At the revival of letters, there were some
who occupied themselves with the sub-
tilties of the schools in metaphysics, and
others who believed in the superstitions of
magic in the sciences: the art of observation*
reigned no more in the empire of the senses,
than enthusiasm in the empire of the soul:
?
who occupied themselves with the sub-
tilties of the schools in metaphysics, and
others who believed in the superstitions of
magic in the sciences: the art of observation*
reigned no more in the empire of the senses,
than enthusiasm in the empire of the soul:
?
Madame de Stael - Germany
336
Chap. VII. Of the Religious Philosophers called
Theosophists . . . 851
Chap. VIII. Of the Spirit of Sectarismin Germany 357
Chap. IX. Of the Contemplation of Nature 368
Chap. X. Of Enthusiasm . . . 388
Chap. XI. Of the Influence of Enthusiasm on
Learning . . . . 395
Chap. XII. Influence of Enthusiasm upon Hap-
piness . . . . 403
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? PART THE THIRD.
PHILOSOPHY AND MORALS.
CHAPTER I.
Of Philosophy.
The world has been pleased, for some time
past, to throw great discredit upon the very
name of philosophy. The case is common
with all those terms, the signification of
which is capable of much extension: they^
become alternately the objects of benedic-
tion or blame among mankind, according
to their use in fortunate or unhappv periods:
but, in spite of the casual injustice or pane-
gyric of individuals and of nations, philo-
sophy, liberty, religion, never change their
value. Man has spoken evil things of the
sun, of love, and of life: he has suffered,
he has felt himself consumed, by these lights
of nature; but would he therefore extinguish
them?
VOL. III. B
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? 2 PHILOSOPHY AND MORALS.
Every thing that has a tendency to set
bounds to our faculties, bears the stamp of a
degrading doctrine. We ought to direct those
faculties to the lofty end of our existence--our
advance to moral perfection. But it is not by
the partial suicide of this or that power of
our nature, that we shall be rendered ca-
pable of rising towards such an object: all
our resources are not too. numerous to for-
ward our approach to it; and, if Heaven
had granted more genius to man, he would
have advanced so much the more in virtue.
Among the different branches of philoso-
phy, metaphysics have, especially, occupied
the attention of the Germans. The objects
which this pursuit embraces, may be divided
jinto three classes. The first relates to the
mystery of the creation; that is to say, ti&
I the Infinite in all things; the second, to the
formation of ideas in the human mind; and
the third, to the exercise of our faculties,
1 without ascending to their source.
The first of these studies, that which
applies itself to the discovery of the secret
of the universe, was cultivated among the
Greeks, as it now is among the Germans.
It is impossible to deny that such a pursuit,
however sublime in its principle, makes us
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? f HILOsdffllf.
3
feel our impotence at every step; and dis-
couragement follows those efforts which
cannot produce a result. The usefulness
of the third sort of metaphysics, that
whkih is! included in the observation of
the actions of our understanding, cannot be
contested; but this usefulness is confined
to. the circle of daily experience. The phi-
losophical reflections of the second class--
those which are directed to the nature
of the human mind, and to the origin
of our ideas--appear to me the most in-
teresting of all. It is not likely that we
should ever be able to know the eternal
truths which explain the existence of this
world: the desire that we feel for such
knowledge, is among the number of those
noble thoughts which draw us towards
another life: but it' is not for nothing,
that the faculty of self-examination has been
given to u*. Doubtless, to observe the
progress of our intellect, such as it exists,
is already to avail ourselves of this faculty;
nevertheless, in rising higher, in striving
to learn whether that intellect acts sponta-
neously, or whether we can only think when
thought is excited by external objects, we
shall cast additional light upon the free-will
b2
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? 4 PHILOSOPHY AND MORALS.
of man, and consequently upon vice and
virtue.
A crowd of moral and religious questions
depends upon the manner in which we con-
sider the origin and formation of our ideas.
It is the diversity of their systems in this re-
spect, above all others, that distinguishes the
German from the French philosophers. We
may easily conceive, that if the difference is at
the fountain-head, it must show itself in the
derived streams: it is impossible, therefore,
to become acquainted with Germany, with-
out tracing the progress of that philosophy,
which, from the days of Leibnitz down to
our own, has incessantly exerted so great a
power over the republic of letters.
There are two methods of considering the
philosophy of the human mind ; either in
its theory or in its results. The examination
of the theory demands a capacity which be-
longs not to me; but it is easy to remark
the influence which this or that metaphysi-
cal opinion exercises over the developement
of the understanding and of the soul. The
Gospel tells us, " that we must judge of
"prophets by their works:" this maxim
may also guide our inquiry into the different
systems of philosophy; for every thing that
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? PHILOSOPHY.
5
is of immoral tendency must be sophistical.
This life has no value, unless it is subservient
to the religious education of. our hearts;
unless it prepares us for a higher destiny, by
our free choice of virtue upon earth. Meta-
physics, social institutions, arts, sciences,
all ought to be appreciated accordingly as
they contribute to the moral perfection of
mankind: this is the touchstone granted lo
the ignorant as well as to the learned. For
if. the knowledge of the means belongs only
to the initiated, the results are discernible by
all the world.
It is necessary to be accustomed to that
mode 6f reasoning which is used in geome-
try, in. order to gain a full comprehension
of metaphysics. In this science, as in that
of calculation, if we omit the least link in
the chain of evidence, we destroy the whole
connexion. Metaphysical reasonings are
more abstract, and not less precise, than
mathematical; and yet their cibject is in-
definite. We must unite, as metaphysi-
cians, two of the most opposite faculties--
fancy, and the power of calculation: we have
to measure a cloud with the same accuracy
that. we. measure a field; and there is no
study which requires such closeness of at-
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? 6 PHILOSOPHY AND MORALS.
tention; nevertheless, in the most sublime
questions there is always some point of view
within the reach of every body, and it IB
that point which I design to seize and to
present.
