form. The same reason holds if
the soul is supposed to be composed of some spiritual matter, as some
maintain; because the said matter is not in potentiality to another
form, as neither is the matter of a celestial body; otherwise the soul
would be corruptible. Wherefore the soul cannot in any way be made of
pre-existent matter.
Reply to Objection 2: The production of act from the potentiality of
matter is nothing else but something becoming actually that previously
was in potentiality. But since the rational soul does not depend in its
existence on corporeal matter, and is subsistent, and exceeds the
capacity of corporeal matter, as we have seen ([757]Q[75], A[2]), it is
not educed from the potentiality of matter.
Reply to Objection 3: As we have said, there is no comparison between
the rational soul and other forms.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the rational soul is produced by God immediately?
Objection 1: It would seem that the rational soul is not immediately
made by God, but by the instrumentality of the angels. For spiritual
things have more order than corporeal things. But inferior bodies are
produced by means of the superior, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv).
Therefore also the inferior spirits, who are the rational souls, are
produced by means of the superior spirits, the angels.
Objection 2: Further, the end corresponds to the beginning of things;
for God is the beginning and end of all. Therefore the issue of things
from their beginning corresponds to the forwarding of them to their
end. But "inferior things are forwarded by the higher," as Dionysius
says (Eccl. Hier. v); therefore also the inferior are produced into
existence by the higher, and souls by angels.
Objection 3: Further, "perfect is that which can produce its like," as
is stated Metaph. v. But spiritual substances are much more perfect
than corporeal. Therefore, since bodies produce their like in their own
species, much more are angels able to produce something specifically
inferior to themselves; and such is the rational soul.
On the contrary, It is written (Gn. 2:7) that God Himself "breathed
into the face of man the breath of life. "
I answer that, Some have held that angels, acting by the power of God,
produce rational souls. But this is quite impossible, and is against
faith. For it has been proved that the rational soul cannot be produced
except by creation. Now, God alone can create; for the first agent
alone can act without presupposing the existence of anything; while the
second cause always presupposes something derived from the first cause,
as above explained ([758]Q[75], A[3]): and every agent, that
presupposes something to its act, acts by making a change therein.
Therefore everything else acts by producing a change, whereas God alone
acts by creation. Since, therefore, the rational soul cannot be
produced by a change in matter, it cannot be produced, save immediately
by God.
Thus the replies to the objections are clear. For that bodies produce
their like or something inferior to themselves, and that the higher
things lead forward the inferior---all these things are effected
through a certain transmutation.
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Whether the human soul was produced before the body?
Objection 1: It would seem that the human soul was made before the
body. For the work of creation preceded the work of distinction and
adornment, as shown above ([759]Q[66], A[1]; [760]Q[70], A[1]). But the
soul was made by creation; whereas the body was made at the end of the
work of adornment. Therefore the soul of man was made before the body.
Objection 2: Further, the rational soul has more in common with the
angels than with the brute animals. But angels were created before
bodies, or at least, at the beginning with corporeal matter; whereas
the body of man was formed on the sixth day, when also the animals were
made. Therefore the soul of man was created before the body.
Objection 3: Further, the end is proportionate to the beginning. But in
the end the soul outlasts the body. Therefore in the beginning it was
created before the body.
On the contrary, The proper act is produced in its proper potentiality.
Therefore since the soul is the proper act of the body, the soul was
produced in the body.
I answer that, Origen (Peri Archon i, 7,8) held that not only the soul
of the first man, but also the souls of all men were created at the
same time as the angels, before their bodies: because he thought that
all spiritual substances, whether souls or angels, are equal in their
natural condition, and differ only by merit; so that some of
them---namely, the souls of men or of heavenly bodies---are united to
bodies while others remain in their different orders entirely free from
matter. Of this opinion we have already spoken ([761]Q[47], A[2]); and
so we need say nothing about it here.
