Therefore
those who are under another's power can give alms.
Summa Theologica
Therefore one ought
not to give alms in order to receive a spiritual effect.
Objection 3: Further, to multiply the cause is to multiply the effect.
If therefore corporal almsdeeds cause a spiritual effect, the greater
the alms, the greater the spiritual profit, which is contrary to what
we read (Lk. 21:3) of the widow who cast two brass mites into the
treasury, and in Our Lord's own words "cast in more than . . . all. "
Therefore bodily almsdeeds have no spiritual effect.
On the contrary, It is written (Ecclus. 17:18): "The alms of a man . .
. shall preserve the grace of a man as the apple of the eye. "
I answer that, Corporal almsdeeds may be considered in three ways.
First, with regard to their substance, and in this way they have merely
a corporal effect, inasmuch as they supply our neighbor's corporal
needs. Secondly, they may be considered with regard to their cause, in
so far as a man gives a corporal alms out of love for God and his
neighbor, and in this respect they bring forth a spiritual fruit,
according to Ecclus. 29:13, 14: "Lose thy money for thy brother . . .
place thy treasure in the commandments of the Most High, and it shall
bring thee more profit than gold. "
Thirdly, with regard to the effect, and in this way again, they have a
spiritual fruit, inasmuch as our neighbor, who is succored by a
corporal alms, is moved to pray for his benefactor; wherefore the above
text goes on (Ecclus. 29:15): "Shut up alms in the heart of the poor,
and it shall obtain help for thee from all evil. "
Reply to Objection 1: This argument considers corporal almsdeeds as to
their substance.
Reply to Objection 2: He who gives an alms does rot intend to buy a
spiritual thing with a corporal thing, for he knows that spiritual
things infinitely surpass corporal things, but he intends to merit a
spiritual fruit through the love of charity.
Reply to Objection 3: The widow who gave less in quantity, gave more in
proportion; and thus we gather that the fervor of her charity, whence
corporal almsdeeds derive their spiritual efficacy, was greater.
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Whether almsgiving is a matter of precept?
Objection 1: It would seem that almsgiving is not a matter of precept.
For the counsels are distinct from the precepts. Now almsgiving is a
matter of counsel, according to Dan. 4:24: "Let my counsel be
acceptable to the King; [Vulg. : 'to thee, and'] redeem thou thy sins
with alms. " Therefore almsgiving is not a matter of precept.
Objection 2: Further, it is lawful for everyone to use and to keep what
is his own. Yet by keeping it he will not give alms. Therefore it is
lawful not to give alms: and consequently almsgiving is not a matter of
precept.
Objection 3: Further, whatever is a matter of precept binds the
transgressor at some time or other under pain of mortal sin, because
positive precepts are binding for some fixed time. Therefore, if
almsgiving were a matter of precept, it would be possible to point to
some fixed time when a man would commit a mortal sin unless he gave an
alms. But it does not appear how this can be so, because it can always
be deemed probable that the person in need can be relieved in some
other way, and that what we would spend in almsgiving might be needful
to ourselves either now or in some future time. Therefore it seems that
almsgiving is not a matter of precept.
Objection 4: Further, every commandment is reducible to the precepts of
the Decalogue. But these precepts contain no reference to almsgiving.
Therefore almsgiving is not a matter of precept.
On the contrary, No man is punished eternally for omitting to do what
is not a matter of precept. But some are punished eternally for
omitting to give alms, as is clear from Mat. 25:41-43. Therefore
almsgiving is a matter of precept.
I answer that, As love of our neighbor is a matter of precept, whatever
is a necessary condition to the love of our neighbor is a matter of
precept also. Now the love of our neighbor requires that not only
should we be our neighbor's well-wishers, but also his well-doers,
according to 1 Jn. 3:18: "Let us not love in word, nor in tongue, but
in deed, and in truth. " And in order to be a person's well-wisher and
well-doer, we ought to succor his needs: this is done by almsgiving.
Therefore almsgiving is a matter of precept.
Since, however, precepts are about acts of virtue, it follows that all
almsgiving must be a matter of precept, in so far as it is necessary to
virtue, namely, in so far as it is demanded by right reason. Now right
reason demands that we should take into consideration something on the
part of the giver, and something on the part of the recipient. On the
part of the giver, it must be noted that he should give of his surplus,
according to Lk. 11:41: "That which remaineth, give alms. " This surplus
is to be taken in reference not only to himself, so as to denote what
is unnecessary to the individual, but also in reference to those of
whom he has charge (in which case we have the expression "necessary to
the person" [*The official necessities of a person in position] taking
the word "person" as expressive of dignity). Because each one must
first of all look after himself and then after those over whom he has
charge, and afterwards with what remains relieve the needs of others.
Thus nature first, by its nutritive power, takes what it requires for
the upkeep of one's own body, and afterwards yields the residue for the
formation of another by the power of generation.
On the part of the recipient it is requisite that he should be in need,
else there would be no reason for giving him alms: yet since it is not
possible for one individual to relieve the needs of all, we are not
bound to relieve all who are in need, but only those who could not be
succored if we not did succor them. For in such cases the words of
Ambrose apply, "Feed him that dies of hunger: if thou hast not fed him,
thou hast slain him" [*Cf. Canon Pasce, dist. lxxxvi, whence the words,
as quoted, are taken]. Accordingly we are bound to give alms of our
surplus, as also to give alms to one whose need is extreme: otherwise
almsgiving, like any other greater good, is a matter of counsel.
Reply to Objection 1: Daniel spoke to a king who was not subject to
God's Law, wherefore such things as were prescribed by the Law which he
did not profess, had to be counselled to him. Or he may have been
speaking in reference to a case in which almsgiving was not a matter of
precept.
Reply to Objection 2: The temporal goods which God grants us, are ours
as to the ownership, but as to the use of them, they belong not to us
alone but also to such others as we are able to succor out of what we
have over and above our needs. Hence Basil says [*Hom. super Luc. xii,
18]: "If you acknowledge them," viz. your temporal goods, "as coming
from God, is He unjust because He apportions them unequally? Why are
you rich while another is poor, unless it be that you may have the
merit of a good stewardship, and he the reward of patience? It is the
hungry man's bread that you withhold, the naked man's cloak that you
have stored away, the shoe of the barefoot that you have left to rot,
the money of the needy that you have buried underground: and so you
injure as many as you might help. " Ambrose expresses himself in the
same way.
Reply to Objection 3: There is a time when we sin mortally if we omit
to give alms; on the part of the recipient when we see that his need is
evident and urgent, and that he is not likely to be succored
otherwise---on the part of the giver, when he has superfluous goods,
which he does not need for the time being, as far as he can judge with
probability. Nor need he consider every case that may possibly occur in
the future, for this would be to think about the morrow, which Our Lord
forbade us to do (Mat. 6:34), but he should judge what is superfluous
and what necessary, according as things probably and generally occur.
Reply to Objection 4: All succor given to our neighbor is reduced to
the precept about honoring our parents. For thus does the Apostle
interpret it (1 Tim. 4:8) where he says: "Dutifulness* [Douay:
'Godliness'] is profitable to all things, having promise of the life
that now is, and of that which is to come," and he says this because
the precept about honoring our parents contains the promise, "that thou
mayest be longlived upon the land" (Ex. 20:12): and dutifulness
comprises all kinds of almsgiving. [*"Pietas," whence our English word
"Piety. " Cf. also inf. [2607] Q[101], A[2]. ]
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Whether one ought to give alms out of what one needs?
Objection 1: It would seem that one ought not to give alms out of what
one needs. For the order of charity should be observed not only as
regards the effect of our benefactions but also as regards our interior
affections. Now it is a sin to contravene the order of charity, because
this order is a matter of precept. Since, then, the order of charity
requires that a man should love himself more than his neighbor, it
seems that he would sin if he deprived himself of what he needed, in
order to succor his neighbor.
Objection 2: Further, whoever gives away what he needs himself,
squanders his own substance, and that is to be a prodigal, according to
the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 1). But no sinful deed should be done.
Therefore we should not give alms out of what we need.
Objection 3: Further, the Apostle says (1 Tim. 5:8): "If any man have
not care of his own, and especially of those of his house, he hath
denied the faith, and is worse than an infidel. " Now if a man gives of
what he needs for himself or for his charge, he seems to detract from
the care he should have for himself or his charge. Therefore it seems
that whoever gives alms from what he needs, sins gravely.
On the contrary, Our Lord said (Mat. 19:21): "If thou wilt be perfect,
go, sell what thou hast, and give to the poor. " Now he that gives all
he has to the poor, gives not only what he needs not, but also what he
needs. Therefore a man may give alms out of what he needs.
I answer that, A thing is necessary in two ways: first, because without
it something is impossible, and it is altogether wrong to give alms out
of what is necessary to us in this sense; for instance, if a man found
himself in the presence of a case of urgency, and had merely sufficient
to support himself and his children, or others under his charge, he
would be throwing away his life and that of others if he were to give
away in alms, what was then necessary to him. Yet I say this without
prejudice to such a case as might happen, supposing that by depriving
himself of necessaries a man might help a great personage, and a
support of the Church or State, since it would be a praiseworthy act to
endanger one's life and the lives of those who are under our charge for
the delivery of such a person, since the common good is to be preferred
to one's own.