I put a question one day to Fichte, who
possesses one of the strongest and most
thinking heads in Germany, whether ne
could not more easily tell me his moral
system than his metaphysical ? " The one
"depends upon the other," he replied; and
the remark was very profound: it compre-
hends all the motives of that interest which
we can take in philosophy.
We have been accustomed to regard it as
destructive of every belief of the heart; it
would then indeed be the enemy of man;
but it is not so with the doctrine of Plato,
nOr with that of the Germans: they consider
sentiment as a fact, the primitive phaeno-
menon of mind; and they look upon the
power of philosophical reasoning as destined
solely to investigate the meaning of this
fact.
The enigma of the universe has wasted
the meditations of many, who have still
deserved our admiration, because they felt
themselves summoned to something better
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? PHILOSOPHY.
7
than the present world. Geniuses of a lofty
kind love to wander unceasingly around the
abyss of thoughts that are without an end;
but still they must turn themselves away
from it, for the mind fatigues itself in vain,
in these efforts to scale the heavens.
The origin of thought has occupied the
attention of all true philosophers. Are there
. two natures in man? If there be but one,
is i$ mind or matter? If there be two, do
idea* come by the senses, or do they spring
up in the soul? Or, in truth, are they a
mixture of the action of external objects
upon us, and of the internal faculties which
we possess?
To these three questions, which at all
times have divided the philosophical world,
is united the inquiry which most imme-
diately touches upon virtue--the inquiry,
whether free-will or fatality decides the re-
solutions of man.
Among the ancients, fatality arose from
the will of the gods; among the moderns,
it is attributed to the course of events. The
ancient fatality gave a new evidence to free-
will ; for the will of man struggled against the
event, and moral resistance was unconquer-
able: the fatalism of the moderns, on the
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? 8 PHILOSOPHY ANDvMORALS.
contrary, necessarily destroys the belief in
free-will: if circumstances make us what we
are, we cannot oppose their empire; if ex-
ternal objects are the cause of all that passes
in our mind, what independent thought can
free us from their ascendency? The fatal-
ism which descended from heaven, filled
the soul with a holy terror; while that
which attaches us to earth only works our
degradation. It may be asked, to what
purpose all these questions? It may be an-
swered, to what purpose any thing that
bears no relation to them? For what is
there more important to man, than to know
whether he really is responsible for his ac-
tions; and what sort of a proportion there is
between the power of the will and the em-
pire of circumstances over it? What would
become of conscience, if our habits alone
gave birth to it; if it was nothing but the
product of colours, of sounds, of perfumes,
of circumstances, in short, of every kind,
with which we may have been surrounded
from our infancy?
That species of metaphysics, which en-
deavours to discover what is the source of
our ideas, has a powerful influence, by its con-
sequences, upon the nature and energy of our
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? PHILOSOPHY. 9
will; that species is at once the most exalted
and the most necessary of all our kinds of
knowledge; and the advocates of the highest
utility, namely of moral utility, cannot un-
dervalue ifcV' . ';-: . w" ? '
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? 10 PHILOSOPHY AND MORALS.
? ' ? ? CHAPTER II.
Of English Philosophy.
Every thing seems to testify in us the ex-
istence of a double nature. The influence
of the senses and that of the mind share our
being between them; and, accordingly as
Philosophy inclines towards the one or
the other, opinions and sentiments are in
every respect diametrically opposite. We
may also describe the dominion of the
senses, and that of thought, by other terms:
--there is in man that which perishes with
his earthly existence, and that which may
survive him; that which experience enables
him to acquire, and that with which his
moral instinct inspires him--the finite and
the infinite; but in what manner soever we
express ourselves, it is always necessary to
grant that there are two different principles
of life in a creature subject to death, and
destined to immortality.
A tendency to spiritualize has been always
very manifest among the people of the North;
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? find eyeu before the introduction of Chris-
tianity, this bias made itself perceptible
through the violence pf warlike passions.
The Greeks bad faith m exteivual miracle*
the German nations believe the miracles of
the soul. All their poetry is filled with
misgivings, with presages, with prophe-
cies of tibe heart; and while the Greeks
united themselves to nature by their in-
dulgence in pleasure, the inhabitants of the
North raised themselves to their Creator by
religious sentiments. In the South, Pagan-
ism deified the phenomena of nature; in the
North, they were inclined to believe in ma-
gic, because it attributes to the mind of man
a boundless power over the material world.
The soul and nature, liberty and necessity,
divide the dominion of existence; and just
as we place the commanding force within
ourselves or without us, we are the sons of
heaven, or the slaves of earth.
At the revival of letters, there were some
who occupied themselves with the sub-
tilties of the schools in metaphysics, and
others who believed in the superstitions of
magic in the sciences: the art of observation*
reigned no more in the empire of the senses,
than enthusiasm in the empire of the soul:
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? 12 PHILOSOPHY AND MORALS.
Tvith very few exceptions, there was neither
experience nbr inspiration among the philo-
sophers. A giant appeared--. this was Bacon:
never were the discoveries of thought, nor
the wonders of nature, so well conceived by
the same intelligence. There is not a phrase
in his writings which does not imply years
of reflection and of study; he animates his
metaphysics with his knowledge of the hu-
man heart; he knows how to generalize
facts by philosophy. In physical science he
has created the art of experiment: but it does
not; at all follow, as it has been attempted
toi make us believe, that he was the advocate
of that system exclusively, which grounds all
our ideas upon our sensations. He admits
inspiration in every thing that belongs to the
soul; and he thinks it. even necessary, in or-
der to interpret natural phenomena accord-
ing to general principles. But, in his age,
there were still alchemists, diviners, and sor-
cerers: they were ignorant enough of Religion,
in the greatest part of Europe, to believe that
there were some truths of which she forbade
the promulgation--she who leads us into all
truth. Bacon was struck with these errors;
--his age had a bias towards superstition, as
our age has towards incredulity. At the
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? ENGLISH PHILOSOPHY. <: 13
epoch in which he lived, it was right to en-
deavour to bring experimental philosophy
into favour; in our era, he would have felt
the necessity of reanimating the internal
source of moral beauty, and of recalling in-
cessantly this truth to the memory of man--
that he exists in himself, in his sentiment,
and in his will. When the age is supersti-
tious, the genius of observation is timid ; the
natural world is ill known :--when the age is
incredulous, enthusiasm exists no more, and
we are thenceforth ignorant of the soul and
of heaven.