Augustine, however (Gen. ad lit. vii, 24), says that the soul of the
first man was created at the same time as the angels, before the body,
for another reason; because he supposes that the body of man, during
the work of the six days, was produced, not actually, but only as to
some "causal virtues"; which cannot be said of the soul, because
neither was it made of any pre-existing corporeal or spiritual matter,
nor could it be produced from any created virtue. Therefore it seems
that the soul itself, during the work of the six days, when all things
were made, was created, together with the angels; and that afterwards,
by its own will, was joined to the service of the body. But he does not
say this by way of assertion; as his words prove. For he says (Gen. ad
lit. vii, 29): "We may believe, if neither Scripture nor reason forbid,
that man was made on the sixth day, in the sense that his body was
created as to its causal virtue in the elements of the world, but that
the soul was already created. "
Now this could be upheld by those who hold that the soul has of itself
a complete species and nature, and that it is not united to the body as
its form, but as its administrator. But if the soul is united to the
body as its form, and is naturally a part of human nature, the above
supposition is quite impossible. For it is clear that God made the
first things in their perfect natural state, as their species required.
Now the soul, as a part of human nature, has its natural perfection
only as united to the body. Therefore it would have been unfitting for
the soul to be created without the body.
Therefore, if we admit the opinion of Augustine about the work of the
six days ([762]Q[74], A[2]), we may say that the human soul preceded in
the work of the six days by a certain generic similitude, so far as it
has intellectual nature in common with the angels; but was itself
created at the same time as the body. According to the other saints,
both the body and soul of the first man were produced in the work of
the six days.
Reply to Objection 1: If the soul by its nature were a complete
species, so that it might be created as to itself, this reason would
prove that the soul was created by itself in the beginning. But as the
soul is naturally the form of the body, it was necessarily created, not
separately, but in the body.
Reply to Objection 2: The same observation applies to the second
objection. For if the soul had a species of itself it would have
something still more in common with the angels. But, as the form of the
body, it belongs to the animal genus, as a formal principle.
Reply to Objection 3: That the soul remains after the body, is due to a
defect of the body, namely, death. Which defect was not due when the
soul was first created.
__________________________________________________________________
THE PRODUCTION OF THE FIRST MAN'S BODY (FOUR ARTICLES)
We have now to consider the production of the first man's body. Under
this head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) The matter from which it was produced;
(2) The author by whom it was produced;
(3) The disposition it received in its production;
(4) The mode and order of its production.
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Whether the body of the first man was made of the slime of the earth?
Objection 1: It would seem that the body of the first man was not made
of the slime of the earth. For it is an act of greater power to make
something out of nothing than out of something; because "not being" is
farther off from actual existence than "being in potentiality. " But
since man is the most honorable of God's lower creatures, it was
fitting that in the production of man's body, the power of God should
be most clearly shown. Therefore it should not have been made of the
slime of the earth, but out of nothing.
Objection 2: Further, the heavenly bodies are nobler than earthly
bodies. But the human body has the greatest nobility; since it is
perfected by the noblest form, which is the rational soul. Therefore it
should not be made of an earthly body, but of a heavenly body.
Objection 3: Further, fire and air are nobler than earth and water, as
is clear from their subtlety. Therefore, since the human body is most
noble, it should rather have been made of fire and air than of the
slime of the earth.
Objection 4: Further, the human body is composed of the four elements.
Therefore it was not made of the slime of the earth, but of the four
elements.
On the contrary, It is written (Gn. 2:7): "God made man of the slime of
the earth. "
I answer that, As God is perfect in His works, He bestowed perfection
on all of them according to their capacity: "God's works are perfect"
(Dt. 32:4). He Himself is simply perfect by the fact that "all things
are pre-contained" in Him, not as component parts, but as "united in
one simple whole," as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. v); in the same way as
various effects pre-exist in their cause, according to its one virtue.
This perfection is bestowed on the angels, inasmuch as all things which
are produced by God in nature through various forms come under their
knowledge. But on man this perfection is bestowed in an inferior way.
For he does not possess a natural knowledge of all natural things, but
is in a manner composed of all things, since he has in himself a
rational soul of the genus of spiritual substances, and in likeness to
the heavenly bodies he is removed from contraries by an equable
temperament. As to the elements, he has them in their very substance,
yet in such a way that the higher elements, fire and air, predominate
in him by their power; for life is mostly found where there is heat,
which is from fire; and where there is humor, which is of the air. But
the inferior elements abound in man by their substance; otherwise the
mingling of elements would not be evenly balanced, unless the inferior
elements, which have the less power, predominated in quantity.