Secondly, a thing is said to be necessary, if a man cannot without it
live in keeping with his social station, as regards either himself or
those of whom he has charge. The "necessary" considered thus is not an
invariable quantity, for one might add much more to a man's property,
and yet not go beyond what he needs in this way, or one might take much
from him, and he would still have sufficient for the decencies of life
in keeping with his own position. Accordingly it is good to give alms
of this kind of "necessary"; and it is a matter not of precept but of
counsel. Yet it would be inordinate to deprive oneself of one's own, in
order to give to others to such an extent that the residue would be
insufficient for one to live in keeping with one's station and the
ordinary occurrences of life: for no man ought to live unbecomingly.
There are, however, three exceptions to the above rule. The first is
when a man changes his state of life, for instance, by entering
religion, for then he gives away all his possessions for Christ's sake,
and does the deed of perfection by transferring himself to another
state. Secondly, when that which he deprives himself of, though it be
required for the decencies of life, can nevertheless easily be
recovered, so that he does not suffer extreme inconvenience. Thirdly,
when he is in presence of extreme indigence in an individual, or great
need on the part of the common weal. For in such cases it would seem
praiseworthy to forego the requirements of one's station, in order to
provide for a greater need.
The objections may be easily solved from what has been said.
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Whether one may give alms out of ill-gotten goods?
Objection 1: It would seem that one may give alms out of ill-gotten
goods. For it is written (Lk. 16:9): "Make unto you friends of the
mammon of iniquity. " Now mammon signifies riches. Therefore it is
lawful to make unto oneself spiritual friends by giving alms out of
ill-gotten riches.
Objection 2: Further, all filthy lucre seems to be ill-gotten. But the
profits from whoredom are filthy lucre; wherefore it was forbidden (Dt.
23:18) to offer therefrom sacrifices or oblations to God: "Thou shalt
not offer the hire of a strumpet . . . in the house of . . . thy God. "
In like manner gains from games of chance are ill-gotten, for, as the
Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 1), "we take such like gains from our
friends to whom we ought rather to give. " And most of all are the
profits from simony ill-gotten, since thereby the Holy Ghost is
wronged. Nevertheless out of such gains it is lawful to give alms.
Therefore one may give alms out of ill-gotten goods.
Objection 3: Further, greater evils should be avoided more than lesser
evils. Now it is less sinful to keep back another's property than to
commit murder, of which a man is guilty if he fails to succor one who
is in extreme need, as appears from the words of Ambrose who says (Cf.
Canon Pasce dist. lxxxvi, whence the words, as quoted, are taken):
"Feed him that dies of hunger, if thou hast not fed him, thou hast
slain him". Therefore, in certain cases, it is lawful to give alms of
ill-gotten goods.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Verb. Dom. xxxv, 2): "Give alms
from your just labors. For you will not bribe Christ your judge, not to
hear you with the poor whom you rob . . . Give not alms from interest
and usury: I speak to the faithful to whom we dispense the Body of
Christ. "
I answer that, A thing may be ill-gotten in three ways. In the first
place a thing is ill-gotten if it be due to the person from whom it is
gotten, and may not be kept by the person who has obtained possession
of it; as in the case of rapine, theft and usury, and of such things a
man may not give alms since he is bound to restore them.
Secondly, a thing is ill-gotten, when he that has it may not keep it,
and yet he may not return it to the person from whom he received it,
because he received it unjustly, while the latter gave it unjustly.
This happens in simony, wherein both giver and receiver contravene the
justice of the Divine Law, so that restitution is to be made not to the
giver, but by giving alms. The same applies to all similar cases of
illegal giving and receiving.
Thirdly, a thing is ill-gotten, not because the taking was unlawful,
but because it is the outcome of something unlawful, as in the case of
a woman's profits from whoredom. This is filthy lucre properly so
called, because the practice of whoredom is filthy and against the Law
of God, yet the woman does not act unjustly or unlawfully in taking the
money. Consequently it is lawful to keep and to give in alms what is
thus acquired by an unlawful action.
Reply to Objection 1: As Augustine says (De Verb. Dom. 2), "Some have
misunderstood this saying of Our Lord, so as to take another's property
and give thereof to the poor, thinking that they are fulfilling the
commandment by so doing. This interpretation must be amended. Yet all
riches are called riches of iniquity, as stated in De Quaest. Ev. ii,
34, because "riches are not unjust save for those who are themselves
unjust, and put all their trust in them. Or, according to Ambrose in
his commentary on Lk. 16:9, "Make unto yourselves friends," etc. , "He
calls mammon unjust, because it draws our affections by the various
allurements of wealth. " Or, because "among the many ancestors whose
property you inherit, there is one who took the property of others
unjustly, although you know nothing about it," as Basil says in a
homily (Hom. super Luc. A, 5). Or, all riches are styled riches "of
iniquity," i. e. , of "inequality," because they are not distributed
equally among all, one being in need, and another in affluence.
Reply to Objection 2: We have already explained how alms may be given
out of the profits of whoredom. Yet sacrifices and oblations were not
made therefrom at the altar, both on account of the scandal, and
through reverence for sacred things. It is also lawful to give alms out
of the profits of simony, because they are not due to him who paid,
indeed he deserves to lose them. But as to the profits from games of
chance, there would seem to be something unlawful as being contrary to
the Divine Law, when a man wins from one who cannot alienate his
property, such as minors, lunatics and so forth, or when a man, with
the desire of making money out of another man, entices him to play, and
wins from him by cheating. In these cases he is bound to restitution,
and consequently cannot give away his gains in alms. Then again there
would seem to be something unlawful as being against the positive civil
law, which altogether forbids any such profits. Since, however, a civil
law does not bind all, but only those who are subject to that law, and
moreover may be abrogated through desuetude, it follows that all such
as are bound by these laws are bound to make restitution of such gains,
unless perchance the contrary custom prevail, or unless a man win from
one who enticed him to play, in which case he is not bound to
restitution, because the loser does not deserve to be paid back: and
yet he cannot lawfully keep what he has won, so long as that positive
law is in force, wherefore in this case he ought to give it away in
alms.
Reply to Objection 3: All things are common property in a case of
extreme necessity. Hence one who is in such dire straits may take
another's goods in order to succor himself, if he can find no one who
is willing to give him something. For the same reason a man may retain
what belongs to another, and give alms thereof; or even take something
if there be no other way of succoring the one who is in need. If
however this be possible without danger, he must ask the owner's
consent, and then succor the poor man who is in extreme necessity.
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Whether one who is under another's power can give alms?
Objection 1: It would seem that one who is under another's power can
give alms. For religious are under the power of their prelates to whom
they have vowed obedience. Now if it were unlawful for them to give
alms, they would lose by entering the state of religion, for as Ambrose
[*The quotation is from the works of Ambrosiaster. Cf. Index to
ecclesiastical authorities quoted by St. Thomas] says on 1 Tim. 4:8:
"'Dutifulness [Douay: 'godliness'] is profitable to all things': The
sum total of the Christian religion consists in doing one's duty by
all," and the most creditable way of doing this is to give alms.
Therefore those who are in another's power can give alms.
Objection 2: Further, a wife is under her husband's power (Gn. 3:16).
But a wife can give alms since she is her husband's partner; hence it
is related of the Blessed Lucy that she gave alms without the knowledge
of her betrothed [*"Sponsus" The matrimonial institutions of the Romans
were so entirely different from ours that "sponsus" is no longer
accurately rendered either "husband" or "betrothed. "] Therefore a
person is not prevented from giving alms, by being under another's
power.
Objection 3: Further, the subjection of children to their parents is
founded on nature, wherefore the Apostle says (Eph. 6:1): "Children,
obey your parents in the Lord. " But, apparently, children may give alms
out of their parents' property. For it is their own, since they are the
heirs; wherefore, since they can employ it for some bodily use, it
seems that much more can they use it in giving alms so as to profit
their souls. Therefore those who are under another's power can give
alms.
Objection 4: Further, servants are under their master's power,
according to Titus 2:9: "Exhort servants to be obedient to their
masters. " Now they may lawfully do anything that will profit their
masters: and this would be especially the case if they gave alms for
them.
Therefore those who are under another's power can give alms.
On the contrary, Alms should not be given out of another's property;
and each one should give alms out of the just profit of his own labor
as Augustine says (De Verb. Dom. xxxv, 2). Now if those who are subject
to anyone were to give alms, this would be out of another's property.
Therefore those who are under another's power cannot give alms.
I answer that, Anyone who is under another's power must, as such, be
ruled in accordance with the power of his superior: for the natural
order demands that the inferior should be ruled according to its
superior. Therefore in those matters in which the inferior is subject
to his superior, his ministrations must be subject to the superior's
permission.
Accordingly he that is under another's power must not give alms of
anything in respect of which he is subject to that other, except in so
far as he has been commissioned by his superior. But if he has
something in respect of which he is not under the power of his
superior, he is no longer subject to another in its regard, being
independent in respect of that particular thing, and he can give alms
therefrom.