At a time when the progress of the hu-
man mind was unsure on every side, Bacon
collected all his forces to trace out the way
in which experimental philosophy ought to
proceed; and his writings, even yet, serve
for conductors to those who study nature.
As a minister of state, he was for a long
time occupied with government and with
politics. The strongest heads are those
which unite the taste and the habit for
meditation with a capacity for business.
Bacon, under both these views, was a won-
derful genius; but his philosophy and his
character failed in the same point. He was
not virtuous enough fully to feel the moral
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? 14 PHf tOStffti* ^Nli MORALS.
liberty of man: nevertheless, we cannot
compare him to the materialists of the last
age; and his successors have pushed the
theory of experience much beyond his in-
tention. He is far, I repeat it, from attri-
buting all our ideas to our sensations^ and
from considering analysis a* the sole instru-
ment of discovery. He frequently follows
& more daring path; and if he adheres to
experimental logic to remove all the preju-
dices which encumber his progress, it is to
the spring of genius alone that he trusts to
forward his advance.
"The human mind," says Luther, "is
"like a drunken peasant on horseback; when
'4 we put it up on one side, it falls down or*
"the other. "--Thus man Has incessantly
fluctuated between his two natures; some-
times his thoughts have disentangled him
from his sensations; sometimes his sensa-
tions have absorbed his thoughts, and he has
wished, successively, to refer every thing
to one or the other: it however appears to
me, that the moment for a fixed doctrine
has arrived* Metaphysics are about to un-
dergo a revolution, like that which Coperni-
cus has produced in the system of the world.
They are about to replace the soul of man in
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? ENGLISH PHILOSOPHY. 1$
the centre, and to make it, in every respect,
like the sun; round which external objects'
trace their circle, and from which they bor-
row their light.
The genealogical tree of the different
branches of human knowledge, in which1
every science is referred to a certain faculty,
is doubtless one of the titles of Bacon to the
admiration of posterity; but that which
constitutes his real glory is this--that he has1
announced his opinion, that there was no
absolute separation of one science from
another; but that general philosophy re-
united them all. He is not the author
of that anatomical method:, which consi-
ders the intellectual powers severally, or
each by itself; and which appears to be
ignorant of the admirable unity in the moral
being. Sensibility, imagination, reason, each
is subservient to the other. Every one
of these faculties would be nothing but
a disease, but weakness, instead of strength,
if it were not modified or completed by
the collective character of our nature.
The exact sciences, at a certain height, stand
in need of the Imagination. She, in her
turn, must support herself upon he accu-
rate knowledge of . Nature. Reason, of all
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? 16 PHILOSOPHY AND MORALS.
our faculties, appears to be that which
would most easily do without the assistance
of the others; and yet, if a person were en-
tirely unprovided with imagination and sen-
sibility, he might by that very want become,
if we may so express it, the fool of Reason;
and, seeing nothing in life but calculations
and material interests, deceive himself as
much concerning the characters and affec-
tions of men, as the enthusiastic being whose
fancy pictures all around him disinterested-
ness and love.
We follow a bad system of education,
when we aim at the exclusive developernent
of this or that quality of mind; for, to de-
vote ourselves to one faculty, is to take up
an intellectual trade. Milton says, with rea-
son, that our education is not good, excepting
when it renders us capable of every employ
in peace or war: all that makes the man
A Man, is the true object of instruction.
Not to know any thing of a science but
that portion of it which individually belongs
to us, is to apply the division of labour
(inculcated by Smith) to the liberal studies,
when it is only adapted to the mechanic
arts. When we arrive at that height where
every science touches upon all the rest in
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? feNGLtSIt PHILOSOPHY; 17
Some particulars, it is then that we approach
the region of universal ideas; and the air
which breathes from that region gives life to
all our thoughts.
The soul is a fire that darts its rays through
all the senses: it is in this fire that existence
consists: all the observations and all the
efforts of philosophers ought to turn towards
this point of individuality--the centre and
the moving power of our sentiments and our
ideas. Doubtless, the imperfection of lan-
guage compels us to make use of erroneous
expressions; we are obliged to repeat, accord-
ing to the customary phrase, such a person
is endowed with the power of reason, of
imagination, or of sensibility, &c. ; but, if
we wish to be understood in a single word,
we ought to say, he has soul--an abundance
of soul*. It is this divine spirit that makes
the whole man.
Love is the instructor who teaches us
more certainly what belongs to the mysteries
of the soul, than the utmost metaphysical
subtilty. We never attach ourselves to this
* M. Ancilloo, of whom I shall have occasion to speak
in the Fourth Part of this work, has made use of this ex-
pression in a book, upon which one cannot grow tired of
meditating.
VOL. III. C
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? 18 PHILOSOPHY AND MORALS.
qr that qualification of the object of our pre-
ference; and every madrigal reveals a great
philosophical truth, when it says--" I love
"I know not why \" for this "I know not
"why," is that collective character, and that
harmony, which we recognise by love, by
admiration, by all the sentiments which re-
veal to us what is most deep and most secret
in the heart of another.
The method of analysis, which can only
examine by division, applies itself like the
dissect ing-knife to dead nature; but it is a
bad instrument to teach us to understand
what is living; and if we feel a difficulty in
verbally defining that animated conception
v{hich represents whole objects to our mind,
it is precisely because that conception clings
more closely to the very essence of things.
To divide, in order to comprehend, is a sign
of weakness in philosophy; as to divide, in
order to rule, is a sign of weakness in
political power.