Therefore the body of man is said to have been formed from the slime of
the earth; because earth and water mingled are called slime, and for
this reason man is called 'a little world,' because all creatures of
the world are in a way to be found in him.
Reply to Objection 1: The power of the Divine Creator was manifested in
man's body when its matter was produced by creation. But it was fitting
that the human body should be made of the four elements, that man might
have something in common with the inferior bodies, as being something
between spiritual and corporeal substances.
Reply to Objection 2: Although the heavenly body is in itself nobler
than the earthly body, yet for the acts of the rational soul the
heavenly body is less adapted. For the rational soul receives the
knowledge of truth in a certain way through the senses, the organs of
which cannot be formed of a heavenly body which is impassible. Nor is
it true that something of the fifth essence enters materially into the
composition of the human body, as some say, who suppose that the soul
is united to the body by means of light. For, first of all, what they
say is false---that light is a body. Secondly, it is impossible for
something to be taken from the fifth essence, or from a heavenly body,
and to be mingled with the elements, since a heavenly body is
impassible; wherefore it does not enter into the composition of mixed
bodies, except as in the effects of its power.
Reply to Objection 3: If fire and air, whose action is of greater
power, predominated also in quantity in the human body, they would
entirely draw the rest into themselves, and there would be no equality
in the mingling, such as is required in the composition of man, for the
sense of touch, which is the foundation of the other senses. For the
organ of any particular sense must not actually have the contraries of
which that sense has the perception, but only potentially; either in
such a way that it is entirely void of the whole "genus" of such
contraries---thus, for instance, the pupil of the eye is without color,
so as to be in potentiality as regards all colors; which is not
possible in the organ of touch, since it is composed of the very
elements, the qualities of which are perceived by that sense---or so
that the organ is a medium between two contraries, as much needs be the
case with regard to touch; for the medium is in potentiality to the
extremes.
Reply to Objection 4: In the slime of the earth are earth, and water
binding the earth together. Of the other elements, Scripture makes no
mention, because they are less in quantity in the human body, as we
have said; and because also in the account of the Creation no mention
is made of fire and air, which are not perceived by senses of
uncultured men such as those to whom the Scripture was immediately
addressed.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the human body was immediately produced by God?
Objection 1: It would seem that the human body was not produced by God
immediately. For Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 4), that "corporeal
things are disposed by God through the angels. " But the human body was
made of corporeal matter, as stated above [763](A[1]). Therefore it was
produced by the instrumentality of the angels, and not immediately by
God.
Objection 2: Further, whatever can be made by a created power, is not
necessarily produced immediately by God. But the human body can be
produced by the created power of a heavenly body; for even certain
animals are produced from putrefaction by the active power of a
heavenly body; and Albumazar says that man is not generated where heat
and cold are extreme, but only in temperate regions. Therefore the
human body was not necessarily produced immediately by God.
Objection 3: Further, nothing is made of corporeal matter except by
some material change. But all corporeal change is caused by a movement
of a heavenly body, which is the first movement. Therefore, since the
human body was produced from corporeal matter, it seems that a heavenly
body had part in its production.
Objection 4: Further, Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. vii, 24) that man's
body was made during the work of the six days, according to the causal
virtues which God inserted in corporeal creatures; and that afterwards
it was actually produced. But what pre-exists in the corporeal creature
by reason of causal virtues can be produced by some corporeal body.
Therefore the human body was produced by some created power, and not
immediately by God.
On the contrary, It is written (Ecclus. 17:1): "God created man out of
the earth. "
I answer that, The first formation of the human body could not be by
the instrumentality of any created power, but was immediately from God.