Reply to Objection 1: If a monk be dispensed through being commissioned
by his superior, he can give alms from the property of his monaster, in
accordance with the terms of his commission; but if he has no such
dispensation, since he has nothing of his own, he cannot give alms
without his abbot's permission either express or presumed for some
probable reason: except in a case of extreme necessity, when it would
be lawful for him to commit a theft in order to give an alms. Nor does
it follow that he is worse off than before, because, as stated in De
Eccles. Dogm. lxxi, "it is a good thing to give one's property to the
poor little by little, but it is better still to give all at once in
order to follow Christ, and being freed from care, to be needy with
Christ. "
Reply to Objection 2: A wife, who has other property besides her dowry
which is for the support of the burdens of marriage, whether that
property be gained by her own industry or by any other lawful means,
can give alms, out of that property, without asking her husband's
permission: yet such alms should be moderate, lest through giving too
much she impoverish her husband. Otherwise she ought not to give alms
without the express or presumed consent of her husband, except in cases
of necessity as stated, in the case of a monk, in the preceding Reply.
For though the wife be her husband's equal in the marriage act, yet in
matters of housekeeping, the head of the woman is the man, as the
Apostle says (1 Cor. 11:3). As regards Blessed Lucy, she had a
betrothed, not a husband, wherefore she could give alms with her
mother's consent.
Reply to Objection 3: What belongs to the children belongs also to the
father: wherefore the child cannot give alms, except in such small
quantity that one may presume the father to be willing: unless,
perchance, the father authorize his child to dispose of any particular
property. The same applies to servants. Hence the Reply to the Fourth
Objection is clear.
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Whether one ought to give alms to those rather who are more closely united
to us?
Objection 1: It would seem that one ought not to give alms to those
rather who are more closely united to us. For it is written (Ecclus.
12:4, 6): "Give to the merciful and uphold not the sinner . . . Do good
to the humble and give not to the ungodly. " Now it happens sometimes
that those who are closely united to us are sinful and ungodly.
Therefore we ought not to give alms to them in preference to others.
Objection 2: Further, alms should be given that we may receive an
eternal reward in return, according to Mat. 6:18: "And thy Father Who
seeth in secret, will repay thee. " Now the eternal reward is gained
chiefly by the alms which are given to the saints, according to Lk.
16:9: "Make unto you friends of the mammon of iniquity, that when you
shall fail, they may receive you into everlasting dwellings, which
passage Augustine expounds (De Verb. Dom. xxxv, 1): "Who shall have
everlasting dwellings unless the saints of God? And who are they that
shall be received by them into their dwellings, if not those who succor
them in their needs? Therefore alms should be given to the more holy
persons rather than to those who are more closely united to us.
Objection 3: Further, man is more closely united to himself. But a man
cannot give himself an alms. Therefore it seems that we are not bound
to give alms to those who are most closely united to us.
On the contrary, The Apostle says (1 Tim. 5:8): "If any man have not
care of his own, and especially of those of his house, he hath denied
the faith, and is worse than an infidel. "
I answer that, As Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 28), "it falls
to us by lot, as it were, to have to look to the welfare of those who
are more closely united to us. " Nevertheless in this matter we must
employ discretion, according to the various degrees of connection,
holiness and utility. For we ought to give alms to one who is much
holier and in greater want, and to one who is more useful to the common
weal, rather than to one who is more closely united to us, especially
if the latter be not very closely united, and has no special claim on
our care then and there, and who is not in very urgent need.
Reply to Objection 1: We ought not to help a sinner as such, that is by
encouraging him to sin, but as man, that is by supporting his nature.
Reply to Objection 2: Almsdeeds deserve on two counts to receive an
eternal reward. First because they are rooted in charity, and in this
respect an almsdeed is meritorious in so far as it observes the order
of charity, which requires that, other things being equal, we should,
in preference, help those who are more closely connected with us.
Wherefore Ambrose says (De Officiis i, 30): "It is with commendable
liberality that you forget not your kindred, if you know them to be in
need, for it is better that you should yourself help your own family,
who would be ashamed to beg help from others. " Secondly, almsdeeds
deserve to be rewarded eternally, through the merit of the recipient,
who prays for the giver, and it is in this sense that Augustine is
speaking.
Reply to Objection 3: Since almsdeeds are works of mercy, just as a man
does not, properly speaking, pity himself, but only by a kind of
comparison, as stated above ([2608]Q[30], AA[1],2), so too, properly
speaking, no man gives himself an alms, unless he act in another's
person; thus when a man is appointed to distribute alms, he can take
something for himself, if he be in want, on the same ground as when he
gives to others.
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Whether alms should be given in abundance?
Objection 1: It would seem that alms should not be given in abundance.
For we ought to give alms to those chiefly who are most closely
connected with us. But we ought not to give to them in such a way that
they are likely to become richer thereby, as Ambrose says (De Officiis
i, 30). Therefore neither should we give abundantly to others.
Objection 2: Further, Ambrose says (De Officiis i, 30): "We should not
lavish our wealth on others all at once, we should dole it out by
degrees. " But to give abundantly is to give lavishly. Therefore alms
should not be given in abundance.
Objection 3: Further, the Apostle says (2 Cor. 8:13): "Not that others
should be eased," i. e. should live on you without working themselves,
"and you burthened," i. e. impoverished. But this would be the result if
alms were given in abundance. Therefore we ought not to give alms
abundantly.
On the contrary, It is written (Tob. 4:93): "If thou have much, give
abundantly. "
I answer that, Alms may be considered abundant in relation either to
the giver, or to the recipient: in relation to the giver, when that
which a man gives is great as compared with his means. To give thus is
praiseworthy, wherefore Our Lord (Lk. 21:3,4) commended the widow
because "of her want, she cast in all the living that she had. "
Nevertheless those conditions must be observed which were laid down
when we spoke of giving alms out of one's necessary goods [2609](A[9]).
On the part of the recipient, an alms may be abundant in two ways;
first, by relieving his need sufficiently, and in this sense it is
praiseworthy to give alms: secondly, by relieving his need more than
sufficiently; this is not praiseworthy, and it would be better to give
to several that are in need, wherefore the Apostle says (1 Cor. 13:3):
"If I should distribute . . . to feed the poor," on which words a gloss
comments: "Thus we are warned to be careful in giving alms, and to
give, not to one only, but to many, that we may profit many. "
Reply to Objection 1: This argument considers abundance of alms as
exceeding the needs of the recipient.
Reply to Objection 2: The passage quoted considers abundance of alms on
the part of the giver; but the sense is that God does not wish a man to
lavish all his wealth at once, except when he changes his state of
life, wherefore he goes on to say: "Except we imitate Eliseus who slew
his oxen and fed the poor with what he had, so that no household cares
might keep him back" (3 Kings 19:21).
Reply to Objection 3: In the passage quoted the words, "not that others
should be eased or refreshed," refer to that abundance of alms which
surpasses the need of the recipient, to whom one should give alms not
that he may have an easy life, but that he may have relief.
Nevertheless we must bring discretion to bear on the matter, on account
of the various conditions of men, some of whom are more daintily
nurtured, and need finer food and clothing. Hence Ambrose says (De
Officiis i, 30): "When you give an alms to a man, you should take into
consideration his age and his weakness; and sometimes the shame which
proclaims his good birth; and again that perhaps he has fallen from
riches to indigence through no fault of his own. "
With regard to the words that follow, "and you burdened," they refer to
abundance on the part of the giver. Yet, as a gloss says on the same
passage, "he says this, not because it would be better to give in
abundance, but because he fears for the weak, and he admonishes them so
to give that they lack not for themselves. "
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OF FRATERNAL CORRECTION (EIGHT ARTICLES)
We must now consider Fraternal Correction, under which head there are
eight points of inquiry:
(1) Whether fraternal correction is an act of charity?
(2) Whether it is a matter of precept?
(3) Whether this precept binds all, or only superiors?
(4) Whether this precept binds the subject to correct his superior?
(5) Whether a sinner may correct anyone?
(6) Whether one ought to correct a person who becomes worse through
being corrected?
(7) Whether secret correction should precede denouncement?
(8) Whether witnesses should be called before denouncement?
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Whether fraternal correction is an act of charity?
Objection 1: It would seem that fraternal correction is not an act of
charity. For a gloss on Mat. 18:15, "If thy brother shall offend
against thee," says that "a man should reprove his brother out of zeal
for justice. " But justice is a distinct virtue from charity. Therefore
fraternal correction is an act, not of charity, but of justice.
Objection 2: Further, fraternal correction is given by secret
admonition. Now admonition is a kind of counsel, which is an act of
prudence, for a prudent man is one who is of good counsel (Ethic. vi,
5). Therefore fraternal correction is an act, not of charity, but of
prudence.
Objection 3: Further, contrary acts do not belong to the same virtue.
Now it is an act of charity to bear with a sinner, according to Gal.
6:2: "Bear ye one another's burdens, and so you shall fulfil the law of
Christ," which is the law of charity. Therefore it seems that the
correction of a sinning brother, which is contrary to bearing with him,
is not an act of charity.