^acon adhered much more than is believed
to that ideal philosophy, which, from the
days of Plato down to our own, has con-
stantly re-appeared under different forms. --
Nevertheless, the success of his analytical
method in the exact sciences has necessarily
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? ENGLISH PHILOSOPHY. 19
had an influence over his metaphysical sys-
tem. His doctrine of sensations, considered
as the origin of ideas, has been understood
in a much more positive sense than that in
which he maintained it himself. We can
clearly see the influence of this doctrine in
the two schools which it has produced--that
of Hobbes, and that of Locke. Certainly
they differ very much jn their intent; but
their principles are alike in many respects.
Hobbes embraced to the letter that philo-
sophy which derives all our ideas from the
impressions of sense. He feared not the
consequences; and he has boldly said, "that
"the soul is as much subjected to necessity,
"as society to despotism. " He admits the
fatalism of sensation as the controller of
thought, and that of force as the controller
of action. He annihilates moral as well as
civil liberty; thinking, with reason, that
one depends upon the other. He was an
Atheist and a slave, and nothing is more in
the course of things; for if there is in man
but the impress of sensations received from
without, earthly power is every thing, and
our soul and our destiny equally depend
upon it.
The cultivation of all pure and elevated
c2
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? 20 PHILOSOPHY AND MORALS.
sentiments is so consolidated in England, by*
political and religious institutions, that the
scepticisms of genius revolve around these
imposing columns without ever shaking them;
Hobbes, accordingly, has gained few parti-
sans in his country; but the influence of
Locke has been more universal. As his cha-
racter was moral and religious, he did not
allow himself to use any of those dangerous
reasonings which are necessarily derived
from his metaphysical system; and the
greater part of his countrymen, in adopting
that system, have shown the same glorious
want of consistency, which he did--have se-
parated results from principles-^until Hume,
and the French philosophers, having ad-
mitted the system, made application of it
in a much more logical manner.
The metaphysical doctrines of Locke have
had no other effect upon the wits of Eng-
land, than to tarnish a little their natural
originality: if they had even dried up the
source of high philosophical reflection, they
would not have destroyed that religious sen-
timent which can so well supply the want
of it: but these doctrines, so generally re-
ceived throughout the rest of Europe (Ger-
many excepted), have been one of the pr'm-
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? ENGLISH PHILOSOPHY. 21
cipal causes of that immorality, the advo-
cates of which have formed it into a theory,
in order to make its practice more certain.
Locke exerted his especial endeavours to
prove that there is nothing innate in the
mind. He was right in his own sense, for
he always blended with the meaning of the
word Idea that of a notion acquired by ex-
perience: ideas thus conceived are the result
of the objects that excite, of the compa-
risons that assemble them, and of the lan-
guage that expedites their union. But this
is not the case with the sentiments, with the
dispositions, and the faculties which consti. .
tute the laws of the human understanding,
in the same manner that attraction and im-
pulse constitute the laws of external nature.
It is truly worth observing what kind of
arguments Locke has been compelled to
adopt, in order to prove that every thing in
the mind came there by means of sensation.
If these arguments led to the truth, doubt-
less we ought to overcome the moral aver-
sion with which they inspire us; but, in ge-
neral, we may trust to this sort of aversion
as an infallible token of what must be
avoided. Locke wished to show that con-
science, or the sense of good and evil, was
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? 22 PHILOSOPHY AND MORALS.
not innate in man; and that we know no-
thing of justice or injustice, except from ex-
perience, as we learn to distinguish red from
blue. To arrive at this conclusion, he has
carefully inquired after all those countries
where the laws and customs pay respect to
crimes; those, for instance, in which it is
thought a duty to kill an enemy; to despise
marriage; to put a father to death, when he
has grown old. He attentively collects every
thing that travellers have related of barbari-
ties which have passed into daily practice.
Of what nature then must that system be,
which excites, in so virtuous a man as
Locke, an eagerness for such narrations?
Let them be melancholy tales, or not, it
may be said, the important thing is to know
if they are true. --Allow them to be true, of
what consequence are they? Do we not
know, by our own experience, that circum-
stances, in other words external objects,
have an influence over the manner in which
we interpret our duties? Amplify these
circumstances, and you will find in them the
causes of national error; but is there any
nation, or any man, that denies the obliga-
tion of all duty? Has it ever been pretended
that the ideas of justice and injustice have
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? no me&ning? Different explanations of them
may prevail in different places j but . the
conviction of the principle is every where
the same; and it is in this cbrtvictioh that
the primitive impression consists, which we
recognise in every being of hutnan birth.
When the savage kills his aged father, he
believes that he renders the old man a ser. t
vice; he does not act for his own interest,
but for that of his parent: the deed he com-
mits is horrible; and yet he is not on that
account devoid of conscience: because he is
ignorant, he is hot therefore vicious. The
sensations, that is to Say, the external objects
with which he is surrounded, blind him;
the inward sentiment, which constitutes the
hatred for vice and the love of virtue, does
not the less exist within him, because he
has been deceived by experience as tt the
manner in which this sentiment ought to be
manifested in his life. To prefer others t6
ourselves, when virtue Commands the prefer-
ence's precisely that. in which the esfsence of
moral beauty consists; and this admirable
instinct of the soul, the opponent of our
physical instinct, is inherent in our nature;
if it could be acquired, it could also be lost;
but it is unchangeable, because it is innate,
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? 24 PHILOSOPHY AND MORALS.
Jt is possible for us to do evil, when we be-
lieve we are doing good; a man may be cul-
pable knowingly and willingly; but he can-
not admit a contradiction for a truth, that
justice is injustice.
There is such a thing as indifference to
good and evil, and it is the ordinary result of
civilization, when its coldness has reached
the point of petrifaction, if the expression
may be allowed; this indifference is a much
greater argument against an innate con-
science than the gross errors of savages:
but the most sceptical of men, if they are
sufferers from oppression in any relation of
life, appeal to justice, as if they had be*
lieved in it all their days; and when they
are seized with any vivid affection, and ty-
rannical power is exerted to control it, they
can invoke the sentiment of equity with as
much force as the most severe of moralists.