Some, indeed, supposed that the forms which are in corporeal matter are
derived from some immaterial forms; but the Philosopher refutes this
opinion (Metaph. vii), for the reason that forms cannot be made in
themselves, but only in the composite, as we have explained
([764]Q[65], A[4]); and because the agent must be like its effect, it
is not fitting that a pure form, not existing in matter, should produce
a form which is in matter, and which form is only made by the fact that
the composite is made. So a form which is in matter can only be the
cause of another form that is in matter, according as composite is made
by composite. Now God, though He is absolutely immaterial, can alone by
His own power produce matter by creation: wherefore He alone can
produce a form in matter, without the aid of any preceding material
form. For this reason the angels cannot transform a body except by
making use of something in the nature of a seed, as Augustine says (De
Trin. iii, 19). Therefore as no pre-existing body has been formed
whereby another body of the same species could be generated, the first
human body was of necessity made immediately by God.
Reply to Objection 1: Although the angels are the ministers of God, as
regards what He does in bodies, yet God does something in bodies beyond
the angels' power, as, for instance, raising the dead, or giving sight
to the blind: and by this power He formed the body of the first man
from the slime of the earth. Nevertheless the angels could act as
ministers in the formation of the body of the first man, in the same
way as they will do at the last resurrection by collecting the dust.
Reply to Objection 2: Perfect animals, produced from seed, cannot be
made by the sole power of a heavenly body, as Avicenna imagined;
although the power of a heavenly body may assist by co-operation in the
work of natural generation, as the Philosopher says (Phys. ii, 26),
"man and the sun beget man from matter. " For this reason, a place of
moderate temperature is required for the production of man and other
animals. But the power of heavenly bodies suffices for the production
of some imperfect animals from properly disposed matter: for it is
clear that more conditions are required to produce a perfect than an
imperfect thing.
Reply to Objection 3: The movement of the heavens causes natural
changes; but not changes that surpass the order of nature, and are
caused by the Divine Power alone, as for the dead to be raised to life,
or the blind to see: like to which also is the making of man from the
slime of the earth.
Reply to Objection 4: An effect may be said to pre-exist in the causal
virtues of creatures, in two ways. First, both in active and in passive
potentiality, so that not only can it be produced out of pre-existing
matter, but also that some pre-existing creature can produce it.
Secondly, in passive potentiality only; that is, that out of
pre-existing matter it can be produced by God. In this sense, according
to Augustine, the human body pre-existed in the previous work in their
causal virtues.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the body of man was given an apt disposition?
Objection 1: It would seem that the body of man was not given an apt
disposition. For since man is the noblest of animals, his body ought to
be the best disposed in what is proper to an animal, that is, in sense
and movement. But some animals have sharper senses and quicker movement
than man; thus dogs have a keener smell, and birds a swifter flight.
Therefore man's body was not aptly disposed.
Objection 2: Further, perfect is what lacks nothing. But the human body
lacks more than the body of other animals, for these are provided with
covering and natural arms of defense, in which man is lacking.
Therefore the human body is very imperfectly disposed.
Objection 3: Further, man is more distant from plants than he is from
the brutes. But plants are erect in stature, while brutes are prone in
stature. Therefore man should not be of erect stature.
On the contrary, It is written (Eccles. 7:30): "God made man right. "
I answer that, All natural things were produced by the Divine art, and
so may be called God's works of art. Now every artist intends to give
to his work the best disposition; not absolutely the best, but the best
as regards the proposed end; and even if this entails some defect, the
artist cares not: thus, for instance, when man makes himself a saw for
the purpose of cutting, he makes it of iron, which is suitable for the
object in view; and he does not prefer to make it of glass, though this
be a more beautiful material, because this very beauty would be an
obstacle to the end he has in view. Therefore God gave to each natural
being the best disposition; not absolutely so, but in the view of its
proper end. This is what the Philosopher says (Phys. ii, 7): "And
because it is better so, not absolutely, but for each one's substance. "
Now the proximate end of the human body is the rational soul and its
operations; since matter is for the sake of the form, and instruments
are for the action of the agent. I say, therefore, that God fashioned
the human body in that disposition which was best, as most suited to
such a form and to such operations. If defect exists in the disposition
of the human body, it is well to observe that such defect arises as a
necessary result of the matter, from the conditions required in the
body, in order to make it suitably proportioned to the soul and its
operations.