On the contrary, To correct the wrongdoer is a spiritual almsdeed. But
almsdeeds are works of charity, as stated above ([2610]Q[32], A[1]).
Therefore fraternal correction is an act of charity.
I answer that, The correction of the wrongdoer is a remedy which should
be employed against a man's sin. Now a man's sin may be considered in
two ways, first as being harmful to the sinner, secondly as conducing
to the harm of others, by hurting or scandalizing them, or by being
detrimental to the common good, the justice of which is disturbed by
that man's sin.
Consequently the correction of a wrongdoer is twofold, one which
applies a remedy to the sin considered as an evil of the sinner
himself. This is fraternal correction properly so called, which is
directed to the amendment of the sinner. Now to do away with anyone's
evil is the same as to procure his good: and to procure a person's good
is an act of charity, whereby we wish and do our friend well.
Consequently fraternal correction also is an act of charity, because
thereby we drive out our brother's evil, viz. sin, the removal of which
pertains to charity rather than the removal of an external loss, or of
a bodily injury, in so much as the contrary good of virtue is more akin
to charity than the good of the body or of external things. Therefore
fraternal correction is an act of charity rather than the healing of a
bodily infirmity, or the relieving of an external bodily need. There is
another correction which applies a remedy to the sin of the wrongdoer,
considered as hurtful to others, and especially to the common good.
This correction is an act of justice, whose concern it is to safeguard
the rectitude of justice between one man and another.
Reply to Objection 1: This gloss speaks of the second correction which
is an act of justice. Or if it speaks of the first correction, then it
takes justice as denoting a general virtue, as we shall state further
on ([2611]Q[58] , A[5]), in which sense again all "sin is iniquity" (1
Jn. 3:4), through being contrary to justice.
Reply to Objection 2: According to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 12),
prudence regulates whatever is directed to the end, about which things
counsel and choice are concerned. Nevertheless when, guided by
prudence, we perform some action aright which is directed to the end of
some virtue, such as temperance or fortitude, that action belongs
chiefly to the virtue to whose end it is directed. Since, then, the
admonition which is given in fraternal correction is directed to the
removal of a brother's sin, which removal pertains to charity, it is
evident that this admonition is chiefly an act of charity, which virtue
commands it, so to speak, but secondarily an act of prudence, which
executes and directs the action.
Reply to Objection 3: Fraternal correction is not opposed to
forbearance with the weak, on the contrary it results from it. For a
man bears with a sinner, in so far as he is not disturbed against him,
and retains his goodwill towards him: the result being that he strives
to make him do better.
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Whether fraternal correction is a matter of precept?
Objection 1: It would seem that fraternal correction is not a matter of
precept. For nothing impossible is a matter of precept, according to
the saying of Jerome [*Pelagius, Expos. Symb. ad Damas]: "Accursed be
he who says that God has commanded any. thing impossible. " Now it is
written (Eccles. 7:14): "Consider the works of God, that no man can
correct whom He hath despised. " Therefore fraternal correction is not a
matter of precept.
Objection 2: Further, all the precepts of the Divine Law are reduced to
the precepts of the Decalogue. But fraternal correction does not come
under any precept of the Decalogue. Therefore it is not a matter of
precept.
Objection 3: Further, the omission of a Divine precept is a mortal sin,
which has no place in a holy man. Yet holy and spiritual men are found
to omit fraternal correction: since Augustine says (De Civ. Dei i, 9):
"Not only those of low degree, but also those of high position, refrain
from reproving others, moved by a guilty cupidity, not by the claims of
charity. " Therefore fraternal correction is not a matter of precept.
Objection 4: Further, whatever is a matter of precept is something due.
If, therefore, fraternal correction is a matter of precept, it is due
to our brethren that we correct them when they sin. Now when a man owes
anyone a material due, such as the payment of a sum of money, he must
not be content that his creditor come to him, but he should seek him
out, that he may pay him his due. Hence we should have to go seeking
for those who need correction, in order that we might correct them;
which appears to be inconvenient, both on account of the great number
of sinners, for whose correction one man could not suffice, and because
religious would have to leave the cloister in order to reprove men,
which would be unbecoming. Therefore fraternal correction is not a
matter of precept.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Verb. Dom. xvi, 4): "You become
worse than the sinner if you fail to correct him. " But this would not
be so unless, by this neglect, one omitted to observe some precept.
Therefore fraternal correction is a matter of precept.
I answer that, Fraternal correction is a matter of precept. We must
observe, however, that while the negative precepts of the Law forbid
sinful acts, the positive precepts inculcate acts of virtue. Now sinful
acts are evil in themselves, and cannot become good, no matter how, or
when, or where, they are done, because of their very nature they are
connected with an evil end, as stated in Ethic. ii, 6: wherefore
negative precepts bind always and for all times. On the other hand,
acts of virtue must not be done anyhow, but by observing the due
circumstances, which are requisite in order that an act be virtuous;
namely, that it be done where, when, and how it ought to be done. And
since the disposition of whatever is directed to the end depends on the
formal aspect of the end, the chief of these circumstances of a
virtuous act is this aspect of the end, which in this case is the good
of virtue. If therefore such a circumstance be omitted from a virtuous
act, as entirely takes away the good of virtue, such an act is contrary
to a precept. If, however, the circumstance omitted from a virtuous act
be such as not to destroy the virtue altogether, though it does not
perfectly attain the good of virtue, it is not against a precept. Hence
the Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 9) says that if we depart but little from
the mean, it is not contrary to the virtue, whereas if we depart much
from the mean virtue is destroyed in its act. Now fraternal correction
is directed to a brother's amendment: so that it is a matter of
precept, in so far as it is necessary for that end, but not so as we
have to correct our erring brother at all places and times.
Reply to Objection 1: In all good deeds man's action is not efficacious
without the Divine assistance: and yet man must do what is in his
power. Hence Augustine says (De Correp. et Gratia xv): "Since we ignore
who is predestined and who is not, charity should so guide our
feelings, that we wish all to be saved. " Consequently we ought to do
our brethren the kindness of correcting them, with the hope of God's
help.
Reply to Objection 2: As stated above ([2612]Q[32], A[5], ad 4), all
the precepts about rendering service to our neighbor are reduced to the
precept about the honor due to parents.
Reply to Objection 3: Fraternal correction may be omitted in three
ways.
First, meritoriously, when out of charity one omits to correct someone.
For Augustine says (De Civ. Dei i, 9): "If a man refrains from chiding
and reproving wrongdoers, because he awaits a suitable time for so
doing, or because he fears lest, if he does so, they may become worse,
or hinder, oppress, or turn away from the faith, others who are weak
and need to be instructed in a life of goodness and virtue, this does
not seem to result from covetousness, but to be counselled by charity. "
Secondly, fraternal correction may be omitted in such a way that one
commits a mortal sin, namely, "when" (as he says in the same passage)
"one fears what people may think, or lest one may suffer grievous pain
or death; provided, however, that the mind is so dominated by such
things, that it gives them the preference to fraternal charity. " This
would seem to be the case when a man reckons that he might probably
withdraw some wrongdoer from sin, and yet omits to do so, through fear
or covetousness.
Thirdly, such an omission is a venial sin, when through fear or
covetousness, a man is loth to correct his brother's faults, and yet
not to such a degree, that if he saw clearly that he could withdraw him
from sin, he would still forbear from so doing, through fear or
covetousness, because in his own mind he prefers fraternal charity to
these things. It is in this way that holy men sometimes omit to correct
wrongdoers.
Reply to Objection 4: We are bound to pay that which is due to some
fixed and certain person, whether it be a material or a spiritual good,
without waiting for him to come to us, but by taking proper steps to
find him. Wherefore just as he that owes money to a creditor should
seek him, when the time comes, so as to pay him what he owes, so he
that has spiritual charge of some person is bound to seek him out, in
order to reprove him for a sin. On the other hand, we are not bound to
seek someone on whom to bestow such favors as are due, not to any
certain person, but to all our neighbors in general, whether those
favors be material or spiritual goods, but it suffices that we bestow
them when the opportunity occurs; because, as Augustine says (De Doctr.
Christ. i, 28), we must look upon this as a matter of chance. For this
reason he says (De Verb. Dom. xvi, 1) that "Our Lord warns us not to be
listless in regard of one another's sins: not indeed by being on the
lookout for something to denounce, but by correcting what we see": else
we should become spies on the lives of others, which is against the
saying of Prov. 24:19: "Lie not in wait, nor seek after wickedness in
the house of the just, nor spoil his rest. " It is evident from this
that there is no need for religious to leave their cloister in order to
rebuke evil-doers.
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Whether fraternal correction belongs only to prelates?
Objection 1: It would seem that fraternal correction belongs to
prelates alone. For Jerome [*Origen, Hom. vii in Joan. ] says: "Let
priests endeavor to fulfil this saying of the Gospel: 'If thy brother
sin against thee,'" etc. Now prelates having charge of others were
usually designated under the name of priests. Therefore it seems that
fraternal correction belongs to prelates alone.