When the flame of any passion, whether it
be indignation or love, takes possession of
the soul, the sacred hand-writing of the
eternal law may be seen by that light re-
appearing in our bosoms.
If the accident of birth and education de-
cided the morality of man, how could we
accuse him for his actions? If all that comi
? ?
Chap. VII. Of the Religious Philosophers called
Theosophists . . . 851
Chap. VIII. Of the Spirit of Sectarismin Germany 357
Chap. IX. Of the Contemplation of Nature 368
Chap. X. Of Enthusiasm . . . 388
Chap. XI. Of the Influence of Enthusiasm on
Learning . . . . 395
Chap. XII. Influence of Enthusiasm upon Hap-
piness . . . . 403
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? PART THE THIRD.
PHILOSOPHY AND MORALS.
CHAPTER I.
Of Philosophy.
The world has been pleased, for some time
past, to throw great discredit upon the very
name of philosophy. The case is common
with all those terms, the signification of
which is capable of much extension: they^
become alternately the objects of benedic-
tion or blame among mankind, according
to their use in fortunate or unhappv periods:
but, in spite of the casual injustice or pane-
gyric of individuals and of nations, philo-
sophy, liberty, religion, never change their
value. Man has spoken evil things of the
sun, of love, and of life: he has suffered,
he has felt himself consumed, by these lights
of nature; but would he therefore extinguish
them?
VOL. III. B
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? 2 PHILOSOPHY AND MORALS.
Every thing that has a tendency to set
bounds to our faculties, bears the stamp of a
degrading doctrine. We ought to direct those
faculties to the lofty end of our existence--our
advance to moral perfection. But it is not by
the partial suicide of this or that power of
our nature, that we shall be rendered ca-
pable of rising towards such an object: all
our resources are not too. numerous to for-
ward our approach to it; and, if Heaven
had granted more genius to man, he would
have advanced so much the more in virtue.
Among the different branches of philoso-
phy, metaphysics have, especially, occupied
the attention of the Germans. The objects
which this pursuit embraces, may be divided
jinto three classes. The first relates to the
mystery of the creation; that is to say, ti&
I the Infinite in all things; the second, to the
formation of ideas in the human mind; and
the third, to the exercise of our faculties,
1 without ascending to their source.
The first of these studies, that which
applies itself to the discovery of the secret
of the universe, was cultivated among the
Greeks, as it now is among the Germans.
It is impossible to deny that such a pursuit,
however sublime in its principle, makes us
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? f HILOsdffllf.
3
feel our impotence at every step; and dis-
couragement follows those efforts which
cannot produce a result. The usefulness
of the third sort of metaphysics, that
whkih is! included in the observation of
the actions of our understanding, cannot be
contested; but this usefulness is confined
to. the circle of daily experience. The phi-
losophical reflections of the second class--
those which are directed to the nature
of the human mind, and to the origin
of our ideas--appear to me the most in-
teresting of all. It is not likely that we
should ever be able to know the eternal
truths which explain the existence of this
world: the desire that we feel for such
knowledge, is among the number of those
noble thoughts which draw us towards
another life: but it' is not for nothing,
that the faculty of self-examination has been
given to u*. Doubtless, to observe the
progress of our intellect, such as it exists,
is already to avail ourselves of this faculty;
nevertheless, in rising higher, in striving
to learn whether that intellect acts sponta-
neously, or whether we can only think when
thought is excited by external objects, we
shall cast additional light upon the free-will
b2
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? 4 PHILOSOPHY AND MORALS.
of man, and consequently upon vice and
virtue.
A crowd of moral and religious questions
depends upon the manner in which we con-
sider the origin and formation of our ideas.
It is the diversity of their systems in this re-
spect, above all others, that distinguishes the
German from the French philosophers. We
may easily conceive, that if the difference is at
the fountain-head, it must show itself in the
derived streams: it is impossible, therefore,
to become acquainted with Germany, with-
out tracing the progress of that philosophy,
which, from the days of Leibnitz down to
our own, has incessantly exerted so great a
power over the republic of letters.
There are two methods of considering the
philosophy of the human mind ; either in
its theory or in its results. The examination
of the theory demands a capacity which be-
longs not to me; but it is easy to remark
the influence which this or that metaphysi-
cal opinion exercises over the developement
of the understanding and of the soul. The
Gospel tells us, " that we must judge of
"prophets by their works:" this maxim
may also guide our inquiry into the different
systems of philosophy; for every thing that
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? PHILOSOPHY.
5
is of immoral tendency must be sophistical.
This life has no value, unless it is subservient
to the religious education of. our hearts;
unless it prepares us for a higher destiny, by
our free choice of virtue upon earth. Meta-
physics, social institutions, arts, sciences,
all ought to be appreciated accordingly as
they contribute to the moral perfection of
mankind: this is the touchstone granted lo
the ignorant as well as to the learned. For
if. the knowledge of the means belongs only
to the initiated, the results are discernible by
all the world.
It is necessary to be accustomed to that
mode 6f reasoning which is used in geome-
try, in. order to gain a full comprehension
of metaphysics. In this science, as in that
of calculation, if we omit the least link in
the chain of evidence, we destroy the whole
connexion. Metaphysical reasonings are
more abstract, and not less precise, than
mathematical; and yet their cibject is in-
definite. We must unite, as metaphysi-
cians, two of the most opposite faculties--
fancy, and the power of calculation: we have
to measure a cloud with the same accuracy
that. we. measure a field; and there is no
study which requires such closeness of at-
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? 6 PHILOSOPHY AND MORALS.
tention; nevertheless, in the most sublime
questions there is always some point of view
within the reach of every body, and it IB
that point which I design to seize and to
present.
I put a question one day to Fichte, who
possesses one of the strongest and most
thinking heads in Germany, whether ne
could not more easily tell me his moral
system than his metaphysical ? " The one
"depends upon the other," he replied; and
the remark was very profound: it compre-
hends all the motives of that interest which
we can take in philosophy.