Reply to Objection 1: The sense of touch, which is the foundation of
the other senses, is more perfect in man than in any other animal; and
for this reason man must have the most equable temperament of all
animals. Moreover man excels all other animals in the interior
sensitive powers, as is clear from what we have said above ([765]Q[78],
A[4]). But by a kind of necessity, man falls short of the other animals
in some of the exterior senses; thus of all animals he has the least
sense of smell. For man needs the largest brain as compared to the
body; both for his greater freedom of action in the interior powers
required for the intellectual operations, as we have seen above
([766]Q[84], A[7]); and in order that the low temperature of the brain
may modify the heat of the heart, which has to be considerable in man
for him to be able to stand erect. So that size of the brain, by reason
of its humidity, is an impediment to the smell, which requires dryness.
In the same way, we may suggest a reason why some animals have a keener
sight, and a more acute hearing than man; namely, on account of a
hindrance to his senses arising necessarily from the perfect equability
of his temperament. The same reason suffices to explain why some
animals are more rapid in movement than man, since this excellence of
speed is inconsistent with the equability of the human temperament.
Reply to Objection 2: Horns and claws, which are the weapons of some
animals, and toughness of hide and quantity of hair or feathers, which
are the clothing of animals, are signs of an abundance of the earthly
element; which does not agree with the equability and softness of the
human temperament. Therefore such things do not suit the nature of man.
Instead of these, he has reason and hands whereby he can make himself
arms and clothes, and other necessaries of life, of infinite variety.
Wherefore the hand is called by Aristotle (De Anima iii, 8), "the organ
of organs. " Moreover this was more becoming to the rational nature,
which is capable of conceiving an infinite number of things, so as to
make for itself an infinite number of instruments.
Reply to Objection 3: An upright stature was becoming to man for four
reasons. First, because the senses are given to man, not only for the
purpose of procuring the necessaries of life, which they are bestowed
on other animals, but also for the purpose of knowledge. Hence, whereas
the other animals take delight in the objects of the senses only as
ordered to food and sex, man alone takes pleasure in the beauty of
sensible objects for its own sake. Therefore, as the senses are
situated chiefly in the face, other animals have the face turned to the
ground, as it were for the purpose of seeking food and procuring a
livelihood; whereas man has his face erect, in order that by the
senses, and chiefly by sight, which is more subtle and penetrates
further into the differences of things, he may freely survey the
sensible objects around him, both heavenly and earthly, so as to gather
intelligible truth from all things. Secondly, for the greater freedom
of the acts of the interior powers; the brain, wherein these actions
are, in a way, performed, not being low down, but lifted up above other
parts of the body. Thirdly, because if man's stature were prone to the
ground he would need to use his hands as fore-feet; and thus their
utility for other purposes would cease. Fourthly, because if man's
stature were prone to the ground, and he used his hands as fore-feet,
he would be obliged to take hold of his food with his mouth. Thus he
would have a protruding mouth, with thick and hard lips, and also a
hard tongue, so as to keep it from being hurt by exterior things; as we
see in other animals. Moreover, such an attitude would quite hinder
speech, which is reason's proper operation.
Nevertheless, though of erect stature, man is far above plants. For
man's superior part, his head, is turned towards the superior part of
the world, and his inferior part is turned towards the inferior world;
and therefore he is perfectly disposed as to the general situation of
his body. Plants have the superior part turned towards the lower world,
since their roots correspond to the mouth; and their inferior part
towards the upper world. But brute animals have a middle disposition,
for the superior part of the animal is that by which it takes food, and
the inferior part that by which it rids itself of the surplus.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the production of the human body is fittingly described in
Scripture?
Objection 1: It would seem that the production of the human body is not
fittingly described in Scripture. For, as the human body was made by
God, so also were the other works of the six days. But in the other
works it is written, "God said; Let it be made, and it was made. "
Therefore the same should have been said of man.
Objection 2: Further, the human body was made by God immediately, as
explained above [767](A[2]). Therefore it was not fittingly said, "Let
us make man. "
Objection 3: Further, the form of the human body is the soul itself
which is the breath of life. Therefore, having said, "God made man of
the slime of the earth," he should not have added: "And He breathed
into him the breath of life. "
Objection 4: Further, the soul, which is the breath of life, is in the
whole body, and chiefly in the heart. Therefore it was not fittingly
said: "He breathed into his face the breath of life. "
Objection 5: Further, the male and female sex belong to the body, while
the image of God belongs to the soul. But the soul, according to
Augustine (Gen. ad lit. vii, 24), was made before the body. Therefore
having said: "To His image He made them," he should not have added,
"male and female He created them. "
On the contrary, Is the authority of Scripture.