Objection 2: Further, fraternal correction is a spiritual alms.
not to give alms in order to receive a spiritual effect.
Objection 3: Further, to multiply the cause is to multiply the effect.
If therefore corporal almsdeeds cause a spiritual effect, the greater
the alms, the greater the spiritual profit, which is contrary to what
we read (Lk. 21:3) of the widow who cast two brass mites into the
treasury, and in Our Lord's own words "cast in more than . . . all. "
Therefore bodily almsdeeds have no spiritual effect.
On the contrary, It is written (Ecclus. 17:18): "The alms of a man . .
. shall preserve the grace of a man as the apple of the eye. "
I answer that, Corporal almsdeeds may be considered in three ways.
First, with regard to their substance, and in this way they have merely
a corporal effect, inasmuch as they supply our neighbor's corporal
needs. Secondly, they may be considered with regard to their cause, in
so far as a man gives a corporal alms out of love for God and his
neighbor, and in this respect they bring forth a spiritual fruit,
according to Ecclus. 29:13, 14: "Lose thy money for thy brother . . .
place thy treasure in the commandments of the Most High, and it shall
bring thee more profit than gold. "
Thirdly, with regard to the effect, and in this way again, they have a
spiritual fruit, inasmuch as our neighbor, who is succored by a
corporal alms, is moved to pray for his benefactor; wherefore the above
text goes on (Ecclus. 29:15): "Shut up alms in the heart of the poor,
and it shall obtain help for thee from all evil. "
Reply to Objection 1: This argument considers corporal almsdeeds as to
their substance.
Reply to Objection 2: He who gives an alms does rot intend to buy a
spiritual thing with a corporal thing, for he knows that spiritual
things infinitely surpass corporal things, but he intends to merit a
spiritual fruit through the love of charity.
Reply to Objection 3: The widow who gave less in quantity, gave more in
proportion; and thus we gather that the fervor of her charity, whence
corporal almsdeeds derive their spiritual efficacy, was greater.
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Whether almsgiving is a matter of precept?
Objection 1: It would seem that almsgiving is not a matter of precept.
For the counsels are distinct from the precepts. Now almsgiving is a
matter of counsel, according to Dan. 4:24: "Let my counsel be
acceptable to the King; [Vulg. : 'to thee, and'] redeem thou thy sins
with alms. " Therefore almsgiving is not a matter of precept.
Objection 2: Further, it is lawful for everyone to use and to keep what
is his own. Yet by keeping it he will not give alms. Therefore it is
lawful not to give alms: and consequently almsgiving is not a matter of
precept.
Objection 3: Further, whatever is a matter of precept binds the
transgressor at some time or other under pain of mortal sin, because
positive precepts are binding for some fixed time. Therefore, if
almsgiving were a matter of precept, it would be possible to point to
some fixed time when a man would commit a mortal sin unless he gave an
alms. But it does not appear how this can be so, because it can always
be deemed probable that the person in need can be relieved in some
other way, and that what we would spend in almsgiving might be needful
to ourselves either now or in some future time. Therefore it seems that
almsgiving is not a matter of precept.
Objection 4: Further, every commandment is reducible to the precepts of
the Decalogue. But these precepts contain no reference to almsgiving.
Therefore almsgiving is not a matter of precept.
On the contrary, No man is punished eternally for omitting to do what
is not a matter of precept. But some are punished eternally for
omitting to give alms, as is clear from Mat. 25:41-43. Therefore
almsgiving is a matter of precept.
I answer that, As love of our neighbor is a matter of precept, whatever
is a necessary condition to the love of our neighbor is a matter of
precept also. Now the love of our neighbor requires that not only
should we be our neighbor's well-wishers, but also his well-doers,
according to 1 Jn. 3:18: "Let us not love in word, nor in tongue, but
in deed, and in truth. " And in order to be a person's well-wisher and
well-doer, we ought to succor his needs: this is done by almsgiving.
Therefore almsgiving is a matter of precept.
Since, however, precepts are about acts of virtue, it follows that all
almsgiving must be a matter of precept, in so far as it is necessary to
virtue, namely, in so far as it is demanded by right reason. Now right
reason demands that we should take into consideration something on the
part of the giver, and something on the part of the recipient. On the
part of the giver, it must be noted that he should give of his surplus,
according to Lk. 11:41: "That which remaineth, give alms. " This surplus
is to be taken in reference not only to himself, so as to denote what
is unnecessary to the individual, but also in reference to those of
whom he has charge (in which case we have the expression "necessary to
the person" [*The official necessities of a person in position] taking
the word "person" as expressive of dignity). Because each one must
first of all look after himself and then after those over whom he has
charge, and afterwards with what remains relieve the needs of others.
Thus nature first, by its nutritive power, takes what it requires for
the upkeep of one's own body, and afterwards yields the residue for the
formation of another by the power of generation.
On the part of the recipient it is requisite that he should be in need,
else there would be no reason for giving him alms: yet since it is not
possible for one individual to relieve the needs of all, we are not
bound to relieve all who are in need, but only those who could not be
succored if we not did succor them. For in such cases the words of
Ambrose apply, "Feed him that dies of hunger: if thou hast not fed him,
thou hast slain him" [*Cf. Canon Pasce, dist. lxxxvi, whence the words,
as quoted, are taken]. Accordingly we are bound to give alms of our
surplus, as also to give alms to one whose need is extreme: otherwise
almsgiving, like any other greater good, is a matter of counsel.
Reply to Objection 1: Daniel spoke to a king who was not subject to
God's Law, wherefore such things as were prescribed by the Law which he
did not profess, had to be counselled to him. Or he may have been
speaking in reference to a case in which almsgiving was not a matter of
precept.
Reply to Objection 2: The temporal goods which God grants us, are ours
as to the ownership, but as to the use of them, they belong not to us
alone but also to such others as we are able to succor out of what we
have over and above our needs. Hence Basil says [*Hom. super Luc. xii,
18]: "If you acknowledge them," viz. your temporal goods, "as coming
from God, is He unjust because He apportions them unequally? Why are
you rich while another is poor, unless it be that you may have the
merit of a good stewardship, and he the reward of patience? It is the
hungry man's bread that you withhold, the naked man's cloak that you
have stored away, the shoe of the barefoot that you have left to rot,
the money of the needy that you have buried underground: and so you
injure as many as you might help. " Ambrose expresses himself in the
same way.
Reply to Objection 3: There is a time when we sin mortally if we omit
to give alms; on the part of the recipient when we see that his need is
evident and urgent, and that he is not likely to be succored
otherwise---on the part of the giver, when he has superfluous goods,
which he does not need for the time being, as far as he can judge with
probability. Nor need he consider every case that may possibly occur in
the future, for this would be to think about the morrow, which Our Lord
forbade us to do (Mat. 6:34), but he should judge what is superfluous
and what necessary, according as things probably and generally occur.
Reply to Objection 4: All succor given to our neighbor is reduced to
the precept about honoring our parents. For thus does the Apostle
interpret it (1 Tim. 4:8) where he says: "Dutifulness* [Douay:
'Godliness'] is profitable to all things, having promise of the life
that now is, and of that which is to come," and he says this because
the precept about honoring our parents contains the promise, "that thou
mayest be longlived upon the land" (Ex. 20:12): and dutifulness
comprises all kinds of almsgiving. [*"Pietas," whence our English word
"Piety. " Cf. also inf. [2607] Q[101], A[2]. ]
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Whether one ought to give alms out of what one needs?
Objection 1: It would seem that one ought not to give alms out of what
one needs. For the order of charity should be observed not only as
regards the effect of our benefactions but also as regards our interior
affections. Now it is a sin to contravene the order of charity, because
this order is a matter of precept. Since, then, the order of charity
requires that a man should love himself more than his neighbor, it
seems that he would sin if he deprived himself of what he needed, in
order to succor his neighbor.
Objection 2: Further, whoever gives away what he needs himself,
squanders his own substance, and that is to be a prodigal, according to
the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 1). But no sinful deed should be done.
Therefore we should not give alms out of what we need.
Objection 3: Further, the Apostle says (1 Tim. 5:8): "If any man have
not care of his own, and especially of those of his house, he hath
denied the faith, and is worse than an infidel. " Now if a man gives of
what he needs for himself or for his charge, he seems to detract from
the care he should have for himself or his charge. Therefore it seems
that whoever gives alms from what he needs, sins gravely.
On the contrary, Our Lord said (Mat. 19:21): "If thou wilt be perfect,
go, sell what thou hast, and give to the poor. " Now he that gives all
he has to the poor, gives not only what he needs not, but also what he
needs. Therefore a man may give alms out of what he needs.
I answer that, A thing is necessary in two ways: first, because without
it something is impossible, and it is altogether wrong to give alms out
of what is necessary to us in this sense; for instance, if a man found
himself in the presence of a case of urgency, and had merely sufficient
to support himself and his children, or others under his charge, he
would be throwing away his life and that of others if he were to give
away in alms, what was then necessary to him. Yet I say this without
prejudice to such a case as might happen, supposing that by depriving
himself of necessaries a man might help a great personage, and a
support of the Church or State, since it would be a praiseworthy act to
endanger one's life and the lives of those who are under our charge for
the delivery of such a person, since the common good is to be preferred
to one's own.