We have been accustomed to regard it as
destructive of every belief of the heart; it
would then indeed be the enemy of man;
but it is not so with the doctrine of Plato,
nOr with that of the Germans: they consider
sentiment as a fact, the primitive phaeno-
menon of mind; and they look upon the
power of philosophical reasoning as destined
solely to investigate the meaning of this
fact.
The enigma of the universe has wasted
the meditations of many, who have still
deserved our admiration, because they felt
themselves summoned to something better
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? PHILOSOPHY.
7
than the present world. Geniuses of a lofty
kind love to wander unceasingly around the
abyss of thoughts that are without an end;
but still they must turn themselves away
from it, for the mind fatigues itself in vain,
in these efforts to scale the heavens.
The origin of thought has occupied the
attention of all true philosophers. Are there
. two natures in man? If there be but one,
is i$ mind or matter? If there be two, do
idea* come by the senses, or do they spring
up in the soul? Or, in truth, are they a
mixture of the action of external objects
upon us, and of the internal faculties which
we possess?
To these three questions, which at all
times have divided the philosophical world,
is united the inquiry which most imme-
diately touches upon virtue--the inquiry,
whether free-will or fatality decides the re-
solutions of man.
Among the ancients, fatality arose from
the will of the gods; among the moderns,
it is attributed to the course of events. The
ancient fatality gave a new evidence to free-
will ; for the will of man struggled against the
event, and moral resistance was unconquer-
able: the fatalism of the moderns, on the
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? 8 PHILOSOPHY ANDvMORALS.
contrary, necessarily destroys the belief in
free-will: if circumstances make us what we
are, we cannot oppose their empire; if ex-
ternal objects are the cause of all that passes
in our mind, what independent thought can
free us from their ascendency? The fatal-
ism which descended from heaven, filled
the soul with a holy terror; while that
which attaches us to earth only works our
degradation. It may be asked, to what
purpose all these questions? It may be an-
swered, to what purpose any thing that
bears no relation to them? For what is
there more important to man, than to know
whether he really is responsible for his ac-
tions; and what sort of a proportion there is
between the power of the will and the em-
pire of circumstances over it? What would
become of conscience, if our habits alone
gave birth to it; if it was nothing but the
product of colours, of sounds, of perfumes,
of circumstances, in short, of every kind,
with which we may have been surrounded
from our infancy?
That species of metaphysics, which en-
deavours to discover what is the source of
our ideas, has a powerful influence, by its con-
sequences, upon the nature and energy of our
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? PHILOSOPHY. 9
will; that species is at once the most exalted
and the most necessary of all our kinds of
knowledge; and the advocates of the highest
utility, namely of moral utility, cannot un-
dervalue ifcV' . ';-: . w" ? '
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? 10 PHILOSOPHY AND MORALS.
? ' ? ? CHAPTER II.
Of English Philosophy.
Every thing seems to testify in us the ex-
istence of a double nature. The influence
of the senses and that of the mind share our
being between them; and, accordingly as
Philosophy inclines towards the one or
the other, opinions and sentiments are in
every respect diametrically opposite. We
may also describe the dominion of the
senses, and that of thought, by other terms:
--there is in man that which perishes with
his earthly existence, and that which may
survive him; that which experience enables
him to acquire, and that with which his
moral instinct inspires him--the finite and
the infinite; but in what manner soever we
express ourselves, it is always necessary to
grant that there are two different principles
of life in a creature subject to death, and
destined to immortality.
A tendency to spiritualize has been always
very manifest among the people of the North;
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? find eyeu before the introduction of Chris-
tianity, this bias made itself perceptible
through the violence pf warlike passions.
The Greeks bad faith m exteivual miracle*
the German nations believe the miracles of
the soul. All their poetry is filled with
misgivings, with presages, with prophe-
cies of tibe heart; and while the Greeks
united themselves to nature by their in-
dulgence in pleasure, the inhabitants of the
North raised themselves to their Creator by
religious sentiments. In the South, Pagan-
ism deified the phenomena of nature; in the
North, they were inclined to believe in ma-
gic, because it attributes to the mind of man
a boundless power over the material world.
The soul and nature, liberty and necessity,
divide the dominion of existence; and just
as we place the commanding force within
ourselves or without us, we are the sons of
heaven, or the slaves of earth.
At the revival of letters, there were some
who occupied themselves with the sub-
tilties of the schools in metaphysics, and
others who believed in the superstitions of
magic in the sciences: the art of observation*
reigned no more in the empire of the senses,
than enthusiasm in the empire of the soul:
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? 12 PHILOSOPHY AND MORALS.
Tvith very few exceptions, there was neither
experience nbr inspiration among the philo-
sophers. A giant appeared--. this was Bacon:
never were the discoveries of thought, nor
the wonders of nature, so well conceived by
the same intelligence. There is not a phrase
in his writings which does not imply years
of reflection and of study; he animates his
metaphysics with his knowledge of the hu-
man heart; he knows how to generalize
facts by philosophy. In physical science he
has created the art of experiment: but it does
not; at all follow, as it has been attempted
toi make us believe, that he was the advocate
of that system exclusively, which grounds all
our ideas upon our sensations. He admits
inspiration in every thing that belongs to the
soul; and he thinks it. even necessary, in or-
der to interpret natural phenomena accord-
ing to general principles. But, in his age,
there were still alchemists, diviners, and sor-
cerers: they were ignorant enough of Religion,
in the greatest part of Europe, to believe that
there were some truths of which she forbade
the promulgation--she who leads us into all
truth. Bacon was struck with these errors;
--his age had a bias towards superstition, as
our age has towards incredulity. At the
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? ENGLISH PHILOSOPHY. <: 13
epoch in which he lived, it was right to en-
deavour to bring experimental philosophy
into favour; in our era, he would have felt
the necessity of reanimating the internal
source of moral beauty, and of recalling in-
cessantly this truth to the memory of man--
that he exists in himself, in his sentiment,
and in his will. When the age is supersti-
tious, the genius of observation is timid ; the
natural world is ill known :--when the age is
incredulous, enthusiasm exists no more, and
we are thenceforth ignorant of the soul and
of heaven.