Reply to Objection 1: As Augustine observes (Gen. ad lit. vi, 12), man
surpasses other things, not in the fact that God Himself made man, as
though He did not make other things; since it is written (Ps. 101:26),
"The work of Thy hands is the heaven," and elsewhere (Ps. 94:5), "His
hands laid down the dry land"; but in this, that man is made to God's
image. Yet in describing man's production, Scripture uses a special way
of speaking, to show that other things were made for man's sake. For we
are accustomed to do with more deliberation and care what we have
chiefly in mind.
Reply to Objection 2: We must not imagine that when God said "Let us
make man," He spoke to the angels, as some were perverse enough to
think. But by these words is signified the plurality of the Divine
Person, Whose image is more clearly expressed in man.
Reply to Objection 3: Some have thought that man's body was formed
first in priority of time, and that afterwards the soul was infused
into the formed body. But it is inconsistent with the perfection of the
production of things, that God should have made either the body without
the soul, or the soul without the body, since each is a part of human
nature. This is especially unfitting as regards the body, for the body
depends on the soul, and not the soul on the body.
To remove the difficulty some have said that the words, "God made man,"
must be understood of the production of the body with the soul; and
that the subsequent words, "and He breathed into his face the breath of
life," should be understood of the Holy Ghost; as the Lord breathed on
His Apostles, saying, "Receive ye the Holy Ghost" (Jn. 20:22). But this
explanation, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiii, 24), is excluded by
the very words of Scripture. For we read farther on, "And man was made
a living soul"; which words the Apostle (1 Cor. 15:45) refers not to
spiritual life, but to animal life. Therefore, by breath of life we
must understand the soul, so that the words, "He breathed into his face
the breath of life," are a sort of exposition of what goes before; for
the soul is the form of the body.
Reply to Objection 4: Since vital operations are more clearly seen in
man's face, on account of the senses which are there expressed;
therefore Scripture says that the breath of life was breathed into
man's face.
Reply to Objection 5: According to Augustine (Gen. ad lit. iv, 34), the
works of the six days were done all at one time; wherefore according to
him man's soul, which he holds to have been made with the angels, was
not made before the sixth day; but on the sixth day both the soul of
the first man was made actually, and his body in its causal elements.
But other doctors hold that on the sixth day both body and soul of man
were actually made.
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THE PRODUCTION OF THE WOMAN (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must next consider the production of the woman. Under this head
there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the woman should have been made in that first production of
things?
(2) Whether the woman should have been made from man?
(3) Whether of man's rib?
(4) Whether the woman was made immediately by God?
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Whether the woman should have been made in the first production of things?
Objection 1: It would seem that the woman should not have been made in
the first production of things. For the Philosopher says (De Gener. ii,
3), that "the female is a misbegotten male. " But nothing misbegotten or
defective should have been in the first production of things. Therefore
woman should not have been made at that first production.
Objection 2: Further, subjection and limitation were a result of sin,
for to the woman was it said after sin (Gn. 3:16): "Thou shalt be under
the man's power"; and Gregory says that, "Where there is no sin, there
is no inequality. " But woman is naturally of less strength and dignity
than man; "for the agent is always more honorable than the patient," as
Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 16). Therefore woman should not have
been made in the first production of things before sin.
Objection 3: Further, occasions of sin should be cut off. But God
foresaw that the woman would be an occasion of sin to man. Therefore He
should not have made woman.