Secondly, a thing is said to be necessary, if a man cannot without it
live in keeping with his social station, as regards either himself or
those of whom he has charge. The "necessary" considered thus is not an
invariable quantity, for one might add much more to a man's property,
and yet not go beyond what he needs in this way, or one might take much
from him, and he would still have sufficient for the decencies of life
in keeping with his own position. Accordingly it is good to give alms
of this kind of "necessary"; and it is a matter not of precept but of
counsel. Yet it would be inordinate to deprive oneself of one's own, in
order to give to others to such an extent that the residue would be
insufficient for one to live in keeping with one's station and the
ordinary occurrences of life: for no man ought to live unbecomingly.
There are, however, three exceptions to the above rule. The first is
when a man changes his state of life, for instance, by entering
religion, for then he gives away all his possessions for Christ's sake,
and does the deed of perfection by transferring himself to another
state. Secondly, when that which he deprives himself of, though it be
required for the decencies of life, can nevertheless easily be
recovered, so that he does not suffer extreme inconvenience. Thirdly,
when he is in presence of extreme indigence in an individual, or great
need on the part of the common weal. For in such cases it would seem
praiseworthy to forego the requirements of one's station, in order to
provide for a greater need.
The objections may be easily solved from what has been said.
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Whether one may give alms out of ill-gotten goods?
Objection 1: It would seem that one may give alms out of ill-gotten
goods. For it is written (Lk. 16:9): "Make unto you friends of the
mammon of iniquity. " Now mammon signifies riches. Therefore it is
lawful to make unto oneself spiritual friends by giving alms out of
ill-gotten riches.
Objection 2: Further, all filthy lucre seems to be ill-gotten. But the
profits from whoredom are filthy lucre; wherefore it was forbidden (Dt.
23:18) to offer therefrom sacrifices or oblations to God: "Thou shalt
not offer the hire of a strumpet . . . in the house of . . . thy God. "
In like manner gains from games of chance are ill-gotten, for, as the
Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 1), "we take such like gains from our
friends to whom we ought rather to give. " And most of all are the
profits from simony ill-gotten, since thereby the Holy Ghost is
wronged. Nevertheless out of such gains it is lawful to give alms.
Therefore one may give alms out of ill-gotten goods.
Objection 3: Further, greater evils should be avoided more than lesser
evils. Now it is less sinful to keep back another's property than to
commit murder, of which a man is guilty if he fails to succor one who
is in extreme need, as appears from the words of Ambrose who says (Cf.
Canon Pasce dist. lxxxvi, whence the words, as quoted, are taken):
"Feed him that dies of hunger, if thou hast not fed him, thou hast
slain him". Therefore, in certain cases, it is lawful to give alms of
ill-gotten goods.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Verb. Dom. xxxv, 2): "Give alms
from your just labors. For you will not bribe Christ your judge, not to
hear you with the poor whom you rob . . . Give not alms from interest
and usury: I speak to the faithful to whom we dispense the Body of
Christ. "
I answer that, A thing may be ill-gotten in three ways. In the first
place a thing is ill-gotten if it be due to the person from whom it is
gotten, and may not be kept by the person who has obtained possession
of it; as in the case of rapine, theft and usury, and of such things a
man may not give alms since he is bound to restore them.
Secondly, a thing is ill-gotten, when he that has it may not keep it,
and yet he may not return it to the person from whom he received it,
because he received it unjustly, while the latter gave it unjustly.
This happens in simony, wherein both giver and receiver contravene the
justice of the Divine Law, so that restitution is to be made not to the
giver, but by giving alms. The same applies to all similar cases of
illegal giving and receiving.
Thirdly, a thing is ill-gotten, not because the taking was unlawful,
but because it is the outcome of something unlawful, as in the case of
a woman's profits from whoredom. This is filthy lucre properly so
called, because the practice of whoredom is filthy and against the Law
of God, yet the woman does not act unjustly or unlawfully in taking the
money. Consequently it is lawful to keep and to give in alms what is
thus acquired by an unlawful action.
Reply to Objection 1: As Augustine says (De Verb. Dom. 2), "Some have
misunderstood this saying of Our Lord, so as to take another's property
and give thereof to the poor, thinking that they are fulfilling the
commandment by so doing. This interpretation must be amended. Yet all
riches are called riches of iniquity, as stated in De Quaest. Ev. ii,
34, because "riches are not unjust save for those who are themselves
unjust, and put all their trust in them. Or, according to Ambrose in
his commentary on Lk. 16:9, "Make unto yourselves friends," etc. , "He
calls mammon unjust, because it draws our affections by the various
allurements of wealth. " Or, because "among the many ancestors whose
property you inherit, there is one who took the property of others
unjustly, although you know nothing about it," as Basil says in a
homily (Hom. super Luc. A, 5). Or, all riches are styled riches "of
iniquity," i. e. , of "inequality," because they are not distributed
equally among all, one being in need, and another in affluence.
Reply to Objection 2: We have already explained how alms may be given
out of the profits of whoredom. Yet sacrifices and oblations were not
made therefrom at the altar, both on account of the scandal, and
through reverence for sacred things. It is also lawful to give alms out
of the profits of simony, because they are not due to him who paid,
indeed he deserves to lose them. But as to the profits from games of
chance, there would seem to be something unlawful as being contrary to
the Divine Law, when a man wins from one who cannot alienate his
property, such as minors, lunatics and so forth, or when a man, with
the desire of making money out of another man, entices him to play, and
wins from him by cheating. In these cases he is bound to restitution,
and consequently cannot give away his gains in alms. Then again there
would seem to be something unlawful as being against the positive civil
law, which altogether forbids any such profits. Since, however, a civil
law does not bind all, but only those who are subject to that law, and
moreover may be abrogated through desuetude, it follows that all such
as are bound by these laws are bound to make restitution of such gains,
unless perchance the contrary custom prevail, or unless a man win from
one who enticed him to play, in which case he is not bound to
restitution, because the loser does not deserve to be paid back: and
yet he cannot lawfully keep what he has won, so long as that positive
law is in force, wherefore in this case he ought to give it away in
alms.
Reply to Objection 3: All things are common property in a case of
extreme necessity. Hence one who is in such dire straits may take
another's goods in order to succor himself, if he can find no one who
is willing to give him something. For the same reason a man may retain
what belongs to another, and give alms thereof; or even take something
if there be no other way of succoring the one who is in need. If
however this be possible without danger, he must ask the owner's
consent, and then succor the poor man who is in extreme necessity.
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Whether one who is under another's power can give alms?
Objection 1: It would seem that one who is under another's power can
give alms. For religious are under the power of their prelates to whom
they have vowed obedience. Now if it were unlawful for them to give
alms, they would lose by entering the state of religion, for as Ambrose
[*The quotation is from the works of Ambrosiaster. Cf. Index to
ecclesiastical authorities quoted by St. Thomas] says on 1 Tim. 4:8:
"'Dutifulness [Douay: 'godliness'] is profitable to all things': The
sum total of the Christian religion consists in doing one's duty by
all," and the most creditable way of doing this is to give alms.
Therefore those who are in another's power can give alms.
Objection 2: Further, a wife is under her husband's power (Gn. 3:16).
But a wife can give alms since she is her husband's partner; hence it
is related of the Blessed Lucy that she gave alms without the knowledge
of her betrothed [*"Sponsus" The matrimonial institutions of the Romans
were so entirely different from ours that "sponsus" is no longer
accurately rendered either "husband" or "betrothed. "] Therefore a
person is not prevented from giving alms, by being under another's
power.
Objection 3: Further, the subjection of children to their parents is
founded on nature, wherefore the Apostle says (Eph. 6:1): "Children,
obey your parents in the Lord. " But, apparently, children may give alms
out of their parents' property. For it is their own, since they are the
heirs; wherefore, since they can employ it for some bodily use, it
seems that much more can they use it in giving alms so as to profit
their souls. Therefore those who are under another's power can give
alms.
Objection 4: Further, servants are under their master's power,
according to Titus 2:9: "Exhort servants to be obedient to their
masters. " Now they may lawfully do anything that will profit their
masters: and this would be especially the case if they gave alms for
them.
Therefore those who are under another's power can give alms.
On the contrary, Alms should not be given out of another's property;
and each one should give alms out of the just profit of his own labor
as Augustine says (De Verb. Dom. xxxv, 2). Now if those who are subject
to anyone were to give alms, this would be out of another's property.
Therefore those who are under another's power cannot give alms.
I answer that, Anyone who is under another's power must, as such, be
ruled in accordance with the power of his superior: for the natural
order demands that the inferior should be ruled according to its
superior. Therefore in those matters in which the inferior is subject
to his superior, his ministrations must be subject to the superior's
permission.
Accordingly he that is under another's power must not give alms of
anything in respect of which he is subject to that other, except in so
far as he has been commissioned by his superior. But if he has
something in respect of which he is not under the power of his
superior, he is no longer subject to another in its regard, being
independent in respect of that particular thing, and he can give alms
therefrom.