At a time when the progress of the hu-
man mind was unsure on every side, Bacon
collected all his forces to trace out the way
in which experimental philosophy ought to
proceed; and his writings, even yet, serve
for conductors to those who study nature.
As a minister of state, he was for a long
time occupied with government and with
politics. The strongest heads are those
which unite the taste and the habit for
meditation with a capacity for business.
Bacon, under both these views, was a won-
derful genius; but his philosophy and his
character failed in the same point. He was
not virtuous enough fully to feel the moral
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? 14 PHf tOStffti* ^Nli MORALS.
liberty of man: nevertheless, we cannot
compare him to the materialists of the last
age; and his successors have pushed the
theory of experience much beyond his in-
tention. He is far, I repeat it, from attri-
buting all our ideas to our sensations^ and
from considering analysis a* the sole instru-
ment of discovery. He frequently follows
& more daring path; and if he adheres to
experimental logic to remove all the preju-
dices which encumber his progress, it is to
the spring of genius alone that he trusts to
forward his advance.
"The human mind," says Luther, "is
"like a drunken peasant on horseback; when
'4 we put it up on one side, it falls down or*
"the other. "--Thus man Has incessantly
fluctuated between his two natures; some-
times his thoughts have disentangled him
from his sensations; sometimes his sensa-
tions have absorbed his thoughts, and he has
wished, successively, to refer every thing
to one or the other: it however appears to
me, that the moment for a fixed doctrine
has arrived* Metaphysics are about to un-
dergo a revolution, like that which Coperni-
cus has produced in the system of the world.
They are about to replace the soul of man in
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? ENGLISH PHILOSOPHY. 1$
the centre, and to make it, in every respect,
like the sun; round which external objects'
trace their circle, and from which they bor-
row their light.
The genealogical tree of the different
branches of human knowledge, in which1
every science is referred to a certain faculty,
is doubtless one of the titles of Bacon to the
admiration of posterity; but that which
constitutes his real glory is this--that he has1
announced his opinion, that there was no
absolute separation of one science from
another; but that general philosophy re-
united them all. He is not the author
of that anatomical method:, which consi-
ders the intellectual powers severally, or
each by itself; and which appears to be
ignorant of the admirable unity in the moral
being. Sensibility, imagination, reason, each
is subservient to the other. Every one
of these faculties would be nothing but
a disease, but weakness, instead of strength,
if it were not modified or completed by
the collective character of our nature.
The exact sciences, at a certain height, stand
in need of the Imagination. She, in her
turn, must support herself upon he accu-
rate knowledge of . Nature. Reason, of all
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? 16 PHILOSOPHY AND MORALS.
our faculties, appears to be that which
would most easily do without the assistance
of the others; and yet, if a person were en-
tirely unprovided with imagination and sen-
sibility, he might by that very want become,
if we may so express it, the fool of Reason;
and, seeing nothing in life but calculations
and material interests, deceive himself as
much concerning the characters and affec-
tions of men, as the enthusiastic being whose
fancy pictures all around him disinterested-
ness and love.
We follow a bad system of education,
when we aim at the exclusive developernent
of this or that quality of mind; for, to de-
vote ourselves to one faculty, is to take up
an intellectual trade. Milton says, with rea-
son, that our education is not good, excepting
when it renders us capable of every employ
in peace or war: all that makes the man
A Man, is the true object of instruction.
Not to know any thing of a science but
that portion of it which individually belongs
to us, is to apply the division of labour
(inculcated by Smith) to the liberal studies,
when it is only adapted to the mechanic
arts. When we arrive at that height where
every science touches upon all the rest in
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? feNGLtSIt PHILOSOPHY; 17
Some particulars, it is then that we approach
the region of universal ideas; and the air
which breathes from that region gives life to
all our thoughts.
The soul is a fire that darts its rays through
all the senses: it is in this fire that existence
consists: all the observations and all the
efforts of philosophers ought to turn towards
this point of individuality--the centre and
the moving power of our sentiments and our
ideas. Doubtless, the imperfection of lan-
guage compels us to make use of erroneous
expressions; we are obliged to repeat, accord-
ing to the customary phrase, such a person
is endowed with the power of reason, of
imagination, or of sensibility, &c. ; but, if
we wish to be understood in a single word,
we ought to say, he has soul--an abundance
of soul*. It is this divine spirit that makes
the whole man.
Love is the instructor who teaches us
more certainly what belongs to the mysteries
of the soul, than the utmost metaphysical
subtilty. We never attach ourselves to this
* M. Ancilloo, of whom I shall have occasion to speak
in the Fourth Part of this work, has made use of this ex-
pression in a book, upon which one cannot grow tired of
meditating.
VOL. III. C
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? 18 PHILOSOPHY AND MORALS.
qr that qualification of the object of our pre-
ference; and every madrigal reveals a great
philosophical truth, when it says--" I love
"I know not why \" for this "I know not
"why," is that collective character, and that
harmony, which we recognise by love, by
admiration, by all the sentiments which re-
veal to us what is most deep and most secret
in the heart of another.
The method of analysis, which can only
examine by division, applies itself like the
dissect ing-knife to dead nature; but it is a
bad instrument to teach us to understand
what is living; and if we feel a difficulty in
verbally defining that animated conception
v{hich represents whole objects to our mind,
it is precisely because that conception clings
more closely to the very essence of things.
To divide, in order to comprehend, is a sign
of weakness in philosophy; as to divide, in
order to rule, is a sign of weakness in
political power.
^acon adhered much more than is believed
to that ideal philosophy, which, from the
days of Plato down to our own, has con-
stantly re-appeared under different forms. --
Nevertheless, the success of his analytical
method in the exact sciences has necessarily
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? ENGLISH PHILOSOPHY. 19
had an influence over his metaphysical sys-
tem. His doctrine of sensations, considered
as the origin of ideas, has been understood
in a much more positive sense than that in
which he maintained it himself. We can
clearly see the influence of this doctrine in
the two schools which it has produced--that
of Hobbes, and that of Locke. Certainly
they differ very much jn their intent; but
their principles are alike in many respects.