On the contrary, It is written (Gn. 2:18): "It is not good for man to
be alone; let us make him a helper like to himself. "
I answer that, It was necessary for woman to be made, as the Scripture
says, as a "helper" to man; not, indeed, as a helpmate in other works,
as some say, since man can be more efficiently helped by another man in
other works; but as a helper in the work of generation. This can be
made clear if we observe the mode of generation carried out in various
living things. Some living things do not possess in themselves the
power of generation, but are generated by some other specific agent,
such as some plants and animals by the influence of the heavenly
bodies, from some fitting matter and not from seed: others possess the
active and passive generative power together; as we see in plants which
are generated from seed; for the noblest vital function in plants is
generation. Wherefore we observe that in these the active power of
generation invariably accompanies the passive power. Among perfect
animals the active power of generation belongs to the male sex, and the
passive power to the female. And as among animals there is a vital
operation nobler than generation, to which their life is principally
directed; therefore the male sex is not found in continual union with
the female in perfect animals, but only at the time of coition; so that
we may consider that by this means the male and female are one, as in
plants they are always united; although in some cases one of them
preponderates, and in some the other. But man is yet further ordered to
a still nobler vital action, and that is intellectual operation.
Therefore there was greater reason for the distinction of these two
forces in man; so that the female should be produced separately from
the male; although they are carnally united for generation. Therefore
directly after the formation of woman, it was said: "And they shall be
two in one flesh" (Gn. 2:24).
Reply to Objection 1: As regards the individual nature, woman is
defective and misbegotten, for the active force in the male seed tends
to the production of a perfect likeness in the masculine sex; while the
production of woman comes from defect in the active force or from some
material indisposition, or even from some external influence; such as
that of a south wind, which is moist, as the Philosopher observes (De
Gener. Animal. iv, 2). On the other hand, as regards human nature in
general, woman is not misbegotten, but is included in nature's
intention as directed to the work of generation. Now the general
intention of nature depends on God, Who is the universal Author of
nature. Therefore, in producing nature, God formed not only the male
but also the female.
Reply to Objection 2: Subjection is twofold. One is servile, by virtue
of which a superior makes use of a subject for his own benefit; and
this kind of subjection began after sin. There is another kind of
subjection which is called economic or civil, whereby the superior
makes use of his subjects for their own benefit and good; and this kind
of subjection existed even before sin. For good order would have been
wanting in the human family if some were not governed by others wiser
than themselves. So by such a kind of subjection woman is naturally
subject to man, because in man the discretion of reason predominates.
Nor is inequality among men excluded by the state of innocence, as we
shall prove ([768]Q[96], A[3]).
Reply to Objection 3: If God had deprived the world of all those things
which proved an occasion of sin, the universe would have been
imperfect. Nor was it fitting for the common good to be destroyed in
order that individual evil might be avoided; especially as God is so
powerful that He can direct any evil to a good end.
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Whether woman should have been made from man?
Objection 1: It would seem that woman should not have been made from
man. For sex belongs both to man and animals. But in the other animals
the female was not made from the male. Therefore neither should it have
been so with man.
Objection 2: Further, things of the same species are of the same
matter. But male and female are of the same species. Therefore, as man
was made of the slime of the earth, so woman should have been made of
the same, and not from man.
Objection 3: Further, woman was made to be a helpmate to man in the
work of generation. But close relationship makes a person unfit for
that office; hence near relations are debarred from intermarriage, as
is written (Lev. 18:6). Therefore woman should not have been made from
man.
On the contrary, It is written (Ecclus. 17:5): "He created of him,"
that is, out of man, "a helpmate like to himself," that is, woman.
I answer that, When all things were first formed, it was more suitable
for the woman to be made from man that (for the female to be from the
male) in other animals. First, in order thus to give the first man a
certain dignity consisting in this, that as God is the principle of the
whole universe, so the first man, in likeness to God, was the principle
of the whole human race. Wherefore Paul says that "God made the whole
human race from one" (Acts 17:26). Secondly, that man might love woman
all the more, and cleave to her more closely, knowing her to be
fashioned from himself. Hence it is written (Gn. 2:23,24): "She was
taken out of man, wherefore a man shall leave father and mother, and
shall cleave to his wife. " This was most necessary as regards the human
race, in which the male and female live together for life; which is not
the case with other animals. Thirdly, because, as the Philosopher says
(Ethic. viii, 12), the human male and female are united, not only for
generation, as with other animals, but also for the purpose of domestic
life, in which each has his or her particular duty, and in which the
man is the head of the woman. Wherefore it was suitable for the woman
to be made out of man, as out of her principle. Fourthly, there is a
sacramental reason for this. For by this is signified that the Church
takes her origin from Christ. Wherefore the Apostle says (Eph. 5:32):
"This is a great sacrament; but I speak in Christ and in the Church. "
Reply OBJ 1 is clear from the foregoing.