Reply to Objection 1: If a monk be dispensed through being commissioned
by his superior, he can give alms from the property of his monaster, in
accordance with the terms of his commission; but if he has no such
dispensation, since he has nothing of his own, he cannot give alms
without his abbot's permission either express or presumed for some
probable reason: except in a case of extreme necessity, when it would
be lawful for him to commit a theft in order to give an alms. Nor does
it follow that he is worse off than before, because, as stated in De
Eccles. Dogm. lxxi, "it is a good thing to give one's property to the
poor little by little, but it is better still to give all at once in
order to follow Christ, and being freed from care, to be needy with
Christ. "
Reply to Objection 2: A wife, who has other property besides her dowry
which is for the support of the burdens of marriage, whether that
property be gained by her own industry or by any other lawful means,
can give alms, out of that property, without asking her husband's
permission: yet such alms should be moderate, lest through giving too
much she impoverish her husband. Otherwise she ought not to give alms
without the express or presumed consent of her husband, except in cases
of necessity as stated, in the case of a monk, in the preceding Reply.
For though the wife be her husband's equal in the marriage act, yet in
matters of housekeeping, the head of the woman is the man, as the
Apostle says (1 Cor. 11:3). As regards Blessed Lucy, she had a
betrothed, not a husband, wherefore she could give alms with her
mother's consent.
Reply to Objection 3: What belongs to the children belongs also to the
father: wherefore the child cannot give alms, except in such small
quantity that one may presume the father to be willing: unless,
perchance, the father authorize his child to dispose of any particular
property. The same applies to servants. Hence the Reply to the Fourth
Objection is clear.
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Whether one ought to give alms to those rather who are more closely united
to us?
Objection 1: It would seem that one ought not to give alms to those
rather who are more closely united to us. For it is written (Ecclus.
12:4, 6): "Give to the merciful and uphold not the sinner . . . Do good
to the humble and give not to the ungodly. " Now it happens sometimes
that those who are closely united to us are sinful and ungodly.
Therefore we ought not to give alms to them in preference to others.
Objection 2: Further, alms should be given that we may receive an
eternal reward in return, according to Mat. 6:18: "And thy Father Who
seeth in secret, will repay thee. " Now the eternal reward is gained
chiefly by the alms which are given to the saints, according to Lk.
16:9: "Make unto you friends of the mammon of iniquity, that when you
shall fail, they may receive you into everlasting dwellings, which
passage Augustine expounds (De Verb. Dom. xxxv, 1): "Who shall have
everlasting dwellings unless the saints of God? And who are they that
shall be received by them into their dwellings, if not those who succor
them in their needs? Therefore alms should be given to the more holy
persons rather than to those who are more closely united to us.
Objection 3: Further, man is more closely united to himself. But a man
cannot give himself an alms. Therefore it seems that we are not bound
to give alms to those who are most closely united to us.
On the contrary, The Apostle says (1 Tim. 5:8): "If any man have not
care of his own, and especially of those of his house, he hath denied
the faith, and is worse than an infidel. "
I answer that, As Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 28), "it falls
to us by lot, as it were, to have to look to the welfare of those who
are more closely united to us. " Nevertheless in this matter we must
employ discretion, according to the various degrees of connection,
holiness and utility. For we ought to give alms to one who is much
holier and in greater want, and to one who is more useful to the common
weal, rather than to one who is more closely united to us, especially
if the latter be not very closely united, and has no special claim on
our care then and there, and who is not in very urgent need.
Reply to Objection 1: We ought not to help a sinner as such, that is by
encouraging him to sin, but as man, that is by supporting his nature.
Reply to Objection 2: Almsdeeds deserve on two counts to receive an
eternal reward. First because they are rooted in charity, and in this
respect an almsdeed is meritorious in so far as it observes the order
of charity, which requires that, other things being equal, we should,
in preference, help those who are more closely connected with us.
Wherefore Ambrose says (De Officiis i, 30): "It is with commendable
liberality that you forget not your kindred, if you know them to be in
need, for it is better that you should yourself help your own family,
who would be ashamed to beg help from others. " Secondly, almsdeeds
deserve to be rewarded eternally, through the merit of the recipient,
who prays for the giver, and it is in this sense that Augustine is
speaking.
Reply to Objection 3: Since almsdeeds are works of mercy, just as a man
does not, properly speaking, pity himself, but only by a kind of
comparison, as stated above ([2608]Q[30], AA[1],2), so too, properly
speaking, no man gives himself an alms, unless he act in another's
person; thus when a man is appointed to distribute alms, he can take
something for himself, if he be in want, on the same ground as when he
gives to others.
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Whether alms should be given in abundance?
Objection 1: It would seem that alms should not be given in abundance.
For we ought to give alms to those chiefly who are most closely
connected with us. But we ought not to give to them in such a way that
they are likely to become richer thereby, as Ambrose says (De Officiis
i, 30). Therefore neither should we give abundantly to others.
Objection 2: Further, Ambrose says (De Officiis i, 30): "We should not
lavish our wealth on others all at once, we should dole it out by
degrees. " But to give abundantly is to give lavishly. Therefore alms
should not be given in abundance.
Objection 3: Further, the Apostle says (2 Cor. 8:13): "Not that others
should be eased," i. e. should live on you without working themselves,
"and you burthened," i. e. impoverished. But this would be the result if
alms were given in abundance. Therefore we ought not to give alms
abundantly.
On the contrary, It is written (Tob. 4:93): "If thou have much, give
abundantly. "
I answer that, Alms may be considered abundant in relation either to
the giver, or to the recipient: in relation to the giver, when that
which a man gives is great as compared with his means. To give thus is
praiseworthy, wherefore Our Lord (Lk. 21:3,4) commended the widow
because "of her want, she cast in all the living that she had. "
Nevertheless those conditions must be observed which were laid down
when we spoke of giving alms out of one's necessary goods [2609](A[9]).
On the part of the recipient, an alms may be abundant in two ways;
first, by relieving his need sufficiently, and in this sense it is
praiseworthy to give alms: secondly, by relieving his need more than
sufficiently; this is not praiseworthy, and it would be better to give
to several that are in need, wherefore the Apostle says (1 Cor. 13:3):
"If I should distribute . . . to feed the poor," on which words a gloss
comments: "Thus we are warned to be careful in giving alms, and to
give, not to one only, but to many, that we may profit many. "
Reply to Objection 1: This argument considers abundance of alms as
exceeding the needs of the recipient.
Reply to Objection 2: The passage quoted considers abundance of alms on
the part of the giver; but the sense is that God does not wish a man to
lavish all his wealth at once, except when he changes his state of
life, wherefore he goes on to say: "Except we imitate Eliseus who slew
his oxen and fed the poor with what he had, so that no household cares
might keep him back" (3 Kings 19:21).
Reply to Objection 3: In the passage quoted the words, "not that others
should be eased or refreshed," refer to that abundance of alms which
surpasses the need of the recipient, to whom one should give alms not
that he may have an easy life, but that he may have relief.
Nevertheless we must bring discretion to bear on the matter, on account
of the various conditions of men, some of whom are more daintily
nurtured, and need finer food and clothing. Hence Ambrose says (De
Officiis i, 30): "When you give an alms to a man, you should take into
consideration his age and his weakness; and sometimes the shame which
proclaims his good birth; and again that perhaps he has fallen from
riches to indigence through no fault of his own. "
With regard to the words that follow, "and you burdened," they refer to
abundance on the part of the giver. Yet, as a gloss says on the same
passage, "he says this, not because it would be better to give in
abundance, but because he fears for the weak, and he admonishes them so
to give that they lack not for themselves. "
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OF FRATERNAL CORRECTION (EIGHT ARTICLES)
We must now consider Fraternal Correction, under which head there are
eight points of inquiry:
(1) Whether fraternal correction is an act of charity?
(2) Whether it is a matter of precept?
(3) Whether this precept binds all, or only superiors?
(4) Whether this precept binds the subject to correct his superior?
(5) Whether a sinner may correct anyone?
(6) Whether one ought to correct a person who becomes worse through
being corrected?
(7) Whether secret correction should precede denouncement?
(8) Whether witnesses should be called before denouncement?
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Whether fraternal correction is an act of charity?
Objection 1: It would seem that fraternal correction is not an act of
charity. For a gloss on Mat. 18:15, "If thy brother shall offend
against thee," says that "a man should reprove his brother out of zeal
for justice. " But justice is a distinct virtue from charity. Therefore
fraternal correction is an act, not of charity, but of justice.
Objection 2: Further, fraternal correction is given by secret
admonition. Now admonition is a kind of counsel, which is an act of
prudence, for a prudent man is one who is of good counsel (Ethic. vi,
5). Therefore fraternal correction is an act, not of charity, but of
prudence.
Objection 3: Further, contrary acts do not belong to the same virtue.
Now it is an act of charity to bear with a sinner, according to Gal.
6:2: "Bear ye one another's burdens, and so you shall fulfil the law of
Christ," which is the law of charity. Therefore it seems that the
correction of a sinning brother, which is contrary to bearing with him,
is not an act of charity.