Hobbes embraced to the letter that philo-
sophy which derives all our ideas from the
impressions of sense. He feared not the
consequences; and he has boldly said, "that
"the soul is as much subjected to necessity,
"as society to despotism. " He admits the
fatalism of sensation as the controller of
thought, and that of force as the controller
of action. He annihilates moral as well as
civil liberty; thinking, with reason, that
one depends upon the other. He was an
Atheist and a slave, and nothing is more in
the course of things; for if there is in man
but the impress of sensations received from
without, earthly power is every thing, and
our soul and our destiny equally depend
upon it.
The cultivation of all pure and elevated
c2
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? 20 PHILOSOPHY AND MORALS.
sentiments is so consolidated in England, by*
political and religious institutions, that the
scepticisms of genius revolve around these
imposing columns without ever shaking them;
Hobbes, accordingly, has gained few parti-
sans in his country; but the influence of
Locke has been more universal. As his cha-
racter was moral and religious, he did not
allow himself to use any of those dangerous
reasonings which are necessarily derived
from his metaphysical system; and the
greater part of his countrymen, in adopting
that system, have shown the same glorious
want of consistency, which he did--have se-
parated results from principles-^until Hume,
and the French philosophers, having ad-
mitted the system, made application of it
in a much more logical manner.
The metaphysical doctrines of Locke have
had no other effect upon the wits of Eng-
land, than to tarnish a little their natural
originality: if they had even dried up the
source of high philosophical reflection, they
would not have destroyed that religious sen-
timent which can so well supply the want
of it: but these doctrines, so generally re-
ceived throughout the rest of Europe (Ger-
many excepted), have been one of the pr'm-
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? ENGLISH PHILOSOPHY. 21
cipal causes of that immorality, the advo-
cates of which have formed it into a theory,
in order to make its practice more certain.
Locke exerted his especial endeavours to
prove that there is nothing innate in the
mind. He was right in his own sense, for
he always blended with the meaning of the
word Idea that of a notion acquired by ex-
perience: ideas thus conceived are the result
of the objects that excite, of the compa-
risons that assemble them, and of the lan-
guage that expedites their union. But this
is not the case with the sentiments, with the
dispositions, and the faculties which consti. .
tute the laws of the human understanding,
in the same manner that attraction and im-
pulse constitute the laws of external nature.
It is truly worth observing what kind of
arguments Locke has been compelled to
adopt, in order to prove that every thing in
the mind came there by means of sensation.
If these arguments led to the truth, doubt-
less we ought to overcome the moral aver-
sion with which they inspire us; but, in ge-
neral, we may trust to this sort of aversion
as an infallible token of what must be
avoided. Locke wished to show that con-
science, or the sense of good and evil, was
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? 22 PHILOSOPHY AND MORALS.
not innate in man; and that we know no-
thing of justice or injustice, except from ex-
perience, as we learn to distinguish red from
blue. To arrive at this conclusion, he has
carefully inquired after all those countries
where the laws and customs pay respect to
crimes; those, for instance, in which it is
thought a duty to kill an enemy; to despise
marriage; to put a father to death, when he
has grown old. He attentively collects every
thing that travellers have related of barbari-
ties which have passed into daily practice.
Of what nature then must that system be,
which excites, in so virtuous a man as
Locke, an eagerness for such narrations?
Let them be melancholy tales, or not, it
may be said, the important thing is to know
if they are true. --Allow them to be true, of
what consequence are they? Do we not
know, by our own experience, that circum-
stances, in other words external objects,
have an influence over the manner in which
we interpret our duties? Amplify these
circumstances, and you will find in them the
causes of national error; but is there any
nation, or any man, that denies the obliga-
tion of all duty? Has it ever been pretended
that the ideas of justice and injustice have
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? no me&ning? Different explanations of them
may prevail in different places j but . the
conviction of the principle is every where
the same; and it is in this cbrtvictioh that
the primitive impression consists, which we
recognise in every being of hutnan birth.
When the savage kills his aged father, he
believes that he renders the old man a ser. t
vice; he does not act for his own interest,
but for that of his parent: the deed he com-
mits is horrible; and yet he is not on that
account devoid of conscience: because he is
ignorant, he is hot therefore vicious. The
sensations, that is to Say, the external objects
with which he is surrounded, blind him;
the inward sentiment, which constitutes the
hatred for vice and the love of virtue, does
not the less exist within him, because he
has been deceived by experience as tt the
manner in which this sentiment ought to be
manifested in his life. To prefer others t6
ourselves, when virtue Commands the prefer-
ence's precisely that. in which the esfsence of
moral beauty consists; and this admirable
instinct of the soul, the opponent of our
physical instinct, is inherent in our nature;
if it could be acquired, it could also be lost;
but it is unchangeable, because it is innate,
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? 24 PHILOSOPHY AND MORALS.
Jt is possible for us to do evil, when we be-
lieve we are doing good; a man may be cul-
pable knowingly and willingly; but he can-
not admit a contradiction for a truth, that
justice is injustice.
There is such a thing as indifference to
good and evil, and it is the ordinary result of
civilization, when its coldness has reached
the point of petrifaction, if the expression
may be allowed; this indifference is a much
greater argument against an innate con-
science than the gross errors of savages:
but the most sceptical of men, if they are
sufferers from oppression in any relation of
life, appeal to justice, as if they had be*
lieved in it all their days; and when they
are seized with any vivid affection, and ty-
rannical power is exerted to control it, they
can invoke the sentiment of equity with as
much force as the most severe of moralists.
When the flame of any passion, whether it
be indignation or love, takes possession of
the soul, the sacred hand-writing of the
eternal law may be seen by that light re-
appearing in our bosoms.
If the accident of birth and education de-
cided the morality of man, how could we
accuse him for his actions? If all that comi
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