Reply to Objection 2: Matter is that from which something is made. Now
created nature has a determinate principle; and since it is determined
to one thing, it has also a determinate mode of proceeding. Wherefore
from determinate matter it produces something in a determinate species.
On the other hand, the Divine Power, being infinite, can produce things
of the same species out of any matter, such as a man from the slime of
the earth, and a woman from out of man.
Reply to Objection 3: A certain affinity arises from natural
generation, and this is an impediment to matrimony. Woman, however, was
not produced from man by natural generation, but by the Divine Power
alone. Wherefore Eve is not called the daughter of Adam; and so this
argument does not prove.
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Whether the woman was fittingly made from the rib of man?
Objection 1: It would seem that the woman should not have been formed
from the rib of man. For the rib was much smaller than the woman's
body. Now from a smaller thing a larger thing can be made only---either
by addition (and then the woman ought to have been described as made
out of that which was added, rather than out of the rib itself)---or by
rarefaction, because, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. x): "A body
cannot increase in bulk except by rarefaction. " But the woman's body is
not more rarefied than man's---at least, not in the proportion of a rib
to Eve's body. Therefore Eve was not formed from a rib of Adam.
Objection 2: Further, in those things which were first created there
was nothing superfluous. Therefore a rib of Adam belonged to the
integrity of his body. So, if a rib was removed, his body remained
imperfect; which is unreasonable to suppose.
Objection 3: Further, a rib cannot be removed from man without pain.
But there was no pain before sin. Therefore it was not right for a rib
to be taken from the man, that Eve might be made from it.
On the contrary, It is written (Gn. 2:22): "God built the rib, which He
took from Adam, into a woman. "
I answer that, It was right for the woman to be made from a rib of man.
First, to signify the social union of man and woman, for the woman
should neither "use authority over man," and so she was not made from
his head; nor was it right for her to be subject to man's contempt as
his slave, and so she was not made from his feet. Secondly, for the
sacramental signification; for from the side of Christ sleeping on the
Cross the Sacraments flowed---namely, blood and water---on which the
Church was established.
Reply to Objection 1: Some say that the woman's body was formed by a
material increase, without anything being added; in the same way as our
Lord multiplied the five loaves. But this is quite impossible. For such
an increase of matter would either be by a change of the very substance
of the matter itself, or by a change of its dimensions. Not by change
of the substance of the matter, both because matter, considered in
itself, is quite unchangeable, since it has a potential existence, and
has nothing but the nature of a subject, and because quantity and size
are extraneous to the essence of matter itself. Wherefore
multiplication of matter is quite unintelligible, as long as the matter
itself remains the same without anything added to it; unless it
receives greater dimensions. This implies rarefaction, which is for the
same matter to receive greater dimensions, as the Philosopher says
(Phys. iv). To say, therefore, that the same matter is enlarged,
without being rarefied, is to combine contradictories ---viz. the
definition with the absence of the thing defined.
Wherefore, as no rarefaction is apparent in such multiplication of
matter, we must admit an addition of matter: either by creation, or
which is more probable, by conversion. Hence Augustine says (Tract.
xxiv in Joan. ) that "Christ filled five thousand men with five loaves,
in the same way as from a few seeds He produces the harvest of
corn"---that is, by transformation of the nourishment. Nevertheless, we
say that the crowds were fed with five loaves, or that woman was made
from the rib, because an addition was made to the already existing
matter of the loaves and of the rib.
Reply to Objection 2: The rib belonged to the integral perfection of
Adam, not as an individual, but as the principle of the human race;
just as the semen belongs to the perfection of the begetter, and is
released by a natural and pleasurable operation. Much more, therefore,
was it possible that by the Divine power the body of the woman should
be produced from the man's rib.
From this it is clear how to answer the third objection.
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Whether the woman was formed immediately by God?