On the contrary, To correct the wrongdoer is a spiritual almsdeed. But
almsdeeds are works of charity, as stated above ([2610]Q[32], A[1]).
Therefore fraternal correction is an act of charity.
I answer that, The correction of the wrongdoer is a remedy which should
be employed against a man's sin. Now a man's sin may be considered in
two ways, first as being harmful to the sinner, secondly as conducing
to the harm of others, by hurting or scandalizing them, or by being
detrimental to the common good, the justice of which is disturbed by
that man's sin.
Consequently the correction of a wrongdoer is twofold, one which
applies a remedy to the sin considered as an evil of the sinner
himself. This is fraternal correction properly so called, which is
directed to the amendment of the sinner. Now to do away with anyone's
evil is the same as to procure his good: and to procure a person's good
is an act of charity, whereby we wish and do our friend well.
Consequently fraternal correction also is an act of charity, because
thereby we drive out our brother's evil, viz. sin, the removal of which
pertains to charity rather than the removal of an external loss, or of
a bodily injury, in so much as the contrary good of virtue is more akin
to charity than the good of the body or of external things. Therefore
fraternal correction is an act of charity rather than the healing of a
bodily infirmity, or the relieving of an external bodily need. There is
another correction which applies a remedy to the sin of the wrongdoer,
considered as hurtful to others, and especially to the common good.
This correction is an act of justice, whose concern it is to safeguard
the rectitude of justice between one man and another.
Reply to Objection 1: This gloss speaks of the second correction which
is an act of justice. Or if it speaks of the first correction, then it
takes justice as denoting a general virtue, as we shall state further
on ([2611]Q[58] , A[5]), in which sense again all "sin is iniquity" (1
Jn. 3:4), through being contrary to justice.
Reply to Objection 2: According to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 12),
prudence regulates whatever is directed to the end, about which things
counsel and choice are concerned. Nevertheless when, guided by
prudence, we perform some action aright which is directed to the end of
some virtue, such as temperance or fortitude, that action belongs
chiefly to the virtue to whose end it is directed. Since, then, the
admonition which is given in fraternal correction is directed to the
removal of a brother's sin, which removal pertains to charity, it is
evident that this admonition is chiefly an act of charity, which virtue
commands it, so to speak, but secondarily an act of prudence, which
executes and directs the action.
Reply to Objection 3: Fraternal correction is not opposed to
forbearance with the weak, on the contrary it results from it. For a
man bears with a sinner, in so far as he is not disturbed against him,
and retains his goodwill towards him: the result being that he strives
to make him do better.
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Whether fraternal correction is a matter of precept?
Objection 1: It would seem that fraternal correction is not a matter of
precept. For nothing impossible is a matter of precept, according to
the saying of Jerome [*Pelagius, Expos. Symb. ad Damas]: "Accursed be
he who says that God has commanded any. thing impossible. " Now it is
written (Eccles. 7:14): "Consider the works of God, that no man can
correct whom He hath despised. " Therefore fraternal correction is not a
matter of precept.
Objection 2: Further, all the precepts of the Divine Law are reduced to
the precepts of the Decalogue. But fraternal correction does not come
under any precept of the Decalogue. Therefore it is not a matter of
precept.
Objection 3: Further, the omission of a Divine precept is a mortal sin,
which has no place in a holy man. Yet holy and spiritual men are found
to omit fraternal correction: since Augustine says (De Civ. Dei i, 9):
"Not only those of low degree, but also those of high position, refrain
from reproving others, moved by a guilty cupidity, not by the claims of
charity. " Therefore fraternal correction is not a matter of precept.
Objection 4: Further, whatever is a matter of precept is something due.
If, therefore, fraternal correction is a matter of precept, it is due
to our brethren that we correct them when they sin. Now when a man owes
anyone a material due, such as the payment of a sum of money, he must
not be content that his creditor come to him, but he should seek him
out, that he may pay him his due. Hence we should have to go seeking
for those who need correction, in order that we might correct them;
which appears to be inconvenient, both on account of the great number
of sinners, for whose correction one man could not suffice, and because
religious would have to leave the cloister in order to reprove men,
which would be unbecoming. Therefore fraternal correction is not a
matter of precept.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Verb. Dom. xvi, 4): "You become
worse than the sinner if you fail to correct him. " But this would not
be so unless, by this neglect, one omitted to observe some precept.
Therefore fraternal correction is a matter of precept.
I answer that, Fraternal correction is a matter of precept. We must
observe, however, that while the negative precepts of the Law forbid
sinful acts, the positive precepts inculcate acts of virtue. Now sinful
acts are evil in themselves, and cannot become good, no matter how, or
when, or where, they are done, because of their very nature they are
connected with an evil end, as stated in Ethic. ii, 6: wherefore
negative precepts bind always and for all times. On the other hand,
acts of virtue must not be done anyhow, but by observing the due
circumstances, which are requisite in order that an act be virtuous;
namely, that it be done where, when, and how it ought to be done. And
since the disposition of whatever is directed to the end depends on the
formal aspect of the end, the chief of these circumstances of a
virtuous act is this aspect of the end, which in this case is the good
of virtue. If therefore such a circumstance be omitted from a virtuous
act, as entirely takes away the good of virtue, such an act is contrary
to a precept. If, however, the circumstance omitted from a virtuous act
be such as not to destroy the virtue altogether, though it does not
perfectly attain the good of virtue, it is not against a precept. Hence
the Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 9) says that if we depart but little from
the mean, it is not contrary to the virtue, whereas if we depart much
from the mean virtue is destroyed in its act. Now fraternal correction
is directed to a brother's amendment: so that it is a matter of
precept, in so far as it is necessary for that end, but not so as we
have to correct our erring brother at all places and times.
Reply to Objection 1: In all good deeds man's action is not efficacious
without the Divine assistance: and yet man must do what is in his
power. Hence Augustine says (De Correp. et Gratia xv): "Since we ignore
who is predestined and who is not, charity should so guide our
feelings, that we wish all to be saved. " Consequently we ought to do
our brethren the kindness of correcting them, with the hope of God's
help.
Reply to Objection 2: As stated above ([2612]Q[32], A[5], ad 4), all
the precepts about rendering service to our neighbor are reduced to the
precept about the honor due to parents.
Reply to Objection 3: Fraternal correction may be omitted in three
ways.
First, meritoriously, when out of charity one omits to correct someone.
For Augustine says (De Civ. Dei i, 9): "If a man refrains from chiding
and reproving wrongdoers, because he awaits a suitable time for so
doing, or because he fears lest, if he does so, they may become worse,
or hinder, oppress, or turn away from the faith, others who are weak
and need to be instructed in a life of goodness and virtue, this does
not seem to result from covetousness, but to be counselled by charity. "
Secondly, fraternal correction may be omitted in such a way that one
commits a mortal sin, namely, "when" (as he says in the same passage)
"one fears what people may think, or lest one may suffer grievous pain
or death; provided, however, that the mind is so dominated by such
things, that it gives them the preference to fraternal charity. " This
would seem to be the case when a man reckons that he might probably
withdraw some wrongdoer from sin, and yet omits to do so, through fear
or covetousness.
Thirdly, such an omission is a venial sin, when through fear or
covetousness, a man is loth to correct his brother's faults, and yet
not to such a degree, that if he saw clearly that he could withdraw him
from sin, he would still forbear from so doing, through fear or
covetousness, because in his own mind he prefers fraternal charity to
these things. It is in this way that holy men sometimes omit to correct
wrongdoers.
Reply to Objection 4: We are bound to pay that which is due to some
fixed and certain person, whether it be a material or a spiritual good,
without waiting for him to come to us, but by taking proper steps to
find him. Wherefore just as he that owes money to a creditor should
seek him, when the time comes, so as to pay him what he owes, so he
that has spiritual charge of some person is bound to seek him out, in
order to reprove him for a sin. On the other hand, we are not bound to
seek someone on whom to bestow such favors as are due, not to any
certain person, but to all our neighbors in general, whether those
favors be material or spiritual goods, but it suffices that we bestow
them when the opportunity occurs; because, as Augustine says (De Doctr.
Christ. i, 28), we must look upon this as a matter of chance. For this
reason he says (De Verb. Dom. xvi, 1) that "Our Lord warns us not to be
listless in regard of one another's sins: not indeed by being on the
lookout for something to denounce, but by correcting what we see": else
we should become spies on the lives of others, which is against the
saying of Prov. 24:19: "Lie not in wait, nor seek after wickedness in
the house of the just, nor spoil his rest. " It is evident from this
that there is no need for religious to leave their cloister in order to
rebuke evil-doers.
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Whether fraternal correction belongs only to prelates?
Objection 1: It would seem that fraternal correction belongs to
prelates alone. For Jerome [*Origen, Hom. vii in Joan. ] says: "Let
priests endeavor to fulfil this saying of the Gospel: 'If thy brother
sin against thee,'" etc. Now prelates having charge of others were
usually designated under the name of priests. Therefore it seems that
fraternal correction belongs to prelates alone.
Objection 2: Further, fraternal correction is a spiritual alms.
